On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:
An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
unnatural definition of a word?
We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings.
Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
meant not constructing one at all?
A good example; he was right and you were wrong.
Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
'not construct'.
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily something which requires getting the diggers out.
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:
An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
unnatural definition of a word?
We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>
Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
meant not constructing one at all?
A good example; he was right and you were wrong.
Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
'not construct'.
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily
something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
No question about it when 'original' just meant 'new' as in the UK
Copyright Act.
On 17 Oct 2023 at 13:52:13 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>
On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:
An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
unnatural definition of a word?
We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>>
Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track' >>>>>> meant not constructing one at all?
A good example; he was right and you were wrong.
Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
'not construct'.
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>> something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
I suggest you go back and look at the Auriol Gray thread, all several hundred posts of it. And probably a similar number in unnm.
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily
something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
On 2023-10-17, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 13:52:13 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote: >>
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>
On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:
An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
unnatural definition of a word?
We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in >>>>>>> certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>>>
Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track' >>>>>>> meant not constructing one at all?
A good example; he was right and you were wrong.
Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means >>>>> 'not construct'.
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
I suggest you go back and look at the Auriol Gray thread, all several hundred
posts of it. And probably a similar number in unnm.
For the record, I'm sure Mark is right on this one, but you're making
me start to regret my curiosity as to why.
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:52:13 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>> something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to >>involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
No, it's in case law. Which, of course, Norman only accepts when the judges agree with him.
On 17 Oct 2023 at 15:45:36 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:
On 2023-10-17, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 13:52:13 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote: >>>
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:
An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
unnatural definition of a word?
We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in >>>>>>>> certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>>>>
Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track' >>>>>>>> meant not constructing one at all?
A good example; he was right and you were wrong.
Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means >>>>>> 'not construct'.
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
I suggest you go back and look at the Auriol Gray thread, all several hundred
posts of it. And probably a similar number in unnm.
For the record, I'm sure Mark is right on this one, but you're making
me start to regret my curiosity as to why.
I'm sure his right too; but if we start talking about we will be swamped by hecklers. And the discussion didn't change any minds last time.
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:30:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
On 17/10/2023 11:13, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:39:44 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>> On 16/10/2023 20:56, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 18:29:55 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
If it's worth copying it's worthy of protection is how it should be, at >>>>>> least for a limited period. How much simpler than reinventing the wheel >>>>>> or trying to work out how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. >>>>>Copyright has never been based on that, either in the UK or anywhere in the
world. Why are you proposing such a radical change?
It's the philosophy that underlies intellectual property rights
generally,
No, it isn't. It really isn't. The philosophy which underlies intellectual >>> property rights generally is the principle that authors (and, subsequently, >>> other creators) should have an incentive to create more.
What incentive? It's not money.
Yes, it is. The original point of copyright (or what later became copyright) was to incentivise the creation of original works to create more works, by giving their creators a sole right to financially exploit those works.
I suggest you spend some time looking at the history of copyright. You might find it educational.
and the UK Copyright Act as enacted makes a pretty good stab
at it. But only when it is enforceable as written, as was Parliament's >>>> intention.
How do you know what Parliament's intention was?
From the words it uses of course. If it had any other intention it
would have used different words.
And how do you interpret those words?
What was your role in helping to draft the legislation?
That's a very silly question.
Well, of course, the answer to it is "absolutely none at all".
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:
An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
unnatural definition of a word?
We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings.
Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
meant not constructing one at all?
A good example; he was right and you were wrong.
Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
'not construct'.
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily something which requires getting the diggers out.
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:26:12 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
On 17/10/2023 11:10, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:11:51 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>> On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be >>>> the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary >>>> but obscure and unnatural.
On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:
Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the >>>>>>> legislation?
The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable,
consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.
Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable? >>>>
I asked you, in the bit you decided to delete:
"What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of >>>> 'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?"
I'll answer that question after you've answered mine. I note that you
skipped over that, previously.
But I have. What do you think the sentence just above your reply means?
It means you didn't answer my questions. Here they are again, separated into two lines:
Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in
the OED?
Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the legislation?
On 17 Oct 2023 at 12:53:55 BST, "Mark Goodge" <usenet@listmail.good-stuff.co.uk> wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:
An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
unnatural definition of a word?
We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>
Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
meant not constructing one at all?
A good example; he was right and you were wrong.
Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
'not construct'.
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily
something which requires getting the diggers out.
Mark
No doubt one of the "unnatural" definitions of "construct"!
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
unnatural definition of a word?
We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>
Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
meant not constructing one at all?
A good example; he was right and you were wrong.
Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
'not construct'.
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily
something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 18:29:55 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...
decisions
On 16/10/2023 17:12, Tim Jackson wrote:
Something I hadn't previously considered is that while CJEU
require "intellectual creation" as part of the test for originality, it
is a uniform test.
So in some respects, e.g. for sculptures and works of artistic
craftsmanship, this might actually *lower* the UK's previous
requirements:
"This judgment has opened a potential can of worms for UK
copyright. Under the current CDPA, certain types of copyright
work have other requirements in addition to originality in
order to acquire copyright protection."
Indeed. Copyright law is in a right muddle due in no small part to
European judges meddling in things they don't understand but feel they
should control, and it desperately needs root and branch reform.
A good illustration of what a mess it's in is actually over sculptures
and what various judges have felt constrained, variously, to hold them
to be. See for example this excellent review:
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/law/yorklawreview/vol1/COOMBS%20YLR%20SPRING%202020%20V1%20FINAL.pdf
This is the Star Wars Stormtrooper helmet case referred to in the
Bristow's article I quoted above, where they say the CJEU Cofemel
decision opened a can of worms for UK copyright.
However, that Stormtrooper muddle was not caused by European law. It
was entirely caused by domestic UK law. The only reference in the case
to European law was a question about whether the English courts should
have been hearing it at all.
The reason it's a can of worms is because it forces a rethink of the
previous UK muddle. Had the English court applied the uniform CJEU
test, "author's own intellectual creation", the muddle would have been eliminated. It would have lowered the test for copyright in
Stormtrooper helmets, so that it only required the author's own
intellectual creation, not the higher muddled UK standard.
On 2023-10-17, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 13:52:13 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote: >>
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>
On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:
An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
unnatural definition of a word?
We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in >>>>>>> certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>>>
Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track' >>>>>>> meant not constructing one at all?
A good example; he was right and you were wrong.
Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means >>>>> 'not construct'.
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
I suggest you go back and look at the Auriol Gray thread, all several hundred
posts of it. And probably a similar number in unnm.
For the record, I'm sure Mark is right on this one, but you're making
me start to regret my curiosity as to why.
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:52:13 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>> something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
No, it's in case law. Which, of course, Norman only accepts when the judges agree with him.
On 17/10/2023 12:56, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:26:12 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
On 17/10/2023 11:10, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:11:51 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>> On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be >>>>> the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary >>>>> but obscure and unnatural.
On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:
Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the >>>>>>>> legislation?
The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable, >>>>>>> consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.
Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable? >>>>>
I asked you, in the bit you decided to delete:
"What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of >>>>> 'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?"
I'll answer that question after you've answered mine. I note that you
skipped over that, previously.
But I have. What do you think the sentence just above your reply means?
It means you didn't answer my questions. Here they are again, separated into >> two lines:
Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in >> the OED?
Nope
On 17/10/2023 12:59, Mark Goodge wrote:
I suggest you spend some time looking at the history of copyright. You might >> find it educational.
I doubt it.
On 17/10/2023 16:38, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:52:13 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote: >>
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
No, it's in case law. Which, of course, Norman only accepts when the judges >> agree with him.
Please cite it.
On 17/10/2023 16:38, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:52:13 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote: >>
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
No, it's in case law. Which, of course, Norman only accepts when the judges >> agree with him.
Please cite it.
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 16:49:14 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
On 17/10/2023 16:38, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:52:13 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:
On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:
Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.
Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?
No, it's in case law. Which, of course, Norman only accepts when the judges >>> agree with him.
Please cite it.
It was mentioned in the thread previously referred to. If you really want
the precise cite, you can look it up just as easily as I can.
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 15:04:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
On 17/10/2023 12:56, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:26:12 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>
On 17/10/2023 11:10, Mark Goodge wrote:It means you didn't answer my questions. Here they are again, separated into
On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:11:51 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be >>>>>> the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary >>>>>> but obscure and unnatural.
On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:
Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the >>>>>>>>> legislation?
The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable, >>>>>>>> consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.
Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable? >>>>>>
I asked you, in the bit you decided to delete:
"What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of >>>>>> 'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?"
I'll answer that question after you've answered mine. I note that you >>>>> skipped over that, previously.
But I have. What do you think the sentence just above your reply means? >>>
two lines:
Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in
the OED?
Nope
Fine, I'll accept your admission that you're unable to answer my points.
Not quite. It is clear cut absolutely yours if the image was taken by an employee *directly* employed by you.
However, if you hire a professional photographer then the image
copyright remains with them or the company that they work for by default unless you agree otherwise in advance (or later buy out the copyright).
It makes no difference who owns the copyright provided that you only use
the image for the purpose it was taken. It only becomes a big issue if
the image has significant commercial value and you sell it elsewhere.
(such images are rare but not incredibly so)
Same applies to wedding photographers although most people are unaware -
they retain the image copyright even though you commissioned the work.
On 16/10/2023 22:36, Fredxx wrote:
On 16/10/2023 19:10, Norman Wells wrote:
Why are you concerned just with cases that go to appeal? The lower
courts have to decide such things too where necessary.
I can see where your going wrong. Where a case does go to an upper
court then precedents are made from those interpretation and meaning
of words.
No, that's 'binding' precedents. All court decisions are precedents,
but the lower courts' decisions are not binding so they don't have to be followed. Nevertheless, it's not a free-for-all with all the lower
courts reinventing the wheel and deciding the same point willy-nilly and however they want if it comes before them. They will consider the
decisions in similar level courts and will attempt to reconcile their
own decisions with those of other courts however they can.
Sometimes those definitions change and don't follow your dictionary
definitions.
Then, in the words of Lord Simmons I've referred to previously, it is:
"a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise
of interpretation".
The lower courts generally follow those cases and often form part of
the argument in the lower court.
Binding precedents have to be followed. It's what the term means.
Hopefully you can see that blindly following dictionary definitions
isn't always very helpful when it comes to case law. Assuming you
understand the importance of case law?
The literal rule of Statutory interpretation is well established and has
to be followed.
Judges are not free to amend the law by changing theclear intention of Parliament expressed in the words it used.
On 09/10/2023 23:03, Simon Parker wrote:
On 09/10/2023 14:05, Norman Wells wrote:
I don't think that's a definition of 'original' either. Not
according to any of the dictionaries I've seen anyway.
Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean,
mean what they say, and only be altered by legislators. Don't you?
You are repeating the mistake you frequently make.
This is uk.legal.moderated. Alt.English.Usage is over there ----->.
There's no mistake.
Laws are written in language to be understood, not
as a starting point for successive iterations like the game of changing
BLACK into WHITE in six easy steps, which is what has happened.
It's a fundamental principle of legal construction in the UK that laws
mean what they say in the ordinary English in which they are expressed.
They're supposed to tell people what they must not do, you see, without having to guess that they might some way down the line mean something
else entirely or even the opposite.
The word 'original' is that which is used in the UK legislation. It properly falls to be interpreted as that word is ordinarily used in the English language, for which the definitive works are what are called dictionaries.
It follows that, if the meaning of the word is in any doubt,
dictionaries will have to be consulted.
And if you do that you find
what is obvious anyway to anyone who speaks the language that it means essentially 'the first one', and that's all.
You will look in vain for any definition that refers to 'own
intellectual creation' which in any case has seemingly had to be derived
from 'originality' rather than 'original' which is the word used in the legislation. It's a bit of a giveaway that misinterpretation is at hand.
"The author's own intellectual creation" is a legal phrase which Tim
kindly placed in quotes, I believe, to indicate such.
You could do worse than obtain no more than the briefest understanding
of "The Infopaq Case" (Ed: do you see what I've done with that phrase
there?) [1] to clarify matters for you which will, it is hoped, assist
you in understanding where you have misdirected yourself.
Once you have grasped the point that "the author's own intellectual
creation" applies to all Berne Convention "works" under the European
acquis, then I would recommend moving on to SAS v World Programming in
which the courts helpfully explicated the "intellectual creation" test
thus:
"The essence of the term is that the person in question has exercised
expressive and creative choices in producing the work. The more
restricted the choices, the less likely it is that the product will be
the intellectual creation (or the expression of the intellectual
creation) of the person who produced it."
I trust this assists you in coming to a better, more accurate
understanding of the matter.
The Berne Convention actually says that 'the expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary,
scientific and artistic domain'.
There is no reference there either to 'own intellectual creation'. It
is 'every production'.
In your opinion. And if you were a senior judge that had been asked toAs always, I'm happy to help where I can but have been busy of late
and haven't been posting as much as I would have liked.
I am of course aware how the case law has developed. What you don't
seem able to comprehend is what a wrong path it has followed. 'Original'
no longer means what it says. And that's a fundamental misinterpretation.
On 10/10/2023 08:48, Norman Wells wrote:
On 09/10/2023 23:03, Simon Parker wrote:
On 09/10/2023 14:05, Norman Wells wrote:
I don't think that's a definition of 'original' either. Not
according to any of the dictionaries I've seen anyway.
Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean,
mean what they say, and only be altered by legislators. Don't you?
You are repeating the mistake you frequently make.
This is uk.legal.moderated. Alt.English.Usage is over there ----->.
There's no mistake.
I'll confidently wager that you will repeat the mistake at least once
more before the end of this post...
Laws are written in language to be understood, not as a starting point
for successive iterations like the game of changing BLACK into WHITE
in six easy steps, which is what has happened.
In your opinion. Which isn't always correct; rather it is frequently mistaken.
It's a fundamental principle of legal construction in the UK that laws
mean what they say in the ordinary English in which they are expressed.
I invite you to quote section 72 of the Highway Act 1835 - a piece of legislation we considered here in ULM recently and then tell me where in
the UK you were, precisely, when you overheard "ordinary English" being expressed in the manner used in that legislation.
As this more than ably demonstrates, language changes. If it didn't, no
new dictionaries would have been produced since 1835.
They're supposed to tell people what they must not do, you see,
without having to guess that they might some way down the line mean
something else entirely or even the opposite.
The UK operates a common law system meaning the courts can develop the
law when a court of record clarifies the law thereby setting a precedent
for other courts to follow or apply in later cases.
The system neither asks for nor needs your agreement. It has been
working fine for centuries. If you don't like that system, you need to consider moving elsewhere as I am not aware of any plans to change it regardless of which government is in power.
The word 'original' is that which is used in the UK legislation. It
properly falls to be interpreted as that word is ordinarily used in
the English language, for which the definitive works are what are
called dictionaries.
And there's the mistake right there. That is not the test applied when determining the meaning of legislation, as has been explained to you
numerous times by multiple posters, myself included.
I've quoted them before but here are the words of paragraph 11-01 from 'Bennion on Statutory Interpretation', (8th edition (2020)).
<quote>
i) The primary indication of legislative intention is the legislative
text, read in context;
ii) Parliament is assumed to be a rational, reasonable and informed legislature pursuing a clear purpose in a coherent and principled
manner;
and
iii) The rules, principles, presumptions and canons which govern
statutory interpretation are aids to construing the legislative text.
<end quote>
Please point to the part where it says that dictionaries, and only dictionaries, must be used when determining legislative intention.
It follows that, if the meaning of the word is in any doubt,
dictionaries will have to be consulted.
It doesn't follow, at all. In case you missed it first time around
("the first time" in this post - it has been quoted several times previously), "The rules, principles, presumptions and canons which
govern statutory interpretation are aids to construing the legislative
text."
Rules - plural, not just the one, the literal rule, which you insist
must be used in all situations and at all times - are only part of the decision making arsenal at the disposal of the judges. There are "principles, presumptions and canons" too. But even then, such things
are merely "aids to construing the legislative text."
In short, the literal rule isn't a rule at all, it is an aid and by no
means the only one or even the most important one.
Unless you are going to claim that Bennion's is wrong?
You're not going to claim that, are you?
And if you do that you find what is obvious anyway to anyone who
speaks the language that it means essentially 'the first one', and
that's all.
You will look in vain for any definition that refers to 'own
intellectual creation' which in any case has seemingly had to be
derived from 'originality' rather than 'original' which is the word
used in the legislation. It's a bit of a giveaway that
misinterpretation is at hand.
I'm not a judge. I don't get to determine legislative intention.
So I
don't need to look, therefore your suggestion that I will be looking in
vain is mistaken.
The meaning of the phrase at issue has already been clarified in law.
"Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote in message news:kpq2mjFsi0tU3@mid.individual.net...
On 24/10/2023 12:07, Simon Parker wrote:
We are a common law jurisdiction. Judges are well within their
capabilities and rights to clarify the law with case law.
Clarify, not change.
But if it isn't going to change anything, then what exactly
is the point of clarification ?
On 17/10/2023 09:39, Norman Wells wrote:
On 16/10/2023 22:36, Fredxx wrote:
On 16/10/2023 19:10, Norman Wells wrote:
Why are you concerned just with cases that go to appeal? The lower
courts have to decide such things too where necessary.
I can see where your going wrong. Where a case does go to an upper
court then precedents are made from those interpretation and meaning
of words.
No, that's 'binding' precedents. All court decisions are precedents,
"All court decisions are precedents", you say?
"*All* court decisions"?
I have to assume you were absent when the hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of precedent was being discussed at law school as neither the Magistrates' Court nor the County Court have the power to set precedent
nor can they overrule precedent set in previous cases.
but the lower courts' decisions are not binding so they don't have to
be followed. Nevertheless, it's not a free-for-all with all the lower
courts reinventing the wheel and deciding the same point willy-nilly
and however they want if it comes before them. They will consider the
decisions in similar level courts and will attempt to reconcile their
own decisions with those of other courts however they can.
Sometimes those definitions change and don't follow your dictionary
definitions.
Then, in the words of Lord Simmons I've referred to previously, it is:
"a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin
disguise of interpretation".
Be that as it may, your understanding of Statutory Interpretation
remains mistaken.
Perhaps it will help if I provide two sample cases and post selected
snippets from the judgments to enable you to see how the process works,
so you can see that it is nothing like you think it is. (Free clue: in neither case is a dictionary consulted.)
The first case is Regina v Secretary of State for Health (Respondent) ex parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) (Appellant) [2003]
UKHL 13 [1]
The decision before the court was, as Lord Bingham of Cornhill explained
in paragraph [1] of the judgment:
"1. The issues in this appeal are whether live human embryos created by
cell nuclear replacement (CNR) fall outside the regulatory scope of the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and whether licensing the creation of such embryos is prohibited by section 3(3)(d) of that Act."
In short, the case would turn on the precise meaning of word "embryo".
You believe that they need merely lookup the word "embryo" in a
dictionary, determine whether or not the CNR process creates something
that meets that definition and the judgment will follow therefrom.
But let us look at what they actually did.
For background, the appellant, acting on behalf of the pressure group Pro-Life, argued before the House of Lords that because CNR was a new
process it was not covered by the 1990 Act and therefore the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority did not have the authority under
the Act to licence research involving CNR. It pointed out
that in s1 of the Act an embryo regulated by the Act is defined as 'a
live human embryo where fertilisation is complete' and that CNR does not involve a process of fertilisation.
It should be noted, before continuing, that the House of Lords applied
the purposive approach to interpreting the Act and explained why they
had done so.
Selected text from the judgment with paragraph numbers shown:
LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL
8. The basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to
the true meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed. But that is not to say that attention should be confined and
a literal interpretation given to the particular provisions which give
rise to difficulty.
Such an approach not only encourages immense
prolixity in drafting
"Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense,
are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of
interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else.
The literal rule of Statutory interpretation is well established and
has to be followed.
Oh no it doesn't.
Judges are not free to amend the law by changing theclear intention of Parliament expressed in the words it used.
We are a common law jurisdiction. Judges are well within their
capabilities and rights to clarify the law with case law.
On 24/10/2023 12:07, Simon Parker wrote:
On 17/10/2023 09:39, Norman Wells wrote:
On 16/10/2023 22:36, Fredxx wrote:
On 16/10/2023 19:10, Norman Wells wrote:
Why are you concerned just with cases that go to appeal? The lower
courts have to decide such things too where necessary.
I can see where your going wrong. Where a case does go to an upper
court then precedents are made from those interpretation and meaning
of words.
No, that's 'binding' precedents. All court decisions are precedents,
"All court decisions are precedents", you say?
"*All* court decisions"?
Yes, of course. The word precedent simply means coming before.
I have to assume you were absent when the hierarchy of courts and the
doctrine of precedent was being discussed at law school as neither the
Magistrates' Court nor the County Court have the power to set precedent
nor can they overrule precedent set in previous cases.
You're confusing 'precedents' with 'binding precedents'. Not all
precedents are binding, only those from higher courts, but they are precedents nevertheless.
Even the Supreme Court, ie the highest court in the land that isn't
bound by anything, 'relies on precedents — that is, earlier laws or decisions that provide some example or rule to guide them in the case
they're actually deciding'.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/precedent#:~:text=A%20precedent%20is%20something%20that,case%20they're%20actually%20deciding.
but the lower courts' decisions are not binding so they don't have to
be followed. Nevertheless, it's not a free-for-all with all the lower
courts reinventing the wheel and deciding the same point willy-nilly
and however they want if it comes before them. They will consider the
decisions in similar level courts and will attempt to reconcile their
own decisions with those of other courts however they can.
Sometimes those definitions change and don't follow your dictionary
definitions.
Then, in the words of Lord Simmons I've referred to previously, it is:
"a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin
disguise of interpretation".
Be that as it may, your understanding of Statutory Interpretation
remains mistaken.
Absolutely not.
Perhaps it will help if I provide two sample cases and post selected
snippets from the judgments to enable you to see how the process works,
so you can see that it is nothing like you think it is. (Free clue: in
neither case is a dictionary consulted.)
The first case is Regina v Secretary of State for Health (Respondent) ex
parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) (Appellant) [2003]
UKHL 13 [1]
The decision before the court was, as Lord Bingham of Cornhill explained
in paragraph [1] of the judgment:
"1. The issues in this appeal are whether live human embryos created by
cell nuclear replacement (CNR) fall outside the regulatory scope of the
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and whether licensing the
creation of such embryos is prohibited by section 3(3)(d) of that Act."
In short, the case would turn on the precise meaning of word "embryo".
You believe that they need merely lookup the word "embryo" in a
dictionary, determine whether or not the CNR process creates something
that meets that definition and the judgment will follow therefrom.
No, the Act can be its own dictionary, and it goes to the trouble of
defining what it means by 'embryo' in its very first Section.
There is no need or justification to look elsewhere. If an Act said
'the term hippopotamus as used herein means a red telephone' then it
means what it says regardless of any external sources.
But let us look at what they actually did.
For background, the appellant, acting on behalf of the pressure group
Pro-Life, argued before the House of Lords that because CNR was a new
process it was not covered by the 1990 Act and therefore the Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority did not have the authority under
the Act to licence research involving CNR. It pointed out
that in s1 of the Act an embryo regulated by the Act is defined as 'a
live human embryo where fertilisation is complete' and that CNR does not
involve a process of fertilisation.
Well, that's got nothing to do with the definition of 'embryo' at all
but rather with the factual matter of whether fertilisation had taken
place. That's not a matter of interpretation at all.
On 24/10/2023 12:07, Simon Parker wrote:
We are a common law jurisdiction. Judges are well within their
capabilities and rights to clarify the law with case law.
Clarify, not change.
On 24/10/2023 23:57, billy bookcase wrote:
"Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote in message
news:kpq2mjFsi0tU3@mid.individual.net...
On 24/10/2023 12:07, Simon Parker wrote:
We are a common law jurisdiction. Judges are well within their
capabilities and rights to clarify the law with case law.
Clarify, not change.
But if it isn't going to change anything, then what exactly
is the point of clarification ?
To clarify, obviously. For the avoidance of doubt.
"Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote in message news:kps2uaFascfU1@mid.individual.net...
On 24/10/2023 23:57, billy bookcase wrote:
"Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote in message
news:kpq2mjFsi0tU3@mid.individual.net...
On 24/10/2023 12:07, Simon Parker wrote:
We are a common law jurisdiction. Judges are well within their
capabilities and rights to clarify the law with case law.
Clarify, not change.
But if it isn't going to change anything, then what exactly
is the point of clarification ?
To clarify, obviously. For the avoidance of doubt.
So there was doubt before, in the interpretion of a particular law,
which no longer exists following clarification.
And you don't regard that, as a change ?
I've said all along that where the Literal Rule produces a difficulty
you can go on to other rules of interpretation. But you can't where it doesn't.
On Tue, 24 Oct 2023 15:29:39 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...
I've said all along that where the Literal Rule produces a difficulty
you can go on to other rules of interpretation. But you can't where it
doesn't.
Prior to Brexit, it often happened that the literal rule did indeed
produce a difficulty. A literal reading of the UK words clashed with EU
law.
In that case, back in 1972 the UK Parliament had said what the courts
should do.
Quote:
"The European Communities Act 1972 was the piece of
legislation that brought the UK into the Europe Union:
**it gives EU law supremacy over UK national law.**
A large amount of EU law effective in the UK currently
relies on the 1972 Act."
https://tinyurl.com/2s7p22z9 (Institute for Government)
This is the reason why the courts often applied a purposive construction >instead of a literal one. They had been instructed by the UK Parliament
to treat EU law as supreme. So they interpreted UK laws in a way that
would achieve that purpose.
That's how the UK courts arrived at "the author's own intellectual
creation".
On Tue, 24 Oct 2023 15:29:39 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...
I've said all along that where the Literal Rule produces a difficulty
you can go on to other rules of interpretation. But you can't where it
doesn't.
Prior to Brexit, it often happened that the literal rule did indeed
produce a difficulty. A literal reading of the UK words clashed with EU
law.
In that case, back in 1972 the UK Parliament had said what the courts
should do.
Quote:
"The European Communities Act 1972 was the piece of
legislation that brought the UK into the Europe Union:
**it gives EU law supremacy over UK national law.**
A large amount of EU law effective in the UK currently
relies on the 1972 Act."
https://tinyurl.com/2s7p22z9 (Institute for Government)
This is the reason why the courts often applied a purposive construction instead of a literal one. They had been instructed by the UK Parliament
to treat EU law as supreme. So they interpreted UK laws in a way that
would achieve that purpose.
That's how the UK courts arrived at "the author's own intellectual
creation".
So what about the position after Brexit? You might think we are no
longer constrained to follow EU law. The UK parliament and Supreme
Court are free to do what they want.
Well, yes, that's right. But in many areas, they haven't yet taken
advantage of that freedom.
Meanwhile, the UK Parliament has provided that the same rules should
continue to apply after Brexit, unless and until changed.
Further quote, following on from the one above:
"The [European Communities] Act is repealed by the EU
Withdrawal Act 2018 although in reality this is more
of a 'copy and paste' act that transfers EU regulation
and law onto the UK statute book."
Pending any change, expect to hear more court decisions which apply "the author's own intellectual creation".
On Thu, 26 Oct 2023 15:08:25 +0100, Tim Jackson <news@timjackson.invalid> wrote:
On Tue, 24 Oct 2023 15:29:39 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...
I've said all along that where the Literal Rule produces a difficulty
you can go on to other rules of interpretation. But you can't where it
doesn't.
Prior to Brexit, it often happened that the literal rule did indeed
produce a difficulty. A literal reading of the UK words clashed with EU
law.
In that case, back in 1972 the UK Parliament had said what the courts
should do.
Quote:
"The European Communities Act 1972 was the piece of
legislation that brought the UK into the Europe Union:
**it gives EU law supremacy over UK national law.**
A large amount of EU law effective in the UK currently
relies on the 1972 Act."
https://tinyurl.com/2s7p22z9 (Institute for Government)
This is the reason why the courts often applied a purposive construction
instead of a literal one. They had been instructed by the UK Parliament
to treat EU law as supreme. So they interpreted UK laws in a way that
would achieve that purpose.
And, of course, the reason why the government could leave it to the courts
is because the UK (or, at least, England and Wales) has a common law jurisdiction. If we did not, then parliament would have had to painstakingly amend all of UK law which conflicted with EU law so as to remove the conflict. I'm not convinced that would have been better.
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