• 'I spent a day in Britain's (AMERICAN TOO!) asylum courts ? and found o

    From Border Czars@21:1/5 to All on Sun Apr 14 06:10:50 2024
    XPost: alt.fan.rush-limbaugh, alt.politics.immigration, sac.politics
    XPost: uk.politics.misc

    We no longer know who lives in the country, are unable to remove those
    with no right to be here and lack a plan to resolve the situation

    To the layman, this week’s story that an Afghan sex offender could be
    given refugee status because his behaviour towards women may put him at
    risk in his home country is absurd. For those used to Britain’s asylum
    system, it’s par for the course.

    After all, just a few weeks ago we heard a similar tale, when the Clapham attacker Abdul Ezedi was granted asylum despite his criminal convictions.
    As a former immigration official noted of that decision: “It’s not a
    glitch that you get sex offenders let in the third time around. It’s how
    the system is meant to work.”

    Over the last year, immigration has hardly left the headlines. Politicians nominally in control of the country have fulminated about the abuses of
    the asylum system that have seen small boat crossings surge, bringing
    29,437 people to our shores last year, and on course for a new record high
    in 2024. They’ve watched as changes to the legal migration system sent the inflow soaring to 1.2 million, and started to unwind the mistakes they
    made with dependent visas for students and care workers.

    In the last few days, focus has shifted back to the Rwanda plan. Having
    come to grief in the Supreme Court and the House of Lords, Rishi Sunak is
    now threatening to leave the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
    should the human rights court block the scheme.

    But even if the planes start taking off, there’s another problem waiting.
    While Westminster can design whatever immigration policy it likes, it
    appears increasingly unable to enforce it on the ground.

    A day in court
    The best way to understand what this means is to see it first hand.
    Immigration and asylum tribunal cases are open to the public. If you’re
    willing to set aside a few hours, you can sit in the gallery and see what Britain’s immigration system looks like in practice.

    What you may not be able to do is find out how the case is resolved.
    First-tier immigration and asylum tribunal decisions are not published.
    The only way to get access to the result is to apply directly to the
    president of the court, and hope they decide in your favour.

    The cases I saw were chosen at random, with no indication of their
    contents beyond the broad codes given in the list of hearings – HU for
    human rights claims, PA for what we would call loosely asylum cases.

    The immigration court I chose sat off a roundabout opposite a Tesco
    superstore. Outside, planes taking off and landing at Heathrow rumbled overhead. Inside, the courtrooms were quiet enough for the ticking clocks
    on the wall to be audible. Green signs in three languages warned those
    waiting their turn not to eat, smoke or drink.

    Most of the attendees sat in groups, chatting in apparent good humour. A
    few were tense and alone. A lost-looking interpreter tried to work out
    which of the courts he was meant to be attending, and staff members
    shuttled back and forth directing people to hearing rooms. They were
    polite, friendly and highly taken aback that someone had turned up to
    listen to cases. One security guard audibly swore when told by another why
    I was there.

    The first case turned out to be a tourist who had overstayed. She had come
    from India for a holiday with her husband in 2021, visiting children who
    had emigrated to the UK. Her husband had sadly died during their visit. Struggling to cope, she had been staying with their children since. Now,
    in 2024, years later with her right to stay long expired, she was fighting
    to stay permanently.

    Human rights laws appeared to present a promising avenue for her
    representative to argue that she would face significant obstacles to functioning on her own in India, and so could not be made to leave.

    To start with, she was receiving therapy for depression in the UK, and it
    was argued that mental health issues were unlikely to be as well cared for
    in India. One child gave evidence as a witness. Despite having lived in
    the UK for 18 years, they were deemed to have limited English skills, so
    the interpreter stayed to assist them. The point was hammered home that
    the woman had said she would “end her life” if made to leave.

    Other medical issues were discussed and disputed. The Home Office
    presenting officer did their best to make the case against allowing her to stay, although it was interesting to note that facts or assertions were
    rarely directly disputed. When the lawyers examined the notes entered as evidence, it was unclear in one instance whether the doctor had actually
    seen the patient, or merely written down the description given by the
    daughter. Nobody appeared to have simply checked directly with the
    surgery.

    In addition, while her family could afford to pay for a carer, and her own financial security would not be an issue, she would lack emotional
    support. Her family in India consisted of a single sister, who was old,
    and to whom she no longer talked. Not only that, but, as her
    representative reminded the court, the Home Office advised against
    travelling in the country as a lone woman. Would we really send her back
    to that?

    At this point, alarm bells should be ringing. It should not be possible to enter on a tourist visa, stay for years, and then avoid deportation by
    claiming the need to access public health services, or arguing that you
    could not possibly function in the country you’d spent your life in. Even
    the most compassionate among us would surely argue that we cannot be
    expected to take on the cost and burden of caring for the citizens of
    other countries in their old age, rather than expecting their government
    or family to fulfil their own obligations.

    Yet these tactics do seem to work; cutting people off from NHS services,
    or forcing them to return to their life as it was can be intolerable to
    our compassionate state, which instead invites them to stay. This urge sometimes leads to absurd outcomes. In one case, an illegal migrant who
    raped a woman at knifepoint avoided deportation after a tribunal found he
    would “experience genuine difficulties being able to access a regular
    supply of his necessary medications”, and be at “real risk of social
    isolation and stigmatisation”. Better, instead, to let him live in
    Britain.

    A long stay
    The second case was again picked at random; of the two due to begin when
    the first ended, it was the one that started soonest. Again, it was a straightforward case of overstaying. The appellant had been given a 14-
    month study visa, and failed to leave on time. The visa was issued in
    2007. Rather than stay for 14 months, she had stayed for 17 years.

    This hearing followed a slightly different format. The appellant’s representative laid out their case. The judge listened. The Home Office presenting officer remained silent because they weren’t there; the
    department had chosen not to send anyone to attend.

    Again, the health of the applicant was raised. They had a serious and
    extensive operation scheduled to take place on the NHS; if they were sent
    back to India, this plan of treatment would be significantly disrupted,
    even if they were able to afford it.

    In this case, the second obstacle was that deportation would constitute a
    major disruption to her married life. In the time she had stayed in the
    UK, she had married an Afghan man who had taken British citizenship. He,
    in turn, would most likely be unable to join or even visit her in India.

    After all, not only did he lack Indian citizenship, he would most likely
    be refused any application to even visit the country: in his time in the
    UK, had received a prison sentence of 11 years for a serious offence. Even
    if India decided to let him in, the British authorities would look askance
    at letting him leave: he had been released on an extremely restrictive
    licence.

    Given this, the argument went, and considering that if the appellant was
    forced to return to India, she would likely be able to return to the UK on
    a spousal visa, did her overstay really warrant the disruption removing
    her would cause? After all, the Home Office had made no effort to enforce
    her removal for 17 years, even when she had applied for (and been denied)
    the right to remain in 2013.

    Although it was possible to sympathise with this argument, it also raised
    some difficult questions. How had it been possible to stay in Britain for
    so long when the Home Office had been made explicitly aware of the
    overstay? After all, it was the length of her stay that had led to her developing the ties which were now being used to argue against ever
    removing her; had she been swiftly removed a decade ago, there would be no claim to continuity of married life, or of NHS treatment. And on that
    topic, how was it that the British taxpayer had found itself providing her healthcare?

    Welcome to the Hotel Britannia
    People come to Britain for a reason. You do not push a dinghy into the
    waters of the channel, or spend your life savings on a plane ticket to
    Heathrow for nothing. The attractions are straightforward: the world
    speaks English, work is easy to find, and if you can get into the country
    you have a good chance of staying.

    Take the asylum seekers crossing the Channel. They aren’t coming because they’ve been misled by cunning people smugglers. They’re doing it because Britain is a good place to lodge a claim. Before appeals, France accepted
    just 28 per cent of the claims it evaluated in 2022. Spain was a little
    more generous at 42 per cent. Denmark accepted 52 per cent of the 985 applications assessed.

    Britain accepted a full 76 per cent of the 23,870 claims it resolved,
    making 1,625 more grants of asylum than Austria despite processing 15,130
    fewer applications. No country with more cases resolved had a higher grant
    rate than the UK.

    Our generosity doesn’t stop there. If your claim is denied – or even if
    you have no claim at all, and simply fail to leave when your visa expires
    – you may well be able to stay. The problem with Britain’s borders, at the
    most basic level, is simple: we don’t know who’s here, and when we do,
    it’s very hard to make them leave.

    In 1998, Britain stopped checking the documents of people leaving the
    country as it was “an inefficient use of resources”. While we had some
    idea of who was coming in, we no longer knew if they were leaving. It
    would take until 2015 for exit checks to be reintroduced. By 2017, two
    years worth of data had been gathered, showing 10 million people whose
    leave to remain in the UK had expired. For 601,222 of these, there was no evidence of their departure.

    To lose one passenger might be considered careless; to lose half a million
    is farcical. Some of these people may have left the country, travelling
    through the Common Travel Area with Ireland, or using different documents,
    or simply falling through holes in the collected data; 201,301 records for people leaving the UK couldn’t be accurately matched to an inbound
    journey. But of the remainder, some will have decided to remain in the UK, living underground.

    How large this population is a matter for guesswork; in 2005, the Home
    Office believed some 430,000 people were living in Britain without the
    right to be here. No subsequent estimate has been published.

    What we do know is that the number has likely grown substantially since
    then. The last publication on exit checks, showed that 3.8 per cent of
    people who required visas to enter the UK were not recorded as leaving on
    time — a little under 92,000 people in 2019/20.

    Removals blocked
    Counting people in and out might make it easier to find those who
    overstay. But even if it did, we would still find it difficult to remove
    them. While immigration has risen to record highs, the number of people
    being removed from the country has fallen by 21,000 since 2009. Enforced removals, in particular, have plummeted. While this has been partially
    offset by a rise in voluntary removals, the overall trend is clear: the Government is finding it increasingly hard to remove those with no right
    to live in the country.

    Take failed asylum seekers. Just 41 per cent of those who made a failed
    claim for asylum between 2010 and 2020 had been removed from the UK by
    June 2022. Among their number was the Liverpool bomber Emad al Swealmeen,
    who had his asylum claim rejected in 2015. The Home Office failed to
    deport him, allowing him to mount a fresh claim in 2017, which was
    rejected in 2020. A year later, he was still in Britain, and still free to attempt his attack on a hospital.

    Part of the problem is simply one of resources. Real terms funding for
    removals fell by 11 per cent between 2015-16 and 2019-20. This year, the planned funding for immigration enforcement is just £537 million, or a
    little over 13 per cent of the £4 billion spent on supporting asylum
    seekers in the UK.

    Given the mismatch between the scale of the challenge and the resources allocated, it’s little surprise that the National Audit Office found in
    2020 that immigration enforcement teams lacked the capacity to fulfil
    their tasks; enforcement visits had fallen from 20,000 a year in 2015 to
    just over 11,000 in 2020.

    Detention capacity is also an issue. The stream of appeals and challenges
    means detention spaces are quickly filled, and there is little political appetite for dealing with this issue; attempts to impose limits on the
    right to appeal in the Rwanda Bill were rejected by the Government. If anything, the overwhelming direction of policy has been to reduce the use
    of detention further.

    In 2019, immigration minister Caroline Nokes wrote that the Government was committed to “a material reduction in the number of people detained an the length of time they spend in detention”, boasting that “by summer 2019,
    the immigration detention estate will be almost 40 per cent smaller than
    it was four years ago”, and that “95 per cent of those who are liable for removal are managed in the community”.

    This has consequences. When the Government declared in January that it had resolved the backlog of asylum cases, it turned out that 17,000 cases had
    been resolved simply because the Home Office had lost touch with the
    claimants. Of the 5,000 immigrants originally identified for removal to
    Rwanda, meanwhile, only 700 are still in regular contact with the
    government. Without resources to keep tabs on people — and ensure they
    leave when necessary — the Government is fighting a losing battle in its attempts to maintain our borders.

    Perhaps most troublesome, however, is the role of the legal system. As the National Audit Office noted, less than half of enforced returns planned in
    2019 actually took place, with late legal challenges often blocking the process.

    Rishi Sunak’s latest tilt at the ECHR is merely the latest in a long
    series of clashes between the Government and the courts. In the view of
    legal critics, judicial empire-building has slowly expanded the range of potential obstacles to deportations, making it difficult to ensure that
    flights can actually get off the ground. These delays, in turn, can
    eventually provide grounds for claims to permanent residency. It hardly
    helps, as one observer noted, that the Government appears to be extremely cautious in assessing its ability to challenge bad case law, or test the
    limits of international law.

    A system on trial
    Both of the cases we saw in court illustrated a major problem for
    immigration enforcement: when the Government is slow to remove people,
    they will tend to build up grounds for staying in the UK. The classic
    example is the asylum seeker who, when their initial application is
    denied, finds a sudden urge to join a church, finds Jesus, and with him a potential fresh claim for staying in the UK.

    The difficulties with credulous clerics accepting conversions at face
    value have been covered elsewhere; the broader problem of people building claims to stay in the UK, whether on the basis of religious persecution,
    the right to a family life, or some other combination remains. So too does
    the problem of the Home Office failing to examine stories in depth.

    It certainly does not help that, as we saw above, the Home Office does not always send a presenting officer to tribunals. The share of cases where no presenting officer attended has been above 10 per cent for five of the
    last six quarters. This can put judges in a difficult position; their job
    is to listen to and evaluate adversarial arguments, rather than to conduct inquiries of their own. When only one side is making a case in person, it
    is difficult for this system to work.

    Even when the Home Office does attend, one expert noted that it often
    lacks the staff and expertise to properly analyse cases. Immigration cases
    can be dismissed on relatively superficial grounds, even as the department fails to conduct the investigations necessary to spot outright
    fabrications.

    Take the example of a political separatist. In assessing such a case, the expert said, the Home Office would tend to rely on evaluating documents.
    If a claimant said they had been beaten in their home country, and
    presented papers from a hospital, the Home Office would scrutinise them
    for spelling errors, wrong dates, and obvious inconsistencies. What it
    would not do, said the expert, was check that the hospital actually
    existed.

    A welcoming environment
    These problems are not new. In this context, it’s little wonder that the Government hit on the idea of the hostile environment: if you can’t stop
    people from coming in, and you can’t deport them, you can at least make it
    hard for them to be here, deter future arrivals and hope they leave on
    their own. Checks on immigration status were introduced for renting
    properties and taking jobs.

    While this succeeded in creating difficult headlines for the Conservative
    party — and shifting part of the cost of border enforcement to the
    businesses and landlords who found themselves on the immigration frontline
    — evidence for its success in encouraging people to leave is thin.

    Part of this is beyond the government’s control; as one expert put it,
    “people still stick it out as it’s worth it”. The benefits of living in
    Britain are considerable, and very few will trade them in for an easier
    time with the paperwork in a much poorer country. Far better to live in a sublet apartment, working cash jobs, than to return home.

    Even so, there is low-hanging fruit for the Government to pick, should it
    so choose. As the then-immigration minister Robert Jenrick noted, the
    practice of gig economy companies allowing “unchecked account sharing”
    makes it easier for illegal working to take place. Targeting the companies enabling these practices for immigration enforcement – and levelling
    massive fines where possible – would end that rapidly.

    The NHS passport to stay
    Also ripe for reconsideration is the UK’s own system of doctors without borders. In both of the court cases we examined earlier, access to
    healthcare was presented as a major obstacle to removing the claimant from Britain.

    As things stand, the NHS is effectively open to the world. Anyone can
    register with and see a GP, regardless of immigration status. Emergency healthcare is provided without charge. Secondary care is different; in
    theory, those without the right to stay should pay for the treatment they receive. Anything considered urgent is delivered, and payment may be
    chased later.

    Even this barrier may be more permeable than it appears. As the BMA
    helpfully notes, whether treatment is urgent is “the doctor’s decision
    alone”, and consists of anything that “cannot wait until the person can be reasonably expected to leave the UK”. As the Government’s guidance sets
    out, when an illegal migrant can be expected to leave is often unclear,
    leaving room for ambiguity over what care might qualify. Hospitals, in
    turn, can choose not to pursue debts in some circumstances, while the Home Office is under no compulsion to refuse immigration applications from
    those who have accrued them.

    Destination unknown
    So even if Rishi Sunak withdraws from the ECHR, and rewrites human rights
    law in the next nine months to make Rwanda work, there are still real
    barriers to stopping the flow across the Channel, or fixing the holes in
    our borders.

    We would still be unsure who is actually living in Britain. Enforcement
    would still be underfunded and overwhelmed. Deportations would still face
    huge legal barriers, with a Home Office poorly equipped to evaluate cases.
    And the pull factors drawing people from around the world would remain.

    Yet as a depressing day in the asylum courts reveals, nobody should be satisfied with the status quo. A situation where the state is no longer
    sure who lives in Britain, is unable to remove those with no right to be
    here, and seems to lack any realistic plan for bringing the situation
    under control is not sustainable.

    https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/04/13/immigration-asylum-courts- home-office-rwanda/

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