There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 19:19:37 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 05/04/2024 18:05, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from
context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested
they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as
*the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will
only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
cycles the experiments were seeing.
I see that as a very plausible explanation. A variation I see is
related to Libet (and others) finding that brain activity before
conscious decision only applies to trivial decisions not major ones.
I'm wondering if this is the equivalent of the autopilot mode we go
into when driving, working our way through traffic and traffic lights
without even being aware of what we are doing; if, however, something significant changes, say we spot a group of children up ahead playing
with a ball, we immediately switch into fully alert mode. Perhaps in a similar sort of way, trivial decisions are made on some sort of
autopilot whereas important decisions put us into a greater state of alertness.
In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
"sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision
you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out
at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going
to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not
the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
have at the beginning of the process.
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
--
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point. Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants. Map it
into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that >>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins >>>>> that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed >>>> the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week.
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one >>>> way or the other.
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists, >>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
--
--
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*.
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function;
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the >>circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that >>there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that >>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins >>>>> that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed >>>> the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides
these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't
even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and
get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing
her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week. My wife passed no further remark
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one >>>> way or the other.
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists, >>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
--
--
Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
"And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of though"
sure, procrastination, or Hamlet-syndrome, can be
wasteful, and even dangerous - though in Hamlet's
case it also prevented him from committing suicide,
and there you'd have part of the answer.
The main problem with your analysis is that
it assumes that evolved traits come cost-free. But
that's of course not the case - they are typically messy
compromises. An influential recent book has been
Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. He differentiates
between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast,
instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower,
more deliberative, and more logical. In Neurosymbolic
AI, we try to replicate this these days on machines.
The "fast mode" works often, but we need to learn when
to switch to "slow mode". But of course we can never
be sure if, at any given point in time, we have
all the relevant information, and identify all
they implications. So "taking time off" works
often enough to counteract System 1 reasoning
to be an advantage, and prevent us from
premature decisions, even if it sometimes means
wasted effort - and when it becomes pathological,
it can of course be positively harmful and require
professional intervention.
Burkhard <b.schafer@ed.ac.uk> wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:Is rumination (overthinking) the curse of System 2 deliberation? Maybe it cannot be helped so either it’s not free will or instead free will as a catastrophizing train wreck?
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that >>>> there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
"And thus the native hue of resolution
Is sicklied o'er with the pale cast of though"
sure, procrastination, or Hamlet-syndrome, can be
wasteful, and even dangerous - though in Hamlet's
case it also prevented him from committing suicide,
and there you'd have part of the answer.
The main problem with your analysis is that
it assumes that evolved traits come cost-free. But
that's of course not the case - they are typically messy
compromises. An influential recent book has been
Thinking, Fast and Slow by Daniel Kahneman. He differentiates
between two modes of thought: "System 1" is fast,
instinctive and emotional; "System 2" is slower,
more deliberative, and more logical. In Neurosymbolic
AI, we try to replicate this these days on machines.
The "fast mode" works often, but we need to learn when
to switch to "slow mode". But of course we can never
be sure if, at any given point in time, we have
all the relevant information, and identify all
they implications. So "taking time off" works
often enough to counteract System 1 reasoning
to be an advantage, and prevent us from
premature decisions, even if it sometimes means
wasted effort - and when it becomes pathological,
it can of course be positively harmful and require
professional intervention.
Paralysis by analysis is also detrimental, but so is System 1 impulsiveness or shooting from the hip in some instances.
What is it called when System 2 deliberation is applied so many times that the result in a given circumstance becomes habit or second nature? Does it become the intuitive backgrounding of System 1?
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 20:51:09 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 06/04/2024 10:18, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 19:19:37 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 05/04/2024 18:05, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that >>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins >>>>> that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists, >>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I don't know if it's exactly the Libet experiments (I suspect so, from >>>> context) but I thought Anil Seth's "Being You" had some good points
about free will. In terms of those experiments specifically he suggested >>>> they weren't necessarily identifying a *decision* being made so much as >>>> *the brain priming for action* - and even more specifically that the
brain might have cycles going where, whichever decision is made, it will >>>> only *prompt action* at specific points in the cycle, and it's those
cycles the experiments were seeing.
I see that as a very plausible explanation. A variation I see is
related to Libet (and others) finding that brain activity before
conscious decision only applies to trivial decisions not major ones.
I'm wondering if this is the equivalent of the autopilot mode we go
into when driving, working our way through traffic and traffic lights
without even being aware of what we are doing; if, however, something
significant changes, say we spot a group of children up ahead playing
with a ball, we immediately switch into fully alert mode. Perhaps in a
similar sort of way, trivial decisions are made on some sort of
autopilot whereas important decisions put us into a greater state of
alertness.
My intuition would be that the Libet experiments (I looked them up and
I'm pretty sure they're indeed what Anil Seth was talking about in his
book) don't represent the same thing as this "autopilot" mode, depending
on how widely you're thinking of it at least. By that I mean that
decision-making is a complex system with many unconscious components
(mostly unconscious components really, and I don't mean that in a "we're
machines" way but a "elephant & the rider metaphor" way), and I don't
know if "autopilot mode" was meant to mean "any unconscious component"
or "the unconscious components involved in that phenomenon specifically"
(which is how I usually use the expression).
If it's the second meaning of the word then I don't think it's the same
phenomenon because that one I think involves complex strings of actions
being done unconsciously because our conscious attention is focused on
other things. They're trivial decisions because presumably important
decisions *would* require conscious focus, but the main thing that makes
them unconscious is that lack of focus. The very same actions could also
be done consciously (like Weingarten describes in his famous article).
The Libet experiments on the other hand don't involve that at all, as
far as I can tell the conscious attention of the participants is very
much focused on the action being studied.
I'm not all that familiar with the details of the Libet experiments
but as I understand it, the experiment basically involved participants watching a clock and making random decisions to press a button. I
can't speak for the participants but I know that I would find it very difficult to remain totally focused in what seems like a potentially
boring situation, my ever-active mind would start wandering all over
the place and every so often, the "little man at the back of my head"
would remind me that I'm supposed to be focusing on the clock. That
"little man at the back of my head" could be what was triggering the
detected activity.
Just to be clear, I'm not literally suggesting "a little man at the
back of my head", but there does seem to be some sort of monitoring
element in our minds that switches us from autopilot to full alertness
as in the example I gave of spotting the playing children when
driving.
In terms of making your mind up I think it's even more obvious that
actions can't be completely involuntary when you consider not just
"sleeping on it" (where you could figure you end up making the decision >>>> you would have made anyway, which is definitely a thing that happens)
but *gathering information*. While there are some decisions we hash out >>>> at length while finally making a decision one could argue we were going >>>> to make the whole time, there are also some where that's definitely not >>>> the case because the final decision depends on information we didn't
have at the beginning of the process.
On Mon, 8 Apr 2024 10:19:01 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 07/04/2024 17:01, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a >>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path. >>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind). >>
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
On Sun, 7 Apr 2024 12:14:12 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-07 10:25 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that >>>> there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'?
I think I've answered that in what I said below about evolution. There
is an underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural
Selection; if the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its
cost, then that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost
outweighs the benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if
cost and benefit more or less balance out, then it is really down to
chance whether or not the trait well survive. As I said already, I see considerable cost involved in this pondering in terms of brain
resources, but I don't see any benefits if the decision is determined
by external factors. Can you suggest any benefits that would outweigh
the cost?
Pre 'pondering' it is
just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the
result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
the 'pondering' among other changes.
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
First of all, I don't think that is really a relevant question - I'm
not debating this issue to make a case for free will, I'm challenging
the robustness of determinism in its own right. I certainly don't want
to fall into the trap of claiming that I can prove Theory B is right
by identifying shortcomings in Theory A, something for which I have previously criticised ID, particularly Stephen Meyer. [1]
Having said that, I don't think it is a big problem for free will as I
can see benefits for pondering in that context. If I have freedom in
making my decisions, then that means I am ultimately responsible for
those decisions and their outcome. It is obviously beneficial for me
to become as good a decision-maker as possible; pondering decisions
and all their foreseeable outcomes can help me get better at it.
FWIW, the more I read and debate this subject, the more it reminds me
of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also applies
here.
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have >>>>>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that >>>>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins >>>>>>> that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed >>>>>> the environment, so why not a different decision being determined?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a
particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides >>>>> these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later, >>>>> she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't >>>>> even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and >>>>> get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different
lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing
colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing >>>> her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me
to start papering later in the week.
You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall
standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
resist the opportunity)
LOL. I've been an avid DIY'er all my life and wallpapering is actually
one of my better skills. I'm a terrible painter, however - I can just
about manage emulsion on walls and ceilings but I am truly awful when
it comes to gloss paint! I also have to admit that turning 73 this
year, my DIY energy is rapidly declining so I have a few jobs I want
to get done this year and after that will be time for hired help :(
My wife passed no further remark
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I
think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she
said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
deterministic action.
At the risk of provoking the woke brigade, after 51 years of marriage
it seems to me that "It just happened" is as good an explanation as
any for explaining why wives change their mind :)
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the
process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision
on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the
conditions *at the time*.
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one >>>>>> way or the other.
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists, >>>>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major* >>>>>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue >>>>> in favour of determinism.
--
--
--
[1]
https://groups.google.com/g/talk.origins/c/z8Yq7lvkAfU/m/um8mt8MDAgAJ
On Mon, 8 Apr 2024 10:19:01 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 07/04/2024 17:01, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a >>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path. >>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies
about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the
decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It
doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also
very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having
made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to
the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't
something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth
between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience
as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough.
Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't,
or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give
answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second
is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just
"information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to
the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct
coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then
all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing
curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an
option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make
your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind). >>
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you
ignored.
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play.
All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors
that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
On Tue, 9 Apr 2024 09:36:07 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-09 3:40 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sun, 7 Apr 2024 12:14:12 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-07 10:25 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is >>>>>> what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the >>>>>> circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that >>>>>> there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists. >>>>>>
You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't >>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering >>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is >>>>> the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'?
I think I've answered that in what I said below about evolution. There
is an underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural
Selection; if the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its
cost, then that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost
outweighs the benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if
cost and benefit more or less balance out, then it is really down to
chance whether or not the trait well survive. As I said already, I see
considerable cost involved in this pondering in terms of brain
resources, but I don't see any benefits if the decision is determined
by external factors. Can you suggest any benefits that would outweigh
the cost?
Apparently not.
Why doesn't that same argument work for the existence of 'pondering' in
Pre 'pondering' it is
just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the
conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the >>>> result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to
the 'pondering' among other changes.
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using >>>>> our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary >>>>> demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see >>>>> any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
First of all, I don't think that is really a relevant question - I'm
not debating this issue to make a case for free will, I'm challenging
the robustness of determinism in its own right. I certainly don't want
to fall into the trap of claiming that I can prove Theory B is right
by identifying shortcomings in Theory A, something for which I have
previously criticised ID, particularly Stephen Meyer. [1]
Having said that, I don't think it is a big problem for free will as I
can see benefits for pondering in that context. If I have freedom in
making my decisions, then that means I am ultimately responsible for
those decisions and their outcome. It is obviously beneficial for me
to become as good a decision-maker as possible; pondering decisions
and all their foreseeable outcomes can help me get better at it.
a deterministic scenario?
What advantage is there in becoming a good decision maker if you
aren't making decisions?
FWIW, the more I read and debate this subject, the more it reminds meYep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also applies
here.
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because
they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
But of course for us any change of mind is always due to a well
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing.
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a >>>>>>> particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides >>>>>>> these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later, >>>>>>> she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't >>>>>>> even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and >>>>>>> get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that.
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have >>>>>>>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that >>>>>>>>> predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins >>>>>>>>> that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed >>>>>>>> the environment, so why not a different decision being determined? >>>>>>>
Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she
continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different >>>>>> lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing >>>>>> colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing >>>>>> her mind?
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things
because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied
with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two
papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in
similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me >>>>> to start papering later in the week.
You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even
with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall >>>> standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't
resist the opportunity)
LOL. I've been an avid DIY'er all my life and wallpapering is actually
one of my better skills. I'm a terrible painter, however - I can just
about manage emulsion on walls and ceilings but I am truly awful when
it comes to gloss paint! I also have to admit that turning 73 this
year, my DIY energy is rapidly declining so I have a few jobs I want
to get done this year and after that will be time for hired help :(
My wife passed no further remark
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I >>>>> think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she >>>>> said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
deterministic action.
At the risk of provoking the woke brigade, after 51 years of marriage
it seems to me that "It just happened" is as good an explanation as
any for explaining why wives change their mind :)
considered, logical decision. /s
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was
entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active
sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the >>>>> process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her
mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision >>>>> on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the >>>> conditions *at the time*.
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists, >>>>>>>>> there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major* >>>>>>>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue >>>>>>> in favour of determinism.
--
--
--
[1]
https://groups.google.com/g/talk.origins/c/z8Yq7lvkAfU/m/um8mt8MDAgAJ
--
On Tue, 9 Apr 2024 10:11:52 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-09 4:09 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Mon, 8 Apr 2024 10:19:01 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 07/04/2024 17:01, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget) >>>>> wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a >>>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't >>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering >>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path. >>>>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or >>>>>> the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up >>>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a >>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left >>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that >>>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where >>>>>> it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above >>>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was >>>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the >>>>> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how >>>>> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a >>>>> random number generator when the two options look more or less equal >>>>> but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being
processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies >>>> about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate).
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the >>>> decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It >>>> doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also >>>> very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having >>>> made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to >>>> the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical
component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't >>>> something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin
flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision
but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision. >>>>
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth >>>> between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we
consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience >>>> as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough. >>>> Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't, >>>> or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where
"feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are
slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both
"thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give >>>> answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second >>>> is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry
the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are
actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just >>>> "information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more
involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange
between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to >>>> the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new
scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct >>>> coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then >>>> all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been
processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing >>>> curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be
one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved
and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don
- where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity
just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
Let's say that the conditions at time A pre-determine the action B at
time B. That only works if time A conditions also pre=determine all the
*changes* in conditions up to time B that provide the time B conditions
that determine action B. You can't skip to the head of the line.
ISTM that your Occam's razor is getting a bit blunt.
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the
name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an >>>> option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make >>>> your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind). >>>>
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts.
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the
example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you >>>>> ignored.
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play. >>>>>> All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors >>>>>> that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice
before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions
to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs
to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
--
On Tue, 9 Apr 2024 11:29:22 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-09 10:26 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Tue, 9 Apr 2024 10:11:52 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>???
wrote:
On 2024-04-09 4:09 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Mon, 8 Apr 2024 10:19:01 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>
On 07/04/2024 17:01, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget) >>>>>>> wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in >>>>>>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a >>>>>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't >>>>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering >>>>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path. >>>>>>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or >>>>>>>> the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right, >>>>>>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up >>>>>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a >>>>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left >>>>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that >>>>>>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From >>>>>>>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination, >>>>>>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the >>>>>>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It >>>>>>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that >>>>>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where >>>>>>>> it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm, >>>>>>>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above >>>>>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was >>>>>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the >>>>>>> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for >>>>>>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of >>>>>>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how >>>>>>> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will >>>>>>> reach the same decision. One exception to that is your suggestion of a >>>>>>> random number generator when the two options look more or less equal >>>>>>> but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I think that makes some big assumptions on what information is being >>>>>> processed and how the processing actually works (and what that implies >>>>>> about how long it can take & what conditions cause it to terminate). >>>>>>
Consider the common decision-making advice of "flip a coin to make the >>>>>> decision; how do you feel about the result? You have your decision". It >>>>>> doesn't always work but I think most would agree that it can. It's also >>>>>> very analogous to the case of your wife changing her mind after having >>>>>> made the choice.
It also seems clear that this method *does* generate new information, to >>>>>> the conscious self at least. The reason to do this is that a critical >>>>>> component of a decision is *how we feel* about something, and this isn't >>>>>> something we have full conscious clarity on. New events like the coin >>>>>> flip might not add information about external aspects of the decision >>>>>> but they can add information about *us* and that can impact the decision.
Or more analytically if you imagine decision-making as a back-and-forth >>>>>> between two different information-processing mechanisms, the one we >>>>>> consciously experience as thoughts and the one we consciously experience >>>>>> as feelings, then ISTM that accounts for the phenomenon neatly enough. >>>>>> Decisions where "feelings" provide a strong answer but "thoughts" don't, >>>>>> or agree with "feelings", are easy and quickly made. Decisions where >>>>>> "feelings" give a weak answer but "thoughts" give a strong one are >>>>>> slightly slower & harder because "thoughts" are a slower & more
effortful process, but still quick enough at conscious scales.
The really long-winded or difficult decisions are those where both >>>>>> "thoughts" and "feelings" give weak or ambiguous answers, or they give >>>>>> answers that are at odds with each other (and it's possible that second >>>>>> is just a case of ambiguous "feelings" - that "feelings" always carry >>>>>> the day & situations where "thought" seems to override "feelings" are >>>>>> actually a case of "thought" identifying a contradiction between
different feelings & resolving it). What goes on with those isn't just >>>>>> "information processing", or at least the processing is a lot more >>>>>> involved than that bloodless term suggests. It's a lengthy exchange >>>>>> between the thinking brain coming up with scenarios, submitting them to >>>>>> the feeling brain for evaluation, incorporating the result into new >>>>>> scenarios & repeat until it's kicked the feeling brain into a distinct >>>>>> coherent preference.
If we collapse all of this into "an information-processing robot" then >>>>>> all it means is there never was a point of "all information has been >>>>>> processed". The sleeping on it is information processing; the choosing >>>>>> curtains then thinking better of it is information processing,
information is being processed the whole time.
What is going on in our brain whilst we are sleeping still seems to be >>>>> one of the most poorly understood aspects of human behaviour but it
seems to me that there is a hell of a lot of brain activity involved >>>>> and part of the reason for sleep is probably to allow the brain to
focus more or less exclusively on processing everything we have
experienced that day without being distracted by what is happening
now.
Again, that takes me back to the point that I have been making to Don >>>>> - where is the benefit from loading the brain with additional activity >>>>> just to process information where the decision has been
pre-determined?
Let's say that the conditions at time A pre-determine the action B at
time B. That only works if time A conditions also pre=determine all the >>>> *changes* in conditions up to time B that provide the time B conditions >>>> that determine action B. You can't skip to the head of the line.
ISTM that your Occam's razor is getting a bit blunt.
Your solution is getting too convoluted.
And in fact could keep
being processed forever, with different cognitive processes being
required to make the processing stop (for example I don't recall the >>>>>> name of the phenomenon but I'm pretty sure it's a thing that picking an >>>>>> option causes us to prefer that option more than we did before.
Presumably it says something that this phenomenon wasn't enough to make >>>>>> your wife feel good about her choice, thus justifying her change of mind).
In that case, it would have been useful for you to retort to the >>>>>>> example I gave about my wife in the second half of my post which you >>>>>>> ignored.
The same general retort will apply to most all of your retorts. >>>>>>>
An added thing to consider is where "consciousness" comes into play. >>>>>>>> All the data the robot is scanning can be processed by sub-processors >>>>>>>> that generate most of the information needed to produce a choice >>>>>>>> before the central processing algorithm distributes instructions >>>>>>>> to the subroutines that activate whatever it is the robot needs >>>>>>>> to do to locomote down a path. Fill in the blanks.
--
--
On Tue, 9 Apr 2024 11:28:11 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-09 10:24 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Tue, 9 Apr 2024 09:36:07 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>During the (present conditions determined) pause conditions change that
wrote:
On 2024-04-09 3:40 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sun, 7 Apr 2024 12:14:12 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-07 10:25 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in >>>>>>>>> deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is >>>>>>>> what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the >>>>>>>> circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists. >>>>>>>>
You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't >>>>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering >>>>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is >>>>>>> the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
Why does it have to have a 'point' or 'value'?
I think I've answered that in what I said below about evolution. There >>>>> is an underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural
Selection; if the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its >>>>> cost, then that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost
outweighs the benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if
cost and benefit more or less balance out, then it is really down to >>>>> chance whether or not the trait well survive. As I said already, I see >>>>> considerable cost involved in this pondering in terms of brain
resources, but I don't see any benefits if the decision is determined >>>>> by external factors. Can you suggest any benefits that would outweigh >>>>> the cost?
cause (determined) better decisions.
Apparently not.Are you becoming a better decision maker (non-deterministic) or are
Why doesn't that same argument work for the existence of 'pondering' in >>>> a deterministic scenario?
Pre 'pondering' it is
just the determined results (one of which is the pondering) of the >>>>>> conditions at that time. Post 'pondering' the determined action is the >>>>>> result of conditions at *that* time which includes any changes due to >>>>>> the 'pondering' among other changes.
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision >>>>>>> can often distract us from other important things we should be using >>>>>>> our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our >>>>>>> lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary >>>>>>> demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see >>>>>>> any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
How does 'free will' avoid this problem?
First of all, I don't think that is really a relevant question - I'm >>>>> not debating this issue to make a case for free will, I'm challenging >>>>> the robustness of determinism in its own right. I certainly don't want >>>>> to fall into the trap of claiming that I can prove Theory B is right >>>>> by identifying shortcomings in Theory A, something for which I have
previously criticised ID, particularly Stephen Meyer. [1]
Having said that, I don't think it is a big problem for free will as I >>>>> can see benefits for pondering in that context. If I have freedom in >>>>> making my decisions, then that means I am ultimately responsible for >>>>> those decisions and their outcome. It is obviously beneficial for me >>>>> to become as good a decision-maker as possible; pondering decisions
and all their foreseeable outcomes can help me get better at it.
What advantage is there in becoming a good decision maker if you
aren't making decisions?
different conditions determining better 'decisions'?
What conditions affecting my decision-making have changed from when I
went to bed last night until I woke this morning?
Hint? Is is supernatural
FWIW, the more I read and debate this subject, the more it reminds me >>>>> of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also applies >>>>> here.Yep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because
they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Funny how in the whole discussion about free will and determinism, you
are the only one to raise the supernatural.
and that bothers me because it invalidates much
of what we believe we know about the universe.
I think at this stage, you have a broad idea of my beliefs but just to summarise them - I'm a religious believer (Catholic), I'm a dualist
inclined towards panpsychism and I believe there is such a thing as
free will. I don't reject any scientific knowledge or *evidence-based* conclusions, finding my beliefs readily compatible with them. What in
my beliefs invalidates much of what we know about the universe?
But of course for us any change of mind is always due to a well
Your wife went into suspended animation for two days!? Amazing. >>>>>>>> Seriously, do you not think it possible, nay, probable that she >>>>>>>> continued to 'ponder' her decision, observed the room in different >>>>>>>> lighting conditions, paid heightened consideration to the existing >>>>>>>> colours in the room, etc. and that this might have led to her changing >>>>>>>> her mind?
We have been redecorating recently. The choice for wallpaper for a >>>>>>>>> particular room came down to two papers. My wife (who finally decides >>>>>>>>> these things <smile>) picked paper A and we bought it. Two days later,
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have >>>>>>>>>>> made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that
predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
Having made a decision plus time (other things happening) have changed
the environment, so why not a different decision being determined? >>>>>>>>>
she changed her mind and decided she's rather have paper B. We hadn't >>>>>>>>> even opened the paper so we were able to take it back to the shop and >>>>>>>>> get it swapped. I can't see any change of environment in that. >>>>>>>>>
I'm actually pretty sure she didn't do any of those physical things >>>>>>> because of other things we were doing that weekend. We made our
decision in the shop on Saturday, and she was completely satisfied >>>>>>> with it (there was actually very little to choose between the two >>>>>>> papers, both were a jungle theme with exotic birds and plants in >>>>>>> similar colours). We brought the paper home and left it aside for me >>>>>>> to start papering later in the week.
You're putting it up yourself? Have you done it before? If not, even >>>>>> with prepasted paper you may want to consider the old English Musichall >>>>>> standard "Father Papered the Parlour".
(I never thought I would be able to make that reference; I couldn't >>>>>> resist the opportunity)
LOL. I've been an avid DIY'er all my life and wallpapering is actually >>>>> one of my better skills. I'm a terrible painter, however - I can just >>>>> about manage emulsion on walls and ceilings but I am truly awful when >>>>> it comes to gloss paint! I also have to admit that turning 73 this
year, my DIY energy is rapidly declining so I have a few jobs I want >>>>> to get done this year and after that will be time for hired help :(
My wife passed no further remark
on it until Monday morning when she announced "I've changed my mind, I >>>>>>> think I prefer the other paper." I chuckled and asked her why and she >>>>>>> said she didn't know, she "just liked the other paper better."
So, no free will involved. "It just happened" sounds more like a
deterministic action.
At the risk of provoking the woke brigade, after 51 years of marriage >>>>> it seems to me that "It just happened" is as good an explanation as >>>>> any for explaining why wives change their mind :)
considered, logical decision. /s
Obviously, there was some rethinking process but I believe it was >>>>>>> entirely sub-conscious, there was no real"pondering" in any active >>>>>>> sense involving the input of new information. The exact details of the >>>>>>> process are irrelevant, my question is not *how* she changed her >>>>>>> mind, it's what was the point of determinism leading her to a decision >>>>>>> on Saturday that was going to change on Monday?
THERE IS NO "POINT", it is just what happens due to the totality of the >>>>>> conditions *at the time*.
I personally don't think those experiments have much to say about it one
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major* >>>>>>>>>>> decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in? >>>>>>>>>>>
way or the other.
I agree with you but they do seem to be a mainstay for those who argue
in favour of determinism.
--
--
--
[1]
https://groups.google.com/g/talk.origins/c/z8Yq7lvkAfU/m/um8mt8MDAgAJ >>>>>
--
--
On Wed, 10 Apr 2024 10:19:45 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-10 4:09 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Tue, 9 Apr 2024 11:28:11 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
[snip for focus]
see just belowHint? Is is supernaturalYep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to
inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because >>>>> they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Funny how in the whole discussion about free will and determinism, you
are the only one to raise the supernatural.
and that bothers me because it invalidates much
of what we believe we know about the universe.
I think at this stage, you have a broad idea of my beliefs but just to
summarise them - I'm a religious believer (Catholic), I'm a dualist
inclined towards panpsychism and I believe there is such a thing as
free will. I don't reject any scientific knowledge or *evidence-based*
conclusions, finding my beliefs readily compatible with them. What in
my beliefs invalidates much of what we know about the universe?
It's the 'dualism' bit. Perhaps I misunderstand, but It seems to me that
dualism requires the existence of some non-material entity that can
cause material changes in defiance of physical laws.
What physical laws are being defied?
That meets my
definition of supernatural.
The general definition of 'the supernatural' is "caused by forces that
cannot be explained by science" (adj) or "things that cannot be
explained by science" (noun) https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/supernatural
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
the supernatural. I think your definition of the supernatural is
related to a particular association of the supernatural with religious
belief but that is down to your own personal belief
to be consistent in your scientific arguments, you really need to
treat belief in determinism just as much based on the "supernatural"
as free will is.
I can't help (ha) but feel that belief in
free will and dualism are two sides of the same coin.I'm sure you don't
*reject* scientific knowledge but I think you must be allowing some
'leeway?' to accept dualism.
I honestly can't think of any area of scientific knowledge where I
have to allow any such 'leeway'; can you suggest any in particular?
[…]
On Thu, 11 Apr 2024 21:32:18 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-11 2:42 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 10 Apr 2024 10:19:45 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-10 4:09 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Tue, 9 Apr 2024 11:28:11 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
[snip for focus]
see just belowHint? Is is supernaturalYep. It's just the spectre (ha) of the supernatural that seems to >>>>>>>> inevitably arise when 'free will' is invoked that bothers me.
What bothers me is when people dismiss things out of hand just because >>>>>>> they might have even a hint of the supernatural.
Funny how in the whole discussion about free will and determinism, you >>>>> are the only one to raise the supernatural.
and that bothers me because it invalidates much
of what we believe we know about the universe.
I think at this stage, you have a broad idea of my beliefs but just to >>>>> summarise them - I'm a religious believer (Catholic), I'm a dualist
inclined towards panpsychism and I believe there is such a thing as
free will. I don't reject any scientific knowledge or *evidence-based* >>>>> conclusions, finding my beliefs readily compatible with them. What in >>>>> my beliefs invalidates much of what we know about the universe?
It's the 'dualism' bit. Perhaps I misunderstand, but It seems to me that >>>> dualism requires the existence of some non-material entity that can
cause material changes in defiance of physical laws.
What physical laws are being defied?
Non-random physical activity without the required energy supply.
I see two problems with that statement. First of all, I'm not at all
sure what you mean by it; if my dualist consciousness makes me decide
to go for a walk, the physical effort involved in that comes from my
body, not from my consciousness - perhaps you can give a specific of
what you mean.
Secondly, even if some unidentified energy supply is necessary, I
can't understand why you see that as a problem; 50 years ago we knew
nothing about the existence of dark energy, but now we know a lot
about it. Why do you rule out other forces or supplies of energy that
we don't know anything about?
I'm happy with that definition as long as it is taken quite strictly, ie
That meets my
definition of supernatural.
The general definition of 'the supernatural' is "caused by forces that
cannot be explained by science" (adj) or "things that cannot be
explained by science" (noun)
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/supernatural
"cannot be explained by science" and not 'is not presently completely
explicable by science'.
I have no problem with that provided the qualifier is not just an
attempt to create unjustified wriggle room. (See my comments below
about the lack of progress in neurological explanations).
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
And there is no indication that it violates
any physical laws. so I would call it paranormal, not supernatural.
I've already given you the Cambridge definition of supernatural i.e
"caused by forces that
cannot be explained by science". The same dictionary defines
paranormal as "impossible to explain by known natural forces or by
science". Can you clarify what the significant difference is that
makes you prefer the latter?
In that sense, therefore, determinism also qualifies as
the supernatural. I think your definition of the supernatural is
related to a particular association of the supernatural with religious
belief but that is down to your own personal belief
I'm sure you do believe that, but then I believe you had no choice but
to do so, it's just who you are. I also believe that you are wrong.
and, if you want
to be consistent in your scientific arguments, you really need toThat does not follow. I believe that I did not chose my belief, I
treat belief in determinism just as much based on the "supernatural"
as free will is.
believe that I hold my belief because of who I am. where is the
supernatural in that?
Can you provide a scientific explanation for your belief?
BTW, I am a bit pissed off by part of your other earlier reply and will
not be responding to it. In future, I would appreciate it if, in
responding to my points, you refrained from comparing me to some other
arsehole on the web, I am arsehole enough on my own.
Sorry, but that sounds like a cop-out. I wasn't comparing *you* to Ron
Dean, I was comparing your *line of reasoning* to his.
just as prone to squeezing evidence to support their beliefs as
religious believers are and I have no hesitation in calling out either
case when I see it. I certainly don't regard you as an arsehole and
don't believe I have ever indicated that I might think so.
BTW, I don't regard Ron Dean as an arsehole either; he has some really strange beliefs and ideas but that doesn't make him an arsehole in my
eyes.
I can't help (ha) but feel that belief in
free will and dualism are two sides of the same coin.I'm sure you don't >>>> *reject* scientific knowledge but I think you must be allowing some
'leeway?' to accept dualism.
I honestly can't think of any area of scientific knowledge where I
have to allow any such 'leeway'; can you suggest any in particular?
Nothing to offer on this?
[…]
--
On Thu, 11 Apr 2024 21:32:18 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-11 2:42 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 10 Apr 2024 10:19:45 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
On Sat, 13 Apr 2024 14:41:16 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 12/04/2024 13:56, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 11 Apr 2024 21:32:18 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-11 2:42 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 10 Apr 2024 10:19:45 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
snip
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this
point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making >>>>> is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When
you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they >>>> have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months
Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to
you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he
refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day
symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon
the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every
indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural
basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of
Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of
which I am not aware?
Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect
brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to
an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up
with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to
space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists
now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious
activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study
so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.
I wasn't talking about development since 1953, I was talking about development since Cobb's book was published in 2020. Unless, of
course, you are trying to suggest that there were significant
developments since 1953 that he failed to take into account. I would
need to see specific examples of that because the book is a
comprehensive account of the study of the brain from Ancient Greece
(and even earlier) through to the present day. TBH, I found the detail
he goes into a bit tedious at times.
The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental
life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people
with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have
also continued bearing fruit. Antonio Damasio for example who wrote
classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book
is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.
Cobb does discuss the work of Damasio and others in the context of localisation theories, particularly the different roles played by the
left and right hemispheres of the brain. He goes on to show how those localisation theories have been shown to fall short in further studies showing that if a particular hemisphere stops functioning, the other hemisphere can take over that function. He particularly refers to work
by Robert Sperry, 19814 Nobel recipient, that showed that when the
corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres, is physically
severed, each hemisphere starts to perform as a whole brain,
recreating the functions of the missing hemisphere. In Sperry's own
words: "The split-brain cat or monkey is thus in many respects an
animal with two separate brains that may be used either together or in alternation." Although Sperry's work was initially on animals, further
work by one of his students on a man who had his corpus callosum
severed to treat epilepsy showed the same thing in humans.
The study of animal and machine cognition has also made huge strides
since 1953. Most of classic experiments with chimpanzees and other great
apes that taught us how similar yet different from us they are were made
after then. 1953 IIRC was still behaviorists looking at basic reflexes
in rats and pigeons; all the cool work into the surprising intelligence
of dolphins, orcas, elephants, corvids (notably Caledonian crows) as
well of course as our closest relatives came after. All the classic
research into human vs animal language came after. These all tell us a
lot about what our consciousness is or might be and isn't.
Let's not even get into machine intelligence, which barely existed as a
field in 1953 and teaches us a huge deal about human intelligence mostly
(so far) by showing us what it isn't. In 1953 people still thought that
a computer would have to be intelligent like a human in order to beat
one at chess. Alison Gopnik's books like "The Philosophical Baby" and
"The Gardener and the Carpenter" are pretty good about unifying those
different strands of animal, machine & human cognitive research to give
insight into consciousness (and many other things).
Anil Seth wrote "Being You" in 2021 and I think it probably gives a
decent account of the current state of neuroscience and cognitive
science on the question of consciousness specifically. In terms of that
quote he'd probably say that it's accurate insofar that 70 years between
1953 and 2021 is by no means "quickly" and that even now one can't say
the hard problem has been solved or dissolved quite yet, but that our
*understanding* of the neural basis of consciousness has advanced leaps
and bounds.
What has advanced leaps and bounds is the amount of *data* that has
become available but as leading French neurologist Yves Fregnac put it
in an article in Science in 2017,
"Big data is not knowledge …
… Only 20 to 30 years ago, neuroanatomical and neurophysiological information was relatively scarce, while understanding mind-related
processes seemed within reach. Nowadays, we are drowning in a flood of information. Paradoxically, all sense of global understanding is in
acute danger of getting washed away. Each overcoming of technological barriers opens a Pandora's box by revealing hidden variables,
mechanisms and nonlinearities, adding new levels of complexity."
I'm especially surprised at you highlighting decision-making as
inexplainable because ISTM it's one of the most investigated. It's what
"System1/System2 thinking" is about for example.
OK, I haven't read Kahnemann's book though I note he is a
psychologist, not a neurologist or a research scientist. That, of
course, does not mean that his ideas are wrong but it always strikes
me as somewhat funny how scientists are generally dismissive of the contribution of the likes of psychologists and philosophers - unless,
of course, their contribution matches what the scientists already
believe :)
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to
come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and
that explosion reinforces my thinking.
I think the field of AI as it currently stands, those I hear most about
at least, would benefit hugely from looking into what the research into
human & animal cognition has been doing the past few decades. A lot of
the talk seems stuck in, well 1953 is a good date actually - the idea
that intelligence is an ineffable, incomprehensible black box to the
point the Turing Test is the only way it can be tested even in
principle. Which would come to a surprise to those who study animal
cognition and human cognitive development.
Those working in AI are already taking account of research into human
& animal cognition - the fundamental concept of machine learning,
which leads to AI, is driven by *neural networks* which are an
attempt to replicate the neurological processes that take place in the
human brain.
It should be a two way-process, however, and those
working in human & animal cognition should also be learning from what
is happening in AI (perhaps they are already doing so but I'm not
aware of it.)
I earlier suggested to Don Cates that we perhaps need a modern-day
Copernicus to turn around our approach to the relationship between
neural processes and consciousness, perhaps we need a similar
turnaround in how we approach the similarities between computers and
the human brain. It seems to me that people tend to focus on how the
brain can be considered as a computer but I think we could maybe learn
more by approaching it the other way round. Computers are a product of
the human brain; it seems to me perfectly rational that in conceiving
and designing computers, the brain would draw on the processes that it already "knows" and uses itself so that the computer is in some ways a rudimentary brain. I think neurological researchers could perhaps
learn something by looking at AI, seeking to identify more about the
gap between AI and human consciousness and exploring ways to fill that
gap.
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Tied in with that is our ability to change our minds after we have
made a decision - has determinism some convoluted way of working that predetermines what way we will make a decision but also predetermins
that we will change it?
A reminder that in the Libet experiments so beloved of determinists,
there was no precursor activity found in regard to making *major*
decisions or changing one's mind so how does that fit in?
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that
there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
What conditions affecting my decision-making have changed from when I
went to bed last night until I woke this morning?
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of competence.
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science perspective.
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
On 19/04/2024 03:36, Mark Isaak wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and
determined. But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside
my area of competence.
I don't know if I ever talked about this on this forum but I had an
epiphany on definitions of "random" when looking at regression plots
ages ago. Which is that "random" isn't a word that applies to a thing,
it applies to *the relationship between two things*. So if you plot the temperature of a place over 100 years against the days in the year
you'll get an up-and-down trend showing summer and winter, and if you
control for that trend you'll be left with a cloud of "random noise"
that represents the year-to-year variation in temperature. On the other
hand if you plot the same temperature points against the year you'll get
a trendline representing the year-to-year variation (maybe a rising
trend for example), and if you control for it you'll be left with random noise that represents the within-year variation. The same thing can be "random noise" or "trend" just depending on your choice of x-axis!
Because "randomness" describes the correlation between two variables (or
more specifically, the lack thereof).
I think that extends to almost all uses of the word "random", there is
almost always a "with respect to..." hidden in there that clarifies what variables it is one is claiming are uncorrelated. For example how is a
coin toss random even though it's deterministic? Well, it's random *with respect to* any guesses the thrower and observers can make as to what
the outcome of the throw will be. It's not random with respect to
precise position and velocity of the coin a millisecond before it lands,
but that's not what it's being asked to be random with respect to.
Or in the context of evolution, the "random" in "random mutation" means "random with respect to whether the mutation is beneficial, harmful or neutral for the organism".
In the context of Martin Harran's comment on using a random number
generator to make the decision I'd say that the randomness in question
is with respect to all of the pro-and-con factors that otherwise would
go into making the decision. For example if we're debating whether to go
on vacation at the beach or in the mountains and we can't decide, I
could say "OK let's just pick the one that's closest" and we wouldn't
think of that as "random"; it's choosing one pro-or-con factor to
prioritize above others. Same with "We'll go with what you prefer". On
the other hand if I say "some neutral third party will hide a shoe in
the house, first to find it gets to decide" that *could* be random even though hiding and finding the shoe aren't what we'd think of as random processes, because who finds the shoe (and therefore, what decision gets made) is presumably uncorrelated to any of the reasons that might
otherwise have contributed to the decision. If it's not uncorrelated
(because you're better at finding things, or I bribed the third party to
tell me where they hid it) then we no longer think of the decision as
having been "random".
From that point of view the "random" decision is indeed completely compatible with determinism, the same way a random coin toss is.
Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:Seems your thread about the book has fallen silent.
snip
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
On 2024-04-19 4:10 AM, Arkalen wrote:
On 19/04/2024 03:36, Mark Isaak wrote:That is not the type of 'random' that I am talking about in the 'free will/determination' discussion. There are physical events that are, even
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and
determined. But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside
my area of competence.
I don't know if I ever talked about this on this forum but I had an
epiphany on definitions of "random" when looking at regression plots
ages ago. Which is that "random" isn't a word that applies to a thing,
it applies to *the relationship between two things*. So if you plot
the temperature of a place over 100 years against the days in the year
you'll get an up-and-down trend showing summer and winter, and if you
control for that trend you'll be left with a cloud of "random noise"
that represents the year-to-year variation in temperature. On the
other hand if you plot the same temperature points against the year
you'll get a trendline representing the year-to-year variation (maybe
a rising trend for example), and if you control for it you'll be left
with random noise that represents the within-year variation. The same
thing can be "random noise" or "trend" just depending on your choice
of x-axis! Because "randomness" describes the correlation between two
variables (or more specifically, the lack thereof).
I think that extends to almost all uses of the word "random", there is
almost always a "with respect to..." hidden in there that clarifies
what variables it is one is claiming are uncorrelated. For example how
is a coin toss random even though it's deterministic? Well, it's
random *with respect to* any guesses the thrower and observers can
make as to what the outcome of the throw will be. It's not random with
respect to precise position and velocity of the coin a millisecond
before it lands, but that's not what it's being asked to be random
with respect to.
Or in the context of evolution, the "random" in "random mutation"
means "random with respect to whether the mutation is beneficial,
harmful or neutral for the organism".
In the context of Martin Harran's comment on using a random number
generator to make the decision I'd say that the randomness in question
is with respect to all of the pro-and-con factors that otherwise would
go into making the decision. For example if we're debating whether to
go on vacation at the beach or in the mountains and we can't decide, I
could say "OK let's just pick the one that's closest" and we wouldn't
think of that as "random"; it's choosing one pro-or-con factor to
prioritize above others. Same with "We'll go with what you prefer". On
the other hand if I say "some neutral third party will hide a shoe in
the house, first to find it gets to decide" that *could* be random
even though hiding and finding the shoe aren't what we'd think of as
random processes, because who finds the shoe (and therefore, what
decision gets made) is presumably uncorrelated to any of the reasons
that might otherwise have contributed to the decision. If it's not
uncorrelated (because you're better at finding things, or I bribed the
third party to tell me where they hid it) then we no longer think of
the decision as having been "random".
From that point of view the "random" decision is indeed completely
compatible with determinism, the same way a random coin toss is.
in principle, unpredictable (which unstable atom will be the next to
fission and where the alpha particle goes and with how much energy).
Once that has happened then those results become part of the conditions
that determine what happens next. So I see short term determination and
long term indeterminacy characterized as determination with an overlay
of some random input.
The necessary randomness of this variation from determinism offers no
support or comfort to the dualist position.
On 20/04/2024 14:42, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:Seems your thread about the book has fallen silent.
snip
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of >>> individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
Threads do that :) But I've read and very much appreciated your replies.
I might have some question about what you said about the limbic system;
I tried looking up what you said about LeDoux debunking it but I
couldn't find something specific enough to hold my interest right at the
time I was looking into it (I have fifty thousand tabs open on alkaline hydrothermal vents as it is and that's a bit more what I've been reading these past weeks).
I hope you continue posting your thoughts as you go through the book, or after you've finished.
On 20/04/2024 18:11, DB Cates wrote:
On 2024-04-19 4:10 AM, Arkalen wrote:
On 19/04/2024 03:36, Mark Isaak wrote:That is not the type of 'random' that I am talking about in the 'free
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal >>>>> but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and
determined. But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside
my area of competence.
I don't know if I ever talked about this on this forum but I had an
epiphany on definitions of "random" when looking at regression plots
ages ago. Which is that "random" isn't a word that applies to a thing,
it applies to *the relationship between two things*. So if you plot
the temperature of a place over 100 years against the days in the year
you'll get an up-and-down trend showing summer and winter, and if you
control for that trend you'll be left with a cloud of "random noise"
that represents the year-to-year variation in temperature. On the
other hand if you plot the same temperature points against the year
you'll get a trendline representing the year-to-year variation (maybe
a rising trend for example), and if you control for it you'll be left
with random noise that represents the within-year variation. The same
thing can be "random noise" or "trend" just depending on your choice
of x-axis! Because "randomness" describes the correlation between two
variables (or more specifically, the lack thereof).
I think that extends to almost all uses of the word "random", there is
almost always a "with respect to..." hidden in there that clarifies
what variables it is one is claiming are uncorrelated. For example how
is a coin toss random even though it's deterministic? Well, it's
random *with respect to* any guesses the thrower and observers can
make as to what the outcome of the throw will be. It's not random with
respect to precise position and velocity of the coin a millisecond
before it lands, but that's not what it's being asked to be random
with respect to.
Or in the context of evolution, the "random" in "random mutation"
means "random with respect to whether the mutation is beneficial,
harmful or neutral for the organism".
In the context of Martin Harran's comment on using a random number
generator to make the decision I'd say that the randomness in question
is with respect to all of the pro-and-con factors that otherwise would
go into making the decision. For example if we're debating whether to
go on vacation at the beach or in the mountains and we can't decide, I
could say "OK let's just pick the one that's closest" and we wouldn't
think of that as "random"; it's choosing one pro-or-con factor to
prioritize above others. Same with "We'll go with what you prefer". On
the other hand if I say "some neutral third party will hide a shoe in
the house, first to find it gets to decide" that *could* be random
even though hiding and finding the shoe aren't what we'd think of as
random processes, because who finds the shoe (and therefore, what
decision gets made) is presumably uncorrelated to any of the reasons
that might otherwise have contributed to the decision. If it's not
uncorrelated (because you're better at finding things, or I bribed the
third party to tell me where they hid it) then we no longer think of
the decision as having been "random".
From that point of view the "random" decision is indeed completely
compatible with determinism, the same way a random coin toss is.
will/determination' discussion. There are physical events that are, even
in principle, unpredictable (which unstable atom will be the next to
fission and where the alpha particle goes and with how much energy).
Once that has happened then those results become part of the conditions
that determine what happens next. So I see short term determination and
long term indeterminacy characterized as determination with an overlay
of some random input.
The necessary randomness of this variation from determinism offers no
support or comfort to the dualist position.
There have been many participants in this conversation; in this case the
two directly involved in this mention of random number generators were
Martin Harran and LDagget, who might have had their own ideas of what
they meant by the concept. But thank you for explaining what you mean by
the term, it really goes to show that it's a very, vary ambiguous word
to be using blithely in this kind of discussion! (which isn't to say we shouldn't use it, I think there's a reason that we do, but yeah let's
not assume we all agree on what it means or implies).
Something I could have added but didn't think in the moment is that it
also depends what we mean by "determinism". Like, if it's "the decision
could be predicted from full knowledge of the person's brain and their
pro and con list" then some forms of randomness used to split ties could genuinely get in the way of that, it really depends on whether we add
the random factor into the scope of info that would allow us to
perfectly predict the decision. If it's "fated by the initial conditions
of the Universe", less so. Like, there's quantum, but that induces its
own issues in terms of free will (i.e. what we think of as "free will"
should be neither determinate or random; its naïve form requires that decisions be caused by the person's will, and only by the person's will,
and neither determinism or randomness at their most naïve seem to
satisfy the constraint)
On Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:08:58 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering
management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
that everything is on an increasing complexity
path - increasing complexity in particles leads to matter; increasing complexity in matter leads to life; increasing complexity in life
leads to consciousness; increasing complexity in consciousness leads
to awareness; his belief that increasing complexity in awareness will ultimately lead to the Omega Point.
From the reviews I have read, I see echoes of that in Tomasello's book
so I will be interested to see to what extent, if any, that is the
case.
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 08:52:51 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:08:58 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate
collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria >>>>> but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering >>>>> management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was
showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual >>>>> decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and
business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science
perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every
conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine >>>> here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has >>>> some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The
Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in
general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than
the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about.
That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level >>>> discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form, >>>> that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of >>>> individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you
it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than
what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of
Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I
can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's
there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
Mind. Anyway, some of the most characteristic parts are quoted here:
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
Full critique is available here: http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific* contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
that everything is on an increasing complexity
path - increasing complexity in particles leads to matter; increasing
complexity in matter leads to life; increasing complexity in life
leads to consciousness; increasing complexity in consciousness leads
to awareness; his belief that increasing complexity in awareness will
ultimately lead to the Omega Point.
From the reviews I have read, I see echoes of that in Tomasello's book
so I will be interested to see to what extent, if any, that is the
case.
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 10:36:02 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 08:52:51 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:08:58 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate >>>>>>> collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria >>>>>>> but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering >>>>>>> management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was >>>>>>> showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual >>>>>>> decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and >>>>>>> business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science >>>>>>> perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every >>>>>> conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine >>>>>> here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has >>>>>> some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The >>>>>> Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in >>>>>> general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than >>>>>> the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about. >>>>>> That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level >>>>>> discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form, >>>>>> that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of >>>>>> individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you >>>>>> it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than >>>>> what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of >>>>> Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I >>>> can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's >>>> there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
Mind. Anyway, some of the most characteristic parts are quoted here:
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
Full critique is available here:
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
FWIW, this article in Naure captures my own thoughts on it:
https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
<quote>
Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
an attack on The Phenomenon of Man which by this time had become a semi-popular classic in the journal Mind; an article subsequently anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
He complains of Teilhard's style (tipsy prose-poetry), some
technical shortcomings (no grasp of the real weakness of modern evolutionary theory), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
standpoint (obscure pious rant) and so duping a gullible public (educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
thought). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
Teilhard died in 1954.
</quote>
that everything is on an increasing complexity
path - increasing complexity in particles leads to matter; increasing >>>>> complexity in matter leads to life; increasing complexity in life
leads to consciousness; increasing complexity in consciousness leads >>>>> to awareness; his belief that increasing complexity in awareness will >>>>> ultimately lead to the Omega Point.
From the reviews I have read, I see echoes of that in Tomasello's book >>>>> so I will be interested to see to what extent, if any, that is the
case.
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 10:36:02 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 08:52:51 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:08:58 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate >>>>>>> collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria >>>>>>> but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering >>>>>>> management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was >>>>>>> showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual >>>>>>> decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and >>>>>>> business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science >>>>>>> perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every >>>>>> conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine >>>>>> here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has >>>>>> some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The >>>>>> Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in >>>>>> general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than >>>>>> the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about. >>>>>> That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level >>>>>> discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form, >>>>>> that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of >>>>>> individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you >>>>>> it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than >>>>> what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of >>>>> Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I >>>> can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's >>>> there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
Mind. Anyway, some of the most characteristic parts are quoted here:
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
Full critique is available here:
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
The reason your computer didn't like the link is probably that it goes
to a HTTP site (no digital certificate) and browsers have got very
picky about that. I have converted the web page to a PDF and uploaded
it here, perhaps your browser will be less apprehensive about that.
https://teilhard-medawar.tiiny.site/
The reason that I have gone to that trouble is that I'm genuinely
interested in hearing your comments on it. Before accepting ideas that
seem attractive, I always like to check contradictory views. I have
been looking for some time for a scientific response to Teilhard but
have never been able to find one; when I have asked, I have invariably
been referred to Medawar's piece which, for the reasons already given,
I have always found unsatisfying.
I'm particularly curious to se your reaction to Medawar's' statement
that "French is not a language that lends itself naturally to the
opaque and ponderous idiom of nature-philosophy, and Teilhard has
according resorted to the use of that tipsy, euphoristic prose-poetry
which is one of the more tiresome manifestations of the French spirit"
On Wed, 17 Apr 2024 15:37:42 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 17/04/2024 13:54, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 13 Apr 2024 14:41:16 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 12/04/2024 13:56, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 11 Apr 2024 21:32:18 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-11 2:42 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 10 Apr 2024 10:19:45 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:
snip
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this >>>>>>> point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making >>>>>>> is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the
most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot
explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various
visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When >>>> you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any
aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience
things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular
sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from;
how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them;
one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail
part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision
after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that
would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and
that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically
studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never
account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters
here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed
to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests
science can't study.
I accept that science can only study *visible* behaviour - that is the
very definition of science. That doesn't mean that all the answers can
be found purely through visible behaviour and we certainly should not
rule out potential answers just because they aren't based on visible behaviour. There seems to be a double standard here; scientists rule
out dualism because it's non-visible yet are quite happy to accept
other ideas that are equally unamenable to study, like the multiverse
for example.
Okay, then I have no idea what Cobb is talking about. Maybe he's
But it sounds like it isn't the hard problem of consciousness you are
talking about, but more that you don't think science could account for
the behavior of philosophical zombies to begin with.
I think you are overplaying the zombies problem, it's just one thought experiment to illustrate the 'hard problem'. Having said that, I'm not suggesting that science could not account for it; what I am saying is
that the *approach* science has taken so far has provided very few
real answers and I think we need to widen our thinking (no pun
intended).
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they >>>>>> have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months >>>>>> Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to >>>>> you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he >>>>> refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day >>>>> symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking
sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon >>>>> the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every >>>>> indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that
will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably
have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural >>>>> basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of >>>>> Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on
the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of >>>>> which I am not aware?
Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect
brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to >>>> an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up
with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to
space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists
now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious
activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study >>>> so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.
I wasn't talking about development since 1953, I was talking about
development since Cobb's book was published in 2020. Unless, of
course, you are trying to suggest that there were significant
developments since 1953 that he failed to take into account. I would
need to see specific examples of that because the book is a
comprehensive account of the study of the brain from Ancient Greece
(and even earlier) through to the present day. TBH, I found the detail
he goes into a bit tedious at times.
You're right, I'd missed that or kinda skipped over it. I haven't read
the book but reading the sentence and some reviews it looks like he is
talking about the hard problem of consciousness - i.e. he isn't saying
there's been no progress since 1953 in accounting for the neural bases
of our behavior, or the way our internal lives correlate to brain
events, but that this isn't the same as accounting for
qualia/awareness/[the thing philosophical zombies lack], and it's that
last one he sees no progress on.
If that is indeed what he's saying then we debate how unrelated the
"easy problem" is to the "hard problem" but the position is at least
defensible. But it's not the one you seem to have.
Am I wrong about what he's saying, and if so do you maybe have a quote
that shows more clearly he's talking about lack of progress on the
neural basis of more specific aspects of consciousness you're thinking
of like decision-making, emotion, imagination, predicting the future etc?
He's not talking about the 'hard problem' at all; he only briefly
touches on Chalmers and also Nagel ('What Is It Like to be a Bat?')
and dismisses both of them as not taking us any further forward,
having nothing to offer regarding answers:
"These views [Chalmers and Nagel] are really a confession of despair,
for we know even less about hypothetical immaterial substances or
speculative exotic states of matter and how they might or might not
interact with the physical world than we do about how brain activity
produces consciousness. Not one piece of experimental evidence
directly points to a non-material explanation of mind. And above all,
the materialist scientific approach contains within it an
investigative programme that can in principle resolve the question
through experimentation. This is not the case for any of the
alternatives."
Cobb is only concerned with our efforts to understand how the brain
work; although he never calls it that, he's effectively talking about
what are supposed to be the *easy* problems i.e. those that should be solvable using a materialist approach.
The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental >>>> life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people >>>> with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have >>>> also continued bearing fruit. Antonio Damasio for example who wrote
classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book >>>> is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.
Cobb does discuss the work of Damasio and others in the context of
localisation theories, particularly the different roles played by the
left and right hemispheres of the brain. He goes on to show how those
localisation theories have been shown to fall short in further studies
showing that if a particular hemisphere stops functioning, the other
hemisphere can take over that function. He particularly refers to work
by Robert Sperry, 19814 Nobel recipient, that showed that when the
corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres, is physically
severed, each hemisphere starts to perform as a whole brain,
recreating the functions of the missing hemisphere. In Sperry's own
words: "The split-brain cat or monkey is thus in many respects an
animal with two separate brains that may be used either together or in
alternation." Although Sperry's work was initially on animals, further
work by one of his students on a man who had his corpus callosum
severed to treat epilepsy showed the same thing in humans.
Damasio's work goes far beyond localisation theories, and the fact a
hard right brain/left brain division has been abandoned to some extent
and brain plasticity is a thing hardly undermines the more general
observation that certain aspects of consciousness are associated with
certain areas within the brain.
Yes, I accept that but a single book covering every aspect of every researcher is obviously impossible. I'm not familiar with Damasio's
work but I'd guess that Cobb has addressed at least some aspects by discussing work by other reearchers in the same area. Have you any
specific aspect of his work in mind?
The study of animal and machine cognition has also made huge strides
since 1953. Most of classic experiments with chimpanzees and other great >>>> apes that taught us how similar yet different from us they are were made >>>> after then. 1953 IIRC was still behaviorists looking at basic reflexes >>>> in rats and pigeons; all the cool work into the surprising intelligence >>>> of dolphins, orcas, elephants, corvids (notably Caledonian crows) as
well of course as our closest relatives came after. All the classic
research into human vs animal language came after. These all tell us a >>>> lot about what our consciousness is or might be and isn't.
Let's not even get into machine intelligence, which barely existed as a >>>> field in 1953 and teaches us a huge deal about human intelligence mostly >>>> (so far) by showing us what it isn't. In 1953 people still thought that >>>> a computer would have to be intelligent like a human in order to beat
one at chess. Alison Gopnik's books like "The Philosophical Baby" and
"The Gardener and the Carpenter" are pretty good about unifying those
different strands of animal, machine & human cognitive research to give >>>> insight into consciousness (and many other things).
Anil Seth wrote "Being You" in 2021 and I think it probably gives a
decent account of the current state of neuroscience and cognitive
science on the question of consciousness specifically. In terms of that >>>> quote he'd probably say that it's accurate insofar that 70 years between >>>> 1953 and 2021 is by no means "quickly" and that even now one can't say >>>> the hard problem has been solved or dissolved quite yet, but that our
*understanding* of the neural basis of consciousness has advanced leaps >>>> and bounds.
What has advanced leaps and bounds is the amount of *data* that has
become available but as leading French neurologist Yves Fregnac put it
in an article in Science in 2017,
"Big data is not knowledge …
… Only 20 to 30 years ago, neuroanatomical and neurophysiological
information was relatively scarce, while understanding mind-related
processes seemed within reach. Nowadays, we are drowning in a flood of
information. Paradoxically, all sense of global understanding is in
acute danger of getting washed away. Each overcoming of technological
barriers opens a Pandora's box by revealing hidden variables,
mechanisms and nonlinearities, adding new levels of complexity."
It's true the big data is not knowledge, and it's also definitely true
that advances in scanning technology have been a mixed bag, with fMRI in
particular resulting in a lot of junk science. It doesn't mean it's all
junk however or that advances haven't been made. Anil Seth's book in
particular is definitely discussing advances in our understanding, not
raw data or junk fMRI entrail-reading (if he was careful enough at
least, which he comes across as being).
Cobb certainly does not dismiss the wealth of data as junk, he thinks
the problem is that no *framework* has been found within which sense
can be made of the data. He also thinks we are trying too hard to look
at the big picture, he is particularly disparaging about the Human
Brain Project wich ran for 10 years with £1 billion in funding from
the EU and produced nothing of value. His own solution is to start
small and gradually build up knowledge:
"My own preference for how best to proceed in understanding the brain
would be to pour resources into discrete, doable projects able to
provide insight that can subsequently be integrated into a more global approach. Crick's approach to studying consciousness applies to the
brain as a whole, it seems to me. As some parts of theoretical physics demonstrate, high-flying ideas that are not rooted in experimental
reality can generate vast amounts of excitement and occupy whole
academic careers, without necessarily advancing understanding. By
developing analytical techniques and theoretical frameworks to
understand what a fly thinks, we will lay the ground for understanding
more complex brains; trying to understand simple animal brains will
keep us busy for the rest of the century, at least. If you feel that
any study of the brain must involve a vertebrate to be truly
interesting, the brain of the tiny zebrafish larva consists of only
100,000 neurons, and easily falls into the small-brain category."
I'm especially surprised at you highlighting decision-making as
inexplainable because ISTM it's one of the most investigated. It's what >>>> "System1/System2 thinking" is about for example.
OK, I haven't read Kahnemann's book though I note he is a
psychologist, not a neurologist or a research scientist. That, of
course, does not mean that his ideas are wrong but it always strikes
me as somewhat funny how scientists are generally dismissive of the
contribution of the likes of psychologists and philosophers - unless,
of course, their contribution matches what the scientists already
believe :)
I haven't read it either but I probably should, "system 1/system 2" puts
names to ideas I'd cobbled together myself from various sources but
didn't know had a name. I've been starting to use those terms but should
probably check what he actually uses them to say before I go too far
with that.
I'd definitely recommend Anil Seth's "Being You" for you though. He also
has talks on youtube, I could find one to link if you like.
Incidentally, I said some time ago that I think that if we do
eventually get an understanding of consciousness, it is more likely to >>>>> come from work on machine learning and AI rather than neurology. I
said that some time before the recent explosion in AI applications and >>>>> that explosion reinforces my thinking.
I think the field of AI as it currently stands, those I hear most about >>>> at least, would benefit hugely from looking into what the research into >>>> human & animal cognition has been doing the past few decades. A lot of >>>> the talk seems stuck in, well 1953 is a good date actually - the idea
that intelligence is an ineffable, incomprehensible black box to the
point the Turing Test is the only way it can be tested even in
principle. Which would come to a surprise to those who study animal
cognition and human cognitive development.
Those working in AI are already taking account of research into human
& animal cognition - the fundamental concept of machine learning,
which leads to AI, is driven by *neural networks* which are an
attempt to replicate the neurological processes that take place in the
human brain.
Neural networks are decades old, they're not the kind of contribution
from human & animal cognition I was thinking of. In fact to my
understanding people working in AI aren't really keeping up to date with
research into neurons themselves either, figuring that the kind of
neuron behavior they already implement is sufficient to the processing
they're trying to do and/or that adding complexity at that level will
harm rather than help. I don't have an opinion as to whether they're
right or wrong on that, like I said it's not the contribution I had in
mind. But I don't think I'd be wrong to say that the contributions of
neural science currently used in computer neural networks were pretty
much all contributed in the previous millennium.
It should be a two way-process, however, and those
working in human & animal cognition should also be learning from what
is happening in AI (perhaps they are already doing so but I'm not
aware of it.)
You definitely want to read Alison Gopnik then, her work is very much
informed by AI research and it is clearly a field she keeps up to date
with and collaborates with researchers from.
I will get around to reading some of her stuff but my reading list is lengthening by the day as inevitably happens when I get involved in
this type of discussion <smile>. I note she is a
psychologist/philosopher, not a neurologist. I don't have an issue
with that, as I've said previously, I think we will only ever get to understand the brain and consciousness by drawing from a wide range of
areas. I only mention it because I think there is still overwhelming
reliance on neurology to provide the answers.
I earlier suggested to Don Cates that we perhaps need a modern-day
Copernicus to turn around our approach to the relationship between
neural processes and consciousness, perhaps we need a similar
turnaround in how we approach the similarities between computers and
the human brain. It seems to me that people tend to focus on how the
brain can be considered as a computer but I think we could maybe learn
more by approaching it the other way round. Computers are a product of
the human brain; it seems to me perfectly rational that in conceiving
and designing computers, the brain would draw on the processes that it
already "knows" and uses itself so that the computer is in some ways a
rudimentary brain. I think neurological researchers could perhaps
learn something by looking at AI, seeking to identify more about the
gap between AI and human consciousness and exploring ways to fill that
gap.
I agree, and last I checked I'd gotten the impression that they were,
and doing so more seriously than the other way around. But I can't say
I've done a thorough survey either and I could be influenced by the fact
I follow Alison Gopnik so I could be improperly generalizing from her
work and that of people in her circles.
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 10:36:02 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 08:52:51 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:08:58 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate >>>>>>> collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria >>>>>>> but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering >>>>>>> management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was >>>>>>> showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual >>>>>>> decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and >>>>>>> business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science >>>>>>> perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses
relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every >>>>>> conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine >>>>>> here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has >>>>>> some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The >>>>>> Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in >>>>>> general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than >>>>>> the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about. >>>>>> That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level >>>>>> discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form, >>>>>> that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of >>>>>> individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you >>>>>> it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than >>>>> what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of >>>>> Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I >>>> can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's >>>> there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
Mind. Anyway, some of the most characteristic parts are quoted here:
https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
Full critique is available here:
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
FWIW, this article in Naure captures my own thoughts on it:
https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
<quote>
Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
an attack on The Phenomenon of Man which by this time had become a semi-popular classic in the journal Mind; an article subsequently anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
He complains of Teilhard's style (tipsy prose-poetry), some
technical shortcomings (no grasp of the real weakness of modern evolutionary theory), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
standpoint (obscure pious rant) and so duping a gullible public (educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
thought). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
Teilhard died in 1954.
</quote>
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a >>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path. >>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a
tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left
and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the
brain is otherwise at rest.
Are you seriously suggesting that the brain is at rest when we are
sleeping?
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal
but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of
competence.
Sorry, I don't even know what you mean by that.
On Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:53:08 -0700, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:25 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 17:48:09 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-06 2:38 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will >>>>>>> vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the
departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take >>>>>>> up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a
decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what >>>>>>> is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will >>>>>> exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options.
See, right there. My claim is that 'deliberating over the options' is
what you are determined by the circumstances to do and is part of the
circumstances that determines what you follow it up with. Assuming that >>>> there is some "point" beyond this is assuming that free will exists.
You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
It's because the "pondering" is part of the determined action.
That just takes us full circle back to my original question - what is
the point or the value of that pondering if the decision is
predetermined?
The pondering, presumably, is part of what determines the
predetermination. Your question strikes me as analogous to "Why does
water flow in rivers if it is predetermined to end up in the ocean?"
That is a rather peculiar analogy. We know exactly why the water flows
and in this case it is an external force - gravity. It is the
involvement of an external force that is one of the main objections to dualism!
In evolutionary terms, I can see various disadvantages to that
pondering. The brain is the most demanding organ in our body,
consuming around 20% of the total energy used. Pondering a decision
can often distract us from other important things we should be using
our brain for and can indirectly have a very negative affect on our
lives. It seems to me that it would make sense to weed out unnecessary
demands unless they have a clear evolutionary advantage. I can't see
any such evolutionary advantage in pondering being added to a
predetermined process.
I highly recommend Kahneman's book _Thinking Fast and Slow_. Our brains
have two thinking methods -- a fast one for when quick decisions are
called for, and a slower one which lets us do algebra and other such
activities. The fast one works well enough, but has multiple shortcuts
which lead to various reasoning fallacies.
On my list, which, as I've just told Arkalen, is increasing all the
time!
On the subject of books, you mentioned recently that you enjoyed Annie
Murphy Paul's book 'The Extended Mind: The Power of Thinking Outside
the Brain.' I read this a while back (it was me who mentioned it here originally) and I'd be interested to hear your views on it,
particularly whether it has affected your thinking on the reliance on neurology which you seemed to favour in previous discussions.
Maybe I can help a bit by mentioning one book you may skip: _The
Evolution of Consciousness_ by Robert Ornstein. It has some good
information on how the mind works (Ornstein describes it as a collection
of simpletons -- simple modules for certain tasks), but it does not
deliver on the promise implied by the title. It is entertaining
nontheless. If you do read it, I suggest skipping the first part (with explains evolution; you know that already) and the last part (musings
about implications, with no empirical input).
Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
rOn Tue, 23 Apr 2024 12:47:39 +0000, *Hemidactylus*As a counter to Teilhard’s progressivism.
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-BowdenAs I said elsethread, I think Gould an effective antidote to Teilhard.
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 10:36:02 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 08:52:51 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:08:58 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>>>>
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate >>>>>>>>>> collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria
but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering >>>>>>>>>> management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was >>>>>>>>>> showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual
decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and >>>>>>>>>> business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science >>>>>>>>>> perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses >>>>>>>>> relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every >>>>>>>>> conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine
here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants: >>>>>>>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has
some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The >>>>>>>>> Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in >>>>>>>>> general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than >>>>>>>>> the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about. >>>>>>>>> That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form,
that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you >>>>>>>>> it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than >>>>>>>> what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of >>>>>>>> Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I >>>>>>> can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's >>>>>>> there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to >>>>>>> Mind. Anyway, some of the most characteristic parts are quoted here: >>>>>>> https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
Full critique is available here:
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't >>>>> let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a >>>>>> purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
FWIW, this article in Naure captures my own thoughts on it:
https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
<quote>
Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
an attack on The Phenomenon of Man ? which by this time had become a
semi-popular classic ? in the journal Mind; an article subsequently
anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's
arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
He complains of Teilhard's style (?tipsy prose-poetry?), some
technical shortcomings (?no grasp of the real weakness of modern
evolutionary theory?), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's
misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
standpoint (?obscure pious rant?) and so duping a gullible public
(?educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
thought?). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
Teilhard died in 1954.
</quote>
Why do you think an *antidote* is needed, in what way do you regard
Teilhard's ideas as poisonous?
No, I wasn’t thinking of NOMA at all. I said it right here:
In regard to Gould himself, assuming you are talking about NOMA, I
don't think he was particularly effective.
And elsethread:
The
drunkards walk against a lower boundary of minimal complexity is one angle. >>> Upwards from this grade just happens. Bacteria remain nestled there and are >>> the predominate form of life still. They may enjoy primitive forms of
internetworking (proto-thinking layer) and certainly fileshare using
plasmids and (ironically enough) phages, which helps them counter human
ingenuity of antibiotics.
“Given the omega point boils down to a path towards Christ (Christogenesis) I don’t know that one can address that from a scientific perspective. From a more abstracted remove his evolutionary perspective was a form of orthogenesis, which isn’t taken very seriously. I think Gould indirectly buries it in Full House (the random walk and Modal Bacter aspects) and Wonderful Life (contingency).”
rOn Tue, 23 Apr 2024 12:47:39 +0000, *Hemidactylus* <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-BowdenAs I said elsethread, I think Gould an effective antidote to Teilhard.
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 10:36:02 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 08:52:51 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:08:58 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>>>
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate >>>>>>>>> collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria >>>>>>>>> but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering >>>>>>>>> management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was >>>>>>>>> showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual >>>>>>>>> decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and >>>>>>>>> business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science >>>>>>>>> perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses >>>>>>>> relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every >>>>>>>> conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine >>>>>>>> here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has >>>>>>>> some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The >>>>>>>> Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in >>>>>>>> general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than >>>>>>>> the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about. >>>>>>>> That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level
discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form, >>>>>>>> that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you >>>>>>>> it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than >>>>>>> what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of >>>>>>> Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I >>>>>> can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's >>>>>> there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to >>>>>> Mind. Anyway, some of the most characteristic parts are quoted here: >>>>>> https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
Full critique is available here:
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't >>>> let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a >>>>> purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
FWIW, this article in Naure captures my own thoughts on it:
https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
<quote>
Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
an attack on The Phenomenon of Man ? which by this time had become a
semi-popular classic ? in the journal Mind; an article subsequently
anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's
arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
He complains of Teilhard's style (?tipsy prose-poetry?), some
technical shortcomings (?no grasp of the real weakness of modern
evolutionary theory?), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's
misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
standpoint (?obscure pious rant?) and so duping a gullible public
(?educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
thought?). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
Teilhard died in 1954.
</quote>
Why do you think an *antidote* is needed, in what way do you regard Teilhard's ideas as poisonous?
In regard to Gould himself, assuming you are talking about NOMA, I
don't think he was particularly effective.
And elsethread:The
drunkards walk against a lower boundary of minimal complexity is one angle. >> Upwards from this grade just happens. Bacteria remain nestled there and are >> the predominate form of life still. They may enjoy primitive forms of
internetworking (proto-thinking layer) and certainly fileshare using
plasmids and (ironically enough) phages, which helps them counter human
ingenuity of antibiotics.
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/22/24 2:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget) >>>>> wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a >>>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't >>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering >>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path. >>>>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or >>>>>> the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up >>>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a >>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left >>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that >>>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where >>>>>> it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above >>>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was >>>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the >>>>> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how >>>>> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not* >>>> all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality, >>>> ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and >>>> one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable >>>> differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by >>>> reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in >>>> various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the pondering makes no difference.
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the >>>> brain is otherwise at rest.
Are you seriously suggesting that the brain is at rest when we are
sleeping?
Relatively, yes. And not just when sleeping, but when relaxing over
dinner, doing routine tasks, etc.
"The brain shows an intrinsic activity that remains independent of
external stimuli or tasks. This high level of continuous activity in
the brain is described as spontaneous, intrinsic or resting state
activity. The term resting state activity is rather paradox since it signifies the opposite of what the term itself says: the brain is
never really at rest, and if it is at rest, it is dead, brain death,
as the neurologist says."
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/learning-the-unwell-brain/201601/the-brain-is-always-active
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal >>>>> but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined. >>>> But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of
competence.
Sorry, I don't even know what you mean by that.
Not a problem. It's not a topic I will pursue.
On Tue, 23 Apr 2024 07:58:55 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 22/04/2024 10:23, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 17 Apr 2024 15:37:42 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 17/04/2024 13:54, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 13 Apr 2024 14:41:16 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>
On 12/04/2024 13:56, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 11 Apr 2024 21:32:18 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-11 2:42 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 10 Apr 2024 10:19:45 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote:
snip
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this >>>>>>>>> point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making >>>>>>>>> is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the >>>>>> most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot >>>>>> explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various >>>>>> visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When >>>>>> you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any >>>>>> aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we
experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference
between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean
consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience >>>>> things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular >>>>> sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from; >>>>> how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them; >>>>> one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality
yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail >>>>> part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of
discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built
arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision >>>>>> after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that >>>> would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and >>>> that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically >>>> studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never
account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters
here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed >>>> to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests
science can't study.
I accept that science can only study *visible* behaviour - that is the
very definition of science. That doesn't mean that all the answers can
be found purely through visible behaviour and we certainly should not
rule out potential answers just because they aren't based on visible
behaviour. There seems to be a double standard here; scientists rule
out dualism because it's non-visible yet are quite happy to accept
other ideas that are equally unamenable to study, like the multiverse
for example.
I don't think that's a very relevant tangent since we've established
that we're talking about visible stuff anyway, but I think that's a
pretty big misunderstanding about how science works or what "study the
visible" implies.
I think we are talking at cross-purposes here, perhaps partly because
of your choice of the word "visible". Perhaps "quantifiable" or
"testable" would have been a better choice.
Science isn't about mindlessly looking at things,
science is about building models, theories - and validating them by
figuring out if they have any consequence on what anything might look
and looking there. The theory is more fundamental than the observations
and it can get away with even the most glancing relationship to the
"visible". The issue with dualism isn't that it's non-visible, it's that
it has no explanatory power and the main reason it has no explanatory
power is that it behaves like a false idea in response to evidence (for
example act like it's irrelevant when brain activity turns out to
totally correlate with every distinct aspect of the mind one can find).
In other words there is "being non-visible" and then there's "actively
shunning visibility", and dualism does the latter. This is a tradeoff of
risk of disconfirmation for lack of content, and it's lack of content
that's the real problem for science.
Multiverse ideas that science entertains (which is obviously not all of
them) are straightforward deductions from models that have been
otherwise validated by their interactions with visible things,
That doesn't mean that their answers are reliable. The Ptolemaic model
was used for rather a long time, giving what mostly were correct
answers but turned out to be utterly wrong in its foundation.
and the
scientists entertaining them would love nothing more than to work out
consequences of these models that would result in a
yet-unobserved-but-visible difference compared to other models. Because
until they do, being "entertained" by science is the best those ideas
can hope for.
Okay, then I have no idea what Cobb is talking about. Maybe he's
But it sounds like it isn't the hard problem of consciousness you are
talking about, but more that you don't think science could account for >>>> the behavior of philosophical zombies to begin with.
I think you are overplaying the zombies problem, it's just one thought
experiment to illustrate the 'hard problem'. Having said that, I'm not
suggesting that science could not account for it; what I am saying is
that the *approach* science has taken so far has provided very few
real answers and I think we need to widen our thinking (no pun
intended).
He's not talking about the 'hard problem' at all; he only briefly
Except that there are scientists working on the problem and believe they
have some promising ideas (there is a short discussion in last months >>>>>>>> Scientific American on AI)
They have been promising for rather a long time. As I pointed out to >>>>>>> you two months ago, in Matthew Cobb's book "The Idea of the Brain", he >>>>>>> refers back to a meeting of 20 scientists in Quebec in1953 for a 5-day >>>>>>> symposium on 'Brain Mechanisms and Consciousness'. Opening the
symposium, Horace "Tid" Winchell Magoun, regarded as one of the
fathers of neuroscience, warned his colleagues of 'the head-shaking >>>>>>> sympathy with which future investigators will probably look back upon >>>>>>> the groping efforts of the mid-twentieth century, for there is every >>>>>>> indication that the neural basis of consciousness is a problem that >>>>>>> will not be solved quickly'. Cobb observes that "Tid would probably >>>>>>> have been amused to learn that nearly seventy years later the neural >>>>>>> basis of consciousness is still not understood, nor, the optimism of >>>>>>> Science magazine notwithstanding, is there any sign of an answer on >>>>>>> the horizon."
Has there been some major development since that book was published of >>>>>>> which I am not aware?
Plenty. Scanning technology has improved and has allowed to connect >>>>>> brain functioning to all kinds of conscious processes and behaviors to >>>>>> an extent they didn't imagine in 1953 or whenever it is they came up >>>>>> with the joke of the astronaut saying "I've been hundreds of times to >>>>>> space & have never seen God" and the neurosurgeon answering "I've
operated on hundreds of brains & have never seen a thought". Dualists >>>>>> now straight-up grant that brain processes *correlate* to conscious >>>>>> activity and see dualism as a claim that this correlation isn't
identity. Of course for science "correlations" is all one can ever study >>>>>> so it isn't an issue for developing our understanding.
I wasn't talking about development since 1953, I was talking about
development since Cobb's book was published in 2020. Unless, of
course, you are trying to suggest that there were significant
developments since 1953 that he failed to take into account. I would >>>>> need to see specific examples of that because the book is a
comprehensive account of the study of the brain from Ancient Greece
(and even earlier) through to the present day. TBH, I found the detail >>>>> he goes into a bit tedious at times.
You're right, I'd missed that or kinda skipped over it. I haven't read >>>> the book but reading the sentence and some reviews it looks like he is >>>> talking about the hard problem of consciousness - i.e. he isn't saying >>>> there's been no progress since 1953 in accounting for the neural bases >>>> of our behavior, or the way our internal lives correlate to brain
events, but that this isn't the same as accounting for
qualia/awareness/[the thing philosophical zombies lack], and it's that >>>> last one he sees no progress on.
If that is indeed what he's saying then we debate how unrelated the
"easy problem" is to the "hard problem" but the position is at least
defensible. But it's not the one you seem to have.
Am I wrong about what he's saying, and if so do you maybe have a quote >>>> that shows more clearly he's talking about lack of progress on the
neural basis of more specific aspects of consciousness you're thinking >>>> of like decision-making, emotion, imagination, predicting the future etc? >>>
touches on Chalmers and also Nagel ('What Is It Like to be a Bat?')
and dismisses both of them as not taking us any further forward,
having nothing to offer regarding answers:
"These views [Chalmers and Nagel] are really a confession of despair,
for we know even less about hypothetical immaterial substances or
speculative exotic states of matter and how they might or might not
interact with the physical world than we do about how brain activity
produces consciousness. Not one piece of experimental evidence
directly points to a non-material explanation of mind. And above all,
the materialist scientific approach contains within it an
investigative programme that can in principle resolve the question
through experimentation. This is not the case for any of the
alternatives."
Cobb is only concerned with our efforts to understand how the brain
work; although he never calls it that, he's effectively talking about
what are supposed to be the *easy* problems i.e. those that should be
solvable using a materialist approach.
referring to some bar for "understanding" or "answer" that hasn't been
met and not saying there's been no change at all, or maybe he's
referring to some specific over-optimistic predictions made by that 1953
magazine. Or maybe he's indeed saying something I disagree with, idk.
Bearing in mind that Cobb is an ardent materialist (see the quote
about Chalmers and Nigel above), I think you would find the book an interesting read.
The more basic behavioral tools of breaking down consciousness & mental >>>>>> life into distinct processes via double dissociations, studying people >>>>>> with brain and/or psychological disorders and running experiments have >>>>>> also continued bearing fruit. Antonio Damasio for example who wrote >>>>>> classics in the field mostly uses such methods IIRC and his first book >>>>>> is in 1994, over 40 years after 1953.
Cobb does discuss the work of Damasio and others in the context of
localisation theories, particularly the different roles played by the >>>>> left and right hemispheres of the brain. He goes on to show how those >>>>> localisation theories have been shown to fall short in further studies >>>>> showing that if a particular hemisphere stops functioning, the other >>>>> hemisphere can take over that function. He particularly refers to work >>>>> by Robert Sperry, 19814 Nobel recipient, that showed that when the
corpus callosum, which connects the two hemispheres, is physically
severed, each hemisphere starts to perform as a whole brain,
recreating the functions of the missing hemisphere. In Sperry's own
words: "The split-brain cat or monkey is thus in many respects an
animal with two separate brains that may be used either together or in >>>>> alternation." Although Sperry's work was initially on animals, further >>>>> work by one of his students on a man who had his corpus callosum
severed to treat epilepsy showed the same thing in humans.
Damasio's work goes far beyond localisation theories, and the fact a
hard right brain/left brain division has been abandoned to some extent >>>> and brain plasticity is a thing hardly undermines the more general
observation that certain aspects of consciousness are associated with
certain areas within the brain.
Yes, I accept that but a single book covering every aspect of every
researcher is obviously impossible. I'm not familiar with Damasio's
work but I'd guess that Cobb has addressed at least some aspects by
discussing work by other reearchers in the same area. Have you any
specific aspect of his work in mind?
I read "The man who mistook his wife for a hat" and "Musicophilia"; the
former is as fun as the title suggests but I'm guessing your reading
list is quite full already :)
I've bumped 'The Evolution of Agency' up my list and I'm currently
just over a third of the way through it; as you said it's a fairly
short and easy read. I'm finding it an interesting read but so far I
can't see how it in any way supports determinism - it seems the very
opposite - but I'm always cautious about judging a book until I read
it fully so I'll discuss that when I'm finished with it.
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/22/24 2:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget) >>>>> wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was >>>>>>>> an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in
deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a >>>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't >>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering >>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path. >>>>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or >>>>>> the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right,
process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up >>>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a >>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left >>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that
is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination,
one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the
robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It
can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that >>>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where >>>>>> it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above >>>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was >>>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the >>>>> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for
the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of
rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how >>>>> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will
reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not* >>>> all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality, >>>> ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and >>>> one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable >>>> differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by >>>> reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the
decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in >>>> various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our
social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the pondering makes no difference.
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
On 4/26/24 12:27 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/22/24 2:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget) >>>>>> wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further >>>>>>>>>> was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption >>>>>>>> that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in >>>>>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a >>>>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't >>>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it >>>>>>>> doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering >>>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path. >>>>>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or >>>>>>> the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right, >>>>>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up >>>>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a >>>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left >>>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that >>>>>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From
the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination, >>>>>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the >>>>>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It >>>>>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that >>>>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where >>>>>>> it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm,
it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above >>>>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was >>>>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the >>>>>> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for >>>>>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of >>>>>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how >>>>>> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will >>>>>> reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not* >>>>> all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality, >>>>> ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and >>>>> one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable >>>>> differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by >>>>> reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the >>>>> decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in >>>>> various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our >>>>> social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if
the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit >>>> more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or
not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering
when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
pondering makes no difference.
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 12:42:17 +0100, Ernest Major
<{$to$}@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
On 26/04/2024 08:27, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/22/24 2:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget) >>>>>>> wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in >>>>>>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a >>>>>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't >>>>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering >>>>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path. >>>>>>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or >>>>>>>> the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right, >>>>>>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up >>>>>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a >>>>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left >>>>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that >>>>>>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From >>>>>>>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination, >>>>>>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the >>>>>>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It >>>>>>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that >>>>>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where >>>>>>>> it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm, >>>>>>>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above >>>>>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was >>>>>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the >>>>>>> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for >>>>>>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of >>>>>>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how >>>>>>> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will >>>>>>> reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not* >>>>>> all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality, >>>>>> ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and >>>>>> one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable >>>>>> differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by >>>>>> reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the >>>>>> decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in >>>>>> various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our >>>>>> social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if >>>>> the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit >>>>> more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or >>>>> not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering >>>>> when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a >>>> tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
pondering makes no difference.
Determinism isn't the same as the decision being made for them.
Determinism is the decision being inevitable, given both the conditions
and the agent. Change the conditions or the agent, and the decision may
be different.
I don't see how that matters, according to determinism, those changes
in conditions and/or agent have in turn been determined by previous
events. That is where you get into an endless regression leading us to
the conclusion that I just quoted to Mark that "… as soon as the Big
Bang took place 13 billion years ago, the entire history of the
universe was already settled."
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
You are making the assumption that the decision is always the same with
the pondering as it would be if have if the pondering has not occurred,
i.e. that the brain processes involved in the pondering had no causal
effect.
No, I'm not making that assumption. The pondering may change the
decision but it's nstill only changing to a decision that is already determined. The question I'm asking is in terms of Cost vs Benefits -
if determinism is true, what benefit is gained from the cost in terms
of brain activity of that pondering?
and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the >>>>>> brain is otherwise at rest.
Are you seriously suggesting that the brain is at rest when we are
sleeping?
Relatively, yes. And not just when sleeping, but when relaxing over
dinner, doing routine tasks, etc.
"The brain shows an intrinsic activity that remains independent of
external stimuli or tasks. This high level of continuous activity in
the brain is described as spontaneous, intrinsic or resting state
activity. The term resting state activity is rather paradox since it
signifies the opposite of what the term itself says: the brain is
never really at rest, and if it is at rest, it is dead, brain death,
as the neurologist says."
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/learning-the-unwell-brain/201601/the-brain-is-always-active
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal >>>>>>> but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of
determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined. >>>>>> But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of >>>>>> competence.
Sorry, I don't even know what you mean by that.
Not a problem. It's not a topic I will pursue.
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 13:46:18 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 25/04/2024 09:55, Martin Harran wrote:
On Tue, 23 Apr 2024 07:58:55 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 22/04/2024 10:23, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 17 Apr 2024 15:37:42 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>
On 17/04/2024 13:54, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 13 Apr 2024 14:41:16 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>>>
On 12/04/2024 13:56, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 11 Apr 2024 21:32:18 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-11 2:42 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 10 Apr 2024 10:19:45 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
snip
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this >>>>>>>>>>> point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the >>>>>>>> most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot >>>>>>>> explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various >>>>>>>> visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When >>>>>>>> you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any >>>>>>>> aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we >>>>>>> experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference >>>>>>> between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean >>>>>>> consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience >>>>>>> things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular >>>>>>> sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from; >>>>>>> how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them; >>>>>>> one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality >>>>>>> yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail >>>>>>> part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of >>>>>>> discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built >>>>>>>> arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision >>>>>>>> after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that >>>>>> would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and >>>>>> that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically >>>>>> studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never >>>>>> account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters >>>>>> here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed >>>>>> to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests >>>>>> science can't study.
I accept that science can only study *visible* behaviour - that is the >>>>> very definition of science. That doesn't mean that all the answers can >>>>> be found purely through visible behaviour and we certainly should not >>>>> rule out potential answers just because they aren't based on visible >>>>> behaviour. There seems to be a double standard here; scientists rule >>>>> out dualism because it's non-visible yet are quite happy to accept
other ideas that are equally unamenable to study, like the multiverse >>>>> for example.
I don't think that's a very relevant tangent since we've established
that we're talking about visible stuff anyway, but I think that's a
pretty big misunderstanding about how science works or what "study the >>>> visible" implies.
I think we are talking at cross-purposes here, perhaps partly because
of your choice of the word "visible". Perhaps "quantifiable" or
"testable" would have been a better choice.
I guess we are talking at cross-purposes because neither word was what I
meant. I used "visible" as a word that pertains to *phenomena*;
"quantifiable" and "testable" are words that pertain to *models* - or
more precisely relationships of models to phenomena. (... and by
"phenomena" I don't just mean "things we observe" because that would
make "visible phenomena" a tautology; I mean the presumed "real things"
that under realism would be the causes of our observations but exist
independently of them, and some of which could in principle never cause
an observation at all).
Sorry, you're losing me a bit here. Perhaps it is me still
misunderstanding exactly what you mean by 'visible'. Thing don't have
to be visible for us to study them and draw conclusions; we can study
the effects or symptoms that they have and try to work out what could
be causing those effects or symptoms. Gravity is an example - gravity
itself is not visible and we don't even know yet exactly what it is,
but we have figured out a heck of a lot about it by studying the
effects and symptoms. We need,however, some way to assess those
effects and symptoms and that is where 'quantifiable' and 'testable'
come in.
"Quantifying" a phenomenon means building a mathematically tractable
model of it; "quantifiable" is a word that applies to phenomena only
insofar as it's referring to *ideas about* those phenomena. And us being
able to easily form mathematically tractable ideas about something is
completely distinct from us being able to observe the thing. As for
"testable", a model being "testable" does mean it implies some visible
phenomena because scientific testing means comparing observations to
predictions, but again it's the *model* that's testable not the
phenomenon and the testability is very much downstream of visibility.
So when you said "dualism" and "multiverse theory" are both non-visible
so it's a double standard that science considers one but not the other,
No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
"the best candidate for burning there has been for many years." I
don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
reason. It is heresy."
'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 13:46:18 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 25/04/2024 09:55, Martin Harran wrote:
On Tue, 23 Apr 2024 07:58:55 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 22/04/2024 10:23, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 17 Apr 2024 15:37:42 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>
On 17/04/2024 13:54, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 13 Apr 2024 14:41:16 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>>>
On 12/04/2024 13:56, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 11 Apr 2024 21:32:18 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-11 2:42 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 10 Apr 2024 10:19:45 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
snip
As discussed just a couple of months ago, science, at least at this >>>>>>>>>>> point in time, cannot explain consciousness of which decision-making
is a subset.
Is this an accurate description of the problem though? I thought the >>>>>>>> most common dualist position at this point was that science cannot >>>>>>>> explain *qualia*, and that explaining the underpinnings of various >>>>>>>> visible behaviors could never even in principle account for them. When >>>>>>>> you say "consciousness" in that sentence do you mean "qualia" or "any >>>>>>>> aspect of consciousness at all"?
Qualia is one of those loosely defined expressions for things we >>>>>>> experience. A typical example is how do you explain the difference >>>>>>> between 'black' and 'white' to a person blind from birth? I mean >>>>>>> consciousness in *all* its many aspects such as how we do experience >>>>>>> things like colour and why we are awed by, for example, a spectacular >>>>>>> sunset but other things like how we are able to forecast future
conditions and plan ahead for them; where our moral values come from; >>>>>>> how we can create imaginary characters and build a story about them; >>>>>>> one of favourites is negative numbers - they don't exist in reality >>>>>>> yet the drive the commerce and financial systems which are an esentail >>>>>>> part of modern life. The big one for me, however, is how do
neurological processes lead to us being able to have the sort of >>>>>>> discussion and debate that we are having right here?
Thank you for clarifying.
And is "decision-making" not a visible
behavior? Certainly this whole conversation seems to have built >>>>>>>> arguments on visible manifestations of it (like coming to a decision >>>>>>>> after sleeping on it, or changing one's mind).
Sorry, I can't get a handle on your point here, why you think
*visibility* of behaviour is relevant.
Because that's the core of what's called "the hard problem of
consciousness"; the idea that we can imagine philosophical zombies that >>>>>> would outwardly behave exactly like us but with no inner experience and >>>>>> that the behavior of such philosophical zombies might be scientifically >>>>>> studiable, but that is all science could study and science can never >>>>>> account for subjective experience. The visibility of behavior matters >>>>>> here because it's what makes it amenable to scientific study, as opposed >>>>>> to qualia/subjective experience/the thing the hard problem suggests >>>>>> science can't study.
I accept that science can only study *visible* behaviour - that is the >>>>> very definition of science. That doesn't mean that all the answers can >>>>> be found purely through visible behaviour and we certainly should not >>>>> rule out potential answers just because they aren't based on visible >>>>> behaviour. There seems to be a double standard here; scientists rule >>>>> out dualism because it's non-visible yet are quite happy to accept
other ideas that are equally unamenable to study, like the multiverse >>>>> for example.
I don't think that's a very relevant tangent since we've established
that we're talking about visible stuff anyway, but I think that's a
pretty big misunderstanding about how science works or what "study the >>>> visible" implies.
I think we are talking at cross-purposes here, perhaps partly because
of your choice of the word "visible". Perhaps "quantifiable" or
"testable" would have been a better choice.
I guess we are talking at cross-purposes because neither word was what I
meant. I used "visible" as a word that pertains to *phenomena*;
"quantifiable" and "testable" are words that pertain to *models* - or
more precisely relationships of models to phenomena. (... and by
"phenomena" I don't just mean "things we observe" because that would
make "visible phenomena" a tautology; I mean the presumed "real things"
that under realism would be the causes of our observations but exist
independently of them, and some of which could in principle never cause
an observation at all).
Sorry, you're losing me a bit here. Perhaps it is me still
misunderstanding exactly what you mean by 'visible'. Thing don't have
to be visible for us to study them and draw conclusions; we can study
the effects or symptoms that they have and try to work out what could
be causing those effects or symptoms. Gravity is an example - gravity
itself is not visible and we don't even know yet exactly what it is,
but we have figured out a heck of a lot about it by studying the
effects and symptoms. We need,however, some way to assess those
effects and symptoms and that is where 'quantifiable' and 'testable'
come in.
"Quantifying" a phenomenon means building a mathematically tractable
model of it; "quantifiable" is a word that applies to phenomena only
insofar as it's referring to *ideas about* those phenomena. And us being
able to easily form mathematically tractable ideas about something is
completely distinct from us being able to observe the thing. As for
"testable", a model being "testable" does mean it implies some visible
phenomena because scientific testing means comparing observations to
predictions, but again it's the *model* that's testable not the
phenomenon and the testability is very much downstream of visibility.
So when you said "dualism" and "multiverse theory" are both non-visible
so it's a double standard that science considers one but not the other,
No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
"the best candidate for burning there has been for many years."
I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
reason. It is heresy."
'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>> Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation >issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false. And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself. Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:32:48 -0700, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/27/24 1:09 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
[big snip for focus]
No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we
figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
As I understand it, lots of people *have* figured out ways to study
effects that would come from dualism, and those effects are not there.
If there were *lots* of them then it shouldn't be hard for you to give
an example or two.
Thus we reject dualism not because it is hard to study, but because it
has been studied and found wanting.
I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
"the best candidate for burning there has been for many years."
Sheldrake's proposal is quackery. Anyone with more than a passing
familiarity with the many and various forms of quackery does not need to
read past the two words "morphic resonance" to by 99% sure that it is hokum.
Thank you for providing that perfect example of what I was talking
about.
The irony in all this is that Sheldrake is a self-declared atheist who started his work with the aim of finding scientific answers that would
dispel supernatural ideas.
I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
reason. It is heresy."
How does one give a scientific critique of magic?
Who asked for a scientific critique of magic? Certainly not me.
An explanation of why you think Sheldrake's work was magic and not
science would be useful.
If anything can
happen, how do you test for "anything"?
'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
Why not? Surely metaphors have a place in science, and "heresy" is
useful as a metaphor.
Maybe it's something to do with my understanding of science where the
driving force is the effort to find answers to new questions and new
answers to old questions without being hidebound by existing
orthodoxy. Thankfully, there have been some exceptionally successful scientists who shared that understanding.
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two.
Perhaps you should contact all those philosophers who spend so much
time debating the difference and tell them they are wasting their
time.
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/26/24 12:27 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/22/24 2:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget) >>>>>>> wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free Will
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also >>>>>>>>>>> common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it?
Do you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions >>>>>>>>>> (lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in >>>>>>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a >>>>>>>>> bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't >>>>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering >>>>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path. >>>>>>>> The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or >>>>>>>> the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right, >>>>>>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up >>>>>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a >>>>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left >>>>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that >>>>>>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From >>>>>>>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination, >>>>>>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the >>>>>>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It >>>>>>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that >>>>>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where >>>>>>>> it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants.
Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or
right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it
didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct
me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm, >>>>>>>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above >>>>>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was >>>>>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the >>>>>>> information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for >>>>>>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of >>>>>>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how >>>>>>> many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will >>>>>>> reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not* >>>>>> all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality, >>>>>> ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and >>>>>> one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable >>>>>> differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by >>>>>> reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the >>>>>> decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in >>>>>> various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our >>>>>> social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible
kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the
underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if >>>>> the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then
that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the
benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit >>>>> more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or >>>>> not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost
involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering >>>>> when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a >>>> tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving.
It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
pondering makes no difference.
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
No, that is not at all how determinism works. It does not say that if
you move to Tibet you will somehow feel the to buy that house inn the
USA. What determinism says is that if you move to Tibet, you will
decide to buy a different house but that decision has not been a free
will one, it was a result of your conditions changing (moving to
Tibet). Your change of country, however, was also not a free will
choice, it in turn was the result of other conditions and preceding
events:
"If determinism is true, then as soon as the Big Bang took place 13
billion years ago, the entire history of the universe was already
settled. Every event that's ever occurred was already predetermined
before it occurred. And this includes human decisions. If determinism
is true, then everything you've ever done - every choice you've ever
made - was already predetermined before our solar system even existed.
And if this is true, then it has obvious implications for free will.
Suppose that you're in an ice cream parlor, waiting in line, trying to
decide whether to order chocolate or vanilla ice cream. And suppose
that when you get to the front of the line, you decide to order
chocolate. Was this choice a product of your free will? Well, if
determinism is true, then your choice was completely caused by prior
events. The immediate causes of the decision were neural events that
occurred in your brain just prior to your choice. But, of course, if determinism is true, then those neural events that caused your
decision had physical causes as well; they were caused by even earlier
events - events that occurred just before they did. And so on,
stretching back into the past. We can follow this back to when you
were a baby, to the very first events of your life. In fact, we can
keep going back before that, because if determinism is true, then
those first events were also caused by prior events. We can keep going
back to events that occurred before you were even conceived, to events involving your mother and father and a bottle of Chianti.
So if determinism is true, then it was already settled before you were
born that you were going to order chocolate ice cream when you got to
the front of the line. And, of course, the same can be said about all
of our decisions, and it seems to follow from this that human beings
do not have free will."
https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/determinism-classical-argument-against-free-will-failure/
That full article is well worth a read, he covers a range of issues
including the arguments between determinists like Einstein and
indeterminists like Heisenberg and Bohr.
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced >technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some >Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably >determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
--Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:32:48 -0700, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/27/24 1:09 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
[big snip for focus]
No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we
figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
As I understand it, lots of people *have* figured out ways to study
effects that would come from dualism, and those effects are not there.
If there were *lots* of them then it shouldn't be hard for you to give
an example or two.
Thus we reject dualism not because it is hard to study, but because it
has been studied and found wanting.
I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens
and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
"the best candidate for burning there has been for many years."
Sheldrake's proposal is quackery. Anyone with more than a passing
familiarity with the many and various forms of quackery does not need to
read past the two words "morphic resonance" to by 99% sure that it is hokum.
Thank you for providing that perfect example of what I was talking
about.
The irony in all this is that Sheldrake is a self-declared atheist who started his work with the aim of finding scientific answers that would
dispel supernatural ideas.
I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
reason. It is heresy."
How does one give a scientific critique of magic?
Who asked for a scientific critique of magic? Certainly not me.
An explanation of why you think Sheldrake's work was magic and not
science would be useful.
If anything can
happen, how do you test for "anything"?
'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
Why not? Surely metaphors have a place in science, and "heresy" is
useful as a metaphor.
Maybe it's something to do with my understanding of science where the
driving force is the effort to find answers to new questions and new
answers to old questions without being hidebound by existing
orthodoxy. Thankfully, there have been some exceptionally successful scientists who shared that understanding.
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 07:42:01 -0700, erik simpson
<eastside.erik@gmail.com> wrote:
On 4/28/24 11:12 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 02:16:38 +0000, *Hemidactylus*The main problem with this group is that we don't have nearly as many
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
[...]
So I guess youve abandoned Teilhard for Sheldrake now. Who next? Deepak >>>> Chopra?
What part of "I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas
and I'm certainly not seeking to defend them" did you not understand?
Or have you decided to replace some of our departed brethren and take
on their approach of arguing against something a person *didn't* say
rather than what they did say?
[...]
cranks and nutters as formerly. Let's all resolve to be at least
occasionally unreasonable in order to maintain mental muscle tone.
The problem with that idea is that I never tolerated the previous
cranks and nutters making up shit about me so, in order to maintain
the environment, I can't tolerate it from their replacements.
Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Determinism and free will are not incompatible.
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free >>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation >>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless. >>
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:24:45 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:Not sure how that works, assuming the Wiki entry is
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Determinism and free will are not incompatible.
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me >>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free >>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation >>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
accurate:
"Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in
the universe, including human decisions and actions, are
causally inevitable."
To me, "causally inevitable" removes the possibility of free
will by making the concept of "choice" irrelevant; if your
decision is causally inevitable it's not a decision at all.
(This in an example of why I tend to avoid discussions in
philosophy; as with Talmudic scholars, any 3 individuals
have at least seven opinions, most contradictory. :-) )
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:30:36 +0000, *Hemidactylus* <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 07:42:01 -0700, erik simpsonGood way to avoid following up on my points per Gould vs Teilhard or to my >> posting evidence that the field of developmental biology has gotten along
<eastside.erik@gmail.com> wrote:
On 4/28/24 11:12 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 02:16:38 +0000, *Hemidactylus*The main problem with this group is that we don't have nearly as many
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
[...]
So I guess you?ve abandoned Teilhard for Sheldrake now. Who next? Deepak >>>>>> Chopra?
What part of "I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas >>>>> and I'm certainly not seeking to defend them" did you not understand? >>>>>
Or have you decided to replace some of our departed brethren and take >>>>> on their approach of arguing against something a person *didn't* say >>>>> rather than what they did say?
[...]
cranks and nutters as formerly. Let's all resolve to be at least
occasionally unreasonable in order to maintain mental muscle tone.
The problem with that idea is that I never tolerated the previous
cranks and nutters making up shit about me so, in order to maintain
the environment, I can't tolerate it from their replacements.
fine invoking morphogenetic fields without needing Sheldrakes spooky psi >> nonsense.
You won't be getting any follow up now. I won't waste my limited time
trying to have a rational discussion with someone who just makes up
shit about me.
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free >>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation >>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless. >>
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".
It's sometimes amusing to
discuss such things as determinism vs. free will, or the
number of angels which can occupy a pin point, but it
becomes boring fairly quickly due to the lack of any way,
even conceptually, to determine the answer. Which, as I
noted below, brings it down to a matter of belief in the
validity of personal experience.
Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
On 4/28/24 8:40 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:32:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/27/24 1:09 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
[big snip for focus]
No, my issue is not with science favouring the study of one of them
because it is relatively easy to study it using well-established
practices that have produced good results in other areas; my issue is
science *ruling out* one of them out in principle. To some extent,
that is understandable because of it being so much less amenable to
study using those well-established practices but in the same way as we >>>> figured out gravity, I think we should be able to figure out ways of
studying the effects and symptoms that would come from dualism.
As I understand it, lots of people *have* figured out ways to study
effects that would come from dualism, and those effects are not there.
If there were *lots* of them then it shouldn't be hard for you to give
an example or two.
Dualism implies that brain stimulation should not affect mind (it does),
and an organ through which mind influences brain (never found).
Thus we reject dualism not because it is hard to study, but because it
has been studied and found wanting.
I get the impression, however, that it goes deeper than just being
difficult to study, there seems to be near-paranoia about opening a
door that might let God in. Take, for example, the early work done by
Rupert Sheldrake. He came up with the idea of 'morphic resonance',
that there is something like a cloud of collective memory that
everything adds to and draws from. He did some research using chickens >>>> and published it in book form. Sir John Maddox viciously attacked the
book in an editorial in Nature, in a statement that caused
considerable jaw-dropping in the scientific ommunity, described it as
"the best candidate for burning there has been for many years."
Sheldrake's proposal is quackery. Anyone with more than a passing
familiarity with the many and various forms of quackery does not need to >>> read past the two words "morphic resonance" to by 99% sure that it is hokum.
Thank you for providing that perfect example of what I was talking
about.
The irony in all this is that Sheldrake is a self-declared atheist who
started his work with the aim of finding scientific answers that would
dispel supernatural ideas.
I don't have an opinion either way on Sheldrakes' ideas and I'm
certainly not seeking to defend them, but what disturbed me was that
Maddox made no scientific attempt to critique his ideas and research,
baldly claiming in a BBC interview that "Sheldrake is putting forward
magic instead of science, and that can be condemned in exactly the
language that the Pope used to condemn Galileo, and for the same
reason. It is heresy."
How does one give a scientific critique of magic?
Who asked for a scientific critique of magic? Certainly not me.
An explanation of why you think Sheldrake's work was magic and not
science would be useful.
If anything can
happen, how do you test for "anything"?
'Heresy' is a word that should not have any place in science.
Why not? Surely metaphors have a place in science, and "heresy" is
useful as a metaphor.
Maybe it's something to do with my understanding of science where the
driving force is the effort to find answers to new questions and new
answers to old questions without being hidebound by existing
orthodoxy. Thankfully, there have been some exceptionally successful
scientists who shared that understanding.
This raises the larger issue of pseudoscience as a whole. It is a
humungous field, which includes issues that range from wasting people's
time to killing people outright to starting world wars. Scientists are reluctant to most of such issues because (a) they *are* a huge waste of
time, and (b) responding is often cited by the crackpots as proof that
they are being taken seriously, so they must be right. If the issues get
big enough (e.g. homeopathy), then they are worth debunking. But usually
not before.
Sheldrake was enough of a scientist to know how to make his case scientifically. He tried to do so. And his case has been unproductive.
Some of his studies can't be replicated. Others are vague. If he is
right, then where are all the telepaths he says exist?
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free >>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation >>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless. >>
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...". It's sometimes amusing to
discuss such things as determinism vs. free will, or the
number of angels which can occupy a pin point, but it
becomes boring fairly quickly due to the lack of any way,
even conceptually, to determine the answer. Which, as I
noted below, brings it down to a matter of belief in the
validity of personal experience.
Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 15:04:07 +0200, Athel Cornish-BowdenAs I said elsethread, I think Gould an effective antidote to Teilhard. The drunkards walk against a lower boundary of minimal complexity is one angle. Upwards from this grade just happens. Bacteria remain nestled there and are the predominate form of life still. They may enjoy primitive forms of internetworking (proto-thinking layer) and certainly fileshare using
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 10:36:02 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Mon, 22 Apr 2024 11:39:56 +0200, Athel Cornish-Bowden
<me@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 2024-04-22 08:52:51 +0000, Martin Harran said:
On Fri, 19 Apr 2024 14:08:58 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote: >>>>>>
On 17/04/2024 12:14, Martin Harran wrote:
snip
Another aspect that strikes me is how individual minds can operate >>>>>>>> collectively, almost as if a new mind is generated as in mob hysteria >>>>>>>> but also in other useful ways; as a management consultant delivering >>>>>>>> management development programmes, one of my favourite topics was >>>>>>>> showing how collective decisions are generally better than individual >>>>>>>> decisions. Although that has long been recognised in management and >>>>>>>> business, I am not aware of any attempt to study it from a science >>>>>>>> perspective.
I read this a few days ago and thought "shhh keep your responses >>>>>>> relevant and focused, don't bring your latest hobbyhorse into every >>>>>>> conversation it's even vaguely reminiscent of" [I ask that you imagine >>>>>>> here Taylor Tomlinson miming the effects of antidepressants:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=47WXVTpnOyU&t=228s ]
But that laudable instinct wore off apparently. You know what book has >>>>>>> some interesting things to say about collective decision-making? "The >>>>>>> Evolution of Agency" by Michael Tomasello ! \o/
Actually one could argue it has a lot to say about decision-making in >>>>>>> general, it just gets at the problem from a very different angle than >>>>>>> the "how it works in the brain" that you seem to be talking about. >>>>>>> That's why I hesitated on the relevance front. But if a more high-level >>>>>>> discussion of how decision-making might work in its most general form, >>>>>>> that comes up with a very interesting perspective on the relationship of
individual humans to the collective, seems like it might interest you >>>>>>> it's a pretty short and (IMO) accessible book.
I've added the book to my list but for somewhat different reasons than >>>>>> what you have said above. I have long been intrigued by the ideas of >>>>>> Teilhard de Chardin
Have you read Peter Medawar's review of Theilhard de Chardin's book? I >>>>> can't find the complete review on the web, though I'm pretty sure it's >>>>> there: I've certainly read it, and I haven't got a subscription to
Mind. Anyway, some of the most characteristic parts are quoted here: >>>>> https://reasonandmeaning.com/2015/03/20/p-b-medawar-critique-of-teilhard-de-chardin/
I expect you won't like it at all, but others may.
Full critique is available here:
http://bactra.org/Medawar/phenomenon-of-man.html
Unfortunately my computer thought that link was dangerous, and wouldn't
let me go there. I'll try again when it's in a better mood.
I read it some time ago. What I didn't like about it was that it is a
purely polemic attack on Teilhard, I didn't see any *scientific*
contradiction to his ideas. Can you point any out to me?
I'll try to do so when I've managed to read the whole review again.
FWIW, this article in Naure captures my own thoughts on it:
https://www.nature.com/articles/35038172
<quote>
Medawar begged to differ [with Teilhard's ideas]: in 1961 he launched
an attack on The Phenomenon of Man which by this time had become a
semi-popular classic in the journal Mind; an article subsequently
anthologized and often quoted. He successfully demolished Teilhard's
arguments in 11 pages of awesome, sustained invective. Or did he?
Curiously, on close reading there is little real critical substance.
He complains of Teilhard's style (tipsy prose-poetry), some
technical shortcomings (no grasp of the real weakness of modern
evolutionary theory), but the main substantive issue is Teilhard's
misappropriation of scientific arguments to promote a religious
standpoint (obscure pious rant) and so duping a gullible public
(educated far beyond their capacity to undertake analytical
thought). We shall never know what Teilhard thought of Medawar, as
Teilhard died in 1954.
</quote>
plasmids and (ironically enough) phages, which helps them counter human ingenuity of antibiotics.
Perhaps forest floor internetworking between trees and mycorrhizae are a sorta convergence to the grade of thinking layer. I dunno.
If not for a bolide the non-avian dinosaurs may not have been wiped away opening ecological paths or niches for mammals to take. There are so many points where evolutionary outcomes could have differed. That we are here seems meaningful to us, but not to the universe, even if Teilhard and his
pal Julian Huxley thought the universe becoming self-aware through us was a profound thought. According to Mayr, Huxley thought humans deserved the
grade (or Kingdom) of Psychozoa which seems somewhat conceited.
On 4/26/24 11:57 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/26/24 12:27 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/22/24 2:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com
(LDagget)
wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates
<cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on >>>>>>>>>>>> Free WillDo you not see that this argument depends on the belief that >>>>>>>>>>> there was
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd >>>>>>>>>>>> like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested.
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any >>>>>>>>>>>> further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort >>>>>>>>>>>> into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. >>>>>>>>>>>> It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear >>>>>>>>>>>> what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined >>>>>>>>>>>> then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it? >>>>>>>>>>>
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different >>>>>>>>>>> conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW >>>>>>>>>>> that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the >>>>>>>>>> assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in >>>>>>>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking >>>>>>>>>> things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there >>>>>>>>>> aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in
emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time
pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down >>>>>>>>> a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left >>>>>>>>> fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data.
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right, >>>>>>>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way,
sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a >>>>>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left >>>>>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that >>>>>>>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From >>>>>>>>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination, >>>>>>>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the >>>>>>>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It >>>>>>>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find >>>>>>>>> that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to >>>>>>>>> where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants. >>>>>>>>> Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or >>>>>>>>> right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it >>>>>>>>> didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct >>>>>>>>> me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm, >>>>>>>>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described >>>>>>>> above
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I >>>>>>>> was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is
available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once >>>>>>>> all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for >>>>>>>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of >>>>>>>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no
matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will >>>>>>>> reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has >>>>>>> *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price,
quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both
self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly
tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in
six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could
decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the >>>>>>> decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it >>>>>>> look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our >>>>>>> social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible >>>>>>> kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the >>>>>> underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if >>>>>> the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then >>>>>> that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the >>>>>> benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and
benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or >>>>>> not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost >>>>>> involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering >>>>>> when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example,
suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a
marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving. >>>>
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the
pondering makes no difference.
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the
decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>> Will issue has never been resolved.
No, that is not at all how determinism works. It does not say that if
you move to Tibet you will somehow feel the to buy that house inn the
USA. What determinism says is that if you move to Tibet, you will
decide to buy a different house but that decision has not been a free
will one, it was a result of your conditions changing (moving to
Tibet). Your change of country, however, was also not a free will
choice, it in turn was the result of other conditions and preceding
events:
"If determinism is true, then as soon as the Big Bang took place 13
billion years ago, the entire history of the universe was already
settled. Every event that's ever occurred was already predetermined
before it occurred. And this includes human decisions. If determinism
is true, then everything you've ever done - every choice you've ever
made - was already predetermined before our solar system even existed.
And if this is true, then it has obvious implications for free will.
Suppose that you're in an ice cream parlor, waiting in line, trying to
decide whether to order chocolate or vanilla ice cream. And suppose
that when you get to the front of the line, you decide to order
chocolate. Was this choice a product of your free will? Well, if
determinism is true, then your choice was completely caused by prior
events. The immediate causes of the decision were neural events that
occurred in your brain just prior to your choice. But, of course, if
determinism is true, then those neural events that caused your
decision had physical causes as well; they were caused by even earlier
events - events that occurred just before they did. And so on,
stretching back into the past. We can follow this back to when you
were a baby, to the very first events of your life. In fact, we can
keep going back before that, because if determinism is true, then
those first events were also caused by prior events. We can keep going
back to events that occurred before you were even conceived, to events
involving your mother and father and a bottle of Chianti.
So if determinism is true, then it was already settled before you were
born that you were going to order chocolate ice cream when you got to
the front of the line. And, of course, the same can be said about all
of our decisions, and it seems to follow from this that human beings
do not have free will."
https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/determinism-classical-argument-against-free-will-failure/
That full article is well worth a read, he covers a range of issues
including the arguments between determinists like Einstein and
indeterminists like Heisenberg and Bohr.
As it happens, I have been reading Yuval Noah Harari's _Homo Deus_ and yesterday read his take on free will. He considers it a modern myth disproved by science. One example he gives is "robo-rats", rats in a laboratory which have electrodes implanted in the pleasure centers of
their brain, which scientists can stimulate to make the rats do what the scientists want them to do. The rats turn this way and that not of their
own choice, but according to the choices of the people pressing buttons.
Now, imagine you are one of those rats. You turn left. Why? Because you *chose* to turn left. "What does it matter whether the neurons are
firing because they are stimulated by other neurons or by transplanted electrodes connected to Professor Talwar's remote control? If you ask
the rat about it, she might well tell you, 'Sure I have free will! Look,
I want to turn left -- and I turn left. I want to climb a ladder -- and
I climb a ladder. Doesn't that prove I have free will?'" [pp. 333-334]
References he cites are S.K. Talwar et al., 'Rat navigation guided by
remote control', Nature 417 (2002); Ben Harder, 'Scientists drive rats
by remote control', Nat. Geographic 1 May 2012; Tom Clarke, 'Here come
the ratbots: Desire drives remote-controlled rodents', Nature 2 May
2002; D. Graham-Rowe, 'Robo-rat controlled by brain electrodes', New Scientist 1 May 2002. Most or all of those are available online; I did
not bother copying links, nor have I read them myself.
The book on the whole is well-written, thought-provoking, and
deliberately provocative; there is stuff in there for everybody to
disagree with. Or in some cases, maybe, to hate the conclusions even as
they agree with them.
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 15:12:31 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 27/04/2024 10:09, Martin Harran wrote:
I'm snipping a lot of stuff here because I think some of the
discussion is moving towards endless circles. Also, my time for this
is a bit limited so I'm cutting to what I think are some of the key
points.
[…]
I'm a bit confused because you said earlier that "you accept science can
only study visible behavior" but now it seems you categorize gravity as
non-visible while agreeing it's something science can and does study.
I meant that gravity does have visible 'behaviour' - we can see the
apple falling from the tree and start to test/quantify different
things falling from different heights and so on.
[…]
In terms of why I originally brought this up, I was responding to your
statement that "science cannot explain consciousness of which
decision-making is a subset". I probably misread the sentence as saying
science cannot explain those things *in principle* when you actually
just meant that science can't explain them *right now*.
Yes, I meant science can't explain them right *now* but I also
expressed my opinion that science is focused on a particular approach
- neurological research - which I don't think will *on its own*
provide an explanation.
Even so I'm
surprised at the idea that science currently cannot explain
decision-making - but then I'm not sure what level of explanation you
were thinking of with that sentence.
Science can explain the neurological process that go on inside the
brain whilst we are making decisions but cannot explain how we arrive
at a particular decision.
But all that to say "visible" in this context referred to the fact that
if we think of consciousness as causing our visible behavior, then
science absolutely could explain it in principle. And I probably
misunderstood you when I thought this was something you might disagree with.
As I've said before, neurology has allowed us to get an incredible understanding of the 'mechanics' of the brain but also as I've said
before, I see that like an electronics engineer who has an incredible
depth of knowledge about the electronic processes going on in my
computer but that doesn't give him any understanding about the ideas I
am using that computer to express.
[…]
Science doesn't reject dualism in principle, it rejects it because no
dualism hypothesis meets the standards of a scientific hypothesis. "I
think we should be able to figure out ways of studying the effects and
symptoms that would come from dualism" is exactly correct! Can you give
examples of such effects or symptoms?
Okay, to take an area that intrigues me. If our mind is just the
products of our body, I would expect it to be under the control of
that body. In practice, however, it is a two-way process- our minds
can also control our bodies. For example, placebos can "cure" people
even though they have no medicinal value whatsoever. Or take
hypnotism; someone can put me into a hypnotic state where I no longer
feel pain. That hypnosis is induced by an external force which shows
that control of our mind is not confined to our own bodies.
Just to be clear, I'm not saying these are validation of dualism but
they are indicators of our minds being capable of being influenced by *external* forces.
[…]
On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me >>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free >>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation >>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than
something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?)
overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
--It's sometimes amusing to
discuss such things as determinism vs. free will, or the
number of angels which can occupy a pin point, but it
becomes boring fairly quickly due to the lack of any way,
even conceptually, to determine the answer. Which, as I
noted below, brings it down to a matter of belief in the
validity of personal experience.
My, somewhat vague and evolving, view is that it feels like I experience >'qualia' and 'make choices' between alternatives and that I am not
special, so others who report the same are not philosophical zombies >deterministically lying to me. It is a 'real thing'. I see two
possibilities. There is some unknown, evidenced phenomenon unrelated to
known physics somehow related to some minimal level of complexity of
life (dualism/free will) or a, actual activity unknown, manifestation of >physical brain activity (determinism). What leads me to believe the
second is more likely is the indirect evidence. Alteration of brain
activity (physical damage, drugs,etc) causes changes in peoples'
reported qualia and changes in (historically expected) personality and
range of choices made. This is usually observable with major changes to
the brain producing major changes in personality and/or range of
choices.but I think it not an unreasonable extrapolation to minor
changes in the brain (caused by minor changes in the environment) to
cause minor changes in experience/choices due to the same mechanisms.
Your friend George is picking new wallpaper for his living room. Knowing
your friend and his living room, you think he will likely pick something
off white with a small floral motif in blue.
You visit and see he chose pale yellow with thin blue striping. You are
not surprised by this and on discussing it with him he states he was >considering something like what you were thinking but this one really
struck him when he saw it in the store.
Or
You visit him and see he chose a vibrant, primary coloured geometric
zig-zag pattern. You think 'was he on drugs? / dropped on his head?' not >'hmm, how unusual'.
So, what is the sourcr of the phenomena we often descibe as 'dualiy'
and/or 'free will? We may never know but my personal belief, based on
the evidence I have, is that it is almost certainly due to some kind of >phyical activity, most likely in the brain (in humans and our close >relatives).
Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
--
On 4/29/24 1:29 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:24:45 +0000, the following appearedRe this topic: Did Nando survive the end-google-groups catastrophe? He
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:Not sure how that works, assuming the Wiki entry is
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Determinism and free will are not incompatible.
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me >>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all >>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free >>>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation >>>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some >>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably >>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
accurate:
"Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in
the universe, including human decisions and actions, are
causally inevitable."
To me, "causally inevitable" removes the possibility of free
will by making the concept of "choice" irrelevant; if your
decision is causally inevitable it's not a decision at all.
(This in an example of why I tend to avoid discussions in
philosophy; as with Talmudic scholars, any 3 individuals
have at least seven opinions, most contradictory. :-) )
was an expert on the subject of making choices (sometimes impossible ones).
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 13:29:50 -0700, Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off>
wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:24:45 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:Not sure how that works, assuming the Wiki entry is
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Determinism and free will are not incompatible.
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me >>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all >>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free >>>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation >>>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some >>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably >>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
accurate:
"Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in
the universe, including human decisions and actions, are
causally inevitable."
To me, "causally inevitable" removes the possibility of free
will by making the concept of "choice" irrelevant; if your
decision is causally inevitable it's not a decision at all.
I think they are only incompatible if one argues exclusively for one
or the other. As I remarked earlier in this discussion, it reminds me
a bit of the Nature vs Nurture debate, the "bit of both" answer also
applies here.
I have to go out later on today. I will wear long trousers and a
raincoat rather than shorts and a t-shirt. Whilst that is arguably a
free will choice, I don't even have to think about it - the fact that
it is cold and raining has effectively made the decision for me.
On the other hand, let's imagine I am still working and have been
offered a super promotion, a job I would love to do and a substantial >increase in salary. It means, however, a move to a different city,
disrupting family life and my children's education. There is no
obvious correct answer there, it will involve consideration of a whole
range of factors so I will need to take time for reflection and
discussion with my family before I make a decision. There are some >deterministic factors there - I wouldn't have to make the decision if
I hadn't been offered the promotion, the views of my family will have
an influence on my decision - but I don't believe my final decision is >determined in advance by those factors.
--
(This in an example of why I tend to avoid discussions in
philosophy; as with Talmudic scholars, any 3 individuals
have at least seven opinions, most contradictory. :-) )
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:43:03 -0700, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
[…]
As it happens, I have been reading Yuval Noah Harari's _Homo Deus_ and
yesterday read his take on free will. He considers it a modern myth
disproved by science. One example he gives is "robo-rats", rats in a
laboratory which have electrodes implanted in the pleasure centers of
their brain, which scientists can stimulate to make the rats do what the
scientists want them to do. The rats turn this way and that not of their
own choice, but according to the choices of the people pressing buttons.
Now, imagine you are one of those rats. You turn left. Why? Because you
*chose* to turn left. "What does it matter whether the neurons are
firing because they are stimulated by other neurons or by transplanted
electrodes connected to Professor Talwar's remote control? If you ask
the rat about it, she might well tell you, 'Sure I have free will! Look,
I want to turn left -- and I turn left. I want to climb a ladder -- and
I climb a ladder. Doesn't that prove I have free will?'" [pp. 333-334]
Most brain research that I'm aware of - including the Lbet experiments
- show a considerable difference in brain activity between trivial
decisions and important decisions. I think it's safe to say that 'Turn
left or tun right' is well into the trivial category.
You and he also seem to be making the assumption that the decision
process in rats can be directly transposed into humans which isnot necessarily the case - there are distinct difference between rats and primates, including humans. See my response to Arkalen below.
On Tue, 30 Apr 2024 16:30:47 -0700, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/30/24 2:08 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:43:03 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
[…]
As it happens, I have been reading Yuval Noah Harari's _Homo Deus_ and >>>> yesterday read his take on free will. He considers it a modern myth
disproved by science. One example he gives is "robo-rats", rats in a
laboratory which have electrodes implanted in the pleasure centers of
their brain, which scientists can stimulate to make the rats do what the >>>> scientists want them to do. The rats turn this way and that not of their >>>> own choice, but according to the choices of the people pressing buttons. >>>> Now, imagine you are one of those rats. You turn left. Why? Because you >>>> *chose* to turn left. "What does it matter whether the neurons are
firing because they are stimulated by other neurons or by transplanted >>>> electrodes connected to Professor Talwar's remote control? If you ask
the rat about it, she might well tell you, 'Sure I have free will! Look, >>>> I want to turn left -- and I turn left. I want to climb a ladder -- and >>>> I climb a ladder. Doesn't that prove I have free will?'" [pp. 333-334]
Most brain research that I'm aware of - including the Lbet experiments
- show a considerable difference in brain activity between trivial
decisions and important decisions. I think it's safe to say that 'Turn
left or tun right' is well into the trivial category.
You and he also seem to be making the assumption that the decision
process in rats can be directly transposed into humans which isnot
necessarily the case - there are distinct difference between rats and
primates, including humans. See my response to Arkalen below.
I took the rat illustration as an illustration, not as proof of final
concept. If a rat controlled by a human can be thinking, "I made that
decision on my own", so can a human controlled by fate.
Sorry to burst your bubble but that idea has already been dismissed by *neurological research*. I've previously referred to work by Wilder
Penfield who is regarded as the pioneer in surgery for epilepsy and
developed the process of carrying out surgery on fully alert patients
which allowed him to observe and record the effect of stimulating
various parts of the brain;
"The Quebec meeting heard some compelling evidence for localisation of function from Penfield, who described his work showing that electrical stimulation of the cortex could evoke both dream-like states and motor activity. But as Penfield explained, although the patient's body moved
if the motor cortex was stimulated, the subjects always said that this occurred 'independent of, or in spite of, their own volition'.
Similarly, the very precise experiences he was able to evoke never
resembled 'things seen or felt in ordinary experience' but were more
like dreams."
Cobb, Matthew. The Idea of the Brain: A History: SHORTLISTED FOR THE
BAILLIE GIFFORD PRIZE 2020 (p. 337). Profile. Kindle Edition.
On 4/30/24 2:08 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:43:03 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
[…]
As it happens, I have been reading Yuval Noah Harari's _Homo Deus_ and
yesterday read his take on free will. He considers it a modern myth
disproved by science. One example he gives is "robo-rats", rats in a
laboratory which have electrodes implanted in the pleasure centers of
their brain, which scientists can stimulate to make the rats do what the >>> scientists want them to do. The rats turn this way and that not of their >>> own choice, but according to the choices of the people pressing buttons. >>> Now, imagine you are one of those rats. You turn left. Why? Because you
*chose* to turn left. "What does it matter whether the neurons are
firing because they are stimulated by other neurons or by transplanted
electrodes connected to Professor Talwar's remote control? If you ask
the rat about it, she might well tell you, 'Sure I have free will! Look, >>> I want to turn left -- and I turn left. I want to climb a ladder -- and
I climb a ladder. Doesn't that prove I have free will?'" [pp. 333-334]
Most brain research that I'm aware of - including the Lbet experiments
- show a considerable difference in brain activity between trivial
decisions and important decisions. I think it's safe to say that 'Turn
left or tun right' is well into the trivial category.
You and he also seem to be making the assumption that the decision
process in rats can be directly transposed into humans which isnot
necessarily the case - there are distinct difference between rats and
primates, including humans. See my response to Arkalen below.
I took the rat illustration as an illustration, not as proof of final concept. If a rat controlled by a human can be thinking, "I made that decision on my own", so can a human controlled by fate.
On 5/1/24 5:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Tue, 30 Apr 2024 16:30:47 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/30/24 2:08 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:43:03 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
[…]
As it happens, I have been reading Yuval Noah Harari's _Homo Deus_ and >>>>> yesterday read his take on free will. He considers it a modern myth >>>>> disproved by science. One example he gives is "robo-rats", rats in a >>>>> laboratory which have electrodes implanted in the pleasure centers of >>>>> their brain, which scientists can stimulate to make the rats do
what the
scientists want them to do. The rats turn this way and that not of
their
own choice, but according to the choices of the people pressing
buttons.
Now, imagine you are one of those rats. You turn left. Why? Because
you
*chose* to turn left. "What does it matter whether the neurons are
firing because they are stimulated by other neurons or by transplanted >>>>> electrodes connected to Professor Talwar's remote control? If you ask >>>>> the rat about it, she might well tell you, 'Sure I have free will!
Look,
I want to turn left -- and I turn left. I want to climb a ladder --
and
I climb a ladder. Doesn't that prove I have free will?'" [pp. 333-334] >>>>
Most brain research that I'm aware of - including the Lbet experiments >>>> - show a considerable difference in brain activity between trivial
decisions and important decisions. I think it's safe to say that 'Turn >>>> left or tun right' is well into the trivial category.
You and he also seem to be making the assumption that the decision
process in rats can be directly transposed into humans which isnot
necessarily the case - there are distinct difference between rats and
primates, including humans. See my response to Arkalen below.
I took the rat illustration as an illustration, not as proof of final
concept. If a rat controlled by a human can be thinking, "I made that
decision on my own", so can a human controlled by fate.
Sorry to burst your bubble but that idea has already been dismissed by
*neurological research*. I've previously referred to work by Wilder
Penfield who is regarded as the pioneer in surgery for epilepsy and
developed the process of carrying out surgery on fully alert patients
which allowed him to observe and record the effect of stimulating
various parts of the brain;
"The Quebec meeting heard some compelling evidence for localisation of
function from Penfield, who described his work showing that electrical
stimulation of the cortex could evoke both dream-like states and motor
activity. But as Penfield explained, although the patient's body moved
if the motor cortex was stimulated, the subjects always said that this
occurred 'independent of, or in spite of, their own volition'.
Similarly, the very precise experiences he was able to evoke never
resembled 'things seen or felt in ordinary experience' but were more
like dreams."
Cobb, Matthew. The Idea of the Brain: A History: SHORTLISTED FOR THE
BAILLIE GIFFORD PRIZE 2020 (p. 337). Profile. Kindle Edition.
Good points. Thanks for reminding me.
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 10:56:54 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 27/04/2024 09:20, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 12:42:17 +0100, Ernest Major
<{$to$}@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
On 26/04/2024 08:27, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/22/24 2:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free WillDo you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it? >>>>>>>>>>>>
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in >>>>>>>>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't >>>>>>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering >>>>>>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or >>>>>>>>>> the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data. >>>>>>>>>>
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right, >>>>>>>>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up >>>>>>>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a >>>>>>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left >>>>>>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that >>>>>>>>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From >>>>>>>>>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination, >>>>>>>>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the >>>>>>>>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It >>>>>>>>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that >>>>>>>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where >>>>>>>>>> it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants. >>>>>>>>>> Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or >>>>>>>>>> right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it >>>>>>>>>> didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct >>>>>>>>>> me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm, >>>>>>>>>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above >>>>>>>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was >>>>>>>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is >>>>>>>>> available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for >>>>>>>>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of >>>>>>>>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will >>>>>>>>> reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not* >>>>>>>> all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality, >>>>>>>> ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly >>>>>>>> tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable >>>>>>>> differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by >>>>>>>> reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the >>>>>>>> decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our >>>>>>>> social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible >>>>>>>> kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the >>>>>>> underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if >>>>>>> the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then >>>>>>> that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the >>>>>>> benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit >>>>>>> more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or >>>>>>> not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost >>>>>>> involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering >>>>>>> when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a >>>>>> tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a >>>>>> marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving. >>>>>
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the >>>>> pondering makes no difference.
Determinism isn't the same as the decision being made for them.
Determinism is the decision being inevitable, given both the conditions >>>> and the agent. Change the conditions or the agent, and the decision may >>>> be different.
I don't see how that matters, according to determinism, those changes
in conditions and/or agent have in turn been determined by previous
events. That is where you get into an endless regression leading us to
the conclusion that I just quoted to Mark that "… as soon as the Big
Bang took place 13 billion years ago, the entire history of the
universe was already settled."
Right but "everything is predetermined because causes lead to effects
and you can trace back the process to the initial conditions of the
Universe" is very different from "everything is predetermined because
effects will happen regardless of a cause".
The first allows one to use causal language, the other one is plain
false (because it uses causal language and says things with it that are
incorrect).
I don't really grasp what you mean by that second version, if effects
will happen regardless of a cause then predeterminism doesn't apply by definition.
In regard to the first one, tracing everything back to the beginning
of the Universe, why stop there? What caused the Universe? ISTM that
this runs into the same issues as Aquinas's first cause argument - you
either have to accept endless regression or some specific point where whatever existed didn't have a prior cause.
There is a third take on determinism that repudiates causal
language entirely, saying "events follow each other according to a
certain pattern but we can't call them 'cause' and 'effect' because that
language relies on the counterfactual of 'what if that cause hadn't
happened' but no such counterfactual exists".
That sounds like a cop-out.
Asking "why do we ponder when the decision is predetermined" is the
second; it's suggesting that the decision being predetermined means it
has no relationship (be it causal in the first interpretation of merely
correlative in the third) to the pondering. But that is very obviously
not the world we live in: whether predetermined or not, future events
are correlated with past events.
Yes, but correlation is not necessarily causation. Go back to the
example I gave way back; the fact that I am a Catholic is correlated
with me being born into a Catholic home but that is not the cause of
me being one today -some of my siblings born into that same home have
not chosen to discard their Catholicism.
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the >>>>>> decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
You are making the assumption that the decision is always the same with >>>> the pondering as it would be if have if the pondering has not occurred, >>>> i.e. that the brain processes involved in the pondering had no causal
effect.
No, I'm not making that assumption. The pondering may change the
decision but it's nstill only changing to a decision that is already
determined. The question I'm asking is in terms of Cost vs Benefits -
if determinism is true, what benefit is gained from the cost in terms
of brain activity of that pondering?
You're framing *pondering itself* as a decision - should I ponder on
this decision or not? What are the costs and benefits? And that's fair
because the choice to ponder or not and for how long *is* a decision we
make. But if your take is that determinism means that the outcomes of
decisions are predetermined regardless of what we do, then the same is
true of the decision to ponder or not. There is no "cost-benefit
analysis", it's just the inevitable outcome of past events.
Evolution often takes an unnecessarily complicated path but there is generally an underlying reason for that. For example, the recurrent
laryngeal nerve in a giraffe is several meters long to join two parts
of the body that are only centimetres apart. We know the reason for
that, however, that as the giraffe's neck lengthened, it was easier
for the nerve to also grow longer, rather than having to create a new connection. I can't see any benefit or good reason for lengthening the decision making process and placing extra demands upon the organ that
already uses 20% of our energy total.
If you want to think of "pondering" as an evolutionary adaptation that
"cost-benefit analysis" is a relevant metric to you can do that, it's
just a different perspective on the same phenomenon. But can't apply one
perspective to "pondering" and the opposite perspective to "the decision
being pondered" in the same sentence.
It would be like saying "why does natural selection favor dark moths
when whether they get eaten or not is predetermined?". Yeah, it's
predetermined... *in part by the moth's color*.
"In part" is the key there. Conditions obviously influence the
decisions we make but that doesn't mean the decision is inevitable. I
see echoes of probability in QM in our day to day lives. The chances
of a child born into a black, inner-city ghetto ending up in jail are
a lot higher than for a white child born to prosperous parents in an
affluent neighbourhood. Clearly, every child born into a black,
inner-city ghetto does not end up in jail and I think that is at least
in part down to people ultimately having free choice to go a different direction from the one that conditions are sending them towards.
and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the
brain is otherwise at rest.
Are you seriously suggesting that the brain is at rest when we are >>>>>>> sleeping?
Relatively, yes. And not just when sleeping, but when relaxing over >>>>>> dinner, doing routine tasks, etc.
"The brain shows an intrinsic activity that remains independent of
external stimuli or tasks. This high level of continuous activity in >>>>> the brain is described as spontaneous, intrinsic or resting state
activity. The term resting state activity is rather paradox since it >>>>> signifies the opposite of what the term itself says: the brain is
never really at rest, and if it is at rest, it is dead, brain death, >>>>> as the neurologist says."
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/learning-the-unwell-brain/201601/the-brain-is-always-active
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal >>>>>>>>> but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of >>>>>>>>> determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of >>>>>>>> competence.
Sorry, I don't even know what you mean by that.
Not a problem. It's not a topic I will pursue.
On 02/05/2024 00:22, Mark Isaak wrote:
On 5/1/24 5:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Tue, 30 Apr 2024 16:30:47 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/30/24 2:08 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:43:03 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
[…]
As it happens, I have been reading Yuval Noah Harari's _Homo Deus_ >>>>>> and
yesterday read his take on free will. He considers it a modern myth >>>>>> disproved by science. One example he gives is "robo-rats", rats in a >>>>>> laboratory which have electrodes implanted in the pleasure centers of >>>>>> their brain, which scientists can stimulate to make the rats do
what the
scientists want them to do. The rats turn this way and that not of >>>>>> their
own choice, but according to the choices of the people pressing
buttons.
Now, imagine you are one of those rats. You turn left. Why?
Because you
*chose* to turn left. "What does it matter whether the neurons are >>>>>> firing because they are stimulated by other neurons or by
transplanted
electrodes connected to Professor Talwar's remote control? If you ask >>>>>> the rat about it, she might well tell you, 'Sure I have free will! >>>>>> Look,
I want to turn left -- and I turn left. I want to climb a ladder
-- and
I climb a ladder. Doesn't that prove I have free will?'" [pp.
333-334]
Most brain research that I'm aware of - including the Lbet experiments >>>>> - show a considerable difference in brain activity between trivial
decisions and important decisions. I think it's safe to say that 'Turn >>>>> left or tun right' is well into the trivial category.
You and he also seem to be making the assumption that the decision
process in rats can be directly transposed into humans which isnot
necessarily the case - there are distinct difference between rats and >>>>> primates, including humans. See my response to Arkalen below.
I took the rat illustration as an illustration, not as proof of final
concept. If a rat controlled by a human can be thinking, "I made that
decision on my own", so can a human controlled by fate.
Sorry to burst your bubble but that idea has already been dismissed by
*neurological research*. I've previously referred to work by Wilder
Penfield who is regarded as the pioneer in surgery for epilepsy and
developed the process of carrying out surgery on fully alert patients
which allowed him to observe and record the effect of stimulating
various parts of the brain;
"The Quebec meeting heard some compelling evidence for localisation of
function from Penfield, who described his work showing that electrical
stimulation of the cortex could evoke both dream-like states and motor
activity. But as Penfield explained, although the patient's body moved
if the motor cortex was stimulated, the subjects always said that this
occurred 'independent of, or in spite of, their own volition'.
Similarly, the very precise experiences he was able to evoke never
resembled 'things seen or felt in ordinary experience' but were more
like dreams."
Cobb, Matthew. The Idea of the Brain: A History: SHORTLISTED FOR THE
BAILLIE GIFFORD PRIZE 2020 (p. 337). Profile. Kindle Edition.
Good points. Thanks for reminding me.
I think he makes a good point to highlight that we don't just blindly
think "this was my decision" of any behavior we display - we have sophisticated systems to examine our own behavior and relate it to
possible decisions that can result in us thinking "this was my decision"
but also "my body is moving against my will" or "this wasn't like me" or
"I have no idea why I did that" or "I'll regret this" - or indeed "it
wasn't my fault [=this wasn't a decision at all]" or "they made me do it
[=it was someone else's decision]".
I think it's still worth noting that this system can be fooled (some
might even argue that accuracy isn't its primary purpose to being with,
so), so the rat thinking "it's my decision to turn left" when some
dopamine center is stimulated isn't that unrealistic for humans. For
example I think there are experiments with people with blindsight where
their decisions would be prompted by visual stimuli their brain
processed but that they couldn't consciously see, and they'd give justifications for why they'd made that decision, fully seeing them as
their own and not coming from external prompts.
I don't think that helps save the analogy though because 1) actual experiments into this probably involve as Martin Harran points out
trivial decisions that could go either way for anyone. Our decisions go through many layers and loops of sophisticated filters. One could
imagine asking a person to pick a red or a blue token and flashing "red"
in their blindsight field of vision could make them pick red, but if you flashed "kill your wife" the most you'd get is them having a vague
sentiment of unease, or a weird intrusive thought as the suggested
decision got immediately quashed by the rest of the decision-making
system for all the obvious reasons. It kind of gets into the general
question of how manipulable humans can be and the overall situation
seems to be "yes" and "not infinitely so though". Like Barnum said about being able to fool everyone some of the time and some people all of the
time but not all the people all of the time.
On 5/2/24 5:45 AM, Arkalen wrote:
On 02/05/2024 00:22, Mark Isaak wrote:
On 5/1/24 5:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Tue, 30 Apr 2024 16:30:47 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/30/24 2:08 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:43:03 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
[…]
As it happens, I have been reading Yuval Noah Harari's _Homo
Deus_ and
yesterday read his take on free will. He considers it a modern myth >>>>>>> disproved by science. One example he gives is "robo-rats", rats in a >>>>>>> laboratory which have electrodes implanted in the pleasure
centers of
their brain, which scientists can stimulate to make the rats do
what the
scientists want them to do. The rats turn this way and that not
of their
own choice, but according to the choices of the people pressing
buttons.
Now, imagine you are one of those rats. You turn left. Why?
Because you
*chose* to turn left. "What does it matter whether the neurons are >>>>>>> firing because they are stimulated by other neurons or by
transplanted
electrodes connected to Professor Talwar's remote control? If you >>>>>>> ask
the rat about it, she might well tell you, 'Sure I have free
will! Look,
I want to turn left -- and I turn left. I want to climb a ladder >>>>>>> -- and
I climb a ladder. Doesn't that prove I have free will?'" [pp.
333-334]
Most brain research that I'm aware of - including the Lbet
experiments
- show a considerable difference in brain activity between trivial >>>>>> decisions and important decisions. I think it's safe to say that
'Turn
left or tun right' is well into the trivial category.
You and he also seem to be making the assumption that the decision >>>>>> process in rats can be directly transposed into humans which isnot >>>>>> necessarily the case - there are distinct difference between rats and >>>>>> primates, including humans. See my response to Arkalen below.
I took the rat illustration as an illustration, not as proof of final >>>>> concept. If a rat controlled by a human can be thinking, "I made that >>>>> decision on my own", so can a human controlled by fate.
Sorry to burst your bubble but that idea has already been dismissed by >>>> *neurological research*. I've previously referred to work by Wilder
Penfield who is regarded as the pioneer in surgery for epilepsy and
developed the process of carrying out surgery on fully alert patients
which allowed him to observe and record the effect of stimulating
various parts of the brain;
"The Quebec meeting heard some compelling evidence for localisation of >>>> function from Penfield, who described his work showing that electrical >>>> stimulation of the cortex could evoke both dream-like states and motor >>>> activity. But as Penfield explained, although the patient's body moved >>>> if the motor cortex was stimulated, the subjects always said that this >>>> occurred 'independent of, or in spite of, their own volition'.
Similarly, the very precise experiences he was able to evoke never
resembled 'things seen or felt in ordinary experience' but were more
like dreams."
Cobb, Matthew. The Idea of the Brain: A History: SHORTLISTED FOR THE
BAILLIE GIFFORD PRIZE 2020 (p. 337). Profile. Kindle Edition.
Good points. Thanks for reminding me.
I think he makes a good point to highlight that we don't just blindly
think "this was my decision" of any behavior we display - we have
sophisticated systems to examine our own behavior and relate it to
possible decisions that can result in us thinking "this was my
decision" but also "my body is moving against my will" or "this wasn't
like me" or "I have no idea why I did that" or "I'll regret this" - or
indeed "it wasn't my fault [=this wasn't a decision at all]" or "they
made me do it [=it was someone else's decision]".
I think it's still worth noting that this system can be fooled (some
might even argue that accuracy isn't its primary purpose to being
with, so), so the rat thinking "it's my decision to turn left" when
some dopamine center is stimulated isn't that unrealistic for humans.
For example I think there are experiments with people with blindsight
where their decisions would be prompted by visual stimuli their brain
processed but that they couldn't consciously see, and they'd give
justifications for why they'd made that decision, fully seeing them as
their own and not coming from external prompts.
Similar examples of people rationalizing behaviors which they are not conscious of making exist for split-brain patients and people with
short-term amnesia.
I don't think that helps save the analogy though because 1) actual
experiments into this probably involve as Martin Harran points out
trivial decisions that could go either way for anyone. Our decisions
go through many layers and loops of sophisticated filters. One could
imagine asking a person to pick a red or a blue token and flashing
"red" in their blindsight field of vision could make them pick red,
but if you flashed "kill your wife" the most you'd get is them having
a vague sentiment of unease, or a weird intrusive thought as the
suggested decision got immediately quashed by the rest of the
decision-making system for all the obvious reasons. It kind of gets
into the general question of how manipulable humans can be and the
overall situation seems to be "yes" and "not infinitely so though".
Like Barnum said about being able to fool everyone some of the time
and some people all of the time but not all the people all of the time.
That quote is identified not with Barnum, but with Abraham Lincoln (even though he didn't say it). Apparently, Barnum did not say, "There's a
sucker born every minute", either.
Anyway, I don't see an meaningful distinction between small decisions
and large ones. The same sort of brain activities, presumably, occur in
each. My car doesn't have more or less free will when I take it for a 400-mile drive than which I take it just out the driveway.
On 2024-04-29 8:45 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house." >>>>>>>>>
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me >>>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all >>>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free >>>>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation >>>>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some >>>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably >>>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if >>>>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than
something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?)
overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is
probabilistic, not "clockwork".
Note: I was asking a question about *my* viewpoint concerning "something >resembling choice" given "probabilistic nature of base reality", not >ascribing that viewpoint to you.
My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that
some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term, >gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects.
How doesIt would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
this allow for "something resembling choice"?
--It's sometimes amusing to
discuss such things as determinism vs. free will, or the
number of angels which can occupy a pin point, but it
becomes boring fairly quickly due to the lack of any way,
even conceptually, to determine the answer. Which, as I
noted below, brings it down to a matter of belief in the
validity of personal experience.
My, somewhat vague and evolving, view is that it feels like I experience >>> 'qualia' and 'make choices' between alternatives and that I am not
special, so others who report the same are not philosophical zombies
deterministically lying to me. It is a 'real thing'. I see two
possibilities. There is some unknown, evidenced phenomenon unrelated to
known physics somehow related to some minimal level of complexity of
life (dualism/free will) or a, actual activity unknown, manifestation of >>> physical brain activity (determinism). What leads me to believe the
second is more likely is the indirect evidence. Alteration of brain
activity (physical damage, drugs,etc) causes changes in peoples'
reported qualia and changes in (historically expected) personality and
range of choices made. This is usually observable with major changes to
the brain producing major changes in personality and/or range of
choices.but I think it not an unreasonable extrapolation to minor
changes in the brain (caused by minor changes in the environment) to
cause minor changes in experience/choices due to the same mechanisms.
Your friend George is picking new wallpaper for his living room. Knowing >>> your friend and his living room, you think he will likely pick something >>> off white with a small floral motif in blue.
You visit and see he chose pale yellow with thin blue striping. You are
not surprised by this and on discussing it with him he states he was
considering something like what you were thinking but this one really
struck him when he saw it in the store.
Or
You visit him and see he chose a vibrant, primary coloured geometric
zig-zag pattern. You think 'was he on drugs? / dropped on his head?' not >>> 'hmm, how unusual'.
So, what is the sourcr of the phenomena we often descibe as 'dualiy'
and/or 'free will? We may never know but my personal belief, based on
the evidence I have, is that it is almost certainly due to some kind of
phyical activity, most likely in the brain (in humans and our close
relatives).
Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
--
--
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me >>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all >>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free >>>>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation >>>>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some >>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably >>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than
something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?)
overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is
probabilistic, not "clockwork".
It's sometimes amusing to
discuss such things as determinism vs. free will, or the
number of angels which can occupy a pin point, but it
becomes boring fairly quickly due to the lack of any way,
even conceptually, to determine the answer. Which, as I
noted below, brings it down to a matter of belief in the
validity of personal experience.
My, somewhat vague and evolving, view is that it feels like I experience
'qualia' and 'make choices' between alternatives and that I am not
special, so others who report the same are not philosophical zombies
deterministically lying to me. It is a 'real thing'. I see two
possibilities. There is some unknown, evidenced phenomenon unrelated to
known physics somehow related to some minimal level of complexity of
life (dualism/free will) or a, actual activity unknown, manifestation of
physical brain activity (determinism). What leads me to believe the
second is more likely is the indirect evidence. Alteration of brain
activity (physical damage, drugs,etc) causes changes in peoples'
reported qualia and changes in (historically expected) personality and
range of choices made. This is usually observable with major changes to
the brain producing major changes in personality and/or range of
choices.but I think it not an unreasonable extrapolation to minor
changes in the brain (caused by minor changes in the environment) to
cause minor changes in experience/choices due to the same mechanisms.
Your friend George is picking new wallpaper for his living room. Knowing
your friend and his living room, you think he will likely pick something
off white with a small floral motif in blue.
You visit and see he chose pale yellow with thin blue striping. You are
not surprised by this and on discussing it with him he states he was
considering something like what you were thinking but this one really
struck him when he saw it in the store.
Or
You visit him and see he chose a vibrant, primary coloured geometric
zig-zag pattern. You think 'was he on drugs? / dropped on his head?' not
'hmm, how unusual'.
So, what is the sourcr of the phenomena we often descibe as 'dualiy'
and/or 'free will? We may never know but my personal belief, based on
the evidence I have, is that it is almost certainly due to some kind of
phyical activity, most likely in the brain (in humans and our close
relatives).
Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
--
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 10:56:54 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 27/04/2024 09:20, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 12:42:17 +0100, Ernest Major
<{$to$}@meden.demon.co.uk> wrote:
On 26/04/2024 08:27, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/22/24 2:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com (LDagget)
wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>>>> wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on Free WillDo you not see that this argument depends on the belief that there was
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort into >>>>>>>>>>>>> making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear what >>>>>>>>>>>>> decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it? >>>>>>>>>>>>
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in >>>>>>>>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there aren't >>>>>>>>>>> any options to begin with but that is just a variation in emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time pondering >>>>>>>>>>> those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left fork or >>>>>>>>>> the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data. >>>>>>>>>>
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right, >>>>>>>>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, sums up >>>>>>>>>> some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a >>>>>>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear.
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left >>>>>>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that >>>>>>>>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From >>>>>>>>>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination, >>>>>>>>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the >>>>>>>>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It >>>>>>>>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find that >>>>>>>>>> its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to where >>>>>>>>>> it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants. >>>>>>>>>> Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or >>>>>>>>>> right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it >>>>>>>>>> didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct >>>>>>>>>> me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm, >>>>>>>>>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated.
It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described above >>>>>>>>> is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I was >>>>>>>>> asking about is why we delay once all the information that is >>>>>>>>> available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for >>>>>>>>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of >>>>>>>>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will >>>>>>>>> reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has *not* >>>>>>>> all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, quality, >>>>>>>> ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly >>>>>>>> tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in six-variable >>>>>>>> differential equation, much less in something that you could decide by >>>>>>>> reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the >>>>>>>> decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our >>>>>>>> social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible >>>>>>>> kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the >>>>>>> underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if >>>>>>> the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then >>>>>>> that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the >>>>>>> benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and benefit >>>>>>> more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or >>>>>>> not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost >>>>>>> involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you
identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering >>>>>>> when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example, suppose a >>>>>> tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a >>>>>> marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving. >>>>>
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the >>>>> pondering makes no difference.
Determinism isn't the same as the decision being made for them.
Determinism is the decision being inevitable, given both the conditions >>>> and the agent. Change the conditions or the agent, and the decision may >>>> be different.
I don't see how that matters, according to determinism, those changes
in conditions and/or agent have in turn been determined by previous
events. That is where you get into an endless regression leading us to
the conclusion that I just quoted to Mark that "… as soon as the Big
Bang took place 13 billion years ago, the entire history of the
universe was already settled."
Right but "everything is predetermined because causes lead to effects
and you can trace back the process to the initial conditions of the
Universe" is very different from "everything is predetermined because
effects will happen regardless of a cause".
The first allows one to use causal language, the other one is plain
false (because it uses causal language and says things with it that are
incorrect).
I don't really grasp what you mean by that second version, if effects
will happen regardless of a cause then predeterminism doesn't apply by definition.
In regard to the first one, tracing everything back to the beginning
of the Universe, why stop there? What caused the Universe? ISTM that
this runs into the same issues as Aquinas's first cause argument - you
either have to accept endless regression or some specific point where whatever existed didn't have a prior cause.
There is a third take on determinism that repudiates causal
language entirely, saying "events follow each other according to a
certain pattern but we can't call them 'cause' and 'effect' because that
language relies on the counterfactual of 'what if that cause hadn't
happened' but no such counterfactual exists".
That sounds like a cop-out.
Asking "why do we ponder when the decision is predetermined" is the
second; it's suggesting that the decision being predetermined means it
has no relationship (be it causal in the first interpretation of merely
correlative in the third) to the pondering. But that is very obviously
not the world we live in: whether predetermined or not, future events
are correlated with past events.
Yes, but correlation is not necessarily causation. Go back to the
example I gave way back; the fact that I am a Catholic is correlated
with me being born into a Catholic home but that is not the cause of
me being one today -some of my siblings born into that same home have
not chosen to discard their Catholicism.
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the >>>>>> decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
You are making the assumption that the decision is always the same with >>>> the pondering as it would be if have if the pondering has not occurred, >>>> i.e. that the brain processes involved in the pondering had no causal
effect.
No, I'm not making that assumption. The pondering may change the
decision but it's nstill only changing to a decision that is already
determined. The question I'm asking is in terms of Cost vs Benefits -
if determinism is true, what benefit is gained from the cost in terms
of brain activity of that pondering?
You're framing *pondering itself* as a decision - should I ponder on
this decision or not? What are the costs and benefits? And that's fair
because the choice to ponder or not and for how long *is* a decision we
make. But if your take is that determinism means that the outcomes of
decisions are predetermined regardless of what we do, then the same is
true of the decision to ponder or not. There is no "cost-benefit
analysis", it's just the inevitable outcome of past events.
Evolution often takes an unnecessarily complicated path but there is generally an underlying reason for that. For example, the recurrent
laryngeal nerve in a giraffe is several meters long to join two parts
of the body that are only centimetres apart. We know the reason for
that, however, that as the giraffe's neck lengthened, it was easier
for the nerve to also grow longer, rather than having to create a new connection. I can't see any benefit or good reason for lengthening the decision making process and placing extra demands upon the organ that
already uses 20% of our energy total.
If you want to think of "pondering" as an evolutionary adaptation that
"cost-benefit analysis" is a relevant metric to you can do that, it's
just a different perspective on the same phenomenon. But can't apply one
perspective to "pondering" and the opposite perspective to "the decision
being pondered" in the same sentence.
It would be like saying "why does natural selection favor dark moths
when whether they get eaten or not is predetermined?". Yeah, it's
predetermined... *in part by the moth's color*.
"In part" is the key there. Conditions obviously influence the
decisions we make but that doesn't mean the decision is inevitable. I
see echoes of probability in QM in our day to day lives. The chances
of a child born into a black, inner-city ghetto ending up in jail are
a lot higher than for a white child born to prosperous parents in an
affluent neighbourhood. Clearly, every child born into a black,
inner-city ghetto does not end up in jail and I think that is at least
in part down to people ultimately having free choice to go a different direction from the one that conditions are sending them towards.
and since it is way too
complex to do consciously, the processing (probably) works best when the
brain is otherwise at rest.
Are you seriously suggesting that the brain is at rest when we are >>>>>>> sleeping?
Relatively, yes. And not just when sleeping, but when relaxing over >>>>>> dinner, doing routine tasks, etc.
"The brain shows an intrinsic activity that remains independent of
external stimuli or tasks. This high level of continuous activity in >>>>> the brain is described as spontaneous, intrinsic or resting state
activity. The term resting state activity is rather paradox since it >>>>> signifies the opposite of what the term itself says: the brain is
never really at rest, and if it is at rest, it is dead, brain death, >>>>> as the neurologist says."
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/learning-the-unwell-brain/201601/the-brain-is-always-active
One exception to that is your suggestion of a
random number generator when the two options look more or less equal >>>>>>>>> but your problem is that that randomness is very antithesis of >>>>>>>>> determinism.
I don't think that's true. A process can be both random and determined.
But that hinges on definitions of random, and is outside my area of >>>>>>>> competence.
Sorry, I don't even know what you mean by that.
Not a problem. It's not a topic I will pursue.
On 02/05/2024 00:22, Mark Isaak wrote:
On 5/1/24 5:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Tue, 30 Apr 2024 16:30:47 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/30/24 2:08 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:43:03 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
[…]
As it happens, I have been reading Yuval Noah Harari's _Homo Deus_ >>>>>> and
yesterday read his take on free will. He considers it a modern myth >>>>>> disproved by science. One example he gives is "robo-rats", rats in a >>>>>> laboratory which have electrodes implanted in the pleasure centers of >>>>>> their brain, which scientists can stimulate to make the rats do
what the
scientists want them to do. The rats turn this way and that not of >>>>>> their
own choice, but according to the choices of the people pressing
buttons.
Now, imagine you are one of those rats. You turn left. Why?
Because you
*chose* to turn left. "What does it matter whether the neurons are >>>>>> firing because they are stimulated by other neurons or by
transplanted
electrodes connected to Professor Talwar's remote control? If you ask >>>>>> the rat about it, she might well tell you, 'Sure I have free will! >>>>>> Look,
I want to turn left -- and I turn left. I want to climb a ladder
-- and
I climb a ladder. Doesn't that prove I have free will?'" [pp.
333-334]
Most brain research that I'm aware of - including the Lbet experiments >>>>> - show a considerable difference in brain activity between trivial
decisions and important decisions. I think it's safe to say that 'Turn >>>>> left or tun right' is well into the trivial category.
You and he also seem to be making the assumption that the decision
process in rats can be directly transposed into humans which isnot
necessarily the case - there are distinct difference between rats and >>>>> primates, including humans. See my response to Arkalen below.
I took the rat illustration as an illustration, not as proof of final
concept. If a rat controlled by a human can be thinking, "I made that
decision on my own", so can a human controlled by fate.
Sorry to burst your bubble but that idea has already been dismissed by
*neurological research*. I've previously referred to work by Wilder
Penfield who is regarded as the pioneer in surgery for epilepsy and
developed the process of carrying out surgery on fully alert patients
which allowed him to observe and record the effect of stimulating
various parts of the brain;
"The Quebec meeting heard some compelling evidence for localisation of
function from Penfield, who described his work showing that electrical
stimulation of the cortex could evoke both dream-like states and motor
activity. But as Penfield explained, although the patient's body moved
if the motor cortex was stimulated, the subjects always said that this
occurred 'independent of, or in spite of, their own volition'.
Similarly, the very precise experiences he was able to evoke never
resembled 'things seen or felt in ordinary experience' but were more
like dreams."
Cobb, Matthew. The Idea of the Brain: A History: SHORTLISTED FOR THE
BAILLIE GIFFORD PRIZE 2020 (p. 337). Profile. Kindle Edition.
Good points. Thanks for reminding me.
I think he makes a good point to highlight that we don't just blindly
think "this was my decision" of any behavior we display - we have sophisticated systems to examine our own behavior and relate it to
possible decisions that can result in us thinking "this was my decision"
but also "my body is moving against my will" or "this wasn't like me" or
"I have no idea why I did that" or "I'll regret this" - or indeed "it
wasn't my fault [=this wasn't a decision at all]" or "they made me do it
[=it was someone else's decision]".
I think it's still worth noting that this system can be fooled (some
might even argue that accuracy isn't its primary purpose to being with,
so), so the rat thinking "it's my decision to turn left" when some
dopamine center is stimulated isn't that unrealistic for humans. For
example I think there are experiments with people with blindsight where
their decisions would be prompted by visual stimuli their brain
processed but that they couldn't consciously see, and they'd give justifications for why they'd made that decision, fully seeing them as
their own and not coming from external prompts.
I don't think that helps save the analogy though because 1) actual experiments into this probably involve as Martin Harran points out
trivial decisions that could go either way for anyone. Our decisions go through many layers and loops of sophisticated filters. One could
imagine asking a person to pick a red or a blue token and flashing "red"
in their blindsight field of vision could make them pick red, but if you flashed "kill your wife" the most you'd get is them having a vague
sentiment of unease, or a weird intrusive thought as the suggested
decision got immediately quashed by the rest of the decision-making
system for all the obvious reasons.
question of how manipulable humans can be and the overall situation
seems to be "yes" and "not infinitely so though". Like Barnum said about being able to fool everyone some of the time and some people all of the
time but not all the people all of the time.
But more to the point 2) as I pointed out in a different response, even
if humans can be "hacked" this way it's a quirk of humans, not an
inherent property of determinism. It is very easy to imagine a similar
system on which the direct brain control suggested in the illustration failed, even if humans themselves aren't an example of it. It's like
resting an argument that computers are deterministic on the way hacking works. It kind of invites tangents into how hacking works and whether
and how it can be avoided that aren't actually relevant to the original point.
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 8:45 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:I misinterpreted your post; my bad.
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house." >>>>>>>>>>
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me >>>>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all >>>>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced >>>>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some >>>>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably >>>>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if >>>>>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will.
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than
something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?)
overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is
probabilistic, not "clockwork".
Note: I was asking a question about *my* viewpoint concerning "something
resembling choice" given "probabilistic nature of base reality", not
ascribing that viewpoint to you.
Usually more the former than the latter, but yes, I believe
My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that
some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term,
gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects.
that is correct.
It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
How does
this allow for "something resembling choice"?
and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
It's sometimes amusing to
discuss such things as determinism vs. free will, or the
number of angels which can occupy a pin point, but it
becomes boring fairly quickly due to the lack of any way,
even conceptually, to determine the answer. Which, as I
noted below, brings it down to a matter of belief in the
validity of personal experience.
My, somewhat vague and evolving, view is that it feels like I experience >>>> 'qualia' and 'make choices' between alternatives and that I am not
special, so others who report the same are not philosophical zombies
deterministically lying to me. It is a 'real thing'. I see two
possibilities. There is some unknown, evidenced phenomenon unrelated to >>>> known physics somehow related to some minimal level of complexity of
life (dualism/free will) or a, actual activity unknown, manifestation of >>>> physical brain activity (determinism). What leads me to believe the
second is more likely is the indirect evidence. Alteration of brain
activity (physical damage, drugs,etc) causes changes in peoples'
reported qualia and changes in (historically expected) personality and >>>> range of choices made. This is usually observable with major changes to >>>> the brain producing major changes in personality and/or range of
choices.but I think it not an unreasonable extrapolation to minor
changes in the brain (caused by minor changes in the environment) to
cause minor changes in experience/choices due to the same mechanisms.
Your friend George is picking new wallpaper for his living room. Knowing >>>> your friend and his living room, you think he will likely pick something >>>> off white with a small floral motif in blue.
You visit and see he chose pale yellow with thin blue striping. You are >>>> not surprised by this and on discussing it with him he states he was
considering something like what you were thinking but this one really
struck him when he saw it in the store.
Or
You visit him and see he chose a vibrant, primary coloured geometric
zig-zag pattern. You think 'was he on drugs? / dropped on his head?' not >>>> 'hmm, how unusual'.
So, what is the sourcr of the phenomena we often descibe as 'dualiy'
and/or 'free will? We may never know but my personal belief, based on
the evidence I have, is that it is almost certainly due to some kind of >>>> phyical activity, most likely in the brain (in humans and our close
relatives).
Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
--
--
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 8:45 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:I misinterpreted your post; my bad.
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>>>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>>>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house." >>>>>>>>>>>
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me >>>>>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all >>>>>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced >>>>>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some >>>>>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably >>>>>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if >>>>>>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will. >>>>>>>
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than
something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?)
overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is
probabilistic, not "clockwork".
Note: I was asking a question about *my* viewpoint concerning "something >>> resembling choice" given "probabilistic nature of base reality", not
ascribing that viewpoint to you.
No problem.
Usually more the former than the latter, but yes, I believe
My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that
some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term, >>> gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects.
that is correct.
It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
How does
this allow for "something resembling choice"?
and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way?
What would be the restriction?
--It's sometimes amusing to
discuss such things as determinism vs. free will, or the
number of angels which can occupy a pin point, but it
becomes boring fairly quickly due to the lack of any way,
even conceptually, to determine the answer. Which, as I
noted below, brings it down to a matter of belief in the
validity of personal experience.
My, somewhat vague and evolving, view is that it feels like I experience >>>>> 'qualia' and 'make choices' between alternatives and that I am not
special, so others who report the same are not philosophical zombies >>>>> deterministically lying to me. It is a 'real thing'. I see two
possibilities. There is some unknown, evidenced phenomenon unrelated to >>>>> known physics somehow related to some minimal level of complexity of >>>>> life (dualism/free will) or a, actual activity unknown, manifestation of >>>>> physical brain activity (determinism). What leads me to believe the
second is more likely is the indirect evidence. Alteration of brain
activity (physical damage, drugs,etc) causes changes in peoples'
reported qualia and changes in (historically expected) personality and >>>>> range of choices made. This is usually observable with major changes to >>>>> the brain producing major changes in personality and/or range of
choices.but I think it not an unreasonable extrapolation to minor
changes in the brain (caused by minor changes in the environment) to >>>>> cause minor changes in experience/choices due to the same mechanisms. >>>>>
Your friend George is picking new wallpaper for his living room. Knowing >>>>> your friend and his living room, you think he will likely pick something >>>>> off white with a small floral motif in blue.
You visit and see he chose pale yellow with thin blue striping. You are >>>>> not surprised by this and on discussing it with him he states he was >>>>> considering something like what you were thinking but this one really >>>>> struck him when he saw it in the store.
Or
You visit him and see he chose a vibrant, primary coloured geometric >>>>> zig-zag pattern. You think 'was he on drugs? / dropped on his head?' not >>>>> 'hmm, how unusual'.
So, what is the sourcr of the phenomena we often descibe as 'dualiy' >>>>> and/or 'free will? We may never know but my personal belief, based on >>>>> the evidence I have, is that it is almost certainly due to some kind of >>>>> phyical activity, most likely in the brain (in humans and our close
relatives).
Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
--
--
--
On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 8:45 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:I misinterpreted your post; my bad.
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house." >>>>>>>>>>>>
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me >>>>>>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all >>>>>>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if >>>>>>>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted >>>>>>>>>>> although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that >>>>>>>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced >>>>>>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some >>>>>>>> Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably >>>>>>>> determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if >>>>>>>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will. >>>>>>>>
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than
something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?) >>>>>> overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is
probabilistic, not "clockwork".
Note: I was asking a question about *my* viewpoint concerning "something >>>> resembling choice" given "probabilistic nature of base reality", not
ascribing that viewpoint to you.
No problem.
Usually more the former than the latter, but yes, I believe
My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that >>>> some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term, >>>> gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects.
that is correct.
It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
How does
this allow for "something resembling choice"?
and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way?
What would be the restriction?
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one, based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:
On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared inHow would random events support free will?
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 8:45 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:I misinterpreted your post; my bad.
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house." >>>>>>>>>>>>>
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me >>>>>>>>>>>>> available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all >>>>>>>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if >>>>>>>>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted >>>>>>>>>>>> although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that >>>>>>>>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced >>>>>>>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if >>>>>>>>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will. >>>>>>>>>
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than >>>>>>> something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?) >>>>>>> overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is
probabilistic, not "clockwork".
Note: I was asking a question about *my* viewpoint concerning "something >>>>> resembling choice" given "probabilistic nature of base reality", not >>>>> ascribing that viewpoint to you.
No problem.
Usually more the former than the latter, but yes, I believe
My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that >>>>> some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term, >>>>> gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects.
that is correct.
It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
How does
this allow for "something resembling choice"?
and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way? >>> What would be the restriction?
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one, based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
On Fri, 03 May 2024 10:51:27 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:I believe that what I wrote above covers that.
On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared inHow would random events support free will?
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
How doesand as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
this allow for "something resembling choice" >>>>> It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way? >>>> What would be the restriction?
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one, based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
On Fri, 03 May 2024 10:51:27 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:I believe that what I wrote above covers that.
On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared inHow would random events support free will?
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 8:45 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:I misinterpreted your post; my bad.
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free >>>>>>>>>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no >>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if >>>>>>>>>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and >>>>>>>>>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted >>>>>>>>>>>>> although its implications are?
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all >>>>>>>>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that >>>>>>>>>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced >>>>>>>>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if >>>>>>>>>> not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will. >>>>>>>>>>
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than >>>>>>>> something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?) >>>>>>>> overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is
probabilistic, not "clockwork".
Note: I was asking a question about *my* viewpoint concerning "something >>>>>> resembling choice" given "probabilistic nature of base reality", not >>>>>> ascribing that viewpoint to you.
No problem.
Usually more the former than the latter, but yes, I believe
My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that >>>>>> some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term, >>>>>> gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects.
that is correct.
It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
How does
this allow for "something resembling choice"?
and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way? >>>> What would be the restriction?
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one, based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
Arkalen wrote:
[ chomp chomp chomp ]
I feel you're maybe seeing the philosophical objection to free will
based on determinism but you're missing a parallel one involved in
random choice. Basically many people feel that a choice being random
isn't "free will" anymore than it being predetermined is. That "free
will" still requires decisions to be under our control somehow, which
randomness negates. Like "free will" involves "free" and "will" and
determinism gets in the way of the "free" part but randomness gets in
the way of the "will" part.
Put another way, if we translate it into the legal domain (the area
where notions of "free will" have actual practical relevance), someone
with a mental disorder that leads them to predictably and unavoidably do
a bad thing would be considered legally incompetent - but someone with a
mental disorder that lead them to behave randomly would be considered
just as incompetent. Either way the issue is not having control over
one's actions.
Please reread that. It's frustratingly pointless for being a combination
of meta arguments and ridiculously literal parsing. I know you can do
better.
Few adherents of a dualism that includes some metaphysical realization of "free will" go so far as to deny that "choices" can be influenced by environmental factors. That some subset of those factors that coincide
with
the timing of making a choice are "random" is pretty much a given. To
what extent you are influenced by a blue car versus a white car driving
past you influences a choice you are about to make may be small or large,
but the color is essentially random with respect to the elements of most
of the sort of choices you might be challenged to make, for example what
to order off of a lunch menu. And if you have some objection to thinking
that some car of a different color can influence such a choice, use your imagination to find something else that could be an influence and fill in
the obvious blanks on a backwards causation chain as per below.
The back chain of dependencies that lead to what car passes you when has
a fading sense of determinism, by which I mean that far enough back, some critical factor, perhaps weather, was essentially random but was consequential
in determining some future event that had influence upon a choice you
are faced with.
This should be a recognized given in all discussions of free will. Nothing
in this is controversial, new, or surprising. No discussion of determinism can honestly deny that in our universe, randomness creeps in. It's a
given.
And so discussions that deny it are grossly tedious. Randomness in
causation
is a given. Choices have myriad influences of varying scale.
The free will question is, what influence is there that is not material?
How does that non-material influence act upon the material brain, by what force or mechanism? What is the evidence?
On 03/05/2024 17:24, Bob Casanova wrote:
On Fri, 03 May 2024 10:51:27 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:I believe that what I wrote above covers that.
On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared inHow would random events support free will?
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
How doesand as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
this allow for "something resembling choice" >>>>> It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way? >>>>> What would be the restriction?
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one, based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
I feel you're maybe seeing the philosophical objection to free will
based on determinism but you're missing a parallel one involved in
random choice. Basically many people feel that a choice being random
isn't "free will" anymore than it being predetermined is. That "free
will" still requires decisions to be under our control somehow, which >randomness negates. Like "free will" involves "free" and "will" and >determinism gets in the way of the "free" part but randomness gets in
the way of the "will" part.
Put another way, if we translate it into the legal domain (the area--
where notions of "free will" have actual practical relevance), someone
with a mental disorder that leads them to predictably and unavoidably do
a bad thing would be considered legally incompetent - but someone with a >mental disorder that lead them to behave randomly would be considered
just as incompetent. Either way the issue is not having control over
one's actions.
On Fri, 3 May 2024 18:14:17 +0200, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me>:
On 03/05/2024 17:24, Bob Casanova wrote:The randomness isn't in the choice, but in the ability of
On Fri, 03 May 2024 10:51:27 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:I believe that what I wrote above covers that.
On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared inHow would random events support free will?
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
How doesand as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
this allow for "something resembling choice" >>>>> It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way? >>>>>> What would be the restriction?
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one, based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
I feel you're maybe seeing the philosophical objection to free will
based on determinism but you're missing a parallel one involved in
random choice. Basically many people feel that a choice being random
isn't "free will" anymore than it being predetermined is. That "free
will" still requires decisions to be under our control somehow, which
randomness negates. Like "free will" involves "free" and "will" and
determinism gets in the way of the "free" part but randomness gets in
the way of the "will" part.
the universe to act other than as clockwork. If the universe
were clockwork, a la Newton, free will would be a
meaningless concept, since everything would proceed directly
from prior conditions, with no room for any sort of actual
choice. Since it's not, but probabilistic instead, there's
room for actual choice (or decisions, if you prefer. How it
works? Damfino; my comment was strictly about possibilities.
Put another way, if we translate it into the legal domain (the area
where notions of "free will" have actual practical relevance), someone
with a mental disorder that leads them to predictably and unavoidably do
a bad thing would be considered legally incompetent - but someone with a
mental disorder that lead them to behave randomly would be considered
just as incompetent. Either way the issue is not having control over
one's actions.
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:
On Fri, 03 May 2024 10:51:27 +0000, the following appearedTo me random means something is arbitrary in relation to surrounding
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:I believe that what I wrote above covers that.
On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared inHow would random events support free will?
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 8:45 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:I misinterpreted your post; my bad.
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth,
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free >>>>>>>>>>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no >>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if >>>>>>>>>>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted >>>>>>>>>>>>>> although its implications are?
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that >>>>>>>>>>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in >>>>>>>>>>>> itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced >>>>>>>>>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will. >>>>>>>>>>>
and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is
something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than >>>>>>>>> something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?) >>>>>>>>> overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is
probabilistic, not "clockwork".
Note: I was asking a question about *my* viewpoint concerning "something
resembling choice" given "probabilistic nature of base reality", not >>>>>>> ascribing that viewpoint to you.
No problem.
Usually more the former than the latter, but yes, I believe
My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that >>>>>>> some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term,
gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects.
that is correct.
It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
How does
this allow for "something resembling choice"?
and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way? >>>>> What would be the restriction?
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one, based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
context or preferable outcome (eg-see random mutation). If your current >behavior is but an uncontrolled hiccup, how is that free will which in my >estimation is a choice made with a preferable outcome in mind? Free will >isnt leaving outcome to rolling dice or a random number generator. Takes >deliberation out of the process that way and responsibility too.
Something could be determined but chaotic and less predictable from the POV >of others. Not sure how to work free will into that though.
On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:
[..]
Usually more the former than the latter, but yes, I believe
My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that >>>> some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term, >>>> gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects.
that is correct.
It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
How does
this allow for "something resembling choice"?
and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way?
What would be the restriction?
"Resemble" seems a peculiar choice of word there. ISTM that randomness contradict determinism but neither supports nor contradicts free will. Randomness creates options, free will decides which one we select.
Let's say I was in the shop today and decided to do a "Quick Pick" for
this weekend's lottery i.e. the numbers are selected at random by the
machine in the shop, not selected by me. Those numbers come up in the
lottery and I win a heap of money. That is a totally random event
unless someone wants to explain how it was determined that the machine
in the shop and the lottery machine both picked those numbers.
After that random event, I now have a number of choices; I could blow
the money on things I always fancied like that Ferrari and the luxury
villa in Spain; I could provide financial security for my kids; I
could support my favourite charities; I could do a mixture of those
things. Those choices are where my free will comes in.
[...]
Arkalen wrote:
[ chomp chomp chomp ]
I feel you're maybe seeing the philosophical objection to free will
based on determinism but you're missing a parallel one involved in
random choice. Basically many people feel that a choice being random
isn't "free will" anymore than it being predetermined is. That "free
will" still requires decisions to be under our control somehow, which
randomness negates. Like "free will" involves "free" and "will" and
determinism gets in the way of the "free" part but randomness gets in
the way of the "will" part.
Put another way, if we translate it into the legal domain (the area
where notions of "free will" have actual practical relevance), someone
with a mental disorder that leads them to predictably and unavoidably do
a bad thing would be considered legally incompetent - but someone with a
mental disorder that lead them to behave randomly would be considered
just as incompetent. Either way the issue is not having control over
one's actions.
Please reread that. It's frustratingly pointless for being a combination
of meta arguments and ridiculously literal parsing. I know you can do
better.
Few adherents of a dualism that includes some metaphysical realization of "free will" go so far as to deny that "choices" can be influenced by environmental factors. That some subset of those factors that coincide
with
the timing of making a choice are "random" is pretty much a given. To
what extent you are influenced by a blue car versus a white car driving
past you influences a choice you are about to make may be small or large,
but the color is essentially random with respect to the elements of most
of the sort of choices you might be challenged to make, for example what
to order off of a lunch menu. And if you have some objection to thinking
that some car of a different color can influence such a choice, use your imagination to find something else that could be an influence and fill in
the obvious blanks on a backwards causation chain as per below.
The back chain of dependencies that lead to what car passes you when has
a fading sense of determinism, by which I mean that far enough back, some critical factor, perhaps weather, was essentially random but was consequential
in determining some future event that had influence upon a choice you
are faced with.
This should be a recognized given in all discussions of free will. Nothing
in this is controversial, new, or surprising. No discussion of determinism can honestly deny that in our universe, randomness creeps in. It's a
given.
And so discussions that deny it are grossly tedious. Randomness in
causation
is a given. Choices have myriad influences of varying scale.
The free will question is, what influence is there that is not material?
How does that non-material influence act upon the material brain, by what force or mechanism? What is the evidence?
On 2024-05-03 1:43 PM, LDagget wrote:
Arkalen wrote:Yes, I agree completely. It's my belief that dualism/free will requires
[ chomp chomp chomp ]
I feel you're maybe seeing the philosophical objection to free will
based on determinism but you're missing a parallel one involved in
random choice. Basically many people feel that a choice being random
isn't "free will" anymore than it being predetermined is. That "free
will" still requires decisions to be under our control somehow, which
randomness negates. Like "free will" involves "free" and "will" and
determinism gets in the way of the "free" part but randomness gets in
the way of the "will" part.
Put another way, if we translate it into the legal domain (the area
where notions of "free will" have actual practical relevance), someone
with a mental disorder that leads them to predictably and unavoidably do
a bad thing would be considered legally incompetent - but someone with a
mental disorder that lead them to behave randomly would be considered
just as incompetent. Either way the issue is not having control over
one's actions.
Please reread that. It's frustratingly pointless for being a combination
of meta arguments and ridiculously literal parsing. I know you can do
better.
Few adherents of a dualism that includes some metaphysical realization of
"free will" go so far as to deny that "choices" can be influenced by
environmental factors. That some subset of those factors that coincide
with
the timing of making a choice are "random" is pretty much a given. To
what extent you are influenced by a blue car versus a white car driving
past you influences a choice you are about to make may be small or large,
but the color is essentially random with respect to the elements of most
of the sort of choices you might be challenged to make, for example what
to order off of a lunch menu. And if you have some objection to thinking
that some car of a different color can influence such a choice, use your
imagination to find something else that could be an influence and fill in
the obvious blanks on a backwards causation chain as per below.
The back chain of dependencies that lead to what car passes you when has
a fading sense of determinism, by which I mean that far enough back, some
critical factor, perhaps weather, was essentially random but was
consequential
in determining some future event that had influence upon a choice you
are faced with.
This should be a recognized given in all discussions of free will. Nothing >>
in this is controversial, new, or surprising. No discussion of determinism >> can honestly deny that in our universe, randomness creeps in. It's a
given.
And so discussions that deny it are grossly tedious. Randomness in
causation
is a given. Choices have myriad influences of varying scale.
The free will question is, what influence is there that is not material?
How does that non-material influence act upon the material brain, by what
force or mechanism? What is the evidence?
the existence of some non-material mechanism that I was trying to get
across.
On 04/05/2024 00:19, Bob Casanova wrote:
On Fri, 3 May 2024 18:14:17 +0200, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me>:
On 03/05/2024 17:24, Bob Casanova wrote:The randomness isn't in the choice, but in the ability of
On Fri, 03 May 2024 10:51:27 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:I believe that what I wrote above covers that.
On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared inHow would random events support free will?
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
How doesand as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
this allow for "something resembling choice" >>>>> It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way?
What would be the restriction?
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one, based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
I feel you're maybe seeing the philosophical objection to free will
based on determinism but you're missing a parallel one involved in
random choice. Basically many people feel that a choice being random
isn't "free will" anymore than it being predetermined is. That "free
will" still requires decisions to be under our control somehow, which
randomness negates. Like "free will" involves "free" and "will" and
determinism gets in the way of the "free" part but randomness gets in
the way of the "will" part.
the universe to act other than as clockwork. If the universe
were clockwork, a la Newton, free will would be a
meaningless concept, since everything would proceed directly
from prior conditions, with no room for any sort of actual
choice. Since it's not, but probabilistic instead, there's
room for actual choice (or decisions, if you prefer. How it
works? Damfino; my comment was strictly about possibilities.
You keep saying that randomness leaves "room for" actual choice or
decisions but don't engage with the arguments that what it leaves room
for aren't "choice" or "decisions".
--
Put another way, if we translate it into the legal domain (the area
where notions of "free will" have actual practical relevance), someone
with a mental disorder that leads them to predictably and unavoidably do >>> a bad thing would be considered legally incompetent - but someone with a >>> mental disorder that lead them to behave randomly would be considered
just as incompetent. Either way the issue is not having control over
one's actions.
On Fri, 03 May 2024 16:28:32 +0000, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:If the universe were strictly deterministic free will would
On Fri, 03 May 2024 10:51:27 +0000, the following appearedTo me random means something is arbitrary in relation to surrounding
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:I believe that what I wrote above covers that.
On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared inHow would random events support free will?
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 8:45 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:I misinterpreted your post; my bad.
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth, >>>>>>>>>>> and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is >>>>>>>>>>> something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free >>>>>>>>>>>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and >>>>>>>>>>>>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> although its implications are?
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that >>>>>>>>>>>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in >>>>>>>>>>>>> itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced >>>>>>>>>>>> technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will. >>>>>>>>>>>>
reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling
choice, but as for testing it...".
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than >>>>>>>>>> something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?) >>>>>>>>>> overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is >>>>>>>>> probabilistic, not "clockwork".
Note: I was asking a question about *my* viewpoint concerning "something
resembling choice" given "probabilistic nature of base reality", not >>>>>>>> ascribing that viewpoint to you.
No problem.
Usually more the former than the latter, but yes, I believe
My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that >>>>>>>> some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term,
gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects.
that is correct.
It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
How does
this allow for "something resembling choice"?
and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way? >>>>>> What would be the restriction?
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one, based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
context or preferable outcome (eg-see random mutation). If your current >> behavior is but an uncontrolled hiccup, how is that free will which in my
estimation is a choice made with a preferable outcome in mind? Free will
isnt leaving outcome to rolling dice or a random number generator. Takes >> deliberation out of the process that way and responsibility too.
Something could be determined but chaotic and less predictable from the POV >> of others. Not sure how to work free will into that though.
be a meaningless concept. Since it's not (Planck pretty well
established this in 1900) there's room for modifications
(choices) not resulting from initial conditions.
Unpredictability of results allows choice.
Arkalen wrote:
[ chomp chomp chomp ]
I feel you're maybe seeing the philosophical objection to free will
based on determinism but you're missing a parallel one involved in
random choice. Basically many people feel that a choice being random
isn't "free will" anymore than it being predetermined is. That "free
will" still requires decisions to be under our control somehow, which
randomness negates. Like "free will" involves "free" and "will" and
determinism gets in the way of the "free" part but randomness gets in
the way of the "will" part.
Put another way, if we translate it into the legal domain (the area
where notions of "free will" have actual practical relevance), someone
with a mental disorder that leads them to predictably and unavoidably do
a bad thing would be considered legally incompetent - but someone with a
mental disorder that lead them to behave randomly would be considered
just as incompetent. Either way the issue is not having control over
one's actions.
Please reread that. It's frustratingly pointless for being a combination
of meta arguments and ridiculously literal parsing. I know you can do
better.
Few adherents of a dualism that includes some metaphysical realization of "free will" go so far as to deny that "choices" can be influenced by environmental factors. That some subset of those factors that coincide
with
the timing of making a choice are "random" is pretty much a given. To
what extent you are influenced by a blue car versus a white car driving
past you influences a choice you are about to make may be small or large,
but the color is essentially random with respect to the elements of most
of the sort of choices you might be challenged to make, for example what
to order off of a lunch menu. And if you have some objection to thinking
that some car of a different color can influence such a choice, use your imagination to find something else that could be an influence and fill in
the obvious blanks on a backwards causation chain as per below.
The back chain of dependencies that lead to what car passes you when has
a fading sense of determinism, by which I mean that far enough back, some critical factor, perhaps weather, was essentially random but was consequential
in determining some future event that had influence upon a choice you
are faced with.
This should be a recognized given in all discussions of free will. Nothing
in this is controversial, new, or surprising. No discussion of determinism can honestly deny that in our universe, randomness creeps in. It's a
given.
And so discussions that deny it are grossly tedious. Randomness in
causation
is a given. Choices have myriad influences of varying scale.
The free will question is, what influence is there that is not material?
How does that non-material influence act upon the material brain, by what force or mechanism? What is the evidence?
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appearedI’m a partisan toward qualia myself, but would like to point out it is nearly synonymous with the bugbear term “lived experience” which makes it all the more amusing.
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false. And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself. Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
I think the problem with conceptualizing free will is on the one hand it’s popular kneejerk equivalence with libertarianism and on the other hand the common focus on Libet type experiments that find neural antecedents that occur only a short time before an action and the perception that one has previewed it and enacted it. Deliberation over longer periods of time and
the self-control to squelch impulsive interference are the more interesting things at play.
The most annoying thing about Sheldrake is how he caused so many people to associate his musing on formative causation and morpic fields with the far more serious concept of morphogenetic fields that developmental biologists had explored over the years. Silly stuff put forward by Sheldrake is never considered for good reason:
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9579920/
https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/immunology-and-microbiology/morphogen
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3413735/
More serious work has been done by people like Brian Goodwin, Lewis Wolpert and numerous others. All Sheldrake has done is sow confusion about the morphogenetic field concept where most laypeople and many biologists
outside that field think he’s responsible for the concept.
*Hemidactylus* <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:Randomized cricket chirps
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appearedIm a partisan toward qualia myself, but would like to point out it is
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am >>>>>> predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and >>>>>> spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if
you prefer, determination and non-determination), and
therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted
although its implications are?
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free >>>> will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation >>>> issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo.
will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and
equivocation issues" doesn't make it false. And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that
we have no way to detect the operation of free will in
itself. Testimony, of course, is irrelevant, since it may
itself be deterministic. I do see the problem, which comes
down to whether to accept of the validity of personal
experience. I happen to choose (there's that word again...)
to do so.
nearly synonymous with the bugbear term lived experience which makes it
all the more amusing.
I think the problem with conceptualizing free will is on the one hand its >> popular kneejerk equivalence with libertarianism and on the other hand the >> common focus on Libet type experiments that find neural antecedents that
occur only a short time before an action and the perception that one has
previewed it and enacted it. Deliberation over longer periods of time and
the self-control to squelch impulsive interference are the more interesting >> things at play.
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:
On Fri, 03 May 2024 16:28:32 +0000, the following appearedIm no complexity guru like Jonathan but could unpredictability stem also >from deterministic chaos which in itself is not random?
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:If the universe were strictly deterministic free will would
On Fri, 03 May 2024 10:51:27 +0000, the following appearedTo me random means something is arbitrary in relation to surrounding
in talk.origins, posted by *Hemidactylus*
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid>:
Bob Casanova <nospam@buzz.off> wrote:I believe that what I wrote above covers that.
On Thu, 2 May 2024 14:04:53 -0500, the following appeared inHow would random events support free will?
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-05-02 12:46 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:The random variation resembles nothing; it's simply an area
On Thu, 2 May 2024 12:34:10 -0500, the following appeared in
talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>:
On 2024-04-29 8:45 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:I misinterpreted your post; my bad.
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 17:49:21 -0500, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>: >>>>>>>>>>
On 2024-04-29 11:53 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:You might want to re-read what I actually wrote, which was >>>>>>>>>> not that anything is "outside reality". Reality, at base, is >>>>>>>>>> probabilistic, not "clockwork".
On Mon, 29 Apr 2024 09:12:08 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/28/24 10:32 AM, Bob Casanova wrote:Yep. I've done the same, although not in any great depth, >>>>>>>>>>>> and come to the same conclusion; the closest I've come is >>>>>>>>>>>> something like, "Well, the probabilistic nature of base >>>>>>>>>>>> reality *seems* to leave room for something resembling >>>>>>>>>>>> choice, but as for testing it...".
On Sat, 27 Apr 2024 16:50:12 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
On 4/26/24 4:27 PM, Bob Casanova wrote:OK. I'd point out that the fact that the concept of free >>>>>>>>>>>>>> will is "wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and >>>>>>>>>>>>>> equivocation issues" doesn't make it false.
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, the following appeared >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> in talk.origins, posted by Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net>:
[...]
So, if I'm understanding that correctly, there is no >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference between determinism and non-determinism (or if >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you prefer, determination and non-determination), and >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> therefore "free will" is a bugaboo which is not accepted >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> although its implications are?
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I
think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy
that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or
two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house." >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find
myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range
and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as
the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry
I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being
fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my
gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free
Will issue has never been resolved.
No detectable difference between the two. And I should have added "free
will" is also wrapped up in religious, personal angst, and equivocation
issues, which also contribute to making it a bugaboo. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
My position is not that it is false, but that it is effectively meaningless.
And that one
possible reason why there's no detectable difference is that >>>>>>>>>>>>>> we have no way to detect the operation of free will in >>>>>>>>>>>>>> itself.
I have given some thought to how, even in theory and with advanced
technology, one might detect free will, and I have come up empty. Some
Star-Trek-like parallel universe thought experiments could conceivably
determine whether the universe was deterministic or not, but even if
not, that only rules out determinism, not the lack of free will. >>>>>>>>>>>>>
Hmm, what could this "something resembling choice" be, other than >>>>>>>>>>> something 'outside' reality (ie supernatural) that somehow (magic?) >>>>>>>>>>> overrides the "probabilistic nature of base reality"?
Note: I was asking a question about *my* viewpoint concerning "something
resembling choice" given "probabilistic nature of base reality", not >>>>>>>>> ascribing that viewpoint to you.
No problem.
Usually more the former than the latter, but yes, I believe
My understanding of the "probabilistic nature of base reality" is that
some subatomic events are truly random and can have, over the long term,
gross effects and very occasionally immediate gross effects. >>>>>>>>>
that is correct.
It would mean that the universe is not, as Newton believed
How does
this allow for "something resembling choice"?
and as Planck disproved, "clockwork". And this in turn means
(to me, at least) that events are not strictly the result of
prior events; i.e., not fully deterministic. So if free will
(or choice, if you prefer) and strict determinism are the
only possibilities then free will, while restricted, is
possible.
How does that possible random variation resemble 'free will' in any way?
What would be the restriction?
where events aren't predetermined by their antecedents. And
since the main objection to the concept of free will seems
to be a philosophical one, based on determinism, in areas
where determinism doesn't govern events the objection is
irrelevant. I suppose it's more an abstract logical point
than anything rigorous, but I have yet to see anyone explain
how determinism applies to random events, thus still ruling
out free will.
context or preferable outcome (eg-see ?random? mutation). If your current >>> behavior is but an uncontrolled hiccup, how is that ?free will? which in my >>> estimation is a choice made with a preferable outcome in mind? Free will >>> isn?t leaving outcome to rolling dice or a random number generator. Takes >>> deliberation out of the process that way and responsibility too.
Something could be determined but chaotic and less predictable from the POV >>> of others. Not sure how to work free will into that though.
be a meaningless concept. Since it's not (Planck pretty well
established this in 1900) there's room for modifications
(choices) not resulting from initial conditions.
Unpredictability of results allows choice.
On Tue, 30 Apr 2024 00:56:24 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
On 29/04/2024 18:43, Mark Isaak wrote:
On 4/26/24 11:57 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 26 Apr 2024 09:32:27 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/26/24 12:27 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Wed, 24 Apr 2024 08:45:37 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/22/24 2:12 AM, Martin Harran wrote:It can only be life-saving if they have control over the decision
rOn Thu, 18 Apr 2024 18:36:48 -0700, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 4/7/24 8:01 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 6 Apr 2024 10:22:18 +0000, j.nobel.daggett@gmail.com >>>>>>>>>> (LDagget)
wrote:
Martin Harran wrote:It is *you* who have missed the point. What you have described >>>>>>>>>> above
On Fri, 5 Apr 2024 16:29:20 -0500, DB Cates
<cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-04-05 11:05 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
There was quite an interesting discussion a few weeks ago on >>>>>>>>>>>>>> Free WillDo you not see that this argument depends on the belief that >>>>>>>>>>>>> there was
vs Determinism but it died a death, at least in part due to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>> departure of some contributors to the Land Beyond GG. I'd >>>>>>>>>>>>>> like to take
up some of the issues again if anyone is interested. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>
One point made by Hemidactylus that didn't get developed any >>>>>>>>>>>>>> further
was the way that we sometimes give a lot of time and effort >>>>>>>>>>>>>> into
making a decision - he gave the example of buying a car. >>>>>>>>>>>>>> It's also
common for someone to want to "sleep it on it" before making a >>>>>>>>>>>>>> decision where the decision is important but it is not clear >>>>>>>>>>>>>> what
decision is best. If a decision is essentially predetermined >>>>>>>>>>>>>> then what
is the point of that time and effort or sleeping on it? >>>>>>>>>>>>>
an *option* to make the decision earlier under different >>>>>>>>>>>>> conditions
(lack of 'thinking it over' and/or 'sleeping on it'). IOW >>>>>>>>>>>>> that free will
exists. You are 'begging the question'.
It's actually the complete opposite, I am starting with the >>>>>>>>>>>> assumption
that there is no free will and asking what then is the point in >>>>>>>>>>>> deliberating over the various options. You seem to be taking >>>>>>>>>>>> things a
bit further and saying that if determinism exists then there >>>>>>>>>>>> aren't
any options to begin with but that is just a variation in >>>>>>>>>>>> emphasis, it
doesn't address the question of why we spend so much time >>>>>>>>>>>> pondering
those options when they don't even exist.
You missed his point.
Consider writing an algorithm controlling a robot walking down >>>>>>>>>>> a path.
The robot comes to a fork in the road. Does it take the left >>>>>>>>>>> fork or
the right fork?
The robot has no free will. It can, however, process data. >>>>>>>>>>>
The algorithm can have layered complexity. Scan left, scan right, >>>>>>>>>>> process data. Simple-minded algorithm scans 1 sec each way, >>>>>>>>>>> sums up
some score of positive and negatives and picks the best. If it's a >>>>>>>>>>> tie, it might kick the random number generator into gear. >>>>>>>>>>>
Alternatively, it can get into a loop where it keeps scanning left >>>>>>>>>>> and right until one "choice" passes a threshold for "better" that >>>>>>>>>>> is not just a greater than sign, maybe 10% better or such. From >>>>>>>>>>> the outside, this is "pause to think". With a little imagination, >>>>>>>>>>> one can add much more complexity and sophistication into how the >>>>>>>>>>> robot chooses. It can be dynamically adjusting the thresholds. It >>>>>>>>>>> can use it's wifi connection to seek external data. It can find >>>>>>>>>>> that
its wifi signal is poor at the fork in the road so back up to >>>>>>>>>>> where
it was better.
Map "go home and sleep on it" to some of that or to variants. >>>>>>>>>>> Map it into Don's words. The robot could not "choose" left or >>>>>>>>>>> right until its algorithm met the decision threshold, i.e. it >>>>>>>>>>> didn't have a legitimate option yet. (hopefully he'll correct >>>>>>>>>>> me if I have abused his intent too far)
To an outside observer lacking full knowledge of the algorithm, >>>>>>>>>>> it looked like it had a choice but inexplicably hesitated. >>>>>>>>>>
is an algorithm to process data and arrive at a decision; what I >>>>>>>>>> was
asking about is why we delay once all the information that is >>>>>>>>>> available or likely to be available *has been processed*. Once >>>>>>>>>> all the
information has been input in your algorithm there is no reason for >>>>>>>>>> the processor to continue analysing unless you add in some sort of >>>>>>>>>> rather pointless "just hang about for a while" function; no >>>>>>>>>> matter how
many times your algorithm runs with a given set of inputs, it will >>>>>>>>>> reach the same decision.
The answer to that is simple: Once all information is in, it has >>>>>>>>> *not*
all been processed. The decider may have thought about price, >>>>>>>>> quality,
ease of cleaning, subjective appreciation of pattern (for both >>>>>>>>> self and
one or two others), and availability, but there are undoubtedly >>>>>>>>> tradeoffs midst all that data that cannot be expressed in
six-variable
differential equation, much less in something that you could >>>>>>>>> decide by
reasoning. Furthermore, there are innumerable other factors that the >>>>>>>>> decider probably did not consider on the first pass (how does it >>>>>>>>> look in
various other lightings? What, if anything, would it imply about our >>>>>>>>> social status? Is it going to remind me of Aunt Agatha's horrible >>>>>>>>> kitchen?) All of that processing takes time,
Which goes back to the question I have already asked here about the >>>>>>>> underlying principle of Cost versus Benefit in Natural Selection; if >>>>>>>> the benefits from a trait or characteristic outweigh its cost, then >>>>>>>> that trait Is likely to be selected for; if the cost outweighs the >>>>>>>> benefits, then it will likely be selected against; if cost and >>>>>>>> benefit
more or less balance out, then it is really down to chance whether or >>>>>>>> not the trait well survive.
What you have said above highlights that there is significant cost >>>>>>>> involved in this pondering in terms of brain resources. Can you >>>>>>>> identify any benefits that would outweigh the cost of such pondering >>>>>>>> when the final decision is predetermined?
I think you can identify such benefits yourself. For example,
suppose a
tribe is faced with a decision of moving elsewhere or staying in a >>>>>>> marginal environment. Pondering the pros and cons can be life-saving. >>>>>>
(free will). If the decision is made for them (determinism), then the >>>>>> pondering makes no difference.
As
for the cost, that is part of the predetermination (if, indeed, the >>>>>>> decision is predetermined).
I have asked the question in the context of decisions being
predetermined or at least beyond the control of the people making
them.
I get the feeling that predetermination means, to you, that if I am
predetermined to choose to buy this house (say), then no matter what I >>>>> think, or even if I don't think at all, I will end up deciding to buy >>>>> that house. I could move to Tibet, scramble my brain with acid, and
spend all my conscious time playing Candy Crush, and still, in a day or >>>>> two, the though will come to me, "I need to buy that house."
That's not how predeterminism works. In a predetermined world, I find >>>>> myself in need or want of a house, contact a realtor who shows me
available listings; I visit those houses which are in good price range >>>>> and neighborhoods; probably I am influenced by external factors such as >>>>> the amount of traffic I had to fight through to get there or how hungry >>>>> I am at the time. The good and bad points of the different houses being >>>>> fed into my mind, I eliminate some obvious non-candidates, and let my >>>>> gut guide me to the best of the remaining.
That is predetermination at work. Note that it appears, to all
observers, exactly the same as non-predetermination. That's why the Free >>>>> Will issue has never been resolved.
No, that is not at all how determinism works. It does not say that if
you move to Tibet you will somehow feel the to buy that house inn the
USA. What determinism says is that if you move to Tibet, you will
decide to buy a different house but that decision has not been a free
will one, it was a result of your conditions changing (moving to
Tibet). Your change of country, however, was also not a free will
choice, it in turn was the result of other conditions and preceding
events:
"If determinism is true, then as soon as the Big Bang took place 13
billion years ago, the entire history of the universe was already
settled. Every event that's ever occurred was already predetermined
before it occurred. And this includes human decisions. If determinism
is true, then everything you've ever done - every choice you've ever
made - was already predetermined before our solar system even existed. >>>> And if this is true, then it has obvious implications for free will.
Suppose that you're in an ice cream parlor, waiting in line, trying to >>>> decide whether to order chocolate or vanilla ice cream. And suppose
that when you get to the front of the line, you decide to order
chocolate. Was this choice a product of your free will? Well, if
determinism is true, then your choice was completely caused by prior
events. The immediate causes of the decision were neural events that
occurred in your brain just prior to your choice. But, of course, if
determinism is true, then those neural events that caused your
decision had physical causes as well; they were caused by even earlier >>>> events - events that occurred just before they did. And so on,
stretching back into the past. We can follow this back to when you
were a baby, to the very first events of your life. In fact, we can
keep going back before that, because if determinism is true, then
those first events were also caused by prior events. We can keep going >>>> back to events that occurred before you were even conceived, to events >>>> involving your mother and father and a bottle of Chianti.
So if determinism is true, then it was already settled before you were >>>> born that you were going to order chocolate ice cream when you got to
the front of the line. And, of course, the same can be said about all
of our decisions, and it seems to follow from this that human beings
do not have free will."
https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/determinism-classical-argument-against-free-will-failure/
That full article is well worth a read, he covers a range of issues
including the arguments between determinists like Einstein and
indeterminists like Heisenberg and Bohr.
As it happens, I have been reading Yuval Noah Harari's _Homo Deus_ and
yesterday read his take on free will. He considers it a modern myth
disproved by science. One example he gives is "robo-rats", rats in a
laboratory which have electrodes implanted in the pleasure centers of
their brain, which scientists can stimulate to make the rats do what the >>> scientists want them to do. The rats turn this way and that not of their >>> own choice, but according to the choices of the people pressing buttons. >>> Now, imagine you are one of those rats. You turn left. Why? Because you
*chose* to turn left. "What does it matter whether the neurons are
firing because they are stimulated by other neurons or by transplanted
electrodes connected to Professor Talwar's remote control? If you ask
the rat about it, she might well tell you, 'Sure I have free will! Look, >>> I want to turn left -- and I turn left. I want to climb a ladder -- and
I climb a ladder. Doesn't that prove I have free will?'" [pp. 333-334]
References he cites are S.K. Talwar et al., 'Rat navigation guided by
remote control', Nature 417 (2002); Ben Harder, 'Scientists drive rats
by remote control', Nat. Geographic 1 May 2012; Tom Clarke, 'Here come
the ratbots: Desire drives remote-controlled rodents', Nature 2 May
2002; D. Graham-Rowe, 'Robo-rat controlled by brain electrodes', New
Scientist 1 May 2002. Most or all of those are available online; I did >>> not bother copying links, nor have I read them myself.
The book on the whole is well-written, thought-provoking, and
deliberately provocative; there is stuff in there for everybody to
disagree with. Or in some cases, maybe, to hate the conclusions even as
they agree with them.
Wow sounds like someone with no executive dysfunction at all. Some of us
are *constantly* going "WHY DID I DO THAT" and I'm pretty sure that's
how making a choice via neural stimulation would often feel. Of course
rationalization happens too but it's not the only way we have of
interacting with/interpreting our own behavior.
I mentioned elsewhere that my initial impression of 'The Evolution of
Agency ' is that I can't see how it in any way supports determinism. > I'm conscious that I owe you a couple of replies else-thread [(time
pressures) but having criticised Mark fore directly transposing rat
mental process to humans and other primates, here might be a useful
place to explain how I got that impression. For example, in his
introductory chapter, Tomasello says:
"To explain in the end specifically human agency- as I wish to do- we
need an account that traces the evolutionary steps in agentive
behavioral organization from creatures who make few and highly
constrained decisions to creatures who quite often decide for
themselves what to do."
Again due to time pressures, I am still only half-way through the book
(I hope to get back to it this week) so I don't want to draw final conclusions but that statement and similar ones in the early parts of
the book seem to imply choices freely made by individuals rather than determined purely by conditions.
On Thu, 2 May 2024 15:19:10 +0200, Arkalen <arkalen@proton.me> wrote:
Apologies for not getting back to this, the last couple of weeks have
been a very busy time for me. TBH, I think we have ploughed this
furrow as much as it can fruitfully be ploughed at this stage and I
want to move onto some other things including my response to the
Tomasello book. I have found it a very stimulating discussion and I'm
sure it is something we will return to at some stage!
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