Daniel Kahn Gillmor (CCed) has been working on a proposal for a stateless OpenPGP command-line interface (that would ideally eventually be supported by all OpenPGP implementations), both RFC draft and reference implementation, and we had a chat some time ago on what might be the requirements from a package manager PoV, where I mentioned I'd bring it up on the dpkg and apt lists.
I think that what we mostly need is:
* verification support for:
- multiple keyrings, mentioned explicitly as AFAIR there was talk
about dropping this from GnuPG (?) (already supported).
- inline signatures for .dsc, .changes, InRelease, etc
(planned with something lile detach-inband-signature-and-message?).
- unbundling inline signatures from their data, which could make it
possible to remove the OpenPGP signature ASCII armored parsing
code from dpkg-dev and apt, but this would come at the cost of
having to depend on such implementation, which would increase
the build-essential set. :/
- being able to warn about or reject specific weak constructs,
needed by apt, in the future by dpkg (not supported AFAICS).
* querying support for:
- getting the key ID matching a pattern in a keyring, needed by
debsig-verify to match on its policy (not supported AFAICS).
- getting the key ID used in a signature, needed by
debsig-verify to match on its policy (not supported AFAICS),
- getting the signature date (?), used by debsigs
(not supported AFAICS, seems just informational use).
* conversion support for:
- binary to ASCII armored signatures, f.ex. for upstream tarball
signatures (already supported).
* signing support for:
- specifying a key ID (not supported AFAICS?).
These are off the top of my head, I might be missing more from apt's
side though. But I think we'd all be very happy if we could stop
having to parse --with-colons stuff, and having to deal with mixed metadata and data streamed out from GnuPG. :)
Daniel Kahn Gillmor (CCed) has been working on a proposal for a
stateless OpenPGP command-line interface (that would ideally eventually
be supported by all OpenPGP implementations), both RFC draft and
I think that what we mostly need is:[…]
- inline signatures for .dsc, .changes, InRelease, etc
(planned with something lile detach-inband-signature-and-message?).
- unbundling inline signatures from their data, which could make it
possible to remove the OpenPGP signature ASCII armored parsing
code from dpkg-dev and apt, but this would come at the cost of
having to depend on such implementation, which would increase
the build-essential set. :/
- being able to warn about or reject specific weak constructs,
needed by apt, in the future by dpkg (not supported AFAICS).
* querying support for:
- getting the key ID matching a pattern in a keyring, needed by
debsig-verify to match on its policy (not supported AFAICS).
- getting the key ID used in a signature, needed by
debsig-verify to match on its policy (not supported AFAICS),
* signing support for:
- specifying a key ID (not supported AFAICS?).
"I have a keyring I know that I want to use (like
/usr/share/keyrings/ubuntu-archive-keyring.gpg) -- is the key material from
that keyring fully included in the keys trusted by apt?"
On Thu, Feb 06, 2020 at 03:28:28PM +0100, Johannes Schauer wrote:
"I have a keyring I know that I want to use (like
/usr/share/keyrings/ubuntu-archive-keyring.gpg) -- is the key material from
that keyring fully included in the keys trusted by apt?"
That is a question though you should ideally ask apt instead of trying
to peak inside its trusted keyrings and figure it out by yourself.
Who knows what might change in the keyring setup in the future. [0]
So if you can outline an interface I guess we can add it to apt-key to decouple mmdebstrap from this
(I didn't mention your bootstrap specifically as I thought you were one of the lucky ones by delegate all these problems to apt).
Quoting David Kalnischkies (2020-02-06 16:43:22)
On Thu, Feb 06, 2020 at 03:28:28PM +0100, Johannes Schauer wrote:
"I have a keyring I know that I want to use (like
/usr/share/keyrings/ubuntu-archive-keyring.gpg) -- is the key material from
that keyring fully included in the keys trusted by apt?"
That is a question though you should ideally ask apt instead of trying
to peak inside its trusted keyrings and figure it out by yourself.
Who knows what might change in the keyring setup in the future. [0]
So if you can outline an interface I guess we can add it to apt-key to decouple mmdebstrap from this
I thought using apt-key was discouraged?
(I didn't mention your bootstrap specifically as I thought you were one of the lucky ones by delegate all these problems to apt).
Far from it. Today you already discovered how bloated mmdebstrap is. One reason
is, that lots of stuff that could be in dpkg/apt actually is not. Dpkg recently
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