On Tue, 19 Oct 2021 at 09:50:46, Tweed <
usenet.tweed@gmail.com> wrote
(my responses usually follow points raised):
NY <me@privacy.invalid> wrote:
[]
The morals of this story are twofold:
- the fire-suppression system was not fit for purpose if it damaged all the >> equipment that it was trying to protect: that is the worse of the two sins - >> it is beyond belief that a non-water-based fire-suppression system should
damage equipment and the company which specified/installed it should hang
their heads in shame
Agreed.
- the disaster-recovery backup was inadequate if it did not preserve the
subtitle and AD streams that accompany the programmes: more periodic testing >> needed once a new system is developed
Agreed.
Another question that certainly should be being asked - I'm asking it,
for a start! - is how long the companies are to be _allowed_ to not meet
their requirements to provide subtitles and AD for whatever proportion
of their programming is specified? I can see that it is reasonable to
permit a _short_ break in such provision "due to unforeseen
circumstances", but there must be something in place to ensure the
provider does not gain any financial advantage (that's the only, or at
least main, thing they understand) from "dragging their feet" in
restoring such provisions - with appropriate fine (of more than their
saving) if they do.
[]
I presume the original programme makers would generate the AD and subtitles, >> so I wonder whether they have copies that can be used to regenerate the
missing data.
I'm not sure they do - certainly for AD; most American material I hear
AD for has a very British accent providing the AD, which I find quite
amusing. (I don't need AD myself, but I usually have it on - [a] I find
it useful in that it allows me to "watch" programmes while doing other
things {such as usenet!}, and [b] I have blind friends who _do_ use it,
and I like to hear what they would hear if they watched the same
programmes.)
Has there been any word yet as to *why* the fire-suppression system
triggered? Was there actually a fire or was it a false-positive tiggering? >>
(Good question. [And I hope it _is_ answered - properly, I mean, not
just "it was a software glitch" or similar no-answer.)
Well you are back to the old problem of writing adequate requirements. The >fire suppression system probably met a written requirement to put a fire
out. Doubtless that requirement called upon the system to meet some sort of >national/international standard. I bet that standard never even considered >sonic shockwaves damaging hard disks. Engineering by paperwork rather than
by experience.
Arguably, you need both. (Standards can mention things experience
_doesn't_ cover, as well as vice versa.)
[]
--
J. P. Gilliver. UMRA: 1960/<1985 MB++G()AL-IS-Ch++(p)Ar@T+H+Sh0!:`)DNAf
A biochemist walks into a student bar and says to the barman: "I'd like a pint of adenosine triphosphate, please." "Certainly," says the barman, "that'll be ATP." (Quoted in) The Independent, 2013-7-13
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