I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute. I think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with
these powers?
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if organisations can bring their own prosecutions, which may explain why the Post Office
did not think at any stage that is was rather a coincidence that 700 or
more Postmasters were apparently carrying out the same fraud. It may also explain the slowness in trying to put this dreadful injustice right.
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police forces
in the name of objectivity and independence?
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute. I think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with
these powers?
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if organisations can bring their own prosecutions, which may explain why the Post Office
did not think at any stage that is was rather a coincidence that 700 or
more Postmasters were apparently carrying out the same fraud. It may also explain the slowness in trying to put this dreadful injustice right.
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police forces
in the name of objectivity and independence?
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute. I >think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with
these powers?
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute.
I think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with these powers?
On 8 Jan 2024 at 14:11:51 GMT, ""Jeff Gaines"" <jgnewsid@outlook.com> wrote:
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute. I >> think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with
these powers?
I believe that the RSPCA has either relinquished this power or at least withdrawn from conducting its own prosecutions. It may or may not be for the reasons you suggest or possibly just to save money at the police's expense.
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if organisations >> can bring their own prosecutions, which may explain why the Post Office
did not think at any stage that is was rather a coincidence that 700 or
more Postmasters were apparently carrying out the same fraud. It may also
explain the slowness in trying to put this dreadful injustice right.
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police forces >> in the name of objectivity and independence?
It would seem likely to lead to expensive duplication of effort in various regulatory situations like Trading Standards, Health and Safety and the financial sector if the police had to duplicate all their technical expertise.
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute.
I think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with these powers?
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if
organisations can bring their own prosecutions, which may explain why
the Post Office did not think at any stage that is was rather a
coincidence that 700 or more Postmasters were apparently carrying out
the same fraud. It may also explain the slowness in trying to put this dreadful injustice right.
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police
forces in the name of objectivity and independence?
On 2024-01-08, Jeff Gaines <jgnewsid@outlook.com> wrote:
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute. I >> think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with
these powers?
Every organisation has these powers, because everyone has these powers. Pretty much anyone can take out a private prosecution.
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if organisations >> can bring their own prosecutions, which may explain why the Post Office
did not think at any stage that is was rather a coincidence that 700 or
more Postmasters were apparently carrying out the same fraud. It may also
explain the slowness in trying to put this dreadful injustice right.
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police forces >> in the name of objectivity and independence?
Perhaps - if first we ensured that the police services were all
sufficiently funded, and actually were objective and independent.
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute. I >> think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with
these powers?
I believe that the RSPCA has either relinquished this power or at least >withdrawn from conducting its own prosecutions. It may or may not be for the >reasons you suggest or possibly just to save money at the police's expense.
I couldn't find a definitive list on legislation.gov.uk, but there's a droplist here, most entries are local CPS
<https://www.thelawpages.com/prosecution-authorities/prosecution-authorities.php>
plus any private individual ...
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute.
I think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with these powers?
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if
organisations can bring their own prosecutions, which may explain why
the Post Office did not think at any stage that is was rather a
coincidence that 700 or more Postmasters were apparently carrying out
the same fraud. It may also explain the slowness in trying to put this dreadful injustice right.
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police
forces in the name of objectivity and independence?
Jeff Gaines wrote:
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute.
I think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with
these powers?
I couldn't find a definitive list on legislation.gov.uk, but there's a >droplist here, most entries are local CPS
<https://www.thelawpages.com/prosecution-authorities/prosecution-authorities.php>
plus any private individual ...
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute.
I think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with these powers?
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if
organisations can bring their own prosecutions, which may explain why
the Post Office did not think at any stage that is was rather a
coincidence that 700 or more Postmasters were apparently carrying out
the same fraud. It may also explain the slowness in trying to put this dreadful injustice right.
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police
forces in the name of objectivity and independence?
On 08/01/2024 14:11, Jeff Gaines wrote:
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to
prosecute. I think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other >>organisations with these powers?
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if >>organisations can bring their own prosecutions, which may explain why
the Post Office did not think at any stage that is was rather a
coincidence that 700 or more Postmasters were apparently carrying out
the same fraud. It may also explain the slowness in trying to put this >>dreadful injustice right.
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police >>forces in the name of objectivity and independence?
The RSPCA never had any statutory rights to carry out prosecutions, any >prosecutions that they did were private prosecutions, except perhaps in
the case where they were acting as agents of the Local Authority, as
the do in some areas.
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute. I >think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with
these powers?
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if organisations >can bring their own prosecutions, which may explain why the Post Office
did not think at any stage that is was rather a coincidence that 700 or
more Postmasters were apparently carrying out the same fraud. It may also >explain the slowness in trying to put this dreadful injustice right.
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police forces
in the name of objectivity and independence?
On 08/01/2024 in message <xn0ogl2t5pyuc1s015@news.individual.net> Jeff
Gaines wrote:
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to
prosecute. I think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other
organisations with these powers?
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if
organisations can bring their own prosecutions, which may explain why
the Post Office did not think at any stage that is was rather a
coincidence that 700 or more Postmasters were apparently carrying out
the same fraud. It may also explain the slowness in trying to put this
dreadful injustice right.
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police
forces in the name of objectivity and independence?
Many thanks for all the replies which are very interesting :-)
I find it hard to believe that the PO issue has been allowed to go on
and on with utterly disastrous effects on so many people and only now in
an election year is anybody showing any interest.
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if
organisations can bring their own prosecutions,
which may explain why
the Post Office did not think at any stage that is was rather a
coincidence that 700 or more Postmasters were apparently carrying out
the same fraud. [...]
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police
forces in the name of objectivity and independence?
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality. After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
"Andy Walker" <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote in message news:unjj9c$215pv$1@dont-email.me...
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality.
After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of
cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Er, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount
of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the system ?
bb
Jeff Gaines wrote:
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to
prosecute. I think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other
organisations with these powers?
It seems to me that objectivity could be somewhat lacking if
organisations can bring their own prosecutions, which may explain why
the Post Office did not think at any stage that is was rather a
coincidence that 700 or more Postmasters were apparently carrying out
the same fraud. It may also explain the slowness in trying to put this
dreadful injustice right.
It seems wrong to me, shouldn't we just leave it all the the police
forces in the name of objectivity and independence?
Many thanks for all the replies which are very interesting :-)
I find it hard to believe that the PO issue has been allowed to go on
and on with utterly disastrous effects on so many people and only now in
an election year is anybody showing any interest.
"Andy Walker" <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote in message news:unjj9c$215pv$1@dont-email.me...
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality.
After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of
cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Er, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount
of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the system ?
"Andy Walker" <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote in message news:unjj9c$215pv$1@dont-email.me...
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality.
After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of
cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Er, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying >these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to >pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount
of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the >system ?
On 2024-01-09, billy bookcase <billy@anon.com> wrote:
"Andy Walker" <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote in message news:unjj9c$215pv$1@dont-email.me...
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality. >>> After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of >>> cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Er, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying >> these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to
pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
Apparently there exist "Post Offices", which people known as "customers" enter into and perform transactions for goods and services.
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount
of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the
system ?
My guess would be that post offices were computerised before Horizon,
but not in a way that reported back automatically to head office, so
it would have been much easier for false accounts to be provided.
On Tue, 9 Jan 2024 18:02:15 -0000, "billy bookcase" <billy@anon.com> wrote:
"Andy Walker" <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote in message news:unjj9c$215pv$1@dont-email.me...
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality. >>> After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of >>> cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Er, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying >>these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to >>pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount
of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the >>system ?
It was all paper based before. So investigating discrepancies would have
been harder, and would have depended to a large part on there already
being reasons to suspect wrongdoing.
The big advantage of computer based record-keeping is that it's relatively easy to generate reports covering a wide range of criteria. You can spot patterns in digital records that are much harder to spot when they're all on paper.
"Jon Ribbens" <jon+usenet@unequivocal.eu> wrote in message news:slrnupr3vc.2nf.jon+usenet@raven.unequivocal.eu...
On 2024-01-09, billy bookcase <billy@anon.com> wrote:
"Andy Walker" <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote in message news:unjj9c$215pv$1@dont-email.me...
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality. >>>> After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of >>>> cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Er, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying >>> these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to >>> pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
Apparently there exist "Post Offices", which people known as "customers"
enter into and perform transactions for goods and services.
And ?
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount
of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the
system ?
My guess would be that post offices were computerised before Horizon,
but not in a way that reported back automatically to head office, so
it would have been much easier for false accounts to be provided.
How ?
In simple terms, individual branches were suppolied with cash to
pay pensions and stampe to sell to customers. If the number of
pensioners they paid out every week, didn't match the amount
they were paid by the DHSS (or whoever) and their takings didn't
match the number of stamps they'd sold, are you saying no one
would have noticed ?
"Jon Ribbens" <jon+usenet@unequivocal.eu> wrote in message news:slrnupr3vc.2nf.jon+usenet@raven.unequivocal.eu...
On 2024-01-09, billy bookcase <billy@anon.com> wrote:
"Andy Walker" <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote in message
news:unjj9c$215pv$1@dont-email.me...
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality. >>>> After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of >>>> cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Er, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying >>> these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to >>> pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
Apparently there exist "Post Offices", which people known as "customers"
enter into and perform transactions for goods and services.
And ?
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount
of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the
system ?
My guess would be that post offices were computerised before Horizon,
but not in a way that reported back automatically to head office, so
it would have been much easier for false accounts to be provided.
How ?
In simple terms, individual branches were suppolied with cash to
pay pensions and stampe to sell to customers. If the number of
pensioners they paid out every week, didn't match the amount
they were paid by the DHSS (or whoever) and their takings didn't
match the number of stamps they'd sold, are you saying no one
would have noticed ?
bb
On 2024-01-09, billy bookcase <billy@anon.com> wrote:
"Jon Ribbens" <jon+usenet@unequivocal.eu> wrote in message
news:slrnupr3vc.2nf.jon+usenet@raven.unequivocal.eu...
On 2024-01-09, billy bookcase <billy@anon.com> wrote:
"Andy Walker" <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote in message
news:unjj9c$215pv$1@dont-email.me...
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality. >>>>> After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of >>>>> cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Er, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying >>>> these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to >>>> pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
Apparently there exist "Post Offices", which people known as "customers" >>> enter into and perform transactions for goods and services.
And ?
And that's the answer to your question of where money comes from.
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount >>>> of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the >>>> system ?
My guess would be that post offices were computerised before Horizon,
but not in a way that reported back automatically to head office, so
it would have been much easier for false accounts to be provided.
How ?
In simple terms, individual branches were suppolied with cash to
pay pensions and stampe to sell to customers. If the number of
pensioners they paid out every week, didn't match the amount
they were paid by the DHSS (or whoever) and their takings didn't
match the number of stamps they'd sold, are you saying no one
would have noticed ?
I'm saying sometimes people provide false figures. If Mark's right that
post offices' accounts weren't even computerised at all before Horizon
then nobody's going to notice if the figures don't add up unless they
perform an audit. And it's often possible to make the figures add up
while still being false (e.g. through sales of goods where the stock
isn't supplied by the Post Office HQ, or through sales of services).
I'm saying sometimes people provide false figures. If Mark's right that
post offices' accounts weren't even computerised at all before Horizon
then nobody's going to notice if the figures don't add up unless they
perform an audit.
And it's often possible to make the figures add up
while still being false (e.g. through sales of goods where the stock
isn't supplied by the Post Office HQ, or through sales of services).
People have been showing growing interest in the issue for some years.
It certainly wasn't the first time I had seen the matter reported and commented upon in the media.
It can't work like that. The sub-postoffice part of the business must supply separate accounts to the Post Office. If they are cheating the Post Office this will show up by ordinary accounting practice. If they are cheating another Post Office customer, say the DWP, then ultimately this will show up.
People knew how to do accounts before the computer was invented, and I don't
accept that Horizon could do anything ordinary accounting couldn't; just quicker, and much, much cheaper in labour costs. So there is no justification for saying that Horizon could be expected to discover more fraud. On the contrary, if it was discovering non-existent fraud it was probably missing real fraud.
On 9 Jan 2024 at 19:06:38 GMT, ""billy bookcase"" <billy@anon.com> wrote:
"Jon Ribbens" <jon+usenet@unequivocal.eu> wrote in message
news:slrnupr3vc.2nf.jon+usenet@raven.unequivocal.eu...
On 2024-01-09, billy bookcase <billy@anon.com> wrote:
"Andy Walker" <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote in message
news:unjj9c$215pv$1@dont-email.me...
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality. >>>>> After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of >>>>> cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Er, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying >>>> these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to >>>> pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
Apparently there exist "Post Offices", which people known as "customers" >>> enter into and perform transactions for goods and services.
And ?
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount >>>> of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the >>>> system ?
My guess would be that post offices were computerised before Horizon,
but not in a way that reported back automatically to head office, so
it would have been much easier for false accounts to be provided.
How ?
In simple terms, individual branches were suppolied with cash to
pay pensions and stampe to sell to customers. If the number of
pensioners they paid out every week, didn't match the amount
they were paid by the DHSS (or whoever) and their takings didn't
match the number of stamps they'd sold, are you saying no one
would have noticed ?
bb
The Post Office surely must have audited its accounts.
The main differences
the new system made must have been to produce results much more quickly and to
result in the employment of thousands fewer clerks. As it turns out, the old system was probably much more reliable in producing correct results, and therefore identifying any fraud that was going on. In other words, the faulty new system was *less* likely to identify actual fraud, but much, much cheaper to run.
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computerEr, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality.
After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of
cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount
of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the system ?
On 09/01/2024 18:02, billy bookcase wrote:r all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of
[I wrote:]
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently} uncovered so much previously hidden criminality.
cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Er, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying >> these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to
pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
You're somewhat supposing a monolithic business in which things
didn't go wrong. Think rather of a village shop in the middle of nowhere with fingers in many pies and computer connexions that go down several
times per week. Data was [AIUI] routinely lost and had to be recovered
and reconciled [for which, before you ask, there were procedures].
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount
of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the
system ?
I'm sure there were, but the cash flow was so complicated that [again
AIUI] audit had been almost impossible unless fraud was already suspected.
you're part-way through downloading details of lottery tickets, TV licences, stamps, benefits, ... when the computer goes down, then there may be several thousand pounds worth of information in limbo, sent off by you as village sub-postmaster but not yet received by other agencies. Village POs are unusually complicated businesses which tend to be run by uncomplicated locals, and it's not surprising that sometimes they get the procedures
wrong, nor that sometimes a huge computer system has bugs, and the result
is a glitch in the trail. The problem wasn't the number of glitches and
bugs but the readiness of the PO to believe that the computer system was infallible.
On 09/01/2024 11:53 am, Jeff Gaines wrote:
I find it hard to believe that the PO issue has been allowed to go
on and on with utterly disastrous effects on so many people and
only now in an election year is
anybody showing any interest.
Your last paragraph is predicated upon an unsound conclusion.
People have been showing growing interest in the issue for some years.
It certainly wasn't the first time I had seen the matter reported and commented upon in the media.
On 09/01/2024 19:56, Roger Hayter wrote:
The main differences the new system made must have been to produce
results much more quickly and to result in the employment of
thousands fewer clerks. As it turns out, the old system was probably
much more reliable in producing correct results, and therefore
identifying any fraud that was going on. In other words, the faulty
new system was *less* likely to identify actual fraud, but much, much
cheaper to run.
I suspect the computer system mainly worked. Probably much better than anything that came before. The problem was that people regarded it as infallible. “Computer says no†syndrome.
On 2024-01-09, billy bookcase <billy@anon.com> wrote:
"Jon Ribbens" <jon+usenet@unequivocal.eu> wrote in message
news:slrnupr71n.2nf.jon+usenet@raven.unequivocal.eu...
I'm saying sometimes people provide false figures. If Mark's right that
post offices' accounts weren't even computerised at all before Horizon
then nobody's going to notice if the figures don't add up unless they
perform an audit.
And you don't think the PO weren't regularly auditing Branch
accounts; when possibly thousands of pounds were going through
each week by way of pensions ?
I've no idea, but I wouldn't be at all surprised if they weren't.
And it's often possible to make the figures add up
while still being false (e.g. through sales of goods where the stock
isn't supplied by the Post Office HQ, or through sales of services).
But that's undeclared profits as a result of selling bought in
stock etc.
No, and also and?
Whereas what's being talked about here are losses running into thousands
of pounds, as only occurred "after" the system was computerised.
And?
And yes a cursory bit of research suggests that indeed it was all
paper based before. Which would have made fraud that much harder
to conceal.
Surely you mean *easier* to conceal?
I have read (unconfirmed) that the issue was that when the Horizon
system connected to head office (via modem) to upload the daily records,
if the connection was dropped mid-upload (which on a modem connection
over damp string to rural locations would probably have been often)
then all the transactions which had been already uploaded would get duplicated when the connection was retried. If so this is just catastrophically, inexcusably bad software design, and most probably
*not* "much better than anything that came before".
"Jon Ribbens" <jon+usenet@unequivocal.eu> wrote in message news:slrnupr71n.2nf.jon+usenet@raven.unequivocal.eu...
I'm saying sometimes people provide false figures. If Mark's right that
post offices' accounts weren't even computerised at all before Horizon
then nobody's going to notice if the figures don't add up unless they
perform an audit.
And you don't think the PO weren't regularly auditing Branch
accounts; when possibly thousands of pounds were going through
each week by way of pensions ?
And it's often possible to make the figures add up
while still being false (e.g. through sales of goods where the stock
isn't supplied by the Post Office HQ, or through sales of services).
But that's undeclared profits as a result of selling bought in
stock etc.
Whereas what's being talked about here are losses running into thousands
of pounds, as only occurred "after" the system was computerised.
And yes a cursory bit of research suggests that indeed it was all
paper based before. Which would have made fraud that much harder
to conceal.
I'm sure there were, but the cash flow was so complicated that [again AIUI] audit had been almost impossible unless fraud was already suspected. If
you're part-way through downloading details of lottery tickets, TV licences, stamps, benefits, ... when the computer goes down, then there may be several thousand pounds worth of information in limbo, sent off by you as village sub-postmaster but not yet received by other agencies. Village POs are unusually complicated businesses which tend to be run by uncomplicated locals, and it's not surprising that sometimes they get the procedures
wrong, nor that sometimes a huge computer system has bugs, and the result
is a glitch in the trail. The problem wasn't the number of glitches and
bugs but the readiness of the PO to believe that the computer system was infallible.
On 09/01/2024 20:14, Roger Hayter wrote:
It can't work like that. The sub-postoffice part of the business must supply >> separate accounts to the Post Office. If they are cheating the Post Office >> this will show up by ordinary accounting practice. If they are cheating
another Post Office customer, say the DWP, then ultimately this will show up.
People knew how to do accounts before the computer was invented, and I don't
accept that Horizon could do anything ordinary accounting couldn't; just
quicker, and much, much cheaper in labour costs. So there is no justification
for saying that Horizon could be expected to discover more fraud. On the
contrary, if it was discovering non-existent fraud it was probably missing >> real fraud.
Traditionally, people did not check accounts. In particular, in a financial system
there are normally many cross-checks that can be performed, but these were too
laborious to be done manually.
When an accounting system works, it is magic how quickly you can understand things.
Slice and dice the information to discover unknown characteristics.
Traditionally, most account systems are disjoint, or represent things in different
ways. It is tremendously laborious to manually compare one system with another, many
entries may need human interpretation, and there may be thousands of entries. Manual
interpretations are hugely difficult, time-consuming. This is the type of thing
computers are brilliant at and humans are not. A well written reconciliation program
can perform man-years of work in seconds.
From memory of this case, some fraud committed was genuine, but was caused by people
trying to manipulate, or misreport, their actual assets to match Horizon's mistakes.
On 10/01/2024 10:34, Jon Ribbens wrote:
I have read (unconfirmed) that the issue was that when the Horizon
system connected to head office (via modem) to upload the daily records,
if the connection was dropped mid-upload (which on a modem connection
over damp string to rural locations would probably have been often)
then all the transactions which had been already uploaded would get
duplicated when the connection was retried. If so this is just
catastrophically, inexcusably bad software design, and most probably
*not* "much better than anything that came before".
I saw somewhere, perhaps from a Computer Weekly article that I can't
find any more, that the Horizon system, at least at the outset, did not implement either of the two obvious checks normally built into an
accounting system, which are
(1) double-entry book-keeping, which means that every transaction is
recorded twice, making it easier to find any discrepancy,
Traditionally, people did not check accounts. In particular, in a financial system
there are normally many cross-checks that can be performed, but these were too
laborious to be done manually.
Eh?
Isn't the basis of all accounting systems double entry ? Where all transactions appear twice - as a credit and a debit or whatever;
and where the column totals can be expected to balance at all times ?
So that there's simply no way that money can simply appear or disappear
out of nowhere ?
I have read (unconfirmed) that the issue was that when the Horizon
system connected to head office (via modem) to upload the daily records,
if the connection was dropped mid-upload (which on a modem connection
over damp string to rural locations would probably have been often)
then all the transactions which had been already uploaded would get duplicated when the connection was retried. If so this is just catastrophically, inexcusably bad software design, and most probably
*not* "much better than anything that came before".
I have read (unconfirmed) that the issue was that when the Horizon
system connected to head office (via modem) to upload the daily records,
if the connection was dropped mid-upload (which on a modem connection
over damp string to rural locations would probably have been often)
then all the transactions which had been already uploaded would get duplicated when the connection was retried. If so this is just catastrophically, inexcusably bad software design, and most probably
*not* "much better than anything that came before".
Again *before* the Horizon system was installed why would the cash flow of any
small sub post office have been that much more complicated than that of any other small shop or business in a small town or village ?
On 2024-01-09, Pancho <Pancho.Jones@proton.me> wrote:
On 09/01/2024 19:56, Roger Hayter wrote:
The main differences the new system made must have been to produce
results much more quickly and to result in the employment of
thousands fewer clerks. As it turns out, the old system was probably
much more reliable in producing correct results, and therefore
identifying any fraud that was going on. In other words, the faulty
new system was *less* likely to identify actual fraud, but much, much
cheaper to run.
I suspect the computer system mainly worked. Probably much better than
anything that came before. The problem was that people regarded it as
infallible. “Computer says no†syndrome.
I have read (unconfirmed) that the issue was that when the Horizon
system connected to head office (via modem) to upload the daily records,
if the connection was dropped mid-upload (which on a modem connection
over damp string to rural locations would probably have been often)
then all the transactions which had been already uploaded would get duplicated when the connection was retried. If so this is just catastrophically, inexcusably bad software design, and most probably
*not* "much better than anything that came before".
On 2024-01-10, Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote:
I'm sure there were, but the cash flow was so complicated that
[again
AIUI] audit had been almost impossible unless fraud was already
suspected. If you're part-way through downloading details of lottery
tickets, TV licences, stamps, benefits, ... when the computer goes
down, then there may be several thousand pounds worth of information
in limbo, sent off by you as village sub-postmaster but not yet
received by other agencies. Village POs are unusually complicated
businesses which tend to be run by uncomplicated locals, and it's not
surprising that sometimes they get the procedures wrong, nor that
sometimes a huge computer system has bugs, and the result is a glitch
in the trail. The problem wasn't the number of glitches and bugs but
the readiness of the PO to believe that the computer system was
infallible.
It's not even that, it's that they kept insisting to the courts that
the system was infallible even after they *knew* it wasn't.
"JNugent" <jnugent@mail.com> wrote in message news:l0579pFp47vU1@mid.individual.net...
On 09/01/2024 11:53 am, Jeff Gaines wrote:
I find it hard to believe that the PO issue has been allowed to go
on and on with utterly disastrous effects on so many people and
only now in an election year is
anybody showing any interest.
Your last paragraph is predicated upon an unsound conclusion.
People have been showing growing interest in the issue for some years.
It certainly wasn't the first time I had seen the matter reported and
commented upon in the media.
The OP's point is well made IMO.
As you imply "Computer Weekly" had been covering the story since 2009
as have "Private Eye" intermittently. There have been two Local TV News features over the years plus maybe one "Panorama". There has been at
least one Parliamentary Enquiry and at least one successful case in
the High Court.
And yet despite all that...
It took four nights of drama-docs on ITV1 before the story really broke
on the front pages of all the national papers, for the public to finally demand that "something must be done", and maybe most significantly of
all
For Paula Vennells to finally hand back her gong
"JNugent" <jnugent@mail.com> wrote in message news:l0579pFp47vU1@mid.individual.net...
On 09/01/2024 11:53 am, Jeff Gaines wrote:
I find it hard to believe that the PO issue has been allowed to go
on and on with utterly disastrous effects on so many people and
only now in an election year is
anybody showing any interest.
Your last paragraph is predicated upon an unsound conclusion.
People have been showing growing interest in the issue for some years.
It certainly wasn't the first time I had seen the matter reported and
commented upon in the media.
The OP's point is well made IMO.
As you imply "Computer Weekly" had been covering the story since 2009
as have "Private Eye" intermittently. There have been two Local TV News features over the years plus maybe one "Panorama". There has been at
least one Parliamentary Enquiry and at least one successful case in
the High Court.
And yet despite all that...
It took four nights of drama-docs on ITV1 before the story really broke
on the front pages of all the national papers, for the public to finally demand that "something must be done", and maybe most significantly of
all
For Paula Vennells to finally hand back her gong
ISTR (maybe someone can confirm this) that another problem with the
software was that it forced the user to accept its version of the
state of the accounts in order be able to open for business at the
beginning of the day.
On 10/01/2024 10:34, Jon Ribbens wrote:
I have read (unconfirmed) that the issue was that when the Horizon
system connected to head office (via modem) to upload the daily records,
if the connection was dropped mid-upload (which on a modem connection
over damp string to rural locations would probably have been often)
then all the transactions which had been already uploaded would get
duplicated when the connection was retried. If so this is just
catastrophically, inexcusably bad software design, and most probably
*not* "much better than anything that came before".
Every system I have ever worked on has had edge cases where it can mess
up. Just because sometimes a dropped modem causes a problem, doesn't
mean every time it causes a problem.
If the system that came before was a manual system, most errors would go unnoticed.
I actually wrote financial modem transfer software in the 1980s. I'm
pretty sure it messed up all the time, but it was still quicker than
getting data entry typists to enter data.
I'm not sure that 'election year' is the driver, more likely the TV docudrama. Fortunately it was on ITV, so the usual 'woke pinko BBC' bashers couldn't dismiss it so easily.
On 10/01/2024 10:09 am, billy bookcase wrote:
"JNugent" <jnugent@mail.com> wrote in message news:l0579pFp47vU1@mid.individual.net...
On 09/01/2024 11:53 am, Jeff Gaines wrote:
I find it hard to believe that the PO issue has been allowed to go
on and on with utterly disastrous effects on so many people and
only now in an election year is
anybody showing any interest.
Your last paragraph is predicated upon an unsound conclusion.
People have been showing growing interest in the issue for some years.
It certainly wasn't the first time I had seen the matter reported and
commented upon in the media.
The OP's point is well made IMO.
As you imply "Computer Weekly" had been covering the story since 2009
as have "Private Eye" intermittently. There have been two Local TV News
features over the years plus maybe one "Panorama". There has been at
least one Parliamentary Enquiry and at least one successful case in
the High Court.
And yet despite all that...
I don't read, and have never seen a copy of, "Computer Weekly".
I don't read "Private Eye".
Yet *I* knew about this evolving scandal, years ago. So did you.
"Andy Walker" <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote in message news:unko1e$26ral$1@dont-email.me...
On 09/01/2024 18:02, billy bookcase wrote:r all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of
[I wrote:]
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently} uncovered so much previously hidden criminality.
cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
Er, how was that supposed to work exactly ?
Prior to the introduction of Horizon, who exactly was it who was supplying >>> these considerable sums of cash which postmasters were supposedly able to >>> pocket, without being in any way held accountable ?
You're somewhat supposing a monolithic business in which things
didn't go wrong. Think rather of a village shop in the middle of nowhere
with fingers in many pies and computer connexions that go down several
times per week. Data was [AIUI] routinely lost and had to be recovered
and reconciled [for which, before you ask, there were procedures].
The position you were referring to above, concerned " the previously hidden criminality",*before* the Horizon system was installed
Nobody doubts that once it was installed the possibility for all sorts
of errors arose. .
Indeed the Horiizon system seems to have broken almost every rule in the book, as well as creating hew ones to break all of its own
https://evidencecritical.systems/2021/07/15/what-went-wrong-with-horizon.html
Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount
of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the
system ?
I'm sure there were, but the cash flow was so complicated that [again
AIUI] audit had been almost impossible unless fraud was already suspected.
Again *before* the Horizon system was installed why would the cash flow of any
small sub post office have been that much more complicated than that of any other small shop or business in a small town or village ?
you're part-way through downloading details of lottery tickets, TV licences, >> stamps, benefits, ... when the computer goes down, then there may be several >> thousand pounds worth of information in limbo, sent off by you as village
sub-postmaster but not yet received by other agencies. Village POs are
unusually complicated businesses which tend to be run by uncomplicated
locals, and it's not surprising that sometimes they get the procedures
wrong, nor that sometimes a huge computer system has bugs, and the result
is a glitch in the trail. The problem wasn't the number of glitches and
bugs but the readiness of the PO to believe that the computer system was
infallible.
Indeed, That's *after* the Horizon system has been installed.
But previously you were specifically referring to "previously hidden criminality.
and "considerable sums of cash, just waiting to be snaffled " from small
sub post offices using paper records.
And I'm simply asking how that was possible
On 10/01/2024 10:09, billy bookcase wrote:
"JNugent" <jnugent@mail.com> wrote in message news:l0579pFp47vU1@mid.individual.net...
On 09/01/2024 11:53 am, Jeff Gaines wrote:
I find it hard to believe that the PO issue has been allowed to go
on and on with utterly disastrous effects on so many people and
only now in an election year is
anybody showing any interest.
Your last paragraph is predicated upon an unsound conclusion.
People have been showing growing interest in the issue for some years.
It certainly wasn't the first time I had seen the matter reported and
commented upon in the media.
The OP's point is well made IMO.
As you imply "Computer Weekly" had been covering the story since 2009
as have "Private Eye" intermittently. There have been two Local TV News
features over the years plus maybe one "Panorama". There has been at
least one Parliamentary Enquiry and at least one successful case in
the High Court.
And yet despite all that...
It took four nights of drama-docs on ITV1 before the story really broke
on the front pages of all the national papers, for the public to finally
demand that "something must be done", and maybe most significantly of
all
For Paula Vennells to finally hand back her gong
I don't think Paula Vennells handing back her gong is particularly significant.
What is really significant is that our Tory government, knowing that there had been a
monstrous miscarriage of justice and deception on the part of the Post Office, decided
that no action was necessary and it was of interest only to a minority of geeks.
But once there's a dramatised version on TV which makes all the millions of viewers
angry and the press interviews many of the postmasters who could have been interviewed
years ago, the government wakes up and says "we have a major public relations problem
now, it's time to show that we do give a fuck about this, otherwise we'll be even lower
in the polls than before".
On 10:28 10 Jan 2024, Jon Ribbens said:
On 2024-01-10, Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote:
I'm sure there were, but the cash flow was so complicated that
[again
AIUI] audit had been almost impossible unless fraud was already
suspected. If you're part-way through downloading details of lottery
tickets, TV licences, stamps, benefits, ... when the computer goes
down, then there may be several thousand pounds worth of information
in limbo, sent off by you as village sub-postmaster but not yet
received by other agencies. Village POs are unusually complicated
businesses which tend to be run by uncomplicated locals, and it's not
surprising that sometimes they get the procedures wrong, nor that
sometimes a huge computer system has bugs, and the result is a glitch
in the trail. The problem wasn't the number of glitches and bugs but
the readiness of the PO to believe that the computer system was
infallible.
It's not even that, it's that they kept insisting to the courts that
the system was infallible even after they *knew* it wasn't.
When IT projects go off the rails, desperate people may do desperate
things but I've never seen one where prime contractor repeatedly lies to
a court.
Did they really think having innocent people fined or imprisoned was
never going to be found out.
It is hard to believe that professional software developers could make
quite so many catastrophic mistakes in one project.
On 10/01/2024 12:12, Pancho wrote:
On 10/01/2024 10:34, Jon Ribbens wrote:You might be able to understand better than I can the detailed analysis
I have read (unconfirmed) that the issue was that when the Horizon
system connected to head office (via modem) to upload the daily records, >>> if the connection was dropped mid-upload (which on a modem connection
over damp string to rural locations would probably have been often)
then all the transactions which had been already uploaded would get
duplicated when the connection was retried. If so this is just
catastrophically, inexcusably bad software design, and most probably
*not* "much better than anything that came before".
of the flaws in the Horizon system, as set out by the judge.
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2019/3408.html
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2019/3408.image2.pdf
The OP's point is well made IMO.
As you imply "Computer Weekly" had been covering the story since 2009
as have "Private Eye" intermittently. There have been two Local TV News >features over the years plus maybe one "Panorama". There has been at
least one Parliamentary Enquiry and at least one successful case in
the High Court.
And yet despite all that...
It took four nights of drama-docs on ITV1 before the story really broke
on the front pages of all the national papers, for the public to finally >demand that "something must be done", and maybe most significantly of
all
For Paula Vennells to finally hand back her gong
On Wed, 10 Jan 2024 15:49:23 +0000, The Todal <the_todal@icloud.com> wrote:
On 10/01/2024 12:12, Pancho wrote:
On 10/01/2024 10:34, Jon Ribbens wrote:You might be able to understand better than I can the detailed analysis
I have read (unconfirmed) that the issue was that when the Horizon
system connected to head office (via modem) to upload the daily records, >>>> if the connection was dropped mid-upload (which on a modem connection
over damp string to rural locations would probably have been often)
then all the transactions which had been already uploaded would get
duplicated when the connection was retried. If so this is just
catastrophically, inexcusably bad software design, and most probably
*not* "much better than anything that came before".
of the flaws in the Horizon system, as set out by the judge.
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2019/3408.html
https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2019/3408.image2.pdf
And also https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/bates-v-post-office-appendix-1-1.pdf
which goes into more detail on the bugs listed in the previous document.
I can't find anything in there which relates specifically to modem dropouts. But I have found one reference to to "poor communication with the data centre", which may be the same thing. I've also found a reference to what programmers would call a race condition, where two different processes attempt to update the same data at the same time. And there's a reference to a string length issue where a block of text in the narrative of a
transaction code was too long for the terminal to wrap, causing the process to freeze mid-transaction with unpredictable results.
All of these are common software errors. But they should all be picked up during beta testing, if not before. A failure to do so is often caused by
not testing against a wide enough set of data and operating conditions.
Mark
On 10/01/2024 10:09, billy bookcase wrote:
"JNugent" <jnugent@mail.com> wrote in message
news:l0579pFp47vU1@mid.individual.net...
On 09/01/2024 11:53 am, Jeff Gaines wrote:
I find it hard to believe that the PO issue has been allowed to go
on and on with utterly disastrous effects on so many people and
only now in an election year is
anybody showing any interest.
Your last paragraph is predicated upon an unsound conclusion.
People have been showing growing interest in the issue for some years.
It certainly wasn't the first time I had seen the matter reported and
commented upon in the media.
The OP's point is well made IMO.
As you imply "Computer Weekly" had been covering the story since 2009
as have "Private Eye" intermittently. There have been two Local TV News
features over the years plus maybe one "Panorama". There has been at
least one Parliamentary Enquiry and at least one successful case in
the High Court.
And yet despite all that...
It took four nights of drama-docs on ITV1 before the story really broke
on the front pages of all the national papers, for the public to finally
demand that "something must be done", and maybe most significantly of
all
For Paula Vennells to finally hand back her gong
I don't think Paula Vennells handing back her gong is particularly significant.
What is really significant is that our Tory government, knowing that
there had been a monstrous miscarriage of justice and deception on the
part of the Post Office, decided that no action was necessary and it was
of interest only to a minority of geeks.
But once there's a dramatised version on TV which makes all the millions
of viewers angry and the press interviews many of the postmasters who
could have been interviewed years ago, the government wakes up and says
"we have a major public relations problem now, it's time to show that we
do give a fuck about this, otherwise we'll be even lower in the polls
than before".
Maybe Channel 4 should introduce a daily dramatised re-enactment of key
news stories. it would probably get a bigger audience than their actual
news show.
On 10/01/2024 11:01, Clive Page wrote:
On 10/01/2024 10:34, Jon Ribbens wrote:
I have read (unconfirmed) that the issue was that when the Horizon
system connected to head office (via modem) to upload the daily records, >>> if the connection was dropped mid-upload (which on a modem connection
over damp string to rural locations would probably have been often)
then all the transactions which had been already uploaded would get
duplicated when the connection was retried. If so this is just
catastrophically, inexcusably bad software design, and most probably
*not* "much better than anything that came before".
I saw somewhere, perhaps from a Computer Weekly article that I can't
find any more, that the Horizon system, at least at the outset, did not
implement either of the two obvious checks normally built into an
accounting system, which are
(1) double-entry book-keeping, which means that every transaction is
recorded twice, making it easier to find any discrepancy,
No, there is a confusion about the difference between the way manual and computer accountancy systems work.
Double entry just means you can't create money out of thin air, it has
to come from somewhere or go somewhere. The somewheres are called
accounts. Accounts can be thought of as buckets. The only thing you can
do is take something out of one bucket and put it in another bucket.
Manual accountancy systems were bucket orientated. They stored a total
of what was in the bucket, together with a list of amounts that had
been put into the bucket, together with which bucket each amount had
come from. (or taken out/sent to). Because a transfer was between two
buckets in the system, it was always recorded in the list of both
buckets, i.e. double entry. The main problem was someone would add
something up wrong. All totals of all the buckets should sum to 0. This
could be used as a check against addition errors.
Computer systems are transfer orientated. They store a list of transfers between two buckets. Each transfer will include: amount transferred,
bucket from, bucket to. The double entry is implicit in the idea of a transfer between two buckets. If you want to know how much is in a
bucket, you get the computer to add the list of transfers filtered on
that specific bucket. In SQL/DB, terms a Select statement with a
SUM(amount) and suitable where clause. There is no reason to record the
same transfer twice, in fact doing so would violate the "single source
of truth" design goal.
Hence, a double entry is a single transaction, not two.
I have a question which you can perhaps answer. If the Horizon screwups
were random, could there have been any where money was doubly credited
to a shop, rather than have been, for example, a double withdrawal? Why
did it seem to always operate against the postmaster?
I don't think Paula Vennells handing back her gong is particularly significant.
What is really significant is that our Tory government, knowing that
there had been a monstrous miscarriage of justice and deception on the
part of the Post Office, decided that no action was necessary and it was
of interest only to a minority of geeks.
The position you were referring to above, concerned " the previously hidden criminality",*before* the Horizon system was installedI expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently} uncovered so much previously hidden criminality. [...]
Nobody doubts that once it was installed the possibility for all sorts
of errors arose. .
Again *before* the Horizon system was installed why would the cash flow of anyWeren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amountI'm sure there were, but the cash flow was so complicated that [again
of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the
system ?
AIUI] audit had been almost impossible unless fraud was already suspected.
small sub post office have been that much more complicated than that of any other small shop or business in a small town or village ?
I don't think Paula Vennells handing back her gong is particularly
significant.
What is really significant is that our Tory government, knowing that
there had been a monstrous miscarriage of justice and deception on the
part of the Post Office, decided that no action was necessary and it
was of interest only to a minority of geeks.
That's not really the case, the gov have started a public inquiry and a compensation scheme, what they have not done up until now is expedite matters.
Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:
ISTR (maybe someone can confirm this) that another problem with the
software was that it forced the user to accept its version of the
state of the accounts in order be able to open for business at the
beginning of the day.
Yes, initially you could park disputed transactions in a suspense account, but then they removed that feature.
So you had to accept the accounts as it
presented to you or you couldn't open the next day, which is obviously commercial suicide if you did that.
Theo
On 10/01/2024 03:20 pm, The Todal wrote:
On 10/01/2024 10:09, billy bookcase wrote:
"JNugent" <jnugent@mail.com> wrote in message
news:l0579pFp47vU1@mid.individual.net...
On 09/01/2024 11:53 am, Jeff Gaines wrote:
I find it hard to believe that the PO issue has been allowed to go
on and on with utterly disastrous effects on so many people and
only now in an election year is
anybody showing any interest.
Your last paragraph is predicated upon an unsound conclusion.
People have been showing growing interest in the issue for some years. >>>> It certainly wasn't the first time I had seen the matter reported and >>>> commented upon in the media.
The OP's point is well made IMO.
As you imply "Computer Weekly" had been covering the story since 2009
as have "Private Eye" intermittently. There have been two Local TV News
features over the years plus maybe one "Panorama". There has been at
least one Parliamentary Enquiry and at least one successful case in
the High Court.
And yet despite all that...
It took four nights of drama-docs on ITV1 before the story really broke
on the front pages of all the national papers, for the public to finally >>> demand that "something must be done", and maybe most significantly of
all
For Paula Vennells to finally hand back her gong
I don't think Paula Vennells handing back her gong is particularly
significant.
What is really significant is that our Tory government, knowing that
there had been a monstrous miscarriage of justice and deception on the
part of the Post Office, decided that no action was necessary and it
was of interest only to a minority of geeks.
But once there's a dramatised version on TV which makes all the
millions of viewers angry and the press interviews many of the
postmasters who could have been interviewed years ago, the government
wakes up and says "we have a major public relations problem now, it's
time to show that we do give a fuck about this, otherwise we'll be
even lower in the polls than before".
You don't accept that so far, only the court of appeal, moving at its
usual pace, has been able to address the issue of wrongful/unsafe
conviction?
Another thing occurs to me which I've not seen commented on elsewhere.
These Horizon bugs will have struck pretty much at random, so for every post-master who found they had a discrepancy of some thousands or tens
of thousands of pounds, there must have been as many or perhaps more
where the discrepancies at the end of a working day were of the order of
a few pounds or a few tens. I assume that in such cases the post-master concerned will just have grumbled and made up the shortfall from their
own money. I wonder if it possible to discover, from the Horizon
records covering the last 25 years, whether this is true too?
On 10/01/2024 10:05, billy bookcase wrote:[I wrote:]
[...]I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently} uncovered so much previously hidden criminality.
The position you were referring to above, concerned " the previously hidden >> criminality",*before* the Horizon system was installed
You missed out [and changed the punctuation of] "[apparently]".
I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently] uncovered so much previously hidden criminality.
After all, the temptation was there in the shape of considerable sums of
cash, just waiting to be snaffled.
For comparison, suppose you install a speed camera and catch some speeding motorists. Is your attitude
(a) "We used not to catch these people, and now we do.";
(b) "Oh look, when we installed the camera, motorists started speeding?";
(c) "There used not to be any motorists caught, so the camera must
be faulty" or
(d) something else?
My personal guess would be that motorists were speeding long before
the camera was installed, and now they're being caught. We now know [and the IT bods should have known long before] that Horizon was faulty; but if you happened to be an ordinary PO employee, and were convinced that the system was working correctly, why would your answer, mutatis mutandis, be different?
Nobody doubts that once it was installed the possibility for all sorts
of errors arose. .
/We/ know that, but /we/ are clever and know that programs have bugs.
Most people work on the principle that the computer is always right. Esp if you've paid huge amounts of money to get the system written and installed, and
have been assured that it works [which, fair dos, it mostly does].
[...]
small sub post office have been that much more complicated than that of any >> other small shop or business in a small town or village ?Weren't there any audit trails in place to trace the path of any amount >>>> of cash, no matter how large or small, as it worked its way through the >>>> system ?I'm sure there were, but the cash flow was so complicated that [again
AIUI] audit had been almost impossible unless fraud was already suspected. >> Again *before* the Horizon system was installed why would the cash flow of any
Theo has given an answer in relation to specifically the PO. But small
POs are /also/ ordinary shops, selling newspapers, groceries, flowers, ..., so
they are inevitably more complex than small shops that are not POs [and don't have the many statutory duties associated with that].
On 10:28 10 Jan 2024, Jon Ribbens said:
On 2024-01-10, Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote:
I'm sure there were, but the cash flow was so complicated that
[again
AIUI] audit had been almost impossible unless fraud was already
suspected. If you're part-way through downloading details of lottery
tickets, TV licences, stamps, benefits, ... when the computer goes
down, then there may be several thousand pounds worth of information
in limbo, sent off by you as village sub-postmaster but not yet
received by other agencies. Village POs are unusually complicated
businesses which tend to be run by uncomplicated locals, and it's not
surprising that sometimes they get the procedures wrong, nor that
sometimes a huge computer system has bugs, and the result is a glitch
in the trail. The problem wasn't the number of glitches and bugs but
the readiness of the PO to believe that the computer system was
infallible.
It's not even that, it's that they kept insisting to the courts that
the system was infallible even after they *knew* it wasn't.
When IT projects go off the rails, desperate people may do desperate things but I've never seen one where prime contractor repeatedly lies to a court.
Did they really think having innocent people fined or imprisoned was never going to be found out.
billy bookcase <billy@anon.com> wrote:
Again *before* the Horizon system was installed why would the cash flow of any
small sub post office have been that much more complicated than that of any >> other small shop or business in a small town or village ?
Let's compare a post office with, say, a village bakery.
The bakery buys flour, energy and wages, and sells loaves of bread. The >counter sells let's say 100 £2 loaves of bread every day. Accounting is a >case of counting the cash in the till and the number of loaves on the shelf, >and it's easy to see where any discrepancy might be.
On 11/01/2024 02:00, JNugent wrote:
On 10/01/2024 03:20 pm, The Todal wrote:
On 10/01/2024 10:09, billy bookcase wrote:
"JNugent" <jnugent@mail.com> wrote in message
news:l0579pFp47vU1@mid.individual.net...
On 09/01/2024 11:53 am, Jeff Gaines wrote:
I find it hard to believe that the PO issue has been allowed to go >>>>>> on and on with utterly disastrous effects on so many people and
only now in an election year is
anybody showing any interest.
Your last paragraph is predicated upon an unsound conclusion.
People have been showing growing interest in the issue for some years. >>>>> It certainly wasn't the first time I had seen the matter reported and >>>>> commented upon in the media.
The OP's point is well made IMO.
As you imply "Computer Weekly" had been covering the story since 2009
as have "Private Eye" intermittently. There have been two Local TV News >>>> features over the years plus maybe one "Panorama". There has been at
least one Parliamentary Enquiry and at least one successful case in
the High Court.
And yet despite all that...
It took four nights of drama-docs on ITV1 before the story really broke >>>> on the front pages of all the national papers, for the public to
finally
demand that "something must be done", and maybe most significantly of
all
For Paula Vennells to finally hand back her gong
I don't think Paula Vennells handing back her gong is particularly
significant.
What is really significant is that our Tory government, knowing that
there had been a monstrous miscarriage of justice and deception on
the part of the Post Office, decided that no action was necessary and
it was of interest only to a minority of geeks.
But once there's a dramatised version on TV which makes all the
millions of viewers angry and the press interviews many of the
postmasters who could have been interviewed years ago, the government
wakes up and says "we have a major public relations problem now, it's
time to show that we do give a fuck about this, otherwise we'll be
even lower in the polls than before".
You don't accept that so far, only the court of appeal, moving at its
usual pace, has been able to address the issue of wrongful/unsafe
conviction?
It would have been possible for the Post Office to confess that numerous prosecutions and convictions have been flawed and that it would support,
at its own expense, applications to the Court of Appeal to set aside
those convictions. But it didn't. It hid behind the convenient stance
that it's up to each convicted person to make their own arrangements at
their own expense. Gamble tens of thousands of pounds when maybe they'd rather live with their convictions and get on with their lives.
Actually there has been at least one attempt to set aside a conviction
where the Court of Appeal decided that the conviction should stand, and
that Horizon had nothing to do with it. See the David Cameron case: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2022/435.html
On Wed, 10 Jan 2024 16:02:07 +0000, Martin Brown wrote:
It is hard to believe that professional software developers could make
quite so many catastrophic mistakes in one project.
Tell me you've never worked in software without saying you've never
worked in software ...
On 11/01/2024 09:37, Jeff Layman wrote:
I have a question which you can perhaps answer. If the Horizon
screwups were random, could there have been any where money was
doubly credited to a shop, rather than have been, for example, a
double withdrawal? Why did it seem to always operate against the
postmaster?
I see no reason errors cannot go both way, but people tend not to
complain about too much money. They just keep quiet and trouser it.
Tax credits is a classic example. The system massively overpaid
people.
On 10/01/2024 14:59, Pamela wrote:
On 10:28 10 Jan 2024, Jon Ribbens said:
On 2024-01-10, Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> wrote:
I'm sure there were, but the cash flow was so complicated that
[again AIUI] audit had been almost impossible unless fraud was
already suspected. If you're part-way through downloading details
of lottery tickets, TV licences, stamps, benefits, ... when the
computer goes down, then there may be several thousand pounds worth
of information in limbo, sent off by you as village sub-postmaster
but not yet received by other agencies. Village POs are unusually
complicated businesses which tend to be run by uncomplicated
locals, and it's not surprising that sometimes they get the
procedures wrong, nor that sometimes a huge computer system has
bugs, and the result is a glitch in the trail. The problem wasn't
the number of glitches and bugs but the readiness of the PO to
believe that the computer system was infallible.
It's not even that, it's that they kept insisting to the courts that
the system was infallible even after they *knew* it wasn't.
When IT projects go off the rails, desperate people may do desperate
things but I've never seen one where prime contractor repeatedly lies
to a court.
Did they really think having innocent people fined or imprisoned was
never going to be found out.
Apparently... And so far they *have* got away with it.
The only casualty has been one sacrificial gong from a former PO CEO.
and *that* only happened due to a public outcry after the ITV drama -
nothing to do with the legal system actually doing useful work :(
Hardly any kind of deterrent at all.
I'm serious when I say that they should cut their losses on the public enquiry and go for a hard line prosecution of the so called expert
witnesses for the PO who lied to the court under oath and the guiding
minds behind the cover-up. Only that way will things *ever* change.
On 10/01/2024 11:57, Pancho wrote:against the postmaster?
On 10/01/2024 11:01, Clive Page wrote:
On 10/01/2024 10:34, Jon Ribbens wrote:
I have read (unconfirmed) that the issue was that when the Horizon
system connected to head office (via modem) to upload the daily records, >>>> if the connection was dropped mid-upload (which on a modem connection
over damp string to rural locations would probably have been often)
then all the transactions which had been already uploaded would get
duplicated when the connection was retried. If so this is just
catastrophically, inexcusably bad software design, and most probably
*not* "much better than anything that came before".
I saw somewhere, perhaps from a Computer Weekly article that I can't
find any more, that the Horizon system, at least at the outset, did not
implement either of the two obvious checks normally built into an
accounting system, which are
(1) double-entry book-keeping, which means that every transaction is
recorded twice, making it easier to find any discrepancy,
No, there is a confusion about the difference between the way manual and
computer accountancy systems work.
Double entry just means you can't create money out of thin air, it has
to come from somewhere or go somewhere. The somewheres are called
accounts. Accounts can be thought of as buckets. The only thing you can
do is take something out of one bucket and put it in another bucket.
Manual accountancy systems were bucket orientated. They stored a total
of what was in the bucket, together with a list of amounts that had
been put into the bucket, together with which bucket each amount had
come from. (or taken out/sent to). Because a transfer was between two
buckets in the system, it was always recorded in the list of both
buckets, i.e. double entry. The main problem was someone would add
something up wrong. All totals of all the buckets should sum to 0. This
could be used as a check against addition errors.
Computer systems are transfer orientated. They store a list of transfers
between two buckets. Each transfer will include: amount transferred,
bucket from, bucket to. The double entry is implicit in the idea of a
transfer between two buckets. If you want to know how much is in a
bucket, you get the computer to add the list of transfers filtered on
that specific bucket. In SQL/DB, terms a Select statement with a
SUM(amount) and suitable where clause. There is no reason to record the
same transfer twice, in fact doing so would violate the "single source
of truth" design goal.
Hence, a double entry is a single transaction, not two.
The accounting info is way above my pay grade, and why I paid an accountant to handle my business accounts.
I have a question which you can perhaps answer. If the Horizon screwups were random, could there have been any where money was doubly credited to a shop, rather than have been, for example, a double withdrawal? Why did it seem to always operate
Much the same appears to be true of the Oyster card system in London,
at least with 1st generation cards, which I still use. A couple of
times I have experience of my card opening an exit gate which
displayed the correct fare but it turned out later that it did not communicate with the Oyster servers, which at the end of the day
thought that I'd had an unfinished journey and wanted to charge me the maximum possible fare (until I got in touch to complain and get this rectified). With the Oyster system the failure to synchronise only
costs passengers a few pounds each time; with Horizon the stakes were
much larger so they *really* should have got this right from the
outset. It's not an trivial problem to solve, but there do appear to
be good ways of doing this and I'm pretty sure that they were known
even 25 years ago when Horizon was designed.
On 10 Jan 2024 13:00:05 +0000 (GMT), Theo
<theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote:
billy bookcase <billy@anon.com> wrote:
Again *before* the Horizon system was installed why would the cash flow of any
small sub post office have been that much more complicated than that of any
other small shop or business in a small town or village ?
Let's compare a post office with, say, a village bakery.
The bakery buys flour, energy and wages, and sells loaves of bread. The >counter sells let's say 100 £2 loaves of bread every day. Accounting is a
case of counting the cash in the till and the number of loaves on the shelf, >and it's easy to see where any discrepancy might be.
How have you accounted for all the flour, etc and other items to
amount to 100 loaves? Maybe there was enough flour for 120 loaves and
a bit-coin generator was using 30% of the power whilst some of the
wages went on the handyman to fix the family's garden.
The accountants doing the audit wouldn't know. HMRC might but most
likely wouldn't pick it up.
I'm puzzled about two things... why are the errors seemingly all in the
PO's favour and against the SPMs, and where did the "missing" money go? Naively one might have expected some SPMs to be erroneously in credit;
and the not-missing money must be somewhere.
On Wed, 10 Jan 2024 21:06:33 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
Maybe Channel 4 should introduce a daily dramatised re-enactment of key
news stories. it would probably get a bigger audience than their actual
news show.
The problem is, "history" isn't absolute.
I have a question which you can perhaps answer. If the Horizon screwups
were random, could there have been any where money was doubly credited
to a shop, rather than have been, for example, a double withdrawal? Why
did it seem to always operate against the postmaster?
On 2024-01-11, Clive Page <usenet@page2.eu> wrote:
Much the same appears to be true of the Oyster card system in London,
at least with 1st generation cards, which I still use. A couple of
times I have experience of my card opening an exit gate which
displayed the correct fare but it turned out later that it did not
communicate with the Oyster servers, which at the end of the day
thought that I'd had an unfinished journey and wanted to charge me the
maximum possible fare (until I got in touch to complain and get this
rectified). With the Oyster system the failure to synchronise only
costs passengers a few pounds each time; with Horizon the stakes were
much larger so they *really* should have got this right from the
outset. It's not an trivial problem to solve, but there do appear to
be good ways of doing this and I'm pretty sure that they were known
even 25 years ago when Horizon was designed.
What boggles my mind is that the same appears to happen with general contactless payment transactions in shops and restaurants etc. I tap
my watch or phone, my device says the transaction was successful,
the merchant's device says the communication failed (between the
devices, not between the merchant and the bank).
In the case of systems like Horizon, where the money for building the software came entirely from the taxpayer, isn't there a case for
insisting that the resulting software should automatically be made
open source?
I'm not expert enough to know how to solve these client-server synchronisation problems in the best way, but even I can recognise
completely incompetent code when I see it. Look, for example, at the example at the bottom of page 17 of the document attached here: https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj00080690-report-eposs-pinicl-task-force
Several other examples have been shown during the course of the current enquiry. Enjoy.
I find it astonishing firstly that they employed a programmer who was
capable of writing something like that, but also that it passed a
software quality review.
I'm serious when I say that they should cut their losses on the public enquiry and go for a hard line prosecution of the so called expert
witnesses for the PO who lied to the court under oath and the guiding
minds behind the cover-up. Only that way will things *ever* change.
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 09:37:26 +0000, Jeff Layman <Jeff@invalid.invalid>
wrote:
I have a question which you can perhaps answer. If the Horizon screwups >>were random, could there have been any where money was doubly credited
to a shop, rather than have been, for example, a double withdrawal? Why >>did it seem to always operate against the postmaster?
That's a good question. I'm sure there were some cases where it did act to benefit the postmaster. But there are two main reasons why it mostly
operated against them.
The first is that the flow of money through a Post Office was, at the time, primarily outbound. Although most people see a post office as a place you go to spend money (eg, buy stamps, pay for parcel post, maybe pick up some stationery, etc), for a distinct subset of the population it was the place you went to collect money - to cash a Giro, collect your pension, etc.
That's also a more complex system than simply takings from retail sales. So that was where the majority of the errors were made.
In the case of systems like Horizon, where the money for building the software came entirely from the taxpayer, isn't there a case for
insisting that the resulting software should automatically be made open source?  I'm not expert enough to know how to solve these
client-server synchronisation problems in the best way, but even I can recognise completely incompetent code when I see it.  Look, for
example, at the example at the bottom of page 17 of the document
attached here: https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj00080690-report-eposs-pinicl-task-force
Several other examples have been shown during the course of the current enquiry. Enjoy.
I find it astonishing firstly that they employed a programmer who was
capable of writing something like that, but also that it passed a
software quality review.  One can only assume that there never was
one. Making the software all open to public gaze might help avoid this
sort of junk, or at least expose it to ridicule.  And if anyone claims that this would have security implications, well I don't think it would, unless they were relying entirely upon security by obscurity, which
isn't generally a good idea.
But for the "apparently" to be applicable, it would have been necessaryYou missed out [and changed the punctuation of] "[apparently]".The position you were referring to above, concerned " the previously hidden >>> criminality",*before* the Horizon system was installedI expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently} uncovered so much previously hidden criminality. >> [...]
for there to have been large sums of money missing in the first place ?
No ?
And so I can only ask you again. *Prior* to the introduction of the Horizon System how was it possible for sub-postmasters to "snaffle" "considerable sums of cash" ? By means of which the Horizon System to then,
"apparently" able to uncover ?
IOW how were they "apparently" getting away with it ?
You have yet to demonstrate how, prior to the introduction of Horizon
sub postmasters were "apparently" stealing all these "considerable
sums of cash"
Another point which appears to have been overlooked is that Horizon was rolled out across the entire business. No just in small sub-po's but in main non franchised Post Offices as well. Which makes it difficult to believe
that problems didn't show up there as well. Or maybe the main offices
were the first priority every evening, for the Fujitsu "oversight" team.
AnthonyL <nospam@please.invalid> wrote:
On 10 Jan 2024 13:00:05 +0000 (GMT), Theo
<theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote:
billy bookcase <billy@anon.com> wrote:
Again *before* the Horizon system was installed why would the cash flow of any
small sub post office have been that much more complicated than that of any
other small shop or business in a small town or village ?
Let's compare a post office with, say, a village bakery.
The bakery buys flour, energy and wages, and sells loaves of bread. The
counter sells let's say 100 £2 loaves of bread every day. Accounting is a
case of counting the cash in the till and the number of loaves on the shelf,
and it's easy to see where any discrepancy might be.
How have you accounted for all the flour, etc and other items to
amount to 100 loaves? Maybe there was enough flour for 120 loaves and
a bit-coin generator was using 30% of the power whilst some of the
wages went on the handyman to fix the family's garden.
The accountants doing the audit wouldn't know. HMRC might but most
likely wouldn't pick it up.
The accounts in question are balancing the daily till, not a question of >whether the business is making a profit or paying the right amount of tax.
For that you just count the value of stock you started with, the cash you >started with, the stock you sold, the amount of cash you took in, the cash >and stock you finished with. That should all tally, and if it doesn't >something is wrong.
How the 'stock' is acquired is immaterial to balancing the till.
You missed out [and changed the punctuation of] "[apparently]".
For comparison, suppose you install a speed camera and catch some speeding >motorists. Is your attitude
(a) "We used not to catch these people, and now we do.";
(b) "Oh look, when we installed the camera, motorists started speeding?";
(c) "There used not to be any motorists caught, so the camera must
be faulty" or
(d) something else?
My personal guess would be that motorists were speeding long before
the camera was installed, and now they're being caught. We now know [and the >IT bods should have known long before] that Horizon was faulty; but if you >happened to be an ordinary PO employee, and were convinced that the system >was working correctly, why would your answer, mutatis mutandis, be different?
I am amazed. Looking at that, it is surprising that the system worked at
all, given those examples!
Scale is the other killer. Systems that work under demonstration or simple >test conditions can suffer catastrophic failures under real load. Running a >pilot deployment can help to flush out the problems but not if you deny
that the errors are problems with the system and prosecute the pilot scheme >participants whose systems gave the wrong answers.
In very rare occasions (if the customer is applying on their birthday
– and only one of 14 specific birthdays), Horizon calculates their age incorrectly as being a year younger than true age. This means the
quote can’t continue.
Jon Ribbens <jon+usenet@unequivocal.eu> wrote:
On 2024-01-11, Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote:
In very rare occasions (if the customer is applying on their birthday
– and only one of 14 specific birthdays), Horizon calculates their age >>> incorrectly as being a year younger than true age. This means the
quote can’t continue.
Oh dear. Someone's been trying to roll their own date-handling code.
Does your age change at the beginning or at the end of your birthday? Does
it matter what time zone you are in?
Given the legal age limits for various activities is this set out in legislation somewhere?
Is the Horizon example poor implementation or poor specification or perhaps just slightly misleading marketing?
Where a person must survive for a specified period after a death in order
to be a beneficiary, does that run from the time of death and to what precision is that recorded? Is it sufficient to reach the beginning of a particular minute or must you survive until the end?
On 2024-01-11, Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote:
In very rare occasions (if the customer is applying on their birthday
– and only one of 14 specific birthdays), Horizon calculates their age
incorrectly as being a year younger than true age. This means the
quote can’t continue.
Oh dear. Someone's been trying to roll their own date-handling code.
Unless something has drastically changed then that is not how it works
at all.
A stocktake is done just before the year end, total sales less total
expenses plus increase in stock and job's pretty well done.
Do you think your local fish and chip shop has counted and accounted
for all potatoes in and all chips sold every day?
As explained elsewhere in this thread the Postmasters had to account
and post to the computer all incomings and all outgoings and the
computer would from time to time go wrong on transactions either way.
Personally, and having been in IT for nearly 40yrs, I don't trust
computer systems and I'd have been tempted to ensure I had some paper
copies or records if time had permitted. Something wrong with system
design when a receipt is given to a customer but a copy not held in
the Post office, or a local copy of an uploaded data set (whether
successful or not) isn't available. oops, a tape drive or a floppy
disk or a carbonated paper printer costs extra.
On 2024-01-12, Owen Rees <orees@hotmail.com> wrote:
Jon Ribbens <jon+usenet@unequivocal.eu> wrote:
On 2024-01-11, Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote:
In very rare occasions (if the customer is applying on their birthday
– and only one of 14 specific birthdays), Horizon calculates their age >>>> incorrectly as being a year younger than true age. This means the
quote can’t continue.
Oh dear. Someone's been trying to roll their own date-handling code.
Does your age change at the beginning or at the end of your birthday? Does >> it matter what time zone you are in?
Given the legal age limits for various activities is this set out in
legislation somewhere?
Is the Horizon example poor implementation or poor specification or perhaps >> just slightly misleading marketing?
Where a person must survive for a specified period after a death in order
to be a beneficiary, does that run from the time of death and to what
precision is that recorded? Is it sufficient to reach the beginning of a
particular minute or must you survive until the end?
These are all good questions, but the fact that it says above
"only one of 14 specific birthdays" implies that the problem
isn't a misunderstanding of the specification, but rather
date-handling code written by someone who didn't have a clue
what they were doing.
 Look, for example, at the example at the bottom of page 17 of the document attached here: https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj00080690-report-eposs-pinicl-task-force
Several other examples have been shown during the course of the current enquiry. Enjoy.
I once had to debug (and fix) a problem with an online retail system
which occasionally assigned payments for purchases made just after midnight to the day before.
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 07:47:36 -0000 (UTC), Jethro_uk <jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Wed, 10 Jan 2024 21:06:33 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
Maybe Channel 4 should introduce a daily dramatised re-enactment of
key news stories. it would probably get a bigger audience than their
actual news show.
The problem is, "history" isn't absolute.
Well, yes. People have already observed how the ITV drama seems to have exaggerated the role of Paula Vennells while completely ignoring the
role played by Adam Crozier.
To be clear, I think Vennells was definitely culpable for her role in
the scandal. But certainly it wasn't just her, and I'm not even sure she
was the worst offender. The way the programme, and now the court of
social media, has made her the prime scapegoat is very conveniently overlooking several other key members of the Post Office's senior
management.
Mark
On 11/01/2024 19:22, Clive Page wrote:
 Look, for example, at the example at the bottom of page 17 of the document attached here: https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj00080690-report-eposs-pinicl-task-force
Several other examples have been shown during the course of the current enquiry. Enjoy.
This was RAD code from 25 years ago. As a RAD developer, my code often exhibited at least two of the characteristics. I nearly always used
“while do†and almost never “do whileâ€, and I also often duplicated statements in the “if†and “else†clause. I can justify doing both.
There are different ways to judge coder quality. Most companies I worked
for judged fast delivery of working code as most important. Enabling
them to exploit business opportunities, short windows in the market. So
I could spend time tidying code, or deliver quickly.
On 11/01/2024 19:22, Clive Page wrote:
 Look, for example, at the example at the bottom of page 17 of the
document attached here:
https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj00080690-report-eposs-pinicl-task-force
Several other examples have been shown during the course of the current
enquiry. Enjoy.
This was RAD code from 25 years ago. As a RAD developer, my code often
On 2024-01-12, Pancho <Pancho.Jones@proton.me> wrote:
On 11/01/2024 19:22, Clive Page wrote:
 Look, for example, at the example at the bottom of page 17 of the
document attached here:
https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj00080690-report-eposs-pinicl-task-force
Several other examples have been shown during the course of the current
enquiry. Enjoy.
This was RAD code from 25 years ago. As a RAD developer, my code often
"RAD code"?
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 16:58:04 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 07:47:36 -0000 (UTC), Jethro_uk
<jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Wed, 10 Jan 2024 21:06:33 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
Maybe Channel 4 should introduce a daily dramatised re-enactment of
key news stories. it would probably get a bigger audience than their
actual news show.
The problem is, "history" isn't absolute.
Well, yes. People have already observed how the ITV drama seems to have
exaggerated the role of Paula Vennells while completely ignoring the
role played by Adam Crozier.
To be clear, I think Vennells was definitely culpable for her role in
the scandal. But certainly it wasn't just her, and I'm not even sure she
was the worst offender. The way the programme, and now the court of
social media, has made her the prime scapegoat is very conveniently
overlooking several other key members of the Post Office's senior
management.
Mark
Fascinating armchair discussion between two chaps who know no one will
face any consequences from this little incident.
There are different ways to judge coder quality. Most companies I worked
for judged fast delivery of working code as most important. Enabling
them to exploit business opportunities, short windows in the market. So
I could spend time tidying code, or deliver quickly.
On 2024-01-11, Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote:
In very rare occasions (if the customer is applying on their birthday –
and only one of 14 specific birthdays), Horizon calculates their age
incorrectly as being a year younger than true age. This means the
quote can’t continue.
Oh dear. Someone's been trying to roll their own date-handling code.
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 16:58:04 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 07:47:36 -0000 (UTC), Jethro_uk
<jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Wed, 10 Jan 2024 21:06:33 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
Maybe Channel 4 should introduce a daily dramatised re-enactment of
key news stories. it would probably get a bigger audience than their
actual news show.
The problem is, "history" isn't absolute.
Well, yes. People have already observed how the ITV drama seems to have
exaggerated the role of Paula Vennells while completely ignoring the
role played by Adam Crozier.
To be clear, I think Vennells was definitely culpable for her role in
the scandal. But certainly it wasn't just her, and I'm not even sure she
was the worst offender. The way the programme, and now the court of
social media, has made her the prime scapegoat is very conveniently
overlooking several other key members of the Post Office's senior
management.
Fascinating armchair discussion between two chaps who know no one will
face any consequences from this little incident.
On 2024-01-12, Pancho <Pancho.Jones@proton.me> wrote:
On 11/01/2024 19:22, Clive Page wrote:
Look, for example, at the example at the bottom of page 17 of the
document attached here:
https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj00080690-report-eposs-pinicl-task-force
Several other examples have been shown during the course of the current
enquiry. Enjoy.
This was RAD code from 25 years ago. As a RAD developer, my code often
"RAD code"?
On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 12:16:12 -0000 (UTC), Jon Ribbens <jon+usenet@unequivocal.eu> wrote:
On 2024-01-12, Pancho <Pancho.Jones@proton.me> wrote:
On 11/01/2024 19:22, Clive Page wrote:
 Look, for example, at the example at the bottom of page 17 of the >>>> document attached here:
https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj00080690-report-eposs-pinicl-task-force
Several other examples have been shown during the course of the current >>>> enquiry. Enjoy.
This was RAD code from 25 years ago. As a RAD developer, my code often
"RAD code"?
"Rapid Application Development". An early form of "move fast and break things". Which is appropriate in some circumstances. But not, I would suggest, in a major financial application.
On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 11:26:54 -0000 (UTC), Jethro_uk <jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 16:58:04 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 07:47:36 -0000 (UTC), Jethro_uk
<jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Wed, 10 Jan 2024 21:06:33 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
Maybe Channel 4 should introduce a daily dramatised re-enactment of
key news stories. it would probably get a bigger audience than their >>>>> actual news show.
The problem is, "history" isn't absolute.
Well, yes. People have already observed how the ITV drama seems to have
exaggerated the role of Paula Vennells while completely ignoring the
role played by Adam Crozier.
To be clear, I think Vennells was definitely culpable for her role in
the scandal. But certainly it wasn't just her, and I'm not even sure she >>> was the worst offender. The way the programme, and now the court of
social media, has made her the prime scapegoat is very conveniently
overlooking several other key members of the Post Office's senior
management.
Fascinating armchair discussion between two chaps who know no one will
face any consequences from this little incident.
On the contrary, the police are already investigating various potential perjury and fraud offences. The chances of there being no successful prosecutions for any of these is, I think, slim. And it's looking increasingly likely that various senior managers of the Post Offices will have their bonuses clawed back, which will probably hurt them more than a conviction for a relatively minor crime. Fujitsu is likely to be sued by the government to the value of the compensation which will need to be paid out, which will cause considerable pain to that company. There are likely to be some quite serious consequences for some individuals and organisations.
Jon Ribbens <jon+usenet@unequivocal.eu> wrote:
On 2024-01-11, Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote:
In very rare occasions (if the customer is applying on their birthday
– and only one of 14 specific birthdays), Horizon calculates their age >>> incorrectly as being a year younger than true age. This means the
quote can’t continue.
Oh dear. Someone's been trying to roll their own date-handling code.
Does your age change at the beginning or at the end of your birthday? Does
it matter what time zone you are in?
It is being discussed on stack exchange right now. It really is bad!
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/77796678/code-sample-from-post-office-horizon-application-what-language-is-this
I presume that they were being paid by the KLOC...
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 12:20:35 +0000,
Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:
It is being discussed on stack exchange right now. It really is bad!
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/77796678/code-sample-from-post-office-horizon-application-what-language-is-this
I presume that they were being paid by the KLOC...
Hah - that is bad.
Although the kind of stuff highlighted by the report was crap, it wasn't necessarily the kind of stuff that might cause the problems we have
seen. It is just indicative of poor management for the development
project - and if they are having problems with the basics, then the complexities of a distributed system and ensuring ACID transactions
are going to have issues too.
BTW I've looked at the report and all the examples are of VB code. I
shudder to think what the C/C++ stuff was like - although maybe they
had better people for that.
On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 00:26:17 -0000 (UTC), Owen Rees <orees@hotmail.com> wrote:
Jon Ribbens <jon+usenet@unequivocal.eu> wrote:
On 2024-01-11, Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote:
In very rare occasions (if the customer is applying on their birthday
– and only one of 14 specific birthdays), Horizon calculates their age >>>> incorrectly as being a year younger than true age. This means the
quote can’t continue.
Oh dear. Someone's been trying to roll their own date-handling code.
Does your age change at the beginning or at the end of your birthday? Does >> it matter what time zone you are in?
Also when does your age change if you were born on the 29th Feb?
Writing custom age calculation functions for the specific doman would have been commonplace then - especially in languages that did not have pretty standardised date libraries. I think Horizon was a mix of VB, C and C++ (none of which had good comprehensive date libraries at the time) with lots of rather adhoc XML.
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 23:22:17 +0000, Jon Ribbens wrote:
On 2024-01-11, Theo <theom+news@chiark.greenend.org.uk> wrote:
In very rare occasions (if the customer is applying on their birthday – >>> and only one of 14 specific birthdays), Horizon calculates their age
incorrectly as being a year younger than true age. This means the
quote can’t continue.
Oh dear. Someone's been trying to roll their own date-handling code.
How else can they keep it secret ?
I have seen so many fucked up snippets of code "checking" input it's
untrue.
One of the best was a routine which insisted on making surnames proper
case. So "LeBlanc" became "Leblanc". Now you may think that's trivial.
Whilst I agree with you in part, there are some good reasons why Adam
Crozier didn't get a mention in the TV series. The only good thing is he
was never awarded a gong.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Crozier
"Crozier left the Royal Mail in 2010 to become the chief executive of
media group ITV plc"
One of the best was a routine which insisted on making surnames proper
case. So "LeBlanc" became "Leblanc".
On 12/01/2024 13:33, Mark Goodge wrote:
On the contrary, the police are already investigating various potential
perjury and fraud offences. The chances of there being no successful
prosecutions for any of these is, I think, slim. And it's looking
increasingly likely that various senior managers of the Post Offices will
have their bonuses clawed back, which will probably hurt them more than a
conviction for a relatively minor crime. Fujitsu is likely to be sued by the >> government to the value of the compensation which will need to be paid out, >> which will cause considerable pain to that company. There are likely to be >> some quite serious consequences for some individuals and organisations.
Won't that will largely depend on whether the PO were aware of the
Horizon shortfalls in functionality. If so, then they may claim the PO / >government would be out of time for any successful claim.
My impression is that the PO were kept in the dark of the flaws in
Horizon. Some of the published emails from Vennells suggest this from
what I recall.
On 2024-01-11, Clive Page <usenet@page2.eu> wrote:
In the case of systems like Horizon, where the money for building the
software came entirely from the taxpayer, isn't there a case for
insisting that the resulting software should automatically be made
open source?
It's certainly *arguable*, but it's also the case that governments tend
to argue the opposite. Just as there's a strong argument that with
contracts like this the contract text and payment amounts should be
public information, but they're usually not. Personally I probably
agree with you, but it would require a politician that was both strong
and brave to push the idea through, so it won't happen.
I'm not expert enough to know how to solve these client-server
synchronisation problems in the best way, but even I can recognise
completely incompetent code when I see it. Look, for example, at the
example at the bottom of page 17 of the document attached here:
https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/fuj00080690-report-eposs-pinicl-task-force
Several other examples have been shown during the course of the current enquiry. Enjoy.
I find it astonishing firstly that they employed a programmer who was
capable of writing something like that, but also that it passed a
software quality review.
Yeah. If anyone who worked for me wrote that code, they wouldn't make it
past their probationary period.
My impression is that the PO were kept in the dark of the flaws in
Horizon.
Also when does your age change if you were born on the 29th Feb?
Writing custom age calculation functions for the specific doman would have been commonplace then - especially in languages that did not have pretty standardised date libraries. I think Horizon was a mix of VB, C and C++ (none of which had good comprehensive date libraries at the time) with lots of rather adhoc XML.
But the problem wasn't really at the level of bugs on date calculations,
it was mainly an architectural one (causing the issues in the figures) and then a managerial one (leading to the persecution and prosecution of sub-postmasters/mistresses).
On 12/01/2024 12:16, Jon Ribbens wrote:
On 2024-01-12, Pancho <Pancho.Jones@proton.me> wrote:
On 11/01/2024 19:22, Clive Page wrote:
Look, for example, at the example at the bottom of page 17 of
the document attached here:
https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/
fuj00080690-report-eposs-pinicl-task-force
Several other examples have been shown during the course of the
current enquiry. Enjoy.
This was RAD code from 25 years ago. As a RAD developer, my code
often
"RAD code"?
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rapid_application_development>
When I was a lad, there was a theory of software development that
senior people could think hard about what was needed to develop an application. They could liaise with users of the proposed application
and come up with a list of functional requirements, and then a design specification which could be given to the coders who would implement
it in code. It is call "Waterfall" design methodology.
In the real world, this method repeatedly failed, often in huge and
expensive projects.
An alternative method was simple, limited,
prototype applications would be developed to prove the concept could
be developed and that it was what the user wanted. Later this morphed
in to "Agile", where very small software goals were set and when
coded, were given to users to test, comment on. A sophisticated
application was then built by multiple iteration of this
specify/develop/test loop.
When I was a lad, there was a theory of software development that senior >people could think hard about what was needed to develop an application.
They could liaise with users of the proposed application and come up
with a list of functional requirements, and then a design specification
which could be given to the coders who would implement it in code. It is
call "Waterfall" design methodology.
In the real world, this method repeatedly failed, often in huge and
expensive projects. An alternative method was simple, limited, prototype >applications would be developed to prove the concept could be developed
and that it was what the user wanted. Later this morphed in to "Agile",
where very small software goals were set and when coded, were given to
users to test, comment on. A sophisticated application was then built by >multiple iteration of this specify/develop/test loop.
On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 11:55:34 +0000, Fredxx <fredxx@spam.invalid> wrote:
Whilst I agree with you in part, there are some good reasons why Adam
Crozier didn't get a mention in the TV series. The only good thing is he
was never awarded a gong.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adam_Crozier
"Crozier left the Royal Mail in 2010 to become the chief executive of
media group ITV plc"
Horizon was already known to be faulty long before that, though. And
although Crozier was a step further removed from it (he was, at the time,
the boss of Paula Vennells's predecessor), the sheer scale of mismanagement at the Post Office means that accountability for it has to go all the way to the top. Crozier was probably a peripheral figure as far as the ITV drama is concerned, because he left Royal Mail shortly after Alan Bates started his campaign and there's no evidence of any contact between them. But, even as a relatively peripheral figure in the personal story of Alan Bates, he's absolutely central to the scandal itself. And that should, I think, have
been at least mentioned in the programme.
As I've already said, I don't have a huge amount of sympathy for Vennells. She was definitely culpable both of her own errors and not dealing with
those of her management team. But she didn't create the situation. She
didn't oversee the introduction of Horizon. Horizon was already known to be faulty when she was appointed. The majority of prosecutions took place
before she was appointed. By the time she joined the Post Office, a culture of deliberate deception and secrecy was already deeply entrenched. She bears no blame for the creation of that culture, or for the mismanagement which
led to its creation.
Vennells's fault was simply that she didn't challenge the culture she had stepped into. She had the opportunity to be a new broom, and to shine a
light on the institutional failings of the Post Office. But she didn't. Instead, she simply accepted the culture as it was, and became a part of it. That is, of course, a huge failing. But it seems to me that the underlying cause is simply weakness. She didn't have the strength of character to face down the opposing voices. In James Arbuthnot's words, "she was willing to accept appalling advice from people in her management and legal teams".
It's worth bearing in mind, too, that one of the first things Vennells did
as CEO was hire an external consultancy to investigate Horizon. But as soon as their early reports indicated potential serious problems, their contract was terminated. Had Vennells kept them in place, and allowed them to
complete their work, she might now be viewed as the hero who fixed the problem she had inherited. It's entirely to her discredit that she chose instead to go with the opinions of people who were determined to lie, lie
and lie again. But the bigger sin, by far, was committed by those liars, and by the people who put them in place to begin with. And one of those people was Adam Crozier.
Mark
On 11/01/2024 12:11, billy bookcase wrote:
[I wrote:]
But for the "apparently" to be applicable, it would have been necessary[...]I expect that rather they were pleased that the new computer
system had [apparently} uncovered so much previously hidden criminality.
The position you were referring to above, concerned " the previously hiddenYou missed out [and changed the punctuation of] "[apparently]".
criminality",*before* the Horizon system was installed
for there to have been large sums of money missing in the first place ?
??? We don't know how much money was missing in the days when
accounts were rarely audited,
and there may well be no sensible way of
finding out.
The "apparently" was there merely because without it, it
reads as though there really was a great deal of criminality pre-Horizon.
No ?
No; but see below.
And so I can only ask you again. *Prior* to the introduction of the Horizon >> System how was it possible for sub-postmasters to "snaffle" "considerable
sums of cash" ? By means of which the Horizon System to then,
"apparently" able to uncover ?
There's no point asking me. I have never managed to snaffle large
amounts of cash, never stolen even small amounts, never committed fraud. You'd need to ask someone with a criminal mind how to get away with doing such things. But it would be foolish to claim it to be impossible.
By relying on the difficulty of detection?
and uncover [apparently] a significant amount of fraud, then a decent first guess is that a similar amount of fraud took place earlier, but went undetected. FTAOD, that "[apparently]" reflects my belief that in fact the detection was largely spurious.
[...]
You have yet to demonstrate how, prior to the introduction of Horizon
sub postmasters were "apparently" stealing all these "considerable
sums of cash"
Ah, I now see your problem. You are treating "apparently" as
meaning "obviously" whereas I meant it to suggest that the appearance
was deceptive.
[...]
Another point which appears to have been overlooked is that Horizon was
rolled out across the entire business. No just in small sub-po's but in main >> non franchised Post Offices as well. Which makes it difficult to believe
that problems didn't show up there as well. Or maybe the main offices
were the first priority every evening, for the Fujitsu "oversight" team.
Main offices are (a) a tiny proportion of the whole, (b) in well-
connected central locations [so that losing connexion is very rare],
(c) well staffed [making it harder for staff to act out of the sight and knowledge of other staff].
On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 14:11:06 +0000, Fredxx <fredxx@spam.invalid> wrote:
On 12/01/2024 13:33, Mark Goodge wrote:
On the contrary, the police are already investigating various potential
perjury and fraud offences. The chances of there being no successful
prosecutions for any of these is, I think, slim. And it's looking
increasingly likely that various senior managers of the Post Offices will >>> have their bonuses clawed back, which will probably hurt them more than a >>> conviction for a relatively minor crime. Fujitsu is likely to be sued by the
government to the value of the compensation which will need to be paid out, >>> which will cause considerable pain to that company. There are likely to be >>> some quite serious consequences for some individuals and organisations.
Won't that will largely depend on whether the PO were aware of the
Horizon shortfalls in functionality. If so, then they may claim the PO /
government would be out of time for any successful claim.
My impression is that the PO were kept in the dark of the flaws in
Horizon. Some of the published emails from Vennells suggest this from
what I recall.
If it can be shown that Fujitsu deliberately misled the Post Office, then
the length of time will not be an issue. There isn't a statute of
limitations on civil claims. All that's required is that they are made in a timely fashion. If the cause of action doesn't become apparent until some time after the event, then the clock starts when it becomes apparent, not when it happened.
Mark
Unless something has drastically changed then that is not how it works
at all.
A stocktake is done just before the year end, total sales less total
expenses plus increase in stock and job's pretty well done.
Do you think your local fish and chip shop has counted and accounted
for all potatoes in and all chips sold every day?
As explained elsewhere in this thread the Postmasters had to account
and post to the computer all incomings and all outgoings and the
computer would from time to time go wrong on transactions either way.
Personally, and having been in IT for nearly 40yrs, I don't trust
computer systems and I'd have been tempted to ensure I had some paper
copies or records if time had permitted. Something wrong with system
design when a receipt is given to a customer but a copy not held in
the Post office, or a local copy of an uploaded data set (whether
successful or not) isn't available. oops, a tape drive or a floppy
disk or a carbonated paper printer costs extra.
I never knew you could get fizzy paper....
how do you inject the carbon dioxide into the paper?
On 12/01/2024 15:16, Mark Goodge wrote:
[quoted text muted]
Well, there actually is a statute of limitation in civil claims.
On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 11:33:22 -0000 (UTC), Jethro_uk <jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
One of the best was a routine which insisted on making surnames proper >>case. So "LeBlanc" became "Leblanc".
It's probably a good job they never had e e cummings as a customer.
But Agile isn't appropriate for every situation. In particular, it isn't suitable for scenarios involving safety-critical, legal-critical or finance-critical applications. In those, it is essential - both as a practical perspective and, in many cases, a legal requirement - to seperate development from testing, and only launch once the testing has been satisfactorily completed.
That doesn't rule out an earlier, more limited
pilot project, particularly as a proof of concept. But it does mean that the earliest production release has to be version 1.0.
Horizon appears to have broken all of those principles. People were prosecuted as a result of flaws in the beta version used in the pilot, which is precisely the point at which you expect bugs and where where the output
of the program should always be sanity-checked against existing methods. And then the production version was rushed into operation before it had been properly tested and before the code had been properly reviewed. You can get away with that if you're developing a social media app. You can't get away with it if you're building a financial system handling millions of pounds every day.
On 12:47 12 Jan 2024, Pancho said:
On 12/01/2024 12:16, Jon Ribbens wrote:
On 2024-01-12, Pancho <Pancho.Jones@proton.me> wrote:
On 11/01/2024 19:22, Clive Page wrote:
Look, for example, at the example at the bottom of page 17 of
the document attached here:
https://www.postofficehorizoninquiry.org.uk/evidence/
fuj00080690-report-eposs-pinicl-task-force
Several other examples have been shown during the course of the
current enquiry. Enjoy.
This was RAD code from 25 years ago. As a RAD developer, my code
often
"RAD code"?
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rapid_application_development>
When I was a lad, there was a theory of software development that
senior people could think hard about what was needed to develop an
application. They could liaise with users of the proposed application
and come up with a list of functional requirements, and then a design
specification which could be given to the coders who would implement
it in code. It is call "Waterfall" design methodology.
In the real world, this method repeatedly failed, often in huge and
expensive projects.
That reminds me of SSADM ... and immediately my heart sinks at the very thought. Groan.
An alternative method was simple, limited,
prototype applications would be developed to prove the concept could
be developed and that it was what the user wanted. Later this morphed
in to "Agile", where very small software goals were set and when
coded, were given to users to test, comment on. A sophisticated
application was then built by multiple iteration of this
specify/develop/test loop.
Rapid prototyping is a rigorous method but I suspect far too many RAD projects felt the inherently incomplete deliverables permitted a
stressed team to apply the method incompletely.
On 12/01/2024 16:10, Pamela wrote:
[quoted text muted]
Yes, I believed understanding SSADM was the route to knowing how to
develop systems, career progression, becoming an important fellow. I
bought books on it, but try as I might, I just couldn't bring myself to
read them.
On 12/01/2024 15:13, Mark Goodge wrote:
It's worth bearing in mind, too, that one of the first things Vennells did >> as CEO was hire an external consultancy to investigate Horizon. But as soon >> as their early reports indicated potential serious problems, their contract >> was terminated. Had Vennells kept them in place, and allowed them toYou say of the external consultants "their contract was terminated" - which is >true. But contacts don't just get terminated, someone high up choses to terminate
complete their work, she might now be viewed as the hero who fixed the
problem she had inherited. It's entirely to her discredit that she chose
instead to go with the opinions of people who were determined to lie, lie
and lie again. But the bigger sin, by far, was committed by those liars, and >> by the people who put them in place to begin with. And one of those people >> was Adam Crozier.
them. That must have been Vennells or someone acting on her instructions. And it
occurred just before these consultants were about to publish a rather damning report,
which no doubt was the reason for the termination of the contract. So that can also
be held against her.
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 12:20:35 +0000,
Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:
It is being discussed on stack exchange right now. It really is bad!
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/77796678/code-sample-from-post-office-horizon-application-what-language-is-this
I presume that they were being paid by the KLOC...
Hah - that is bad.
Although the kind of stuff highlighted by the report was crap, it wasn't necessarily the kind of stuff that might cause the problems we have
seen. It is just indicative of poor management for the development
project - and if they are having problems with the basics, then the complexities of a distributed system and ensuring ACID transactions
are going to have issues too.
BTW I've looked at the report and all the examples are of VB code. I
shudder to think what the C/C++ stuff was like - although maybe they
had better people for that.
On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 08:25:42 +0000, SH <i.love@spam.com> wrote:
Unless something has drastically changed then that is not how it works
at all.
A stocktake is done just before the year end, total sales less total
expenses plus increase in stock and job's pretty well done.
Do you think your local fish and chip shop has counted and accounted
for all potatoes in and all chips sold every day?
As explained elsewhere in this thread the Postmasters had to account
and post to the computer all incomings and all outgoings and the
computer would from time to time go wrong on transactions either way.
Personally, and having been in IT for nearly 40yrs, I don't trust
computer systems and I'd have been tempted to ensure I had some paper
copies or records if time had permitted. Something wrong with system
design when a receipt is given to a customer but a copy not held in
the Post office, or a local copy of an uploaded data set (whether
successful or not) isn't available. oops, a tape drive or a floppy
disk or a carbonated paper printer costs extra.
I never knew you could get fizzy paper....
how do you inject the carbon dioxide into the paper?
:)
Shake a pop bottle nearby then open it.
But you seem to have lost the attribution to me.
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 12:20:35 +0000,
Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:
It is being discussed on stack exchange right now. It really is bad!
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/77796678/code-sample-from-post-office-horizon-application-what-language-is-this
I presume that they were being paid by the KLOC...
Hah - that is bad.
Although the kind of stuff highlighted by the report was crap, it wasn't necessarily the kind of stuff that might cause the problems we have
seen. It is just indicative of poor management for the development
project - and if they are having problems with the basics, then the complexities of a distributed system and ensuring ACID transactions
are going to have issues too.
BTW I've looked at the report and all the examples are of VB code. I
shudder to think what the C/C++ stuff was like - although maybe they
had better people for that.
On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 14:11:06 +0000, Fredxx wrote:
My impression is that the PO were kept in the dark of the flaws in
Horizon.
That doesn't square with their intimidation and bullying of anyone who suggested otherwise. By their actions alone they are guilty as sin.
On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 11:26:54 -0000 (UTC), Jethro_uk <jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 16:58:04 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 07:47:36 -0000 (UTC), Jethro_uk
<jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Wed, 10 Jan 2024 21:06:33 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
Maybe Channel 4 should introduce a daily dramatised re-enactment of
key news stories. it would probably get a bigger audience than their >>>>> actual news show.
The problem is, "history" isn't absolute.
Well, yes. People have already observed how the ITV drama seems to have
exaggerated the role of Paula Vennells while completely ignoring the
role played by Adam Crozier.
To be clear, I think Vennells was definitely culpable for her role in
the scandal. But certainly it wasn't just her, and I'm not even sure she >>> was the worst offender. The way the programme, and now the court of
social media, has made her the prime scapegoat is very conveniently
overlooking several other key members of the Post Office's senior
management.
Fascinating armchair discussion between two chaps who know no one will
face any consequences from this little incident.
On the contrary, the police are already investigating various potential perjury and fraud offences. The chances of there being no successful prosecutions for any of these is, I think, slim. And it's looking increasingly likely that various senior managers of the Post Offices will have their bonuses clawed back, which will probably hurt them more than a conviction for a relatively minor crime. Fujitsu is likely to be sued by the government to the value of the compensation which will need to be paid out, which will cause considerable pain to that company. There are likely to be some quite serious consequences for some individuals and organisations.
On 12 Jan 2024 at 13:33:48 GMT, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Fri, 12 Jan 2024 11:26:54 -0000 (UTC), Jethro_uk
<jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 16:58:04 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
On Thu, 11 Jan 2024 07:47:36 -0000 (UTC), Jethro_uk
<jethro_uk@hotmailbin.com> wrote:
On Wed, 10 Jan 2024 21:06:33 +0000, Mark Goodge wrote:
Maybe Channel 4 should introduce a daily dramatised re-enactment of >>>>>> key news stories. it would probably get a bigger audience than their >>>>>> actual news show.
The problem is, "history" isn't absolute.
Well, yes. People have already observed how the ITV drama seems to have >>>> exaggerated the role of Paula Vennells while completely ignoring the
role played by Adam Crozier.
To be clear, I think Vennells was definitely culpable for her role in
the scandal. But certainly it wasn't just her, and I'm not even sure she >>>> was the worst offender. The way the programme, and now the court of
social media, has made her the prime scapegoat is very conveniently
overlooking several other key members of the Post Office's senior
management.
Fascinating armchair discussion between two chaps who know no one will
face any consequences from this little incident.
On the contrary, the police are already investigating various potential
perjury and fraud offences. The chances of there being no successful
prosecutions for any of these is, I think, slim. And it's looking
increasingly likely that various senior managers of the Post Offices will
have their bonuses clawed back, which will probably hurt them more than a
conviction for a relatively minor crime. Fujitsu is likely to be sued by the >> government to the value of the compensation which will need to be paid out, >> which will cause considerable pain to that company. There are likely to be >> some quite serious consequences for some individuals and organisations.
I was under the impression (from Private Eye and the ITV drama) that Fujitsu is untouchable because of their various government contracts, and involvement of senior politicians and officials. So the government is unlikely to sue - I'd have thought a 'no prejudice' payment is more likely.
On 08/01/2024 14:36, Jon Ribbens wrote:
On 2024-01-08, Jeff Gaines <jgnewsid@outlook.com> wrote:
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute. I >>> think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations with
these powers?
Every organisation has these powers, because everyone has these powers.
Pretty much anyone can take out a private prosecution.
Following full privatisation in 2015 the Royal Mail Group retained both
its investigative branch and its legal department and continued
prosecuting around 150 cases per year as a private prosecutor. While
being granted no statutory investigative powers it was granted access to
the Police National Computer system for intelligence and prosecution purposes. Additionally, it had financial investigators appointed by the National Crime Agency for the purposes of undertaking financial investigations for restraint and confiscation proceedings. Finally, (especially for Roland and thread convergence :-)), Royal Mail Group was included within the list of "Relevant Public Authorities" under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 designated to grant authorisations for the carrying out of detailed surveillance.
Can you name any other private organisations that have:
(1) Access to the PNC;
(2) NCA appointed financial investigators working there; and
(3) Are listed as a "Relevant Public Authority" in RIPA?
The Post Office is unlike any private prosecutor of which I am aware.
There can't be (m)any in a similar situation and to suggest that these private prosecutions brought by the Post Office were like those brought
by any other private organisation is to deny the additional 'privileges' abused by the Post Office in the Horizon prosecutions.
I confess I do not know if it is legally possible, but in addition to
any other sanctions the Post Office may face, I would like to see it
forced to repay all the money paid from the public purse for these
private prosecutions.
On 08/01/2024 14:36, Jon Ribbens wrote:
On 2024-01-08, Jeff Gaines <jgnewsid@outlook.com> wrote:
I was surprised to read that the Post Office has the power to prosecute. I >>> think the RSPCA has similar powers; are there other organisations withEvery organisation has these powers, because everyone has these
these powers?
powers.
Pretty much anyone can take out a private prosecution.
Following full privatisation in 2015 the Royal Mail Group retained both
its investigative branch and its legal department and continued
prosecuting around 150 cases per year as a private prosecutor. While
being granted no statutory investigative powers it was granted access
to the Police National Computer system for intelligence and prosecution >purposes. Additionally, it had financial investigators appointed by
the National Crime Agency for the purposes of undertaking financial >investigations for restraint and confiscation proceedings. Finally, >(especially for Roland and thread convergence :-)), Royal Mail Group
was included within the list of "Relevant Public Authorities" under the >Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 designated to grant >authorisations for the carrying out of detailed surveillance.
Can you name any other private organisations that have:
(1) Access to the PNC;
(2) NCA appointed financial investigators working there; and
(3) Are listed as a "Relevant Public Authority" in RIPA?
Then there's the £12b NHS National Programme for IT (NPfIT) that was
largely abandoned in 2011 amid spiralling costs, technical difficulties
and contractual disputes.
There's a sidebar article in The Times today which goes into some detail of an actual incident. A customer came in to make a Giro withdrawal. The amount was put through the system, which authorised the payment and generated a receipt. The customer was issued with the money from the till, and given the money along with the receipt. As the customer left the building, the
computer terminal froze, and generated an error code. When it restarted, the transaction just carried out was missing from the daily log. As far as the system was concerned, it had never been asked to authorise a payment to a customer. The postmaster had simply given someone £150 out of the till with no reason to do so. And, of course, at the end of the day the till was £150 down, which the system flagged as a discrepancy and expected the postmaster to make good.
In that particular case, the postmaster managed to get it sorted out. Fortunately, the postmaster was able to get in touch with the customer, and the customer had kept the receipt. With the customer's co-operation, the postmaster was able to not only show that the system had generated a receipt but that the withdrawal had correctly been made from the customer's account. Everything had gone through correctly, but Horizon simply lost track of the transaction.
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