• Re: Copyright on NHS medical scans?

    From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Sun Oct 8 14:25:05 2023
    On Fri, 6 Oct 2023 08:16:33 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 06/10/2023 01:58, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Tue, 3 Oct 2023 22:04:49 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 03/10/2023 14:17, Ottavio Caruso wrote:
    Am 03/10/2023 um 10:52 schrieb Pamela:
    Who holds the copyright on NHS medical scans (such as MRI, CT, etc)? >>>>
    Is it the patient or the NHS?


    It's not intellectual work, therefore copyright doesn't mean anything in >>> this context.

    Whether it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it.

    That might have been true once, but more recent case law says that for copyright to subsist, the work must be the "author's own intellectual creation".

    For which the bar is extraordinarily low, as illustrated by any
    photographs by anyone (even a monkey) attracting copyright.

    Thank you for agreeing that you were previously wrong to say "Whether
    it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it."

    And also for agreeing with me that nevertheless it doesn't take much intellectual effort on the part of the radiographer.

    On the monkey selfie, however, the US court decision simply said that
    only a work by a human qualifies for copyright. So the monkey didn't
    qualify.

    It never reached the separate question of whether the human who set up
    the camera, lighting etc, and who encouraged the monkey to play with it,
    making adjustments when the initial results were poor, would have been
    entitled to copyright as a result.

    And of course, it was about US law rather than UK, where I'm pretty sure
    those questions would have been relevant, though I'm still not sure what
    the outcome would have been.

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

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  • From Tony The Welsh Twat@21:1/5 to Martin Brown on Sun Oct 8 06:45:42 2023
    On Wednesday, 4 October 2023 at 09:28:56 UTC+1, Martin Brown wrote:

    MRI or CT raw data isn't much good to anybody without specialist tools.

    --
    Martin Brown

    I had a PET scan a few years ago (they inject you with a radioactive dye that sticks to anything that shouldn't be inside of you) and then perform a 3D scan where they can view the results and do a full 360 degree analysis of where the dye has collected.

    I asked the consultant if I could get a copy of the images and he said "they're a proprietary format only readable by this software........if we give you the images you'll need to spend a couple of grand on the software to be able to view them".

    A bit like RealAudio files from many moons ago.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Sun Oct 8 18:56:35 2023
    On 08/10/2023 14:25, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Fri, 6 Oct 2023 08:16:33 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 06/10/2023 01:58, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Tue, 3 Oct 2023 22:04:49 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 03/10/2023 14:17, Ottavio Caruso wrote:
    Am 03/10/2023 um 10:52 schrieb Pamela:
    Who holds the copyright on NHS medical scans (such as MRI, CT, etc)? >>>>>>
    Is it the patient or the NHS?


    It's not intellectual work, therefore copyright doesn't mean anything in >>>>> this context.

    Whether it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it.

    That might have been true once, but more recent case law says that for
    copyright to subsist, the work must be the "author's own intellectual
    creation".

    For which the bar is extraordinarily low, as illustrated by any
    photographs by anyone (even a monkey) attracting copyright.

    Thank you for agreeing that you were previously wrong to say "Whether
    it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it."

    The bar is so low it can hardly be regarded as 'intellectual' in any
    normal understanding of the word. Unless of course you regard a monkey
    that can press a button as intellectual.

    Perhaps you'd give an example or two of 'works' that are not
    'intellectual creations' under your definitions?

    And also for agreeing with me that nevertheless it doesn't take much intellectual effort on the part of the radiographer.

    Since that's something I didn't say or allege, I don't agree at all.

    On the monkey selfie, however, the US court decision simply said that
    only a work by a human qualifies for copyright. So the monkey didn't qualify.

    It never reached the separate question of whether the human who set up
    the camera, lighting etc, and who encouraged the monkey to play with it, making adjustments when the initial results were poor, would have been entitled to copyright as a result.

    And of course, it was about US law rather than UK, where I'm pretty sure those questions would have been relevant, though I'm still not sure what
    the outcome would have been.

    Since this is a UK group, what do you think it would have been here?

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  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Mon Oct 9 01:26:26 2023
    On Sun, 8 Oct 2023 18:56:35 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 08/10/2023 14:25, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Fri, 6 Oct 2023 08:16:33 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 06/10/2023 01:58, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Tue, 3 Oct 2023 22:04:49 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 03/10/2023 14:17, Ottavio Caruso wrote:
    Am 03/10/2023 um 10:52 schrieb Pamela:
    Who holds the copyright on NHS medical scans (such as MRI, CT, etc)? >>>>>>
    Is it the patient or the NHS?


    It's not intellectual work, therefore copyright doesn't mean anything in
    this context.

    Whether it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it.

    That might have been true once, but more recent case law says that for >>> copyright to subsist, the work must be the "author's own intellectual
    creation".

    For which the bar is extraordinarily low, as illustrated by any
    photographs by anyone (even a monkey) attracting copyright.

    Thank you for agreeing that you were previously wrong to say "Whether
    it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it."

    The bar is so low it can hardly be regarded as 'intellectual' in any
    normal understanding of the word. Unless of course you regard a monkey
    that can press a button as intellectual.

    I don't. You've misinterpreted the monkey selfie case. Please go back
    and read my previous comment, which is still quoted below.

    Perhaps you'd give an example or two of 'works' that are not
    'intellectual creations' under your definitions?

    A football fixture list. See the Football Dataco case below. There was
    no copyright, as the list wasn't an intellectual creation. (However,
    there was also a separate question about /sui generis/ database right.)

    And also for agreeing with me that nevertheless it doesn't take much intellectual effort on the part of the radiographer.

    Since that's something I didn't say or allege, I don't agree at all.

    Please stop trying to split hairs. You said there didn't need to be
    anything 'intellectual' in the normal sense of the word as something high-flown. I agree.

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't
    have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright.
    Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    It just needs to be "the author's [i.e. the radiographer's] own
    intellectual creation". Nowadays, this is what makes it "original".

    But while not requiring very much creativity, there still has to be
    some. Mere skill and labour, by themselves, are not enough.

    "Football Dataco: skill and labour is dead!" https://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2012/03/01/


    On the monkey selfie, however, the US court decision simply said that
    only a work by a human qualifies for copyright. So the monkey didn't qualify.

    It never reached the separate question of whether the human who set up
    the camera, lighting etc, and who encouraged the monkey to play with it, making adjustments when the initial results were poor, would have been entitled to copyright as a result.

    And of course, it was about US law rather than UK, where I'm pretty sure those questions would have been relevant, though I'm still not sure what the outcome would have been.

    Since this is a UK group, what do you think it would have been here?

    Quote: "...rather than UK, where I'm still not sure what the outcome
    would have been."

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

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  • From TTman@21:1/5 to Pamela on Mon Oct 9 10:11:20 2023
    On 03/10/2023 11:52, Pamela wrote:
    Who holds the copyright on NHS medical scans (such as MRI, CT, etc)?

    Is it the patient or the NHS?

    Pass, but if you want a copy of your MRI scan, just ask.... I have
    mine.To view an MRI scan yopu need to download a viewer..

    --
    This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. www.avast.com

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  • From GB@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Mon Oct 9 09:58:10 2023
    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't
    have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright. Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as
    subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great
    skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of
    whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video
    doorbells, for example.

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  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Mon Oct 9 11:17:06 2023
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 09:58:10 +0100, GB wrote...

    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't
    have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright. Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great
    skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video doorbells, for example.

    For copyright to subsist, the work also has to be "original". The
    modern view of originality requires that the work be an expression of
    "the author's own intellectual creation". I don't think a video
    doorbell image qualifies.

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

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  • From Iain Archer@21:1/5 to Tony The Welsh Twat on Sun Oct 8 20:13:12 2023
    On Sun, 08 Oct 2023 06:45:42 -0700, Tony The Welsh Twat wrote:

    On Wednesday, 4 October 2023 at 09:28:56 UTC+1, Martin Brown wrote:

    MRI or CT raw data isn't much good to anybody without specialist tools.

    --
    Martin Brown

    I had a PET scan a few years ago (they inject you with a radioactive
    dye that sticks to anything that shouldn't be inside of you) and then
    perform a 3D scan where they can view the results and do a full 360
    degree analysis of where the dye has collected.

    I asked the consultant if I could get a copy of the images and he said "they're a proprietary format only readable by this software........if
    we give you the images you'll need to spend a couple of grand on the
    software to be able to view them".

    A bit like RealAudio files from many moons ago.

    In that case can't they be regarded as personal information? Doesn't
    the provider then have a responsibility to make them available in a
    suitable format? I suspect some files of array slices in a clearly
    described format, proprietary or not, would be enough to be useful.
    I dare say they'd have any copyright of those files too.

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  • From Jeff Layman@21:1/5 to Tony The Welsh Twat on Mon Oct 9 11:55:25 2023
    On 08/10/2023 14:45, Tony The Welsh Twat wrote:
    On Wednesday, 4 October 2023 at 09:28:56 UTC+1, Martin Brown wrote:

    MRI or CT raw data isn't much good to anybody without specialist tools.

    --
    Martin Brown

    I had a PET scan a few years ago (they inject you with a radioactive dye that sticks to anything that shouldn't be inside of you) and then perform a 3D scan where they can view the results and do a full 360 degree analysis of where the dye has
    collected.

    I asked the consultant if I could get a copy of the images and he said "they're a proprietary format only readable by this software........if we give you the images you'll need to spend a couple of grand on the software to be able to view them".

    To view PET scans (and MRI scans) you need a DICOM viewer. There are
    several free viewers available for Windows. Whether or not you'll be
    able to make sense of what you'll be seeing on the screen is another
    matter entirely.

    --

    Jeff

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  • From Ottavio Caruso@21:1/5 to All on Mon Oct 9 09:44:05 2023
    Am 08/10/2023 um 13:25 schrieb Tim Jackson:
    On Fri, 6 Oct 2023 08:16:33 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 06/10/2023 01:58, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Tue, 3 Oct 2023 22:04:49 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 03/10/2023 14:17, Ottavio Caruso wrote:
    Am 03/10/2023 um 10:52 schrieb Pamela:
    Who holds the copyright on NHS medical scans (such as MRI, CT, etc)? >>>>>>
    Is it the patient or the NHS?


    It's not intellectual work, therefore copyright doesn't mean anything in >>>>> this context.

    Whether it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it.

    That might have been true once, but more recent case law says that for
    copyright to subsist, the work must be the "author's own intellectual
    creation".

    For which the bar is extraordinarily low, as illustrated by any
    photographs by anyone (even a monkey) attracting copyright.

    Thank you for agreeing that you were previously wrong to say "Whether
    it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it."

    And also for agreeing with me that nevertheless it doesn't take much intellectual effort on the part of the radiographer.

    On the monkey selfie, however, the US court decision simply said that
    only a work by a human qualifies for copyright. So the monkey didn't qualify.

    It never reached the separate question of whether the human who set up
    the camera, lighting etc, and who encouraged the monkey to play with it, making adjustments when the initial results were poor, would have been entitled to copyright as a result.

    And of course, it was about US law rather than UK, where I'm pretty sure those questions would have been relevant, though I'm still not sure what
    the outcome would have been.


    My previous GP allowed me to see a copy of my scans on the app "Patient Access". Not so with my new GP.

    --
    Ottavio Caruso

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  • From GB@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Mon Oct 9 12:41:33 2023
    On 09/10/2023 11:17, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 09:58:10 +0100, GB wrote...

    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't
    have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright.
    Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as
    subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great
    skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of
    whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video
    doorbells, for example.

    For copyright to subsist, the work also has to be "original". The
    modern view of originality requires that the work be an expression of
    "the author's own intellectual creation". I don't think a video
    doorbell image qualifies.


    Wasn't there a case not long ago of a monkey that managed to take a snap
    of itself whilst playing with a camera?

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  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Mon Oct 9 13:26:20 2023
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 12:41:33 +0100, GB wrote...

    On 09/10/2023 11:17, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 09:58:10 +0100, GB wrote...

    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't
    have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright.
    Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as
    subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great
    skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of
    whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video
    doorbells, for example.

    For copyright to subsist, the work also has to be "original". The
    modern view of originality requires that the work be an expression of
    "the author's own intellectual creation". I don't think a video
    doorbell image qualifies.


    Wasn't there a case not long ago of a monkey that managed to take a snap
    of itself whilst playing with a camera?

    Yes, but it was a US case rather than UK. See one of my previous
    replies to Norman, who had misunderstood it. It wasn't decided on
    substantive questions about artistic quality or originality. Merely on
    the basis that works by non-humans don't qualify for copyright
    protection.

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to All on Mon Oct 9 15:17:43 2023
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 11:17:06 +0100, Tim Jackson <news@timjackson.invalid>
    wrote:

    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 09:58:10 +0100, GB wrote...

    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't
    have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright.
    Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as
    subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great
    skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of
    whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video
    doorbells, for example.

    For copyright to subsist, the work also has to be "original". The
    modern view of originality requires that the work be an expression of
    "the author's own intellectual creation". I don't think a video
    doorbell image qualifies.

    It's generally accepted that if a person configures a camera to take a photo
    or video when triggered by certain conditions, then that constitutes the author's own intellectual creation. It doesn't have to mean a physical
    finger on the shutter. There's no difference, legally speaking, between
    setting the camera to "wait ten seconds and then take a photo" (commonly
    used to allow the photographer time to get into shot themselves), "take a
    photo every minute" (eg, in order to create a time-lapse) and "wait until
    the motion detector detects motion, and then take a photo". The key in all cases is that the conditions under which the photo will be taken are set by
    the human operator.

    Motion detection, in particular, has been around a very long time, long
    before it became widespread in domestic CCTV. It's a very common wildlife photography technique, for example. If I set up a camera in my garden and
    leave it overnight with motion detection switched on, then I own the
    copyright in the photos and videos it takes of foxes and hedgehogs. And the same applies to a camera in my front yard where the motion detector is triggered by someone walking up to my door.

    Ring's terms and conditions don't explicitly state that the owner of the doorbell owns the copyright, but are worded in a way which makes that presumption. For example, in the section where it talks about sharing
    content via the "Ring Neighbors" and "Ring Community" features that you
    grant Ring a licence to use the content. That would be meaningless if the
    owner of the device was not the rightsholder, as only the rightsholder can grant a licence to use the content. And it also explicitly prohibits sharing any content that the user does not own, which, again, would be meaningless
    if the doorbell's owner didn't own the content it generates.

    Mark

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Mon Oct 9 13:02:34 2023
    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Sun, 8 Oct 2023 18:56:35 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 08/10/2023 14:25, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Fri, 6 Oct 2023 08:16:33 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 06/10/2023 01:58, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Tue, 3 Oct 2023 22:04:49 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 03/10/2023 14:17, Ottavio Caruso wrote:
    Am 03/10/2023 um 10:52 schrieb Pamela:
    Who holds the copyright on NHS medical scans (such as MRI, CT, etc)? >>>>>>>>
    Is it the patient or the NHS?


    It's not intellectual work, therefore copyright doesn't mean anything in
    this context.

    Whether it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it.

    That might have been true once, but more recent case law says that for >>>>> copyright to subsist, the work must be the "author's own intellectual >>>>> creation".

    For which the bar is extraordinarily low, as illustrated by any
    photographs by anyone (even a monkey) attracting copyright.

    Thank you for agreeing that you were previously wrong to say "Whether
    it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it."

    The bar is so low it can hardly be regarded as 'intellectual' in any
    normal understanding of the word. Unless of course you regard a monkey
    that can press a button as intellectual.

    I don't. You've misinterpreted the monkey selfie case. Please go back
    and read my previous comment, which is still quoted below.

    Perhaps you'd give an example or two of 'works' that are not
    'intellectual creations' under your definitions?

    A football fixture list. See the Football Dataco case below. There was
    no copyright, as the list wasn't an intellectual creation.

    Why then would anyone want to copy it if it's so easy to create ab
    initio and requires no intellect? And why should they be allowed to?

    People are always free to make their own lists just as long as they
    don't copy someone else's.

    I think this is an absurd decision. Don't you?

    I think the basic principle should be 'if it's worth copying it's worth protection'. Don't you?

    (However,
    there was also a separate question about /sui generis/ database right.)

    And also for agreeing with me that nevertheless it doesn't take much
    intellectual effort on the part of the radiographer.

    Since that's something I didn't say or allege, I don't agree at all.

    Please stop trying to split hairs. You said there didn't need to be
    anything 'intellectual' in the normal sense of the word as something high-flown. I agree.

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't
    have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright. Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    Quite. If there's no 'artistic quality', though, I find it rather hard
    to see how it can be an author's own 'intellectual creation'.

    It just needs to be "the author's [i.e. the radiographer's] own
    intellectual creation". Nowadays, this is what makes it "original".

    Rather than the obvious and ordinary meaning of 'new' or 'different',
    and the simplicity that would bring, which I think was intended in the
    UK Act before the blessed European Courts got involved and muddied
    everything with their verbal contortions.

    But while not requiring very much creativity, there still has to be
    some. Mere skill and labour, by themselves, are not enough.

    "Football Dataco: skill and labour is dead!" https://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2012/03/01/

    The court should perhaps have been asked how many angels can dance on
    the head of a pin. It would have been a better use of its time.

    Copyright law is now muddled and confused in all sorts of areas, as this
    case shows. It's completely anachronistic, especially as regards the
    term of protection, and it doesn't cope adequately, or even at all, with developed ease of copying and almost universal ignorance and disregard
    of it by the general populace. It's failing and it's time for a
    fundamental overhaul.

    On the monkey selfie, however, the US court decision simply said that
    only a work by a human qualifies for copyright. So the monkey didn't
    qualify.

    It never reached the separate question of whether the human who set up
    the camera, lighting etc, and who encouraged the monkey to play with it, >>> making adjustments when the initial results were poor, would have been
    entitled to copyright as a result.

    And of course, it was about US law rather than UK, where I'm pretty sure >>> those questions would have been relevant, though I'm still not sure what >>> the outcome would have been.

    Since this is a UK group, what do you think it would have been here?

    Quote: "...rather than UK, where I'm still not sure what the outcome
    would have been."

    Do you not have an opinion? How would you advise?

    What if a loutish human had just come up and pressed the shutter instead
    of the monkey?

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to All on Mon Oct 9 13:59:14 2023
    On 09/10/2023 09:58, GB wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't
    have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright.
    Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great
    skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video doorbells, for example.

    Copyright in someone else's work only affects you if you want to copy
    it. Why should you be free just to do that? What would be the reason
    for your wanting to copy it without gaining permission first?

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Mon Oct 9 14:05:31 2023
    On 09/10/2023 11:17, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 09:58:10 +0100, GB wrote...

    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't
    have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright.
    Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as
    subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great
    skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of
    whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video
    doorbells, for example.

    For copyright to subsist, the work also has to be "original". The
    modern view of originality requires that the work be an expression of
    "the author's own intellectual creation". I don't think a video
    doorbell image qualifies.

    I don't think that's a definition of 'original' either. Not according
    to any of the dictionaries I've seen anyway.

    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean, mean
    what they say, and only be altered by legislators. Don't you?

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  • From Tony The Welsh Twat@21:1/5 to Jeff Layman on Mon Oct 9 08:27:25 2023
    On Monday, 9 October 2023 at 11:56:05 UTC+1, Jeff Layman wrote:

    To view PET scans (and MRI scans) you need a DICOM viewer. There are
    several free viewers available for Windows. Whether or not you'll be
    able to make sense of what you'll be seeing on the screen is another
    matter entirely.

    --

    Jeff

    For some reason, the word Nifty is in my head as the image format he mentioned - of course, given that I had something nasty in my lung and all of the "so I've got cancer" thoughts flooding my head at the time, I might be mistaken as I wasn't thinking
    clearly.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From billy bookcase@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Mon Oct 9 19:37:57 2023
    "Tim Jackson" <news@timjackson.invalid> wrote in message news:MPG.3f8cbd892b71d706989f64@text.usenet.plus.net...

    On the monkey selfie, however, the US court decision simply said that
    only a work by a human qualifies for copyright. So the monkey didn't qualify.

    A Court comprised exclusively of humans, it maybe goes without saying.


    bb

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Jeff Layman@21:1/5 to Tony The Welsh Twat on Mon Oct 9 21:49:22 2023
    On 09/10/2023 16:27, Tony The Welsh Twat wrote:
    On Monday, 9 October 2023 at 11:56:05 UTC+1, Jeff Layman wrote:

    To view PET scans (and MRI scans) you need a DICOM viewer. There are
    several free viewers available for Windows. Whether or not you'll be
    able to make sense of what you'll be seeing on the screen is another
    matter entirely.

    --

    Jeff

    For some reason, the word Nifty is in my head as the image format he mentioned - of course, given that I had something nasty in my lung and all of the "so I've got cancer" thoughts flooding my head at the time, I might be mistaken as I wasn't thinking
    clearly.

    Well, it would all have been very unsettling at the time, but you're
    right about "NIFTI" (sometimes it seems to be referred to as Nifty). It
    appears to be a file format which is different from DICOM, and was
    originally intended for brain scans. You /might/ be able to install a
    "Nifti viewer" on a Windows or Linux system, but it wouldn't be simple.
    More information here: <https://niftypet.readthedocs.io/en/latest/>

    Or you can convert NIFTI to DICOM. If you do an internet search on the
    last four words you'll get several hits.

    --

    Jeff

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Simon Parker@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Mon Oct 9 23:03:09 2023
    On 09/10/2023 14:05, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 11:17, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 09:58:10 +0100, GB wrote...

    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't
    have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright.
    Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as
    subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great
    skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of
    whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video
    doorbells, for example.

    For copyright to subsist, the work also has to be "original".  The
    modern view of originality requires that the work be an expression of
    "the author's own intellectual creation".  I don't think a video
    doorbell image qualifies.

    I don't think that's a definition of 'original' either.  Not according
    to any of the dictionaries I've seen anyway.

    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean, mean
    what they say, and only be altered by legislators.  Don't you?

    You are repeating the mistake you frequently make.

    This is uk.legal.moderated. Alt.English.Usage is over there ----->.

    "The author's own intellectual creation" is a legal phrase which Tim
    kindly placed in quotes, I believe, to indicate such.

    You could do worse than obtain no more than the briefest understanding
    of "The Infopaq Case" (Ed: do you see what I've done with that phrase
    there?) [1] to clarify matters for you which will, it is hoped, assist
    you in understanding where you have misdirected yourself.

    Once you have grasped the point that "the author's own intellectual
    creation" applies to all Berne Convention "works" under the European
    acquis, then I would recommend moving on to SAS v World Programming in
    which the courts helpfully explicated the "intellectual creation" test thus:

    "The essence of the term is that the person in question has exercised expressive and creative choices in producing the work. The more
    restricted the choices, the less likely it is that the product will be
    the intellectual creation (or the expression of the intellectual
    creation) of the person who produced it."

    I trust this assists you in coming to a better, more accurate
    understanding of the matter.

    As always, I'm happy to help where I can but have been busy of late and
    haven't been posting as much as I would have liked.

    Regards

    S.P.

    [1] Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int'l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening [19 July
    2009] ECR I-6569 [2]

    [2] The "Significance" section of the relevant Wikipedia entry [3] will
    assist you in acquiring clue.

    [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infopaq_International_A/S_v_Danske_Dagblades_Forening#Significance

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Simon Parker on Tue Oct 10 08:48:20 2023
    On 09/10/2023 23:03, Simon Parker wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 14:05, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 11:17, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 09:58:10 +0100, GB wrote...

    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't >>>>> have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright. >>>>> Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as >>>> subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great
    skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of >>>> whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video
    doorbells, for example.

    For copyright to subsist, the work also has to be "original".  The
    modern view of originality requires that the work be an expression of
    "the author's own intellectual creation".  I don't think a video
    doorbell image qualifies.

    I don't think that's a definition of 'original' either.  Not according
    to any of the dictionaries I've seen anyway.

    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean,
    mean what they say, and only be altered by legislators.  Don't you?

    You are repeating the mistake you frequently make.

    This is uk.legal.moderated.  Alt.English.Usage is over there ----->.

    There's no mistake. Laws are written in language to be understood, not
    as a starting point for successive iterations like the game of changing
    BLACK into WHITE in six easy steps, which is what has happened.

    It's a fundamental principle of legal construction in the UK that laws
    mean what they say in the ordinary English in which they are expressed.
    They're supposed to tell people what they must not do, you see, without
    having to guess that they might some way down the line mean something
    else entirely or even the opposite.

    The word 'original' is that which is used in the UK legislation. It
    properly falls to be interpreted as that word is ordinarily used in the
    English language, for which the definitive works are what are called dictionaries.

    It follows that, if the meaning of the word is in any doubt,
    dictionaries will have to be consulted. And if you do that you find
    what is obvious anyway to anyone who speaks the language that it means essentially 'the first one', and that's all.

    You will look in vain for any definition that refers to 'own
    intellectual creation' which in any case has seemingly had to be derived
    from 'originality' rather than 'original' which is the word used in the legislation. It's a bit of a giveaway that misinterpretation is at hand.

    "The author's own intellectual creation" is a legal phrase which Tim
    kindly placed in quotes, I believe, to indicate such.

    You could do worse than obtain no more than the briefest understanding
    of "The Infopaq Case" (Ed: do you see what I've done with that phrase
    there?) [1] to clarify matters for you which will, it is hoped, assist
    you in understanding where you have misdirected yourself.

    Once you have grasped the point that "the author's own intellectual
    creation" applies to all Berne Convention "works" under the European
    acquis, then I would recommend moving on to SAS v World Programming in
    which the courts helpfully explicated the "intellectual creation" test
    thus:

    "The essence of the term is that the person in question has exercised expressive and creative choices in producing the work.  The more
    restricted the choices, the less likely it is that the product will be
    the intellectual creation (or the expression of the intellectual
    creation) of the person who produced it."

    I trust this assists you in coming to a better, more accurate
    understanding of the matter.

    The Berne Convention actually says that 'the expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary,
    scientific and artistic domain'.

    There is no reference there either to 'own intellectual creation'. It
    is 'every production'.

    As always, I'm happy to help where I can but have been busy of late and haven't been posting as much as I would have liked.

    I am of course aware how the case law has developed. What you don't
    seem able to comprehend is what a wrong path it has followed.
    'Original' no longer means what it says. And that's a fundamental misinterpretation.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Brian W@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 10 01:40:09 2023
    On Tuesday, 10 October 2023 at 08:53:54 UTC+1, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 23:03, Simon Parker wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 14:05, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 11:17, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 09:58:10 +0100, GB wrote...

    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't >>>>> have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright. >>>>> Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as >>>> subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great
    skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of >>>> whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video
    doorbells, for example.

    For copyright to subsist, the work also has to be "original". The
    modern view of originality requires that the work be an expression of
    "the author's own intellectual creation". I don't think a video
    doorbell image qualifies.

    I don't think that's a definition of 'original' either. Not according
    to any of the dictionaries I've seen anyway.

    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean,
    mean what they say, and only be altered by legislators. Don't you?

    You are repeating the mistake you frequently make.

    This is uk.legal.moderated. Alt.English.Usage is over there ----->.
    There's no mistake. Laws are written in language to be understood, not
    as a starting point for successive iterations like the game of changing
    BLACK into WHITE in six easy steps, which is what has happened.

    It's a fundamental principle of legal construction in the UK that laws
    mean what they say in the ordinary English in which they are expressed. They're supposed to tell people what they must not do, you see, without having to guess that they might some way down the line mean something
    else entirely or even the opposite.

    The word 'original' is that which is used in the UK legislation. It
    properly falls to be interpreted as that word is ordinarily used in the English language, for which the definitive works are what are called dictionaries.

    It follows that, if the meaning of the word is in any doubt,
    dictionaries will have to be consulted. And if you do that you find
    what is obvious anyway to anyone who speaks the language that it means essentially 'the first one', and that's all.

    You will look in vain for any definition that refers to 'own
    intellectual creation' which in any case has seemingly had to be derived
    from 'originality' rather than 'original' which is the word used in the legislation. It's a bit of a giveaway that misinterpretation is at hand.
    "The author's own intellectual creation" is a legal phrase which Tim
    kindly placed in quotes, I believe, to indicate such.

    You could do worse than obtain no more than the briefest understanding
    of "The Infopaq Case" (Ed: do you see what I've done with that phrase there?) [1] to clarify matters for you which will, it is hoped, assist
    you in understanding where you have misdirected yourself.

    Once you have grasped the point that "the author's own intellectual creation" applies to all Berne Convention "works" under the European acquis, then I would recommend moving on to SAS v World Programming in which the courts helpfully explicated the "intellectual creation" test thus:

    "The essence of the term is that the person in question has exercised expressive and creative choices in producing the work. The more
    restricted the choices, the less likely it is that the product will be
    the intellectual creation (or the expression of the intellectual
    creation) of the person who produced it."

    I trust this assists you in coming to a better, more accurate
    understanding of the matter.
    The Berne Convention actually says that 'the expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary,
    scientific and artistic domain'.

    There is no reference there either to 'own intellectual creation'. It
    is 'every production'.
    As always, I'm happy to help where I can but have been busy of late and haven't been posting as much as I would have liked.
    I am of course aware how the case law has developed. What you don't
    seem able to comprehend is what a wrong path it has followed.
    'Original' no longer means what it says. And that's a fundamental misinterpretation.

    Whereas I agree with you that the CJEU took a wrong turn when it decided that "original" means "the author's own intellectual
    creation", even before that decision the word "original" in the 1988 Act (and earlier Acts) was not interpreted in accordance with the dictionary definition. It was taken to mean something that involved the author's own skill and labour, and that wasn't
    simply copied from elsewhere.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From billy bookcase@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 10 09:04:37 2023
    "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote in message news:kokdu3Fjrj6U1@mid.individual.net...
    On 09/10/2023 23:03, Simon Parker wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 14:05, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 11:17, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 09:58:10 +0100, GB wrote...

    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't >>>>>> have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright. >>>>>> Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as >>>>> subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great
    skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of >>>>> whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video
    doorbells, for example.

    For copyright to subsist, the work also has to be "original". The
    modern view of originality requires that the work be an expression of
    "the author's own intellectual creation". I don't think a video
    doorbell image qualifies.

    I don't think that's a definition of 'original' either. Not according to >>> any of the dictionaries I've seen anyway.

    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean, mean
    what they say, and only be altered by legislators. Don't you?

    You are repeating the mistake you frequently make.

    This is uk.legal.moderated. Alt.English.Usage is over there ----->.

    There's no mistake. Laws are written in language to be understood, not as
    a starting point for successive iterations like the game of changing BLACK into WHITE in six easy steps, which is what has happened.

    It's a fundamental principle of legal construction in the UK that laws
    mean what they say in the ordinary English in which they are expressed. They're supposed to tell people what they must not do, you see, without having to guess that they might some way down the line mean something else entirely or even the opposite.

    The word 'original' is that which is used in the UK legislation. It
    properly falls to be interpreted as that word is ordinarily used in the English language, for which the definitive works are what are called dictionaries.

    It follows that, if the meaning of the word is in any doubt, dictionaries will have to be consulted. And if you do that you find what is obvious anyway to anyone who speaks the language that it means essentially 'the
    first one', and that's all.

    You will look in vain for any definition that refers to 'own intellectual creation' which in any case has seemingly had to be derived from 'originality' rather than 'original' which is the word used in the legislation. It's a bit of a giveaway that misinterpretation is at hand.

    "The author's own intellectual creation" is a legal phrase which Tim
    kindly placed in quotes, I believe, to indicate such.

    You could do worse than obtain no more than the briefest understanding of
    "The Infopaq Case" (Ed: do you see what I've done with that phrase
    there?) [1] to clarify matters for you which will, it is hoped, assist
    you in understanding where you have misdirected yourself.

    Once you have grasped the point that "the author's own intellectual
    creation" applies to all Berne Convention "works" under the European
    acquis, then I would recommend moving on to SAS v World Programming in
    which the courts helpfully explicated the "intellectual creation" test
    thus:

    "The essence of the term is that the person in question has exercised
    expressive and creative choices in producing the work. The more
    restricted the choices, the less likely it is that the product will be
    the intellectual creation (or the expression of the intellectual
    creation) of the person who produced it."

    I trust this assists you in coming to a better, more accurate
    understanding of the matter.

    The Berne Convention actually says that 'the expression "literary and artistic works" shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain'.

    There is no reference there either to 'own intellectual creation'. It is 'every production'.

    As always, I'm happy to help where I can but have been busy of late and
    haven't been posting as much as I would have liked.

    I am of course aware how the case law has developed. What you don't seem able to comprehend is what a wrong path it has followed. 'Original' no
    longer means what it says. And that's a fundamental misinterpretation.



    https://popcornplanet.co.uk/collections/bulk-popcorn

    First come, first served.



    bb








    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Brian W on Tue Oct 10 12:03:50 2023
    On 10/10/2023 09:40, Brian W wrote:
    On Tuesday, 10 October 2023 at 08:53:54 UTC+1, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 23:03, Simon Parker wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 14:05, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 11:17, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 09:58:10 +0100, GB wrote...

    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    In fact, I view an MRI scan as a type of 'photograph', which doesn't >>>>>>> have to have any artistic quality in order to qualify for copyright. >>>>>>> Copyright etc Act 1988, section 4.

    I think it is a great shame that photographs are generally accepted as >>>>>> subject to copyright. It presumably dates back to a time when great >>>>>> skill was required, and photos were carefully composed.

    Applying the same rules to a machine that automatically takes snaps of >>>>>> whatever happens to wander in front of the lens seems daft to me.
    Presumably, somebody owns the copyright to the video taken by video >>>>>> doorbells, for example.

    For copyright to subsist, the work also has to be "original". The
    modern view of originality requires that the work be an expression of >>>>> "the author's own intellectual creation". I don't think a video
    doorbell image qualifies.

    I don't think that's a definition of 'original' either. Not according >>>> to any of the dictionaries I've seen anyway.

    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean,
    mean what they say, and only be altered by legislators. Don't you?

    You are repeating the mistake you frequently make.

    This is uk.legal.moderated. Alt.English.Usage is over there ----->.
    There's no mistake. Laws are written in language to be understood, not
    as a starting point for successive iterations like the game of changing
    BLACK into WHITE in six easy steps, which is what has happened.

    It's a fundamental principle of legal construction in the UK that laws
    mean what they say in the ordinary English in which they are expressed.
    They're supposed to tell people what they must not do, you see, without
    having to guess that they might some way down the line mean something
    else entirely or even the opposite.

    The word 'original' is that which is used in the UK legislation. It
    properly falls to be interpreted as that word is ordinarily used in the
    English language, for which the definitive works are what are called
    dictionaries.

    It follows that, if the meaning of the word is in any doubt,
    dictionaries will have to be consulted. And if you do that you find
    what is obvious anyway to anyone who speaks the language that it means
    essentially 'the first one', and that's all.

    You will look in vain for any definition that refers to 'own
    intellectual creation' which in any case has seemingly had to be derived
    from 'originality' rather than 'original' which is the word used in the
    legislation. It's a bit of a giveaway that misinterpretation is at hand.
    "The author's own intellectual creation" is a legal phrase which Tim
    kindly placed in quotes, I believe, to indicate such.

    You could do worse than obtain no more than the briefest understanding
    of "The Infopaq Case" (Ed: do you see what I've done with that phrase
    there?) [1] to clarify matters for you which will, it is hoped, assist
    you in understanding where you have misdirected yourself.

    Once you have grasped the point that "the author's own intellectual
    creation" applies to all Berne Convention "works" under the European
    acquis, then I would recommend moving on to SAS v World Programming in
    which the courts helpfully explicated the "intellectual creation" test
    thus:

    "The essence of the term is that the person in question has exercised
    expressive and creative choices in producing the work. The more
    restricted the choices, the less likely it is that the product will be
    the intellectual creation (or the expression of the intellectual
    creation) of the person who produced it."

    I trust this assists you in coming to a better, more accurate
    understanding of the matter.
    The Berne Convention actually says that 'the expression “literary and
    artistic works” shall include every production in the literary,
    scientific and artistic domain'.

    There is no reference there either to 'own intellectual creation'. It
    is 'every production'.
    As always, I'm happy to help where I can but have been busy of late and
    haven't been posting as much as I would have liked.
    I am of course aware how the case law has developed. What you don't
    seem able to comprehend is what a wrong path it has followed.
    'Original' no longer means what it says. And that's a fundamental
    misinterpretation.

    Whereas I agree with you that the CJEU took a wrong turn when it decided that "original" means "the author's own intellectual
    creation", even before that decision the word "original" in the 1988 Act (and earlier Acts) was not interpreted in accordance with the dictionary definition. It was taken to mean something that involved the author's own skill and labour,

    That's what makes it a 'work'.

    and that wasn't simply copied from elsewhere.

    And that's what makes it 'original'

    Both wholly in accordance with dictionary definitions and ordinary
    English usage.

    A perfectly reasonable explanation therefore of what constitutes an
    'original work' which are the words used in the Act.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Adam Funk@21:1/5 to billy bookcase on Tue Oct 10 16:35:20 2023
    On 2023-10-09, billy bookcase wrote:


    "Tim Jackson" <news@timjackson.invalid> wrote in message news:MPG.3f8cbd892b71d706989f64@text.usenet.plus.net...

    On the monkey selfie, however, the US court decision simply said that
    only a work by a human qualifies for copyright. So the monkey didn't
    qualify.

    A Court comprised exclusively of humans, it maybe goes without saying.

    "Ook!"

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to just on Tue Oct 10 16:52:00 2023
    On Mon, 09 Oct 2023 15:17:43 +0100, Mark Goodge wrote...

    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 11:17:06 +0100, Tim Jackson <news@timjackson.invalid> wrote:

    For copyright to subsist, the work also has to be "original". The
    modern view of originality requires that the work be an expression of
    "the author's own intellectual creation". I don't think a video
    doorbell image qualifies.

    It's generally accepted that if a person configures a camera to take a photo or video when triggered by certain conditions, then that constitutes the author's own intellectual creation. It doesn't have to mean a physical
    finger on the shutter.

    I agree that's often the case.

    Similarly, this would have been relevant if a court in this country
    had considered the monkey selfie case. (The US court never reached the question of what contribution was made by the human photographer. It
    just said that the monkey's contribution didn't count.)

    There's no difference, legally speaking, between
    setting the camera to "wait ten seconds and then take a photo" (commonly
    used to allow the photographer time to get into shot themselves), "take a photo every minute" (eg, in order to create a time-lapse) and "wait until
    the motion detector detects motion, and then take a photo". The key in all cases is that the conditions under which the photo will be taken are set by the human operator.

    However, do you have a modern reference for that, in cases where
    everything is fully automatic? E.g. triggered by an automatic motion
    detector. Or just one photo per minute, irrespective of whether
    anything of interest is in view?

    I can see a distinction between that and the ten second delay set by the photograher, or the time-lapse of, say, a sunset. In those cases, the photographer is still in control of how the camera is set up relative to
    the subject, how the photo is taken, etc.

    The nearest reference I could find in a quick search was https://tinyurl.com/yeysmyxm
    leading to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threshold_of_originality#Pre- positioned_recording_devices

    For England, this refers to Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland,
    concerning security camera stills of Princess Diana and Dodi Al-Fayed
    shortly before their deaths in an underpass, pursued by paparazzi. But
    I think the law has moved on since.

    Back then, both parties just seem to have assumed that the stills would
    have had copyright (the outdated Norman Wells view of the law). But
    that was a number of years before the "author's own intellectual
    creation" doctrine took hold in English law. I think the result might
    be rather different today, when "original" requires "the author's own intellectual creation".

    [snip]

    Ring's terms and conditions don't explicitly state that the owner of the doorbell owns the copyright, but are worded in a way which makes that presumption. For example, in the section where it talks about sharing
    content via the "Ring Neighbors" and "Ring Community" features that you
    grant Ring a licence to use the content. That would be meaningless if the owner of the device was not the rightsholder, as only the rightsholder can grant a licence to use the content. And it also explicitly prohibits sharing any content that the user does not own, which, again, would be meaningless
    if the doorbell's owner didn't own the content it generates.

    Ring (Amazon?) probably take the view that, either way, this ensures
    they get what they want. If automatic shots have copyright, they get a licence. If they don't, their terms are superfluous, but that's because
    they don't need a licence.

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

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  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Tue Oct 10 16:51:54 2023
    On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 08:48:20 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    The Berne Convention actually says that 'the expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary,
    scientific and artistic domain'.

    There is no reference there either to 'own intellectual creation'. It
    is 'every production'.

    Every production --in the artistic domain--.

    This says nothing about what member states can choose to protect or not protect, when it comes to works which are /not/ in the artistic domain.
    I.e. which are not intellectual creations.

    I am of course aware how the case law has developed.

    Strange, then, that you started this sub-thread saying "Whether it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it." Whereas now you reluctantly
    accept that it does (but you don't like it).

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 10 17:15:21 2023
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 14:05:31 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean, mean
    what they say, and only be altered by legislators. Don't you?

    For a common law jurisdiction such as the UK, that would not be
    old-fashioned but, rather, entirely novel. Case law has, literally, existed since time immemorial.

    Mark

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  • From Roger Hayter@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Tue Oct 10 16:54:26 2023
    On 10 Oct 2023 at 16:51:54 BST, "Tim Jackson" <news@timjackson.invalid> wrote:

    On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 08:48:20 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    The Berne Convention actually says that 'the expression “literary and
    artistic works” shall include every production in the literary,
    scientific and artistic domain'.

    There is no reference there either to 'own intellectual creation'. It
    is 'every production'.

    Every production --in the artistic domain--.

    This says nothing about what member states can choose to protect or not protect, when it comes to works which are /not/ in the artistic domain.
    I.e. which are not intellectual creations.


    A false dichotomy - what about an engineering drawing? Obviously in the days when they weren't drawn by software.




    I am of course aware how the case law has developed.

    Strange, then, that you started this sub-thread saying "Whether it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it." Whereas now you reluctantly
    accept that it does (but you don't like it).


    --
    Roger Hayter

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to All on Tue Oct 10 18:22:06 2023
    On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 16:52:00 +0100, Tim Jackson <news@timjackson.invalid> wrote:

    On Mon, 09 Oct 2023 15:17:43 +0100, Mark Goodge wrote...

    There's no difference, legally speaking, between
    setting the camera to "wait ten seconds and then take a photo" (commonly
    used to allow the photographer time to get into shot themselves), "take a
    photo every minute" (eg, in order to create a time-lapse) and "wait until
    the motion detector detects motion, and then take a photo". The key in all >> cases is that the conditions under which the photo will be taken are set by >> the human operator.

    However, do you have a modern reference for that, in cases where
    everything is fully automatic? E.g. triggered by an automatic motion >detector. Or just one photo per minute, irrespective of whether
    anything of interest is in view?

    I'm not, offhand, aware of a direct reference to it. I have found instances where it is assumed (eg, the Ring Ts&Cs), but none where it's explicitly
    stated or argued.

    I can see a distinction between that and the ten second delay set by the >photograher, or the time-lapse of, say, a sunset. In those cases, the >photographer is still in control of how the camera is set up relative to
    the subject, how the photo is taken, etc.

    The nearest reference I could find in a quick search was >https://tinyurl.com/yeysmyxm
    leading to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threshold_of_originality#Pre- >positioned_recording_devices

    I'd broadly agree with the point argued under New Zealand law in that
    article. That is, the positioning of the camera involves decision-making by
    the operator, as does the choice of what criteria will trigger a recording.

    The idea that the output of a static, continuously recording camera is not subject to copyright seems implausible to me. One of my videos on YouTube is the output from a static camera where my only interaction was to determine which way it was pointing, and then start and stop it:

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O-QeeARiYUI

    I don't think anyone would seriously argue that I don't own the copyright in that. Obviously, I knew what I wanted to record, and that was part of my decision-making. But the Ring camera covering my front yard is pointed in
    such a way as to capture what I want it to record - that is, people walking
    up to my house. The fact that one camera was only recorded for a minute,
    while the other records every and any time it detects a person, doesn't
    change that.

    For England, this refers to Hyde Park Residence Ltd v Yelland,
    concerning security camera stills of Princess Diana and Dodi Al-Fayed
    shortly before their deaths in an underpass, pursued by paparazzi. But
    I think the law has moved on since.

    Back then, both parties just seem to have assumed that the stills would
    have had copyright (the outdated Norman Wells view of the law). But
    that was a number of years before the "author's own intellectual
    creation" doctrine took hold in English law. I think the result might
    be rather different today, when "original" requires "the author's own >intellectual creation".

    I'd say that it is still an original intellectual creation. The positioning
    of a security camera is actually quite crucial, you have to make sure it's covering what you want it to cover. And if you're using motion detection,
    you have to be sure it's being triggered by the right motion. It took me
    quite a lot of careful positioning of my front yard Ring camera to cover as much of the yard as possible, and then some more tweaking to the settings to ensure that it's only triggered by movement on my property (and not by, for example, people walking past on the pavement). I think it would be hard to argue that that's not my own intellectual creation. It may not be
    particularly deep intellect. But then, neither were the primary school paintings produced by my children, and nobody would argue that they're not subject to copyright. The "author's own intellectual creation" doesn't set
    any minimum standards for what constitutes "intellectual". It just has to
    have involved at least some thought.

    You might, possibly, be able to make that argument with my Ring doorbell,
    since the positioning of that is far less a matter of choice with respect to coverage (in fact, I installed it precisely where the old doorbell was,
    solely so that I can run a power cable through the same hole as the previous bell wire and therefore don't need to drill a new hole or fill an old one).
    But other people might make different decisions. And even I made some
    choices about the motion detection settings.

    It's also worth bearing in mind that the nature of the content doesn't
    affect the rights. If I was taking photos of my children in the garden, and
    it just so happened that a plane crashed into the park at that precise time
    and one of the photos showed the crash, it would still be my copyright.
    There's a well-known video online taken by videographer who was doing a
    wedding shoot in Beirut at the precise time of the ammonium nitrate
    explosion; it's not what he intended to capture but it is, nonetheless, his copyright. And that, I think, has bearing on the Diana paperazzi case; just because that's not what the cameras were intended to capture doesn't mean there's no copyright in them. For many security cameras, indeed, the most desirable content is absolutely nothing of interest at all - just an empty
    room or a street with nothing remarkable happening. But when something does happen which is caputured on those cameras, even if it's of actions which
    are entirely unrelated to the reasons why the cameras were installed, it's
    as much the copyright of the camera operator as their intended footage.

    Obviously, if I dropped a camera by mistake, and it hit the shutter on the
    way down and took a photo, that wouldn't be my intellectual creation as the photo would be purely accidental. If I leave my camera on the table and
    someone else picks it up and takes a photo with it, that's not my copyright because, again, it's not my intellectual creation. But I think that's where
    the boundary lies. The questions to be asked are, firstly, did I, the owner
    of the camera, intend for the content to be created, and, secondly, did I
    take at least some meaningful steps - either the positioning of the camera,
    or the configuration of its triggers - in order to facilitate the creation
    of that content?

    I think that if the answer to both of those is "yes", then that satisfies
    the bar of "intellectual creation". And I think that bar will easily be met
    by any typical CCTV camera.

    Where it does get complicated, I think, is where the "intellect" involved is artificial. And I think we will need some case law to determine who, if
    anyone, owns the copyright in an image generated by AI. But I don't think
    we're quite there yet.

    Mark

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 10 18:32:39 2023
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 13:02:34 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    A football fixture list. See the Football Dataco case below. There was
    no copyright, as the list wasn't an intellectual creation.

    Why then would anyone want to copy it if it's so easy to create ab
    initio and requires no intellect? And why should they be allowed to?

    People are always free to make their own lists just as long as they
    don't copy someone else's.

    The point is that Football DataCo didn't "make" a list. The fixture list is
    a necessary part of running a football league competition. There are a
    number of criteria involved in generating the fixtures (including trying to alternate home and away fixtures for teams, and to avoid/prefer derbies on certain dates, etc), and there is intellectual property in the software
    which generates those fixtures. But once generated, the fixtures are a
    matter of simple fact, not an intellectual creation in their own right.

    I think this is an absurd decision. Don't you?

    No, it was absolutely the right decision. The real absurdity is that
    Football DataCo got away with asserting a non-existent right for so long, before one of the organisations they were trying to gouge finally stood up
    to them.

    I think the basic principle should be 'if it's worth copying it's worth >protection'. Don't you?

    So you'd extend copyright indefinitely, and abolish the entire concept of
    works entering the public domain? Because even old photos and old books are worth copying.

    Mark

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Tue Oct 10 18:05:10 2023
    On 10/10/2023 16:51, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 08:48:20 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    The Berne Convention actually says that 'the expression “literary and
    artistic works” shall include every production in the literary,
    scientific and artistic domain'.

    There is no reference there either to 'own intellectual creation'. It
    is 'every production'.

    Every production --in the artistic domain--.

    Actually, 'every production in the literary, scientific and artistic
    domain'.

    And from the words you quoted earlier from the CDPA it's clear that that
    is 'irrespective of artistic quality' or, by extension, of literary merit.

    Take those considerations out of the equation and you are left just with
    'a production' or, as it's expressed in the UK, 'a work'.

    This says nothing about what member states can choose to protect or not protect, when it comes to works which are /not/ in the artistic domain.
    I.e. which are not intellectual creations.

    I am of course aware how the case law has developed.

    Strange, then, that you started this sub-thread saying "Whether it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it." Whereas now you reluctantly
    accept that it does (but you don't like it).

    Of course I don't like it. No-one sensible should.

    But 'a work' is not in my view necessarily 'an intellectual creation'.
    They're not synonyms, so substitution of the latter for the former
    (which is totally unnecessary and unjustified) is rewriting the UK Act.
    And I say that is for our legislators alone to do, if they're so minded,
    not European judges.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 10 18:07:41 2023
    On 10/10/2023 17:15, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 14:05:31 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean, mean
    what they say, and only be altered by legislators. Don't you?

    For a common law jurisdiction such as the UK, that would not be
    old-fashioned but, rather, entirely novel. Case law has, literally, existed since time immemorial.

    Not all law in a common law jurisdiction is case law. There is Statute
    law too, which is the only sort of law that can possibly say what it
    means and mean what it says.

    And Statute law is what the Copyright Designs and Patents Act is.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Tue Oct 10 18:19:15 2023
    On 10/10/2023 16:52, Tim Jackson wrote:

    Back then, both parties just seem to have assumed that the stills would
    have had copyright (the outdated Norman Wells view of the law). But
    that was a number of years before the "author's own intellectual
    creation" doctrine took hold in English law. I think the result might
    be rather different today, when "original" requires "the author's own intellectual creation".

    Just a couple of questions:

    1) Were they photographs, irrespective of artistic quality?
    2) Had they existed before?

    Answer yes to (1) and no to (2)? Then answer this one too:

    3) How are they not original artistic works *according to ordinary
    English*?

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 10 19:37:32 2023
    On 10/10/2023 18:32, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 13:02:34 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 01:26, Tim Jackson wrote:

    A football fixture list. See the Football Dataco case below. There was >>> no copyright, as the list wasn't an intellectual creation.

    Why then would anyone want to copy it if it's so easy to create ab
    initio and requires no intellect? And why should they be allowed to?

    People are always free to make their own lists just as long as they
    don't copy someone else's.

    The point is that Football DataCo didn't "make" a list. The fixture list is
    a necessary part of running a football league competition. There are a
    number of criteria involved in generating the fixtures (including trying to alternate home and away fixtures for teams, and to avoid/prefer derbies on certain dates, etc), and there is intellectual property in the software
    which generates those fixtures. But once generated, the fixtures are a
    matter of simple fact, not an intellectual creation in their own right.

    But the case wasn't decided on that basis. Mr Jackson says above it was decided on the basis that it wasn't an intellectual creation. *Your*
    basis has some merit. However, that is not a legal determinant of
    whether something can attract copyright.

    It seems to me that the European Court's approach was, as is rather
    typical I'm afraid, to decide the 'right' outcome (as they see it) first
    and then fiddle the words of whatever law is in place as best they can
    to justify whatever it is they want.

    And a big fiddle it is too. It effectively rewrites what the UK
    legislators enacted ('original work' to 'intellectual creation'), and
    that is really, really wrong. It's not the British way at all, nor is
    it anything that should happen or be tolerated in any law-based
    civilised country, where laws have to mean what they actually say.

    I think this is an absurd decision. Don't you?

    No, it was absolutely the right decision. The real absurdity is that
    Football DataCo got away with asserting a non-existent right for so long, before one of the organisations they were trying to gouge finally stood up
    to them.

    Under 'original work' I say they had a perfect right.

    I think the basic principle should be 'if it's worth copying it's worth
    protection'. Don't you?

    So you'd extend copyright indefinitely, and abolish the entire concept of works entering the public domain? Because even old photos and old books are worth copying.

    It's a matter of philosophy. There's an argument for perpetuity. After
    all, why should anyone ever be allowed just to copy someone else's work
    rather than make a similar effort themselves and create something else?
    But there's an argument too for a limited term of protection, like
    patents, so as to put in the public domain anything after a reasonable
    monopoly period in which the author can make what he can from it.

    I'm in the latter camp.


    Mark


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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Wed Oct 11 21:25:50 2023
    On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 19:37:32 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 10/10/2023 18:32, Mark Goodge wrote:

    The point is that Football DataCo didn't "make" a list. The fixture list is >> a necessary part of running a football league competition. There are a
    number of criteria involved in generating the fixtures (including trying to >> alternate home and away fixtures for teams, and to avoid/prefer derbies on >> certain dates, etc), and there is intellectual property in the software
    which generates those fixtures. But once generated, the fixtures are a
    matter of simple fact, not an intellectual creation in their own right.

    But the case wasn't decided on that basis.

    Yes, it was.

    Mr Jackson says above it was
    decided on the basis that it wasn't an intellectual creation.

    Precisely.

    The fixture list is an inevitable side-effect of runing a league
    competition. It is not, therefore, an intellectual creation.

    No, it was absolutely the right decision. The real absurdity is that
    Football DataCo got away with asserting a non-existent right for so long,
    before one of the organisations they were trying to gouge finally stood up >> to them.

    Under 'original work' I say they had a perfect right.

    Football DataCo didn't generate the fixture list. No human generated the fixture list. The fixture list was generated by software owned by the
    Premier League and English Football League.

    I think the basic principle should be 'if it's worth copying it's worth
    protection'. Don't you?

    So you'd extend copyright indefinitely, and abolish the entire concept of
    works entering the public domain? Because even old photos and old books are >> worth copying.

    It's a matter of philosophy. There's an argument for perpetuity. After
    all, why should anyone ever be allowed just to copy someone else's work >rather than make a similar effort themselves and create something else?
    But there's an argument too for a limited term of protection, like
    patents, so as to put in the public domain anything after a reasonable >monopoly period in which the author can make what he can from it.

    I'm in the latter camp.

    So you don't actually think that if it's worth copying then it's worth protecting. Glad we cleared that up.

    Mark

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Wed Oct 11 21:21:46 2023
    On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 18:07:41 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 10/10/2023 17:15, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 14:05:31 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean, mean
    what they say, and only be altered by legislators. Don't you?

    For a common law jurisdiction such as the UK, that would not be
    old-fashioned but, rather, entirely novel. Case law has, literally, existed >> since time immemorial.

    Not all law in a common law jurisdiction is case law. There is Statute
    law too, which is the only sort of law that can possibly say what it
    means and mean what it says.

    In a common law system, all statute law can be interpreted and clarified by case law.

    And Statute law is what the Copyright Designs and Patents Act is.

    Indeed it is. And, like all statute law, it can be interpreted and clarified
    by case law.

    Mark

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Wed Oct 11 22:12:25 2023
    On 11/10/2023 21:25, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 19:37:32 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 10/10/2023 18:32, Mark Goodge wrote:

    The point is that Football DataCo didn't "make" a list. The fixture list is >>> a necessary part of running a football league competition. There are a
    number of criteria involved in generating the fixtures (including trying to >>> alternate home and away fixtures for teams, and to avoid/prefer derbies on >>> certain dates, etc), and there is intellectual property in the software
    which generates those fixtures. But once generated, the fixtures are a
    matter of simple fact, not an intellectual creation in their own right.

    But the case wasn't decided on that basis.

    Yes, it was.

    Mr Jackson says above it was
    decided on the basis that it wasn't an intellectual creation.

    Precisely.

    The fixture list is an inevitable side-effect of runing a league
    competition. It is not, therefore, an intellectual creation.

    No, it was absolutely the right decision. The real absurdity is that
    Football DataCo got away with asserting a non-existent right for so long, >>> before one of the organisations they were trying to gouge finally stood up >>> to them.

    Under 'original work' I say they had a perfect right.

    Football DataCo didn't generate the fixture list. No human generated the fixture list. The fixture list was generated by software owned by the
    Premier League and English Football League.

    No human generates a photograph. He just initiates a mechanical or
    electronic process in just the same way as Football DataCo did in
    producing its fixture list. So, what's the difference?

    Anyway, under UK law as it stands, which undoubtedly gives copyright
    protection to photographs, I say what Football DataCo produced was (a) a
    work and (b) original. Being written, it therefore qualifies for
    copyright protection under the straightforward meaning of the words
    'original literary work'.

    Or should do in any logical world.

    I think the basic principle should be 'if it's worth copying it's worth >>>> protection'. Don't you?

    So you'd extend copyright indefinitely, and abolish the entire concept of >>> works entering the public domain? Because even old photos and old books are >>> worth copying.

    It's a matter of philosophy. There's an argument for perpetuity. After
    all, why should anyone ever be allowed just to copy someone else's work
    rather than make a similar effort themselves and create something else?
    But there's an argument too for a limited term of protection, like
    patents, so as to put in the public domain anything after a reasonable
    monopoly period in which the author can make what he can from it.

    I'm in the latter camp.

    So you don't actually think that if it's worth copying then it's worth protecting. Glad we cleared that up.

    No. All I've said is that I believe the term of protection should be
    limited, like patents for inventions.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Wed Oct 11 22:18:42 2023
    On 11/10/2023 21:21, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 18:07:41 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 10/10/2023 17:15, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 9 Oct 2023 14:05:31 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>
    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean, mean >>>> what they say, and only be altered by legislators. Don't you?

    For a common law jurisdiction such as the UK, that would not be
    old-fashioned but, rather, entirely novel. Case law has, literally, existed >>> since time immemorial.

    Not all law in a common law jurisdiction is case law. There is Statute
    law too, which is the only sort of law that can possibly say what it
    means and mean what it says.

    In a common law system, all statute law can be interpreted and clarified by case law.

    But not misinterpreted or altered from its clearly expressed meaning.
    That's my point.

    And Statute law is what the Copyright Designs and Patents Act is.

    Indeed it is. And, like all statute law, it can be interpreted and clarified by case law.

    Only where necessary, which it isn't here.

    There is nothing that needs to be interpreted or clarified in the
    expression 'original work'. They're simple enough English words, and
    they, not anything else, are the law of the land.

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Thu Oct 12 09:30:05 2023
    On Wed, 11 Oct 2023 22:12:25 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 11/10/2023 21:25, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Football DataCo didn't generate the fixture list. No human generated the
    fixture list. The fixture list was generated by software owned by the
    Premier League and English Football League.

    No human generates a photograph. He just initiates a mechanical or >electronic process in just the same way as Football DataCo did in
    producing its fixture list. So, what's the difference?

    The photo is the intended result. The camera is just the tool.

    In the case of the fixture list, the list is not the intended result. It's simply a by-product of the intended result. The intended reasult is a functioning league competition.

    Anyway, under UK law as it stands, which undoubtedly gives copyright >protection to photographs, I say what Football DataCo produced was (a) a
    work and (b) original. Being written, it therefore qualifies for
    copyright protection under the straightforward meaning of the words
    'original literary work'.

    A minor flaw in your argument is that the law isn't based on what you say.

    Mark

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Thu Oct 12 09:15:26 2023
    On Wed, 11 Oct 2023 22:18:42 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 11/10/2023 21:21, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Indeed it is. And, like all statute law, it can be interpreted and clarified >> by case law.

    Only where necessary, which it isn't here.

    There is nothing that needs to be interpreted or clarified in the
    expression 'original work'. They're simple enough English words, and
    they, not anything else, are the law of the land.

    Define "original".

    Define "work".

    Mark

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Thu Oct 12 11:34:22 2023
    On 12/10/2023 09:15, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Oct 2023 22:18:42 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 11/10/2023 21:21, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Indeed it is. And, like all statute law, it can be interpreted and clarified
    by case law.

    Only where necessary, which it isn't here.

    There is nothing that needs to be interpreted or clarified in the
    expression 'original work'. They're simple enough English words, and
    they, not anything else, are the law of the land.

    Define "original".

    Define "work".

    If anyone cannot understand simple words, they need to refer to what are
    called dictionaries. Most, though, mean what they say, and are well understood. And that's the case here.

    If you're arguing for meanings other than how they're normally
    understood, that's for you to support.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Thu Oct 12 11:39:02 2023
    On 12/10/2023 09:30, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Oct 2023 22:12:25 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 11/10/2023 21:25, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Football DataCo didn't generate the fixture list. No human generated the >>> fixture list. The fixture list was generated by software owned by the
    Premier League and English Football League.

    No human generates a photograph. He just initiates a mechanical or
    electronic process in just the same way as Football DataCo did in
    producing its fixture list. So, what's the difference?

    The photo is the intended result. The camera is just the tool.

    In the case of the fixture list, the list is not the intended result. It's simply a by-product of the intended result. The intended reasult is a functioning league competition.

    That may be the FA's objective Football DataCo's objective is just to
    produce the fixture list. And it's their objective we're concerned with.

    Anyway, under UK law as it stands, which undoubtedly gives copyright
    protection to photographs, I say what Football DataCo produced was (a) a
    work and (b) original. Being written, it therefore qualifies for
    copyright protection under the straightforward meaning of the words
    'original literary work'.

    A minor flaw in your argument is that the law isn't based on what you say.

    The law is what it says. And, under all of the accepted rules of
    Statutory interpretation, that's what it means.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Thu Oct 12 16:42:07 2023
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 11:34:22 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 12/10/2023 09:15, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Oct 2023 22:18:42 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
    On 11/10/2023 21:21, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Indeed it is. And, like all statute law, it can be interpreted and clarified
    by case law.

    Only where necessary, which it isn't here.

    There is nothing that needs to be interpreted or clarified in the
    expression 'original work'. They're simple enough English words, and
    they, not anything else, are the law of the land.

    Define "original".

    Define "work".

    If anyone cannot understand simple words, they need to refer to what are >called dictionaries. Most, though, mean what they say, and are well >understood. And that's the case here.

    So which of the dictionary entries for those words (there are, after all,
    many) relate to the legislation?

    Bearing in mind, also, that dictionaries record usage, they do not prescribe usage or define meaning. So a word can change its usage, and hence
    dictionary entry, over time. When that happens, do you think that changes
    the legislation which uses that word?

    Mark

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Thu Oct 12 16:44:10 2023
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 11:39:02 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 12/10/2023 09:30, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Oct 2023 22:12:25 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
    On 11/10/2023 21:25, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Football DataCo didn't generate the fixture list. No human generated the >>>> fixture list. The fixture list was generated by software owned by the
    Premier League and English Football League.

    No human generates a photograph. He just initiates a mechanical or
    electronic process in just the same way as Football DataCo did in
    producing its fixture list. So, what's the difference?

    The photo is the intended result. The camera is just the tool.

    In the case of the fixture list, the list is not the intended result. It's >> simply a by-product of the intended result. The intended reasult is a
    functioning league competition.

    That may be the FA's objective Football DataCo's objective is just to >produce the fixture list. And it's their objective we're concerned with.

    But Football DataCo didn't produce the list. They took it from the published output of the Premier League's software. The list existed before Football DataCo got their hands on it.

    Anyway, under UK law as it stands, which undoubtedly gives copyright
    protection to photographs, I say what Football DataCo produced was (a) a >>> work and (b) original. Being written, it therefore qualifies for
    copyright protection under the straightforward meaning of the words
    'original literary work'.

    A minor flaw in your argument is that the law isn't based on what you say.

    The law is what it says. And, under all of the accepted rules of
    Statutory interpretation, that's what it means.

    And the accepted rules of interpetation include case law.

    Mark

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Adam Funk@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Thu Oct 12 16:38:02 2023
    On 2023-10-10, Mark Goodge wrote:

    It's also worth bearing in mind that the nature of the content doesn't
    affect the rights. If I was taking photos of my children in the garden, and it just so happened that a plane crashed into the park at that precise time and one of the photos showed the crash, it would still be my copyright. There's a well-known video online taken by videographer who was doing a wedding shoot in Beirut at the precise time of the ammonium nitrate explosion; it's not what he intended to capture but it is, nonetheless, his copyright. And that, I think, has bearing on the Diana paperazzi case; just because that's not what the cameras were intended to capture doesn't mean there's no copyright in them. For many security cameras, indeed, the most desirable content is absolutely nothing of interest at all - just an empty room or a street with nothing remarkable happening. But when something does happen which is caputured on those cameras, even if it's of actions which
    are entirely unrelated to the reasons why the cameras were installed, it's
    as much the copyright of the camera operator as their intended footage.

    Just out of curiosity, and wandering off the topic of UK law...

    I know that some other countries do not have freedom of panorama and
    allow copyright on art works to restrict photography of them. Can that
    apply to moving artworks such as a large sculpture being transported
    between sites on the back of a truck?

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Thu Oct 12 17:27:02 2023
    On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 18:19:15 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 10/10/2023 16:52, Tim Jackson wrote:

    Back then, both parties just seem to have assumed that the stills would have had copyright (the outdated Norman Wells view of the law). But
    that was a number of years before the "author's own intellectual
    creation" doctrine took hold in English law. I think the result might
    be rather different today, when "original" requires "the author's own intellectual creation".

    Just a couple of questions:

    1) Were they photographs, irrespective of artistic quality?
    2) Had they existed before?

    Answer yes to (1) and no to (2)? Then answer this one too:

    3) How are they not original artistic works *according to ordinary
    English*?

    Norman, as usual you're just going round in circles. This point (why
    ordinary English is not the appropriate criterion) has been answered by
    several people already. You've not answered the reasons given. You
    just repeat the same tired statements about ordinary English and what
    you would like the law to be, over and over again.

    And again.

    And again.

    OK, we understand that you don't like the CJEU's position, and don't
    think the UK courts should have followed it. But I'm not going down
    your rabbit hole with you. Maybe the Mad Hatter will agree with you and
    offer more tea.

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Adam Funk on Thu Oct 12 17:38:18 2023
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 16:38:02 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:

    On 2023-10-10, Mark Goodge wrote:

    It's also worth bearing in mind that the nature of the content doesn't
    affect the rights. If I was taking photos of my children in the garden, and >> it just so happened that a plane crashed into the park at that precise time >> and one of the photos showed the crash, it would still be my copyright.
    There's a well-known video online taken by videographer who was doing a
    wedding shoot in Beirut at the precise time of the ammonium nitrate
    explosion; it's not what he intended to capture but it is, nonetheless, his >> copyright. And that, I think, has bearing on the Diana paperazzi case; just >> because that's not what the cameras were intended to capture doesn't mean
    there's no copyright in them. For many security cameras, indeed, the most
    desirable content is absolutely nothing of interest at all - just an empty >> room or a street with nothing remarkable happening. But when something does >> happen which is caputured on those cameras, even if it's of actions which
    are entirely unrelated to the reasons why the cameras were installed, it's >> as much the copyright of the camera operator as their intended footage.

    Just out of curiosity, and wandering off the topic of UK law...

    I know that some other countries do not have freedom of panorama and
    allow copyright on art works to restrict photography of them. Can that
    apply to moving artworks such as a large sculpture being transported
    between sites on the back of a truck?

    That would be very jurisdiction dependent. In France, which doesn't have general freedom of panorama, it would depend on whether the photo was specifically of the sculpture or whether it was merely an incidental
    capture. For example, if you knew that a famous sculpture (possibly one not normally visible in public) was due to be moved by road so you waited for
    the truck to come past and took a photo of it, that would be an
    infringement. But if you were just taking photos of the street, and coincidentally happened to take one which included the statue on the truck,
    it wouldn't be an infringement as it would be a merely incidental inclusion.
    So CCTV footage that happened to capture it wouldn't be an infringement.

    The fact that France doesn't have freedom of panorama, but does have an incidental inclusion exemption, can lead to some very borderline edge cases where a work subject to copyright appears as a relatively small part of a photograph. For example, a general street scene which just happens to
    include a modern sculpture, or a landscape that happens to include a distant shot of a modern bridge (the Millau Viaduct is a classic example). There doesn't appear to be any particular rule of thumb as to how these are determined, it's all done on a case by case basis.

    Mark

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Thu Oct 12 17:06:01 2023
    On 12/10/2023 16:42, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 11:34:22 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 12/10/2023 09:15, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Oct 2023 22:18:42 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>
    On 11/10/2023 21:21, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Indeed it is. And, like all statute law, it can be interpreted and clarified
    by case law.

    Only where necessary, which it isn't here.

    There is nothing that needs to be interpreted or clarified in the
    expression 'original work'. They're simple enough English words, and
    they, not anything else, are the law of the land.

    Define "original".

    Define "work".

    If anyone cannot understand simple words, they need to refer to what are
    called dictionaries. Most, though, mean what they say, and are well
    understood. And that's the case here.

    So which of the dictionary entries for those words (there are, after all, many) relate to the legislation?

    If it's necessary to refer to any, which in this case it's not because
    the words used are very simple to understand, then it's those that are
    the most common in ordinary use, which are usually the first in any
    dictionary that is applicable.

    Bearing in mind, also, that dictionaries record usage, they do not prescribe usage or define meaning.

    Oh dear. It is the *primary* function of any dictionary to define what
    words mean. And you will find that they all do immediately following
    what part of speech it is.

    Surely you leant that at school?

    So a word can change its usage, and hence
    dictionary entry, over time. When that happens, do you think that changes
    the legislation which uses that word?

    No. The legislation is constant. It means what it did when it was enacted.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Pamela@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Thu Oct 12 18:46:32 2023
    On 15:10 3 Oct 2023, Tim Jackson said:

    On Tue, 03 Oct 2023 11:52:15 +0100, Pamela wrote...

    Who holds the copyright on NHS medical scans (such as MRI, CT, etc)?

    Is it the patient or the NHS?

    https://tinyurl.com/33xymbkf

    which leads to

    https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikilegal/Copyright_of_Medical_Imaging
    #W orks_created_in_the_United_Kingdom


    It's interesting (according to the mainly American entry in Wikipedia):

    "the situation of x-rays will not necessarily conform to a simple
    solo photographer model. The necessary creativity and originality
    could arguably come from a physician who orders an x-ray taken at a
    particular angle or for a certain length of time, rather than the
    technician who carries out the orders."

    It seems to be anticipating comparison with a photographic situation with
    a model release form.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Roger Hayter@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Thu Oct 12 21:14:22 2023
    On 12 Oct 2023 at 17:06:01 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 12/10/2023 16:42, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 11:34:22 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
    On 12/10/2023 09:15, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Wed, 11 Oct 2023 22:18:42 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>
    On 11/10/2023 21:21, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Indeed it is. And, like all statute law, it can be interpreted and clarified
    by case law.

    Only where necessary, which it isn't here.

    There is nothing that needs to be interpreted or clarified in the
    expression 'original work'. They're simple enough English words, and >>>>> they, not anything else, are the law of the land.

    Define "original".

    Define "work".

    If anyone cannot understand simple words, they need to refer to what are >>> called dictionaries. Most, though, mean what they say, and are well
    understood. And that's the case here.

    So which of the dictionary entries for those words (there are, after all,
    many) relate to the legislation?

    If it's necessary to refer to any, which in this case it's not because
    the words used are very simple to understand, then it's those that are
    the most common in ordinary use, which are usually the first in any dictionary that is applicable.

    1. That is a rule you have just invented out of thin air, with zero justification;

    2. Dictionaries often put the most traditional (or etymologically justifiable) meaning first and follow it with more colloquial or metaphorical meanings, which latter may well now be much more usual.




    Bearing in mind, also, that dictionaries record usage, they do not prescribe >> usage or define meaning.

    Oh dear. It is the *primary* function of any dictionary to define what
    words mean. And you will find that they all do immediately following
    what part of speech it is.


    No! A dictionary's main role is to say how words are used - it is commonly called a definition but the lexicographer is merely reporting usage, not
    laying down the law! Older usages may be given in more verbose dictionaries
    to help us understand how a word has changed.





    Surely you leant that at school?

    So a word can change its usage, and hence
    dictionary entry, over time. When that happens, do you think that changes
    the legislation which uses that word?

    No. The legislation is constant. It means what it did when it was enacted.

    The legislation, as interpreted by case law, is fairly constant, subject to later cases, but the words as used now may not mean the same as when the legislation was written. And it is the meaning when the legislation was
    written that is more relevant.

    --
    Roger Hayter

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Martin Brown@21:1/5 to Pamela on Fri Oct 13 09:03:37 2023
    On 12/10/2023 18:46, Pamela wrote:
    On 15:10 3 Oct 2023, Tim Jackson said:

    On Tue, 03 Oct 2023 11:52:15 +0100, Pamela wrote...

    Who holds the copyright on NHS medical scans (such as MRI, CT, etc)?

    Is it the patient or the NHS?

    https://tinyurl.com/33xymbkf

    which leads to

    https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikilegal/Copyright_of_Medical_Imaging
    #W orks_created_in_the_United_Kingdom


    It's interesting (according to the mainly American entry in Wikipedia):

    "the situation of x-rays will not necessarily conform to a simple
    solo photographer model. The necessary creativity and originality
    could arguably come from a physician who orders an x-ray taken at a
    particular angle or for a certain length of time, rather than the
    technician who carries out the orders."

    That makes no sense at all. The technician will select the exposure. The clinician will choose the angle that he wants the shot from.

    Tomography the technician will choose the best slice to show whatever
    organ or feature the clinician wants to see in detail and adjust
    contrast and resolution to best meet that requirement. The technician is
    every bit a photographer and controls the imaging process.

    The clinician is just the person who asked for an image to be taken. In
    the NHS both are employees of the NHS so it doesn't matter but with NHS
    MRI scans being outsourced to privately operated travelling MRI scanner
    vans there could be situations where who owns copyright is blurred.

    My instinct is that the private operator of the MRI vans owns the image copyright unless their contract with the NHS says otherwise.

    It seems to be anticipating comparison with a photographic situation with
    a model release form.

    Hardly. That part still applies if your image ends up in a medical
    textbook - I know because one of my dental X-rays is in one.

    --
    Martin Brown

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Anthony R. Gold@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Thu Oct 12 21:49:33 2023
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 17:06:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    Oh dear. It is the *primary* function of any dictionary to define what
    words mean. And you will find that they all do immediately following
    what part of speech it is.

    If that was true then dictionaries must precede their languages and so it
    would be impossible for any spoken language to precede its written form.

    Why would the OED document the date of the first different use of words? Do
    you believe those dates are when some dictionary defined that use or the
    date a dictionary lexicographer found that this meaning had come into use?

    Surely you leant that at school?

    Not I.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Anthony R. Gold on Fri Oct 13 09:54:12 2023
    On 13/10/2023 02:49, Anthony R. Gold wrote:
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 17:06:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    Oh dear. It is the *primary* function of any dictionary to define what
    words mean. And you will find that they all do immediately following
    what part of speech it is.

    If that was true then dictionaries must precede their languages and so it would be impossible for any spoken language to precede its written form.

    No, that's illogical. Definitions, ie what words have come to mean
    precisely, naturally follow their usage not precede it.

    Why would the OED document the date of the first different use of words?

    For historical interest of course.

    Do you believe those dates are when some dictionary defined that use or the date a dictionary lexicographer found that this meaning had come into use?

    A lexicographer of course records how words are used and what they're understood to mean at the time of writing. So, he's recording how
    Statutes will be understood and if necessary interpreted at that time
    because they work on the same principles.

    Successive lexicographers will record any changes in the language.

    The language is now pretty well codified and settled, largely because of
    such lexicographers who have recorded the language.

    Definitions of words in dictionaries rarely vary much between them now.
    That's why they are relied on for such definitions, and why legal
    arguments rely on them too.

    Surely you learnt that at school?

    Not I.

    Education isn't what it was then.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Fri Oct 13 12:09:35 2023
    On 12/10/2023 17:27, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Tue, 10 Oct 2023 18:19:15 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...
    On 10/10/2023 16:52, Tim Jackson wrote:

    Back then, both parties just seem to have assumed that the stills would
    have had copyright (the outdated Norman Wells view of the law). But
    that was a number of years before the "author's own intellectual
    creation" doctrine took hold in English law. I think the result might
    be rather different today, when "original" requires "the author's own
    intellectual creation".

    Just a couple of questions:

    1) Were they photographs, irrespective of artistic quality?
    2) Had they existed before?

    Answer yes to (1) and no to (2)? Then answer this one too:

    3) How are they not original artistic works *according to ordinary
    English*?

    Norman, as usual you're just going round in circles. This point (why ordinary English is not the appropriate criterion) has been answered by several people already. You've not answered the reasons given. You
    just repeat the same tired statements about ordinary English and what
    you would like the law to be, over and over again.

    But ordinary English *is* the appropriate criterion.

    It is the 'literal rule of Statutory Interpretation':

    "The literal rule requires courts to interpret statutes in their plain,
    literal and ordinary sense"

    https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/the-rules-behind-statutory-interpretation-administrative-law-essay.php#:~:text=There%20are%20four%20Rules%20of,rule%20and%20the%20purposive%20approach.

    So, perhaps you'd now like to answer my questions above, the third of
    which I will rephrase as:

    3) How are they not original artistic works in the plain, literal and ordinary sense of those words?

    I'm asking for *your* logical answer if you have one, not the verbal contortions of successive European courts.

    OK, we understand that you don't like the CJEU's position, and don't
    think the UK courts should have followed it. But I'm not going down
    your rabbit hole with you. Maybe the Mad Hatter will agree with you and offer more tea.

    The rabbit hole you've gone down already is one of the European Courts'
    making. I'm just wondering if you can't see it.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Pamela@21:1/5 to Martin Brown on Fri Oct 13 14:42:49 2023
    On 09:03 13 Oct 2023, Martin Brown said:
    On 12/10/2023 18:46, Pamela wrote:
    On 15:10 3 Oct 2023, Tim Jackson said:
    On Tue, 03 Oct 2023 11:52:15 +0100, Pamela wrote...


    Who holds the copyright on NHS medical scans (such as MRI, CT,
    etc)?

    Is it the patient or the NHS?

    https://tinyurl.com/33xymbkf

    which leads to

    https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikilegal/
    Copyright_of_Medical_Imagi
    ng #W orks_created_in_the_United_Kingdom


    It's interesting (according to the mainly American entry in
    Wikipedia):

    "the situation of x-rays will not necessarily conform to a
    simple solo photographer model. The necessary creativity and
    originality could arguably come from a physician who orders an
    x-ray taken at a particular angle or for a certain length of
    time, rather than the technician who carries out the orders."

    That makes no sense at all. The technician will select the exposure.
    The clinician will choose the angle that he wants the shot from.

    Tomography the technician will choose the best slice to show whatever
    organ or feature the clinician wants to see in detail and adjust
    contrast and resolution to best meet that requirement. The technician
    is every bit a photographer and controls the imaging process.

    The clinician is just the person who asked for an image to be taken.

    A parallel situation the author had in mind may have been be an editor
    of a popular magazine commissioning a photoshoot and specifying its key parameters such as location, photographer, items to be shown and the
    model (whose parallel is the patient in this thread).

    In the NHS both are employees of the NHS so it doesn't matter but
    with NHS MRI scans being outsourced to privately operated travelling
    MRI scanner vans there could be situations where who owns copyright
    is blurred.

    My instinct is that the private operator of the MRI vans owns the
    image copyright unless their contract with the NHS says otherwise.

    It seems to be anticipating comparison with a photographic situation
    with a model release form.

    Hardly. That part still applies if your image ends up in a medical
    textbook - I know because one of my dental X-rays is in one.

    The way I interpreted the text ... it anticipates the objection and
    counters it in advance, arriving at a conclusion agreeing with your
    experience.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Fri Oct 13 15:56:02 2023
    On Fri, 13 Oct 2023 12:09:35 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    But ordinary English *is* the appropriate criterion.

    It is the 'literal rule of Statutory Interpretation':

    "The literal rule requires courts to interpret statutes in their plain, literal and ordinary sense"

    https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/the-rules-behind-statutory-interpretation-administrative-law-essay.php#:~:text=There%20are%20four%20Rules%20of,rule%20and%20the%20purposive%20approach.

    Is a student essay the best you can do? The disclaimer at the top says
    "You should not treat any information in this essay as being
    authoritative".

    Even then, note that the student also says your literal rule is just one
    of four rules of statutory interpretation. S/he goes on to describe the others, including:

    "The purposive approach is implemented to ensure the law is effective as Parliament would have intended. This is used when interpreting EU Law
    see Pickstone v Freemans plc.... EU Law overrides all sources of
    domestic law, had the literal rule been applied in this case the UK
    would have breached its treaty obligations to give effect to an EU
    directive"


    I know your next line: Now that we have left the EU, Parliament and/or
    the Supreme Court are free to say they no longer want to stick with "the author's own intellectual creation". Yes, but so far they haven't said
    that. That nice Mr Rees-Mogg probably wanted to put it on his bonfire,
    but he has been quietly overruled.

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Fri Oct 13 16:43:03 2023
    On Fri, 13 Oct 2023 14:42:49 +0100, Pamela wrote...

    A parallel situation the author had in mind may have been be an editor
    of a popular magazine commissioning a photoshoot and specifying its key parameters such as location, photographer, items to be shown and the
    model (whose parallel is the patient in this thread).

    I think that relates to the idea / expression dichotomy. There is no
    copyright in the editor's ideas behind the photoshoot, just in the photographer's resulting expression of those ideas.

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Fri Oct 13 16:41:35 2023
    On 13/10/2023 15:56, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Fri, 13 Oct 2023 12:09:35 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    But ordinary English *is* the appropriate criterion.

    It is the 'literal rule of Statutory Interpretation':

    "The literal rule requires courts to interpret statutes in their plain,
    literal and ordinary sense"

    https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/the-rules-behind-statutory-interpretation-administrative-law-essay.php#:~:text=There%20are%20four%20Rules%20of,rule%20and%20the%20purposive%20approach.

    Is a student essay the best you can do?

    Of course not. It's just an example of a clear, elementary and
    fundamental principle that happens to be correct.

    The disclaimer at the top says
    "You should not treat any information in this essay as being
    authoritative".

    It doesn't mean it's wrong.

    However, since you sniffily dismiss it for trivial reasons, let's try
    another couple you might find a bit more difficult:

    "3.1 The literal rule
    Under this rule the judge considers what the legislation actually says,
    rather than what it might mean. In order to achieve this, the judge will
    give the words in the Act a literal meaning, that is, their plain
    ordinary everyday meaning, even if the effect of this is to produce what
    might be considered as an otherwise unjust or undesirable outcome.

    The literal rule says that the intention of Parliament is best found in
    the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used. As the legislative democratic part of the state, Parliament must be taken to want to effect exactly what it says in its laws. If judges are permitted to give a
    non-obvious or non-literal meaning to the words of parliamentary law,
    then the will of Parliament, and thereby the will of the people, is
    being contradicted.

    Lord Diplock once noted:

    'Where the meaning of the statutory words is plain and unambiguous it is
    not then for the judges to invent fancied ambiguities as an excuse for
    failing to give effect to its plain meaning because they consider the consequences for doing so would be inexpedient, or even unjust or immoral.'"

    https://www.open.edu/openlearn/mod/oucontent/view.php?id=68342&section=3.1

    Or:

    "The literal rule of statutory interpretation should be the first rule
    applied by judges. Under the literal rule, the words of the statute are
    given their natural or ordinary meaning and applied without the judge
    seeking to put a gloss on the words or seek to make sense of the statute."

    https://e-lawresources.co.uk/Literal-rule.php

    Or in fact:

    Any number of other authoritative sources saying the same.

    Even then, note that the student also says your literal rule is just one
    of four rules of statutory interpretation.

    Of which it 'should be the first rule applied by judges'.

    S/he goes on to describe the others, including:

    "The purposive approach is implemented to ensure the law is effective as Parliament would have intended. This is used when interpreting EU Law
    see Pickstone v Freemans plc.... EU Law overrides all sources of
    domestic law, had the literal rule been applied in this case the UK
    would have breached its treaty obligations to give effect to an EU
    directive"

    But we are not interpreting EU law. We're interpreting the Copyright,
    Designs and Patents Act 1988, which is UK law.

    I know your next line: Now that we have left the EU, Parliament and/or
    the Supreme Court are free to say they no longer want to stick with "the author's own intellectual creation". Yes, but so far they haven't said
    that. That nice Mr Rees-Mogg probably wanted to put it on his bonfire,
    but he has been quietly overruled.

    How come you didn't get my next line right then?

    It's actually do you disagree with Lord Diplock, the Open University and e-lawresources? If so why, and with what superior authority?

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  • From Pamela@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Fri Oct 13 17:35:40 2023
    On 16:43 13 Oct 2023, Tim Jackson said:
    On Fri, 13 Oct 2023 14:42:49 +0100, Pamela wrote...

    A parallel situation the author had in mind may have been be an
    editor of a popular magazine commissioning a photoshoot and
    specifying its key parameters such as location, photographer, items
    to be shown and the model (whose parallel is the patient in this
    thread).

    I think that relates to the idea / expression dichotomy. There is no copyright in the editor's ideas behind the photoshoot, just in the photographer's resulting expression of those ideas.

    In the context of comment in the Wikipedia article, rather than my
    original quesion ...

    While it's true such an editor would not hold any copyright unless
    agreed otherwise, such an agreement would seems likely in the case of
    certain publications such as Vogue.

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Sat Oct 14 12:44:16 2023
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 17:06:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 12/10/2023 16:42, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Bearing in mind, also, that dictionaries record usage, they do not prescribe >> usage or define meaning.

    Oh dear. It is the *primary* function of any dictionary to define what
    words mean. And you will find that they all do immediately following
    what part of speech it is.

    Surely you leant that at school?

    No; I learnt precisely the opposite: that dictionaries record usage and
    explain meaning, rather than prescribe definitions and dictate meaning. But maybe that's simply a function of my education. As my English teacher
    enjoyed pointing out, there is no English equivalent of the Acadmie
    Franaise, and therefore nobody has the authority to stipulate the meaning
    of a word. At least some of what he taught us must have stuck, because I did get a grade A in O-Level English Language.

    Mark

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to All on Sat Oct 14 13:20:34 2023
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 18:46:32 +0100, Pamela <uklm@permabulator.33mail.com> wrote:

    On 15:10 3 Oct 2023, Tim Jackson said:

    On Tue, 03 Oct 2023 11:52:15 +0100, Pamela wrote...

    Who holds the copyright on NHS medical scans (such as MRI, CT, etc)?

    Is it the patient or the NHS?

    https://tinyurl.com/33xymbkf

    which leads to

    https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikilegal/Copyright_of_Medical_Imaging
    #W orks_created_in_the_United_Kingdom


    It's interesting (according to the mainly American entry in Wikipedia):

    "the situation of x-rays will not necessarily conform to a simple
    solo photographer model. The necessary creativity and originality
    could arguably come from a physician who orders an x-ray taken at a
    particular angle or for a certain length of time, rather than the
    technician who carries out the orders."

    That's an intersting comment. It's not dissimilar to the early days of photography itself, where the equipment was cumbersome and often required multiple operators. The photographer would be in charge of the arrangement, positioning and setting up the camera, determining focus and exposure, etc,
    but quite often his assistant would be the one to physically operate the shutter, acting on the photographer's instructions. But nobody would assert that the assistant owns the copyight. It always belongs to the photographer.

    Having said that, I think that in the case of any image taken as part of a medical procedure, be it an X-ray, MRI scan or whatever, comparisons with a solo photographer are irrelevent as the image will almost always be a work
    for hire. So neither the radiographer nor the physician owns the copyright,
    it will, rather, belong to their employer. Which in the circumstances
    described in this thread will be the NHS. Or, more specifically, a
    particular NHS Trust.

    Mark

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  • From Martin Brown@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Sat Oct 14 15:31:06 2023
    On 14/10/2023 13:20, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 18:46:32 +0100, Pamela <uklm@permabulator.33mail.com> wrote:

    Having said that, I think that in the case of any image taken as part of a medical procedure, be it an X-ray, MRI scan or whatever, comparisons with a solo photographer are irrelevent as the image will almost always be a work for hire. So neither the radiographer nor the physician owns the copyright, it will, rather, belong to their employer. Which in the circumstances described in this thread will be the NHS. Or, more specifically, a
    particular NHS Trust.

    I think the lines are potentially blurred now with the NHS outsourcing a proportion of all scans to private medical facilities and mobile MRI
    vans operated by for profit companies. Basically they can't retain
    enough NHS radiologists or capital spend to provide an adequate service.

    From the trade press 5 years ago and things have not improved.

    https://radiologybusiness.com/topics/healthcare-policy/nhs-spent-150m-radiology-outsourcing-2017

    I suspect the NHS have negotiated that they have the image rights but
    who can tell? It would only become clear if for some strange reason a particular medical image scan had huge commercial value and there was a copyright dispute over it that went the full distance to court.

    --
    Martin Brown

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  • From Martin Brown@21:1/5 to Pamela on Sat Oct 14 15:33:52 2023
    On 13/10/2023 14:42, Pamela wrote:
    On 09:03 13 Oct 2023, Martin Brown said:
    On 12/10/2023 18:46, Pamela wrote:
    On 15:10 3 Oct 2023, Tim Jackson said:
    On Tue, 03 Oct 2023 11:52:15 +0100, Pamela wrote...


    Who holds the copyright on NHS medical scans (such as MRI, CT,
    etc)?

    Is it the patient or the NHS?

    https://tinyurl.com/33xymbkf

    which leads to

    https://meta.wikimedia.org/wiki/Wikilegal/
    Copyright_of_Medical_Imagi
    ng #W orks_created_in_the_United_Kingdom


    It's interesting (according to the mainly American entry in
    Wikipedia):

    "the situation of x-rays will not necessarily conform to a
    simple solo photographer model. The necessary creativity and
    originality could arguably come from a physician who orders an
    x-ray taken at a particular angle or for a certain length of
    time, rather than the technician who carries out the orders."

    That makes no sense at all. The technician will select the exposure.
    The clinician will choose the angle that he wants the shot from.

    Tomography the technician will choose the best slice to show whatever
    organ or feature the clinician wants to see in detail and adjust
    contrast and resolution to best meet that requirement. The technician
    is every bit a photographer and controls the imaging process.

    The clinician is just the person who asked for an image to be taken.

    A parallel situation the author had in mind may have been be an editor
    of a popular magazine commissioning a photoshoot and specifying its key parameters such as location, photographer, items to be shown and the
    model (whose parallel is the patient in this thread).

    In which case the copyright belongs to the commercial photographer who
    took the image. There are a lot of tricks in commercial photography that
    are not at all obvious to the outsider. He has the image rights unless
    the contract he was employed under specifically states otherwise.

    Many photographers are freelance or in small businesses and depend on
    selling their most valuable commercial images to the highest bidder. I
    used to work for an industrial photographer during my summer holidays it
    was quite interesting work. I still have friends in the photo industry.

    In the NHS both are employees of the NHS so it doesn't matter but
    with NHS MRI scans being outsourced to privately operated travelling
    MRI scanner vans there could be situations where who owns copyright
    is blurred.

    My instinct is that the private operator of the MRI vans owns the
    image copyright unless their contract with the NHS says otherwise.

    It seems to be anticipating comparison with a photographic situation
    with a model release form.

    Hardly. That part still applies if your image ends up in a medical
    textbook - I know because one of my dental X-rays is in one.

    The way I interpreted the text ... it anticipates the objection and
    counters it in advance, arriving at a conclusion agreeing with your experience.

    Image copyright belongs to the person who made the image by default
    unless that person is employed directly by the company to do that task
    (staff photographer in which case the copyright is with his employer).

    Freelancers own their image copyright and sometimes even get credit in
    print on particularly notable ones. Even amateurs can get paid for a
    good shot - use it you pay for it (and never give away image copyright).

    https://www.nuj.org.uk/resource/useitpayforit-guidelines-for-selling-your-pictures.html

    Certain free to use sites lay claim to all your IP by default. You can
    to some extent circumvent this issue by only uploading a relatively low resolution image there and then charge for the full resolution original.

    --
    Martin Brown

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to All on Sat Oct 14 20:33:18 2023
    On Sat, 14 Oct 2023 15:31:06 +0100, Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:

    On 14/10/2023 13:20, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 18:46:32 +0100, Pamela <uklm@permabulator.33mail.com>
    wrote:

    Having said that, I think that in the case of any image taken as part of a >> medical procedure, be it an X-ray, MRI scan or whatever, comparisons with a >> solo photographer are irrelevent as the image will almost always be a work >> for hire. So neither the radiographer nor the physician owns the copyright, >> it will, rather, belong to their employer. Which in the circumstances
    described in this thread will be the NHS. Or, more specifically, a
    particular NHS Trust.

    I think the lines are potentially blurred now with the NHS outsourcing a >proportion of all scans to private medical facilities and mobile MRI
    vans operated by for profit companies. Basically they can't retain
    enough NHS radiologists or capital spend to provide an adequate service.

    I don't think that matters directly. If I was, say, a retailer or
    manufacturer wanting photos of my products for a catalogue (or website), I could either get one of my staff to take them or I could hire a contractor.
    But either way, it would be a work for hire.

    From the trade press 5 years ago and things have not improved.

    https://radiologybusiness.com/topics/healthcare-policy/nhs-spent-150m-radiology-outsourcing-2017

    I suspect the NHS have negotiated that they have the image rights but
    who can tell? It would only become clear if for some strange reason a >particular medical image scan had huge commercial value and there was a >copyright dispute over it that went the full distance to court.

    I can't see how the images could be anyting other than the property of the
    NHS. They need to have control over them both for their own records and for GDPR purposes. Medical images are potentially sensitive personal data; the
    NHS obviously has justification for retaining them but the photographer - either in-house or external - does not.

    Mark

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Sat Oct 14 17:08:01 2023
    On 14/10/2023 12:44, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 17:06:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 12/10/2023 16:42, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Bearing in mind, also, that dictionaries record usage, they do not prescribe
    usage or define meaning.

    Oh dear. It is the *primary* function of any dictionary to define what
    words mean. And you will find that they all do immediately following
    what part of speech it is.

    Surely you leant that at school?

    No; I learnt precisely the opposite: that dictionaries record usage and explain meaning, rather than prescribe definitions and dictate meaning. But maybe that's simply a function of my education. As my English teacher
    enjoyed pointing out, there is no English equivalent of the Académie Française, and therefore nobody has the authority to stipulate the meaning of a word.

    I suggest you Google for 'dictionary definitions' and see whether others
    agree with you.

    At least some of what he taught us must have stuck, because I did
    get a grade A in O-Level English Language.

    Congratulations.

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  • From Martin Brown@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Sun Oct 15 09:32:33 2023
    On 14/10/2023 20:33, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Sat, 14 Oct 2023 15:31:06 +0100, Martin Brown <'''newspam'''@nonad.co.uk> wrote:

    On 14/10/2023 13:20, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 18:46:32 +0100, Pamela <uklm@permabulator.33mail.com> >>> wrote:

    Having said that, I think that in the case of any image taken as part of a >>> medical procedure, be it an X-ray, MRI scan or whatever, comparisons with a >>> solo photographer are irrelevent as the image will almost always be a work >>> for hire. So neither the radiographer nor the physician owns the copyright, >>> it will, rather, belong to their employer. Which in the circumstances
    described in this thread will be the NHS. Or, more specifically, a
    particular NHS Trust.

    I think the lines are potentially blurred now with the NHS outsourcing a
    proportion of all scans to private medical facilities and mobile MRI
    vans operated by for profit companies. Basically they can't retain
    enough NHS radiologists or capital spend to provide an adequate service.

    I don't think that matters directly. If I was, say, a retailer or manufacturer wanting photos of my products for a catalogue (or website), I could either get one of my staff to take them or I could hire a contractor. But either way, it would be a work for hire.

    Not quite. It is clear cut absolutely yours if the image was taken by an employee *directly* employed by you.

    However, if you hire a professional photographer then the image
    copyright remains with them or the company that they work for by default
    unless you agree otherwise in advance (or later buy out the copyright).

    It makes no difference who owns the copyright provided that you only use
    the image for the purpose it was taken. It only becomes a big issue if
    the image has significant commercial value and you sell it elsewhere.
    (such images are rare but not incredibly so)

    Same applies to wedding photographers although most people are unaware -
    they retain the image copyright even though you commissioned the work.

    https://www.theweddingsecret.co.uk/magazine/wedding-photography-copyright/

    The better digital print houses will raise eyebrows if they think you
    are attempting to infringe a professional photographer's copyright.

    It has become more complex now that imaging is digital and some wedding photographers do provide digital media in addition to prints. They often digitally watermark them in the same sort of way that in the old days we stamped "Proof print" in orange ink the sky somewhere.

    From the trade press 5 years ago and things have not improved.

    https://radiologybusiness.com/topics/healthcare-policy/nhs-spent-150m-radiology-outsourcing-2017

    I suspect the NHS have negotiated that they have the image rights but
    who can tell? It would only become clear if for some strange reason a
    particular medical image scan had huge commercial value and there was a
    copyright dispute over it that went the full distance to court.

    I can't see how the images could be anyting other than the property of the NHS. They need to have control over them both for their own records and for GDPR purposes. Medical images are potentially sensitive personal data; the NHS obviously has justification for retaining them but the photographer - either in-house or external - does not.

    Historically, professional photographers were expected to keep all
    negatives on file in perpetuity and offer them back to clients only when
    they retired. I recall my former summer job employer doing just that.

    Most of the clients had gone out of business by then (or changed hands
    so many times they weren't interested). I think a lot of it (orphaned negatives) ends up in the museum of photography at Leeds (or junked if
    it has no real historical merit).

    --
    Martin Brown

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Sun Oct 15 14:11:14 2023
    On Sat, 14 Oct 2023 17:08:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 14/10/2023 12:44, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 17:06:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
    On 12/10/2023 16:42, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Bearing in mind, also, that dictionaries record usage, they do not prescribe
    usage or define meaning.

    Oh dear. It is the *primary* function of any dictionary to define what
    words mean. And you will find that they all do immediately following
    what part of speech it is.

    Surely you leant that at school?

    No; I learnt precisely the opposite: that dictionaries record usage and
    explain meaning, rather than prescribe definitions and dictate meaning. But >> maybe that's simply a function of my education. As my English teacher
    enjoyed pointing out, there is no English equivalent of the Acadmie
    Franaise, and therefore nobody has the authority to stipulate the meaning >> of a word.

    I suggest you Google for 'dictionary definitions' and see whether others >agree with you.

    Thank you, I have, and they do. Here's what some of them have to say about "dictionary":

    a reference source in print or electronic form containing words usually
    alphabetically arranged along with information about their forms,
    pronunciations, functions, etymologies, meanings, and syntactic and
    idiomatic uses

    https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dictionary

    a book or digital resource (such as Dictionary.com) containing a selection
    of words and information about their meanings, pronunciations,
    etymologies, inflected forms, derived forms, etc., in either the same or
    another language; lexicon; glossary

    https://www.dictionary.com/browse/dictionary

    a book that contains a list of words in alphabetical order and explains
    their meanings, or gives a word for them in another language;

    https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/dictionary

    You will note that none of them claim to prescribe definitions. Instead, in
    the words of the Cambridge Dictionary, they explain meanings.

    Mark

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Sun Oct 15 15:00:49 2023
    On 15/10/2023 14:11, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Sat, 14 Oct 2023 17:08:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 14/10/2023 12:44, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 17:06:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>
    On 12/10/2023 16:42, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Bearing in mind, also, that dictionaries record usage, they do not prescribe
    usage or define meaning.

    Oh dear. It is the *primary* function of any dictionary to define what >>>> words mean. And you will find that they all do immediately following
    what part of speech it is.

    Surely you leant that at school?

    No; I learnt precisely the opposite: that dictionaries record usage and
    explain meaning, rather than prescribe definitions and dictate meaning. But >>> maybe that's simply a function of my education. As my English teacher
    enjoyed pointing out, there is no English equivalent of the Académie
    Française, and therefore nobody has the authority to stipulate the meaning >>> of a word.

    I suggest you Google for 'dictionary definitions' and see whether others
    agree with you.

    Thank you, I have, and they do. Here's what some of them have to say about "dictionary":

    a reference source in print or electronic form containing words usually
    alphabetically arranged along with information about their forms,
    pronunciations, functions, etymologies, meanings, and syntactic and
    idiomatic uses

    https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/dictionary

    a book or digital resource (such as Dictionary.com) containing a selection
    of words and information about their meanings, pronunciations,
    etymologies, inflected forms, derived forms, etc., in either the same or
    another language; lexicon; glossary

    https://www.dictionary.com/browse/dictionary

    a book that contains a list of words in alphabetical order and explains
    their meanings, or gives a word for them in another language;

    https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/dictionary

    You will note that none of them claim to prescribe definitions. Instead, in the words of the Cambridge Dictionary, they explain meanings.

    *All* dictionaries give definitions of the words they contain, as indeed
    they should, and as is universally understood.

    "In addition to its *basic function* of *defining* words, a dictionary
    may provide information about their pronunciation, grammatical forms ...

    https://www.britannica.com/topic/dictionary

    From the very first page of the search I suggested:

    Dictionary.com | Meanings & Definitions of English Words https://www.dictionary.com
    The world's leading online dictionary: English *definitions*,

    Cambridge English Dictionary: Meanings & Definitions https://dictionary.cambridge.org › dictionary › english
    4 days ago — Get clear, simple *definitions*

    Merriam-Webster: America's Most Trusted Dictionary https://www.merriam-webster.com
    Find *definitions* for over 300000 words

    Collins Online Dictionary | *Definitions*, Thesaurus and ... https://www.collinsdictionary.com
    Pioneers in Language Reference for 200 years. Popular and trusted online dictionary with over 1 million words. Find *definitions*,

    Britannica
    https://www.britannica.com › dictionary
    Clear and simple *definitions*

    Vocabulary.com
    https://www.vocabulary.com › dictionary
    Vocabulary.com is the world's best dictionary for English *definitions*

    and so on, and so on.

    There's no doubt about it. There's no argument about it.

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Sun Oct 15 18:47:25 2023
    On Sun, 15 Oct 2023 15:00:49 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 15/10/2023 14:11, Mark Goodge wrote:

    You will note that none of them claim to prescribe definitions. Instead, in >> the words of the Cambridge Dictionary, they explain meanings.

    *All* dictionaries give definitions of the words they contain, as indeed
    they should, and as is universally understood.

    "In addition to its *basic function* of *defining* words, a dictionary
    may provide information about their pronunciation, grammatical forms ...

    https://www.britannica.com/topic/dictionary

    You appear to be taking that word out of context. As used here "defining
    words" is a synonym for "giving their meanings". There is no sense intended that the definitions in a dictionary are prescriptive. They are merely a description of how the word is normally used.

    Mark

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Sun Oct 15 22:05:31 2023
    On Fri, 13 Oct 2023 09:54:12 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 13/10/2023 02:49, Anthony R. Gold wrote:
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 17:06:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
    Oh dear. It is the *primary* function of any dictionary to define what
    words mean. And you will find that they all do immediately following
    what part of speech it is.

    If that was true then dictionaries must precede their languages and so it
    would be impossible for any spoken language to precede its written form.

    No, that's illogical. Definitions, ie what words have come to mean >precisely, naturally follow their usage not precede it.

    So a "definition" is based on usage, then?

    Do you believe those dates are when some dictionary defined that use or the >> date a dictionary lexicographer found that this meaning had come into use?

    A lexicographer of course records how words are used and what they're >understood to mean at the time of writing. So, he's recording how
    Statutes will be understood and if necessary interpreted at that time
    because they work on the same principles.

    So if we want to interpret legislation written in, say, 1972, it's first necessary to find a dictionary published in 1972?

    Successive lexicographers will record any changes in the language.

    The language is now pretty well codified and settled, largely because of
    such lexicographers who have recorded the language.

    When I was a kid, "gay" meant happy, "a thing" wasn't a thing, a mouse was a rodent, the web was something made by spiders and a tidal wave was a tidal wave, not a tsunami. We'd never heard of email, or the Internet, or
    clickbait. A troll was something that lived under a bridge. You could make friends, but there was no such word as "unfriend". You could follow
    something, but you couldn't unfollow it. We knew what a gig was, but if we heard the phrase "gig economy" we'd assume it meant the business of running
    a concert venue. A ghost was a thing from the afterlife, not a verb
    describing a way of avoiding someone. Woke was the past tense of "to wake".
    A stream was a very small river, and music came on a record. Birds tweeted,
    but none of them retweeted. If someone had mentioned a microchip, we'd have assumed they meant a very small piece of fried potato. "Unlike" meant dissimilar to, not the act of ceasing to like. Free running meant that you didn't have to pay for it. You might find a happy ending in a book or movie, but not a massage parlour. In fact, you'd have struggled to find a massage parlour. A text was something we studied in English Lit. A boss battle might
    be the result of a workplace dispute. A muffin top was the surface of
    something you might find at a bakery.

    So yeah, the language is pretty well codified and settled. Just don't tell anyone who works for a dictionary publisher, or who grew up n the 20th
    century.

    Mark

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  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Mon Oct 16 11:17:31 2023
    On Fri, 13 Oct 2023 16:41:35 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 13/10/2023 15:56, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Fri, 13 Oct 2023 12:09:35 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    But ordinary English *is* the appropriate criterion.

    It is the 'literal rule of Statutory Interpretation':

    "The literal rule requires courts to interpret statutes in their plain,
    literal and ordinary sense"

    https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/the-rules-behind-statutory-interpretation-administrative-law-essay.php#:~:text=There%20are%20four%20Rules%20of,rule%20and%20the%20purposive%20approach.

    Is a student essay the best you can do?

    Of course not. It's just an example of a clear, elementary and
    fundamental principle that happens to be correct.

    Sorry, Norman, your voice is extremely muffled coming from the bottom of
    that rabbit hole. I'm having difficulty making sense of whatever you
    were trying to say.

    However, a couple of links did come through:

    https://www.open.edu/openlearn/mod/oucontent/view.php?id=68342
    &section=3.1

    https://e-lawresources.co.uk/Literal-rule.php

    Thank you for providing more sources of what your previous student essay
    was saying, though you have to explore the menus on the left hand side
    to get the detail.

    Namely, that while the literal rule comes first, it is not the only
    rule. As time had gone by, the courts have found more and more cases
    where it's not right, and your sources say that you have to consider and
    apply the other rules.

    And specifically, both the websites you link say that when considering
    the effect of EU law and CJEU rulings, you need to apply the purposive approach.

    And both say that this affects the interpretation of domestic law as
    well as EU law.

    This is why the UK courts no longer apply the literal rule to
    "original" in copyright cases, but instead use the purposive
    construction "the author's own intellectual creation".

    Again, thank you for the three references you have now provided which
    confirm this use of a purposive approach.

    As I said, your voice is getting very muffled and unclear. If you go
    further down your rabbit hole, I may not be able to hear you.

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Mon Oct 16 08:09:35 2023
    On 15/10/2023 22:05, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Fri, 13 Oct 2023 09:54:12 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 13/10/2023 02:49, Anthony R. Gold wrote:
    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 17:06:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>
    Oh dear. It is the *primary* function of any dictionary to define what >>>> words mean. And you will find that they all do immediately following
    what part of speech it is.

    If that was true then dictionaries must precede their languages and so it >>> would be impossible for any spoken language to precede its written form.

    No, that's illogical. Definitions, ie what words have come to mean
    precisely, naturally follow their usage not precede it.

    So a "definition" is based on usage, then?

    It follows usage when usage has become consistent and firmed up.

    Do you believe those dates are when some dictionary defined that use or the >>> date a dictionary lexicographer found that this meaning had come into use? >>
    A lexicographer of course records how words are used and what they're
    understood to mean at the time of writing. So, he's recording how
    Statutes will be understood and if necessary interpreted at that time
    because they work on the same principles.

    So if we want to interpret legislation written in, say, 1972, it's first necessary to find a dictionary published in 1972?

    Only if there's a realistic dispute involving alleged significant change
    of usage and meaning, but generally not, because language is pretty
    stable over such periods.

    Successive lexicographers will record any changes in the language.

    The language is now pretty well codified and settled, largely because of
    such lexicographers who have recorded the language.

    When I was a kid, "gay" meant happy, "a thing" wasn't a thing, a mouse was a rodent, the web was something made by spiders and a tidal wave was a tidal wave, not a tsunami. We'd never heard of email, or the Internet, or clickbait. A troll was something that lived under a bridge. You could make friends, but there was no such word as "unfriend". You could follow something, but you couldn't unfollow it. We knew what a gig was, but if we heard the phrase "gig economy" we'd assume it meant the business of running
    a concert venue. A ghost was a thing from the afterlife, not a verb describing a way of avoiding someone. Woke was the past tense of "to wake".
    A stream was a very small river, and music came on a record. Birds tweeted, but none of them retweeted. If someone had mentioned a microchip, we'd have assumed they meant a very small piece of fried potato. "Unlike" meant dissimilar to, not the act of ceasing to like. Free running meant that you didn't have to pay for it. You might find a happy ending in a book or movie, but not a massage parlour. In fact, you'd have struggled to find a massage parlour. A text was something we studied in English Lit. A boss battle might be the result of a workplace dispute. A muffin top was the surface of something you might find at a bakery.

    So yeah, the language is pretty well codified and settled.

    Yes it is, particularly as regards the sort of words used in
    legislation, which is what we're talking about. Most of what you've illustrated are neologisms. They are extensions of language that do not
    alter the meanings of existing words but are just additions to the lexicon.

    It is almost always clear from the context in legal proceedings which definition of any word applies.

    Just don't tell
    anyone who works for a dictionary publisher, or who grew up n the 20th century.

    No-one's arguing that new words do not come into existence, or that old
    words are sometimes gives an additional possible interpretation by
    popular usage. In context, however, it's rarely a problem.

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Mon Oct 16 11:57:46 2023
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 08:09:35 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 15/10/2023 22:05, Mark Goodge wrote:

    So a "definition" is based on usage, then?

    It follows usage when usage has become consistent and firmed up.

    So what happens when usage changes?

    When I was a kid, "gay" meant happy, "a thing" wasn't a thing, a mouse was a >> rodent, the web was something made by spiders and a tidal wave was a tidal >> wave, not a tsunami. We'd never heard of email, or the Internet, or
    clickbait. A troll was something that lived under a bridge. You could make >> friends, but there was no such word as "unfriend". You could follow
    something, but you couldn't unfollow it. We knew what a gig was, but if we >> heard the phrase "gig economy" we'd assume it meant the business of running >> a concert venue. A ghost was a thing from the afterlife, not a verb
    describing a way of avoiding someone. Woke was the past tense of "to wake". >> A stream was a very small river, and music came on a record. Birds tweeted, >> but none of them retweeted. If someone had mentioned a microchip, we'd have >> assumed they meant a very small piece of fried potato. "Unlike" meant
    dissimilar to, not the act of ceasing to like. Free running meant that you >> didn't have to pay for it. You might find a happy ending in a book or movie, >> but not a massage parlour. In fact, you'd have struggled to find a massage >> parlour. A text was something we studied in English Lit. A boss battle might >> be the result of a workplace dispute. A muffin top was the surface of
    something you might find at a bakery.

    So yeah, the language is pretty well codified and settled.

    Yes it is, particularly as regards the sort of words used in
    legislation, which is what we're talking about. Most of what you've >illustrated are neologisms. They are extensions of language that do not >alter the meanings of existing words but are just additions to the lexicon.

    I think you'll find that words like "ghost", "woke", "stream", "gig", "gay", and "text" have been around for a very long time. it's the meaning that is
    new, not the word.

    It is almost always clear from the context in legal proceedings which >definition of any word applies.

    Oh, so not the first entry for the word in the dictionary, then?

    Just don't tell
    anyone who works for a dictionary publisher, or who grew up n the 20th
    century.

    No-one's arguing that new words do not come into existence, or that old
    words are sometimes gives an additional possible interpretation by
    popular usage. In context, however, it's rarely a problem.

    But what do you do on the occasions when it is a problem?

    Mark

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  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Mon Oct 16 12:27:53 2023
    On Sun, 15 Oct 2023 09:32:33 +0100, Martin Brown wrote...


    On 14/10/2023 13:20, Mark Goodge wrote:

    ..... comparisons with a
    solo photographer are irrelevent as the image will almost always be a work
    for hire.
    [snip]
    ..... If I was, say, a retailer or
    manufacturer wanting photos of my products for a catalogue (or website), I could either get one of my staff to take them or I could hire a contractor. But either way, it would be a work for hire.

    "Work for hire" is a concept from US law. As Martin explains below, it
    doesn't apply in the UK.

    Not quite. It is clear cut absolutely yours if the image was taken by
    an
    employee *directly* employed by you.

    However, if you hire a professional photographer then the image
    copyright remains with them or the company that they work for by default unless you agree otherwise in advance (or later buy out the copyright).

    It makes no difference who owns the copyright provided that you only use
    the image for the purpose it was taken. It only becomes a big issue if
    the image has significant commercial value and you sell it elsewhere.
    (such images are rare but not incredibly so)

    That is indeed the normal rule: just a licence to use the image for the purposes that were originally understood.

    I'm only aware of one case (Doc Martens) where there was held to be an
    implied transfer of beneficial ownership of the copyright, rather than
    just a licence. There were unusual circumstances.

    https://tinyurl.com/yc9yxkzs
    which leads to https://www.pinsentmasons.com/out-law/news/dr-martens-sigh-of-relief- over-copyright-in-airwair-logo

    Same applies to wedding photographers although most people are unaware -
    they retain the image copyright even though you commissioned the work.

    https://www.theweddingsecret.co.uk/magazine/wedding-photography-copyright/

    One local firm of photographers offers to work on the basis that the
    client will own the copyright, if that's what is wanted. They charge
    higher fees if so.

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Mon Oct 16 12:26:20 2023
    On 16/10/2023 11:17, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Fri, 13 Oct 2023 16:41:35 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 13/10/2023 15:56, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Fri, 13 Oct 2023 12:09:35 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    But ordinary English *is* the appropriate criterion.

    It is the 'literal rule of Statutory Interpretation':

    "The literal rule requires courts to interpret statutes in their plain, >>>> literal and ordinary sense"

    https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/administrative-law/the-rules-behind-statutory-interpretation-administrative-law-essay.php#:~:text=There%20are%20four%20Rules%20of,rule%20and%20the%20purposive%20approach.

    Is a student essay the best you can do?

    Of course not. It's just an example of a clear, elementary and
    fundamental principle that happens to be correct.

    Sorry, Norman, your voice is extremely muffled coming from the bottom of
    that rabbit hole. I'm having difficulty making sense of whatever you
    were trying to say.

    However, a couple of links did come through:

    https://www.open.edu/openlearn/mod/oucontent/view.php?id=68342
    &section=3.1

    https://e-lawresources.co.uk/Literal-rule.php

    Thank you for providing more sources of what your previous student essay
    was saying,

    My pleasure. I always seek to inform and correct those who are wrong.

    though you have to explore the menus on the left hand side
    to get the detail.

    Namely, that while the literal rule comes first, it is not the only
    rule.

    If it works, it works. There is no reason to go on to other rules when
    it does. And it does.

    It's not Pick'n'Mix where you can choose whatever rule you want, but a hierarchy.

    As time had gone by, the courts have found more and more cases
    where it's not right, and your sources say that you have to consider and apply the other rules.

    Only where 'it's not right'. But it is in the case we're considering.

    As it says in the introduction to 'The Golden Rule' in the OU publication:

    "*if* the literal rule produces an absurdity,"

    ... which it doesn't ...

    "then the court should look for another meaning of the words to avoid
    that absurd result. The rule was closely defined by Lord Wensleydale in
    Grey v Pearson (1857) HL Cas 61, who stated:

    The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to
    unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or
    inconsistency with the rest of the instrument in which case the
    grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to
    avoid the absurdity and inconsistency, but no farther."

    So, not only do you disagree with Lord Diplock as pointed out
    previously, you also disagree with Lord Wensleydale. That's quite
    something.

    I don't think even you think 'The Mischief Rule' applies, so we can skip
    over that.

    As regards 'The Purposive Approach', I'm agreeing with Lord Simmons who:

    "called this approach ‘a naked usurpation of the legislative function
    under the thin disguise of interpretation’. He went on to say that ‘if a gap is disclosed, the remedy lies in an amending Act’."

    and with this:

    "These comments highlight one issue with the purposive approach. How Parliament’s intentions can be determined and whether judges should
    really be refusing to follow the clear words of Parliament."

    In the case we're considering, there is no justification for it, and
    really no excuse except appeasement.

    Indeed, in Pickstone v Freeman plc (1989) AC 66, it is quite clear that
    the literal approach is considered first and foremost, and the purposive approach only comes into it if the literal approach causes a serious
    problem:

    "The House of Lords decided that the literal approach would have left
    the United Kingdom in breach of its Treaty obligations to give effect to
    an EU directive. It therefore used the purposive approach..."

    The literal approach to 'original work' causes no such anomalies.

    And specifically, both the websites you link say that when considering
    the effect of EU law and CJEU rulings, you need to apply the purposive approach.

    Well, no. We're dealing here not with EU law but an eminently clear UK Statute, where the above words have not been interpreted but, by
    changing their clear meaning, misinterpreted.

    And both say that this affects the interpretation of domestic law as
    well as EU law.

    It can. But never to the extent of deliberately misinterpreting it.

    This is why the UK courts no longer apply the literal rule to
    "original" in copyright cases, but instead use the purposive
    construction "the author's own intellectual creation".

    Again, thank you for the three references you have now provided which
    confirm this use of a purposive approach.

    No-one is denying that there have been cases where purposive
    construction has been used to produce an absurd result.

    The way to determine Parliament's purpose in enacting the legislation it
    has, is best done by looking at the words it uses. If they are clear
    and precise, literal interpretation must be the way to go.

    Sorry if I'll never believe you when you argue black is white, whatever
    case law you produce.

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  • From Adam Funk@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Mon Oct 16 14:04:06 2023
    On 2023-10-12, Mark Goodge wrote:

    On Thu, 12 Oct 2023 16:38:02 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:

    On 2023-10-10, Mark Goodge wrote:

    It's also worth bearing in mind that the nature of the content doesn't
    affect the rights. If I was taking photos of my children in the garden, and >>> it just so happened that a plane crashed into the park at that precise time >>> and one of the photos showed the crash, it would still be my copyright.
    There's a well-known video online taken by videographer who was doing a
    wedding shoot in Beirut at the precise time of the ammonium nitrate
    explosion; it's not what he intended to capture but it is, nonetheless, his >>> copyright. And that, I think, has bearing on the Diana paperazzi case; just >>> because that's not what the cameras were intended to capture doesn't mean >>> there's no copyright in them. For many security cameras, indeed, the most >>> desirable content is absolutely nothing of interest at all - just an empty >>> room or a street with nothing remarkable happening. But when something does >>> happen which is caputured on those cameras, even if it's of actions which >>> are entirely unrelated to the reasons why the cameras were installed, it's >>> as much the copyright of the camera operator as their intended footage.

    Just out of curiosity, and wandering off the topic of UK law...

    I know that some other countries do not have freedom of panorama and
    allow copyright on art works to restrict photography of them. Can that >>apply to moving artworks such as a large sculpture being transported >>between sites on the back of a truck?

    That would be very jurisdiction dependent. In France, which doesn't have general freedom of panorama, it would depend on whether the photo was specifically of the sculpture or whether it was merely an incidental
    capture. For example, if you knew that a famous sculpture (possibly one not normally visible in public) was due to be moved by road so you waited for
    the truck to come past and took a photo of it, that would be an
    infringement. But if you were just taking photos of the street, and coincidentally happened to take one which included the statue on the truck, it wouldn't be an infringement as it would be a merely incidental inclusion. So CCTV footage that happened to capture it wouldn't be an infringement.

    The fact that France doesn't have freedom of panorama, but does have an incidental inclusion exemption, can lead to some very borderline edge cases where a work subject to copyright appears as a relatively small part of a photograph. For example, a general street scene which just happens to
    include a modern sculpture, or a landscape that happens to include a distant shot of a modern bridge (the Millau Viaduct is a classic example). There doesn't appear to be any particular rule of thumb as to how these are determined, it's all done on a case by case basis.

    Interesting, thanks.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Mon Oct 16 14:16:36 2023
    On 16/10/2023 11:57, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 08:09:35 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 15/10/2023 22:05, Mark Goodge wrote:

    So a "definition" is based on usage, then?

    It follows usage when usage has become consistent and firmed up.

    So what happens when usage changes?

    Further definitions are added of course.

    When I was a kid, "gay" meant happy, "a thing" wasn't a thing, a mouse was a
    rodent, the web was something made by spiders and a tidal wave was a tidal >>> wave, not a tsunami. We'd never heard of email, or the Internet, or
    clickbait. A troll was something that lived under a bridge. You could make >>> friends, but there was no such word as "unfriend". You could follow
    something, but you couldn't unfollow it. We knew what a gig was, but if we >>> heard the phrase "gig economy" we'd assume it meant the business of running >>> a concert venue. A ghost was a thing from the afterlife, not a verb
    describing a way of avoiding someone. Woke was the past tense of "to wake". >>> A stream was a very small river, and music came on a record. Birds tweeted, >>> but none of them retweeted. If someone had mentioned a microchip, we'd have >>> assumed they meant a very small piece of fried potato. "Unlike" meant
    dissimilar to, not the act of ceasing to like. Free running meant that you >>> didn't have to pay for it. You might find a happy ending in a book or movie,
    but not a massage parlour. In fact, you'd have struggled to find a massage >>> parlour. A text was something we studied in English Lit. A boss battle might
    be the result of a workplace dispute. A muffin top was the surface of
    something you might find at a bakery.

    So yeah, the language is pretty well codified and settled.

    Yes it is, particularly as regards the sort of words used in
    legislation, which is what we're talking about. Most of what you've
    illustrated are neologisms. They are extensions of language that do not
    alter the meanings of existing words but are just additions to the lexicon.

    I think you'll find that words like "ghost", "woke", "stream", "gig", "gay", and "text" have been around for a very long time. it's the meaning that is new, not the word.

    It is almost always clear from the context in legal proceedings which
    definition of any word applies.

    Oh, so not the first entry for the word in the dictionary, then?

    That's of course understood. The meaning has to fit the context. You
    can't take a word to be a verb when it's clear a noun is required for
    example. But neither can you take an obscure meaning of a word with
    several meanings when a more common meaning is given and it fits the
    context.

    Just don't tell
    anyone who works for a dictionary publisher, or who grew up n the 20th
    century.

    No-one's arguing that new words do not come into existence, or that old
    words are sometimes gives an additional possible interpretation by
    popular usage. In context, however, it's rarely a problem.

    But what do you do on the occasions when it is a problem?

    The courts decide, after hearing argument, which is the 'true'
    interpretation. But, as I said, it's rarely a problem in practice.
    Legislators are very careful, where they can, to be precise, even to the
    extent of providing a definitions section which says how certain terms
    in any Act are to be interpreted.

    Imprecision applies more to subjective words like 'dishonestly' or
    'tending to deprave and corrupt' which have to be interpreted according
    to current standards than to objective ones like 'original work' which
    don't.

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  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Mon Oct 16 17:12:48 2023
    On Fri, 6 Oct 2023 01:58:24 +0100, Tim Jackson wrote...

    On Tue, 3 Oct 2023 22:04:49 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    Whether it's an intellectual work doesn't come into it.

    That might have been true once, but more recent case law says that for copyright to subsist, the work must be the "author's own intellectual creation".

    However, I don't think you can just dismiss an MRI scan as not being an intellectual creation. I imagine that a radiographer has to put in at
    least some intellectual effort in order to get a good scan which shows
    the required features of the patient's body.

    Interesting article here, published in the post-Brexit transition
    period. It relates to copyright in fabric designs, but applicable more generally:

    "Cofemel v G-Star Raw (C-683/17) and its effect on UK copyright law
    before and after Brexit"

    https://tinyurl.com/24zjmzv8

    which leads to https://www.bristows.com/viewpoint/articles/cofemel-v-g-star-raw-c-683- 17-and-its-effect-on-uk-copyright-law-before-and-after-brexit/

    Quote:
    "After Brexit, whether there is a deal or not, the CJEU
    decision will be considered to be binding on the UK’s lower
    courts in the same way that Supreme Court judgments are.
    It is possible that we will see a case on this point reach
    the UK Supreme Court in the next few years..."

    The article confirms that under CJEU case law, originality requires the "author’s own intellectual creation".

    It also confirms what I say above, that you can't just dismiss an MRI
    scan, as long as there has been some level of intellectual creation:

    "National laws which make copyright protection dependent on
    artistic value or have an artistic intention requirement, are
    not acceptable."

    So as long as there is an intellectual creation, there is no big issue
    with "irrespective of artistic quality" in section 4 of the UK Copyright
    etc Act.

    Something I hadn't previously considered is that while CJEU decisions
    require "intellectual creation" as part of the test for originality, it
    is a uniform test.

    So in some respects, e.g. for sculptures and works of artistic
    craftsmanship, this might actually *lower* the UK's previous
    requirements:

    "This judgment has opened a potential can of worms for UK
    copyright. Under the current CDPA, certain types of copyright
    work have other requirements in addition to originality in
    order to acquire copyright protection."

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Mon Oct 16 18:29:55 2023
    On 16/10/2023 17:12, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Fri, 6 Oct 2023 01:58:24 +0100, Tim Jackson wrote...

    Interesting article here, published in the post-Brexit transition
    period. It relates to copyright in fabric designs, but applicable more generally:

    "Cofemel v G-Star Raw (C-683/17) and its effect on UK copyright law
    before and after Brexit"

    https://tinyurl.com/24zjmzv8

    which leads to https://www.bristows.com/viewpoint/articles/cofemel-v-g-star-raw-c-683- 17-and-its-effect-on-uk-copyright-law-before-and-after-brexit/

    Quote:
    "After Brexit, whether there is a deal or not, the CJEU
    decision will be considered to be binding on the UK’s lower
    courts in the same way that Supreme Court judgments are.
    It is possible that we will see a case on this point reach
    the UK Supreme Court in the next few years..."

    The article confirms that under CJEU case law, originality requires the "author’s own intellectual creation".

    Much easier when it just meant 'new' as in the UK Copyright Act.

    It also confirms what I say above, that you can't just dismiss an MRI
    scan, as long as there has been some level of intellectual creation:

    No question about it when 'original' just meant 'new' as in the UK
    Copyright Act.

    "National laws which make copyright protection dependent on
    artistic value or have an artistic intention requirement, are
    not acceptable."

    Fancy! Just like the UK Copyright Act then.

    So as long as there is an intellectual creation, there is no big issue
    with "irrespective of artistic quality" in section 4 of the UK Copyright
    etc Act.

    There never was before under a proper reading of the UK Copyright Act.
    It just had to be 'original', ie 'new'.

    Something I hadn't previously considered is that while CJEU decisions
    require "intellectual creation" as part of the test for originality, it
    is a uniform test.

    But still far more difficult and imprecise than 'original', ie 'new', as
    set out in the UK Copyright Act.

    So in some respects, e.g. for sculptures and works of artistic
    craftsmanship, this might actually *lower* the UK's previous
    requirements:

    "This judgment has opened a potential can of worms for UK
    copyright. Under the current CDPA, certain types of copyright
    work have other requirements in addition to originality in
    order to acquire copyright protection."

    Indeed. Copyright law is in a right muddle due in no small part to
    European judges meddling in things they don't understand but feel they
    should control, and it desperately needs root and branch reform.

    A good illustration of what a mess it's in is actually over sculptures
    and what various judges have felt constrained, variously, to hold them
    to be. See for example this excellent review:

    https://www.york.ac.uk/media/law/yorklawreview/vol1/COOMBS%20YLR%20SPRING%202020%20V1%20FINAL.pdf

    The mind frankly boggles at the absurdity of it all.

    If it's worth copying it's worthy of protection is how it should be, at
    least for a limited period. How much simpler than reinventing the wheel
    or trying to work out how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Mon Oct 16 18:45:49 2023
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 14:16:36 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 11:57, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 08:09:35 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>
    No-one's arguing that new words do not come into existence, or that old
    words are sometimes gives an additional possible interpretation by
    popular usage. In context, however, it's rarely a problem.

    But what do you do on the occasions when it is a problem?

    The courts decide, after hearing argument, which is the 'true' >interpretation.

    That is *exactly* what case law does.

    But, as I said, it's rarely a problem in practice.

    Indeed, it isn't. The majority of cases don't go to appeal, and those which
    do rarely turn on the meanings of words. But, every now and then, there is
    case which goes to appeal and which does turn on the meanings of words. So
    then the court has to decide which of the many possible meanings of the word
    is the one which is most applicable. Which is the system working precisely
    as intended.

    Legislators are very careful, where they can, to be precise, even to the >extent of providing a definitions section which says how certain terms
    in any Act are to be interpreted.

    Imprecision applies more to subjective words like 'dishonestly' or
    'tending to deprave and corrupt' which have to be interpreted according
    to current standards than to objective ones like 'original work' which
    don't.

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the
    legislation?

    Mark

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Mon Oct 16 19:10:21 2023
    On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 14:16:36 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 11:57, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 08:09:35 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>
    No-one's arguing that new words do not come into existence, or that old >>>> words are sometimes gives an additional possible interpretation by
    popular usage. In context, however, it's rarely a problem.

    But what do you do on the occasions when it is a problem?

    The courts decide, after hearing argument, which is the 'true'
    interpretation.

    That is *exactly* what case law does.

    Quite. Where have I said otherwise?

    But, as I said, it's rarely a problem in practice.

    Indeed, it isn't. The majority of cases don't go to appeal, and those which do rarely turn on the meanings of words. But, every now and then, there is case which goes to appeal and which does turn on the meanings of words.

    Why are you concerned just with cases that go to appeal? The lower
    courts have to decide such things too where necessary.

    So then the court has to decide which of the many possible meanings of the word
    is the one which is most applicable. Which is the system working precisely
    as intended.

    Yes, and it will do so according to various established criteria,
    primarily what meanings are reasonable and consistent in context, and
    what the words mean in their plain, literal and ordinary sense.

    Legislators are very careful, where they can, to be precise, even to the
    extent of providing a definitions section which says how certain terms
    in any Act are to be interpreted.

    Imprecision applies more to subjective words like 'dishonestly' or
    'tending to deprave and corrupt' which have to be interpreted according
    to current standards than to objective ones like 'original work' which
    don't.

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable,
    consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of 'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Mon Oct 16 20:51:43 2023
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the >> OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the
    legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable,
    consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable?

    Mark

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Mon Oct 16 20:56:42 2023
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 18:29:55 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 17:12, Tim Jackson wrote:

    So as long as there is an intellectual creation, there is no big issue
    with "irrespective of artistic quality" in section 4 of the UK Copyright
    etc Act.

    There never was before under a proper reading of the UK Copyright Act.
    It just had to be 'original', ie 'new'.

    It also needs to be a work. A work requires the input of at last some effort
    or skil. Otherwise, it's purely an accident.

    Something I hadn't previously considered is that while CJEU decisions
    require "intellectual creation" as part of the test for originality, it
    is a uniform test.

    But still far more difficult and imprecise than 'original', ie 'new', as
    set out in the UK Copyright Act.

    On the contrary, it clarifies what is meant by "work", making it clear that
    it only requires a minimal level of deliberate input, and doesn't require
    any artistic value.

    If it's worth copying it's worthy of protection is how it should be, at
    least for a limited period. How much simpler than reinventing the wheel
    or trying to work out how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.

    Copyright has never been based on that, either in the UK or anywhere in the world. Why are you proposing such a radical change?

    Mark

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  • From Fredxx@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Mon Oct 16 22:36:53 2023
    On 16/10/2023 19:10, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    <snip>

    Indeed, it isn't. The majority of cases don't go to appeal, and those
    which
    do rarely turn on the meanings of words. But, every now and then,
    there is
    case which goes to appeal and which does turn on the meanings of words.

    Why are you concerned just with cases that go to appeal?  The lower
    courts have to decide such things too where necessary.

    I can see where your going wrong. Where a case does go to an upper court
    then precedents are made from those interpretation and meaning of words. Sometimes those definitions change and don't follow your dictionary definitions.

    The lower courts generally follow those cases and often form part of the argument in the lower court.

    Hopefully you can see that blindly following dictionary definitions
    isn't always very helpful when it comes to case law. Assuming you
    understand the importance of case law?

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Mon Oct 16 22:11:51 2023
    On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
    OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the
    legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable,
    consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable?

    Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be
    the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary
    but obscure and unnatural.

    I asked you, in the bit you decided to delete:

    "What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of 'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?"

    You tell me, and I'll tell you where you're wrong.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Mon Oct 16 22:39:44 2023
    On 16/10/2023 20:56, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 18:29:55 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 17:12, Tim Jackson wrote:

    So as long as there is an intellectual creation, there is no big issue
    with "irrespective of artistic quality" in section 4 of the UK Copyright >>> etc Act.

    There never was before under a proper reading of the UK Copyright Act.
    It just had to be 'original', ie 'new'.

    It also needs to be a work. A work requires the input of at last some effort or skil. Otherwise, it's purely an accident.

    'It' of course means the work. And I totally agree it means the product
    of skill and/or labour. Which were the criteria before the blessed
    European judges intervened to muddy it and confuse a very
    straightforward word with very straightforward considerations.

    Something I hadn't previously considered is that while CJEU decisions
    require "intellectual creation" as part of the test for originality, it
    is a uniform test.

    But still far more difficult and imprecise than 'original', ie 'new', as
    set out in the UK Copyright Act.

    On the contrary, it clarifies what is meant by "work", making it clear that it only requires a minimal level of deliberate input, and doesn't require
    any artistic value.

    It doesn't 'clarify' what is meant by a work at all, and certainly not
    in the way you set out above, but has changed the wording and the
    meaning to something else and something different. Anyway, who are you
    to add 'intellectual creation' only requires 'a minimal level of
    deliberate input, and doesn't require any artistic value'? Who knows
    what it requires? And what is the point, if you are correct, of calling
    it anything other than 'a work'?

    That's the trouble with trying to interpret simple words that need no interpretation. If you do that, it inevitably results in
    misinterpretation because you've substituted different words which have
    other, different meanings.

    If it's worth copying it's worthy of protection is how it should be, at
    least for a limited period. How much simpler than reinventing the wheel
    or trying to work out how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.

    Copyright has never been based on that, either in the UK or anywhere in the world. Why are you proposing such a radical change?

    It's the philosophy that underlies intellectual property rights
    generally, and the UK Copyright Act as enacted makes a pretty good stab
    at it. But only when it is enforceable as written, as was Parliament's intention.

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  • From Roger Hayter@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Mon Oct 16 22:04:33 2023
    On 16 Oct 2023 at 22:11:51 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>> On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
    OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the
    legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable,
    consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable?

    Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be
    the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary
    but obscure and unnatural.

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an unnatural definition of a word?



    I asked you, in the bit you decided to delete:

    "What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of 'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?"

    You tell me, and I'll tell you where you're wrong.


    --
    Roger Hayter

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Roger Hayter on Tue Oct 17 09:45:24 2023
    On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 16 Oct 2023 at 22:11:51 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>> On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
    OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the
    legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable,
    consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable?

    Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be
    the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary
    but obscure and unnatural.

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
    certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings.

    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
    meant not constructing one at all?

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Fredxx on Tue Oct 17 09:39:06 2023
    On 16/10/2023 22:36, Fredxx wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 19:10, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    <snip>

    Indeed, it isn't. The majority of cases don't go to appeal, and those
    which
    do rarely turn on the meanings of words. But, every now and then,
    there is
    case which goes to appeal and which does turn on the meanings of words.

    Why are you concerned just with cases that go to appeal?  The lower
    courts have to decide such things too where necessary.

    I can see where your going wrong. Where a case does go to an upper court
    then precedents are made from those interpretation and meaning of words.

    No, that's 'binding' precedents. All court decisions are precedents,
    but the lower courts' decisions are not binding so they don't have to be followed. Nevertheless, it's not a free-for-all with all the lower
    courts reinventing the wheel and deciding the same point willy-nilly and however they want if it comes before them. They will consider the
    decisions in similar level courts and will attempt to reconcile their
    own decisions with those of other courts however they can.

    Sometimes those definitions change and don't follow your dictionary definitions.

    Then, in the words of Lord Simmons I've referred to previously, it is:

    "a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise
    of interpretation".

    The lower courts generally follow those cases and often form part of the argument in the lower court.

    Binding precedents have to be followed. It's what the term means.

    Hopefully you can see that blindly following dictionary definitions
    isn't always very helpful when it comes to case law. Assuming you
    understand the importance of case law?

    The literal rule of Statutory interpretation is well established and has
    to be followed. Judges are not free to amend the law by changing the
    clear intention of Parliament expressed in the words it used.

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 17 11:10:13 2023
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:11:51 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>> On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
    OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the
    legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable,
    consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable?

    Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be
    the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary
    but obscure and unnatural.

    I asked you, in the bit you decided to delete:

    "What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of >'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?"

    I'll answer that question after you've answered mine. I note that you
    skipped over that, previously.

    Mark

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 17 11:13:21 2023
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:39:44 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 20:56, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 18:29:55 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>

    If it's worth copying it's worthy of protection is how it should be, at
    least for a limited period. How much simpler than reinventing the wheel >>> or trying to work out how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.

    Copyright has never been based on that, either in the UK or anywhere in the >> world. Why are you proposing such a radical change?

    It's the philosophy that underlies intellectual property rights
    generally,

    No, it isn't. It really isn't. The philosophy which underlies intellectual property rights generally is the principle that authors (and, subsequently, other creators) should have an incentive to create more.

    and the UK Copyright Act as enacted makes a pretty good stab
    at it. But only when it is enforceable as written, as was Parliament's >intention.

    How do you know what Parliament's intention was? What was your role in
    helping to draft the legislation?

    Mark

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  • From Roger Hayter@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 17 10:43:43 2023
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 16 Oct 2023 at 22:11:51 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>> On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
    OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the
    legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable,
    consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable?

    Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be
    the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary
    but obscure and unnatural.

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you >> personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
    certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings.

    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
    meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    --
    Roger Hayter

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Roger Hayter on Tue Oct 17 12:24:27 2023
    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
    certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings.

    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
    meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
    'not construct'.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 17 12:26:12 2023
    On 17/10/2023 11:10, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:11:51 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>> On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
    OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the
    legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable,
    consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable?

    Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be
    the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary
    but obscure and unnatural.

    I asked you, in the bit you decided to delete:

    "What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of
    'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?"

    I'll answer that question after you've answered mine. I note that you
    skipped over that, previously.

    But I have. What do you think the sentence just above your reply means?

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 17 12:30:01 2023
    On 17/10/2023 11:13, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:39:44 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 16/10/2023 20:56, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 18:29:55 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>

    If it's worth copying it's worthy of protection is how it should be, at >>>> least for a limited period. How much simpler than reinventing the wheel >>>> or trying to work out how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.

    Copyright has never been based on that, either in the UK or anywhere in the >>> world. Why are you proposing such a radical change?

    It's the philosophy that underlies intellectual property rights
    generally,

    No, it isn't. It really isn't. The philosophy which underlies intellectual property rights generally is the principle that authors (and, subsequently, other creators) should have an incentive to create more.

    What incentive? It's not money.

    and the UK Copyright Act as enacted makes a pretty good stab
    at it. But only when it is enforceable as written, as was Parliament's
    intention.

    How do you know what Parliament's intention was?

    From the words it uses of course. If it had any other intention it
    would have used different words.

    What was your role in helping to draft the legislation?

    That's a very silly question.

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 17 12:53:55 2023
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
    certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings.

    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
    meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
    'not construct'.

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
    the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Mark

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 17 12:56:44 2023
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:26:12 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 11:10, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:11:51 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>> On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>> On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
    OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the
    legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable,
    consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable?

    Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be
    the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary
    but obscure and unnatural.

    I asked you, in the bit you decided to delete:

    "What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of >>> 'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?"

    I'll answer that question after you've answered mine. I note that you
    skipped over that, previously.

    But I have. What do you think the sentence just above your reply means?

    It means you didn't answer my questions. Here they are again, separated into two lines:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in
    the OED?

    Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the legislation?

    Mark

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 17 12:59:29 2023
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:30:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 11:13, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:39:44 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
    On 16/10/2023 20:56, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 18:29:55 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>

    If it's worth copying it's worthy of protection is how it should be, at >>>>> least for a limited period. How much simpler than reinventing the wheel >>>>> or trying to work out how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. >>>>
    Copyright has never been based on that, either in the UK or anywhere in the
    world. Why are you proposing such a radical change?

    It's the philosophy that underlies intellectual property rights
    generally,

    No, it isn't. It really isn't. The philosophy which underlies intellectual >> property rights generally is the principle that authors (and, subsequently, >> other creators) should have an incentive to create more.

    What incentive? It's not money.

    Yes, it is. The original point of copyright (or what later became copyright) was to incentivise the creation of original works to create more works, by giving their creators a sole right to financially exploit those works.

    I suggest you spend some time looking at the history of copyright. You might find it educational.

    and the UK Copyright Act as enacted makes a pretty good stab
    at it. But only when it is enforceable as written, as was Parliament's
    intention.

    How do you know what Parliament's intention was?

    From the words it uses of course. If it had any other intention it
    would have used different words.

    And how do you interpret those words?

    What was your role in helping to draft the legislation?

    That's a very silly question.

    Well, of course, the answer to it is "absolutely none at all".

    Mark

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  • From Roger Hayter@21:1/5 to usenet@listmail.good-stuff.co.uk on Tue Oct 17 12:07:57 2023
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 12:53:55 BST, "Mark Goodge" <usenet@listmail.good-stuff.co.uk> wrote:

    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
    certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings.

    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
    meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
    'not construct'.

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
    the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Mark

    No doubt one of the "unnatural" definitions of "construct"!

    --
    Roger Hayter

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  • From Adam Funk@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 17 13:52:13 2023
    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
    certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings.

    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
    meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
    'not construct'.

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
    the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

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  • From Roger Hayter@21:1/5 to Adam Funk on Tue Oct 17 14:21:53 2023
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 13:52:13 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:

    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
    certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>
    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
    meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
    'not construct'.

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
    the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
    grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily
    something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    I suggest you go back and look at the Auriol Gray thread, all several hundred posts of it. And probably a similar number in unnm.


    --
    Roger Hayter

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  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Tue Oct 17 15:51:56 2023
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 18:29:55 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    No question about it when 'original' just meant 'new' as in the UK
    Copyright Act.

    But "original" didn't just mean "new". And your real beef isn't about
    that anyway. It's about whether either term implies an "intellectual
    creation".

    "New" is a requirement for patents, rather than copyright. To be
    patentable, an invention must be new, i.e. not previously known to the
    public.

    "Original" has, and has always had, a slightly different (but often overlapping) meaning. The idea behind a work can be as old as the
    hills, but it must be expressed in a way that is original to the author.
    This expression might not always be very new, as long as it hasn't been
    copied from elsewhere:

    "It is possible for authors and creators to create, have rights in and
    exploit a work very similar to the creation of another author or creator without infringing copyright, as long as the work of another author or
    creator was not copied." https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_909_2016.pdf

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

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  • From Adam Funk@21:1/5 to Roger Hayter on Tue Oct 17 15:45:36 2023
    On 2023-10-17, Roger Hayter wrote:

    On 17 Oct 2023 at 13:52:13 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:

    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>
    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
    certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>>
    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track' >>>>>> meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
    'not construct'.

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
    grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>> something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    I suggest you go back and look at the Auriol Gray thread, all several hundred posts of it. And probably a similar number in unnm.

    For the record, I'm sure Mark is right on this one, but you're making
    me start to regret my curiosity as to why.

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Adam Funk on Tue Oct 17 16:38:00 2023
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:52:13 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:

    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
    the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
    grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily
    something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    No, it's in case law. Which, of course, Norman only accepts when the judges agree with him.

    Mark

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  • From Roger Hayter@21:1/5 to Adam Funk on Tue Oct 17 16:00:46 2023
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 15:45:36 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:

    On 2023-10-17, Roger Hayter wrote:

    On 17 Oct 2023 at 13:52:13 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote: >>
    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>
    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in >>>>>>> certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>>>
    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track' >>>>>>> meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means >>>>> 'not construct'.

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    I suggest you go back and look at the Auriol Gray thread, all several hundred
    posts of it. And probably a similar number in unnm.

    For the record, I'm sure Mark is right on this one, but you're making
    me start to regret my curiosity as to why.

    I'm sure his right too; but if we start talking about we will be swamped by hecklers. And the discussion didn't change any minds last time.

    --
    Roger Hayter

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  • From Adam Funk@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 17 18:43:55 2023
    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:52:13 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:

    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
    grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>> something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to >>involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    No, it's in case law. Which, of course, Norman only accepts when the judges agree with him.

    OK, thanks.

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  • From Adam Funk@21:1/5 to Roger Hayter on Tue Oct 17 18:44:16 2023
    On 2023-10-17, Roger Hayter wrote:

    On 17 Oct 2023 at 15:45:36 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:

    On 2023-10-17, Roger Hayter wrote:

    On 17 Oct 2023 at 13:52:13 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote: >>>
    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in >>>>>>>> certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>>>>
    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track' >>>>>>>> meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means >>>>>> 'not construct'.

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    I suggest you go back and look at the Auriol Gray thread, all several hundred
    posts of it. And probably a similar number in unnm.

    For the record, I'm sure Mark is right on this one, but you're making
    me start to regret my curiosity as to why.

    I'm sure his right too; but if we start talking about we will be swamped by hecklers. And the discussion didn't change any minds last time.

    OK, if that happens, I apologize in advance!

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 17 14:55:24 2023
    On 17/10/2023 12:59, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:30:01 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 17/10/2023 11:13, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:39:44 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>> On 16/10/2023 20:56, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 18:29:55 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    If it's worth copying it's worthy of protection is how it should be, at >>>>>> least for a limited period. How much simpler than reinventing the wheel >>>>>> or trying to work out how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. >>>>>
    Copyright has never been based on that, either in the UK or anywhere in the
    world. Why are you proposing such a radical change?

    It's the philosophy that underlies intellectual property rights
    generally,

    No, it isn't. It really isn't. The philosophy which underlies intellectual >>> property rights generally is the principle that authors (and, subsequently, >>> other creators) should have an incentive to create more.

    What incentive? It's not money.

    Yes, it is. The original point of copyright (or what later became copyright) was to incentivise the creation of original works to create more works, by giving their creators a sole right to financially exploit those works.

    That's not an incentive to create more. It's in fact an incentive to
    use his time not on further creation but on commercial exploitation of
    what he has already.

    Successful exploitation may be an incentive (or even a necessity) to
    produce more, but not the copyright itself.

    I suggest you spend some time looking at the history of copyright. You might find it educational.

    I doubt it.

    and the UK Copyright Act as enacted makes a pretty good stab
    at it. But only when it is enforceable as written, as was Parliament's >>>> intention.

    How do you know what Parliament's intention was?

    From the words it uses of course. If it had any other intention it
    would have used different words.

    And how do you interpret those words?

    What was your role in helping to draft the legislation?

    That's a very silly question.

    Well, of course, the answer to it is "absolutely none at all".

    It's knowing the answer that made it a very silly question.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 17 15:01:37 2023
    On 17/10/2023 12:53, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
    certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings.

    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
    meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
    'not construct'.

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
    the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Which is precisely why we've been having a lengthy discussion here about Statutory interpretation and the literal rule that requires words in an
    Act to have their plain, literal and ordinary meanings. Not something
    abstruse from a different planet, not something that makes no sense in
    context, and certainly not something that means the opposite of what it
    says.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 17 15:04:27 2023
    On 17/10/2023 12:56, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:26:12 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 11:10, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:11:51 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>> On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
    OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the >>>>>>> legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable,
    consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable? >>>>
    Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be >>>> the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary >>>> but obscure and unnatural.

    I asked you, in the bit you decided to delete:

    "What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of >>>> 'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?"

    I'll answer that question after you've answered mine. I note that you
    skipped over that, previously.

    But I have. What do you think the sentence just above your reply means?

    It means you didn't answer my questions. Here they are again, separated into two lines:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in
    the OED?

    Nope, nor is it relevant. If you disagree, you'll have to make your own points.

    Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the legislation?

    They're what I said only a few lines above.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Roger Hayter on Tue Oct 17 15:05:35 2023
    On 17/10/2023 13:07, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 12:53:55 BST, "Mark Goodge" <usenet@listmail.good-stuff.co.uk> wrote:

    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
    certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>
    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
    meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
    'not construct'.

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
    the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
    grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily
    something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Mark

    No doubt one of the "unnatural" definitions of "construct"!

    Hard to see it any other way when it refers to 'construct a cycle track'.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Adam Funk on Tue Oct 17 15:07:11 2023
    On 17/10/2023 13:52, Adam Funk wrote:
    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    >>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in
    certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>
    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track'
    meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means
    'not construct'.

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of
    the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
    grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily
    something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    No, but that's not necessary. There is only one reasonable applicable definition.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Tue Oct 17 16:09:19 2023
    On 17/10/2023 15:51, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 18:29:55 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    On 16/10/2023 17:12, Tim Jackson wrote:
    Something I hadn't previously considered is that while CJEU
    decisions
    require "intellectual creation" as part of the test for originality, it
    is a uniform test.
    So in some respects, e.g. for sculptures and works of artistic
    craftsmanship, this might actually *lower* the UK's previous
    requirements:

    "This judgment has opened a potential can of worms for UK
    copyright. Under the current CDPA, certain types of copyright
    work have other requirements in addition to originality in
    order to acquire copyright protection."

    Indeed. Copyright law is in a right muddle due in no small part to
    European judges meddling in things they don't understand but feel they
    should control, and it desperately needs root and branch reform.

    A good illustration of what a mess it's in is actually over sculptures
    and what various judges have felt constrained, variously, to hold them
    to be. See for example this excellent review:

    https://www.york.ac.uk/media/law/yorklawreview/vol1/COOMBS%20YLR%20SPRING%202020%20V1%20FINAL.pdf

    This is the Star Wars Stormtrooper helmet case referred to in the
    Bristow's article I quoted above, where they say the CJEU Cofemel
    decision opened a can of worms for UK copyright.

    However, that Stormtrooper muddle was not caused by European law. It
    was entirely caused by domestic UK law. The only reference in the case
    to European law was a question about whether the English courts should
    have been hearing it at all.

    The reason it's a can of worms is because it forces a rethink of the
    previous UK muddle. Had the English court applied the uniform CJEU
    test, "author's own intellectual creation", the muddle would have been eliminated. It would have lowered the test for copyright in
    Stormtrooper helmets, so that it only required the author's own
    intellectual creation, not the higher muddled UK standard.

    So would 'new', and even simpler.

    Copyright law is now an absolute mess.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Adam Funk on Tue Oct 17 16:48:38 2023
    On 17/10/2023 15:45, Adam Funk wrote:
    On 2023-10-17, Roger Hayter wrote:

    On 17 Oct 2023 at 13:52:13 BST, "Adam Funk" <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote: >>
    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:24:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>
    On 17/10/2023 11:43, Roger Hayter wrote:
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 09:45:24 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>>>> On 16/10/2023 23:04, Roger Hayter wrote:

    An "unnatural" meaning of a word is a worrying concept in many ways. Are you
    personally going to be responsible for telling courts when they have picked an
    unnatural definition of a word?

    We've had arguments here before over the meaning of words used in >>>>>>> certain Acts, and some have argued for extremely unnatural meanings. >>>>>>>
    Perhaps you recall Mr Parker arguing that 'construct a cycle track' >>>>>>> meant not constructing one at all?

    A good example; he was right and you were wrong.

    Of course! How silly of me not to appreciate that 'construct' means >>>>> 'not construct'.

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    I suggest you go back and look at the Auriol Gray thread, all several hundred
    posts of it. And probably a similar number in unnm.

    For the record, I'm sure Mark is right on this one, but you're making
    me start to regret my curiosity as to why.

    I think that's absolutely bizarre.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 17 16:49:14 2023
    On 17/10/2023 16:38, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:52:13 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:

    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a
    grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>> something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    No, it's in case law. Which, of course, Norman only accepts when the judges agree with him.

    Please cite it.

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 17 20:07:52 2023
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 15:04:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 12:56, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:26:12 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>
    On 17/10/2023 11:10, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:11:51 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>>> On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
    OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the >>>>>>>> legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable, >>>>>>> consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable? >>>>>
    Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be >>>>> the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary >>>>> but obscure and unnatural.

    I asked you, in the bit you decided to delete:

    "What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of >>>>> 'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?"

    I'll answer that question after you've answered mine. I note that you
    skipped over that, previously.

    But I have. What do you think the sentence just above your reply means?

    It means you didn't answer my questions. Here they are again, separated into >> two lines:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in >> the OED?

    Nope

    Fine, I'll accept your admission that you're unable to answer my points.

    Mark

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 17 20:09:06 2023
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 14:55:24 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 12:59, Mark Goodge wrote:

    I suggest you spend some time looking at the history of copyright. You might >> find it educational.

    I doubt it.

    That is at least an honest answer.

    Mark

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  • From Roger Hayter@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 17 19:14:17 2023
    On 17 Oct 2023 at 16:49:14 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 16:38, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:52:13 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote: >>
    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    No, it's in case law. Which, of course, Norman only accepts when the judges >> agree with him.

    Please cite it.

    Please don't. We've really, really exhausted this topic very recently.

    --
    Roger Hayter

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  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 17 20:24:14 2023
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 16:49:14 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 16:38, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:52:13 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote: >>
    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    No, it's in case law. Which, of course, Norman only accepts when the judges >> agree with him.

    Please cite it.

    It was mentioned in the thread previously referred to. If you really want
    the precise cite, you can look it up just as easily as I can.

    Mark

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 17 22:01:51 2023
    On 17/10/2023 20:24, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 16:49:14 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 16:38, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 13:52:13 +0100, Adam Funk <a24061a@ducksburg.com> wrote:

    On 2023-10-17, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Well, what he actually pointed out was that "construct" in the context of >>>>> the legislation has much the same meaning as it does in, for example, a >>>>> grammatical construction, or a logical construction, and not necessarily >>>>> something which requires getting the diggers out.

    Just out of curiosity (and to be clear, not because I think it has to
    involve diggers), is there something in that statute or another
    relevant one that defines "construct" for this purpose?

    No, it's in case law. Which, of course, Norman only accepts when the judges >>> agree with him.

    Please cite it.

    It was mentioned in the thread previously referred to. If you really want
    the precise cite, you can look it up just as easily as I can.

    No, you raised it, you support it. You see, I don't think you can.

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  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Tue Oct 17 22:02:54 2023
    On 17/10/2023 20:07, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 15:04:27 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 17/10/2023 12:56, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Tue, 17 Oct 2023 12:26:12 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote: >>>
    On 17/10/2023 11:10, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 22:11:51 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 20:51, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Mon, 16 Oct 2023 19:10:21 +0100, Norman Wells <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 18:45, Mark Goodge wrote:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in the
    OED? Do you know which of them was intended by the authors of the >>>>>>>>> legislation?

    The number isn't relevant. It's only those that are reasonable, >>>>>>>> consistent, plain, literal and ordinary.

    Why do you think that some of the OED's definitions are unreasonable? >>>>>>
    Because some of them in context won't make any sense, some will even be >>>>>> the wrong part of speech, and some won't be plain, literal or ordinary >>>>>> but obscure and unnatural.

    I asked you, in the bit you decided to delete:

    "What definitions from the OED do you say apply in the interpretation of >>>>>> 'original work', if not 'new' and 'a product of labour'?"

    I'll answer that question after you've answered mine. I note that you >>>>> skipped over that, previously.

    But I have. What do you think the sentence just above your reply means? >>>
    It means you didn't answer my questions. Here they are again, separated into
    two lines:

    Do you know how many definitions the words "original" and "work" have in
    the OED?

    Nope

    Fine, I'll accept your admission that you're unable to answer my points.

    How many doesn't matter in the slightest.

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  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Sat Oct 21 18:53:46 2023
    On Sun, 15 Oct 2023 09:32:33 +0100, Martin Brown wrote...

    Not quite. It is clear cut absolutely yours if the image was taken by an employee *directly* employed by you.

    However, if you hire a professional photographer then the image
    copyright remains with them or the company that they work for by default unless you agree otherwise in advance (or later buy out the copyright).

    It makes no difference who owns the copyright provided that you only use
    the image for the purpose it was taken. It only becomes a big issue if
    the image has significant commercial value and you sell it elsewhere.
    (such images are rare but not incredibly so)

    Same applies to wedding photographers although most people are unaware -
    they retain the image copyright even though you commissioned the work.

    Sorry to come back rather late, but while looking for something else I
    just came across this more detailed confirmation of what you say.

    https://www.gov.uk/guidance/ownership-of-copyright-works

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

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  • From Simon Parker@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 24 12:07:26 2023
    On 17/10/2023 09:39, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 22:36, Fredxx wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 19:10, Norman Wells wrote:

    Why are you concerned just with cases that go to appeal?  The lower
    courts have to decide such things too where necessary.

    I can see where your going wrong. Where a case does go to an upper
    court then precedents are made from those interpretation and meaning
    of words.

    No, that's 'binding' precedents.  All court decisions are precedents,

    "All court decisions are precedents", you say?

    "*All* court decisions"?

    I have to assume you were absent when the hierarchy of courts and the
    doctrine of precedent was being discussed at law school as neither the Magistrates' Court nor the County Court have the power to set precedent
    nor can they overrule precedent set in previous cases.


    but the lower courts' decisions are not binding so they don't have to be followed.  Nevertheless, it's not a free-for-all with all the lower
    courts reinventing the wheel and deciding the same point willy-nilly and however they want if it comes before them.  They will consider the
    decisions in similar level courts and will attempt to reconcile their
    own decisions with those of other courts however they can.

    Sometimes those definitions change and don't follow your dictionary
    definitions.

    Then, in the words of Lord Simmons I've referred to previously, it is:

    "a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise
    of interpretation".

    Be that as it may, your understanding of Statutory Interpretation
    remains mistaken.

    Perhaps it will help if I provide two sample cases and post selected
    snippets from the judgments to enable you to see how the process works,
    so you can see that it is nothing like you think it is. (Free clue: in
    neither case is a dictionary consulted.)

    The first case is Regina v Secretary of State for Health (Respondent) ex
    parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) (Appellant) [2003]
    UKHL 13 [1]

    The decision before the court was, as Lord Bingham of Cornhill explained
    in paragraph [1] of the judgment:

    "1. The issues in this appeal are whether live human embryos created by
    cell nuclear replacement (CNR) fall outside the regulatory scope of the
    Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and whether licensing the
    creation of such embryos is prohibited by section 3(3)(d) of that Act."

    In short, the case would turn on the precise meaning of word "embryo".
    You believe that they need merely lookup the word "embryo" in a
    dictionary, determine whether or not the CNR process creates something
    that meets that definition and the judgment will follow therefrom.

    But let us look at what they actually did.

    For background, the appellant, acting on behalf of the pressure group
    Pro-Life, argued before the House of Lords that because CNR was a new
    process it was not covered by the 1990 Act and therefore the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority did not have the authority under
    the Act to licence research involving CNR. It pointed out
    that in s1 of the Act an embryo regulated by the Act is defined as 'a
    live human embryo where fertilisation is complete' and that CNR does not involve a process of fertilisation.

    It should be noted, before continuing, that the House of Lords applied
    the purposive approach to interpreting the Act and explained why they
    had done so.

    Selected text from the judgment with paragraph numbers shown:

    LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL

    8. The basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to
    the true meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be
    construed. But that is not to say that attention should be confined and
    a literal interpretation given to the particular provisions which give
    rise to difficulty. Such an approach not only encourages immense
    prolixity in drafting, since the draftsman will feel obliged to provide expressly for every contingency which may possibly arise. It may also
    (under the banner of loyalty to the will of Parliament) lead to the
    frustration of that will, because undue concentration on the minutiae of
    the enactment may lead the court to neglect the purpose which Parliament intended to achieve when it enacted the statute. Every statute other
    than a pure consolidating statute is, after all, enacted to make some
    change, or address some problem, or remove some blemish, or effect some improvement in the national life. The court's task, within the
    permissible bounds of interpretation, is to give effect to Parliament's purpose. So the controversial provisions should be read in the context
    of the statute as a whole, and the statute as a whole should be read in
    the historical context of the situation which led to its enactment.

    9. There is, I think, no inconsistency between the rule that
    statutory language retains the meaning it had when Parliament used it
    and the rule that a statute is always speaking. If Parliament, however
    long ago, passed an Act applicable to dogs, it could not properly be interpreted to apply to cats; but it could properly be held to apply to
    animals which were not regarded as dogs when the Act was passed but are
    so regarded now. The meaning of "cruel and unusual punishments" has not
    changed over the years since 1689, but many punishments which were not
    then thought to fall within that category would now be held to do so.
    The courts have frequently had to grapple with the question whether a
    modern invention or activity falls within old statutory language: see
    Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 4th ed (2002) Part XVIII, Section
    288. A revealing example is found in Grant v Southwestern and County
    Properties Ltd [1975] Ch 185, where Walton J had to decide whether a
    tape recording fell within the expression "document" in the Rules of the Supreme Court. Pointing out (page 190) that the furnishing of
    information had been treated as one of the main functions of a document,
    the judge concluded that the tape recording was a document.

    10. Limited help is in my opinion to be derived from statements
    made in cases where there is said to be an omission in a statute
    attributable to the oversight or inadvertence of the draftsman: see
    Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980] AC 74 at 105; Inco Europe
    Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586. This is not such a
    case. More pertinent is the guidance given by the late Lord Wilberforce
    in his dissenting opinion in Royal College of Nursing of the United
    Kingdom v Department of Health and Social Security [1981] AC 800. The
    case concerned the Abortion Act 1967 and the issue which divided the
    House was whether nurses could lawfully take part in a termination
    procedure not known when the Act was passed. At page 822 Lord
    Wilberforce said:

    "In interpreting an Act of Parliament it is proper, and indeed
    necessary, to have regard to the state of affairs existing, and known by Parliament to be existing, at the time. It is a fair presumption that Parliament's policy or intention is directed to that state of affairs.
    Leaving aside cases of omission by inadvertence, this being not such a
    case, when a new state of affairs, or a fresh set of facts bearing on
    policy, comes into existence, the courts have to consider whether they
    fall within the Parliamentary intention. They may be held to do so, if
    they fall within the same genus of facts as those to which the expressed
    policy has been formulated. They may also be held to do so if there can
    be detected a clear purpose in the legislation which can only be
    fulfilled if the extension is made. How liberally these principles may
    be applied must depend upon the nature of the enactment, and the
    strictness or otherwise of the words in which it has been expressed. The
    courts should be less willing to extend expressed meanings if it is
    clear that the Act in question was designed to be restrictive or
    circumscribed in its operation rather than liberal or permissive. They
    will be much less willing to do so where the subject matter is different
    in kind or dimension from that for which the legislation was passed. In
    any event there is one course which the courts cannot take, under the
    law of this country; they cannot fill gaps; they cannot by asking the
    question 'What would Parliament have done in this current case - not
    being one in contemplation - if the facts had been before it?' attempt themselves to supply the answer, if the answer is not to be found in the
    terms of the Act itself."

    Both parties relied on this passage, which may now be treated as
    authoritative. Mr Gordon QC for the Alliance submitted that the Court of
    Appeal had fallen into error by asking the question which Lord
    Wilberforce said should not be asked, and by themselves supplying the
    answer.

    ...

    Section 1(1)(a)

    14. It is against this background that one comes to interpret
    section 1(1)(a). At first reading Mr Gordon's construction has an
    obvious attraction: the Act is dealing with live human embryos "where fertilisation is complete", and the definition is a composite one
    including the last four words. But the Act is only directed to the
    creation of embryos in vitro, outside the human body (section 1(2)). Can Parliament have been intending to distinguish between live human embryos produced by fertilisation of a female egg and live human embryos
    produced without such fertilisation? The answer must certainly be
    negative, since Parliament was unaware that the latter alternative was physically possible. This suggests that the four words were not intended
    to form an integral part of the definition of embryo but were directed
    to the time at which it should be treated as such. This was the view
    taken by the judge (in paragraph 62 of his judgment) and by the Court of
    Appeal (paragraphs 29, 53, 58) and I agree with it. The somewhat
    marginal importance of the four words is in my opinion indicated by the
    fact that section 1(1)(b) appears to contradict them. The crucial point, strongly relied on by Mr Parker QC in his compelling argument, is that
    this was an Act passed for the protection of live human embryos created
    outside the human body. The essential thrust of section 1(1)(a) was
    directed to such embryos, not to the manner of their creation, which
    Parliament (entirely understandably on the then current state of
    scientific knowledge) took for granted.

    15. Bearing in mind the constitutional imperative that the courts
    stick to their interpretative role and do not assume the mantle of
    legislators, however, I would not leave the matter there but would seek
    to apply the guidance of Lord Wilberforce quoted above in paragraph 10:

    (1) Does the creation of live human embryos by CNR fall within the same
    genus of facts as those to which the expressed policy of Parliament has
    been formulated? In my opinion, it plainly does. An embryo created by in
    vitro fertilisation and one created by CNR are very similar organisms.
    The difference between them as organisms is that the CNR embryo, if
    allowed to develop, will grow into a clone of the donor of the
    replacement nucleus which the embryo produced by fertilisation will not.
    But this is a difference which plainly points towards the need for
    regulation, not against it.

    (2) Is the operation of the 1990 Act to be regarded as liberal and
    permissive in its operation or restrictive and circumscribed? This is
    not an entirely simple question. The Act intended to permit certain
    activities but to circumscribe the freedom to pursue them which had
    previously been enjoyed. Loyalty to the evident purpose of the Act would require regulation of activities not distinguishable in any significant
    respect from those regulated by the Act, unless the wording or policy of
    the Act shows that they should be prohibited.

    (3) Is the embryo created by CNR different in kind or dimension from
    that for which the Act was passed? Plainly not: as already pointed out,
    the organisms in question are, as organisms, very similar.

    While it is impermissible to ask what Parliament would have done if the
    facts had been before it, there is one important question which may
    permissibly be asked: it is whether Parliament, faced with the taxing
    task of enacting a legislative solution to the difficult religious,
    moral and scientific issues mentioned above, could rationally have
    intended to leave live human embryos created by CNR outside the scope of regulation had it known of them as a scientific possibility. There is
    only one possible answer to this question and it is negative.

    ...

    19. For these reasons I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

    LORD STEYN

    Purposive Interpretation

    21. In reaching a conclusion that cell nuclear replacement is a
    process covered by section 1(1) of the Human Fertilisation and
    Embryology Act 1990 the Court of Appeal adopted a purposive approach:
    para 27. The extensive interpretation adopted by the Court of Appeal
    could only be justified by a purposive approach. It was a necessary step
    in the reasoning of the Court of Appeal but not a sufficient one. The
    Court of Appeal found the basis for such an approach in the fact that
    the Human Rights Act 1998 extended "the boundaries of purposive interpretation…where needs must". Given that the 1998 Act is not
    applicable in the present case I would accept the submission of counsel
    for the appellant that this approach is not appropriate. On the other
    hand, the adoption of a purposive approach to construction of statutes generally, and the 1990 Act in particular, is amply justified on wider
    grounds. In Cabell v Markham (1945) 148 F 2d 737 Justice Learned Hand
    explained the merits of purposive interpretation, at p 739:

    "Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense,
    are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of
    interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to
    remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish,
    whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning."

    The pendulum has swung towards purposive methods of construction. This
    change was not initiated by the teleological approach of European
    Community jurisprudence, and the influence of European legal culture
    generally, but it has been accelerated by European ideas: see, however,
    a classic early statement of the purposive approach by Lord Blackburn in
    River Wear Commissioners v Adamson (1877) 2 App Cas 743, 763. In any
    event, nowadays the shift towards purposive interpretation is not in
    doubt. The qualification is that the degree of liberality permitted is influenced by the context, eg social welfare legislation and tax
    statutes may have to be approached somewhat differently. For these
    slightly different reasons I agree with the conclusion of the Court of
    Appeal that section 1(1) of the 1990 Act must be construed in a
    purposive way.
    <end quotes>

    (I recommend that anyone interested in Statutory Interpretation read the
    whole judgment but have selected these paragraphs as they show the
    process in action.)

    However, that is not to say that the Purposive Approach is always correct.

    In a more recent case involving the interpretation of the Human
    Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 the House of Lords refused to take
    a purposive approach to interpreting the statute.

    I therefore give you Quintavalle (on behalf of Comment on Reproductive
    Ethics) (Appellant) v Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (Respondents) [2005] UKHL 28 [2]:

    LORD HOFFMANN

    [32] Lord Wilberforce's remarks provided valuable assistance to the
    House in R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC
    687. The question there was whether the definition of an embryo in the
    1990 Act, which contemplated that it would be created by fertilisation, extended to embryos created by cell nuclear replacement in an
    unfertilised egg. This was a method of creating embryos which was not contemplated at the time of the Act and the language of the definition
    was to some extent inappropriate to describe it, but the House
    nevertheless held that the policy of the Act was to regulate the use of
    embryos however created. The House followed Lord Wilberforce's guidance
    in holding that there was a "clear purpose in the legislation" which
    could "only be fulfilled if the extension [was] made".

    [33] But, like all guidance on construction, Lord Wilberforce's remarks
    are more appropriate to some cases than others. This is not a case in
    which one starts with the presumption that Parliament's intention was
    directed to the state of affairs existing at the time of the Act. It
    obviously intended to regulate research and treatment which were not
    possible at the time. Nor is it a case, like the first Quintavalle case,
    in which the statutory language needs to be extended beyond the
    "expressed meaning". The word "suitable" is an empty vessel which is
    filled with meaning by context and background. Nor is it helpful in this
    case to ask whether some new state of affairs falls within "the same
    genus" as those to which the expressed policy has been formulated. That
    would beg the question because the dispute is precisely over what the
    genus is. If "suitability" has the meaning for which the authority
    contends, then plainly PGD and HLA typing fall within it. If not, then
    not. Finally, Lord Wilberforce's recommendation of caution in the
    construction of statutes concerning controversial subjects "involving
    moral and social judgments on which opinions strongly differ" would be
    very much to the point if everything which the Act did not forbid was permitted. It has much less force when the question is whether or not
    the authority has power to authorise it.

    LORD BROWN OF EATON-UNDER-HEYWOOD

    [43] The ethical questions raised by such a process are, it need hardly
    be stated, profound. Should genetic testing be used to enable a choice
    to be made between a number of healthy embryos, a choice based on the
    selection of certain preferred genetic characteristics? Is it acceptable
    to follow a procedure resulting in the birth of a child designed to
    secure the health of a sibling and necessarily therefore intended to
    donate tissue (including perhaps bone marrow) to that sibling? Is this
    straying into the field of "designer babies" or, as the celebrated
    geneticist, Lord Winston, has put it, "treating the offspring to be born
    as a commodity?" These are just some of the questions prompted by this litigation. But troubling though such questions are, the arguments are certainly not all one way, as may be demonstrated by the facts of this
    very case.

    <end quotes>

    Both cases demonstrate that there is no "one size fits all" nor is there
    a hierarchy (as erroneously claimed) nor even a particular rule that
    must always be followed regardless.

    Each case is decided on its own merits and the most appropriate guidance
    on interpretation will be used to reach the correct decision. That
    might be the literal rule, or it might not.

    To insist the literal rule must be used in all cases by all courts is a
    fiction of your own devising and, as I've said numerous times,
    frequently leads you astray in your mistaken understanding of
    interpretation.


    The lower courts generally follow those cases and often form part of
    the argument in the lower court.

    Binding precedents have to be followed.  It's what the term means.

    Hopefully you can see that blindly following dictionary definitions
    isn't always very helpful when it comes to case law. Assuming you
    understand the importance of case law?

    The literal rule of Statutory interpretation is well established and has
    to be followed.

    Oh no it doesn't.


    Judges are not free to amend the law by changing the
    clear intention of Parliament expressed in the words it used.

    We are a common law jurisdiction. Judges are well within their
    capabilities and rights to clarify the law with case law. The cases
    I've highlighted herein are perfect examples of this.

    I hope you take the time to read and understand the text I've taken the
    time to select from the above judgments, which I've also taken time to
    select.

    If you do, then you have a chance of beginning to understand the process
    of interpretation.

    However, if you insist on sticking to your dogmatic use of the literal
    rule then I am not sure that I can assist you further in coming to a
    correct understanding of the process.

    Regards

    S.P.

    [1] https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2003/13.html
    [2] https://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2005/28.html

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Simon Parker@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 24 11:59:58 2023
    On 10/10/2023 08:48, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 23:03, Simon Parker wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 14:05, Norman Wells wrote:

    I don't think that's a definition of 'original' either.  Not
    according to any of the dictionaries I've seen anyway.

    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean,
    mean what they say, and only be altered by legislators.  Don't you?

    You are repeating the mistake you frequently make.

    This is uk.legal.moderated.  Alt.English.Usage is over there ----->.

    There's no mistake.

    I'll confidently wager that you will repeat the mistake at least once
    more before the end of this post...


    Laws are written in language to be understood, not
    as a starting point for successive iterations like the game of changing
    BLACK into WHITE in six easy steps, which is what has happened.

    In your opinion. Which isn't always correct; rather it is frequently
    mistaken.


    It's a fundamental principle of legal construction in the UK that laws
    mean what they say in the ordinary English in which they are expressed.

    I invite you to quote section 72 of the Highway Act 1835 - a piece of legislation we considered here in ULM recently and then tell me where in
    the UK you were, precisely, when you overheard "ordinary English" being expressed in the manner used in that legislation.

    As this more than ably demonstrates, language changes. If it didn't, no
    new dictionaries would have been produced since 1835.


    They're supposed to tell people what they must not do, you see, without having to guess that they might some way down the line mean something
    else entirely or even the opposite.

    The UK operates a common law system meaning the courts can develop the
    law when a court of record clarifies the law thereby setting a precedent
    for other courts to follow or apply in later cases.

    The system neither asks for nor needs your agreement. It has been
    working fine for centuries. If you don't like that system, you need to consider moving elsewhere as I am not aware of any plans to change it regardless of which government is in power.


    The word 'original' is that which is used in the UK legislation.  It properly falls to be interpreted as that word is ordinarily used in the English language, for which the definitive works are what are called dictionaries.

    And there's the mistake right there. That is not the test applied when determining the meaning of legislation, as has been explained to you
    numerous times by multiple posters, myself included.

    I've quoted them before but here are the words of paragraph 11-01 from
    'Bennion on Statutory Interpretation', (8th edition (2020)).

    <quote>
    i) The primary indication of legislative intention is the legislative
    text, read in context;

    ii) Parliament is assumed to be a rational, reasonable and informed
    legislature pursuing a clear purpose in a coherent and principled
    manner; and

    iii) The rules, principles, presumptions and canons which govern
    statutory interpretation are aids to construing the legislative text.
    <end quote>

    Please point to the part where it says that dictionaries, and only dictionaries, must be used when determining legislative intention.

    If it isn't in that paragraph, perhaps you have a different paragraph
    from Bennion's in mind?

    Which paragraph number please so I may consult it for myself to ensure
    it states what you claim.

    Or perhaps you had a source more authoritative than Bennion's in mind?
    If so, please do let me know what source you have in mind and I'll see
    if we have a copy when I'm next in chambers.


    It follows that, if the meaning of the word is in any doubt,
    dictionaries will have to be consulted.

    It doesn't follow, at all. In case you missed it first time around
    ("the first time" in this post - it has been quoted several times
    previously), "The rules, principles, presumptions and canons which
    govern statutory interpretation are aids to construing the legislative
    text."

    Rules - plural, not just the one, the literal rule, which you insist
    must be used in all situations and at all times - are only part of the
    decision making arsenal at the disposal of the judges. There are
    "principles, presumptions and canons" too. But even then, such things
    are merely "aids to construing the legislative text."

    In short, the literal rule isn't a rule at all, it is an aid and by no
    means the only one or even the most important one.

    Unless you are going to claim that Bennion's is wrong?

    You're not going to claim that, are you?


    And if you do that you find
    what is obvious anyway to anyone who speaks the language that it means essentially 'the first one', and that's all.

    You will look in vain for any definition that refers to 'own
    intellectual creation' which in any case has seemingly had to be derived
    from 'originality' rather than 'original' which is the word used in the legislation.  It's a bit of a giveaway that misinterpretation is at hand.


    I'm not a judge. I don't get to determine legislative intention. So I
    don't need to look, therefore your suggestion that I will be looking in
    vain is mistaken.

    The meaning of the phrase at issue has already been clarified in law.
    I've even given you the case name so you can look it up for yourself.

    If you don't agree with that clarification you need to..., ah..., you
    can..., well..., this is awkward.

    It is my sad duty to inform you that there is precisely nothing you can
    do about it.

    You can pontificate here until the cows come home and you can insist
    that the learned judges were wrong, even going so far as to provide a
    list of reasons as to why you think they were wrong.

    But, and this is the important part, their decision stands regardless of
    anything you have to say on the matter here or indeed anywhere else.
    Your thoughts are of no consequence whatsoever.


    "The author's own intellectual creation" is a legal phrase which Tim
    kindly placed in quotes, I believe, to indicate such.

    You could do worse than obtain no more than the briefest understanding
    of "The Infopaq Case" (Ed: do you see what I've done with that phrase
    there?) [1] to clarify matters for you which will, it is hoped, assist
    you in understanding where you have misdirected yourself.

    Once you have grasped the point that "the author's own intellectual
    creation" applies to all Berne Convention "works" under the European
    acquis, then I would recommend moving on to SAS v World Programming in
    which the courts helpfully explicated the "intellectual creation" test
    thus:

    "The essence of the term is that the person in question has exercised
    expressive and creative choices in producing the work.  The more
    restricted the choices, the less likely it is that the product will be
    the intellectual creation (or the expression of the intellectual
    creation) of the person who produced it."

    I trust this assists you in coming to a better, more accurate
    understanding of the matter.

    The Berne Convention actually says that 'the expression “literary and artistic works” shall include every production in the literary,
    scientific and artistic domain'.

    There is no reference there either to 'own intellectual creation'.  It
    is 'every production'.

    Oh dear! And here's mistake number two.

    I'm not sure I can spell it out more clearly but "The Infopaq Case"
    clarified the law and the phrase "the author's own intellection
    creation" thereafter applies to all "works" protected by the Berne
    Convention under the European acquis.

    Again, you may not like this. You may not agree with it. Your options
    remain the same as detailed above. There is nothing you can do about it
    and your thoughts on the matter are of no consequence whatsoever.


    As always, I'm happy to help where I can but have been busy of late
    and haven't been posting as much as I would have liked.

    I am of course aware how the case law has developed.  What you don't
    seem able to comprehend is what a wrong path it has followed. 'Original'
    no longer means what it says.  And that's a fundamental misinterpretation.
    In your opinion. And if you were a senior judge that had been asked to
    sit on a relevant case, your opinion might matter.

    But you're not, you haven't and it doesn't.

    Regards

    S.P.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Simon Parker on Tue Oct 24 14:52:02 2023
    On 24/10/2023 11:59, Simon Parker wrote:
    On 10/10/2023 08:48, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 23:03, Simon Parker wrote:
    On 09/10/2023 14:05, Norman Wells wrote:

    I don't think that's a definition of 'original' either.  Not
    according to any of the dictionaries I've seen anyway.

    Call me old-fashioned, but I think laws should say what they mean,
    mean what they say, and only be altered by legislators.  Don't you?

    You are repeating the mistake you frequently make.

    This is uk.legal.moderated.  Alt.English.Usage is over there ----->.

    There's no mistake.

    I'll confidently wager that you will repeat the mistake at least once
    more before the end of this post...

    Laws are written in language to be understood, not as a starting point
    for successive iterations like the game of changing BLACK into WHITE
    in six easy steps, which is what has happened.

    In your opinion.  Which isn't always correct; rather it is frequently mistaken.

    It's a fundamental principle of legal construction in the UK that laws
    mean what they say in the ordinary English in which they are expressed.

    I invite you to quote section 72 of the Highway Act 1835 - a piece of legislation we considered here in ULM recently and then tell me where in
    the UK you were, precisely, when you overheard "ordinary English" being expressed in the manner used in that legislation.

    What is it exactly you do not understand in that Section? If you say,
    perhaps I can help you out because I find it eminently understandable
    even though it is nearly 200 years old.

    As this more than ably demonstrates, language changes.  If it didn't, no
    new dictionaries would have been produced since 1835.

    In what significant way are you saying the language has changed so as to
    alter the meaning of S72 between then and now?

    They're supposed to tell people what they must not do, you see,
    without having to guess that they might some way down the line mean
    something else entirely or even the opposite.

    The UK operates a common law system meaning the courts can develop the
    law when a court of record clarifies the law thereby setting a precedent
    for other courts to follow or apply in later cases.

    Not willy-nilly. Where there is Statute law, courts cannot alter it but
    merely explain its 'true' construction within the confines of words used
    in it that actually need interpretation. Anything else is
    misinterpretation.

    The system neither asks for nor needs your agreement.  It has been
    working fine for centuries.  If you don't like that system, you need to consider moving elsewhere as I am not aware of any plans to change it regardless of which government is in power.

    Who suggested anything of the sort? Not me.

    The word 'original' is that which is used in the UK legislation.  It
    properly falls to be interpreted as that word is ordinarily used in
    the English language, for which the definitive works are what are
    called dictionaries.

    And there's the mistake right there.  That is not the test applied when determining the meaning of legislation, as has been explained to you
    numerous times by multiple posters, myself included.

    The literal test is the first and primary test. It is only where that
    gives rise to logical difficulties that the other tests may be employed.

    I've quoted them before but here are the words of paragraph 11-01 from 'Bennion on Statutory Interpretation', (8th edition (2020)).

    <quote>
    i) The primary indication of legislative intention is the legislative
    text, read in context;

    ie the Literal Rule.

    ii) Parliament is assumed to be a rational, reasonable and informed legislature pursuing a clear purpose in a coherent and principled
    manner;

    ie, if the Literal Rule works without logical difficulties, that's all
    that's necessary

    and

    iii) The rules, principles, presumptions and canons which govern
    statutory interpretation are aids to construing the legislative text.
    <end quote>

    Quite. The Literal Rule being first and foremost among them.

    Please point to the part where it says that dictionaries, and only dictionaries, must be used when determining legislative intention.

    Since I never said that, no. But they're jolly useful nevertheless.

    It follows that, if the meaning of the word is in any doubt,
    dictionaries will have to be consulted.

    It doesn't follow, at all.  In case you missed it first time around
    ("the first time" in this post - it has been quoted several times previously), "The rules, principles, presumptions and canons which
    govern statutory interpretation are aids to construing the legislative
    text."

    Please quote the "rules, principles, presumptions and canons" you mean
    that you think apply, and say in which order and when you stop.

    Rules - plural, not just the one, the literal rule, which you insist
    must be used in all situations and at all times - are only part of the decision making arsenal at the disposal of the judges.  There are "principles, presumptions and canons" too.  But even then, such things
    are merely "aids to construing the legislative text."

    In short, the literal rule isn't a rule at all, it is an aid and by no
    means the only one or even the most important one.

    But it is the most important one for obvious reasons. I've quoted
    several eminent judges here in this thread who have said as much.

    Unless you are going to claim that Bennion's is wrong?

    I don't think he's disagreeing with me actually.

    You're not going to claim that, are you?

    And if you do that you find what is obvious anyway to anyone who
    speaks the language that it means essentially 'the first one', and
    that's all.

    You will look in vain for any definition that refers to 'own
    intellectual creation' which in any case has seemingly had to be
    derived from 'originality' rather than 'original' which is the word
    used in the legislation.  It's a bit of a giveaway that
    misinterpretation is at hand.

    I'm not a judge.  I don't get to determine legislative intention.

    No, the best indication of that is the words the legislators used in the legislation. If they have a coherent meaning in ordinary English, that
    was obviously the legislative intention.

      So I
    don't need to look, therefore your suggestion that I will be looking in
    vain is mistaken.

    The meaning of the phrase at issue has already been clarified in law.

    No, it's been 'altered', not clarified.

    And I'm saying that's a step too far.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to billy bookcase on Wed Oct 25 09:46:02 2023
    On 24/10/2023 23:57, billy bookcase wrote:
    "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote in message news:kpq2mjFsi0tU3@mid.individual.net...

    On 24/10/2023 12:07, Simon Parker wrote:

    We are a common law jurisdiction. Judges are well within their
    capabilities and rights to clarify the law with case law.

    Clarify, not change.

    But if it isn't going to change anything, then what exactly
    is the point of clarification ?

    To clarify, obviously. For the avoidance of doubt.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Simon Parker on Tue Oct 24 15:29:39 2023
    On 24/10/2023 12:07, Simon Parker wrote:
    On 17/10/2023 09:39, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 22:36, Fredxx wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 19:10, Norman Wells wrote:

    Why are you concerned just with cases that go to appeal?  The lower
    courts have to decide such things too where necessary.

    I can see where your going wrong. Where a case does go to an upper
    court then precedents are made from those interpretation and meaning
    of words.

    No, that's 'binding' precedents.  All court decisions are precedents,

    "All court decisions are precedents", you say?

    "*All* court decisions"?

    Yes, of course. The word precedent simply means coming before.
    I have to assume you were absent when the hierarchy of courts and the doctrine of precedent was being discussed at law school as neither the Magistrates' Court nor the County Court have the power to set precedent
    nor can they overrule precedent set in previous cases.

    You're confusing 'precedents' with 'binding precedents'. Not all
    precedents are binding, only those from higher courts, but they are
    precedents nevertheless.

    Even the Supreme Court, ie the highest court in the land that isn't
    bound by anything, 'relies on precedents — that is, earlier laws or
    decisions that provide some example or rule to guide them in the case
    they're actually deciding'.

    https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/precedent#:~:text=A%20precedent%20is%20something%20that,case%20they're%20actually%20deciding.

    but the lower courts' decisions are not binding so they don't have to
    be followed.  Nevertheless, it's not a free-for-all with all the lower
    courts reinventing the wheel and deciding the same point willy-nilly
    and however they want if it comes before them.  They will consider the
    decisions in similar level courts and will attempt to reconcile their
    own decisions with those of other courts however they can.

    Sometimes those definitions change and don't follow your dictionary
    definitions.

    Then, in the words of Lord Simmons I've referred to previously, it is:

    "a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin
    disguise of interpretation".

    Be that as it may, your understanding of Statutory Interpretation
    remains mistaken.

    Absolutely not.

    Perhaps it will help if I provide two sample cases and post selected
    snippets from the judgments to enable you to see how the process works,
    so you can see that it is nothing like you think it is.  (Free clue: in neither case is a dictionary consulted.)

    The first case is Regina v Secretary of State for Health (Respondent) ex parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) (Appellant) [2003]
    UKHL 13 [1]

    The decision before the court was, as Lord Bingham of Cornhill explained
    in paragraph [1] of the judgment:

    "1. The issues in this appeal are whether live human embryos created by
    cell nuclear replacement (CNR) fall outside the regulatory scope of the
    Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and whether licensing the creation of such embryos is prohibited by section 3(3)(d) of that Act."

    In short, the case would turn on the precise meaning of word "embryo".
    You believe that they need merely lookup the word "embryo" in a
    dictionary, determine whether or not the CNR process creates something
    that meets that definition and the judgment will follow therefrom.

    No, the Act can be its own dictionary, and it goes to the trouble of
    defining what it means by 'embryo' in its very first Section.

    There is no need or justification to look elsewhere. If an Act said
    'the term hippopotamus as used herein means a red telephone' then it
    means what it says regardless of any external sources.

    But let us look at what they actually did.

    For background, the appellant, acting on behalf of the pressure group Pro-Life, argued before the House of Lords that because CNR was a new
    process it was not covered by the 1990 Act and therefore the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority did not have the authority under
    the Act to licence research involving CNR.  It pointed out
    that in s1 of the Act an embryo regulated by the Act is defined as 'a
    live human embryo where fertilisation is complete' and that CNR does not involve a process of fertilisation.

    Well, that's got nothing to do with the definition of 'embryo' at all
    but rather with the factual matter of whether fertilisation had taken
    place. That's not a matter of interpretation at all.

    It should be noted, before continuing, that the House of Lords applied
    the purposive approach to interpreting the Act and explained why they
    had done so.

    Selected text from the judgment with paragraph numbers shown:

    LORD BINGHAM OF CORNHILL

        8. The basic task of the court is to ascertain and give effect to
    the true meaning of what Parliament has said in the enactment to be construed. But that is not to say that attention should be confined and
    a literal interpretation given to the particular provisions which give
    rise to difficulty.

    I've said all along that where the Literal Rule produces a difficulty
    you can go on to other rules of interpretation. But you can't where it doesn't.

    Such an approach not only encourages immense
    prolixity in drafting

    <Snipped immense prolixity in post, except for>

    "Of course it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense,
    are the primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of
    interpreting the meaning of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or anything else.

    Thank you, Lord Steyn. That's the Literal Rule.

    The literal rule of Statutory interpretation is well established and
    has to be followed.

    Oh no it doesn't.

    Judges are not free to amend the law by changing the
    clear intention of Parliament expressed in the words it used.

    We are a common law jurisdiction.  Judges are well within their
    capabilities and rights to clarify the law with case law.

    Clarify, not change.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Roger Hayter@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 24 20:38:34 2023
    On 24 Oct 2023 at 15:29:39 BST, "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote:

    On 24/10/2023 12:07, Simon Parker wrote:
    On 17/10/2023 09:39, Norman Wells wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 22:36, Fredxx wrote:
    On 16/10/2023 19:10, Norman Wells wrote:

    Why are you concerned just with cases that go to appeal? The lower
    courts have to decide such things too where necessary.

    I can see where your going wrong. Where a case does go to an upper
    court then precedents are made from those interpretation and meaning
    of words.

    No, that's 'binding' precedents. All court decisions are precedents,

    "All court decisions are precedents", you say?

    "*All* court decisions"?

    Yes, of course. The word precedent simply means coming before.
    I have to assume you were absent when the hierarchy of courts and the
    doctrine of precedent was being discussed at law school as neither the
    Magistrates' Court nor the County Court have the power to set precedent
    nor can they overrule precedent set in previous cases.

    You're confusing 'precedents' with 'binding precedents'. Not all
    precedents are binding, only those from higher courts, but they are precedents nevertheless.

    Even the Supreme Court, ie the highest court in the land that isn't
    bound by anything, 'relies on precedents — that is, earlier laws or decisions that provide some example or rule to guide them in the case
    they're actually deciding'.

    https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/precedent#:~:text=A%20precedent%20is%20something%20that,case%20they're%20actually%20deciding.

    but the lower courts' decisions are not binding so they don't have to
    be followed. Nevertheless, it's not a free-for-all with all the lower
    courts reinventing the wheel and deciding the same point willy-nilly
    and however they want if it comes before them. They will consider the
    decisions in similar level courts and will attempt to reconcile their
    own decisions with those of other courts however they can.

    Sometimes those definitions change and don't follow your dictionary
    definitions.

    Then, in the words of Lord Simmons I've referred to previously, it is:

    "a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin
    disguise of interpretation".

    Be that as it may, your understanding of Statutory Interpretation
    remains mistaken.

    Absolutely not.

    Perhaps it will help if I provide two sample cases and post selected
    snippets from the judgments to enable you to see how the process works,
    so you can see that it is nothing like you think it is. (Free clue: in
    neither case is a dictionary consulted.)

    The first case is Regina v Secretary of State for Health (Respondent) ex
    parte Quintavalle (on behalf of Pro-Life Alliance) (Appellant) [2003]
    UKHL 13 [1]

    The decision before the court was, as Lord Bingham of Cornhill explained
    in paragraph [1] of the judgment:

    "1. The issues in this appeal are whether live human embryos created by
    cell nuclear replacement (CNR) fall outside the regulatory scope of the
    Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 and whether licensing the
    creation of such embryos is prohibited by section 3(3)(d) of that Act."

    In short, the case would turn on the precise meaning of word "embryo".
    You believe that they need merely lookup the word "embryo" in a
    dictionary, determine whether or not the CNR process creates something
    that meets that definition and the judgment will follow therefrom.

    No, the Act can be its own dictionary, and it goes to the trouble of
    defining what it means by 'embryo' in its very first Section.

    There is no need or justification to look elsewhere. If an Act said
    'the term hippopotamus as used herein means a red telephone' then it
    means what it says regardless of any external sources.

    But let us look at what they actually did.

    For background, the appellant, acting on behalf of the pressure group
    Pro-Life, argued before the House of Lords that because CNR was a new
    process it was not covered by the 1990 Act and therefore the Human
    Fertilisation and Embryology Authority did not have the authority under
    the Act to licence research involving CNR. It pointed out
    that in s1 of the Act an embryo regulated by the Act is defined as 'a
    live human embryo where fertilisation is complete' and that CNR does not
    involve a process of fertilisation.

    Well, that's got nothing to do with the definition of 'embryo' at all
    but rather with the factual matter of whether fertilisation had taken
    place. That's not a matter of interpretation at all.

    I think you rather miss the whole point of the case; with nuclear replacement *no* fertilisation takes place at all (because the nucleus is diploid and has never been near any gametes). So the decision deliberately contradicts the plain words of the statute. This must be worrying to you, with your schema of statutory interpretation. Or maybe you'll just say they're wrong??

    snk;




    --
    Roger Hayter

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From billy bookcase@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Tue Oct 24 23:57:50 2023
    "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote in message news:kpq2mjFsi0tU3@mid.individual.net...

    On 24/10/2023 12:07, Simon Parker wrote:

    We are a common law jurisdiction. Judges are well within their
    capabilities and rights to clarify the law with case law.

    Clarify, not change.



    But if it isn't going to change anything, then what exactly
    is the point of clarification ?


    bb

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From billy bookcase@21:1/5 to Norman Wells on Wed Oct 25 13:42:23 2023
    "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote in message news:kps2uaFascfU1@mid.individual.net...
    On 24/10/2023 23:57, billy bookcase wrote:
    "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote in message
    news:kpq2mjFsi0tU3@mid.individual.net...

    On 24/10/2023 12:07, Simon Parker wrote:

    We are a common law jurisdiction. Judges are well within their
    capabilities and rights to clarify the law with case law.

    Clarify, not change.

    But if it isn't going to change anything, then what exactly
    is the point of clarification ?

    To clarify, obviously. For the avoidance of doubt.

    So there was doubt before, in the interpretion of a particular law,
    which no longer exists following clarification.

    And you don't regard that, as a change ?


    bb







    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to billy bookcase on Wed Oct 25 17:08:35 2023
    On 25/10/2023 13:42, billy bookcase wrote:
    "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote in message news:kps2uaFascfU1@mid.individual.net...
    On 24/10/2023 23:57, billy bookcase wrote:
    "Norman Wells" <hex@unseen.ac.am> wrote in message
    news:kpq2mjFsi0tU3@mid.individual.net...

    On 24/10/2023 12:07, Simon Parker wrote:

    We are a common law jurisdiction. Judges are well within their
    capabilities and rights to clarify the law with case law.

    Clarify, not change.

    But if it isn't going to change anything, then what exactly
    is the point of clarification ?

    To clarify, obviously. For the avoidance of doubt.

    So there was doubt before, in the interpretion of a particular law,
    which no longer exists following clarification.

    And you don't regard that, as a change ?

    Not necessarily, no. It's a clarification.

    To take a hypothetical example, if a Statute were to say a Notice of
    Intended Prosecution must be served on the registered keeper of a
    vehicle within 14 days of the detection of the offence, it would be a clarification to decide when exactly the 'detection' of the offence is
    deemed to be, eg the instant the speed camera flashes, when a human
    registers that and looks at the evidence, or when?

    It would also be a clarification if a court were to decide by when
    exactly the NIP has to be served, eg by the same time on the fourteenth
    day as the offence occurred, or any time up to midnight on the
    fourteenth day.

    Both would be matters of interpretation that clarify rather than alter.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Tim Jackson@21:1/5 to All on Thu Oct 26 15:08:25 2023
    On Tue, 24 Oct 2023 15:29:39 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    I've said all along that where the Literal Rule produces a difficulty
    you can go on to other rules of interpretation. But you can't where it doesn't.

    Prior to Brexit, it often happened that the literal rule did indeed
    produce a difficulty. A literal reading of the UK words clashed with EU
    law.

    In that case, back in 1972 the UK Parliament had said what the courts
    should do.

    Quote:
    "The European Communities Act 1972 was the piece of
    legislation that brought the UK into the Europe Union:
    **it gives EU law supremacy over UK national law.**

    A large amount of EU law effective in the UK currently
    relies on the 1972 Act."

    https://tinyurl.com/2s7p22z9 (Institute for Government)

    This is the reason why the courts often applied a purposive construction instead of a literal one. They had been instructed by the UK Parliament
    to treat EU law as supreme. So they interpreted UK laws in a way that
    would achieve that purpose.

    That's how the UK courts arrived at "the author's own intellectual
    creation".


    So what about the position after Brexit? You might think we are no
    longer constrained to follow EU law. The UK parliament and Supreme
    Court are free to do what they want.

    Well, yes, that's right. But in many areas, they haven't yet taken
    advantage of that freedom.

    Meanwhile, the UK Parliament has provided that the same rules should
    continue to apply after Brexit, unless and until changed.

    Further quote, following on from the one above:
    "The [European Communities] Act is repealed by the EU
    Withdrawal Act 2018 although in reality this is more
    of a 'copy and paste' act that transfers EU regulation
    and law onto the UK statute book."

    Pending any change, expect to hear more court decisions which apply "the author's own intellectual creation".

    --
    Tim Jackson
    news@timjackson.invalid
    (Change '.invalid' to '.plus.com' to reply direct)

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Mark Goodge@21:1/5 to All on Thu Oct 26 16:40:52 2023
    On Thu, 26 Oct 2023 15:08:25 +0100, Tim Jackson <news@timjackson.invalid> wrote:

    On Tue, 24 Oct 2023 15:29:39 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    I've said all along that where the Literal Rule produces a difficulty
    you can go on to other rules of interpretation. But you can't where it
    doesn't.

    Prior to Brexit, it often happened that the literal rule did indeed
    produce a difficulty. A literal reading of the UK words clashed with EU
    law.

    In that case, back in 1972 the UK Parliament had said what the courts
    should do.

    Quote:
    "The European Communities Act 1972 was the piece of
    legislation that brought the UK into the Europe Union:
    **it gives EU law supremacy over UK national law.**

    A large amount of EU law effective in the UK currently
    relies on the 1972 Act."

    https://tinyurl.com/2s7p22z9 (Institute for Government)

    This is the reason why the courts often applied a purposive construction >instead of a literal one. They had been instructed by the UK Parliament
    to treat EU law as supreme. So they interpreted UK laws in a way that
    would achieve that purpose.

    And, of course, the reason why the government could leave it to the courts
    is because the UK (or, at least, England and Wales) has a common law jurisdiction. If we did not, then parliament would have had to painstakingly amend all of UK law which conflicted with EU law so as to remove the
    conflict. I'm not convinced that would have been better.

    That's how the UK courts arrived at "the author's own intellectual
    creation".

    And if we didn't have a common law jurisdiction, then parliament would have legislated that into existence. Either way, it would be what we have.

    Mark

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Tim Jackson on Thu Oct 26 16:12:02 2023
    On 26/10/2023 15:08, Tim Jackson wrote:
    On Tue, 24 Oct 2023 15:29:39 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    I've said all along that where the Literal Rule produces a difficulty
    you can go on to other rules of interpretation. But you can't where it
    doesn't.

    Prior to Brexit, it often happened that the literal rule did indeed
    produce a difficulty. A literal reading of the UK words clashed with EU
    law.

    In that case, back in 1972 the UK Parliament had said what the courts
    should do.

    Quote:
    "The European Communities Act 1972 was the piece of
    legislation that brought the UK into the Europe Union:
    **it gives EU law supremacy over UK national law.**

    A large amount of EU law effective in the UK currently
    relies on the 1972 Act."

    https://tinyurl.com/2s7p22z9 (Institute for Government)

    This is the reason why the courts often applied a purposive construction instead of a literal one. They had been instructed by the UK Parliament
    to treat EU law as supreme. So they interpreted UK laws in a way that
    would achieve that purpose.

    That's how the UK courts arrived at "the author's own intellectual
    creation".


    So what about the position after Brexit? You might think we are no
    longer constrained to follow EU law. The UK parliament and Supreme
    Court are free to do what they want.

    Well, yes, that's right. But in many areas, they haven't yet taken
    advantage of that freedom.

    Meanwhile, the UK Parliament has provided that the same rules should
    continue to apply after Brexit, unless and until changed.

    Further quote, following on from the one above:
    "The [European Communities] Act is repealed by the EU
    Withdrawal Act 2018 although in reality this is more
    of a 'copy and paste' act that transfers EU regulation
    and law onto the UK statute book."

    Pending any change, expect to hear more court decisions which apply "the author's own intellectual creation".

    No wonder we voted to leave.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Norman Wells@21:1/5 to Mark Goodge on Thu Oct 26 17:29:27 2023
    On 26/10/2023 16:40, Mark Goodge wrote:
    On Thu, 26 Oct 2023 15:08:25 +0100, Tim Jackson <news@timjackson.invalid> wrote:

    On Tue, 24 Oct 2023 15:29:39 +0100, Norman Wells wrote...

    I've said all along that where the Literal Rule produces a difficulty
    you can go on to other rules of interpretation. But you can't where it
    doesn't.

    Prior to Brexit, it often happened that the literal rule did indeed
    produce a difficulty. A literal reading of the UK words clashed with EU
    law.

    In that case, back in 1972 the UK Parliament had said what the courts
    should do.

    Quote:
    "The European Communities Act 1972 was the piece of
    legislation that brought the UK into the Europe Union:
    **it gives EU law supremacy over UK national law.**

    A large amount of EU law effective in the UK currently
    relies on the 1972 Act."

    https://tinyurl.com/2s7p22z9 (Institute for Government)

    This is the reason why the courts often applied a purposive construction
    instead of a literal one. They had been instructed by the UK Parliament
    to treat EU law as supreme. So they interpreted UK laws in a way that
    would achieve that purpose.

    And, of course, the reason why the government could leave it to the courts
    is because the UK (or, at least, England and Wales) has a common law jurisdiction. If we did not, then parliament would have had to painstakingly amend all of UK law which conflicted with EU law so as to remove the conflict. I'm not convinced that would have been better.

    It seems you have a serious misunderstanding of what common law is.

    Perhaps this will help:

    "The common law is the law declared by judges, derived from custom and precedent. It originated with the legal reforms of King Henry II in the
    12th century and was called “common” because it applied equally across
    the whole country. The doctrine of binding precedent, whereby courts
    follow and apply the principles declared in previous cases decided by
    more senior courts, known as “courts of record”, is also known by the
    Latin expression “stare decisis”.

    The common law includes both substantive rules, such as the offence of
    murder, and procedural ones, such as court procedure rules derived from
    the inherent jurisdiction of the court.

    Common law rules may be superseded or replaced by legislation, which is
    said to “trump” or take precedence over the common law. Offences of
    theft, for example, based on the old common law offence of larceny, are
    now governed by the Theft Acts 1968, 1978 etc; and the original
    penalties for murder (though not the offence itself) were replaced by
    statutes such as the Homicide Act 1957.

    There is a limit to the extent to which common law judges, however
    creative or “activist”, can reform an out-of-date law, particularly if
    it derives from a statute. In such circumstances, only Parliament can
    change the law. The need for such a change often follows a period of
    research and consultation by the Law Commission, which was set up to
    review and propose reform to old or inadequate laws."

    https://www.iclr.co.uk/knowledge/topics/the-english-legal-system/

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)