• More Bad News As Trump Has Failed To Create Well Paying Jobs and Has Ha

    From Sean Hannity@21:1/5 to All on Tue May 15 23:59:07 2018
    XPost: alt.global-warming, uk.politics.misc, alt.fan.rush-limbaugh

    Looks like only his cultish fool followers believe what the liar
    says. From what I see, the only money his followers earn is for
    attending his rallies. They don't seem like the industrious or entrepreneurial type. Maybe the Kremlin gives them some money.
    Who knows?





    ....

    One year in: Has Trump been good for US workers?
    Harry J. HolzerWednesday, January 17, 2018

    rump was elected President in 2016, at least partly due to the
    anger of less-educated white workers, particularly against
    immigrants and international trade policies. He very skillfully
    exploited that anger, promising that, if elected, he would fight
    for better trade deals and limited immigration, as well as a range
    of other policies to help these workers

    After one year in office, is Trump making good on these promises?
    In this essay, I argue that Trump’s policy actions to date provide
    meager help to those who so enthusiastically supported him, and
    mostly in the short term—while, over the longer term, these
    policies will likely cause them more harm than good.

    Trump’s impact on the overall health of the job market, for which
    he takes a great deal of credit, as well as the impacts of the
    recently signed tax bill on workers, have been well-discussed
    elsewhere. Very simply, there is little evidence that Trump’s
    policies have raised the pace of growth in the job market beyond
    what was happening in 2015 and 2016;[1] and it appears as though
    the fairly meager benefits of the tax cuts for non-college
    educated U.S. workers will be outweighed by the costs over time of
    paying for them with lower government benefits or higher taxes.[2]

    I therefore focus on other important Trump policies affecting
    labor—namely, regulatory cuts, trade and immigration, education
    and workforce development, and policies to “make work pay” for the
    unskilled.

    Weakening Regulation

    Donald Trump has already made his mark as a deregulator, cutting
    several Obama-era regulations that directly affect workers—for
    example, rules raising the numbers of workers with earnings
    covered by overtime pay or requiring financial advisers to act
    more clearly in the “fiduciary” interests of their clients. He has
    also limited or cancelled others that indirectly affect workers,
    like climate regulations or those covering the financial markets
    in the Dodd-Frank legislation.

    There is little doubt that limiting regulation can reduce employer
    costs and improve production, employment and earnings of workers,
    in manufacturing and other sectors. But the economic benefits of
    lower regulation must be balanced against the benefits workers
    will forego and the higher risks of financial and climate
    disasters over time, and our knowledge of the exact magnitudes of
    these benefits and costs is limited. Still, given what we know,
    it’s quite unlikely that workers’ interests will be served in the
    long run by Trump’s regulatory changes.[3]

    Very simply, there is little evidence that Trump’s policies have
    raised the pace of growth in the job market beyond what was
    happening in 2015 and 2016.
    Trade and Immigration

    To-date, Trump’s primary policy change in this area has been to
    withdraw the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and to
    demand some renegotiation of terms on the North American Free
    Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico.[4] It is too soon
    to tell what changes, if any, will be made to NAFTA, but we can
    render some judgments on the likely effects of American TPP
    withdrawal on our workers.

    Though the effects of withdrawal in the next decade may not be
    large, they seem likely negative. As many analysts have pointed
    out, the reductions in tariffs protecting the markets of our Asian
    partners would have been greater than our own tariffs, leading our
    exports to rise more than imports. In addition, wages in exporting
    industries tend to mostly be higher than those in import-sensitive
    sectors like nondurable manufacturing. Thus, overall GDP under
    TPP would likely have risen.[5]

    Additionally, higher federal budget deficits will almost certainly
    raise the value of the dollar relative to foreign currencies and
    cause further damage to our trade balance. This will make our
    exports more expensive and our imports cheaper, leading to less of
    the former and more of the latter. Indeed, the negative effects of
    federal deficits on our current account balance might be the most
    significant effect of Trump on international trade outcomes in the
    US during his time in office, and it will likely be negative.

    But perhaps more importantly, our withdrawal from TPP leaves a
    large vacuum in economic and geopolitical leadership in Asia,
    which will almost certainly be filled by China. It is hard to
    imagine any circumstances under which this development, over time,
    will benefit U.S. workers.

    Regarding immigration, a collection of small and large actions
    will likely have the cumulative effect of discouraging immigration
    to the U.S. of both highly- and less highly-educated workers from
    abroad, even if no further legislative reforms to immigration are
    undertaken. Trump’s most important action to date has arguably
    been his cancellation of the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals
    (DACA) program (though this currently is being address during
    budget negotiations between the President and Congress), but the
    Administration has also pursued the controversial travel ban, the
    cancellation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Salvadoran
    refugees, heightened deportations of undocumented workers, and
    ongoing talk of ending “chain immigration” across family members.

    Will the reduction in immigration improve the job prospects of
    native-born U.S. workers? The high rate of business startups and
    patents secured by such immigrants suggests any reduction in
    immigration from highly-educated workers only harms the U.S.
    economy.[6] At a time when the U.S. labor market has become more
    sluggish, discouraging the entry of international graduate
    students or highly-skilled immigrants seems very ill-advised.[7]

    The net economic effects of discouraging immigration among less-
    educated workers is more mixed. Prominent labor economists, such
    as George Borjas and David Card, have generated quite different
    estimates of the impacts of such immigration on native-born, less-
    educated Americans. A reasonable average of their estimates
    implies that immigration has reduced their earnings by maybe 3-4
    percent since 1980, though the estimated loss should also decline
    over time as foreign capital responds to lower wages by entering
    the U.S. at greater rates and raising worker wages.[8]

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    At the same time, these immigrants reduce consumer prices in some
    key sectors, like housing, food, shelter, and medical/elder care –
    thereby contributing to the real incomes of U.S. workers. They
    also contribute to labor force and revenue growth in the U.S. just
    when native-born Baby Boomers are retiring in great numbers and
    putting downward pressure on overall economic growth and federal
    revenues.[9]

    Overall, the positive contributions of low-skilled immigrants to
    real income, labor force activity and federal revenues (and
    therefore to the solvency of programs like Social Security and
    Medicare) are perhaps large enough to outweigh their modest
    downward pressure on the wages of less-educated, native born
    workers—leading me to believe we should reject proposals that
    would drastically curtail such immigration.[10] Overall, the net
    effects of Trump’s actions on trade and immigration will likely be
    negative to the U.S. economy and to native-born workers over time.

    Worker Skills: Education and Training

    While issues like trade and immigration are highly emotional ones
    for many U.S. workers, the ability of U.S. workers to gain
    education and skills that the labor market values is arguably much
    more important to their economic well-being over time.

    One year into the Trump administration, the most important effects
    in this area might derive not from any explicit policies, but from
    the unanticipated consequences of the tax cuts passed in early
    2018. These tax cuts will likely discourage important education
    and training initiatives at all levels in the coming years –
    federal, state and local.

    On the federal level, the growth of budget deficits caused by the
    tax bill will almost certainly preclude major new investment
    initiatives, like expanding high-quality pre-kindergarten programs
    or community college job training efforts. Important existing
    programs, like Pell grants for low-income college students, face
    major risks as well.

    But even before the tax cuts were enacted, the Trump
    Administration had proposed large cuts in funding to already-
    shrinking federal training programs run by the Department of
    Labor, on top of the very large reductions that have already
    occurred over time.[11] I expect to see these cuts implemented and
    growing over time.

    But public education in the U.S. at the K-12 and postsecondary
    levels is overwhelmingly funded at the state and local levels. The
    decision of Congress to impose $10,000 caps on the deductability
    of state and local taxes will almost certainly put pressure on
    many states to cut such funding. To some extent, this has already
    been occurring. Overall state revenues for higher education have
    been declining over the past decade in real value, and the tax cut
    will likely accelerate that trend.[12]

    Furthermore, recent state-funded innovations in both “red” and
    “blue” states, to train workers for high-demand jobs might also be
    at risk as public spending becomes costlier.[13]

    In the summer of 2017, the Administration announced an initiative
    to double the federal expenditures on apprenticeships from $100 to
    $200 million (carved out of existing Labor Department funding).
    The initiative seeks to spread new apprenticeship models that
    might have more employer uptake because they are less regulated
    than the current model of “registered” apprenticeship. This idea
    merits some experimentation and careful evaluation to measure its
    effects. But since we have strong evidence of the positive impacts
    of registered apprenticeship on worker earnings, and none for
    unregistered models, we should move cautiously in this area before
    changing existing policy.[14]

    Lastly, the strong convictions of Education Secretary Betsy DeVos
    around school choice mean we can expect an expansion in the
    support of private and for-profit schools. While expanding student
    choice through publicly funded charter schools is warranted by
    research evidence, this is much less true of private schools and
    vouchers.[15] Furthermore, the research on for-profit higher
    education is quite negative, showing much higher costs than public
    two-year and four-year colleges, much higher rates of student
    default on loans, and lower value among employers in the labor
    market. We should therefore proceed very cautiously in this area,
    and continue to demand appropriate regulation of the for-profit
    educational sector.[16]

    Policies to “Make Work Pay”

    Policies at the federal, state and local levels to increase
    compensation take many forms besides just education and training.
    These efforts include raising the statutory minimum wage and
    expanding publicly funded benefits like health insurance (as done
    through the Affordable Care Act) or paid family leave. They can
    also entail expansions in tax credits for workers like the Earned
    Income Tax Credit (EITC) or the Child Tax Credit (CTC).

    In a very different realm, federal and state governments can also
    undertake policies to more actively support or restrict collective
    bargaining, in either the private or public sectors, or to protect
    workers from wage theft, “noncompete clauses” in their employment
    contracts (which deny workers the right to take jobs with company
    competitors, thus restricting their bargaining power and wage
    growth opportunities), or very unstable work schedules.[17]

    It was never likely that a Republican administration would support
    expanding collective bargaining or additional regulation of
    private employer decisions over wage and hours, and the
    determination of President Trump and congressional Republicans to
    kill the ACA is not surprising.

    But the failure of the Trump Administration and Congress to even
    consider expanding the EITC in a tax bill that throws trillions of
    dollars at high-income individuals and corporations, is quite
    shocking and disturbing.
    But the failure of the Trump Administration and Congress to even
    consider expanding the EITC in a tax bill that throws trillions of
    dollars at high-income individuals and corporations, is quite
    shocking and disturbing. For many years, conservative policy
    analysts or politicians (including House Speaker Paul Ryan) have
    signaled their support for an EITC expansion; it was commonly
    believed that this would occur as part of any larger tax reform
    effort.[18]

    While the Child Tax Credit was doubled in size (from a maximum of
    $1000 to $2000 per child), its refundability for low-income
    families was increased by just $300, after Sen. Rubio threatened
    to withhold his support for the bill. This a very small
    consolation prize for the working poor, relative to the huge gains
    that will be reaped by the affluent from this bill.

    Furthermore, in the absence of sensible federal legislation to
    moderately increase the minimum wage (President Trump supported a
    $10 minimum wage on the campaign trail) or provide paid leave
    (which both Trump and his daughter Ivanka have endorsed), many
    states are moving ahead on their own. Over 30 have already enacted
    statutory minimum wages above the federal level (now at $7.25),
    some going as high as $15 an hour in the process. About a half
    dozen states (including Washington DC) are enacting paid worker
    leave.

    Of course, it is not necessarily negative for states to enact such
    policies with different levels of generosity. Some cities or
    states (like Seattle or San Francisco) have higher costs of living
    and higher concentrations of skilled workers than do many others,
    it is sensible for these localities to enact higher minimum wages
    or more generous paid leave than do others.

    But I fear that an absence of federal policies has created too
    much variance across states in minimum wage levels, benefits like
    paid leave, and regulation of employer hiring behavior (through
    initiatives like “Ban the Box” that limit employer ability to ask
    their workers about having criminal records in their past).
    Indeed, some jurisdictions like Washington DC are embracing the
    $15 minimum wage, generous paid leave, and a range of limits on
    employer permission to screen their job applicants; others, like
    Arlington VA – located right across the river from DC and easily
    accessible through public transit – has adopted none of these.
    These enormous differences could induce employers to relocate
    geographically from higher- to lower-cost jurisdictions, or to
    economize on their hiring of low-skill labor in high-wage
    locations by implementing labor-saving automation more rapidly.
    [19]

    What Will Happen in 2018 and Beyond?

    It is possible that President Trump and his congressional allies,
    moving into an election year, will try harder to find common
    ground with Democrats on issues to benefit less-educated workers.
    Cooperation on infrastructure, for example, would be popular
    politically and perhaps more likely to occur. Such a bill would
    create an opportunity to spread skill-formation and good jobs to
    many unskilled workers who now lack them. And, given the
    difficulties construction contractors are having recruiting and
    training workers as their Baby Boomer workers retire,
    incentivizing employers to train more such workers for lucrative
    constructions jobs would be a win-win.

    At the same time, the budget deficits generated by the tax bill,
    along with conservative ideology (and the fact that the Norquist
    “No Tax” pledge has been signed by almost all congressional
    Republicans), might make it impossible to generate sufficient
    funding for new infrastructure development with any serious scale.
    And, considering the fact that an increase in federal dollars for
    workers training will face near certain opposition in the
    Republican Congress, it’s not at all clear that a major
    infrastructure initiative will be beneficial to many currently
    low-wage workers.

    It’s also likely that, in 2018, House Republicans will push to
    reduce benefits and require more work from low-income benefit
    recipients in programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
    Program (SNAP, or Food Stamps) or Medicaid. Indeed, the Trump
    Administration has already allowed states to require Medicaid
    able-bodied recipients to work as a condition for remaining in the
    program.

    But, to ensure that these changes do not harm low-income
    recipients who desperately need these benefits, and to really
    provide positive effects on their work experience, the work rules
    would have to be accompanied by a broad range of fairly expensive
    additional services, such as: careful assessment of worker
    employability, work supports like transportation and child care
    for those who need them, clear exemptions for parents of small
    children and those who are disabled or opioid-dependent, increased
    access to community college or employer-based training for those
    who can benefit from it, access to subsidized private sector jobs,
    and a guarantee of public sector work or service activities if
    none can be found by the recipients.

    It seems highly unlikely that states which adopt the Medicaid work
    rules will agree to such an expansion of their obligations to
    recipients.

    Conclusion

    After one year in office, President Trump has provided “feel-good”
    rhetoric to the white non-college workers who enthusiastically
    supported him, and policy actions that will deliver modest short-
    term benefits for them but larger long-term costs.

    The labor market overall is improving, but at roughly the same
    pace as it did under President Obama. The tax and regulation cuts
    enacted by the Administration offer modest and mostly short-term
    rewards with much greater costs and risks over the longer term.
    Much the same can be said about his trade and immigration
    policies, which may be pleasing to his supporters but ultimately
    will raise consumer prices, lower innovation and growth in the
    U.S., and hurt our fiscal balance domestically and our influence
    overseas.

    On education and training, the deficits generated by tax cuts will
    put great pressure on existing investments in human capital (like
    Pell grants for the poor and Labor Department training programs),
    and preclude important new federal investments in everything from
    pre-K to community colleges. Perhaps more importantly, the
    pressure put on state and local public spending from the cap on
    deductions for state and local taxes will likely inhibit both K-12
    and higher education investments, as well as important workforce
    innovations.

    Finally, efforts to “make work pay” for low-income workers have
    grown too modestly (in the case of the Child Tax Credit) or not at
    all (in the case of the EITC). Efforts to eliminate the Affordable
    Care Act have mostly failed, but the elimination of the individual
    insurance mandate in the tax bill could weaken it considerably and
    reduce coverage for millions of less-educated workers.

    And while the Trump Administration does nothing to moderately
    raise the federal minimum wage or provide paid family leave to
    workers, an enormous divide is opening between states implementing
    these policies on their own—sometimes at very high levels, like
    the $15 minimum wage—and those that don’t. Potential negative
    impacts on low-wage worker employment prospects in very “blue”
    states might well result, as employers relocate away from or
    accelerate their automation of low-skill jobs.

    Over time, I’m afraid those workers who have enthusiastically
    supported Donald Trump in the 2016 election and beyond will be
    very disappointed by the lack of progress or harm his policies
    inflict on them.


    FOOTNOTES

    1 While payroll job creation and employment growth in the
    population are strong, their pace of improvement during 2017 was
    no greater than in 2014-16. For instance, total payroll job
    creation was approximately 2.6, 2.2 and 2.1 million in 2015, 2016
    and 2017 respectively; and the employment-to-population ratio rose
    from 59.3 percent in 2014 to 59.6, 59.8, and 60.1 percent
    respectively in the years 2015-17, showing fairly constant rates
    of growth.
    2 Henry Aaron. “Tax Cut Proponents Ignore That There’s No Free
    Lunch.” Economic Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017; and William Gale
    et al. “Who Will Pay for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act?” Economic
    Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017.
    3 Gotbaum, Joshua. “Moving DoL’s Fiduciary standards into the 21st
    Century: The Case of ERISA Investing.” Economic Studies, Brookings
    Brief, 2016; Daniel Hamermesh. “How Businesses Could Skirt the New
    Overtime Law.” Time, October 24, 2016; Klein, Aaron et al. “The
    Impact of the odd-Frank Act on Economic Stability and Growth.”
    Economic Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017; and the Hamilton Project
    and the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago.
    Twelve Economic Facts on Energy and Climate Change. Brookings
    Institution, 2016.
    4 Of course, Trump’s Democratic opponent for President, Hillary
    Clinton, also pledged during the 2016 campaign to not sign the
    current TPP agreement, though she had strongly supported it
    earlier.
    5 Peter Petri and Michael Plummer. The Economic Effects of the
    Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates. The Peterson Institute
    of International Economics, Washington DC, 2015; and David Riker.
    Do Jobs in Export Industry Still Pay More? And Why? Office of
    Competition and Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce,
    Washington DC, 2010.
    6 Jennifer Hunt. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?”
    American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. Vol. 2, No. 2, 2010.
    7 Malloy, Raven et al. 2016. “Understanding Declining Fluidity in
    the US Labor Market.” Economic Studies, Brookings Brief.
    8 The National Academy of Science. The Economic and Fiscal
    Consequences of Immigration. Washington DC, National Academy
    Press. 2017.
    9 Since the first few generations of immigrant children show
    strong improvement over time in economic success, and since low-
    income immigrants often need services provided at the state or
    local level, the net fiscal benefits of immigration are greater in
    the long- than the short-run and greater nationally than locally.
    10 For instance, Senators Tom Cotton and David Perdue recently
    introduced a bill to shift immigration from less- to more-educated
    immigrants, but to also curtail overall immigration numbers. The
    proposed bill was supported by Trump and his Administration.
    11 Jay Shambaugh et al. “Returning to Education: The Hamilton
    Project on Human Capital and Wages.” The Hamilton Project,
    Brookings Institution, forthcoming in 2018.
    12 Harry Holzer and Sandy Baum. Making College Work: Pathways to
    Success for Disadvantaged Students. Brookings Press. 2017.
    13 For instance, Kentucky’s FAME program provides apprenticeships
    to companies in advanced manufacturing, while Tennessee’s “Drive
    to 55” sets an ambitious goal of improving postsecondary
    credential completion in the state to 55 percent of the
    population. South Carolina also aggressively markets
    apprenticeships to its companies and provides a $1000 tax credit
    per year for each apprentice.
    14 Robert Lerman. “Expanding Apprenticeship Opportunities in the
    United States.” In M. Kearney and B. Harris eds. Policies to
    Address Poverty in America. The Hamilton Project, Brookings
    Institution, Washington DC. 2014.
    15 Mark Dynarski. “On Negative Effects of Vouchers.” Economic
    Studies, Brookings Brief, 2016.
    16 Stephanie Cellini et al. “The Government is Sanctioning For-
    Profit Colleges. What Happens to the Students?” Economic Studies,
    Brookings Brief 2017.
    17 David Weil. “Denying Reality: Labor Standards in the Trump
    Era.” Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Allied Social
    Science Association, January 5, 2018.
    18 Michael Strain. “Earned Income Tax Credit Does Better Job of
    Lifting Workers Out of Poverty.” McClatchy News Service, May 1.
    19 Isaac Sorkin. “Are There Long-Run Effects of the Minimum Wage
    on Employment?” Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2015;
    and Jonathan Meer and Jeremy West. “Effects of the Minimum Wage on
    Employment Dynamics.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working
    Paper. 2013.



    https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/one-year-in-has-trump-been- good-for-us-workers/

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Sean Hannity@21:1/5 to All on Wed Jan 30 00:22:04 2019
    XPost: alt.global-warming, uk.politics.misc, alt.fan.rush-limbaugh

    Looks like only his cultish fool followers believe what the liar
    says. From what I see, the only money his followers earn is for
    attending his rallies. They don't seem like the industrious or entrepreneurial type. Maybe the Kremlin gives them some money.
    Who knows?





    ....

    One year in: Has Trump been good for US workers?
    Harry J. HolzerWednesday, January 17, 2018

    rump was elected President in 2016, at least partly due to the
    anger of less-educated white workers, particularly against
    immigrants and international trade policies. He very skillfully
    exploited that anger, promising that, if elected, he would fight
    for better trade deals and limited immigration, as well as a range
    of other policies to help these workers

    After one year in office, is Trump making good on these promises?
    In this essay, I argue that Trump’s policy actions to date provide
    meager help to those who so enthusiastically supported him, and
    mostly in the short term—while, over the longer term, these
    policies will likely cause them more harm than good.

    Trump’s impact on the overall health of the job market, for which
    he takes a great deal of credit, as well as the impacts of the
    recently signed tax bill on workers, have been well-discussed
    elsewhere. Very simply, there is little evidence that Trump’s
    policies have raised the pace of growth in the job market beyond
    what was happening in 2015 and 2016;[1] and it appears as though
    the fairly meager benefits of the tax cuts for non-college
    educated U.S. workers will be outweighed by the costs over time of
    paying for them with lower government benefits or higher taxes.[2]

    I therefore focus on other important Trump policies affecting
    labor—namely, regulatory cuts, trade and immigration, education
    and workforce development, and policies to “make work pay” for the
    unskilled.

    Weakening Regulation

    Donald Trump has already made his mark as a deregulator, cutting
    several Obama-era regulations that directly affect workers—for
    example, rules raising the numbers of workers with earnings
    covered by overtime pay or requiring financial advisers to act
    more clearly in the “fiduciary” interests of their clients. He has
    also limited or cancelled others that indirectly affect workers,
    like climate regulations or those covering the financial markets
    in the Dodd-Frank legislation.

    There is little doubt that limiting regulation can reduce employer
    costs and improve production, employment and earnings of workers,
    in manufacturing and other sectors. But the economic benefits of
    lower regulation must be balanced against the benefits workers
    will forego and the higher risks of financial and climate
    disasters over time, and our knowledge of the exact magnitudes of
    these benefits and costs is limited. Still, given what we know,
    it’s quite unlikely that workers’ interests will be served in the
    long run by Trump’s regulatory changes.[3]

    Very simply, there is little evidence that Trump’s policies have
    raised the pace of growth in the job market beyond what was
    happening in 2015 and 2016.
    Trade and Immigration

    To-date, Trump’s primary policy change in this area has been to
    withdraw the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and to
    demand some renegotiation of terms on the North American Free
    Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico.[4] It is too soon
    to tell what changes, if any, will be made to NAFTA, but we can
    render some judgments on the likely effects of American TPP
    withdrawal on our workers.

    Though the effects of withdrawal in the next decade may not be
    large, they seem likely negative. As many analysts have pointed
    out, the reductions in tariffs protecting the markets of our Asian
    partners would have been greater than our own tariffs, leading our
    exports to rise more than imports. In addition, wages in exporting
    industries tend to mostly be higher than those in import-sensitive
    sectors like nondurable manufacturing. Thus, overall GDP under
    TPP would likely have risen.[5]

    Additionally, higher federal budget deficits will almost certainly
    raise the value of the dollar relative to foreign currencies and
    cause further damage to our trade balance. This will make our
    exports more expensive and our imports cheaper, leading to less of
    the former and more of the latter. Indeed, the negative effects of
    federal deficits on our current account balance might be the most
    significant effect of Trump on international trade outcomes in the
    US during his time in office, and it will likely be negative.

    But perhaps more importantly, our withdrawal from TPP leaves a
    large vacuum in economic and geopolitical leadership in Asia,
    which will almost certainly be filled by China. It is hard to
    imagine any circumstances under which this development, over time,
    will benefit U.S. workers.

    Regarding immigration, a collection of small and large actions
    will likely have the cumulative effect of discouraging immigration
    to the U.S. of both highly- and less highly-educated workers from
    abroad, even if no further legislative reforms to immigration are
    undertaken. Trump’s most important action to date has arguably
    been his cancellation of the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals
    (DACA) program (though this currently is being address during
    budget negotiations between the President and Congress), but the
    Administration has also pursued the controversial travel ban, the
    cancellation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Salvadoran
    refugees, heightened deportations of undocumented workers, and
    ongoing talk of ending “chain immigration” across family members.

    Will the reduction in immigration improve the job prospects of
    native-born U.S. workers? The high rate of business startups and
    patents secured by such immigrants suggests any reduction in
    immigration from highly-educated workers only harms the U.S.
    economy.[6] At a time when the U.S. labor market has become more
    sluggish, discouraging the entry of international graduate
    students or highly-skilled immigrants seems very ill-advised.[7]

    The net economic effects of discouraging immigration among less-
    educated workers is more mixed. Prominent labor economists, such
    as George Borjas and David Card, have generated quite different
    estimates of the impacts of such immigration on native-born, less-
    educated Americans. A reasonable average of their estimates
    implies that immigration has reduced their earnings by maybe 3-4
    percent since 1980, though the estimated loss should also decline
    over time as foreign capital responds to lower wages by entering
    the U.S. at greater rates and raising worker wages.[8]

    RELATED CONTENT
    tax_return002
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    How the tax bill will penalize wage earners, in one chart
    Adam LooneyWednesday, December 20, 2017
    President Trump and Congressional Republicans celebrate after
    Congress passed sweeping tax overhaul legislation.
    TAXATION
    Winners and losers in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
    Fred Dews and Adam LooneyFriday, December 22, 2017
    At the same time, these immigrants reduce consumer prices in some
    key sectors, like housing, food, shelter, and medical/elder care –
    thereby contributing to the real incomes of U.S. workers. They
    also contribute to labor force and revenue growth in the U.S. just
    when native-born Baby Boomers are retiring in great numbers and
    putting downward pressure on overall economic growth and federal
    revenues.[9]

    Overall, the positive contributions of low-skilled immigrants to
    real income, labor force activity and federal revenues (and
    therefore to the solvency of programs like Social Security and
    Medicare) are perhaps large enough to outweigh their modest
    downward pressure on the wages of less-educated, native born
    workers—leading me to believe we should reject proposals that
    would drastically curtail such immigration.[10] Overall, the net
    effects of Trump’s actions on trade and immigration will likely be
    negative to the U.S. economy and to native-born workers over time.

    Worker Skills: Education and Training

    While issues like trade and immigration are highly emotional ones
    for many U.S. workers, the ability of U.S. workers to gain
    education and skills that the labor market values is arguably much
    more important to their economic well-being over time.

    One year into the Trump administration, the most important effects
    in this area might derive not from any explicit policies, but from
    the unanticipated consequences of the tax cuts passed in early
    2018. These tax cuts will likely discourage important education
    and training initiatives at all levels in the coming years –
    federal, state and local.

    On the federal level, the growth of budget deficits caused by the
    tax bill will almost certainly preclude major new investment
    initiatives, like expanding high-quality pre-kindergarten programs
    or community college job training efforts. Important existing
    programs, like Pell grants for low-income college students, face
    major risks as well.

    But even before the tax cuts were enacted, the Trump
    Administration had proposed large cuts in funding to already-
    shrinking federal training programs run by the Department of
    Labor, on top of the very large reductions that have already
    occurred over time.[11] I expect to see these cuts implemented and
    growing over time.

    But public education in the U.S. at the K-12 and postsecondary
    levels is overwhelmingly funded at the state and local levels. The
    decision of Congress to impose $10,000 caps on the deductability
    of state and local taxes will almost certainly put pressure on
    many states to cut such funding. To some extent, this has already
    been occurring. Overall state revenues for higher education have
    been declining over the past decade in real value, and the tax cut
    will likely accelerate that trend.[12]

    Furthermore, recent state-funded innovations in both “red” and
    “blue” states, to train workers for high-demand jobs might also be
    at risk as public spending becomes costlier.[13]

    In the summer of 2017, the Administration announced an initiative
    to double the federal expenditures on apprenticeships from $100 to
    $200 million (carved out of existing Labor Department funding).
    The initiative seeks to spread new apprenticeship models that
    might have more employer uptake because they are less regulated
    than the current model of “registered” apprenticeship. This idea
    merits some experimentation and careful evaluation to measure its
    effects. But since we have strong evidence of the positive impacts
    of registered apprenticeship on worker earnings, and none for
    unregistered models, we should move cautiously in this area before
    changing existing policy.[14]

    Lastly, the strong convictions of Education Secretary Betsy DeVos
    around school choice mean we can expect an expansion in the
    support of private and for-profit schools. While expanding student
    choice through publicly funded charter schools is warranted by
    research evidence, this is much less true of private schools and
    vouchers.[15] Furthermore, the research on for-profit higher
    education is quite negative, showing much higher costs than public
    two-year and four-year colleges, much higher rates of student
    default on loans, and lower value among employers in the labor
    market. We should therefore proceed very cautiously in this area,
    and continue to demand appropriate regulation of the for-profit
    educational sector.[16]

    Policies to “Make Work Pay”

    Policies at the federal, state and local levels to increase
    compensation take many forms besides just education and training.
    These efforts include raising the statutory minimum wage and
    expanding publicly funded benefits like health insurance (as done
    through the Affordable Care Act) or paid family leave. They can
    also entail expansions in tax credits for workers like the Earned
    Income Tax Credit (EITC) or the Child Tax Credit (CTC).

    In a very different realm, federal and state governments can also
    undertake policies to more actively support or restrict collective
    bargaining, in either the private or public sectors, or to protect
    workers from wage theft, “noncompete clauses” in their employment
    contracts (which deny workers the right to take jobs with company
    competitors, thus restricting their bargaining power and wage
    growth opportunities), or very unstable work schedules.[17]

    It was never likely that a Republican administration would support
    expanding collective bargaining or additional regulation of
    private employer decisions over wage and hours, and the
    determination of President Trump and congressional Republicans to
    kill the ACA is not surprising.

    But the failure of the Trump Administration and Congress to even
    consider expanding the EITC in a tax bill that throws trillions of
    dollars at high-income individuals and corporations, is quite
    shocking and disturbing.
    But the failure of the Trump Administration and Congress to even
    consider expanding the EITC in a tax bill that throws trillions of
    dollars at high-income individuals and corporations, is quite
    shocking and disturbing. For many years, conservative policy
    analysts or politicians (including House Speaker Paul Ryan) have
    signaled their support for an EITC expansion; it was commonly
    believed that this would occur as part of any larger tax reform
    effort.[18]

    While the Child Tax Credit was doubled in size (from a maximum of
    $1000 to $2000 per child), its refundability for low-income
    families was increased by just $300, after Sen. Rubio threatened
    to withhold his support for the bill. This a very small
    consolation prize for the working poor, relative to the huge gains
    that will be reaped by the affluent from this bill.

    Furthermore, in the absence of sensible federal legislation to
    moderately increase the minimum wage (President Trump supported a
    $10 minimum wage on the campaign trail) or provide paid leave
    (which both Trump and his daughter Ivanka have endorsed), many
    states are moving ahead on their own. Over 30 have already enacted
    statutory minimum wages above the federal level (now at $7.25),
    some going as high as $15 an hour in the process. About a half
    dozen states (including Washington DC) are enacting paid worker
    leave.

    Of course, it is not necessarily negative for states to enact such
    policies with different levels of generosity. Some cities or
    states (like Seattle or San Francisco) have higher costs of living
    and higher concentrations of skilled workers than do many others,
    it is sensible for these localities to enact higher minimum wages
    or more generous paid leave than do others.

    But I fear that an absence of federal policies has created too
    much variance across states in minimum wage levels, benefits like
    paid leave, and regulation of employer hiring behavior (through
    initiatives like “Ban the Box” that limit employer ability to ask
    their workers about having criminal records in their past).
    Indeed, some jurisdictions like Washington DC are embracing the
    $15 minimum wage, generous paid leave, and a range of limits on
    employer permission to screen their job applicants; others, like
    Arlington VA – located right across the river from DC and easily
    accessible through public transit – has adopted none of these.
    These enormous differences could induce employers to relocate
    geographically from higher- to lower-cost jurisdictions, or to
    economize on their hiring of low-skill labor in high-wage
    locations by implementing labor-saving automation more rapidly.
    [19]

    What Will Happen in 2018 and Beyond?

    It is possible that President Trump and his congressional allies,
    moving into an election year, will try harder to find common
    ground with Democrats on issues to benefit less-educated workers.
    Cooperation on infrastructure, for example, would be popular
    politically and perhaps more likely to occur. Such a bill would
    create an opportunity to spread skill-formation and good jobs to
    many unskilled workers who now lack them. And, given the
    difficulties construction contractors are having recruiting and
    training workers as their Baby Boomer workers retire,
    incentivizing employers to train more such workers for lucrative
    constructions jobs would be a win-win.

    At the same time, the budget deficits generated by the tax bill,
    along with conservative ideology (and the fact that the Norquist
    “No Tax” pledge has been signed by almost all congressional
    Republicans), might make it impossible to generate sufficient
    funding for new infrastructure development with any serious scale.
    And, considering the fact that an increase in federal dollars for
    workers training will face near certain opposition in the
    Republican Congress, it’s not at all clear that a major
    infrastructure initiative will be beneficial to many currently
    low-wage workers.

    It’s also likely that, in 2018, House Republicans will push to
    reduce benefits and require more work from low-income benefit
    recipients in programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
    Program (SNAP, or Food Stamps) or Medicaid. Indeed, the Trump
    Administration has already allowed states to require Medicaid
    able-bodied recipients to work as a condition for remaining in the
    program.

    But, to ensure that these changes do not harm low-income
    recipients who desperately need these benefits, and to really
    provide positive effects on their work experience, the work rules
    would have to be accompanied by a broad range of fairly expensive
    additional services, such as: careful assessment of worker
    employability, work supports like transportation and child care
    for those who need them, clear exemptions for parents of small
    children and those who are disabled or opioid-dependent, increased
    access to community college or employer-based training for those
    who can benefit from it, access to subsidized private sector jobs,
    and a guarantee of public sector work or service activities if
    none can be found by the recipients.

    It seems highly unlikely that states which adopt the Medicaid work
    rules will agree to such an expansion of their obligations to
    recipients.

    Conclusion

    After one year in office, President Trump has provided “feel-good”
    rhetoric to the white non-college workers who enthusiastically
    supported him, and policy actions that will deliver modest short-
    term benefits for them but larger long-term costs.

    The labor market overall is improving, but at roughly the same
    pace as it did under President Obama. The tax and regulation cuts
    enacted by the Administration offer modest and mostly short-term
    rewards with much greater costs and risks over the longer term.
    Much the same can be said about his trade and immigration
    policies, which may be pleasing to his supporters but ultimately
    will raise consumer prices, lower innovation and growth in the
    U.S., and hurt our fiscal balance domestically and our influence
    overseas.

    On education and training, the deficits generated by tax cuts will
    put great pressure on existing investments in human capital (like
    Pell grants for the poor and Labor Department training programs),
    and preclude important new federal investments in everything from
    pre-K to community colleges. Perhaps more importantly, the
    pressure put on state and local public spending from the cap on
    deductions for state and local taxes will likely inhibit both K-12
    and higher education investments, as well as important workforce
    innovations.

    Finally, efforts to “make work pay” for low-income workers have
    grown too modestly (in the case of the Child Tax Credit) or not at
    all (in the case of the EITC). Efforts to eliminate the Affordable
    Care Act have mostly failed, but the elimination of the individual
    insurance mandate in the tax bill could weaken it considerably and
    reduce coverage for millions of less-educated workers.

    And while the Trump Administration does nothing to moderately
    raise the federal minimum wage or provide paid family leave to
    workers, an enormous divide is opening between states implementing
    these policies on their own—sometimes at very high levels, like
    the $15 minimum wage—and those that don’t. Potential negative
    impacts on low-wage worker employment prospects in very “blue”
    states might well result, as employers relocate away from or
    accelerate their automation of low-skill jobs.

    Over time, I’m afraid those workers who have enthusiastically
    supported Donald Trump in the 2016 election and beyond will be
    very disappointed by the lack of progress or harm his policies
    inflict on them.


    FOOTNOTES

    1 While payroll job creation and employment growth in the
    population are strong, their pace of improvement during 2017 was
    no greater than in 2014-16. For instance, total payroll job
    creation was approximately 2.6, 2.2 and 2.1 million in 2015, 2016
    and 2017 respectively; and the employment-to-population ratio rose
    from 59.3 percent in 2014 to 59.6, 59.8, and 60.1 percent
    respectively in the years 2015-17, showing fairly constant rates
    of growth.
    2 Henry Aaron. “Tax Cut Proponents Ignore That There’s No Free
    Lunch.” Economic Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017; and William Gale
    et al. “Who Will Pay for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act?” Economic
    Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017.
    3 Gotbaum, Joshua. “Moving DoL’s Fiduciary standards into the 21st
    Century: The Case of ERISA Investing.” Economic Studies, Brookings
    Brief, 2016; Daniel Hamermesh. “How Businesses Could Skirt the New
    Overtime Law.” Time, October 24, 2016; Klein, Aaron et al. “The
    Impact of the odd-Frank Act on Economic Stability and Growth.”
    Economic Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017; and the Hamilton Project
    and the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago.
    Twelve Economic Facts on Energy and Climate Change. Brookings
    Institution, 2016.
    4 Of course, Trump’s Democratic opponent for President, Hillary
    Clinton, also pledged during the 2016 campaign to not sign the
    current TPP agreement, though she had strongly supported it
    earlier.
    5 Peter Petri and Michael Plummer. The Economic Effects of the
    Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates. The Peterson Institute
    of International Economics, Washington DC, 2015; and David Riker.
    Do Jobs in Export Industry Still Pay More? And Why? Office of
    Competition and Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce,
    Washington DC, 2010.
    6 Jennifer Hunt. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?”
    American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. Vol. 2, No. 2, 2010.
    7 Malloy, Raven et al. 2016. “Understanding Declining Fluidity in
    the US Labor Market.” Economic Studies, Brookings Brief.
    8 The National Academy of Science. The Economic and Fiscal
    Consequences of Immigration. Washington DC, National Academy
    Press. 2017.
    9 Since the first few generations of immigrant children show
    strong improvement over time in economic success, and since low-
    income immigrants often need services provided at the state or
    local level, the net fiscal benefits of immigration are greater in
    the long- than the short-run and greater nationally than locally.
    10 For instance, Senators Tom Cotton and David Perdue recently
    introduced a bill to shift immigration from less- to more-educated
    immigrants, but to also curtail overall immigration numbers. The
    proposed bill was supported by Trump and his Administration.
    11 Jay Shambaugh et al. “Returning to Education: The Hamilton
    Project on Human Capital and Wages.” The Hamilton Project,
    Brookings Institution, forthcoming in 2018.
    12 Harry Holzer and Sandy Baum. Making College Work: Pathways to
    Success for Disadvantaged Students. Brookings Press. 2017.
    13 For instance, Kentucky’s FAME program provides apprenticeships
    to companies in advanced manufacturing, while Tennessee’s “Drive
    to 55” sets an ambitious goal of improving postsecondary
    credential completion in the state to 55 percent of the
    population. South Carolina also aggressively markets
    apprenticeships to its companies and provides a $1000 tax credit
    per year for each apprentice.
    14 Robert Lerman. “Expanding Apprenticeship Opportunities in the
    United States.” In M. Kearney and B. Harris eds. Policies to
    Address Poverty in America. The Hamilton Project, Brookings
    Institution, Washington DC. 2014.
    15 Mark Dynarski. “On Negative Effects of Vouchers.” Economic
    Studies, Brookings Brief, 2016.
    16 Stephanie Cellini et al. “The Government is Sanctioning For-
    Profit Colleges. What Happens to the Students?” Economic Studies,
    Brookings Brief 2017.
    17 David Weil. “Denying Reality: Labor Standards in the Trump
    Era.” Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Allied Social
    Science Association, January 5, 2018.
    18 Michael Strain. “Earned Income Tax Credit Does Better Job of
    Lifting Workers Out of Poverty.” McClatchy News Service, May 1.
    19 Isaac Sorkin. “Are There Long-Run Effects of the Minimum Wage
    on Employment?” Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2015;
    and Jonathan Meer and Jeremy West. “Effects of the Minimum Wage on
    Employment Dynamics.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working
    Paper. 2013.



    https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/one-year-in-has-trump-been- good-for-us-workers/

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Sean Hannity@21:1/5 to All on Fri Oct 4 12:44:00 2019
    XPost: alt.global-warming, uk.politics.misc, alt.fan.rush-limbaugh

    Looks like only his cultish fool followers believe what the liar
    says. From what I see, the only money his followers earn is for
    attending his rallies. They don't seem like the industrious or entrepreneurial type. Maybe the Kremlin gives them some money.
    Who knows?





    ....

    One year in: Has Trump been good for US workers?
    Harry J. HolzerWednesday, January 17, 2018

    rump was elected President in 2016, at least partly due to the
    anger of less-educated white workers, particularly against
    immigrants and international trade policies. He very skillfully
    exploited that anger, promising that, if elected, he would fight
    for better trade deals and limited immigration, as well as a range
    of other policies to help these workers

    After one year in office, is Trump making good on these promises?
    In this essay, I argue that Trump’s policy actions to date provide
    meager help to those who so enthusiastically supported him, and
    mostly in the short term—while, over the longer term, these
    policies will likely cause them more harm than good.

    Trump’s impact on the overall health of the job market, for which
    he takes a great deal of credit, as well as the impacts of the
    recently signed tax bill on workers, have been well-discussed
    elsewhere. Very simply, there is little evidence that Trump’s
    policies have raised the pace of growth in the job market beyond
    what was happening in 2015 and 2016;[1] and it appears as though
    the fairly meager benefits of the tax cuts for non-college
    educated U.S. workers will be outweighed by the costs over time of
    paying for them with lower government benefits or higher taxes.[2]

    I therefore focus on other important Trump policies affecting
    labor—namely, regulatory cuts, trade and immigration, education
    and workforce development, and policies to “make work pay” for the
    unskilled.

    Weakening Regulation

    Donald Trump has already made his mark as a deregulator, cutting
    several Obama-era regulations that directly affect workers—for
    example, rules raising the numbers of workers with earnings
    covered by overtime pay or requiring financial advisers to act
    more clearly in the “fiduciary” interests of their clients. He has
    also limited or cancelled others that indirectly affect workers,
    like climate regulations or those covering the financial markets
    in the Dodd-Frank legislation.

    There is little doubt that limiting regulation can reduce employer
    costs and improve production, employment and earnings of workers,
    in manufacturing and other sectors. But the economic benefits of
    lower regulation must be balanced against the benefits workers
    will forego and the higher risks of financial and climate
    disasters over time, and our knowledge of the exact magnitudes of
    these benefits and costs is limited. Still, given what we know,
    it’s quite unlikely that workers’ interests will be served in the
    long run by Trump’s regulatory changes.[3]

    Very simply, there is little evidence that Trump’s policies have
    raised the pace of growth in the job market beyond what was
    happening in 2015 and 2016.
    Trade and Immigration

    To-date, Trump’s primary policy change in this area has been to
    withdraw the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and to
    demand some renegotiation of terms on the North American Free
    Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico.[4] It is too soon
    to tell what changes, if any, will be made to NAFTA, but we can
    render some judgments on the likely effects of American TPP
    withdrawal on our workers.

    Though the effects of withdrawal in the next decade may not be
    large, they seem likely negative. As many analysts have pointed
    out, the reductions in tariffs protecting the markets of our Asian
    partners would have been greater than our own tariffs, leading our
    exports to rise more than imports. In addition, wages in exporting
    industries tend to mostly be higher than those in import-sensitive
    sectors like nondurable manufacturing. Thus, overall GDP under
    TPP would likely have risen.[5]

    Additionally, higher federal budget deficits will almost certainly
    raise the value of the dollar relative to foreign currencies and
    cause further damage to our trade balance. This will make our
    exports more expensive and our imports cheaper, leading to less of
    the former and more of the latter. Indeed, the negative effects of
    federal deficits on our current account balance might be the most
    significant effect of Trump on international trade outcomes in the
    US during his time in office, and it will likely be negative.

    But perhaps more importantly, our withdrawal from TPP leaves a
    large vacuum in economic and geopolitical leadership in Asia,
    which will almost certainly be filled by China. It is hard to
    imagine any circumstances under which this development, over time,
    will benefit U.S. workers.

    Regarding immigration, a collection of small and large actions
    will likely have the cumulative effect of discouraging immigration
    to the U.S. of both highly- and less highly-educated workers from
    abroad, even if no further legislative reforms to immigration are
    undertaken. Trump’s most important action to date has arguably
    been his cancellation of the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals
    (DACA) program (though this currently is being address during
    budget negotiations between the President and Congress), but the
    Administration has also pursued the controversial travel ban, the
    cancellation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Salvadoran
    refugees, heightened deportations of undocumented workers, and
    ongoing talk of ending “chain immigration” across family members.

    Will the reduction in immigration improve the job prospects of
    native-born U.S. workers? The high rate of business startups and
    patents secured by such immigrants suggests any reduction in
    immigration from highly-educated workers only harms the U.S.
    economy.[6] At a time when the U.S. labor market has become more
    sluggish, discouraging the entry of international graduate
    students or highly-skilled immigrants seems very ill-advised.[7]

    The net economic effects of discouraging immigration among less-
    educated workers is more mixed. Prominent labor economists, such
    as George Borjas and David Card, have generated quite different
    estimates of the impacts of such immigration on native-born, less-
    educated Americans. A reasonable average of their estimates
    implies that immigration has reduced their earnings by maybe 3-4
    percent since 1980, though the estimated loss should also decline
    over time as foreign capital responds to lower wages by entering
    the U.S. at greater rates and raising worker wages.[8]

    RELATED CONTENT
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    At the same time, these immigrants reduce consumer prices in some
    key sectors, like housing, food, shelter, and medical/elder care –
    thereby contributing to the real incomes of U.S. workers. They
    also contribute to labor force and revenue growth in the U.S. just
    when native-born Baby Boomers are retiring in great numbers and
    putting downward pressure on overall economic growth and federal
    revenues.[9]

    Overall, the positive contributions of low-skilled immigrants to
    real income, labor force activity and federal revenues (and
    therefore to the solvency of programs like Social Security and
    Medicare) are perhaps large enough to outweigh their modest
    downward pressure on the wages of less-educated, native born
    workers—leading me to believe we should reject proposals that
    would drastically curtail such immigration.[10] Overall, the net
    effects of Trump’s actions on trade and immigration will likely be
    negative to the U.S. economy and to native-born workers over time.

    Worker Skills: Education and Training

    While issues like trade and immigration are highly emotional ones
    for many U.S. workers, the ability of U.S. workers to gain
    education and skills that the labor market values is arguably much
    more important to their economic well-being over time.

    One year into the Trump administration, the most important effects
    in this area might derive not from any explicit policies, but from
    the unanticipated consequences of the tax cuts passed in early
    2018. These tax cuts will likely discourage important education
    and training initiatives at all levels in the coming years –
    federal, state and local.

    On the federal level, the growth of budget deficits caused by the
    tax bill will almost certainly preclude major new investment
    initiatives, like expanding high-quality pre-kindergarten programs
    or community college job training efforts. Important existing
    programs, like Pell grants for low-income college students, face
    major risks as well.

    But even before the tax cuts were enacted, the Trump
    Administration had proposed large cuts in funding to already-
    shrinking federal training programs run by the Department of
    Labor, on top of the very large reductions that have already
    occurred over time.[11] I expect to see these cuts implemented and
    growing over time.

    But public education in the U.S. at the K-12 and postsecondary
    levels is overwhelmingly funded at the state and local levels. The
    decision of Congress to impose $10,000 caps on the deductability
    of state and local taxes will almost certainly put pressure on
    many states to cut such funding. To some extent, this has already
    been occurring. Overall state revenues for higher education have
    been declining over the past decade in real value, and the tax cut
    will likely accelerate that trend.[12]

    Furthermore, recent state-funded innovations in both “red” and
    “blue” states, to train workers for high-demand jobs might also be
    at risk as public spending becomes costlier.[13]

    In the summer of 2017, the Administration announced an initiative
    to double the federal expenditures on apprenticeships from $100 to
    $200 million (carved out of existing Labor Department funding).
    The initiative seeks to spread new apprenticeship models that
    might have more employer uptake because they are less regulated
    than the current model of “registered” apprenticeship. This idea
    merits some experimentation and careful evaluation to measure its
    effects. But since we have strong evidence of the positive impacts
    of registered apprenticeship on worker earnings, and none for
    unregistered models, we should move cautiously in this area before
    changing existing policy.[14]

    Lastly, the strong convictions of Education Secretary Betsy DeVos
    around school choice mean we can expect an expansion in the
    support of private and for-profit schools. While expanding student
    choice through publicly funded charter schools is warranted by
    research evidence, this is much less true of private schools and
    vouchers.[15] Furthermore, the research on for-profit higher
    education is quite negative, showing much higher costs than public
    two-year and four-year colleges, much higher rates of student
    default on loans, and lower value among employers in the labor
    market. We should therefore proceed very cautiously in this area,
    and continue to demand appropriate regulation of the for-profit
    educational sector.[16]

    Policies to “Make Work Pay”

    Policies at the federal, state and local levels to increase
    compensation take many forms besides just education and training.
    These efforts include raising the statutory minimum wage and
    expanding publicly funded benefits like health insurance (as done
    through the Affordable Care Act) or paid family leave. They can
    also entail expansions in tax credits for workers like the Earned
    Income Tax Credit (EITC) or the Child Tax Credit (CTC).

    In a very different realm, federal and state governments can also
    undertake policies to more actively support or restrict collective
    bargaining, in either the private or public sectors, or to protect
    workers from wage theft, “noncompete clauses” in their employment
    contracts (which deny workers the right to take jobs with company
    competitors, thus restricting their bargaining power and wage
    growth opportunities), or very unstable work schedules.[17]

    It was never likely that a Republican administration would support
    expanding collective bargaining or additional regulation of
    private employer decisions over wage and hours, and the
    determination of President Trump and congressional Republicans to
    kill the ACA is not surprising.

    But the failure of the Trump Administration and Congress to even
    consider expanding the EITC in a tax bill that throws trillions of
    dollars at high-income individuals and corporations, is quite
    shocking and disturbing.
    But the failure of the Trump Administration and Congress to even
    consider expanding the EITC in a tax bill that throws trillions of
    dollars at high-income individuals and corporations, is quite
    shocking and disturbing. For many years, conservative policy
    analysts or politicians (including House Speaker Paul Ryan) have
    signaled their support for an EITC expansion; it was commonly
    believed that this would occur as part of any larger tax reform
    effort.[18]

    While the Child Tax Credit was doubled in size (from a maximum of
    $1000 to $2000 per child), its refundability for low-income
    families was increased by just $300, after Sen. Rubio threatened
    to withhold his support for the bill. This a very small
    consolation prize for the working poor, relative to the huge gains
    that will be reaped by the affluent from this bill.

    Furthermore, in the absence of sensible federal legislation to
    moderately increase the minimum wage (President Trump supported a
    $10 minimum wage on the campaign trail) or provide paid leave
    (which both Trump and his daughter Ivanka have endorsed), many
    states are moving ahead on their own. Over 30 have already enacted
    statutory minimum wages above the federal level (now at $7.25),
    some going as high as $15 an hour in the process. About a half
    dozen states (including Washington DC) are enacting paid worker
    leave.

    Of course, it is not necessarily negative for states to enact such
    policies with different levels of generosity. Some cities or
    states (like Seattle or San Francisco) have higher costs of living
    and higher concentrations of skilled workers than do many others,
    it is sensible for these localities to enact higher minimum wages
    or more generous paid leave than do others.

    But I fear that an absence of federal policies has created too
    much variance across states in minimum wage levels, benefits like
    paid leave, and regulation of employer hiring behavior (through
    initiatives like “Ban the Box” that limit employer ability to ask
    their workers about having criminal records in their past).
    Indeed, some jurisdictions like Washington DC are embracing the
    $15 minimum wage, generous paid leave, and a range of limits on
    employer permission to screen their job applicants; others, like
    Arlington VA – located right across the river from DC and easily
    accessible through public transit – has adopted none of these.
    These enormous differences could induce employers to relocate
    geographically from higher- to lower-cost jurisdictions, or to
    economize on their hiring of low-skill labor in high-wage
    locations by implementing labor-saving automation more rapidly.
    [19]

    What Will Happen in 2018 and Beyond?

    It is possible that President Trump and his congressional allies,
    moving into an election year, will try harder to find common
    ground with Democrats on issues to benefit less-educated workers.
    Cooperation on infrastructure, for example, would be popular
    politically and perhaps more likely to occur. Such a bill would
    create an opportunity to spread skill-formation and good jobs to
    many unskilled workers who now lack them. And, given the
    difficulties construction contractors are having recruiting and
    training workers as their Baby Boomer workers retire,
    incentivizing employers to train more such workers for lucrative
    constructions jobs would be a win-win.

    At the same time, the budget deficits generated by the tax bill,
    along with conservative ideology (and the fact that the Norquist
    “No Tax” pledge has been signed by almost all congressional
    Republicans), might make it impossible to generate sufficient
    funding for new infrastructure development with any serious scale.
    And, considering the fact that an increase in federal dollars for
    workers training will face near certain opposition in the
    Republican Congress, it’s not at all clear that a major
    infrastructure initiative will be beneficial to many currently
    low-wage workers.

    It’s also likely that, in 2018, House Republicans will push to
    reduce benefits and require more work from low-income benefit
    recipients in programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
    Program (SNAP, or Food Stamps) or Medicaid. Indeed, the Trump
    Administration has already allowed states to require Medicaid
    able-bodied recipients to work as a condition for remaining in the
    program.

    But, to ensure that these changes do not harm low-income
    recipients who desperately need these benefits, and to really
    provide positive effects on their work experience, the work rules
    would have to be accompanied by a broad range of fairly expensive
    additional services, such as: careful assessment of worker
    employability, work supports like transportation and child care
    for those who need them, clear exemptions for parents of small
    children and those who are disabled or opioid-dependent, increased
    access to community college or employer-based training for those
    who can benefit from it, access to subsidized private sector jobs,
    and a guarantee of public sector work or service activities if
    none can be found by the recipients.

    It seems highly unlikely that states which adopt the Medicaid work
    rules will agree to such an expansion of their obligations to
    recipients.

    Conclusion

    After one year in office, President Trump has provided “feel-good”
    rhetoric to the white non-college workers who enthusiastically
    supported him, and policy actions that will deliver modest short-
    term benefits for them but larger long-term costs.

    The labor market overall is improving, but at roughly the same
    pace as it did under President Obama. The tax and regulation cuts
    enacted by the Administration offer modest and mostly short-term
    rewards with much greater costs and risks over the longer term.
    Much the same can be said about his trade and immigration
    policies, which may be pleasing to his supporters but ultimately
    will raise consumer prices, lower innovation and growth in the
    U.S., and hurt our fiscal balance domestically and our influence
    overseas.

    On education and training, the deficits generated by tax cuts will
    put great pressure on existing investments in human capital (like
    Pell grants for the poor and Labor Department training programs),
    and preclude important new federal investments in everything from
    pre-K to community colleges. Perhaps more importantly, the
    pressure put on state and local public spending from the cap on
    deductions for state and local taxes will likely inhibit both K-12
    and higher education investments, as well as important workforce
    innovations.

    Finally, efforts to “make work pay” for low-income workers have
    grown too modestly (in the case of the Child Tax Credit) or not at
    all (in the case of the EITC). Efforts to eliminate the Affordable
    Care Act have mostly failed, but the elimination of the individual
    insurance mandate in the tax bill could weaken it considerably and
    reduce coverage for millions of less-educated workers.

    And while the Trump Administration does nothing to moderately
    raise the federal minimum wage or provide paid family leave to
    workers, an enormous divide is opening between states implementing
    these policies on their own—sometimes at very high levels, like
    the $15 minimum wage—and those that don’t. Potential negative
    impacts on low-wage worker employment prospects in very “blue”
    states might well result, as employers relocate away from or
    accelerate their automation of low-skill jobs.

    Over time, I’m afraid those workers who have enthusiastically
    supported Donald Trump in the 2016 election and beyond will be
    very disappointed by the lack of progress or harm his policies
    inflict on them.


    FOOTNOTES

    1 While payroll job creation and employment growth in the
    population are strong, their pace of improvement during 2017 was
    no greater than in 2014-16. For instance, total payroll job
    creation was approximately 2.6, 2.2 and 2.1 million in 2015, 2016
    and 2017 respectively; and the employment-to-population ratio rose
    from 59.3 percent in 2014 to 59.6, 59.8, and 60.1 percent
    respectively in the years 2015-17, showing fairly constant rates
    of growth.
    2 Henry Aaron. “Tax Cut Proponents Ignore That There’s No Free
    Lunch.” Economic Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017; and William Gale
    et al. “Who Will Pay for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act?” Economic
    Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017.
    3 Gotbaum, Joshua. “Moving DoL’s Fiduciary standards into the 21st
    Century: The Case of ERISA Investing.” Economic Studies, Brookings
    Brief, 2016; Daniel Hamermesh. “How Businesses Could Skirt the New
    Overtime Law.” Time, October 24, 2016; Klein, Aaron et al. “The
    Impact of the odd-Frank Act on Economic Stability and Growth.”
    Economic Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017; and the Hamilton Project
    and the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago.
    Twelve Economic Facts on Energy and Climate Change. Brookings
    Institution, 2016.
    4 Of course, Trump’s Democratic opponent for President, Hillary
    Clinton, also pledged during the 2016 campaign to not sign the
    current TPP agreement, though she had strongly supported it
    earlier.
    5 Peter Petri and Michael Plummer. The Economic Effects of the
    Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates. The Peterson Institute
    of International Economics, Washington DC, 2015; and David Riker.
    Do Jobs in Export Industry Still Pay More? And Why? Office of
    Competition and Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce,
    Washington DC, 2010.
    6 Jennifer Hunt. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?”
    American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. Vol. 2, No. 2, 2010.
    7 Malloy, Raven et al. 2016. “Understanding Declining Fluidity in
    the US Labor Market.” Economic Studies, Brookings Brief.
    8 The National Academy of Science. The Economic and Fiscal
    Consequences of Immigration. Washington DC, National Academy
    Press. 2017.
    9 Since the first few generations of immigrant children show
    strong improvement over time in economic success, and since low-
    income immigrants often need services provided at the state or
    local level, the net fiscal benefits of immigration are greater in
    the long- than the short-run and greater nationally than locally.
    10 For instance, Senators Tom Cotton and David Perdue recently
    introduced a bill to shift immigration from less- to more-educated
    immigrants, but to also curtail overall immigration numbers. The
    proposed bill was supported by Trump and his Administration.
    11 Jay Shambaugh et al. “Returning to Education: The Hamilton
    Project on Human Capital and Wages.” The Hamilton Project,
    Brookings Institution, forthcoming in 2018.
    12 Harry Holzer and Sandy Baum. Making College Work: Pathways to
    Success for Disadvantaged Students. Brookings Press. 2017.
    13 For instance, Kentucky’s FAME program provides apprenticeships
    to companies in advanced manufacturing, while Tennessee’s “Drive
    to 55” sets an ambitious goal of improving postsecondary
    credential completion in the state to 55 percent of the
    population. South Carolina also aggressively markets
    apprenticeships to its companies and provides a $1000 tax credit
    per year for each apprentice.
    14 Robert Lerman. “Expanding Apprenticeship Opportunities in the
    United States.” In M. Kearney and B. Harris eds. Policies to
    Address Poverty in America. The Hamilton Project, Brookings
    Institution, Washington DC. 2014.
    15 Mark Dynarski. “On Negative Effects of Vouchers.” Economic
    Studies, Brookings Brief, 2016.
    16 Stephanie Cellini et al. “The Government is Sanctioning For-
    Profit Colleges. What Happens to the Students?” Economic Studies,
    Brookings Brief 2017.
    17 David Weil. “Denying Reality: Labor Standards in the Trump
    Era.” Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Allied Social
    Science Association, January 5, 2018.
    18 Michael Strain. “Earned Income Tax Credit Does Better Job of
    Lifting Workers Out of Poverty.” McClatchy News Service, May 1.
    19 Isaac Sorkin. “Are There Long-Run Effects of the Minimum Wage
    on Employment?” Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2015;
    and Jonathan Meer and Jeremy West. “Effects of the Minimum Wage on
    Employment Dynamics.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working
    Paper. 2013.



    https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/one-year-in-has-trump-been- good-for-us-workers/

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Sean Hannity@21:1/5 to All on Wed May 13 01:51:58 2020
    XPost: alt.global-warming, uk.politics.misc, alt.fan.rush-limbaugh

    Looks like only his cultish fool followers believe what the liar
    says. From what I see, the only money his followers earn is for
    attending his rallies. They don't seem like the industrious or entrepreneurial type. Maybe the Kremlin gives them some money.
    Who knows?





    ....

    One year in: Has Trump been good for US workers?
    Harry J. HolzerWednesday, January 17, 2018

    rump was elected President in 2016, at least partly due to the
    anger of less-educated white workers, particularly against
    immigrants and international trade policies. He very skillfully
    exploited that anger, promising that, if elected, he would fight
    for better trade deals and limited immigration, as well as a range
    of other policies to help these workers

    After one year in office, is Trump making good on these promises?
    In this essay, I argue that Trump’s policy actions to date provide
    meager help to those who so enthusiastically supported him, and
    mostly in the short term—while, over the longer term, these
    policies will likely cause them more harm than good.

    Trump’s impact on the overall health of the job market, for which
    he takes a great deal of credit, as well as the impacts of the
    recently signed tax bill on workers, have been well-discussed
    elsewhere. Very simply, there is little evidence that Trump’s
    policies have raised the pace of growth in the job market beyond
    what was happening in 2015 and 2016;[1] and it appears as though
    the fairly meager benefits of the tax cuts for non-college
    educated U.S. workers will be outweighed by the costs over time of
    paying for them with lower government benefits or higher taxes.[2]

    I therefore focus on other important Trump policies affecting
    labor—namely, regulatory cuts, trade and immigration, education
    and workforce development, and policies to “make work pay” for the
    unskilled.

    Weakening Regulation

    Donald Trump has already made his mark as a deregulator, cutting
    several Obama-era regulations that directly affect workers—for
    example, rules raising the numbers of workers with earnings
    covered by overtime pay or requiring financial advisers to act
    more clearly in the “fiduciary” interests of their clients. He has
    also limited or cancelled others that indirectly affect workers,
    like climate regulations or those covering the financial markets
    in the Dodd-Frank legislation.

    There is little doubt that limiting regulation can reduce employer
    costs and improve production, employment and earnings of workers,
    in manufacturing and other sectors. But the economic benefits of
    lower regulation must be balanced against the benefits workers
    will forego and the higher risks of financial and climate
    disasters over time, and our knowledge of the exact magnitudes of
    these benefits and costs is limited. Still, given what we know,
    it’s quite unlikely that workers’ interests will be served in the
    long run by Trump’s regulatory changes.[3]

    Very simply, there is little evidence that Trump’s policies have
    raised the pace of growth in the job market beyond what was
    happening in 2015 and 2016.
    Trade and Immigration

    To-date, Trump’s primary policy change in this area has been to
    withdraw the U.S. from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and to
    demand some renegotiation of terms on the North American Free
    Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico.[4] It is too soon
    to tell what changes, if any, will be made to NAFTA, but we can
    render some judgments on the likely effects of American TPP
    withdrawal on our workers.

    Though the effects of withdrawal in the next decade may not be
    large, they seem likely negative. As many analysts have pointed
    out, the reductions in tariffs protecting the markets of our Asian
    partners would have been greater than our own tariffs, leading our
    exports to rise more than imports. In addition, wages in exporting
    industries tend to mostly be higher than those in import-sensitive
    sectors like nondurable manufacturing. Thus, overall GDP under
    TPP would likely have risen.[5]

    Additionally, higher federal budget deficits will almost certainly
    raise the value of the dollar relative to foreign currencies and
    cause further damage to our trade balance. This will make our
    exports more expensive and our imports cheaper, leading to less of
    the former and more of the latter. Indeed, the negative effects of
    federal deficits on our current account balance might be the most
    significant effect of Trump on international trade outcomes in the
    US during his time in office, and it will likely be negative.

    But perhaps more importantly, our withdrawal from TPP leaves a
    large vacuum in economic and geopolitical leadership in Asia,
    which will almost certainly be filled by China. It is hard to
    imagine any circumstances under which this development, over time,
    will benefit U.S. workers.

    Regarding immigration, a collection of small and large actions
    will likely have the cumulative effect of discouraging immigration
    to the U.S. of both highly- and less highly-educated workers from
    abroad, even if no further legislative reforms to immigration are
    undertaken. Trump’s most important action to date has arguably
    been his cancellation of the Deferred Action for Child Arrivals
    (DACA) program (though this currently is being address during
    budget negotiations between the President and Congress), but the
    Administration has also pursued the controversial travel ban, the
    cancellation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Salvadoran
    refugees, heightened deportations of undocumented workers, and
    ongoing talk of ending “chain immigration” across family members.

    Will the reduction in immigration improve the job prospects of
    native-born U.S. workers? The high rate of business startups and
    patents secured by such immigrants suggests any reduction in
    immigration from highly-educated workers only harms the U.S.
    economy.[6] At a time when the U.S. labor market has become more
    sluggish, discouraging the entry of international graduate
    students or highly-skilled immigrants seems very ill-advised.[7]

    The net economic effects of discouraging immigration among less-
    educated workers is more mixed. Prominent labor economists, such
    as George Borjas and David Card, have generated quite different
    estimates of the impacts of such immigration on native-born, less-
    educated Americans. A reasonable average of their estimates
    implies that immigration has reduced their earnings by maybe 3-4
    percent since 1980, though the estimated loss should also decline
    over time as foreign capital responds to lower wages by entering
    the U.S. at greater rates and raising worker wages.[8]

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    At the same time, these immigrants reduce consumer prices in some
    key sectors, like housing, food, shelter, and medical/elder care –
    thereby contributing to the real incomes of U.S. workers. They
    also contribute to labor force and revenue growth in the U.S. just
    when native-born Baby Boomers are retiring in great numbers and
    putting downward pressure on overall economic growth and federal
    revenues.[9]

    Overall, the positive contributions of low-skilled immigrants to
    real income, labor force activity and federal revenues (and
    therefore to the solvency of programs like Social Security and
    Medicare) are perhaps large enough to outweigh their modest
    downward pressure on the wages of less-educated, native born
    workers—leading me to believe we should reject proposals that
    would drastically curtail such immigration.[10] Overall, the net
    effects of Trump’s actions on trade and immigration will likely be
    negative to the U.S. economy and to native-born workers over time.

    Worker Skills: Education and Training

    While issues like trade and immigration are highly emotional ones
    for many U.S. workers, the ability of U.S. workers to gain
    education and skills that the labor market values is arguably much
    more important to their economic well-being over time.

    One year into the Trump administration, the most important effects
    in this area might derive not from any explicit policies, but from
    the unanticipated consequences of the tax cuts passed in early
    2018. These tax cuts will likely discourage important education
    and training initiatives at all levels in the coming years –
    federal, state and local.

    On the federal level, the growth of budget deficits caused by the
    tax bill will almost certainly preclude major new investment
    initiatives, like expanding high-quality pre-kindergarten programs
    or community college job training efforts. Important existing
    programs, like Pell grants for low-income college students, face
    major risks as well.

    But even before the tax cuts were enacted, the Trump
    Administration had proposed large cuts in funding to already-
    shrinking federal training programs run by the Department of
    Labor, on top of the very large reductions that have already
    occurred over time.[11] I expect to see these cuts implemented and
    growing over time.

    But public education in the U.S. at the K-12 and postsecondary
    levels is overwhelmingly funded at the state and local levels. The
    decision of Congress to impose $10,000 caps on the deductability
    of state and local taxes will almost certainly put pressure on
    many states to cut such funding. To some extent, this has already
    been occurring. Overall state revenues for higher education have
    been declining over the past decade in real value, and the tax cut
    will likely accelerate that trend.[12]

    Furthermore, recent state-funded innovations in both “red” and
    “blue” states, to train workers for high-demand jobs might also be
    at risk as public spending becomes costlier.[13]

    In the summer of 2017, the Administration announced an initiative
    to double the federal expenditures on apprenticeships from $100 to
    $200 million (carved out of existing Labor Department funding).
    The initiative seeks to spread new apprenticeship models that
    might have more employer uptake because they are less regulated
    than the current model of “registered” apprenticeship. This idea
    merits some experimentation and careful evaluation to measure its
    effects. But since we have strong evidence of the positive impacts
    of registered apprenticeship on worker earnings, and none for
    unregistered models, we should move cautiously in this area before
    changing existing policy.[14]

    Lastly, the strong convictions of Education Secretary Betsy DeVos
    around school choice mean we can expect an expansion in the
    support of private and for-profit schools. While expanding student
    choice through publicly funded charter schools is warranted by
    research evidence, this is much less true of private schools and
    vouchers.[15] Furthermore, the research on for-profit higher
    education is quite negative, showing much higher costs than public
    two-year and four-year colleges, much higher rates of student
    default on loans, and lower value among employers in the labor
    market. We should therefore proceed very cautiously in this area,
    and continue to demand appropriate regulation of the for-profit
    educational sector.[16]

    Policies to “Make Work Pay”

    Policies at the federal, state and local levels to increase
    compensation take many forms besides just education and training.
    These efforts include raising the statutory minimum wage and
    expanding publicly funded benefits like health insurance (as done
    through the Affordable Care Act) or paid family leave. They can
    also entail expansions in tax credits for workers like the Earned
    Income Tax Credit (EITC) or the Child Tax Credit (CTC).

    In a very different realm, federal and state governments can also
    undertake policies to more actively support or restrict collective
    bargaining, in either the private or public sectors, or to protect
    workers from wage theft, “noncompete clauses” in their employment
    contracts (which deny workers the right to take jobs with company
    competitors, thus restricting their bargaining power and wage
    growth opportunities), or very unstable work schedules.[17]

    It was never likely that a Republican administration would support
    expanding collective bargaining or additional regulation of
    private employer decisions over wage and hours, and the
    determination of President Trump and congressional Republicans to
    kill the ACA is not surprising.

    But the failure of the Trump Administration and Congress to even
    consider expanding the EITC in a tax bill that throws trillions of
    dollars at high-income individuals and corporations, is quite
    shocking and disturbing.
    But the failure of the Trump Administration and Congress to even
    consider expanding the EITC in a tax bill that throws trillions of
    dollars at high-income individuals and corporations, is quite
    shocking and disturbing. For many years, conservative policy
    analysts or politicians (including House Speaker Paul Ryan) have
    signaled their support for an EITC expansion; it was commonly
    believed that this would occur as part of any larger tax reform
    effort.[18]

    While the Child Tax Credit was doubled in size (from a maximum of
    $1000 to $2000 per child), its refundability for low-income
    families was increased by just $300, after Sen. Rubio threatened
    to withhold his support for the bill. This a very small
    consolation prize for the working poor, relative to the huge gains
    that will be reaped by the affluent from this bill.

    Furthermore, in the absence of sensible federal legislation to
    moderately increase the minimum wage (President Trump supported a
    $10 minimum wage on the campaign trail) or provide paid leave
    (which both Trump and his daughter Ivanka have endorsed), many
    states are moving ahead on their own. Over 30 have already enacted
    statutory minimum wages above the federal level (now at $7.25),
    some going as high as $15 an hour in the process. About a half
    dozen states (including Washington DC) are enacting paid worker
    leave.

    Of course, it is not necessarily negative for states to enact such
    policies with different levels of generosity. Some cities or
    states (like Seattle or San Francisco) have higher costs of living
    and higher concentrations of skilled workers than do many others,
    it is sensible for these localities to enact higher minimum wages
    or more generous paid leave than do others.

    But I fear that an absence of federal policies has created too
    much variance across states in minimum wage levels, benefits like
    paid leave, and regulation of employer hiring behavior (through
    initiatives like “Ban the Box” that limit employer ability to ask
    their workers about having criminal records in their past).
    Indeed, some jurisdictions like Washington DC are embracing the
    $15 minimum wage, generous paid leave, and a range of limits on
    employer permission to screen their job applicants; others, like
    Arlington VA – located right across the river from DC and easily
    accessible through public transit – has adopted none of these.
    These enormous differences could induce employers to relocate
    geographically from higher- to lower-cost jurisdictions, or to
    economize on their hiring of low-skill labor in high-wage
    locations by implementing labor-saving automation more rapidly.
    [19]

    What Will Happen in 2018 and Beyond?

    It is possible that President Trump and his congressional allies,
    moving into an election year, will try harder to find common
    ground with Democrats on issues to benefit less-educated workers.
    Cooperation on infrastructure, for example, would be popular
    politically and perhaps more likely to occur. Such a bill would
    create an opportunity to spread skill-formation and good jobs to
    many unskilled workers who now lack them. And, given the
    difficulties construction contractors are having recruiting and
    training workers as their Baby Boomer workers retire,
    incentivizing employers to train more such workers for lucrative
    constructions jobs would be a win-win.

    At the same time, the budget deficits generated by the tax bill,
    along with conservative ideology (and the fact that the Norquist
    “No Tax” pledge has been signed by almost all congressional
    Republicans), might make it impossible to generate sufficient
    funding for new infrastructure development with any serious scale.
    And, considering the fact that an increase in federal dollars for
    workers training will face near certain opposition in the
    Republican Congress, it’s not at all clear that a major
    infrastructure initiative will be beneficial to many currently
    low-wage workers.

    It’s also likely that, in 2018, House Republicans will push to
    reduce benefits and require more work from low-income benefit
    recipients in programs like the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
    Program (SNAP, or Food Stamps) or Medicaid. Indeed, the Trump
    Administration has already allowed states to require Medicaid
    able-bodied recipients to work as a condition for remaining in the
    program.

    But, to ensure that these changes do not harm low-income
    recipients who desperately need these benefits, and to really
    provide positive effects on their work experience, the work rules
    would have to be accompanied by a broad range of fairly expensive
    additional services, such as: careful assessment of worker
    employability, work supports like transportation and child care
    for those who need them, clear exemptions for parents of small
    children and those who are disabled or opioid-dependent, increased
    access to community college or employer-based training for those
    who can benefit from it, access to subsidized private sector jobs,
    and a guarantee of public sector work or service activities if
    none can be found by the recipients.

    It seems highly unlikely that states which adopt the Medicaid work
    rules will agree to such an expansion of their obligations to
    recipients.

    Conclusion

    After one year in office, President Trump has provided “feel-good”
    rhetoric to the white non-college workers who enthusiastically
    supported him, and policy actions that will deliver modest short-
    term benefits for them but larger long-term costs.

    The labor market overall is improving, but at roughly the same
    pace as it did under President Obama. The tax and regulation cuts
    enacted by the Administration offer modest and mostly short-term
    rewards with much greater costs and risks over the longer term.
    Much the same can be said about his trade and immigration
    policies, which may be pleasing to his supporters but ultimately
    will raise consumer prices, lower innovation and growth in the
    U.S., and hurt our fiscal balance domestically and our influence
    overseas.

    On education and training, the deficits generated by tax cuts will
    put great pressure on existing investments in human capital (like
    Pell grants for the poor and Labor Department training programs),
    and preclude important new federal investments in everything from
    pre-K to community colleges. Perhaps more importantly, the
    pressure put on state and local public spending from the cap on
    deductions for state and local taxes will likely inhibit both K-12
    and higher education investments, as well as important workforce
    innovations.

    Finally, efforts to “make work pay” for low-income workers have
    grown too modestly (in the case of the Child Tax Credit) or not at
    all (in the case of the EITC). Efforts to eliminate the Affordable
    Care Act have mostly failed, but the elimination of the individual
    insurance mandate in the tax bill could weaken it considerably and
    reduce coverage for millions of less-educated workers.

    And while the Trump Administration does nothing to moderately
    raise the federal minimum wage or provide paid family leave to
    workers, an enormous divide is opening between states implementing
    these policies on their own—sometimes at very high levels, like
    the $15 minimum wage—and those that don’t. Potential negative
    impacts on low-wage worker employment prospects in very “blue”
    states might well result, as employers relocate away from or
    accelerate their automation of low-skill jobs.

    Over time, I’m afraid those workers who have enthusiastically
    supported Donald Trump in the 2016 election and beyond will be
    very disappointed by the lack of progress or harm his policies
    inflict on them.


    FOOTNOTES

    1 While payroll job creation and employment growth in the
    population are strong, their pace of improvement during 2017 was
    no greater than in 2014-16. For instance, total payroll job
    creation was approximately 2.6, 2.2 and 2.1 million in 2015, 2016
    and 2017 respectively; and the employment-to-population ratio rose
    from 59.3 percent in 2014 to 59.6, 59.8, and 60.1 percent
    respectively in the years 2015-17, showing fairly constant rates
    of growth.
    2 Henry Aaron. “Tax Cut Proponents Ignore That There’s No Free
    Lunch.” Economic Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017; and William Gale
    et al. “Who Will Pay for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act?” Economic
    Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017.
    3 Gotbaum, Joshua. “Moving DoL’s Fiduciary standards into the 21st
    Century: The Case of ERISA Investing.” Economic Studies, Brookings
    Brief, 2016; Daniel Hamermesh. “How Businesses Could Skirt the New
    Overtime Law.” Time, October 24, 2016; Klein, Aaron et al. “The
    Impact of the odd-Frank Act on Economic Stability and Growth.”
    Economic Studies, Brookings Brief, 2017; and the Hamilton Project
    and the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago.
    Twelve Economic Facts on Energy and Climate Change. Brookings
    Institution, 2016.
    4 Of course, Trump’s Democratic opponent for President, Hillary
    Clinton, also pledged during the 2016 campaign to not sign the
    current TPP agreement, though she had strongly supported it
    earlier.
    5 Peter Petri and Michael Plummer. The Economic Effects of the
    Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Estimates. The Peterson Institute
    of International Economics, Washington DC, 2015; and David Riker.
    Do Jobs in Export Industry Still Pay More? And Why? Office of
    Competition and Economic Analysis, US Department of Commerce,
    Washington DC, 2010.
    6 Jennifer Hunt. “How Much Does Immigration Boost Innovation?”
    American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics. Vol. 2, No. 2, 2010.
    7 Malloy, Raven et al. 2016. “Understanding Declining Fluidity in
    the US Labor Market.” Economic Studies, Brookings Brief.
    8 The National Academy of Science. The Economic and Fiscal
    Consequences of Immigration. Washington DC, National Academy
    Press. 2017.
    9 Since the first few generations of immigrant children show
    strong improvement over time in economic success, and since low-
    income immigrants often need services provided at the state or
    local level, the net fiscal benefits of immigration are greater in
    the long- than the short-run and greater nationally than locally.
    10 For instance, Senators Tom Cotton and David Perdue recently
    introduced a bill to shift immigration from less- to more-educated
    immigrants, but to also curtail overall immigration numbers. The
    proposed bill was supported by Trump and his Administration.
    11 Jay Shambaugh et al. “Returning to Education: The Hamilton
    Project on Human Capital and Wages.” The Hamilton Project,
    Brookings Institution, forthcoming in 2018.
    12 Harry Holzer and Sandy Baum. Making College Work: Pathways to
    Success for Disadvantaged Students. Brookings Press. 2017.
    13 For instance, Kentucky’s FAME program provides apprenticeships
    to companies in advanced manufacturing, while Tennessee’s “Drive
    to 55” sets an ambitious goal of improving postsecondary
    credential completion in the state to 55 percent of the
    population. South Carolina also aggressively markets
    apprenticeships to its companies and provides a $1000 tax credit
    per year for each apprentice.
    14 Robert Lerman. “Expanding Apprenticeship Opportunities in the
    United States.” In M. Kearney and B. Harris eds. Policies to
    Address Poverty in America. The Hamilton Project, Brookings
    Institution, Washington DC. 2014.
    15 Mark Dynarski. “On Negative Effects of Vouchers.” Economic
    Studies, Brookings Brief, 2016.
    16 Stephanie Cellini et al. “The Government is Sanctioning For-
    Profit Colleges. What Happens to the Students?” Economic Studies,
    Brookings Brief 2017.
    17 David Weil. “Denying Reality: Labor Standards in the Trump
    Era.” Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Allied Social
    Science Association, January 5, 2018.
    18 Michael Strain. “Earned Income Tax Credit Does Better Job of
    Lifting Workers Out of Poverty.” McClatchy News Service, May 1.
    19 Isaac Sorkin. “Are There Long-Run Effects of the Minimum Wage
    on Employment?” Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2015;
    and Jonathan Meer and Jeremy West. “Effects of the Minimum Wage on
    Employment Dynamics.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working
    Paper. 2013.



    https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/one-year-in-has-trump-been- good-for-us-workers/

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