On 2/15/24 12:19 PM, Mark Isaak wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
Not having free will means you never need apologize.
On 2/15/24 12:19 PM, Mark Isaak wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingNot having free will means you never need apologize.
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 3:23:11 PM UTC-5, Mark Isaak wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I would say that it is a continuum, not a dichotomy. I'd say that you have free will to the extent that the causes for your actions reside within you rather than outside you.
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
On 2/15/24 1:44 PM, broger...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 3:23:11 PM UTC-5, Mark Isaak wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free
will?
I would say that it is a continuum, not a dichotomy. I'd say that you
have free will to the extent that the causes for your actions reside
within you rather than outside you.
Even if everything within you came from outside you?
On 2/15/24 12:19 PM, Mark Isaak wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingNot having free will means you never need apologize.
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
On 2/15/24 1:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingI posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will? >>
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
The whole controversy over Libet's results, though, is that what appears conscious may not be.
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
That summary implies that learned behavior and behavior from free will
are the same. But what about someone who learns a habit and then has to struggle mightily to break that habit?
Or more to the crux of the matter, I just chose to put a comma instead
of a colon before that last "I". How can anyone (myself included) know
that that decision was not ordained ineluctably by the arrangement of my axons and their various activating potentials?
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12 PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakSo you are free to the extent that you go against your natural
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will? >> I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
inclinations. Is that what you mean?
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:19:51 -0800, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
On 2/15/24 1:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingI posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>> anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will? >>>
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
The whole controversy over Libet's results, though, is that what appears
conscious may not be.
The controversy reminds me somewhat of Ron Dean taking some of Gould
and Eldredge's results and using them to argue a conclusion that is
the opposite of what G&E themselves concluded about the impact on the
ToE.
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
That summary implies that learned behavior and behavior from free will
are the same.
Not quite sure how you get to that.
But what about someone who learns a habit and then has to
struggle mightily to break that habit?
I can't see your issue with that. A habit is our body in control of
what we do; deciding to break the habit is an exercise of free will.
For example, I started smoking when I was 16 - that was a free will
decision, nobody or nothing forced me. Nicotine then took charge and
my body demanded a regular supply for the next forty years. After
those 40 years, I made a decision to quit. My body didn't like that
decision at all and there was an ensuing battle for quite some time
between my mind and my body. Seventeen years later, that battle has
still not entirely abated, I still get the occasional yearning for a cigarette or cigar.
There are, of course, external *influences* - my decision about
smoking was made lying in coronary care awaiting a by-pass which
thankfully was avoided with multiple stents. I don't believe, however,
that external influences are deterministic. To take another example,
my Catholic faith originated in being born to committed Catholic
parents, in a strongly Catholic community and education in Catholic
schools. Many - probably most - of my peers (including siblings) who
came through the same religious/cultural and education background have
long discarded their religious beliefs; my decision to stay with them
was a personal decision, made after considerable study and reflection,
but still a decision made by myself.
By coincidence, I have just started reading 'Determined A Science of
Life without Free Will' by Robert M. Sapolskyby; I'm only a couple of chapters into it so too early to draw conclusions but he seems to base
his argument largely on these external influences being deterministic.
Or more to the crux of the matter, I just chose to put a comma instead
of a colon before that last "I". How can anyone (myself included) know
that that decision was not ordained ineluctably by the arrangement of my
axons and their various activating potentials?
I have a pin here, would you care to count the angels on its head?
"Hitchens doesn't believe in addiction, because it cannot be objectively
proven by any scientific test. For the same reason, he refuses to
recognise other "modern" medical conditions such as ADHD or dyslexia,
which he dismisses as "disreputable, unscientific rubbish"
Perhaps he can't help himself from lying like that.
Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingNot having the capacity to mull decisions over an extended period of time? Not solely living in the now or on autopilot?
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingI posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>> anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will? >>>
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will
positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics.
--
----
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakSo you are free to the extent that you go against your natural inclinations. Is that what you mean?
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>> anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will? >>> I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free
will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to
*define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*.
What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one
of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key characteristic.
I think there may be some bias as free will is necessary for
Christianity.
On Friday, February 16, 2024 at 10:58:12 AM UTC-5, DB Cates wrote:
...
Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't
be applied to whatever action you actually do?
Butting in, instinctive reactions include those that are 'mostly' hardwired responses to well defined stimuli. The point of this definition is to draw
a distinction from reactions that are based upon pathways whose nature
is significantly the result of development from prior experiences.
mostly, and significantly are of course weasel words. More fully, the distinction would attempt to capture a reaction to duck when the eyes
detect fast movement of something towards where one currently thinks
their head is, and the more deliberative choice to crouch down in a slow moving canoe that is about to pass under a low hanging branch.
The former is close to hardwired while the latter is more of a learned behavior that incorporates a more complex situational analysis that
appears to have layers of processing that are more plastic in adapting
to more complex situations.
On 16/02/2024 14:34, Richmond wrote:
I think there may be some bias as free will is necessary for
Christianity.
Libertarian free will seems to be contradicted by large swathes of Christianity.
Divine omniscience is a problem - freely choosing to do what God knew
you were going to do doesn't seem to me to qualify as libertarian free
will.
Then there is occasionalism - the position that everything happens by
God's will. While I have the impression that it is more prevalent in
Islam when I performed a web search to remind myself of the word I was presented with Christian sites espousing that position.
On 2024-02-16 3:53 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:How does "having the capacity to mull decisions over an extended period
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingNot having the capacity to mull decisions over an extended period of time? >> Not solely living in the now or on autopilot?
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will? >>>
of time" and/or "Not solely living in the now" preclude being on autopilot?
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 03:32:17 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
I think we are close to violent agreement here - not a bad thing in
your final days on TO :)
On 2/16/24 1:09 PM, Kerr-Mudd, John wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 11:59:30 +0000The will to continue is only free if you choose a free news reader.
Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 03:32:17 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"[]
<brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
[]
I think we are close to violent agreement here - not a bad thing in
your final days on TO :)
The End Days are with us! Repent! (iff you have the free will to do so).
If a GGuser wills it enough they don't have to give up usenet.
Otherwise (like giganews) it's not free will.
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:
On 2024-02-16 3:53 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:Autopilot is walking and chewing gum at the same time. Fretting about how
Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:How does "having the capacity to mull decisions over an extended period
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingNot having the capacity to mull decisions over an extended period of time? >>> Not solely living in the now or on autopilot?
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>> anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will? >>>>
of time" and/or "Not solely living in the now" preclude being on autopilot? >>
to budget for the next week isn’t so much.
On 2024-02-16 11:52 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:Yes, I realize that is the claim, but what, precisely, is the
On 2024-02-16 3:53 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:Autopilot is walking and chewing gum at the same time. Fretting about how
Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:How does "having the capacity to mull decisions over an extended period
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>> anyway.Not having the capacity to mull decisions over an extended period of time? >>>> Not solely living in the now or on autopilot?
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will? >>>>>
of time" and/or "Not solely living in the now" preclude being on autopilot? >>>
to budget for the next week isn’t so much.
difference? Time? does the final outcome of an autopilot's processing
have to be immediate? If 'fretting' is due to a pattern of physical
processes in the brain, then the autopilot is in play.
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:
On 2024-02-16 11:52 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:Yes, I realize that is the claim, but what, precisely, is the
On 2024-02-16 3:53 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:Autopilot is walking and chewing gum at the same time. Fretting about how >>> to budget for the next week isn’t so much.
Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:How does "having the capacity to mull decisions over an extended period >>>> of time" and/or "Not solely living in the now" preclude being on autopilot?
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>> anyway.Not having the capacity to mull decisions over an extended period of time?
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
Not solely living in the now or on autopilot?
difference? Time? does the final outcome of an autopilot's processing
have to be immediate? If 'fretting' is due to a pattern of physical
processes in the brain, then the autopilot is in play.
Autopilot is second nature? A professional beancounter may be expected to know how to budget without fretting, but maybe they are paying off student debt via an OnlyFans account.
On Friday, February 16, 2024 at 11:43:12 AM UTC-5, DB Cates wrote:
On 2024-02-16 10:18 AM, Lawyer Daggett wrote:
On Friday, February 16, 2024 at 10:58:12 AM UTC-5, DB Cates wrote:I agree completely. Unfortunately it does not really address the
...
Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't >>>> be applied to whatever action you actually do?
Butting in, instinctive reactions include those that are 'mostly' hardwired >>> responses to well defined stimuli. The point of this definition is to draw >>> a distinction from reactions that are based upon pathways whose nature
is significantly the result of development from prior experiences.
mostly, and significantly are of course weasel words. More fully, the
distinction would attempt to capture a reaction to duck when the eyes
detect fast movement of something towards where one currently thinks
their head is, and the more deliberative choice to crouch down in a slow >>> moving canoe that is about to pass under a low hanging branch.
The former is close to hardwired while the latter is more of a learned
behavior that incorporates a more complex situational analysis that
appears to have layers of processing that are more plastic in adapting
to more complex situations.
connection to the 'free will' controversy.
Perhaps. I think that many who claim that we have free will (by some ambiguous
definition of free will) admit that instinctive actions are not the result of this
free will. And while they admit therefore that some actions people take are not
the result of free will, they assert that this thing called free will arises from
reactions that involve these other networks that produce reactions. We even elevate these reactions with the label "choice" but it isn't ever clear to me what
that elevation entails at the level of brain chemistry, neuronal pathways, or any
materialistic mechanism. It's a bit like that science cartoon with the box that
says "and then a miracle occurs".
So we get a situation where some simpler reaction pathways don't include
free will but those that involve a more complex set of inputs and dependencies
are anointed as "choices" which involve some unspecified miracle. Or so it seems to me.
On 2024-02-16 9:41 PM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:Sorry, I don't follow.
On 2024-02-16 11:52 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:Yes, I realize that is the claim, but what, precisely, is the
On 2024-02-16 3:53 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:Autopilot is walking and chewing gum at the same time. Fretting about how >>>> to budget for the next week isn’t so much.
Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:How does "having the capacity to mull decisions over an extended period >>>>> of time" and/or "Not solely living in the now" preclude being on autopilot?
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>>> anyway.Not having the capacity to mull decisions over an extended period of time?
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
Not solely living in the now or on autopilot?
difference? Time? does the final outcome of an autopilot's processing
have to be immediate? If 'fretting' is due to a pattern of physical
processes in the brain, then the autopilot is in play.
Autopilot is second nature? A professional beancounter may be expected to
know how to budget without fretting, but maybe they are paying off student >> debt via an OnlyFans account.
but now I have the horrible vision of my debt after having to pay people
to watch my ONLYFANS account. shudder
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 00:07:55 +0000, *Hemidactylus* <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
erik simpson <eastside.erik@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2/16/24 1:09 PM, Kerr-Mudd, John wrote:Nice pun. Libre vs gratis may not quite cover free will.
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 11:59:30 +0000The will to continue is only free if you choose a free news reader.
Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 03:32:17 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"[]
<brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
[]
I think we are close to violent agreement here - not a bad thing in
your final days on TO :)
The End Days are with us! Repent! (iff you have the free will to do so). >>>>
If a GGuser wills it enough they don't have to give up usenet.
Otherwise (like giganews) it's not free will.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gratis_versus_libre
With freedom there is freedom from and freedom to. I think that maps to
negative and positive freedom but that distinction seems wholly social
and/or political and not neural.
But there is the gratis consideration per cost given ATP is physiological
currency. Free or not in some sense of that vague adjective, will costs
energy. I would point to ego depletion and glucose research but that seems >> to have belly flopped in the replication crisis???
Since you mention it, there is the issue of total cost vs incremental
cost. Access to Internet generally requires substantial investment in computer equipment and connection fees, but Usenet access with free
servers requires little if any additional cost beyond that.
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't
<brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>>> On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:So you are free to the extent that you go against your natural
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>> anyway.I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
inclinations. Is that what you mean?
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free
will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to
*define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*.
What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one
of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key
characteristic.
be applied to whatever action you actually do?
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some
financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling
unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of
me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill
and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction.
Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be
instinctive.
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't
<brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>>> On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:So you are free to the extent that you go against your natural inclinations. Is that what you mean?
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>> anyway.I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free
will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to
*define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*.
What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one
of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key
characteristic.
be applied to whatever action you actually do?
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some
financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling
unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of
me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill
and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction.
Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be
instinctive.
--
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that last
wrote:
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>> anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will
positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics. >>>> --
sentence.
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to screw
up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics
e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something
over which they had no control?
On 2024-02-17 3:53 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>???? Maybe your instincts need some recalibration.
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't
<brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>>>> On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:So you are free to the extent that you go against your natural
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>>> anyway.I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
inclinations. Is that what you mean?
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free
will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to
*define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*. >>>> What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one
of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key
characteristic.
be applied to whatever action you actually do?
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some
financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling
unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of
me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill
and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction.
Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be
instinctive.
--
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post last night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment'
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that last
wrote:
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>>> anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>
coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will
positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics. >>>>> --
sentence.
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to screw >>> up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics
e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something
over which they had no control?
(I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but protection of society and rehabilitation. Where this idea has been properly funded and implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not properly
construed as 'punishment'. I think this position is compatible with both 'free will' and 'determinism'.
What it appears to be in most places is that protection of society thing (actually protection of the status quo) as cheaply as possible and
avoiding all that expensive rehabilitation thing. If someone makes a
shitton of money as well... well that's a bonus.
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:
On 2024-02-17 3:53 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>???? Maybe your instincts need some recalibration.
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't >>>> be applied to whatever action you actually do?
<brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>>>>> On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:inclinations. Is that what you mean?
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>>>> anyway.I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>> So you are free to the extent that you go against your natural
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free
will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to
*define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*. >>>>> What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one >>>>> of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key
characteristic.
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some
financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling
unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of
me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill
and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction.
Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be
instinctive.
--
It does recall Plato’s ring of Gyges. What if someone could act with impunity? Probably why parents resort to an elf on the shelf, businesses
and municipalities to CCTV, and social engineers to religions with their multiple edicts and a wrathful deity. All is panopticon.
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 12:06:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 11:09 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:I just noticed that he put in that detail of "rich looking guy". Perhaps
On 2024-02-17 3:53 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>???? Maybe your instincts need some recalibration.
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't >>>>>> be applied to whatever action you actually do?
<brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingI posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>> So you are free to the extent that you go against your natural >>>>>>>> inclinations. Is that what you mean?
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free >>>>>>> will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to >>>>>>> *define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*. >>>>>>> What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one >>>>>>> of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key
characteristic.
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some
financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling
unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of
me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill >>>>> and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction.
Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be
instinctive.
--
It does recall Plato’s ring of Gyges. What if someone could act with
impunity? Probably why parents resort to an elf on the shelf, businesses >>> and municipalities to CCTV, and social engineers to religions with their >>> multiple edicts and a wrathful deity. All is panopticon.
realizing (instinctively or freely?) that the instinctive reaction
varies with circumstances.
Yes, I did that deliberately because I recall a TV programme some
years ago where they set up two till operators to give excess change
to customers and monitored how many customers pointed out the error to
the operator. One operator was a young lady in a well-known chain
supermarket and the other was the elderly owner in a small corner shop (mom-and-pop store). I can't remember the exact figures but the number
who pointed out the error to the corner shop owner was far higher than
with the till operator in the chain supermarket.
Which leads me to surmise that whatever the
actual action it was likely to be instinctive given the full
circumstances involved.
On the contrary, I think that our decisions being affected by
circumstances is a good indicator for the existence of free will. If
we don't have free will then that would imply some underlying
deterministic process like a computer program with interminable IF…AND
IF …OR IF...ELSE…THEN steps with equally interminable nesting. Any experienced programmer will tell you how quickly that gets out of
control.
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:43:44 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post last
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that last >>>> sentence.
wrote:
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty >>>>>> coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will >>>>>> positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics.
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>>>> anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>
--
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to screw >>>> up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics
e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something
over which they had no control?
night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment'
(I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but protection of
society and rehabilitation. Where this idea has been properly funded and
implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not properly
construed as 'punishment'. I think this position is compatible with both
'free will' and 'determinism'.
What it appears to be in most places is that protection of society thing
(actually protection of the status quo) as cheaply as possible and
avoiding all that expensive rehabilitation thing. If someone makes a
shitton of money as well... well that's a bonus.
A man murders his wife in a fit of temper after discovering she has
had an affair. He is extremely remorseful so there is no real need for
any rehabilitation. This is the only time in his life that he is known
to have been violent, the police believe that this was a once-off
event between two specific individuals and the husband is no threat to
the general public. Do you think he should not be sent to jail?
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:43:44 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post last
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that last >>>> sentence.
wrote:
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty >>>>>> coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will >>>>>> positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics.
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>>>> anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>
--
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to screw >>>> up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics
e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something
over which they had no control?
night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment'
(I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but protection of
society and rehabilitation. Where this idea has been properly funded and
implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not properly
construed as 'punishment'. I think this position is compatible with both
'free will' and 'determinism'.
What it appears to be in most places is that protection of society thing
(actually protection of the status quo) as cheaply as possible and
avoiding all that expensive rehabilitation thing. If someone makes a
shitton of money as well... well that's a bonus.
A man murders his wife in a fit of temper after discovering she has
had an affair. He is extremely remorseful so there is no real need for
any rehabilitation. This is the only time in his life that he is known
to have been violent, the police believe that this was a once-off
event between two specific individuals and the husband is no threat to
the general public. Do you think he should not be sent to jail?
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 15:06:33 +0000, *Hemidactylus* <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
jillery <69jpil69@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 00:07:55 +0000, *Hemidactylus*To reply is a compulsion. Could not have done otherwise.
<ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
erik simpson <eastside.erik@gmail.com> wrote:
On 2/16/24 1:09 PM, Kerr-Mudd, John wrote:Nice pun. Libre vs gratis may not quite cover free will.
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 11:59:30 +0000The will to continue is only free if you choose a free news reader.
Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 03:32:17 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"[]
<brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
[]
I think we are close to violent agreement here - not a bad thing in >>>>>> your final days on TO :)
The End Days are with us! Repent! (iff you have the free will to do so).
If a GGuser wills it enough they don't have to give up usenet.
Otherwise (like giganews) it's not free will.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gratis_versus_libre
With freedom there is freedom from and freedom to. I think that maps to >>> negative and positive freedom but that distinction seems wholly social >>> and/or political and not neural.
But there is the gratis consideration per cost given ATP is physiological >>> currency. Free or not in some sense of that vague adjective, will costs >>> energy. I would point to ego depletion and glucose research but that seems
to have belly flopped in the replication crisis???
Since you mention it, there is the issue of total cost vs incremental
cost. Access to Internet generally requires substantial investment in
computer equipment and connection fees, but Usenet access with free
servers requires little if any additional cost beyond that.
Even if to reply is a compulsion, the contents of those replies remain
under conscious control.
Here's a different example, a real-life one. A jury recently awarded
E. Jean Carroll $83.3 million against Donald Trump. The compensatory
damages of $18.3 are based on some sort of objective assessment of
what his behaviour cost her but what about the $65 million in
*punitive damages*. Apart from the fact that they are specifically
defined as punitive, I doubt if they will do much to rehabilitate
Trump or protect other women from him. Does that make them pointless?
On Sun, 18 Feb 2024 09:23:22 +0000, "Kerr-Mudd, John"
<admin@127.0.0.1> wrote:
Never let the other guy have the Last Word.
My experience is people who mention the Last Word are trying to get
the Last Word.
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:43:44 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post last
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that last >>>> sentence.
wrote:
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty >>>>>> coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will >>>>>> positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics.
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>>>> anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>
--
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to screw >>>> up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics
e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something
over which they had no control?
night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment'
(I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but protection of
society and rehabilitation.
Here's a different example, a real-life one. A jury recently awarded
E. Jean Carroll $83.3 million against Donald Trump. The compensatory
damages of $18.3 are based on some sort of objective assessment of
what his behaviour cost her but what about the $65 million in
*punitive damages*. Apart from the fact that they are specifically
defined as punitive, I doubt if they will do much to rehabilitate
Trump or protect other women from him. Does that make them pointless?
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 12:06:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 11:09 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:I just noticed that he put in that detail of "rich looking guy". Perhaps
On 2024-02-17 3:53 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>???? Maybe your instincts need some recalibration.
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't >>>>>> be applied to whatever action you actually do?
<brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingI posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>> So you are free to the extent that you go against your natural >>>>>>>> inclinations. Is that what you mean?
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free >>>>>>> will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to >>>>>>> *define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*. >>>>>>> What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one >>>>>>> of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key
characteristic.
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some
financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling
unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of
me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill >>>>> and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction.
Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be
instinctive.
--
It does recall Platos ring of Gyges. What if someone could act with
impunity? Probably why parents resort to an elf on the shelf, businesses >>> and municipalities to CCTV, and social engineers to religions with their >>> multiple edicts and a wrathful deity. All is panopticon.
realizing (instinctively or freely?) that the instinctive reaction
varies with circumstances.
Yes, I did that deliberately because I recall a TV programme some
years ago where they set up two till operators to give excess change
to customers and monitored how many customers pointed out the error to
the operator. One operator was a young lady in a well-known chain
supermarket and the other was the elderly owner in a small corner shop (mom-and-pop store). I can't remember the exact figures but the number
who pointed out the error to the corner shop owner was far higher than
with the till operator in the chain supermarket.
Which leads me to surmise that whatever the
actual action it was likely to be instinctive given the full
circumstances involved.
On the contrary, I think that our decisions being affected by
circumstances is a good indicator for the existence of free will. If
we don't have free will then that would imply some underlying
deterministic process like a computer program with interminable IF AND
IF OR IF...ELSE THEN steps with equally interminable nesting. Any experienced programmer will tell you how quickly that gets out of
control.
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 20:44:10 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 5:02 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 12:06:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 11:09 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:I just noticed that he put in that detail of "rich looking guy". Perhaps >>>> realizing (instinctively or freely?) that the instinctive reaction
On 2024-02-17 3:53 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:???? Maybe your instincts need some recalibration.
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" >>>>>>>>> <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't >>>>>>>> be applied to whatever action you actually do?
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingI posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>>>> So you are free to the extent that you go against your natural >>>>>>>>>> inclinations. Is that what you mean?
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free >>>>>>>>> will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to >>>>>>>>> *define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*.
What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one >>>>>>>>> of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key >>>>>>>>> characteristic.
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some >>>>>>> financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling >>>>>>> unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of >>>>>>> me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill >>>>>>> and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction. >>>>>>> Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be
instinctive.
--
It does recall Plato's ring of Gyges. What if someone could act with >>>>> impunity? Probably why parents resort to an elf on the shelf, businesses >>>>> and municipalities to CCTV, and social engineers to religions with their >>>>> multiple edicts and a wrathful deity. All is panopticon.
varies with circumstances.
Yes, I did that deliberately because I recall a TV programme some
years ago where they set up two till operators to give excess change
to customers and monitored how many customers pointed out the error to
the operator. One operator was a young lady in a well-known chain
supermarket and the other was the elderly owner in a small corner shop
(mom-and-pop store). I can't remember the exact figures but the number
who pointed out the error to the corner shop owner was far higher than
with the till operator in the chain supermarket.
I am at a loss how you might think this helps your argument.
It illustrates that people will make different decisions according to circumstances and, as I went on to say, I believe that is an indicator
*in favour of* free will. I see echoes of quantum physics here. Given
the half-life of a group of atoms, we can predict that 50% of them
will decay in that period but we cannot identify whether any specific
atom will decay. In a similar way, with statistical research, we can
probably identify what percentage of people will give the money back
in the above circumstances but we cannot predict how any individual
will react.
Can you please tell me in detail just what you mean by 'free will'. I
Which leads me to surmise that whatever the
actual action it was likely to be instinctive given the full
circumstances involved.
On the contrary, I think that our decisions being affected by
circumstances is a good indicator for the existence of free will. If
we don't have free will then that would imply some underlying
deterministic process like a computer program with interminable IF AND
IF OR IF...ELSE THEN steps with equally interminable nesting. Any
experienced programmer will tell you how quickly that gets out of
control.
was under the impression that it meant that we were 'free' to chose our
actions independently of the set of circumstances.
I certainly never said that. I said free will is the ability to act
against our instincts in a given set of circumstances.
To take another example and illustrate the difference between humans
and animals.
If a human hunter spots a deer and has a clear shot but
then spots a fawn beside it, he may decide not to take the shot
because he doesn't want to leave the fawn motherless; neither does he
feel right about shooting the fawn. Can you see any wild predator
turning down an easy meal in those circumstances?
On Sunday, February 18, 2024 at 4:43:13 AM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 15:36:17 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"
<broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Saturday, February 17, 2024 at 6:18:13?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>> On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:43:44 -0600, DB Cates <cate...@hotmail.com>You don't really approve of Parole Boards than?
wrote:I don't care what the police think. The best predictor of future
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:A man murders his wife in a fit of temper after discovering she has
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cate...@hotmail.com> >>>>>> wrote:Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post last >>>>> night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment' >>>>> (I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but protection of >>>>> society and rehabilitation. Where this idea has been properly funded and >>>>> implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not properly
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cate...@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>> wrote:Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that last >>>>>>> sentence.
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty >>>>>>>>> coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will >>>>>>>>> positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics.
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>>>>
--
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to screw
up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics >>>>>> e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something >>>>>> over which they had no control?
construed as 'punishment'. I think this position is compatible with both >>>>> 'free will' and 'determinism'.
What it appears to be in most places is that protection of society thing >>>>> (actually protection of the status quo) as cheaply as possible and
avoiding all that expensive rehabilitation thing. If someone makes a >>>>> shitton of money as well... well that's a bonus.
had an affair. He is extremely remorseful so there is no real need for >>>> any rehabilitation. This is the only time in his life that he is known >>>> to have been violent, the police believe that this was a once-off
event between two specific individuals and the husband is no threat to >>>> the general public. Do you think he should not be sent to jail?
behavior is past behavior.
I'm not sure why you think I don't approve of Parole Boards. I never said anything remotely like that. Parole Boards exist to take into account
past behavior that has accrued since conviction and imprisonment.
He has a murderously violent temper - the police cannot reasonablyI think we are in violent agreement again. I am not arguing against
conclude he is no risk to the public. Nor would it be wise to set the
precedent of not punishing a man who kills his wife on the grounds that
he only has one wife and is unlikely to kill anyone else - other men
who might want to be rid of their wives could be watching.
punitive measure, Don is the one who seems to think they are
pointless.
I'll let Don speak for himself, but I'm not sure that he thinks punitive measures are pointless, only that rather than thinking of them as
punishment it is more useful to think of their goals as being protection
of society (including disincentivizing other potential offenders) and rehabilitation.
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 15:36:17 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:kill anyone else - other men who might want to be rid of their wives could be watching.
On Saturday, February 17, 2024 at 6:18:13?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:43:44 -0600, DB Cates <cate...@hotmail.com>I don't care what the police think. The best predictor of future behavior is past behavior.
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:A man murders his wife in a fit of temper after discovering she has
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cate...@hotmail.com>Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post last >>>> night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment'
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cate...@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that last >>>>>> sentence.
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty >>>>>>>> coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will >>>>>>>> positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics.
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>>>
--
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to screw >>>>>> up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics >>>>> e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something
over which they had no control?
(I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but protection of >>>> society and rehabilitation. Where this idea has been properly funded and >>>> implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not properly
construed as 'punishment'. I think this position is compatible with both >>>> 'free will' and 'determinism'.
What it appears to be in most places is that protection of society thing >>>> (actually protection of the status quo) as cheaply as possible and
avoiding all that expensive rehabilitation thing. If someone makes a
shitton of money as well... well that's a bonus.
had an affair. He is extremely remorseful so there is no real need for
any rehabilitation. This is the only time in his life that he is known
to have been violent, the police believe that this was a once-off
event between two specific individuals and the husband is no threat to
the general public. Do you think he should not be sent to jail?
You don't really approve of Parole Boards than?
He has a murderously violent temper - the police cannot reasonably conclude he is no risk to the public. Nor would it be wise to set the precedent of not punishing a man who kills his wife on the grounds that he only has one wife and is unlikely to
I think we are in violent agreement again. I am not arguing against
punitive measure, Don is the one who seems to think they are
pointless.
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 20:44:10 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 5:02 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 12:06:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 11:09 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:I just noticed that he put in that detail of "rich looking guy". Perhaps >>>> realizing (instinctively or freely?) that the instinctive reaction
On 2024-02-17 3:53 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:???? Maybe your instincts need some recalibration.
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" >>>>>>>>> <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't >>>>>>>> be applied to whatever action you actually do?
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingI posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>>>> So you are free to the extent that you go against your natural >>>>>>>>>> inclinations. Is that what you mean?
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free >>>>>>>>> will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to >>>>>>>>> *define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*.
What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one >>>>>>>>> of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key >>>>>>>>> characteristic.
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some >>>>>>> financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling >>>>>>> unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of >>>>>>> me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill >>>>>>> and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction. >>>>>>> Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be
instinctive.
--
It does recall Plato's ring of Gyges. What if someone could act with >>>>> impunity? Probably why parents resort to an elf on the shelf, businesses >>>>> and municipalities to CCTV, and social engineers to religions with their >>>>> multiple edicts and a wrathful deity. All is panopticon.
varies with circumstances.
Yes, I did that deliberately because I recall a TV programme some
years ago where they set up two till operators to give excess change
to customers and monitored how many customers pointed out the error to
the operator. One operator was a young lady in a well-known chain
supermarket and the other was the elderly owner in a small corner shop
(mom-and-pop store). I can't remember the exact figures but the number
who pointed out the error to the corner shop owner was far higher than
with the till operator in the chain supermarket.
I am at a loss how you might think this helps your argument.
It illustrates that people will make different decisions according to circumstances and, as I went on to say, I believe that is an indicator
*in favour of* free will.
the half-life of a group of atoms, we can predict that 50% of them
will decay in that period but we cannot identify whether any specific
atom will decay. In a similar way, with statistical research, we can
probably identify what percentage of people will give the money back
in the above circumstances but we cannot predict how any individual
will react.
Can you please tell me in detail just what you mean by 'free will'. I
Which leads me to surmise that whatever the
actual action it was likely to be instinctive given the full
circumstances involved.
On the contrary, I think that our decisions being affected by
circumstances is a good indicator for the existence of free will. If
we don't have free will then that would imply some underlying
deterministic process like a computer program with interminable IF…AND >>> IF …OR IF...ELSE…THEN steps with equally interminable nesting. Any
experienced programmer will tell you how quickly that gets out of
control.
was under the impression that it meant that we were 'free' to chose our
actions independently of the set of circumstances.
I certainly never said that. I said free will is the ability to act
against our instincts in a given set of circumstances.
To take another example and illustrate the difference between humans
and animals. If a human hunter spots a deer and has a clear shot but
then spots a fawn beside it, he may decide not to take the shot
because he doesn't want to leave the fawn motherless; neither does he
feel right about shooting the fawn. Can you see any wild predator
turning down an easy meal in those circumstances?
--
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:43:44 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post last
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that last >>>> sentence.
wrote:
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty >>>>>> coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will >>>>>> positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics.
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>>>> anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>
--
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to screw >>>> up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics
e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something
over which they had no control?
night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment'
(I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but protection of
society and rehabilitation.
Here's a different example, a real-life one. A jury recently awarded
E. Jean Carroll $83.3 million against Donald Trump. The compensatory
damages of $18.3 are based on some sort of objective assessment of
what his behaviour cost her but what about the $65 million in
*punitive damages*. Apart from the fact that they are specifically
defined as punitive, I doubt if they will do much to rehabilitate
Trump or protect other women from him. Does that make them pointless?
Where this idea has been properly funded and
implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not properly
construed as 'punishment'. I think this position is compatible with both
'free will' and 'determinism'.
What it appears to be in most places is that protection of society thing
(actually protection of the status quo) as cheaply as possible and
avoiding all that expensive rehabilitation thing. If someone makes a
shitton of money as well... well that's a bonus.
--
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 21:05:51 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 5:14 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:43:44 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Your hypothetical is ridiculous. Such extreme violence followed by
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post last >>>> night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment'
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that last >>>>>> sentence.
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty >>>>>>>> coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will >>>>>>>> positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics.
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>>>
--
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to screw >>>>>> up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics >>>>> e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something
over which they had no control?
(I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but protection of >>>> society and rehabilitation. Where this idea has been properly funded and >>>> implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not properly
construed as 'punishment'. I think this position is compatible with both >>>> 'free will' and 'determinism'.
What it appears to be in most places is that protection of society thing >>>> (actually protection of the status quo) as cheaply as possible and
avoiding all that expensive rehabilitation thing. If someone makes a
shitton of money as well... well that's a bonus.
A man murders his wife in a fit of temper after discovering she has
had an affair. He is extremely remorseful so there is no real need for
any rehabilitation. This is the only time in his life that he is known
to have been violent, the police believe that this was a once-off
event between two specific individuals and the husband is no threat to
the general public. Do you think he should not be sent to jail?
apparently genuine remorse in the absence of any history of violence
would indicate some kind of undiagnosed medical problem.
What the police
believe would be meaningless. Jail? Maybe, certainly careful
supervisiion while appropriate medical care is arranged.
Please explain the relevant difference you see between some kind of undiagnosed medical problem and the absence of free will.
difference I can see is that a medical condition may be curable but
absence of free will can't. If he has no free will then it is
pointless sending him to jail for rehabilitation and the only way to
fully protect the public would be to send him to jail for the rest of
his life without the possibility of parole.
--
On 18/02/2024 03:23, DB Cates wrote:
On 2024-02-17 5:14 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:43:44 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>[new followup]
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post last >>>> night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment'
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that >>>>>> last
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty >>>>>>>> coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will >>>>>>>> positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up >>>>>>>> physics.
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up >>>>>>>>>> something
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty >>>>>>>>>> of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having >>>>>>>>>> free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here.
Benjamin
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We >>>>>>>>> may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as
"bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with
religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide >>>>>>>>> not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>>>
--
sentence.
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to >>>>>> screw
up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics >>>>> e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something
over which they had no control?
(I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but
protection of
society and rehabilitation. Where this idea has been properly funded
and
implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not properly
construed as 'punishment'. I think this position is compatible with
both
'free will' and 'determinism'.
What it appears to be in most places is that protection of society
thing
(actually protection of the status quo) as cheaply as possible and
avoiding all that expensive rehabilitation thing. If someone makes a
shitton of money as well... well that's a bonus.
A man murders his wife in a fit of temper after discovering she has
had an affair. He is extremely remorseful so there is no real need for
any rehabilitation. This is the only time in his life that he is known
to have been violent, the police believe that this was a once-off
event between two specific individuals and the husband is no threat to
the general public. Do you think he should not be sent to jail?
OH. oh. can I make up a hypothetical? Here goes.
After a big breakthrough in quantum computing a group gets an
obscenely large grant that simulates a pair of real people who are
kept in a highly controlled environment. Single environmental changes
are introduced and their responses are closely monitored. The
simulation predicts their responses with a very high degree of accuracy.
Is your faith in free will shaken?
I assume you mean that in the experiment
there are two real people, and also there
is a separate simulation of the people
in that situation.
It's a problem for the argument that you
mention "quantum computing", because it's
possible to use that to claim that you
have merely recreated free will in a
quantum computer.
On 2024-02-17 5:02 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 12:06:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 11:09 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:I just noticed that he put in that detail of "rich looking guy". Perhaps >>> realizing (instinctively or freely?) that the instinctive reaction
On 2024-02-17 3:53 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>> wrote:???? Maybe your instincts need some recalibration.
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" >>>>>>>> <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't >>>>>>> be applied to whatever action you actually do?
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingI posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>>> So you are free to the extent that you go against your natural >>>>>>>>> inclinations. Is that what you mean?
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free >>>>>>>> will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to >>>>>>>> *define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*. >>>>>>>> What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one >>>>>>>> of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key >>>>>>>> characteristic.
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some
financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling >>>>>> unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of >>>>>> me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill >>>>>> and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction. >>>>>> Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be
instinctive.
--
It does recall Plato’s ring of Gyges. What if someone could act with >>>> impunity? Probably why parents resort to an elf on the shelf, businesses >>>> and municipalities to CCTV, and social engineers to religions with their >>>> multiple edicts and a wrathful deity. All is panopticon.
varies with circumstances.
Yes, I did that deliberately because I recall a TV programme some
years ago where they set up two till operators to give excess change
to customers and monitored how many customers pointed out the error to
the operator. One operator was a young lady in a well-known chain
supermarket and the other was the elderly owner in a small corner shop
(mom-and-pop store). I can't remember the exact figures but the number
who pointed out the error to the corner shop owner was far higher than
with the till operator in the chain supermarket.
I am at a loss how you might think this helps your argument.
Can you please tell me in detail just what you mean by 'free will'. I
Which leads me to surmise that whatever the
actual action it was likely to be instinctive given the full
circumstances involved.
On the contrary, I think that our decisions being affected by
circumstances is a good indicator for the existence of free will. If
we don't have free will then that would imply some underlying
deterministic process like a computer program with interminable IF…AND
IF …OR IF...ELSE…THEN steps with equally interminable nesting. Any
experienced programmer will tell you how quickly that gets out of
control.
was under the impression that it meant that we were 'free' to chose our actions independently of the set of circumstances.
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:
On 2024-02-17 5:02 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There are biological and social factors that can be construed as deterministic. In the extreme either level makes free will problematic.
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 12:06:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 11:09 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:I just noticed that he put in that detail of "rich looking guy". Perhaps >>>> realizing (instinctively or freely?) that the instinctive reaction
On 2024-02-17 3:53 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:???? Maybe your instincts need some recalibration.
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" >>>>>>>>> <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't >>>>>>>> be applied to whatever action you actually do?
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingI posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>>>> So you are free to the extent that you go against your natural >>>>>>>>>> inclinations. Is that what you mean?
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free >>>>>>>>> will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to >>>>>>>>> *define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*.
What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one >>>>>>>>> of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key >>>>>>>>> characteristic.
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some >>>>>>> financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling >>>>>>> unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of >>>>>>> me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill >>>>>>> and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction. >>>>>>> Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be
instinctive.
--
It does recall Plato’s ring of Gyges. What if someone could act with >>>>> impunity? Probably why parents resort to an elf on the shelf, businesses >>>>> and municipalities to CCTV, and social engineers to religions with their >>>>> multiple edicts and a wrathful deity. All is panopticon.
varies with circumstances.
Yes, I did that deliberately because I recall a TV programme some
years ago where they set up two till operators to give excess change
to customers and monitored how many customers pointed out the error to
the operator. One operator was a young lady in a well-known chain
supermarket and the other was the elderly owner in a small corner shop
(mom-and-pop store). I can't remember the exact figures but the number
who pointed out the error to the corner shop owner was far higher than
with the till operator in the chain supermarket.
I am at a loss how you might think this helps your argument.
Can you please tell me in detail just what you mean by 'free will'. I
Which leads me to surmise that whatever the
actual action it was likely to be instinctive given the full
circumstances involved.
On the contrary, I think that our decisions being affected by
circumstances is a good indicator for the existence of free will. If
we don't have free will then that would imply some underlying
deterministic process like a computer program with interminable IF…AND >>> IF …OR IF...ELSE…THEN steps with equally interminable nesting. Any
experienced programmer will tell you how quickly that gets out of
control.
was under the impression that it meant that we were 'free' to chose our
actions independently of the set of circumstances.
I am a very weak compatibilist. I had listened to the debate Dennett had
with Sam Harris years ago. Harris is too simplistic. Sapolsky is far more formidable. As an aside Dennett is sadly showing his age, not in mental acumen but with whatever is going on on his scalp: https://youtu.be/aYzFH8xqhns?si=qUj4jMdcjpzzI1Kg
As with consciousness and self-concept I find non-libertarian free will concepts intriguing but am agnostic about it all.
On Sun, 18 Feb 2024 14:37:18 +0000, *Hemidactylus* <ecphoric@allspamis.invalid> wrote:
Martin Harran <martinharran@gmail.com> wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 20:44:10 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 5:02 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 12:06:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 11:09 AM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:I just noticed that he put in that detail of "rich looking guy". Perhaps >>>>>> realizing (instinctively or freely?) that the instinctive reaction >>>>>> varies with circumstances.
On 2024-02-17 3:53 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote:???? Maybe your instincts need some recalibration.
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" >>>>>>>>>>> <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakSo you are free to the extent that you go against your natural >>>>>>>>>>>> inclinations. Is that what you mean?
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingI posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free >>>>>>>>>>> will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to >>>>>>>>>>> *define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*.
What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one
of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key >>>>>>>>>>> characteristic.
be applied to whatever action you actually do?
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some >>>>>>>>> financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling >>>>>>>>> unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of >>>>>>>>> me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill >>>>>>>>> and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction. >>>>>>>>> Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be >>>>>>>>> instinctive.
--
It does recall Plato's ring of Gyges. What if someone could act with >>>>>>> impunity? Probably why parents resort to an elf on the shelf, businesses
and municipalities to CCTV, and social engineers to religions with their
multiple edicts and a wrathful deity. All is panopticon.
Yes, I did that deliberately because I recall a TV programme some
years ago where they set up two till operators to give excess change >>>>> to customers and monitored how many customers pointed out the error to >>>>> the operator. One operator was a young lady in a well-known chain
supermarket and the other was the elderly owner in a small corner shop >>>>> (mom-and-pop store). I can't remember the exact figures but the number >>>>> who pointed out the error to the corner shop owner was far higher than >>>>> with the till operator in the chain supermarket.
I am at a loss how you might think this helps your argument.
It illustrates that people will make different decisions according to
circumstances and, as I went on to say, I believe that is an indicator
*in favour of* free will. I see echoes of quantum physics here. Given
the half-life of a group of atoms, we can predict that 50% of them
will decay in that period but we cannot identify whether any specific
atom will decay. In a similar way, with statistical research, we can
probably identify what percentage of people will give the money back
in the above circumstances but we cannot predict how any individual
will react.
Can you please tell me in detail just what you mean by 'free will'. I
Which leads me to surmise that whatever the
actual action it was likely to be instinctive given the full
circumstances involved.
On the contrary, I think that our decisions being affected by
circumstances is a good indicator for the existence of free will. If >>>>> we don't have free will then that would imply some underlying
deterministic process like a computer program with interminable IF?AND >>>>> IF ?OR IF...ELSE?THEN steps with equally interminable nesting. Any
experienced programmer will tell you how quickly that gets out of
control.
was under the impression that it meant that we were 'free' to chose our >>>> actions independently of the set of circumstances.
I certainly never said that. I said free will is the ability to act
against our instincts in a given set of circumstances.
To take another example and illustrate the difference between humans
and animals.
Weird dichotomy.
How is it weird?
Different circumstances affect different individuals differently. After
If a human hunter spots a deer and has a clear shot but
then spots a fawn beside it, he may decide not to take the shot
because he doesn't want to leave the fawn motherless; neither does he
feel right about shooting the fawn. Can you see any wild predator
turning down an easy meal in those circumstances?
Dogs are domesticated wolves. Some go feral. But among the domesticated,
dogs can act against instinct. In the wild a dog would probably try to kill >> and eat a rodent. My hamster got loose when I was a kid and we spent hours >> trying to find. Later on my dog plopped it down unharmed in front of my
mom. Did my dog have free will?
I think that may be related to familiarity and/or proximity. For the
first 40 years or so of our marriage, we nearly always had a dog and a
cat. In every case, the dog and cat lived together quite comfortably.
I remember one case where one of our cats had kittens; when she washed
the kittens with her tongue, she would then go on to wash the dog with
her tongue. In another case, I remember we had a bitch who had pups
and when the pups were suckling her, the cat would join in and it
didn't bother the bitch at all.
Here's an old ad that was popular in the UK and Ireland before
encouraging the burning of fossil fuels became non-PC:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8uSLYcsHrGU
Also a well trained dog exhibits a degree of impulse control in multiple
circumstances.
On Sun, 18 Feb 2024 10:09:47 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>kill anyone else - other men who might want to be rid of their wives could be watching.
wrote:
On 2024-02-18 3:40 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 15:36:17 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"
<brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
On Saturday, February 17, 2024 at 6:18:13?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>>> On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:43:44 -0600, DB Cates <cate...@hotmail.com>
wrote:I don't care what the police think. The best predictor of future behavior is past behavior.
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:A man murders his wife in a fit of temper after discovering she has
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cate...@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post last >>>>>> night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment' >>>>>> (I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but protection of >>>>>> society and rehabilitation. Where this idea has been properly funded and >>>>>> implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not properly
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cate...@hotmail.com> >>>>>>>>> wrote:Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that last
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty >>>>>>>>>> coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will >>>>>>>>>> positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics.
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>>>>>
--
sentence.
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to screw
up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics >>>>>>> e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something >>>>>>> over which they had no control?
construed as 'punishment'. I think this position is compatible with both >>>>>> 'free will' and 'determinism'.
What it appears to be in most places is that protection of society thing >>>>>> (actually protection of the status quo) as cheaply as possible and >>>>>> avoiding all that expensive rehabilitation thing. If someone makes a >>>>>> shitton of money as well... well that's a bonus.
had an affair. He is extremely remorseful so there is no real need for >>>>> any rehabilitation. This is the only time in his life that he is known >>>>> to have been violent, the police believe that this was a once-off
event between two specific individuals and the husband is no threat to >>>>> the general public. Do you think he should not be sent to jail?
You don't really approve of Parole Boards than?
He has a murderously violent temper - the police cannot reasonably conclude he is no risk to the public. Nor would it be wise to set the precedent of not punishing a man who kills his wife on the grounds that he only has one wife and is unlikely to
What? Where do you get that from?
I think we are in violent agreement again. I am not arguing against
punitive measure, Don is the one who seems to think they are
pointless.
When I suggested that lack of free will would screw up the penal/legal system, you replied:
"Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment'
(I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but protection
of society and rehabilitation. Where this idea has been properly
funded and implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not
properly construed as 'punishment'."
I took that to mean that you didn't think that punishment is any great
value. If I read that wrong, then back to my original question, what
do you see as the value of punishment in the absence of free will?
--
broger...@gmail.com <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 2:48:16 PM UTC-5, DB Cates wrote:Dennett argues for a free will worth wanting, a crane type over a skyhook.
On 2024-02-20 12:26 PM, broger...@gmail.com wrote:....
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 1:03:16 PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>>> On Tue, 20 Feb 2024 09:49:51 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"
<broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 12:03:16?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>>>>> On Tue, 20 Feb 2024 04:45:50 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"So why did you say TL;DR *for Martin*?
<broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
[snip for focus]
I'd say that (1) free will isn't magical, it just means that we >>>>>>>> make choices, even if, given exactly who we are and theI have never treated as TL;DR a post from you or anyone else in any >>>>>>> discussion in which I am involved with the notable exception of Peter >>>>>>> Nyikos and I have given my reasons for that several times in the past. >>>>>>>
circumstances we were in, no other choice could have happened and >>>>>>>> (2) the problems with the most extreme version of free will - I did >>>>>>>> X, but even being exactly who I am and being in the exact same >>>>>>>> situation I might just as well have done Y - do not depend on
materialism or physical determinism; they just depend on there >>>>>>>> being causes for effects; whether those causes reside in
arrangements of matter or in immaterial "soul stuff" makes no difference.
I wrote a longish post on this in this thread a few days back, but >>>>>>>> it may have been TL;DR for Martin
The tone of your comment suggests that along with LD, you are having >>>>>>> to resort to petulant ad hominem.
My comment was meant to skewer my own verbosity, not to complain about you.
Because I was talking to Daggett about his response to you.
I think that one problem with not stating a definition is that it leads >>>> to confusion as there seems to be between you and Daggett. In my view, >>>> you do not seem to be asserting the sort of libertarian, maximalist
type of free will, ie the idea that an exactly identical person in
exactly identical circumstances might do different things. I think that >>>> that sort of free will is incoherent, independent of whether you are a >>>> physicalist or a dualist, and I think Daggett is right to argue against >>>> it. But I don't think that your position requires it. You seem to want >>>> to say that people make meaningful choices, and I agree that they
certainly do. One is defined by one's choices and so it is not a
limitation on one's freedom to say that one's choice's are determined
by (and reveal) exactly what one is. I am free, but I am not free to be >>>> someone other than who I am. Who I am may change over time, in response >>>> to the effects of my choices and my environment, but at any instant,
who I am is a given.
I'm trying to determine the utility of a description of 'free will' that >>> is indistinguishable from determinism. ie I agree with everything you
say above except the label.
That's generally the problem people have with compatibilism - they don't
think the free will of compatibilism counts as free enough. I'd just say
that I certainly feel free, I make choices that reflect competing
internal and external causes, and when the causes are more internal than
external I feel less constrained and more free. That I cannot choose to
be something that I am not (at a given point in time) just seems to me to
be a given, not something that impinges on *my* freedom, since *my*
freedom is the freedom of the thing I am (at this given point in time) to
act for my own internal reasons rather than being forced by something else. >>
He gets into our complexity of cognition giving us degrees of freedom. A bivalve only open and closes a certain way. Our forearm with various articulations (wrist, elbow, etc) has more freedom of motion.
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 2:48:16 PM UTC-5, DB Cates wrote:
On 2024-02-20 12:26 PM, broger...@gmail.com wrote:....
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 1:03:16 PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>> On Tue, 20 Feb 2024 09:49:51 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"
<broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 12:03:16?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>>>> On Tue, 20 Feb 2024 04:45:50 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"So why did you say TL;DR *for Martin*?
<broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
[snip for focus]
I'd say that (1) free will isn't magical, it just means that weI have never treated as TL;DR a post from you or anyone else in any >>>>>> discussion in which I am involved with the notable exception of Peter >>>>>> Nyikos and I have given my reasons for that several times in the past. >>>>>>
make choices, even if, given exactly who we are and the
circumstances we were in, no other choice could have happened and >>>>>>> (2) the problems with the most extreme version of free will - I did >>>>>>> X, but even being exactly who I am and being in the exact same
situation I might just as well have done Y - do not depend on
materialism or physical determinism; they just depend on there
being causes for effects; whether those causes reside in
arrangements of matter or in immaterial "soul stuff" makes no difference.
I wrote a longish post on this in this thread a few days back, but >>>>>>> it may have been TL;DR for Martin
The tone of your comment suggests that along with LD, you are having >>>>>> to resort to petulant ad hominem.
My comment was meant to skewer my own verbosity, not to complain about you.
Because I was talking to Daggett about his response to you.
I think that one problem with not stating a definition is that it leads
to confusion as there seems to be between you and Daggett. In my view,
you do not seem to be asserting the sort of libertarian, maximalist
type of free will, ie the idea that an exactly identical person in
exactly identical circumstances might do different things. I think that
that sort of free will is incoherent, independent of whether you are a
physicalist or a dualist, and I think Daggett is right to argue against
it. But I don't think that your position requires it. You seem to want
to say that people make meaningful choices, and I agree that they
certainly do. One is defined by one's choices and so it is not a
limitation on one's freedom to say that one's choice's are determined
by (and reveal) exactly what one is. I am free, but I am not free to be
someone other than who I am. Who I am may change over time, in response
to the effects of my choices and my environment, but at any instant,
who I am is a given.
I'm trying to determine the utility of a description of 'free will' that
is indistinguishable from determinism. ie I agree with everything you
say above except the label.
That's generally the problem people have with compatibilism - they don't think the free will of compatibilism counts as free enough. I'd just say
that I certainly feel free, I make choices that reflect competing
internal and external causes, and when the causes are more internal than external I feel less constrained and more free. That I cannot choose to
be something that I am not (at a given point in time) just seems to me to
be a given, not something that impinges on *my* freedom, since *my*
freedom is the freedom of the thing I am (at this given point in time) to
act for my own internal reasons rather than being forced by something else.
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 14:10:26 -0800, the following appeared
in talk.origins, posted by erik simpson
<eastside.erik@gmail.com>:
On 2/15/24 12:19 PM, Mark Isaak wrote:Even more, you can never be guilty of anything. The perfect
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up somethingNot having free will means you never need apologize.
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will? >>>
philosophy for a sociopath! :-(
On 2024-02-20 4:54 PM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
broger...@gmail.com <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:I am a man of limited intellect, but that makes no sense to me.
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 2:48:16 PM UTC-5, DB Cates wrote:Dennett argues for a free will worth wanting, a crane type over a skyhook. >> He gets into our complexity of cognition giving us degrees of freedom. A
On 2024-02-20 12:26 PM, broger...@gmail.com wrote:....
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 1:03:16 PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>>>> On Tue, 20 Feb 2024 09:49:51 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"
<broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 12:03:16?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:So why did you say TL;DR *for Martin*?
On Tue, 20 Feb 2024 04:45:50 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" >>>>>>>> <broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
[snip for focus]
I'd say that (1) free will isn't magical, it just means that we >>>>>>>>> make choices, even if, given exactly who we are and theI have never treated as TL;DR a post from you or anyone else in any >>>>>>>> discussion in which I am involved with the notable exception of Peter >>>>>>>> Nyikos and I have given my reasons for that several times in the past. >>>>>>>>
circumstances we were in, no other choice could have happened and >>>>>>>>> (2) the problems with the most extreme version of free will - I did >>>>>>>>> X, but even being exactly who I am and being in the exact same >>>>>>>>> situation I might just as well have done Y - do not depend on >>>>>>>>> materialism or physical determinism; they just depend on there >>>>>>>>> being causes for effects; whether those causes reside in
arrangements of matter or in immaterial "soul stuff" makes no difference.
I wrote a longish post on this in this thread a few days back, but >>>>>>>>> it may have been TL;DR for Martin
The tone of your comment suggests that along with LD, you are having >>>>>>>> to resort to petulant ad hominem.
My comment was meant to skewer my own verbosity, not to complain about you.
Because I was talking to Daggett about his response to you.
I think that one problem with not stating a definition is that it leads >>>>> to confusion as there seems to be between you and Daggett. In my view, >>>>> you do not seem to be asserting the sort of libertarian, maximalist
type of free will, ie the idea that an exactly identical person in
exactly identical circumstances might do different things. I think that >>>>> that sort of free will is incoherent, independent of whether you are a >>>>> physicalist or a dualist, and I think Daggett is right to argue against >>>>> it. But I don't think that your position requires it. You seem to want >>>>> to say that people make meaningful choices, and I agree that they
certainly do. One is defined by one's choices and so it is not a
limitation on one's freedom to say that one's choice's are determined >>>>> by (and reveal) exactly what one is. I am free, but I am not free to be >>>>> someone other than who I am. Who I am may change over time, in response >>>>> to the effects of my choices and my environment, but at any instant, >>>>> who I am is a given.
I'm trying to determine the utility of a description of 'free will' that >>>> is indistinguishable from determinism. ie I agree with everything you
say above except the label.
That's generally the problem people have with compatibilism - they don't >>> think the free will of compatibilism counts as free enough. I'd just say >>> that I certainly feel free, I make choices that reflect competing
internal and external causes, and when the causes are more internal than >>> external I feel less constrained and more free. That I cannot choose to
be something that I am not (at a given point in time) just seems to me to >>> be a given, not something that impinges on *my* freedom, since *my*
freedom is the freedom of the thing I am (at this given point in time) to >>> act for my own internal reasons rather than being forced by something else. >>>
bivalve only open and closes a certain way. Our forearm with various
articulations (wrist, elbow, etc) has more freedom of motion.
On 2/20/24 3:01 PM, DB Cates wrote:
On 2024-02-20 4:54 PM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:On the other hand, i have four fingers and a thumb, but my left rear
broger...@gmail.com <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:I am a man of limited intellect, but that makes no sense to me.
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 2:48:16 PM UTC-5, DB Cates wrote:Dennett argues for a free will worth wanting, a crane type over a
On 2024-02-20 12:26 PM, broger...@gmail.com wrote:....
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 1:03:16 PM UTC-5, Martin Harran >>>>>> wrote:
On Tue, 20 Feb 2024 09:49:51 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"
<broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 12:03:16?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran >>>>>>>> wrote:So why did you say TL;DR *for Martin*?
On Tue, 20 Feb 2024 04:45:50 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" >>>>>>>>> <broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
[snip for focus]
I'd say that (1) free will isn't magical, it just means that we >>>>>>>>>> make choices, even if, given exactly who we are and theI have never treated as TL;DR a post from you or anyone else in any >>>>>>>>> discussion in which I am involved with the notable exception of >>>>>>>>> Peter
circumstances we were in, no other choice could have happened and >>>>>>>>>> (2) the problems with the most extreme version of free will - I >>>>>>>>>> did
X, but even being exactly who I am and being in the exact same >>>>>>>>>> situation I might just as well have done Y - do not depend on >>>>>>>>>> materialism or physical determinism; they just depend on there >>>>>>>>>> being causes for effects; whether those causes reside in
arrangements of matter or in immaterial "soul stuff" makes no >>>>>>>>>> difference.
I wrote a longish post on this in this thread a few days back, but >>>>>>>>>> it may have been TL;DR for Martin
Nyikos and I have given my reasons for that several times in the >>>>>>>>> past.
The tone of your comment suggests that along with LD, you are >>>>>>>>> having
to resort to petulant ad hominem.
My comment was meant to skewer my own verbosity, not to complain >>>>>>>> about you.
Because I was talking to Daggett about his response to you.
I think that one problem with not stating a definition is that it
leads
to confusion as there seems to be between you and Daggett. In my view, >>>>>> you do not seem to be asserting the sort of libertarian, maximalist >>>>>> type of free will, ie the idea that an exactly identical person in >>>>>> exactly identical circumstances might do different things. I think >>>>>> that
that sort of free will is incoherent, independent of whether you are a >>>>>> physicalist or a dualist, and I think Daggett is right to argue
against
it. But I don't think that your position requires it. You seem to want >>>>>> to say that people make meaningful choices, and I agree that they
certainly do. One is defined by one's choices and so it is not a
limitation on one's freedom to say that one's choice's are determined >>>>>> by (and reveal) exactly what one is. I am free, but I am not free
to be
someone other than who I am. Who I am may change over time, in
response
to the effects of my choices and my environment, but at any instant, >>>>>> who I am is a given.
I'm trying to determine the utility of a description of 'free will'
that
is indistinguishable from determinism. ie I agree with everything you >>>>> say above except the label.
That's generally the problem people have with compatibilism - they don't >>>> think the free will of compatibilism counts as free enough. I'd just say >>>> that I certainly feel free, I make choices that reflect competing
internal and external causes, and when the causes are more internal than >>>> external I feel less constrained and more free. That I cannot choose to >>>> be something that I am not (at a given point in time) just seems to
me to
be a given, not something that impinges on *my* freedom, since *my*
freedom is the freedom of the thing I am (at this given point in
time) to
act for my own internal reasons rather than being forced by something
else.
skyhook.
He gets into our complexity of cognition giving us degrees of freedom. A >>> bivalve only open and closes a certain way. Our forearm with various
articulations (wrist, elbow, etc) has more freedom of motion.
upper molar has no free will whatsoever.
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:
On 2024-02-20 4:54 PM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:Dennett from his debate with Sam Harris:
broger...@gmail.com <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:I am a man of limited intellect, but that makes no sense to me.
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 2:48:16 PM UTC-5, DB Cates wrote:Dennett argues for a free will worth wanting, a crane type over a skyhook. >>> He gets into our complexity of cognition giving us degrees of freedom. A >>> bivalve only open and closes a certain way. Our forearm with various
On 2024-02-20 12:26 PM, broger...@gmail.com wrote:....
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 1:03:16 PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Tue, 20 Feb 2024 09:49:51 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"
<broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 12:03:16?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:So why did you say TL;DR *for Martin*?
On Tue, 20 Feb 2024 04:45:50 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" >>>>>>>>> <broger...@gmail.com> wrote:
[snip for focus]
I'd say that (1) free will isn't magical, it just means that we >>>>>>>>>> make choices, even if, given exactly who we are and theI have never treated as TL;DR a post from you or anyone else in any >>>>>>>>> discussion in which I am involved with the notable exception of Peter >>>>>>>>> Nyikos and I have given my reasons for that several times in the past.
circumstances we were in, no other choice could have happened and >>>>>>>>>> (2) the problems with the most extreme version of free will - I did >>>>>>>>>> X, but even being exactly who I am and being in the exact same >>>>>>>>>> situation I might just as well have done Y - do not depend on >>>>>>>>>> materialism or physical determinism; they just depend on there >>>>>>>>>> being causes for effects; whether those causes reside in
arrangements of matter or in immaterial "soul stuff" makes no difference.
I wrote a longish post on this in this thread a few days back, but >>>>>>>>>> it may have been TL;DR for Martin
The tone of your comment suggests that along with LD, you are having >>>>>>>>> to resort to petulant ad hominem.
My comment was meant to skewer my own verbosity, not to complain about you.
Because I was talking to Daggett about his response to you.
I think that one problem with not stating a definition is that it leads >>>>>> to confusion as there seems to be between you and Daggett. In my view, >>>>>> you do not seem to be asserting the sort of libertarian, maximalist >>>>>> type of free will, ie the idea that an exactly identical person in >>>>>> exactly identical circumstances might do different things. I think that >>>>>> that sort of free will is incoherent, independent of whether you are a >>>>>> physicalist or a dualist, and I think Daggett is right to argue against >>>>>> it. But I don't think that your position requires it. You seem to want >>>>>> to say that people make meaningful choices, and I agree that they
certainly do. One is defined by one's choices and so it is not a
limitation on one's freedom to say that one's choice's are determined >>>>>> by (and reveal) exactly what one is. I am free, but I am not free to be >>>>>> someone other than who I am. Who I am may change over time, in response >>>>>> to the effects of my choices and my environment, but at any instant, >>>>>> who I am is a given.
I'm trying to determine the utility of a description of 'free will' that >>>>> is indistinguishable from determinism. ie I agree with everything you >>>>> say above except the label.
That's generally the problem people have with compatibilism - they don't >>>> think the free will of compatibilism counts as free enough. I'd just say >>>> that I certainly feel free, I make choices that reflect competing
internal and external causes, and when the causes are more internal than >>>> external I feel less constrained and more free. That I cannot choose to >>>> be something that I am not (at a given point in time) just seems to me to >>>> be a given, not something that impinges on *my* freedom, since *my*
freedom is the freedom of the thing I am (at this given point in time) to >>>> act for my own internal reasons rather than being forced by something else.
articulations (wrist, elbow, etc) has more freedom of motion.
“You want to claim that free will — the core of free will — is its denial
of determinism, and I made a career saying that’s not the core. In fact, let me try a new line on you, because I’ve been thinking, why doesn’t he see this the way I see it, and I think that the big source — the likely, big source — of confusion about this is that when people think about freedom, in the context of free will, they’re ignoring a very good and legitimate notion of freedom, which is basically the engineering notion of freedom when you talk about degrees of freedom. My wrists, my shoulder, my elbow, those joints, there’s three degrees of freedom right there, and in control theory it’s all about how you control the degrees of freedom. And if we look around the world, some things have basically no degrees of freedom, like that rock over there, and some things, like you and me, have uncountably many degrees of freedom because of the versatility of our
minds; the capacity that we can be moved by reasons on any topic at all — this gives us a complexity from the point of view of control theory, which
is completely absent in any other creature. And that kind of freedom is actually, I claim, at the heart of our understanding of free will because it’s that complexity, which is not just complexity, but it’s the competence
to control that complexity — that’s what free will is. What you want, if you’ve got free will, is the capacity — and it’ll never be perfect — to
respond to the circumstances with all the degrees of freedom you need to do what you think would be really the right thing to do. You may not always do the right thing, but — let’s take a dead simple case: imagine writing a chess program, which, stupidly, was written wrong so that the king could
only move forward or back or left or right, like a rook, and it could not move diagonally; and this was somehow hidden in it so that it just never
even considered moves, diagonal moves, by the king. Completely disabled
chess program, it’s missing a very important degree of freedom, which it should have and be able to control and recognize when to use and so forth. What you want — I mean, let me ask you a question about what would be ideal from the point of view of responsibility: what does an ideal responsible agent have? Is it not mainly true beliefs, a well-ordered set of desires,
the cognitive adroitness to change one’s attention, to change one’s mind, to be moved by reasons — the capacity to listen to reasons, the capacity for some self-control? These things all come in degrees, but our model of a responsible adult, someone you would trust, someone you would make a
promise to — or that you’d accept a promise from — is someone with all those degrees of freedom and control of them. Now, what removes freedom
from somebody is if either the degrees of freedom don’t exist — they’re blocked mechanically — or some other agent has usurped them and has taken over control: a marionette and a puppeteer.”
https://medium.com/@mgmobrien/does-free-will-exist-sam-harris-and-dan-dennett-discuss-a3d54259a417
From his early book _Elbow Room_:
“Suppose you buy a model airplane, a working model with a motor. You start it up and off it flies, crashing into a tree. “Needs to be controlled,” you
mutter, and fasten long wires to one wingtip. Now you can control it,
making it go up and down—whichever you want, whenever you want—as it goes round and round in a circle. “Not enough degrees of freedom” you mutter, so
you replace the wires with a wireless radio “remote control” system. Now you can control the direction, height, speed, turning, diving, and banking
of the plane. There are many more degrees of freedom, and they are all
under your control, but not until you have discovered the parameters of the plane’s degrees of freedom and the causal relationships between those parameters and your joystick-moving acts—an epistemic problem that is often not trivial and must always be solved before control can be effected.”…“One
can control only those states or activities of a thing that fall within the range of its degrees of freedom, or in other words, within the range of
what it can do. (We speak of what a model airplane can do, and of its
degrees of freedom, but in doing this we are not attributing to it the sort of agency or freedom we attribute to a moral agent, of course. Still, the advanced sorts of agency and freedom certainly have the simple sorts as prerequisites.”
More recent _Freedom Evolves_: “Yes, trees can "decide" that spring has come and it is time to push out the blossoms, and clams can "decide" to
clam up tight when they feel an alarming bump on their shells, but these options are so rudimentary, so close to being simple switches, that they
are decisions by courtesy only. But even a simple switch, turned on and off by some environmental change, marks a degree of freedom, as the engineers say, and hence is something that needs to be controlled, one way or
another. A system has a degree of freedom when there is an ensemble of possibilities of one kind or another, and which of these possibilities is actual at any time depends on whatever function or switch controls this degree of freedom.”
On 2024-02-20 6:19 PM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:[snip]
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:
On 2024-02-20 4:54 PM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
More words doesn't mean more sense.Dennett from his debate with Sam Harris:I am a man of limited intellect, but that makes no sense to me.
Dennett argues for a free will worth wanting, a crane type over a skyhook. >>>> He gets into our complexity of cognition giving us degrees of freedom. A >>>> bivalve only open and closes a certain way. Our forearm with various
articulations (wrist, elbow, etc) has more freedom of motion.
“You want to claim that free will — the core of free will — is its denial
of determinism, and I made a career saying that’s not the core. In fact, >> let me try a new line on you, because I’ve been thinking, why doesn’t he >> see this the way I see it, and I think that the big source — the likely, >> big source — of confusion about this is that when people think about
freedom, in the context of free will, they’re ignoring a very good and
legitimate notion of freedom, which is basically the engineering notion of >> freedom when you talk about degrees of freedom. My wrists, my shoulder, my >> elbow, those joints, there’s three degrees of freedom right there, and in >> control theory it’s all about how you control the degrees of freedom. And >> if we look around the world, some things have basically no degrees of
freedom, like that rock over there, and some things, like you and me, have >> uncountably many degrees of freedom because of the versatility of our
minds; the capacity that we can be moved by reasons on any topic at all — >> this gives us a complexity from the point of view of control theory, which >> is completely absent in any other creature. And that kind of freedom is
actually, I claim, at the heart of our understanding of free will because
it’s that complexity, which is not just complexity, but it’s the competence
to control that complexity — that’s what free will is. What you want, if >> you’ve got free will, is the capacity — and it’ll never be perfect — to
respond to the circumstances with all the degrees of freedom you need to do >> what you think would be really the right thing to do. You may not always do >> the right thing, but — let’s take a dead simple case: imagine writing a >> chess program, which, stupidly, was written wrong so that the king could
only move forward or back or left or right, like a rook, and it could not
move diagonally; and this was somehow hidden in it so that it just never
even considered moves, diagonal moves, by the king. Completely disabled
chess program, it’s missing a very important degree of freedom, which it >> should have and be able to control and recognize when to use and so forth. >> What you want — I mean, let me ask you a question about what would be ideal
from the point of view of responsibility: what does an ideal responsible
agent have? Is it not mainly true beliefs, a well-ordered set of desires,
the cognitive adroitness to change one’s attention, to change one’s mind,
to be moved by reasons — the capacity to listen to reasons, the capacity >> for some self-control? These things all come in degrees, but our model of a >> responsible adult, someone you would trust, someone you would make a
promise to — or that you’d accept a promise from — is someone with all >> those degrees of freedom and control of them. Now, what removes freedom
from somebody is if either the degrees of freedom don’t exist — they’re
blocked mechanically — or some other agent has usurped them and has taken >> over control: a marionette and a puppeteer.”
https://medium.com/@mgmobrien/does-free-will-exist-sam-harris-and-dan-dennett-discuss-a3d54259a417
From his early book _Elbow Room_:
“Suppose you buy a model airplane, a working model with a motor. You start >> it up and off it flies, crashing into a tree. “Needs to be controlled,” you
mutter, and fasten long wires to one wingtip. Now you can control it,
making it go up and down—whichever you want, whenever you want—as it goes
round and round in a circle. “Not enough degrees of freedom” you mutter, so
you replace the wires with a wireless radio “remote control” system. Now >> you can control the direction, height, speed, turning, diving, and banking >> of the plane. There are many more degrees of freedom, and they are all
under your control, but not until you have discovered the parameters of the >> plane’s degrees of freedom and the causal relationships between those
parameters and your joystick-moving acts—an epistemic problem that is often
not trivial and must always be solved before control can be effected.”…“One
can control only those states or activities of a thing that fall within the >> range of its degrees of freedom, or in other words, within the range of
what it can do. (We speak of what a model airplane can do, and of its
degrees of freedom, but in doing this we are not attributing to it the sort >> of agency or freedom we attribute to a moral agent, of course. Still, the
advanced sorts of agency and freedom certainly have the simple sorts as
prerequisites.”
More recent _Freedom Evolves_: “Yes, trees can "decide" that spring has
come and it is time to push out the blossoms, and clams can "decide" to
clam up tight when they feel an alarming bump on their shells, but these
options are so rudimentary, so close to being simple switches, that they
are decisions by courtesy only. But even a simple switch, turned on and off >> by some environmental change, marks a degree of freedom, as the engineers
say, and hence is something that needs to be controlled, one way or
another. A system has a degree of freedom when there is an ensemble of
possibilities of one kind or another, and which of these possibilities is
actual at any time depends on whatever function or switch controls this
degree of freedom.”
It seems to me that the free will vs determinism thing is
dualistic. That's the point of it. It's not about whether a clock is
free to tick or not to tick (because it stopped), but whether it is free
to act against its own nature. If I consider myself as a non physical
spirit within a physical body, then it's a valid question, do I have
complete freedom, or am I at the mercy of my body? But if I consider I
am a conscious entity which is an emergent property of my brain and
body, then the question doesn't really arise at all. Perhaps the only
way it can arise is if there is quantum uncertainty.
So, what I call free will is a product of the function of my brain. It's
a way of looking at it. If it is not free will can there be any such
thing as free will?
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:
On 2024-02-20 6:19 PM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:[snip]
DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> wrote:
On 2024-02-20 4:54 PM, *Hemidactylus* wrote:
More words doesn't mean more sense.Dennett from his debate with Sam Harris:I am a man of limited intellect, but that makes no sense to me.
Dennett argues for a free will worth wanting, a crane type over a skyhook.
He gets into our complexity of cognition giving us degrees of freedom. A >>>>> bivalve only open and closes a certain way. Our forearm with various >>>>> articulations (wrist, elbow, etc) has more freedom of motion.
“You want to claim that free will — the core of free will — is its denial
of determinism, and I made a career saying that’s not the core. In fact, >>> let me try a new line on you, because I’ve been thinking, why doesn’t he
see this the way I see it, and I think that the big source — the likely, >>> big source — of confusion about this is that when people think about
freedom, in the context of free will, they’re ignoring a very good and >>> legitimate notion of freedom, which is basically the engineering notion of >>> freedom when you talk about degrees of freedom. My wrists, my shoulder, my >>> elbow, those joints, there’s three degrees of freedom right there, and in >>> control theory it’s all about how you control the degrees of freedom. And >>> if we look around the world, some things have basically no degrees of
freedom, like that rock over there, and some things, like you and me, have >>> uncountably many degrees of freedom because of the versatility of our
minds; the capacity that we can be moved by reasons on any topic at all — >>> this gives us a complexity from the point of view of control theory, which >>> is completely absent in any other creature. And that kind of freedom is
actually, I claim, at the heart of our understanding of free will because >>> it’s that complexity, which is not just complexity, but it’s the competence
to control that complexity — that’s what free will is. What you want, if
you’ve got free will, is the capacity — and it’ll never be perfect — to
respond to the circumstances with all the degrees of freedom you need to do >>> what you think would be really the right thing to do. You may not always do >>> the right thing, but — let’s take a dead simple case: imagine writing a >>> chess program, which, stupidly, was written wrong so that the king could >>> only move forward or back or left or right, like a rook, and it could not >>> move diagonally; and this was somehow hidden in it so that it just never >>> even considered moves, diagonal moves, by the king. Completely disabled
chess program, it’s missing a very important degree of freedom, which it >>> should have and be able to control and recognize when to use and so forth. >>> What you want — I mean, let me ask you a question about what would be ideal
from the point of view of responsibility: what does an ideal responsible >>> agent have? Is it not mainly true beliefs, a well-ordered set of desires, >>> the cognitive adroitness to change one’s attention, to change one’s mind,
to be moved by reasons — the capacity to listen to reasons, the capacity >>> for some self-control? These things all come in degrees, but our model of a >>> responsible adult, someone you would trust, someone you would make a
promise to — or that you’d accept a promise from — is someone with all
those degrees of freedom and control of them. Now, what removes freedom
from somebody is if either the degrees of freedom don’t exist — they’re
blocked mechanically — or some other agent has usurped them and has taken >>> over control: a marionette and a puppeteer.”
https://medium.com/@mgmobrien/does-free-will-exist-sam-harris-and-dan-dennett-discuss-a3d54259a417
From his early book _Elbow Room_:
“Suppose you buy a model airplane, a working model with a motor. You start
it up and off it flies, crashing into a tree. “Needs to be controlled,” you
mutter, and fasten long wires to one wingtip. Now you can control it,
making it go up and down—whichever you want, whenever you want—as it goes
round and round in a circle. “Not enough degrees of freedom” you mutter, so
you replace the wires with a wireless radio “remote control” system. Now
you can control the direction, height, speed, turning, diving, and banking >>> of the plane. There are many more degrees of freedom, and they are all
under your control, but not until you have discovered the parameters of the >>> plane’s degrees of freedom and the causal relationships between those
parameters and your joystick-moving acts—an epistemic problem that is often
not trivial and must always be solved before control can be effected.”…“One
can control only those states or activities of a thing that fall within the >>> range of its degrees of freedom, or in other words, within the range of
what it can do. (We speak of what a model airplane can do, and of its
degrees of freedom, but in doing this we are not attributing to it the sort >>> of agency or freedom we attribute to a moral agent, of course. Still, the >>> advanced sorts of agency and freedom certainly have the simple sorts as
prerequisites.”
More recent _Freedom Evolves_: “Yes, trees can "decide" that spring has >>> come and it is time to push out the blossoms, and clams can "decide" to
clam up tight when they feel an alarming bump on their shells, but these >>> options are so rudimentary, so close to being simple switches, that they >>> are decisions by courtesy only. But even a simple switch, turned on and off >>> by some environmental change, marks a degree of freedom, as the engineers >>> say, and hence is something that needs to be controlled, one way or
another. A system has a degree of freedom when there is an ensemble of
possibilities of one kind or another, and which of these possibilities is >>> actual at any time depends on whatever function or switch controls this
degree of freedom.”
You seem to want to assert your autonomy from being remote controlled by Dennett’s words, but you should instead be reasons responsive.
about self-control and articulated degrees of freedom (as in the clam vs forearm) are subtle but powerful.
I have more words. Here is a concise Dennett: “Consciousness is for control. In engineering control theory, we talk about degrees of freedom—how many degrees of freedom does that robot have in its arm? One or five—each one has to be controlled.”
“A degree of freedom is an opportunity for control. You have millions of degrees of freedom, because it’s not just “where do I put my arms now, or my feet?” There’s “what do I think about now?” And you can think about
anything. You’re the ultimate chameleon when it comes to having degrees of freedom, because you can think about things here, or far away in the past
and the future. You can plot schemes, write novels.”
From : https://now.tufts.edu/2020/09/02/our-brains-our-selves
And far wordier Dennett on this very thing of degrees of freedom, where humans excel, and our deliberative self control, where maturity or
arbitrary age of majority (the Sorites problem) comes into the spotlight:
https://www.amherstlecture.org/dennett2019/dennett2019_ALP.pdf
“How many degrees of freedom in a robotic arm (in an automobile assembly line, for instance? It depends on how many joints the arm has and how each joint can vary. Roughly speaking, the degrees of freedom of a thing line up pretty well with how many moving parts it has, how many different ways can
it be.”
Clam shell vs forearm. See?
“Each degree of freedom is an opportunity to control. How many degrees of freedom in your arm for you to control? Lots.”
If I understand him correctly clamping off degrees of freedom is akin to procedural memory allowing you to drive while more consciously mulling over pressing matters.
Here’s a real kicker: “Autonomy is self-control as contrasted with remote control
and with being out of control.” So free will worth wanting is the coy evasion of manipulation by others and not going berserker by succumbing to base impulses.
And given I do much of my information procession and knowledge gathering
with a smartphone or tablet, which aren’t the bane of existence, this caveat is apt: “Suppose you are doing something really important and you need to look up something on your smart phone. If you get distracted by a YouTube link or advertisement on the screen, your string has just been pulled. “Oh, that looks interesting,” you remark to yourself, and off you go, abandoning, if only temporarily, your important project. Even if you don’t bite, the people who would control you are gathering all the feedback they can, trying to learn all about you, so that they can design a better distractor to dangle in front of you tomorrow. (I tell my grandchildren
about anglerfish that lie in wait, dangling a little wiggly worm-lure in front of their mouths, until snap! – their prey gets too close and becomes lunch. There are thousands of different species of anglerfish out there, I tell my grandchildren, and they must learn to be self-conscious about approaching anything that looks tempting.)”
“I think that this is perhaps the greatest risk to human political freedom that we’ve ever seen. The capacity of individuals and companies to distract you and to channel, to clamp your degrees of freedom so that you just don’t think about things that you really should be thinking about because you’re so distracted by all these other things which you can’t help looking at, thinking about, instead. The competition for your attention strikes at the heart of your freedom, your ability to think for yourself.”
Another point by Dennett: “We’re drowning in degrees of freedom which are,
remember, opportunities for control. But you simply cannot control all the degrees of freedom you’ve got. You’d go crazy trying.”…”We’re autopuppets
after all, apparently, but not entirely. At any time we can pull only some
of our strings. But that’s not none. What we all have to learn when we grow up is that we are blessed – or cursed – with more degrees of freedom than we can handle, and what we have to learn is not the science or algorithm of self-control but the art of self-control. We need to learn – and almost all of us succeed in learning – how to marshal our attention and clamp degrees of freedom that we’re not going to need for a while so that we can concentrate
on the things that really matter.”
So his version of compatibilist free-will is quite limited in scope. It accounts for much being outside awareness and “clamped”. That’s a nifty concept.
I've also considered one argument, not so much for free will but against
no free will, that should some entity commit act X then if there is no
free will involved then that entity should not attract any praise or condemnation or anything in between from anyone else since they were not 'responsible' for X. But the huge long mesh of incidents leading to X happening also led to the existence of that entity. So even though I
free will to be an illusion, I have no moral qualms about judging that
entity based on X. (Of course, I would have done so anyway without this examination... hmmmm, or would I?)
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:53:50 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:03 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 13:48:14 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com"Can you come up with a definition of 'instinctive reaction' that can't
<brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
On Thursday, February 15, 2024 at 4:43:12?PM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote: >>>>> On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark Isaak
<specime...@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:So you are free to the extent that you go against your natural inclinations. Is that what you mean?
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>> anyway.I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these
initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts.
I don't like your "to the extent that" qualifier. I think that free
will is one of those things that is difficult if not impossible to
*define* in simple terms but whose characteristics can be *described*.
What I have given above is a description, not a definition; it is one
of many possible descriptions but I think it does capture a key
characteristic.
be applied to whatever action you actually do?
Definitions are tricky but examples are easy e.g. I'm under some
financial strain. Walking down the street, I see a $50 bill falling
unnoticed from the pocket of a rich-looking guy walking in front of
me. There is nobody around to see what is happening. Lifting the bill
and putting it into my own pocket would be an instinctive reaction.
Calling out "Hi mister, you've just dropped $50" would not be
instinctive.
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 18:19:51 -0800, Mark Isaak <specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
[...]
But what about someone who learns a habit and then has to
struggle mightily to break that habit?
I can't see your issue with that. A habit is our body in control of
what we do; deciding to break the habit is an exercise of free will.
For example, I started smoking when I was 16 - that was a free will
decision, nobody or nothing forced me. Nicotine then took charge and
my body demanded a regular supply for the next forty years. After
those 40 years, I made a decision to quit. My body didn't like that
decision at all and there was an ensuing battle for quite some time
between my mind and my body. Seventeen years later, that battle has
still not entirely abated, I still get the occasional yearning for a cigarette or cigar.
On Tue, 20 Feb 2024 03:39:53 -0800 (PST), "broger...@gmail.com" <brogers31751@gmail.com> wrote:
On Tuesday, February 20, 2024 at 5:18:15?AM UTC-5, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sun, 18 Feb 2024 18:37:24 -0600, DB Cates <cate...@hotmail.com>
wrote:
[...]
I think we all find it very difficult because, as I observed earlier,Sigh, I find it very difficult to fully express my thought on this
subject.
free will is one of those areas of life (including life itself) which
are impossible to define precisely and we have to settle for
describing various characteristics in different ways. In debating
this, we are essentially debating philosophically rather than
scientifically so it is little wonder that we so often end up going
round in circles :)
For all the difficulty in defining free will, I still think it useful to make the attempt. Otherwise you greatly increase the likelihood of going round in circles or talking to yourself.
A definition comes from consensus. Several people have tried to define
free will here but I don't see any real consensus on anything that
would amount to a definition. I don't think that the absence of an
agreed definition prohibits discussion that is at least interesting if
not informative.
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:43:44 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post last
wrote:
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>Being a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase that last >>>> sentence.
wrote:
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having difficulty >>>>>> coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free will >>>>>> positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw up physics.
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up something >>>>>>>> arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here plenty of times >>>>>>>> anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the
'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. Benjamin >>>>>>> Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to initiate a >>>>>>> voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. We may >>>>>>> view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as "bubbling >>>>>>> up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto and >>>>>>> abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with religious >>>>>>> and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you "control >>>>>>> yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders."
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to decide not to >>>>>>> do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do
something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our instincts. >>>>>>>
--
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential to screw >>>> up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics
e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something
over which they had no control?
night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment'
(I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but protection of
society and rehabilitation. Where this idea has been properly funded and
implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not properly
construed as 'punishment'. I think this position is compatible with both
'free will' and 'determinism'.
What it appears to be in most places is that protection of society thing
(actually protection of the status quo) as cheaply as possible and
avoiding all that expensive rehabilitation thing. If someone makes a
shitton of money as well... well that's a bonus.
A man murders his wife in a fit of temper after discovering she has
had an affair. He is extremely remorseful so there is no real need for
any rehabilitation. This is the only time in his life that he is known
to have been violent, the police believe that this was a once-off
event between two specific individuals and the husband is no threat to
the general public. Do you think he should not be sent to jail?
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 21:23:51 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 5:14 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
[...][new followup]
A man murders his wife in a fit of temper after discovering she has
had an affair. He is extremely remorseful so there is no real need for
any rehabilitation. This is the only time in his life that he is known
to have been violent, the police believe that this was a once-off
event between two specific individuals and the husband is no threat to
the general public. Do you think he should not be sent to jail?
OH. oh. can I make up a hypothetical? Here goes.
After a big breakthrough in quantum computing a group gets an obscenely
large grant that simulates a pair of real people who are kept in a
highly controlled environment. Single environmental changes are
introduced and their responses are closely monitored. The simulation
predicts their responses with a very high degree of accuracy.
Is your faith in free will shaken?
I'm not a big fan of drawing conclusions from thought experiments that
have no possibility of being carried out in real life. The nearest
thing to real life that I can think of is the Stanley Milgram
experiments but I don't think that those really have much impact on
the free-will debate. They just show that many people are too easily manipulated into abandoning their own judgement and placing their
trust in authority figures.
On 18/02/2024 17:25, DB Cates wrote:
On 2024-02-18 6:48 AM, Robert Carnegie wrote:
On 18/02/2024 03:23, DB Cates wrote:In that case, surely it would give different results, not the same.
On 2024-02-17 5:14 PM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Sat, 17 Feb 2024 10:43:44 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com>[new followup]
wrote:
On 2024-02-17 3:45 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Fri, 16 Feb 2024 09:59:40 -0600, DB Cates <cates_db@hotmail.com> >>>>>>> wrote:Interesting. I actually addressed some of this in a different post >>>>>> last
On 2024-02-16 4:31 AM, Martin Harran wrote:
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 20:54:05 -0600, DB CatesBeing a hidebound materialist I plead guilty. Let me rephrase
<cates_db@hotmail.com>
wrote:
On 2024-02-15 3:41 PM, Martin Harran wrote:There is a whiff of scientism about that final remark!
On Thu, 15 Feb 2024 12:19:13 -0800, Mark IsaakAnd how would one determine otherwise? I'm really having
<specimenNOSPAM@curioustaxon.omy.net> wrote:
Lacking any creationism subjects to argue about, I bring up >>>>>>>>>>>> something
arguably off topic, but on a topic which comes up here >>>>>>>>>>>> plenty of times
anyway.
What is the difference between having free will and not >>>>>>>>>>>> having free will?
I posted this earlier today in a response to Burkhard in the >>>>>>>>>>> 'Masterclass' thread but I think it's worth repeating here. >>>>>>>>>>> Benjamin
Libet (he of the famous experiments):
"The role of conscious free will would be, then, not to
initiate a
voluntary act, but rather to control occurrences of the act. >>>>>>>>>>> We may
view the unconscious initiatives for voluntary actions as >>>>>>>>>>> "bubbling
up" in the brain. The conscious-will then selects which of these >>>>>>>>>>> initiatives may go forward to an action or which ones to veto >>>>>>>>>>> and
abort, with no act appearing.
This kind of role for free will is actually in accord with >>>>>>>>>>> religious
and ethical strictures, which commonly advocate that you >>>>>>>>>>> "control
yourself" Most of the Ten Commandments are "do not" orders." >>>>>>>>>>>
That hits the spot for me - free will is the ability to
decide not to
do something that our instincts want us to do or decide to do >>>>>>>>>>> something that our instincts don't want us to do.
The absence of free will would be us just following our
instincts.
difficulty
coming up with any way of distinguishing the free will/no free >>>>>>>>>> will
positions. At least the 'no free will' position doesn't screw >>>>>>>>>> up physics.
--
that last
sentence.
At least the 'no free will' position doesn't have the potential >>>>>>>> to screw
up physics.
Do you think it doesn't matter if it screws up things beyond physics >>>>>>> e.g. with the legal/penal system by punishing people for something >>>>>>> over which they had no control?
night. Now, the legal/penal system is not supposed to be 'punishment' >>>>>> (I'll get to what it mostly appears to me to be later) but
protection of
society and rehabilitation. Where this idea has been properly
funded and
implemented, it appears to work fairly well; and is not properly
construed as 'punishment'. I think this position is compatible
with both
'free will' and 'determinism'.
What it appears to be in most places is that protection of society >>>>>> thing
(actually protection of the status quo) as cheaply as possible and >>>>>> avoiding all that expensive rehabilitation thing. If someone makes a >>>>>> shitton of money as well... well that's a bonus.
A man murders his wife in a fit of temper after discovering she has
had an affair. He is extremely remorseful so there is no real need for >>>>> any rehabilitation. This is the only time in his life that he is known >>>>> to have been violent, the police believe that this was a once-off
event between two specific individuals and the husband is no threat to >>>>> the general public. Do you think he should not be sent to jail?
OH. oh. can I make up a hypothetical? Here goes.
After a big breakthrough in quantum computing a group gets an
obscenely large grant that simulates a pair of real people who are
kept in a highly controlled environment. Single environmental
changes are introduced and their responses are closely monitored.
The simulation predicts their responses with a very high degree of
accuracy.
Is your faith in free will shaken?
I assume you mean that in the experiment
there are two real people, and also there
is a separate simulation of the people
in that situation.
It's a problem for the argument that you
mention "quantum computing", because it's
possible to use that to claim that you
have merely recreated free will in a
quantum computer.
But what if the real people behave deterministically
but the computer simulated people don't?
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