It almost happened: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqtdElVxNWI
Operation Barbarossa was still on the offensive, and would his generals have >pursued a more thoughtful strategy to take Russia, instead of Adolf trying
to micro-manage it at every level? Or would Goering have taken over and >mucked things up even worse?
It almost happened: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqtdElVxNWI
Operation Barbarossa was still on the offensive, and would his generals have pursued a more thoughtful strategy to take Russia, instead of Adolf trying
to micro-manage it at every level? Or would Goering have taken over and mucked things up even worse?
It almost happened: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqtdElVxNWI
Operation Barbarossa was still on the offensive, and would his generals
have
pursued a more thoughtful strategy to take Russia, instead of Adolf trying
to micro-manage it at every level? Or would Goering have taken over and mucked things up even worse?
On 11/7/2019 3:15 PM, Byker wrote:
It almost happened: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqtdElVxNWI
Operation Barbarossa was still on the offensive, and would his generals
have
pursued a more thoughtful strategy to take Russia, instead of Adolf trying >> to micro-manage it at every level? Or would Goering have taken over and
mucked things up even worse?
Might want to cross post to alt.history.what-if.
AFAIK, Google /still/ has this group on such strict lockdown that you
can't even view its archive, let alone get anyone without a standalone
Usenet subscription to view the topic. So if that reader has one of
those glitches that purge the body while keeping the header, there's no
way for someone to read the response.
On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 16:15:35 -0600, "Byker" <byker@do~rag.net> wrote:
It almost happened: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqtdElVxNWI
Operation Barbarossa was still on the offensive, and would his generals have >>pursued a more thoughtful strategy to take Russia, instead of Adolf trying >>to micro-manage it at every level? Or would Goering have taken over and >>mucked things up even worse?
Why June 4 1942 especially?
Certainly Fall Blau (the 1942 offensive) was going very nicely at that
point and Stalingrad was definitely there for the taking in Aug Sept
1942 if taken on the march as opposed to a block by block struggle
which would do nothing for them but chew up time and manpower.
The Horny Goat <lcraver@home.ca> on Thu, 07 Nov 2019 18:31:37 -0800
typed in soc.history.what-if the following:
On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 16:15:35 -0600, "Byker" <byker@do~rag.net> wrote:
It almost happened: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqtdElVxNWI
Operation Barbarossa was still on the offensive, and would his generals have >>>pursued a more thoughtful strategy to take Russia, instead of Adolf trying >>>to micro-manage it at every level? Or would Goering have taken over and >>>mucked things up even worse?
Why June 4 1942 especially?
Certainly Fall Blau (the 1942 offensive) was going very nicely at that >>point and Stalingrad was definitely there for the taking in Aug Sept
1942 if taken on the march as opposed to a block by block struggle
which would do nothing for them but chew up time and manpower.
Question: would "Goring" have diverted the Sixth Army group to
take Stalingrad, when the objective was the oilfields?
Although, I can see a Nazi hierarchy insisting that "Stalin City"
be taken for the Glory of the late Furher! regard less of the military
merits (or lack there of).
On Tue, 12 Nov 2019 08:00:46 -0800, pyotr filipivich wrote:
The Horny Goat <lcraver@home.ca> on Thu, 07 Nov 2019 18:31:37 -0800
typed in soc.history.what-if the following:
On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 16:15:35 -0600, "Byker" <byker@do~rag.net> wrote:
It almost happened: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqtdElVxNWI
Operation Barbarossa was still on the offensive, and would his generals have
pursued a more thoughtful strategy to take Russia, instead of Adolf trying >>>>to micro-manage it at every level? Or would Goering have taken over and >>>>mucked things up even worse?
Why June 4 1942 especially?
Certainly Fall Blau (the 1942 offensive) was going very nicely at that >>>point and Stalingrad was definitely there for the taking in Aug Sept >>>1942 if taken on the march as opposed to a block by block struggle
which would do nothing for them but chew up time and manpower.
Question: would "Goring" have diverted the Sixth Army group to
take Stalingrad, when the objective was the oilfields?
Although, I can see a Nazi hierarchy insisting that "Stalin City"
be taken for the Glory of the late Furher! regard less of the military
merits (or lack there of).
There are two views on Goring, one negative and one positive. He was a
person enormous ability and clear-sighted.
Overall Goring was sceptical about the war from the start which he tried to >stop. He was sure that the war against Russia was doomed to defeat. Then he >was particularly worried about the growing power of the US.
If in power, he would try to make a comprise peace.
The minimum that Stalin would accept here was a full retreat of the German >forces from Russia. I doubt that Goring would be willing to pay such a
price, but he might accept much of a retreat.
Also, he was an experienced military officer. I am sure he would have been >concerned about the German military being overextending. So as far as >Stalingrad is concerned, I doubt that he would be extending the war. I
would expect some deep retreats by the German military.
On Thu, 7 Nov 2019 16:15:35 -0600, "Byker" <byker@do~rag.net> wrote:
It almost happened: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TqtdElVxNWI
Why June 4 1942 especially?
Certainly Fall Blau (the 1942 offensive) was going
very nicely at that point...
There are two basic possibilities if Hitler dies in '42.
He's replaced by a Party Stalwart with little military experience.
He's replaced by a Party Stalwart with military experience.
Either way, it is possible to go forward with
Operation Blue, and not add Stalingrad as an
objective.
Not diverting resources to that (imho) vanity
project _might_ have enabled the army to take the
oilfields.
Now, whether the 3rd Reich would have been able to
exploit those oil fields is another matter.
I doubt that by 1942, either side would accept a
status quo ante.
The economic problems (raw materials for industry,
POL, etc) remained. Goebbels would have had a hard
time selling Germany on the pull back from the
East...
Question: would "Goring" have diverted the Sixth Army group to
take Stalingrad, when the objective was the oilfields?
Although, I can see a Nazi hierarchy insisting that "Stalin City"
be taken for the Glory of the late Furher! regard less of the military
merits (or lack there of).
I doubt that by 1942, either side would accept a
status quo ante.
The economic problems (raw materials for industry,
POL, etc) remained. Goebbels would have had a hard
time selling Germany on the pull back from the
East...
By late 1942, most Germans were less concerned with
victory than with avoiding catastrophic defeat, and
with the on-going cost of the war. Ending the Eastern
Front would be a colossal relief. A lot of young men
would be thinking "I'm not going to die."
On the other side, Stalin might be happy to get his
cookies back and rebuild while Germany fought it out
with the US and UK.
Certainly Fall Blau (the 1942 offensive) was going
very nicely at that point...
Not yet. Fall BLAU started on 28 June, more than three weeks later.
There had been some successful German offensives
before 4 June: BUSTARD HUNT, which cleared eastern
Crimea; and the destruction of the Barvenkovo salient
near Kharkov. But the main attack had not started.
He's replaced by a Party Stalwart with little military experience.
He's replaced by a Party Stalwart with military experience.
Goering is the designated successor. If there is some
further pulling and hauling that replaces him, that's
likely to paralyze German operations for a while.
Taking Stalingrad was part of the original plan, AIUI.
At the very least, German forces were to appraach
Stalingrad and screen it from the surrounding area.
4th Panzer Army (far right flank) and 6th Army (right
center) were sent in that direction. Then 4th Panzer was
switched to the south, to assist 1st Panzer Army and
Seventeenth Army in crossing the lower Don into the
north Caucasus, i.e. moving SE, _behind_ 6th Army.
Then 6th Army bogged down at Stalingrad, and 4th Panzer
was turned again, to the NE, to help capture Stalingrad.
4th Panzer quickly overran the entire southern half of
the city. It was in the north that 6th Army got into the
brutal street fight.
Not likely. 1st Panzer was literally out of fuel, 200 km
from the north end of the Caspian Gates. It would take
a major extension of German effort to get to there. Then
they have to fight through the Gates: the narrow strip
between the Caspian Sea and the eastern Caucasus, about
300 km more. There might not be a lot of Soviet troops
in the area, but the US and Britain could send
reinforcements from Iran.
Now, whether the 3rd Reich would have been able to
exploit those oil fields is another matter.
Not any time soon. The Germans captured a lesser oilfield
at Maikop, north of the western Caucasus, in early August.
The Soviets trashed it before withdrawing. The Germans held
it until January 1943. They sent a group of oil-field techs
to get it working, but got essentially nothing in five months.
By late 1942, most Germans were less concerned with
victory than with avoiding catastrophic defeat, and
with the on-going cost of the war. Ending the Eastern
Front would be a colossal relief. A lot of young men
would be thinking "I'm not going to die."
On the other side, Stalin might be happy to get his
cookies back and rebuild while Germany fought it out
with the US and UK.
There had been some successful German offensives
before 4 June: BUSTARD HUNT, which cleared eastern
Crimea; and the destruction of the Barvenkovo salient
near Kharkov. But the main attack had not started.
Sevastopol had not yet fallen on June 4th but yes the handwriting was
on the wall then.
On Wed, 13 Nov 2019 14:53:56 -0600, Rich Rostrom
<rrostrom@comcast.net> wrote:
Certainly Fall Blau (the 1942 offensive) was going
very nicely at that point...
Not yet. Fall BLAU started on 28 June, more than three weeks later.
Alas you're right - I was thinking of the fighting around Kharkov
where the Red Army attacked and got clobbered.
There had been some successful German offensives
before 4 June: BUSTARD HUNT, which cleared eastern
Crimea; and the destruction of the Barvenkovo salient
near Kharkov. But the main attack had not started.
Sevastopol had not yet fallen on June 4th but yes the handwriting was
on the wall then.
He's replaced by a Party Stalwart with little military experience.
He's replaced by a Party Stalwart with military experience.
Or alternately a party stalwart with some military experience who
thinks he knows a LOT more than he really does - which in my opinion describes Goering in 1942.
Goering is the designated successor. If there is some
further pulling and hauling that replaces him, that's
likely to paralyze German operations for a while.
Taking Stalingrad was part of the original plan, AIUI.
At the very least, German forces were to appraach
Stalingrad and screen it from the surrounding area.
4th Panzer Army (far right flank) and 6th Army (right
center) were sent in that direction. Then 4th Panzer was
switched to the south, to assist 1st Panzer Army and
Seventeenth Army in crossing the lower Don into the
north Caucasus, i.e. moving SE, _behind_ 6th Army.
Then 6th Army bogged down at Stalingrad, and 4th Panzer
was turned again, to the NE, to help capture Stalingrad.
4th Panzer quickly overran the entire southern half of
the city. It was in the north that 6th Army got into the
brutal street fight.
I am convinced Stalingrad was there for the taking in the summer of
1942 but that the attack degenerated into a frontal assault rather
than a flanking maneuver. And we all know what happened after that.
Not likely. 1st Panzer was literally out of fuel, 200 km
from the north end of the Caspian Gates. It would take
a major extension of German effort to get to there. Then
they have to fight through the Gates: the narrow strip
between the Caspian Sea and the eastern Caucasus, about
300 km more. There might not be a lot of Soviet troops
in the area, but the US and Britain could send
reinforcements from Iran.
I do think the Germans could have cut off Russian access to Caucasian
oil. However unless they captured the fields intact (ha!!) they had
little hope of extracting economically significant amounts of oil
witihin the frst 18 months after capture. Rich (amongst others) will
recall our chat on that subject 3-4 years back. The short version is
that having 100,000 barrels of oil 2000 miles from Germany does not
help the German economy if you do not have an effective method of transporting it to the Reich. On the other hand, reducing the Soviet
supply of oil by 100,000 barrels DOES hurt the Red Army and is
infinitely more achieveable than transporting the same oil from the
Caucasus to the Reich.
Now, whether the 3rd Reich would have been able to
exploit those oil fields is another matter.
Not any time soon. The Germans captured a lesser oilfield
at Maikop, north of the western Caucasus, in early August.
The Soviets trashed it before withdrawing. The Germans held
it until January 1943. They sent a group of oil-field techs
to get it working, but got essentially nothing in five months.
My previous point about transporting oil via pipeline (and do you have
any idea how hard it is to defend a pipeline - even if you magically
had one nearly 2000 miles long - against a determined partisan force?
By late 1942, most Germans were less concerned with
victory than with avoiding catastrophic defeat, and
with the on-going cost of the war. Ending the Eastern
Front would be a colossal relief. A lot of young men
would be thinking "I'm not going to die."
That's a reason assumption in the spring of 1943 - far less so before
the destruction of 6th army.
On the other side, Stalin might be happy to get his
cookies back and rebuild while Germany fought it out
with the US and UK.
There were actual peace negotiations in the spring of 1943. Stalin
wanted the 1941 boundary, Hitler wanted the Dniepr. Since there was no
deal they fought it out.
It would depend on who Goering uses as his military advisors. His
choices of military leaders in the Luftwaffe were overall excellent
and highly capable people.
Joseph "Beppo" Schmid was in charge of Luftwaffe intelligence from the beginning of 1938 to late 1942. The intelligence used to plan the Battle
of Britain was very defective, and his performance as a ground commander
and in the Defence of the Reich campaign was unimpressive. His primary quality seemed to be his close friendship with Goering. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schmid
"John Dallman" wrote in message >news:memo.20191116150543.1784D@jgd.cix.co.uk...
Joseph "Beppo" Schmid was in charge of Luftwaffe intelligence from the
beginning of 1938 to late 1942. The intelligence used to plan the Battle
of Britain was very defective, and his performance as a ground commander
and in the Defence of the Reich campaign was unimpressive. His primary
quality seemed to be his close friendship with Goering.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Schmid
From what I've learned about the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe, despite >their high losses, had all but exhausted the RAF. The British pilots were >getting so little sleep that they nodded off at the controls and shuffled >around like zombies. By the time Der Fuhrer threw in the towel, the RAF >hadn't so much "won" the Battle of Britain as the Luftwaffe LOST it: >https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uCu7IT81gh8&t=21m22s
and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time*
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time*
Hermann GĂśring would not have known these figures, but he did know that something was going wrong. At Nuremberg, he stated that the losses were sustainable and he could have kept going but what mucked up the NAZIs was
the lack of shipping for Sealion. If so, the question is, what was the
point of this air war?
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time*
Hermann Göring would not have known these figures, but he did know that >something was going wrong. At Nuremberg, he stated that the losses were >sustainable and he could have kept going but what mucked up the NAZIs was
the lack of shipping for Sealion. If so, the question is, what was the
point of this air war?
On 11/16/2019 8:15 PM, SolomonW wrote:
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:To make it safe for the shipping they did have, obviously! :P
and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time*
Hermann Göring would not have known these figures, but he did know that
something was going wrong. At Nuremberg, he stated that the losses were
sustainable and he could have kept going but what mucked up the NAZIs was
the lack of shipping for Sealion. If so, the question is, what was the
point of this air war?
Slightly more realistically in Hitler's mind it was probably to punish >Britain for not surrendering and to scare them into doing so.
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 15:15:35 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time*
Hermann Göring would not have known these figures, but he did know that >>something was going wrong. At Nuremberg, he stated that the losses were >>sustainable and he could have kept going but what mucked up the NAZIs was >>the lack of shipping for Sealion. If so, the question is, what was the >>point of this air war?
He wouldn't have known the RAF figures, sure, but he knew the
Luftwaffe figures weren't sustainable ...
but afaict he believed the
RAF losses were equally unsustainable,
Hitler certainly didn't seem to believe the losses were sustainable in
the face of prep for Barbarossa.
What was the point of the BoB from the Nazi PoV?
I am not entirely sure the Nazis had a clear agenda, or not a clear
single agenda.
I *think* there is evidence that Hitler suffered a version of 'victory disease' and believed that he could actually stage Sealion ... which
the Kriegsmarine, at least, had a pretty good idea they couldn't, and
tried repeatedly to tell High Command and Hitler, who completely
ignored them.
I *think* that there is also evidence that Hitler believed that the
BoB and the threat of Sealion would force the UK to negotiate a peace favourable to Germany
even though there isn't any real evidence that
the UK would ever have considered such
and a lot of historical
evidence to suggest the exact opposite.
I am pretty sure that Hitler had some inkling that leaving an
unconquered or at least unemasculated UK at his rear for Barbarossa
was not a good idea ... after all, the reason for the attack in the
West was because he believed that a two front European war was largely
what had led to Germany's defeat in WW1. Of course, this notion was
impacted by the 'victory disease' and by the fact that the BoB wasn't
seen to be a clear German defeat *at the time* so he eventually seems
to have convinced himself that leaving an unconquered UK in his rear
was no biggie ... an unfortunate delusion.
Unfortunately, many (not all) generalist history books still rely on the beliefs expressed by the leaders in 1940 rather than on more recent, and
more comprehensive, research.
Have you looked how deep the Russian oil fields go
inland? I do not believe Germany could go that far
inland.
It might be possible to establish an airfield to
bomb them in that area. Still, there are some
significant problems Germany does not have much in
the way of heavy bombers...
Agreed, there is a sea route, but it requires access from the ports of
Italy through the Mediterranean into the Black Sea.
I doubt it, German losses are not that high yet, and
the Germans think they are winning.
... so he eventually seems to have convinced himself
that leaving an unconquered UK in his rear was no
biggie ... an unfortunate delusion.
In fact, the RAF won the BoB handily while the leaders thought it was
a close run thing, and the Luftwaffe lost the BoB decisively, even
though the leaders believed they had fought the RAF to a standstill.
SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com> wrote:
Have you looked how deep the Russian oil fields go
inland? I do not believe Germany could go that far
inland.
It might be possible to establish an airfield to
bomb them in that area. Still, there are some
significant problems Germany does not have much in
the way of heavy bombers...
The Allies with vastly greater bomber forces had only limited
success against oil targets.
Agreed, there is a sea route, but it requires access from the ports of
Italy through the Mediterranean into the Black Sea.
???
If the Axis controls oil in the Caucasus, and can get
it to the Black Sea, they ship it to _Romania_, and
thence overland by rail or up the Danube by barge.
I doubt it, German losses are not that high yet, and
the Germans think they are winning.
German losses in the East had already approached 500,000.
The Germans who survived the winter of 1941-1942 in the
frozen fields of Russia didn't feel like they were "winning".
From what I've learned about the Battle of Britain, the Luftwaffe, despite >their high losses, had all but exhausted the RAF. The British pilots were >getting so little sleep that they nodded off at the controls and shuffled >around like zombies. By the time Der Fuhrer threw in the towel, the RAF >hadn't so much "won" the Battle of Britain as the Luftwaffe LOST it: >https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uCu7IT81gh8&t=21m22s
Or alternately a party stalwart with some military experience who
thinks he knows a LOT more than he really does - which in my opinion
describes Goering in 1942.
It would depend on who Goering uses as his military advisors. His choices
of military leaders in the Luftwaffe were overall excellent and highly >capable people.
Taking Stalingrad was part of the original plan, AIUI.
At the very least, German forces were to appraach
Stalingrad and screen it from the surrounding area.
Then 6th Army bogged down at Stalingrad, and 4th Panzer
was turned again, to the NE, to help capture Stalingrad.
4th Panzer quickly overran the entire southern half of
the city. It was in the north that 6th Army got into the
brutal street fight.
I am convinced Stalingrad was there for the taking in the summer of
1942 but that the attack degenerated into a frontal assault rather
than a flanking maneuver. And we all know what happened after that.
If the attack on the oil fields were stopped a flanking attack is possible. >It is not an easy operation as the Volga has to be crossed first.
Not likely. 1st Panzer was literally out of fuel, 200 km
from the north end of the Caspian Gates. It would take
a major extension of German effort to get to there. Then
they have to fight through the Gates: the narrow strip
between the Caspian Sea and the eastern Caucasus, about
300 km more. There might not be a lot of Soviet troops
in the area, but the US and Britain could send
reinforcements from Iran.
I do think the Germans could have cut off Russian access to Caucasian
oil. However unless they captured the fields intact (ha!!) they had
little hope of extracting economically significant amounts of oil
witihin the frst 18 months after capture. Rich (amongst others) will
recall our chat on that subject 3-4 years back. The short version is
that having 100,000 barrels of oil 2000 miles from Germany does not
help the German economy if you do not have an effective method of
transporting it to the Reich. On the other hand, reducing the Soviet
supply of oil by 100,000 barrels DOES hurt the Red Army and is
infinitely more achieveable than transporting the same oil from the
Caucasus to the Reich.
Have you looked how deep the Russian oil fields go inland? I do not believe >Germany could go that far inland.
It might be possible to establish an airfield to bomb them in that area. >Still, there are some significant problems Germany does not have much in
the way of heavy bombers, supplying strategic bombers from so deep in >Russia, the Soviet airforce is growing rapidly and as later experience
showed oil fields are not that vulnerable to air assault.
Now, whether the 3rd Reich would have been able to
exploit those oil fields is another matter.
Not any time soon. The Germans captured a lesser oilfield
at Maikop, north of the western Caucasus, in early August.
The Soviets trashed it before withdrawing. The Germans held
it until January 1943. They sent a group of oil-field techs
to get it working, but got essentially nothing in five months.
My previous point about transporting oil via pipeline (and do you have
any idea how hard it is to defend a pipeline - even if you magically
had one nearly 2000 miles long - against a determined partisan force?
Agreed, there is a sea route, but it requires access from the ports of
Italy through the Mediterranean into the Black Sea. It would not happen >because of the British RN.
By late 1942, most Germans were less concerned with
victory than with avoiding catastrophic defeat, and
with the on-going cost of the war. Ending the Eastern
Front would be a colossal relief. A lot of young men
would be thinking "I'm not going to die."
That's a reason assumption in the spring of 1943 - far less so before
the destruction of 6th army.
I doubt it, German loses are not that high yet, and the Germans think they >are winning. Not that it matters; it is not like the masses in Germany or >Russia have much of a vote in the war.
On the other side, Stalin might be happy to get his
cookies back and rebuild while Germany fought it out
with the US and UK.
There were actual peace negotiations in the spring of 1943. Stalin
wanted the 1941 boundary, Hitler wanted the Dniepr. Since there was no
deal they fought it out.
This is shrouded in mystery, but I am confident that if such a meeting did >take place, we would have real evidence that it did take place. My view is >that anti-Soviets were only too glad to support and spread such stories.
What we know is that there are some references to a possible meeting in >Stockholm in early 43 with some low-level officals of both countries. I
have also read in a reference that a significant Soviet official came to >Stockholm to talk and no-one came from Germany came to see him. The
proposed meeting may have been aborted. Another set of low-level meetings
may have occurred in mid-June or late 43, initiated allegedly by the
Soviets.
Stalin might have been in early 1943, wavering on what he should do so. At >the same time, Ribbentrop has some freedom to explore as Hitler then wanted
a separate peace. As we know that Ribbentrop was interested, he might have >put some feelers out for a separate peace. Like Goering, he did not want a >war with Russia. Hitler then decided that it was best to wait till he got a >victory at Kursk that would allow him possibly to negotiate something out
of the Russian campaign. Strategically he lost Kursk, and that was it.
The RAF was benefitting from the Empire Air Training Scheme which
produced hundreds of pilots and aircrew every month in excess of
operational needs.
The RAF pilot total *increased* every month during the Battle of
Britain - the Luftwaffe pilot total *decreased* every month in the
same time period.
RAF Fighter Pilots: ~800 in July, 950 in August, ~1050 in Spetember,
~1200 in October, ~1400 in November)
RAF Pilot Losses: 68 in Julyt, 176 in August, 123 in September, 120 in >October (Total = 487)
Luftwaffe Fighter Pilots: ~500 in July, ~450 in August, ~375 in >September-October-November.
Luftwaffe Pilot Losses: 348 in July, 993 in August, 829 in September,
492 in October (Total = 2662)
The number of operational fighters available to the RAF in the SE and
S operational areas remained much the same during the Battle ... and
these were first line Hurricanes and Spitfires ... while the number of >operational fighters available to the Luftwaffe (which included duds
like the Me-110) decreased dramatically during the same period.
RAF Fighters: ~850 in July, ~900 in August-September, ~800 in >October-November.
Luftwaffe Fighters: ~800 in July, ~750 in August, ~600 in >September-October-November.
Then, when you look at the number of sorties flown per day, the RAF
flew as many as 10 for every one the Luftwaffe flew except during some
weeks in august when they flew between 30-50% more. Giving them much
more bang for their pounds.
The thing is, we know all this with the benefit of postwar 20:20
hindsight ... Churchill didn't know that the RAF was increasing in
strength vis a vis the Luftwaffe *at the time* ... and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the
time* ... we only know this from the data becoming available post WW2.
In fact, the RAF won the BoB handily while the leaders thought it was
a close run thing, and the Luftwaffe lost the BoB decisively, even
though the leaders believed they had fought the RAF to a standstill.
Even so, the Air Ministry had realised by early 1941 that the BoB had
been won, though the magnitude of the victory wasn't fully understood
til German records could be examined after the war.
Unfortunately, many (not all) generalist history books still rely on
the beliefs expressed by the leaders in 1940 rather than on more
recent, and more comprehensive, research.
I agree with this too. The other issue is that time was not he felt on his >side, the longer he waited, the more powerful the USSR would be.
Not a lot of coastal shipping to protect after the French surrender!
U-Boats and the KM surface raiders, on the other hand ...
Slightly more realistically in Hitler's mind it was probably to punish >>Britain for not surrendering and to scare them into doing so.
Yes, I suspect this was an important factor, though I am not sure the >evidence is conclusive enough to say that it was the only factor.
As I said in an above post, I strongly suspect that form of 'victory
disease' was an important factor in Hitler's thinking about the BoB
and Sealion.
If the Axis controls oil in the Caucasus, and can get
it to the Black Sea, they ship it to _Romania_, and
thence overland by rail or up the Danube by barge.
I doubt it, German losses are not that high yet, and
the Germans think they are winning.
German losses in the East had already approached 500,000.
The Germans who survived the winter of 1941-1942 in the
frozen fields of Russia didn't feel like they were "winning".
Taking Stalingrad was part of the original plan, AIUI.
At the very least, German forces were to appraach
Stalingrad and screen it from the surrounding area.
I was suggesting Stalingrad could have been taken as part of the wide flanking sweep after taking Voronezh and the Germans could have had it
firmly in hand by the first snow.
This PROBABLY severs rail transport
of oil from the Caucasus.
On the other side, Stalin might be happy to get his
cookies back and rebuild while Germany fought it out
with the US and UK.
There were actual peace negotiations in the spring of 1943. Stalin
wanted the 1941 boundary, Hitler wanted the Dniepr. Since there was no
deal they fought it out.
This is shrouded in mystery, but I am confident that if such a meeting did >>take place, we would have real evidence that it did take place. My view is >>that anti-Soviets were only too glad to support and spread such stories.
Why would it be in Soviet interests (either before or after 1956) to
have the UK and USA think the Soviets were not fully in the Allied
camp in 1943 or anytime before or since?
What we know is that there are some references to a possible meeting in >>Stockholm in early 43 with some low-level officals of both countries. I >>have also read in a reference that a significant Soviet official came to >>Stockholm to talk and no-one came from Germany came to see him. The >>proposed meeting may have been aborted. Another set of low-level meetings >>may have occurred in mid-June or late 43, initiated allegedly by the >>Soviets.
Can't remember which book but I seem to remember hearing Molotov's
name which in 1943 is about as close to Stalin as one gets unless one
is assuming a Soviet Hess.
Stalin might have been in early 1943, wavering on what he should do so. At >>the same time, Ribbentrop has some freedom to explore as Hitler then wanted >>a separate peace. As we know that Ribbentrop was interested, he might have >>put some feelers out for a separate peace. Like Goering, he did not want a >>war with Russia. Hitler then decided that it was best to wait till he got a >>victory at Kursk that would allow him possibly to negotiate something out >>of the Russian campaign. Strategically he lost Kursk, and that was it.
I'm skeptical about that story - I find the idea of Soviet demands for
the 1941 frontier and Germany wanting the Dniepr far more plausible.
As you say, they then fought Kursk as which if Stalin ever did have
any ideas about stopping before Berlin they quickly disappeared.
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor <aspqrz@tpg.com.au>
wrote:
The RAF was benefitting from the Empire Air Training Scheme which
produced hundreds of pilots and aircrew every month in excess of >>operational needs.
Was that really true in 1940? I know the Canadian arm of that really
only hit its stride in 1941 and really contributed in 42-43 but
despite the presence of 1st Canadian division in England in September
1940 (when it would have been the most powerful unit in England at the
time of the Sealon that never was - long before 1943-44 when the Yanks
were 'over-sexed, over-paid and over here") I am not aware the RCAF
had much influence during the battle of Britain. And that was the
largest element of the Empire ATS.
Stalin might have been in early 1943, wavering on what he should do so. At >>>the same time, Ribbentrop has some freedom to explore as Hitler then wanted >>>a separate peace. As we know that Ribbentrop was interested, he might have >>>put some feelers out for a separate peace. Like Goering, he did not want a >>>war with Russia. Hitler then decided that it was best to wait till he got a >>>victory at Kursk that would allow him possibly to negotiate something out >>>of the Russian campaign. Strategically he lost Kursk, and that was it.
I'm skeptical about that story - I find the idea of Soviet demands for
the 1941 frontier and Germany wanting the Dniepr far more plausible.
As you say, they then fought Kursk as which if Stalin ever did have
any ideas about stopping before Berlin they quickly disappeared.
I am not sure whether we agree here or not, but I think we do.
Was that really true in 1940? I know the Canadian arm of that really
only hit its stride in 1941 and really contributed in 42-43 but
despite the presence of 1st Canadian division in England in September
1940 (when it would have been the most powerful unit in England at the
time of the Sealon that never was - long before 1943-44 when the Yanks
were 'over-sexed, over-paid and over here") I am not aware the RCAF
had much influence during the battle of Britain. And that was the
largest element of the Empire ATS.
From what I understand, most of it was in this period run through Canada.
The pilots were trained in Australia, then sent to Canada for more training >and only then to battle. It was only in late 1940, that the first of these >pilots were in action but which stage the battle of Britain was over.
Who else but WSC could have said "we shall fight
them on the beaches, we shall never surrender"?
the US and Britain could send
reinforcements from Iran.
If that's so why was it not requested and sent during 1942?
The rail transport through Stalingrad was cut, but
many Russian railway lines bypassed Stalingrad in
the area. These were what was used by the Russians.
(Many of whom ended up in Canada and later the US)
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 16:39:18 +1100, Phil McGregor <aspqrz@tpg.com.au>
wrote:
Not a lot of coastal shipping to protect after the French surrender! >>U-Boats and the KM surface raiders, on the other hand ...
Are you talking about the British or Germans? If the latter don't
forget that Germany still had the power to evacuate 1/4 million people >(somewhat comparable to Dunkirk) from the Baltic States even in 1945.
On Sun, 17 Nov 2019 12:47:08 +1100, Phil McGregor <aspqrz@tpg.com.au>
wrote:
The RAF was benefitting from the Empire Air Training Scheme which
produced hundreds of pilots and aircrew every month in excess of >>operational needs.
Was that really true in 1940? I know the Canadian arm of that really
only hit its stride in 1941 and really contributed in 42-43 but
despite the presence of 1st Canadian division in England in September
1940 (when it would have been the most powerful unit in England at the
time of the Sealon that never was - long before 1943-44 when the Yanks
were 'over-sexed, over-paid and over here") I am not aware the RCAF
had much influence during the battle of Britain. And that was the
largest element of the Empire ATS.
The thing is, we know all this with the benefit of postwar 20:20
hindsight ... Churchill didn't know that the RAF was increasing in
strength vis a vis the Luftwaffe *at the time* ... and Goering didn't
know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the >>time* ... we only know this from the data becoming available post WW2.
Interesting - what's your source on this? I've read Churchill's 6
volume history and didn't see any mention of that (those books were
written mostly 1948-52 if that helps)
In fact, the RAF won the BoB handily while the leaders thought it was
a close run thing, and the Luftwaffe lost the BoB decisively, even
though the leaders believed they had fought the RAF to a standstill.
Even so, the Air Ministry had realised by early 1941 that the BoB had
been won, though the magnitude of the victory wasn't fully understood
til German records could be examined after the war.
In fairness Churchill spoke many times on the RAF and he definitely
knew that praising them was very good for public morale.
The Horny Goat <lcraver@home.ca> wrote:
the US and Britain could send
reinforcements from Iran.
If that's so why was it not requested and sent during 1942?
US/UK troops weren't needed; the Germans
were stopped over 450 km from Baku.
From what I understand, most of it was in this period run through Canada.
The pilots were trained in Australia, then sent to Canada for more training >and only then to battle. It was only in late 1940, that the first of these >pilots were in action but which stage the battle of Britain was over.
Are you talking about the British or Germans? If the latter don't
forget that Germany still had the power to evacuate 1/4 million people >>(somewhat comparable to Dunkirk) from the Baltic States even in 1945.
Indeed.
Two words.
Wilhelm Gustloff.
Sure, the Germans had merchant ships in the Baltic. They were *needed*
in the Baltic to ship, amongst other things, Swedish Iron ore and
supplies for Barbarossa.
They didn't risk them in the English Channel or North Sea where the RN
would have trashed them.
Phil
But Britain was already training pilots and, as you can see from the
figures I provided, the number of Fighter Pilots increased overall
every month ... by hundreds.
What's interesting is that this figure doesn't cover the actual number
of Pilots involved ... the overall figure (Pilots flying at least one
sortie) is 2937 ... a thousand more than the 1400 November figure and
the 487 losses.
Figures are all available online.
The thing is, we know all this with the benefit of postwar 20:20 >>>hindsight ... Churchill didn't know that the RAF was increasing in >>>strength vis a vis the Luftwaffe *at the time* ... and Goering didn't >>>know that they were falling further and further behind the RAF *at the >>>time* ... we only know this from the data becoming available post WW2.
Interesting - what's your source on this? I've read Churchill's 6
volume history and didn't see any mention of that (those books were
written mostly 1948-52 if that helps)
Well, the Air Ministry, as noted below, realised that the BoB had been
won in 1941.
I guess Churchill didn't emphasise it partly because it didn't suit
the heroic narrative he was selling in those books and partly because
he wrote them (IIRC) without specific reference (in them) to any
primary or even secondary sources
Indeed. And selling the heroic myth of 'The Few' played as well after
the war.
On Wed, 20 Nov 2019 10:58:13 +1100, Phil McGregor
<aspqrz@tpg.com.au> wrote:
What's interesting is that this figure doesn't cover the actual
number of Pilots involved ... the overall figure (Pilots flying
at least one sortie) is 2937 ... a thousand more than the 1400
November figure and the 487 losses.
Is that the entire RAF or is it just 11 Fighter Group? (The one
covering SE England especially London)
During one of the raids a German bomber got lost and managed to drop
his load on Dublin destroying the synagogue there. The next day De
Valera called in the German ambassador and told him he WOULD pay for
the rebuilding of the synagogue and if he wouldn't he would call
Churchill who undoubtedly would. The synagogue had their centenary in
1992 and it is said the rabbi took great pleasure in telling onlookers
that they were worshipping in the only synagogue ever built by the
Third Reich!
SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com> wrote:
The rail transport through Stalingrad was cut, but
many Russian railway lines bypassed Stalingrad in
the area. These were what was used by the Russians.
????
East of Stalingrad is the completely empty
Caspian Depression. There is a rail line
along the Volga to Astrakhan, and thence
along the Caspian coast to the Caucasus.
The only other rail connection from Russia
runs SE from Rostov.
Well east of Stalingrad, there was a single
rail line from the southern Urals to the
northeast corner of the Caspian Sea, but
it didn't connect to Astrakhan.
On Tue, 19 Nov 2019 17:48:26 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
From what I understand, most of it was in this period run through Canada. >>The pilots were trained in Australia, then sent to Canada for more training >>and only then to battle. It was only in late 1940, that the first of these >>pilots were in action but which stage the battle of Britain was over.
True, to a point.
The EATS was supposed to train 50,000 a year ... 28,000 in the
Dominions and Colonies and the remaining 22,000 in the UK.
So it was the UK cohort of the EATS who bolstered the pilot numbers consistently during the BoB.
Phil McGregor
On Mon, 18 Nov 2019 00:31:13 -0600, Rich Rostrom
<rrostrom@comcast.net> wrote:
If the Axis controls oil in the Caucasus, and can get
it to the Black Sea, they ship it to _Romania_, and
thence overland by rail or up the Danube by barge.
Where would these tanker ships be constructed? With respect Romania
isn't exactly known as a shipbuilding nation to put it mildly.
On Wed, 20 Nov 2019 10:58:13 +1100, Phil McGregor <aspqrz@tpg.com.au>
wrote:
But Britain was already training pilots and, as you can see from the >>figures I provided, the number of Fighter Pilots increased overall
every month ... by hundreds.
What's interesting is that this figure doesn't cover the actual number
of Pilots involved ... the overall figure (Pilots flying at least one >>sortie) is 2937 ... a thousand more than the 1400 November figure and
the 487 losses.
Figures are all available online.
Is that the entire RAF or is it just 11 Fighter Group? (The one
covering SE England especially London)
On Wed, 20 Nov 2019 11:02:30 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
On Tue, 19 Nov 2019 17:48:26 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
From what I understand, most of it was in this period run through Canada. >>>The pilots were trained in Australia, then sent to Canada for more training >>>and only then to battle. It was only in late 1940, that the first of these >>>pilots were in action but which stage the battle of Britain was over.
True, to a point.
The EATS was supposed to train 50,000 a year ... 28,000 in the
Dominions and Colonies and the remaining 22,000 in the UK.
So it was the UK cohort of the EATS who bolstered the pilot numbers
consistently during the BoB.
Phil McGregor
Reading the Wiki, I doubt that it was UK EATS, the first of these EATS was >sent to Britain in Oct 1941.
https://www.wikiwand.com/en/British_Commonwealth_Air_Training_Plan
"The United Kingdom was considered an unsuitable location for air training, >due to the possibility of enemy attack, the strain caused by wartime
traffic at airfields and the unpredictable weather, so the plan called for >the facilities in the Dominions to train British and each other's
aircrews."
I unclear where these pilots came from, but I think they may have been >existing pilots who were retrained. Reading the reports, it appears that >their lack of experience was a problem. Although Britain had more pilots
and planes in numbers at the end of the Battle of Britain, I doubt many
were of the same quality as at the start.
I'm pretty sure it includes the two Groups facing the Luftwaffe as
they are the figures listed for BoB RAF pilot numbers, 11 Group (7
Spitfire, 14 Hurricane and 2 Defiant Squadrons) in the SE and 10 Group
(5 Hurricane and 3 Spitfire Squadrons, plus a Gladiator Squadron) in
the SW, which was also engaged, though not as heavily.
The German figures are for BoB Fighter squadrons afaict.
Lack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
On Thu, 21 Nov 2019 00:00:29 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
Lack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were
sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
In the book "The most dangerous enemy by Stephen Bungay" on p373, there
is a short discussion on this question. He does not state the reasons why >exactly, but he is firm that these British replacement pilots were not
nearly as good as the old one.
Having said that, this problem would have affected the Germans too. Their >replacement pilots would need time to learn, which is basically what you >said.
On Thu, 21 Nov 2019 00:00:29 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:
Lack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were
sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
In the book "The most dangerous enemy by Stephen Bungay" on p373, there
is a short discussion on this question. He does not state the reasons why >exactly, but he is firm that these British replacement pilots were not
nearly as good as the old one.
Having said that, this problem would have affected the Germans too. Their >replacement pilots would need time to learn, which is basically what you >said.
The high kill numbers of individual German aces is actually a case in
point ... the Germans couldn't afford to pull them out of frontline
combat so they were kept there till they died.
Had the British taken and held Narvik ...
...I have no doubt the Brits would have invaded
Northern Sweden sometime between 1941-43 to take
the iron fields...
This is a railway map of Russia 1942.
I wonder though - given the terrain, could a
determined garrison hold out?
The Horny Goat <lcraver@home.ca> wrote:
Had the British taken and held Narvik ...
The Allies did take Narvik (I write "Allies"
because the French _Chasseurs Alpins_ were
heavily involved).
However, after the fall of southern Norway
to the Germans, and with the collapse of
France, Narvik was deemed untenable.
I wonder though - given the terrain, could a
determined garrison hold out? The Allies would
also keep northern Norway, which has effects on
Finland; it would also secure the convoy route
to Murmansk. And here's a big question: would
the Axis be able to hold the Petsamo nickel
mines, and how important was Petsamo nickel?
...I have no doubt the Brits would have invaded
Northern Sweden sometime between 1941-43 to take
the iron fields...
Very unlikely. By that time, Germany had the Briey
fields in France, Britain would not want to
force Sweden into the Axis, and German forces
operating through and with Sweden would easily
recapture the Kiruna mines _and_ take Narvik.
On Thu, 21 Nov 2019 19:55:45 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
On Thu, 21 Nov 2019 00:00:29 +1100, Phil McGregor wrote:This affects all pilots wth the possible excepton of the Soviets who
Lack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were
sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
In the book "The most dangerous enemy by Stephen Bungay" on p373, there
is a short discussion on this question. He does not state the reasons why >>exactly, but he is firm that these British replacement pilots were not >>nearly as good as the old one.
Having said that, this problem would have affected the Germans too. Their >>replacement pilots would need time to learn, which is basically what you >>said.
suffered such losses on 22 Jun 1941.
SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com> wrote:
This is a railway map of Russia 1942.
It shows one, not "many" rail line bypassing Stalingrad well to the East.
This affects all pilots wth the possible excepton of the Soviets whoLack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were >>>> sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
In the book "The most dangerous enemy by Stephen Bungay" on p373, there >>>is a short discussion on this question. He does not state the reasons why >>>exactly, but he is firm that these British replacement pilots were not >>>nearly as good as the old one.
Having said that, this problem would have affected the Germans too. Their >>>replacement pilots would need time to learn, which is basically what you >>>said.
suffered such losses on 22 Jun 1941.
In 1941, they were throwing in pilots that had almost no training and from >what I read it was only towards the end of ww2 that Russian pilot training
in hours started equaling Western training times.
On Sat, 23 Nov 2019 21:01:56 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
This affects all pilots wth the possible excepton of the Soviets whoLack of experience was, indeed, a problem ... but it was lack of
*combat* experience rather than lack of *flight* experience. They were >>>>> sending newly trained pilots to operational units,
In the book "The most dangerous enemy by Stephen Bungay" on p373, there >>>>is a short discussion on this question. He does not state the reasons why >>>>exactly, but he is firm that these British replacement pilots were not >>>>nearly as good as the old one.
Having said that, this problem would have affected the Germans too. Their >>>>replacement pilots would need time to learn, which is basically what you >>>>said.
suffered such losses on 22 Jun 1941.
In 1941, they were throwing in pilots that had almost no training and from >>what I read it was only towards the end of ww2 that Russian pilot training >>in hours started equaling Western training times.
I apologize for leaving the impression that I thought Red Air Force
pilots were as good as Allied and German pilots - perhaps by 1945 but
a LOT of not so superb pilots were dead.
My reference to 22 June 1941 (which I presume most here know was the
day the Germans invaded Russia) was simply that the Red Air Force lost roughly 1000 planes that day many on the ground. This had the result
that during the 1941 they mostly flew whatever they had available and
many of these were NOT up to 1940-41 standards - some of these dated
back to the 1920s.
The first Soviet "airborne" operations were in fact during the 1941-42 counteroffensive where troops were dropped behind German lines to join
up with the partisans. The story is that a common method of
"paratrooping" was for the plane to fly as low to the ground as
possible and for the men to jump into as deep a snowbank as they could
spot from the air - WITHOUT PARACHUTES. I've read stories that have to
be apocryphal as to how many jumped that way but there are too many
stories of that sort for this not to have been used in a few cases.
There is no suggestion this was ever attempted other than in the
deepest of winter.
To me it seems too "Bartholomew Bandy-ish" to have ever been a
widespread practice. (Apologies to those unfamiliar with Donald Jack's
hero)
I apologize for leaving the impression that I thought Red Air Force
pilots were as good as Allied and German pilots - perhaps by 1945 but
a LOT of not so superb pilots were dead.
How good they were is disputed, there was an air battle during ww2 where
the Russians and the US fought and technically the Russians won.
On Sun, 24 Nov 2019 13:46:08 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
I apologize for leaving the impression that I thought Red Air Force
pilots were as good as Allied and German pilots - perhaps by 1945 but
a LOT of not so superb pilots were dead.
How good they were is disputed, there was an air battle during ww2 where
the Russians and the US fought and technically the Russians won.
When was this battle? If it happened at all it had to be somewhere
near the Elbe in 1945 and as I said the Red Air Force was pretty
competent by then.
Totally different situation from 1941 - no one suggests the Red Air
Force in the first 6 months of the invasioni were at the standard of
the RAF or Luftwaffe over Britain in 1940. Some individual pilots were
but not overall by a long shot.
Petsamo is a LONG way from Narvik...
On 11/24/2019 12:03 AM, The Horny Goat wrote:
On Sun, 24 Nov 2019 13:46:08 +1100, SolomonW <SolomonW@citi.com>
wrote:
I apologize for leaving the impression that I thought Red Air Force
pilots were as good as Allied and German pilots - perhaps by 1945 but
a LOT of not so superb pilots were dead.
How good they were is disputed, there was an air battle during ww2 where >>> the Russians and the US fought and technically the Russians won.
When was this battle? If it happened at all it had to be somewhere
near the Elbe in 1945 and as I said the Red Air Force was pretty
competent by then.
Totally different situation from 1941 - no one suggests the Red Air
Force in the first 6 months of the invasioni were at the standard of
the RAF or Luftwaffe over Britain in 1940. Some individual pilots were
but not overall by a long shot.
Read the article (though preferably replacing the for-profit Wikiwand
address with the corresponding Wikipedia one).
It's in Serbia almost
exactly 75 years ago.
It's also P-38s, which weren't really suitable dogfighters, against
YAK-9s. Euro Theatre P-38s were not given to the best American pilots at
that point-there are P-51s all over the European skies instead.
The Horny Goat <lcraver@home.ca> wrote:
Petsamo is a LONG way from Narvik...
But is adjacent to northern Norway, and very
distant from the rest of Finland - and also
adjacent to the USSR.
Totally different situation from 1941 - no one suggests the Red Air
Force in the first 6 months of the invasioni were at the standard of
the RAF or Luftwaffe over Britain in 1940. Some individual pilots were
but not overall by a long shot.
Read the article (though preferably replacing the for-profit Wikiwand
address with the corresponding Wikipedia one). It's in Serbia almost
exactly 75 years ago.
It's also P-38s, which weren't really suitable dogfighters, against
YAK-9s. Euro Theatre P-38s were not given to the best American pilots at
that point-there are P-51s all over the European skies instead.
On Mon, 25 Nov 2019 01:08:37 -0600, Rich Rostrom
<rrostrom@comcast.net> wrote:
The Horny Goat <lcraver@home.ca> wrote:
Petsamo is a LONG way from Narvik...
But is adjacent to northern Norway, and very
distant from the rest of Finland - and also
adjacent to the USSR.
It's not all that close to the portion of Finland that the Soviets
annexed after the war - which includes Petsamo.
the men to jump into as deep a snowbank as they could
spot from the air - WITHOUT PARACHUTES.
Having said that, I doubt there was much different between the P-38
and P-51. The big issue is that the P-51 was much cheaper.
The Horny Goat <lcraver@home.ca> wrote:
the men to jump into as deep a snowbank as they could
spot from the air - WITHOUT PARACHUTES.
Well, that sounds crazy - but not that much
crazier than floating down slowly through the
air while men on the ground shoot at you.
Petsamo is a LONG way from Narvik...
But is adjacent to northern Norway, and very
distant from the rest of Finland - and also
adjacent to the USSR.
It's not all that close to the portion of Finland that the Soviets
annexed after the war - which includes Petsamo.
I'm not sure why you think I was referring to
Narvik rather than Petsamo.
You DO understand that this is something they attempted in mid-winter
in areas where snowdrifts were known to be deep?
You DO understand that this is something they attempted in mid-winter
in areas where snowdrifts were known to be deep?
Of course. That's why I wrote that it was not "that much crazier"
than conventional parachuting into combat. There was actually a
method to the madness. In the end it didn't work, but it was
arguably worth trying.
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