From the news feed:75 years ago, what if Japan never attacked Pearl Harbor?
75 years ago, what if Japan never attacked Pearl Harbor?
From the news feed:75 years ago, what if Japan never attacked Pearl Harbor?
By Ishaan Tharoor December 7
On 2016-12-07 6:46 PM, a425couple wrote:
From the news feed:75 years ago, what if Japan never attacked Pearl Harbor?
By Ishaan Tharoor December 7
I suppose it would have delayed American entry in the war to the point
where Japan and Germany may have become unstoppable.
Dave Smith <adavid.smith@sympatico.ca> wrote:
On 2016-12-07 6:46 PM, a425couple wrote:
From the news feed:75 years ago, what if Japan never attacked Pearl Harbor?
By Ishaan Tharoor December 7
I suppose it would have delayed American entry in the war to the point
where Japan and Germany may have become unstoppable.
Well, they were "stoppable" by the respective oceans. At some point, FDR's sub-
hunting might have forced a war with Germany, but absent a Japanese attack on American possessions, it would be hard to see the US public (much less Congress)
support military action against Japan.
On 2016-12-09 3:31 PM, mtfester@netMAPSONscape.net wrote:
Dave Smith <adavid.smith@sympatico.ca> wrote:
On 2016-12-07 6:46 PM, a425couple wrote:
From the news feed:75 years ago, what if Japan never attacked Pearl Harbor?
By Ishaan Tharoor December 7
Well, they were "stoppable" by the respective oceans. At some point, FDR's sub-
hunting might have forced a war with Germany, but absent a Japanese attack on
American possessions, it would be hard to see the US public (much less Congress)
support military action against Japan.
Perhaps the attack on Pearl Harbor and the sinking of most of the
Pacific fleet at anchor stuck in the minds of Americans, but they struck
the Philippines the next day. While the country may have been
independent at the time, it was still important to the US.
Well, they were "stoppable" by the respective oceans. At some point, FDR's sub-
hunting might have forced a war with Germany, but absent a Japanese attack on >American possessions, it would be hard to see the US public (much less Congress)
support military action against Japan.
Well, they were "stoppable" by the respective oceans.
four state-of-the-art
battleships, two oceanic carriers and a host of smaller warships,
largely built in Italian yards with substantial injections of
German technology.
Now that is interesting,especially as neither the Germans or the
Italians had built successful oceanic carriers.
I am also wondering how this program was to be paid for and why
they assumed Franco would agree to this
From the news feed:75 years ago, what if Japan never attacked Pearl Harbor?
By Ishaan Tharoor December 7
Few events in World War II were as defining as the Japanese assault on
Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941. The "date which shall live in infamy" - as President Franklin D. Roosevelt famously put it - prompted the American
entry into the
war, subdued an entrenched isolationist faction in the country's politics and, in the long run, prefigured Washington's assumption of the role of global superpower.
2,403 Americans died and 19 vessels were either sunk or badly damaged in
the attack, which involved more than 350 warplanes launched from Japanese carriers that had secretly made their way to a remote expanse of the North Pacific. It caught the brass in Hawaii by surprise and stunned the nation.
"With astounding success," Time magazine wrote, "the little man has
clipped the big fellow."
But the big fellow would hit back. Japan's bold strike is now largely seen
as an act of "strategic imbecility," a move born out of militarist, ideological fervor that provoked a ruinous war Japan could never win and ended in mushroom clouds and hideous death and destruction at home.
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the Japanese naval commander, hoped his plan to attack on Pearl Harbor would deliver a fatal blow to American capabilities
in the Pacific and persuade Washington to push for a political settlement. Otherwise, he knew that his country stood no chance against the United
States in a protracted war, according to Steve Twomey, author of a new
book on the tense build-up to Pearl Harbor.
Twomey documents Yamamoto's initial opposition to engaging the United
States: "In a drawn-out conflict, 'Japan's resources will be depleted, battleships and weaponry will be damaged, replenishing materials will be impossible,' Yamamoto wrote on September 29 to the chief of the Naval
General Staff. 'Japan will wind up 'impoverished,' and any war 'with so little chance of success should not be fought.'"
But with war a fait accompli, Yamamoto conceived of a raid that
would be so stunning that American morale would go "down to
such an extent that it cannot be recovered," as he put it.
Unfortunately for him, the United States was galvanized by the
assault - and had its fleet of aircraft carriers largely unscathed.
A plane carrying the Japanese admiral would be shot down
over the Solomon Islands by American forces in 1943 with the U.S. counter-offensive already well underway.
Could it have gone differently? No modern conflict has spawned more alternative histories than World War II. In the decades since, writers, Hollywood execs and amateur historians have indulged in all sorts of speculation: What the world would look like if the Axis powers triumphed,
or if the Nazis crushed the Soviets, or if the United States had not
deployed nuclear weapons, or if Roosevelt had chosen not to enter
the war at all.
But even if Japan had not attacked Pearl Harbor, it's quite likely that
the two sides would have still clashed.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the USS Arizona on Dec. 7, 1941, pushed the U.S. into World War II. But the battleship wasn't supposed to
be docked at the harbor on that date. The Post's Michael Ruane takes us
back to that fateful day in American history. (Claritza Jimenez, Michael Ruane/The Washington Post)
Japan's will to power
For imperial Japan, the United States posed a fundamental obstacle to its expanding position in the Pacific. Here was a resource-hungry island
nation eager to assert itself on the world stage in the same way European powers had done in centuries prior.
By the summer of 1941, it had seized a
considerable swath of East Asia, from Manchuria and Korea to the north to
the formerly French territories of Indochina further south, and was
embroiled in a bitter war in China.
American sanctions attempted to rein in Tokyo: Washington slapped on embargoes on oil and other goods essential to Japan's war machine. The
price to have them lifted - a Japanese withdrawal from China, as well as
the abandonment of its "tripartite" alliance with Germany and Italy -
proved too steep and humiliating. So Japan calculated further expansion
in order to access the resources it needed.
"Our increasing economic pressure on Japan, plus the militaristic cast of
the government ... and their partial loss of face in China, spelled a probable resumption of their policy of conquest," mused a lengthy essay in the Atlantic, published in 1948. "In what direction would the Japanese strike, and against whom?"
Japan opted not to venture into Soviet Siberia; in 1939, Japanese troops
had suffered a chastening defeat at the hands of a combined Soviet and Mongolian army and its forces were already bogged down on various
fronts in China.
The decision was made to target the vulnerable British and Dutch
colonies in Southeast Asia - what's now the independent nations of
Burma, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. The Japanese knew
this would likely spur a greater response from the United States,
which then controlled the Philippines and other scattered island
possessions in the Pacific.
"Unwilling to give up what it wanted - greater empire - in return for the restoration of lost trade, unwilling to endure the humiliation of swift withdrawal from China, as the Americans wanted, Japan was going to
seize the tin, nickel, rubber, and especially oil of the British and Dutch colonies," wrote Twomey.
The rest is history. Some observers, though, reckon that American policy could have forced imperialist Japan's hand.
Abe to become first Japanese leader to visit Pearl Harbor
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will visit Pearl Harbor with President Obama, becoming his country's first leader to travel to the site of the Japanese attack 75 years ago that drew the United States into World War
II.
(Reuters)
"Never inflict upon another major military power a policy which would
cause you yourself to go to war unless you are fully prepared to engage
that power militarily," wrote American historian Roland Worth Jr., in "No Choice But War: The United States Embargo against Japan and the
Eruption of War in the Pacific." "And don't be surprised that if they do decide to retaliate, that they seek out a time and a place that inflicts maximum harm and humiliation upon your cause."
Roosevelt's battle with the isolationists
Meanwhile, in the United States, President Roosevelt faced widespread
public opposition to entering the war. The memory of World War I - a
struggle many Americans believed wasn't worth fighting -
still loomed large in the
political imagination. Roosevelt faced off a 1940 election challenge by pandering to anti-war voters.
"I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again,"
he declared on the campaign trail in Boston in October 1940. "Your
boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."
But Roosevelt was steadily trying to engage in the conflicts abroad, no matter his rhetoric. He was an avowed anti-fascist and was preoccupied
more by Nazi aggression in Europe than Japanese inroads in Asia.
His political opponents fretted that he would push toward a greater confrontation. This included figures from the America First movement, a
big tent coalition of isolationists, nationalists, pacifists and, indeed, some anti-Semites, who wanted the United States to cling to a policy of neutrality and weren't that bothered by an ascendant fascism in Europe.
Charles Lindbergh, the legendary aviator, was one of the more prominent champions of the America First cause.
"The pall of the war seems to hang over us today. More and more people
are simply giving in to it. Many say we are as good as in already. The attitude of the country seems to waver back and forth," Lindbergh wrote in his diary on Jan. 6, 1941. "Our greatest hope lies in the fact [that] eighty-five percent of the people in the United States (according to the latest polls) are against intervention."
In March 1941, Roosevelt persuaded Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act,
which "loaned" arms and ships to the beleaguered Allies in Europe. U.S. warships engaged Nazi submarines in the Atlantic and protected convoys bearing relief supplies to the British.
Months of secret diplomacy with
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill already bound Roosevelt's administration to the Allied cause, but the United States was not yet formally in war.
The attack on Pearl Harbor in December gave Roosevelt all the ammunition
he needed. Germany, in alliance with Japan, declared war on the United
States four days later, saving Roosevelt the trouble of having to do it himself.
FDR's 'Infamy' speech The day after the attack on Pearl Harbor on
Dec. 7, 1941, President Franklin
Delano Roosevelt delivered a formal address to the joint Congressional session on Dec. 8. Here's an excerpt of the now-famous speech. (Jenny Starrs/The Washington Post)
The isolationists were defeated. "I can see nothing to do under these circumstances except to fight. If I had been in Congress, I certainly
would have voted for a declaration of war," Lindbergh lamented. Other politicians in Congress, mostly Republicans, would soon lose elections
and become an irrelevant wing of the party.
Without the American entry into World War II, it's possible Japan would
have consolidated its position of supremacy in East Asia and that the war
in Europe could have dragged on for far longer than it did.
The U.S.'s role in
the war forced Nazi Germany to commit a sizeable troop presence in Western Europe that it would have otherwise diverted to the withering invasion of
the Soviet Union. It helped turn the tide of battle.
For decades since, though, conspiracy theories have surrounded Roosevelt's role in the build-up to Pearl Harbor, with a coterie of revisionist historians alleging he deliberately bungled military coordination and obscured intelligence in order to provoke the crisis that led to war. Most mainstream historians dismiss these claims.
"He was totally caught off guard by it," Roosevelt biographer Jean Edward Smith told NPR this week. "The record is clear. There was no evidence of
the Japanese moving toward Pearl Harbor that was picked up in Washington."
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/12/07/75-years-ago-what-if-japan-never-attacked-pearl-harbor/?utm_term=.2b8621cc5a60
In article <memo.20161210171609.31292A@kenney.cix.co.uk>,
kenney@cix.co.uk (Kenneth Young) wrote:
Now that is interesting,especially as neither the Germans or the
Italians had built successful oceanic carriers.
The Germans, at least, were sure they could do it, although the plans for
the Graf Zeppelin are not totally convincing.
Now that is interesting,especially as neither the Germans or the
Italians had built successful oceanic carriers. I am also wondering how
this program was to be paid for and why they assumed Franco would agree
to this
Japan's will to power
For imperial Japan, the United States posed a fundamental obstacle to its expanding position in the Pacific. Here was a resource-hungry island
nation eager to assert itself on the world stage in the same way European powers had done in centuries prior.
Now if this article had been from say a non US publisher what is the
chance the above European would be replaced by US, the move into
the interior of North America, the war with Spain, the Monroe doctrine?
By the summer of 1941, it had seized a
considerable swath of East Asia, from Manchuria and Korea to the north to the formerly French territories of Indochina further south, and was embroiled in a bitter war in China.
Back to simple summary, and northern summer of course. And the
time line ignores the escalation of sanctions...
and Japanese actions through 1940 and 1941.
By the way should Manchuria and Korea be formerly
Chinese territories, or Korea formerly Korean to
stay consistent?
Roosevelt's battle with the isolationists
Meanwhile, in the United States, President Roosevelt faced widespread public opposition to entering the war. The memory of World War I - a struggle many Americans believed wasn't worth fighting -
How about the world believed it was not worth fighting.
still loomed large in the
political imagination. Roosevelt faced off a 1940 election challenge by pandering to anti-war voters.
Pandering? Not acknowledging their views?
Was the Republican candidate pandering as well?
"I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again,"
he declared on the campaign trail in Boston in October 1940. "Your
boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."
Quite correct if peace could be maintained.
But Roosevelt was steadily trying to engage in the conflicts abroad, no matter his rhetoric. He was an avowed anti-fascist and was preoccupied
more by Nazi aggression in Europe than Japanese inroads in Asia.
So FDR wanted into the war instead of FDR wanted to help
the good guys win.
In March 1941, Roosevelt persuaded Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act, which "loaned" arms and ships to the beleaguered Allies in Europe. U.S. warships engaged Nazi submarines in the Atlantic and protected convoys bearing relief supplies to the British.
But the incidents with U-boats were months in the future in March
1941, along with the convoy escorts, partly triggered by the US taking
over the security of Iceland and Greenland.
Months of secret diplomacy with British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill already bound
Roosevelt's administration to the Allied cause,
but the United States was not yet formally in war.
There was no binding, there were agreements in terms of material
help and joint war plans and aims worked out for if the US became
involved. Like the British pre WWI the US idea was to avoid bindings.
The attack on Pearl Harbor in December gave Roosevelt all the ammunition
he needed. Germany, in alliance with Japan, declared war on the United States four days later, saving Roosevelt the trouble of having to do it himself.
Somehow it seems the invasion of the Philippines is not good enough.
The isolationists were defeated. "I can see nothing to do under these circumstances except to fight. If I had been in Congress, I certainly
would have voted for a declaration of war," Lindbergh lamented. Other politicians in Congress, mostly Republicans, would soon lose elections
and become an irrelevant wing of the party.
Quoting their attitudes in 1940 and 1941 versus the new reality would
be a good campaign tactic.
The U.S.'s role in the war forced Nazi Germany to
commit a sizeable troop presence in Western Europe
that it would have otherwise diverted to the
withering invasion of the Soviet Union. It helped
turn the tide of battle.
So the US commitment of 4 divisions to England by the end of
August 1942 played a big part in German army deployments? The
the over 30 commonwealth divisions in England and the Middle
East played no part. Nor did the need for occupation troops in
all the conquered territory play a part (and this was a big one),
Only the US forces. Yes this was written for a US audience.
So FDR could have saved the USSR by staying at peace and
deploying a corps or two into Iceland in 1942? Thereby forcing
major changes to the German army dispositions?
"He was totally caught off guard by it," Roosevelt biographer Jean Edward Smith told NPR this week. "The record is clear. There was no evidence of the Japanese moving toward Pearl Harbor that was picked up in Washington."
So FDR is charged with failing military co-ordination, what ever that
means, MacArthur using his air force, leaving his supplies in Bataan?
Kimmel and Short having more integrated plans?
FDR obscured intelligence is interesting, he ordered some message
suppressed? Or ordered specific interpretations become official?
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:
A very long exercise in nitpicking, taking offense where
none was meant, and misconstruing anodyne language as
badly as possible.
Japan's will to power
For imperial Japan, the United States posed a fundamental obstacle to
its
expanding position in the Pacific. Here was a resource-hungry island
nation eager to assert itself on the world stage in the same way
European
powers had done in centuries prior.
Now if this article had been from say a non US publisher what is the
chance the above European would be replaced by US, the move into
the interior of North America, the war with Spain, the Monroe doctrine?
None.
Japan's imperial ambitions paralleled the transoceanic empire
building of Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and
most recently Germany and Italy, not the frontier growth of the U.S.
And the Monroe Doctrine was _anti_-imperialist.
By the summer of 1941, it had seized a
considerable swath of East Asia, from Manchuria and Korea to the north
to
the formerly French territories of Indochina further south, and was
embroiled in a bitter war in China.
Back to simple summary, and northern summer of course. And the
time line ignores the escalation of sanctions...
Mentioned in the next sentence, for heaven's sake.
and Japanese actions through 1940 and 1941.
I.e., seizing a considerable swath of East Asia?
By the way should Manchuria and Korea be formerly
Chinese territories, or Korea formerly Korean to
stay consistent?
Well. actually, Indochina was still French. So in writing
that sentence, the author perpetrated an _abominable_
falsehood, for which he should be flogged to death, or
perhaps impaled and burned alive. Or maybe he was just
careless.
Roosevelt's battle with the isolationists
Meanwhile, in the United States, President Roosevelt faced widespread
public opposition to entering the war. The memory of World War I - a
struggle many Americans believed wasn't worth fighting -
How about the world believed it was not worth fighting.
Since this paragraph is about the U.S. political climate,
that is irrelevant.
still loomed large in the
political imagination. Roosevelt faced off a 1940 election challenge by
pandering to anti-war voters.
Pandering? Not acknowledging their views?
Two phrases with the same meaning.
Was the Republican candidate pandering as well?
Yes.
"I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and
again,"
he declared on the campaign trail in Boston in October 1940. "Your
boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."
Quite correct if peace could be maintained.
Which he already knew was unlikely. His policies already
included preparations for anticipated participation in
"foreign wars". Even Roosevelt's biggest fans acknowledge
he was being deceptive.
But Roosevelt was steadily trying to engage in the conflicts abroad, no
matter his rhetoric. He was an avowed anti-fascist and was preoccupied
more by Nazi aggression in Europe than Japanese inroads in Asia.
So FDR wanted into the war instead of FDR wanted to help
the good guys win.
He "wanted into the war" so the good guys would win.
In March 1941, Roosevelt persuaded Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act,
which "loaned" arms and ships to the beleaguered Allies in Europe. U.S.
warships engaged Nazi submarines in the Atlantic and protected convoys
bearing relief supplies to the British.
But the incidents with U-boats were months in the future in March
1941, along with the convoy escorts, partly triggered by the US taking
over the security of Iceland and Greenland.
The Navy (at Roosevelt's insistence) transferred 25% of the Pacific
Fleet to the Atlantic starting in April. U.S. warships were patrolling
far out into the Atlantic (the old battleships NEW YORK and TEXAS were assigned to guard Denmark Strait in alternate shifts; BISMARCK passed
through during a shift change). US forces were deployed to Iceland on
5 July.
Months of secret diplomacy with British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill already bound
Roosevelt's administration to the Allied cause,
but the United States was not yet formally in war.
There was no binding, there were agreements in terms of material
help and joint war plans and aims worked out for if the US became
involved. Like the British pre WWI the US idea was to avoid bindings.
Umm. The U.S. was not _formally_, _openly_ committed to
fight on the Allied side - not "bound" in the sense of
required by an irrevocable pledge in writing - but
the Roosevelt administration (which was not the U.S.)
was as committed as it could be.
The attack on Pearl Harbor in December gave Roosevelt all the
ammunition
he needed. Germany, in alliance with Japan, declared war on the United
States four days later, saving Roosevelt the trouble of having to do it
himself.
Somehow it seems the invasion of the Philippines is not good enough.
Some historians question whether the U.S. would have
declared war because the Philippines were invaded.
However, that is irrelevant - Pearl Harbor did happen,
and did resolve this issue roughly as FDR wanted.
The isolationists were defeated. "I can see nothing to do under these
circumstances except to fight. If I had been in Congress, I certainly
would have voted for a declaration of war," Lindbergh lamented. Other
politicians in Congress, mostly Republicans, would soon lose elections
and become an irrelevant wing of the party.
Quoting their attitudes in 1940 and 1941 versus the new reality would
be a good campaign tactic.
In fact the Republicans did very well in the 1942
elections, gaining 47 House seats and 9 Senate seats.
One of the few Republican losses was Jeannette Rankin
of Montana, the only vote against the declaration of
war. Rankin however was highly atypical for a Republican:
she had been a suffragette, the first woman Representative
in 1917, was an outspoken pacifist, and a lifelong
Progressive.
...The U.S.'s role in the war forced Nazi Germany to
commit a sizeable troop presence in Western Europe
that it would have otherwise diverted to the
withering invasion of the Soviet Union. It helped
turn the tide of battle.
So the US commitment of 4 divisions to England by the end of
August 1942 played a big part in German army deployments? The
the over 30 commonwealth divisions in England and the Middle
East played no part. Nor did the need for occupation troops in
all the conquered territory play a part (and this was a big one),
Only the US forces. Yes this was written for a US audience.
The point of this paragraph is that the entry of the
U.S. caused Germany to change its strategies and
deployment.
Yes, there were 30 BCE divisions in Britain
and the Middle East, and German forces were deployed to
defend against them or oppose them, and to garrison
occupied Europe. But all these threats and needs had been
accounted for. When the U.S. entered the war, that was a
_new_ threat. The U.S. had well over 2M men under arms in
December 1941 - a very large addition to Allied troop
strength, which the Germans responded to. This included
sending additional troops to the Atlantic coast.
So FDR could have saved the USSR by staying at peace and
deploying a corps or two into Iceland in 1942? Thereby forcing
major changes to the German army dispositions?
Don't put up straw men.
"He was totally caught off guard by it," Roosevelt biographer Jean
Edward
Smith told NPR this week. "The record is clear. There was no evidence
of
the Japanese moving toward Pearl Harbor that was picked up in
Washington."
So FDR is charged with failing military co-ordination, what ever that
means, MacArthur using his air force, leaving his supplies in Bataan?
Kimmel and Short having more integrated plans?
FDR obscured intelligence is interesting, he ordered some message
suppressed? Or ordered specific interpretations become official?
More strawman argument. The author made no such insinuation or
accusation.
The quoted essay is a fairly good popular summary of the
events leading up to Pearl Harbor. It does no good to
read obscure implications into every passage.
That would be an oversell and can be compared to his other
writings which made it clear the US was not that fragile.
Also the Pearl Harbor idea was around in January 1941, well
before war became inevitable. It was developed as war became
more likely.
For imperial Japan, the United States posed a fundamental obstacle to its expanding position in the Pacific. Here was a resource-hungry island
nation eager to assert itself on the world stage in the same way European powers had done in centuries prior.
Now if this article had been from say a non US publisher what is the
chance the above European would be replaced by US, the move into
the interior of North America, the war with Spain, the Monroe doctrine?
As for resource hungry that really overstates it, Australia used about the same amount of oil on a tenth the population. It was an excuse more
than a necessity or if you like the near current economic thought, control
of raw materials.
Back to simple summary, and northern summer of course. And the
time line ignores the escalation of sanctions and Japanese actions
through 1940 and 1941. By the way should Manchuria and Korea
be formerly Chinese territories, or Korea formerly Korean to stay
consistent?
US sanctions alone were not enough, the British and Dutch had to agree.
Japan was not going to give up on the tripartite pact, the US wanted
The Philippines did not have a great deal of war resources as such
though hemp for rope was important enough for Manila to be an
interchangeable word for rope.
So if the Japanese were passive then trading freely with them must
mean they would have stayed peaceful, despite the major expenditure
on the military.
But Roosevelt was steadily trying to engage in the conflicts abroad, no matter his rhetoric. He was an avowed anti-fascist and was preoccupied
more by Nazi aggression in Europe than Japanese inroads in Asia.
So FDR wanted into the war instead of FDR wanted to help
the good guys win.
So as things stood in January 1941, with it down to Germany versus
Britain in popular short hand the US did not want to become involved.
In March 1941, Roosevelt persuaded Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act, which "loaned" arms and ships to the beleaguered Allies in Europe. U.S. warships engaged Nazi submarines in the Atlantic and protected convoys bearing relief supplies to the British.
But the incidents with U-boats were months in the future in March
1941, along with the convoy escorts, partly triggered by the US taking
over the security of Iceland and Greenland.
There was no binding, there were agreements in terms of material
help and joint war plans and aims worked out for if the US became
involved. Like the British pre WWI the US idea was to avoid bindings.
The attack on Pearl Harbor in December gave Roosevelt all the ammunition
he needed. Germany, in alliance with Japan, declared war on the United States four days later, saving Roosevelt the trouble of having to do it himself.
Somehow it seems the invasion of the Philippines is not good enough.
It is generally agreed if Germany did not defeat the USSR by the
end of the 1942 summer campaign the result was probably going
to be the USSR winning.
What the western allies did in 1942 to turn the tide was ship
resources and weapons to the USSR, but the amount and
delays involved meant a limited impact.
Geoffrey Sinclair <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:
That would be an oversell and can be compared to his other
writings which made it clear the US was not that fragile.
Also the Pearl Harbor idea was around in January 1941, well
before war became inevitable. It was developed as war became
more likely.
An attack on PH was envisioned by Hector Bywater in 1925, though that
attach was to be by sub-lain mines.
Bywater and Yamamoto were known
to be in the same area; they were both supposedly in Washington when
Yamamoto was attached there, and they may have spoken. Certainly,
post-war Japanese officials stated the book was "influential".
For imperial Japan, the United States posed a fundamental obstacle to
its
expanding position in the Pacific. Here was a resource-hungry island
nation eager to assert itself on the world stage in the same way
European
powers had done in centuries prior.
Now if this article had been from say a non US publisher what is the
chance the above European would be replaced by US, the move into
the interior of North America, the war with Spain, the Monroe doctrine?
Actually, Japan's actions were not THAT dissimilar from other actions by imperial powers; just a few generations later.
As for resource hungry that really overstates it, Australia used about
the
same amount of oil on a tenth the population. It was an excuse more
than a necessity or if you like the near current economic thought,
control
of raw materials.
More of an oil shortage; they needed it for their armies. Other materials gladly accepted, of course.
Back to simple summary, and northern summer of course. And the
time line ignores the escalation of sanctions and Japanese actions
through 1940 and 1941. By the way should Manchuria and Korea
be formerly Chinese territories, or Korea formerly Korean to stay
consistent?
Korea was recognized by the international community as Japanese.
Manchuria was accepted as such, if not formally recognized.
US sanctions alone were not enough, the British and Dutch had to agree.
To be fair, they were unlikely to oppose the US at that time, considering.
Japan was not going to give up on the tripartite pact, the US wanted
Which is, IMO, a key, and underrecognized point. The US was willing
to give in to most Japanese terms if they would simply agree to
let the US attack Germany (remember, the Tripartite Pact wasn't
binding if an Axis nation attacked first. ) This pretty clearly
indicated the US wanted to focus its attention on the European
conflict.
The Philippines did not have a great deal of war resources as such
though hemp for rope was important enough for Manila to be an
interchangeable word for rope.
It was, however, a strategic position which Japan would have to account
for if they left it alone.
So if the Japanese were passive then trading freely with them must
mean they would have stayed peaceful, despite the major expenditure
on the military.
They likely would have stayed neutral with respect to the US.
But Roosevelt was steadily trying to engage in the conflicts abroad, no
matter his rhetoric. He was an avowed anti-fascist and was preoccupied
more by Nazi aggression in Europe than Japanese inroads in Asia.
So FDR wanted into the war instead of FDR wanted to help
the good guys win.
In this case, there wasn't much difference. He really did want into
the European war, though there's no real evidence he wanted to
fight the Japanese at the same time.
So as things stood in January 1941, with it down to Germany versus
Britain in popular short hand the US did not want to become involved.
There's diagram on page 226 of https://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Berinsky101107/BerinskyManuscript101107.pdf
which indicates that a gradually rising portion of the US population
favored
a more active role in aiding Britain (over 50% for the first time in Sep
of 1940, and relatively steady rise afterwards.
In March 1941, Roosevelt persuaded Congress to pass the Lend-Lease Act,
which "loaned" arms and ships to the beleaguered Allies in Europe. U.S.
warships engaged Nazi submarines in the Atlantic and protected convoys
bearing relief supplies to the British.
But the incidents with U-boats were months in the future in March
1941, along with the convoy escorts, partly triggered by the US taking
over the security of Iceland and Greenland.
While direct attacks weren't going on, the US was in fact escorting
vessels into internationally recognized war zones, in violation of pretty every neutrality agreement.
There was no binding, there were agreements in terms of material
help and joint war plans and aims worked out for if the US became
involved. Like the British pre WWI the US idea was to avoid bindings.
Well not FDR's idea, judging by his actions.
The attack on Pearl Harbor in December gave Roosevelt all the
ammunition
he needed. Germany, in alliance with Japan, declared war on the United
States four days later, saving Roosevelt the trouble of having to do it
himself.
Somehow it seems the invasion of the Philippines is not good enough.
It would not have been enough to get a declaration of war against Germany, no.
It is generally agreed if Germany did not defeat the USSR by the
end of the 1942 summer campaign the result was probably going
to be the USSR winning.
That would depend on the willingness of the US to continue to supply the Soviets. The US was responsible for something like half the Soviet small ammo, and sizeable portions of its fuel, including more than half their aviation fuel, scrap, etc. 15% of Soviet aircraft were supplied by the Western allies, more than 400K vehicles of all sorts, 1900 locomotives,
an enormous amount of foodstuffs, etc.
That doesn't include British contributions to the Soviet war effort
which, while smaller, came at perhaps the most critical time. But it
is doubtful the UK would have provided that without assurances from the
US that they would be replaced.
What the western allies did in 1942 to turn the tide was ship
resources and weapons to the USSR, but the amount and
delays involved meant a limited impact.
See above; I doubt the Russians would have fared as well without
half their aviation fuel, for example.
Simply put in 1941 the Germans attacked all along the line
with an almost entirely German force (ignoring Finland),
In 1942 it attacked on half the front and needed 4
Axis allied armies
It is generally agreed if Germany did not defeat the USSR by the...
end of the 1942 summer campaign the result was probably going
to be the USSR winning.
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:
Simply put in 1941 the Germans attacked all along the line
with an almost entirely German force (ignoring Finland),
In 1941, the Axis attacked the USSR with 15 armies.
12 German:
AOK Norwegen
Army Group North, XVIII Army, IV Panzer Army (at this time
"Gruppe") XVI Army
Army Group Center, III Panzer Army, IX Army, IV Army,
II Panzer Army
Army Group South, VI Army, I Panzer Army, XVII Army,
XI Army
2 Romanian: III Romanian Army, IV Romanian Army
(both in AG South)
1 Finnish: Karelian Army
12/15 is 80%, and 80% is not "almost entirely".
In 1942 it attacked on half the front and needed 4
Axis allied armies
Five, actually: 2 Romanian, 1 Finnish, 1 Italian,
and 1 Hungarian.
But as noted correctly, Soviet resistance had become
much stronger, limiting the scope of Axis offensives.
Actually that change might be said to have begun by
October 1941; after then Army Group Center attacked
toward Moscow, while Army Group South advanced to
Kharkov and Rostov, but Army Group North made no
further offensive moves.
In 1942, AG North _and_ AG Center stayed defensive,
while only AG South attacked.
And of course in 1943, there was only one small
spasm of Axis offense, though it involved two
Army Groups (Center and South) because it occurred
at the border between them.
The Navy (at Roosevelt's insistence) transferred 25% of the Pacific
Fleet to the Atlantic starting in April. U.S. warships were patrolling
far out into the Atlantic (the old battleships NEW YORK and TEXAS were assigned to guard Denmark Strait in alternate shifts; BISMARCK passed
through during a shift change). US forces were deployed to Iceland on 5
July.
On Mon, 12 Dec 2016 16:06:27 -0500, Rich Rostrom wrote:
The Navy (at Roosevelt's insistence) transferred 25% of the Pacific
Fleet to the Atlantic starting in April. U.S. warships were patrolling
far out into the Atlantic (the old battleships NEW YORK and TEXAS were
assigned to guard Denmark Strait in alternate shifts; BISMARCK passed
through during a shift change). US forces were deployed to Iceland on 5
July.
What if the New York and Texas were there, what chance could they have
had against the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen? Didn't those ships have 12"
guns?
What if the New York and Texas were there, what chance could they
have had against the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen? Didn't those ships
have 12" guns?
On Mon, 12 Dec 2016 16:06:27 -0500, Rich Rostrom wrote:
The Navy (at Roosevelt's insistence) transferred 25% of the Pacific
Fleet to the Atlantic starting in April. U.S. warships were patrolling
far out into the Atlantic (the old battleships NEW YORK and TEXAS were
assigned to guard Denmark Strait in alternate shifts; BISMARCK passed
through during a shift change). US forces were deployed to Iceland on 5
July.
What if the New York and Texas were there, what chance could they have
had against the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen? Didn't those ships have 12"
guns?
In article <o4mmc9$1j7$1@dont-email.me>, sctvguy1@invalid.net (sctvguy1) >wrote:
What if the New York and Texas were there, what chance could they
have had against the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen? Didn't those ships
have 12" guns?
The chance of taking serious damage was there and enough to deter
surface raiders for long enough for the convoy to scatter. Have you heard >about the RN AMC whose name I can not spell. One hit from a 14 inch gun >mission killed Bismark.
"sctvguy1" <sctvguy1@invalid.net> wrote in message
On Mon, 12 Dec 2016 16:06:27 -0500, Rich Rostrom wrote:
What if the New York and Texas were there, what chance could they have
had against the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen?
Of the US WWII battleships only Arkansas had 12 inch guns.
...Bismarck should be able to disengage but would be
outnumbered 2 to 1 if it stayed to fight.
The USN 14 inch gun fired a 1,500 pound shell to
34,300 yards at 30 degree elevation.
The German 15 inch gun fired a 1,764 pound shell to
38,880 yards at 30 degree elevation.
The difference in range is small...
...given the situation, the chances of hits at
that range and Bismarck wanting to preserve ammunition.
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:
"sctvguy1" <sctvguy1@invalid.net> wrote in message
On Mon, 12 Dec 2016 16:06:27 -0500, Rich Rostrom wrote:
What if the New York and Texas were there, what chance could they have
had against the Bismarck and Prinz Eugen?
At the time, the US was neutral, so neither side would
automatically open fire. I don't know what the orders
of the US BBs were; I'm pretty sure BISMARCK was under
orders not to start anything with any US ships.
So probably there would not have been a battle.
Of course BISMARCK might mistake the US ship for a British
battleship and open fire.
In that case...
BISMARCK was new; NEW YORK and TEXAS were among the oldest
battleships in service, even though modernized. I would say
BISMARCK would have a major edge over either US ship.
Of the US WWII battleships only Arkansas had 12 inch guns.
And the ALASKA class "large cruisers", which are usually
included in lists of battleships, even though the US Navy
didn't do so.
...Bismarck should be able to disengage but would be
outnumbered 2 to 1 if it stayed to fight.
TEXAS and NEW YORK were never there at the same time.
While one was on patrol, the other was back in the US,
refitting, refueling, and so on.
So... unless the two ships stumble into each other in
thick weather, and starting shooting at close range,
the most likely result is that BISMARCK evades the
America, possibly with a few long range shots exchanged.
In terms of guns Arkansas took until the 1940/41 work before its
main battery's maximum elevation was changed from 15 to 30
degrees. It fired a 740 pound AP round to around 23,900 yards
at 15 degrees elevation, so up to low to mid 30,000 yards at 30
degrees.
In terms of guns Arkansas took until the 1940/41 work before its
main battery's maximum elevation was changed from 15 to 30
degrees. It fired a 740 pound AP round to around 23,900 yards
at 15 degrees elevation, so up to low to mid 30,000 yards at 30
degrees.
On Sunday, January 8, 2017 at 7:38:44 AM UTC-8, Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
In terms of guns Arkansas took until the 1940/41 work before its
main battery's maximum elevation was changed from 15 to 30
degrees. It fired a 740 pound AP round to around 23,900 yards
at 15 degrees elevation, so up to low to mid 30,000 yards at 30
degrees.
Insofar as I know, the Arkansas, Texas, and New York never had a
modification
to increase main battery elevation beyond 15 degrees, despite what many publications say.
The 12" AP Mark 15 in all Mods weighed 870 pounds.
At what elevation would Arkansas's and Bismarck's guns, respectively, be reloaded? In 1940, Warspite's could fire at 26 degrees elevation, but the guns would be reloaded at 20. The reconditioned Italian dreadnoughts of
the Cavour class could fire at 27 degrees, but they were reloaded at 15 degrees (the difference helps explain why the British would shoot faster).
The mark II RN 15 inch gun turret allowed elevation from -5
to +30 degrees with loading from -5 to +20 degrees, these
were fitted in Hood and there were modifications made to give
the earlier turrets similar abilities. The original mark I
mountings allowed -5 to +20 degrees elevation and loading at
any of these angles.
What possible reason to shoot at -5°?
What possible reason to shoot at -5°?
especially
at long range or at night or in bad weather.
Geoffrey Sinclair 17:26, lunedì 9 gennaio 2017:
The mark II RN 15 inch gun turret allowed elevation from -5
to +30 degrees with loading from -5 to +20 degrees, these
were fitted in Hood and there were modifications made to give
the earlier turrets similar abilities. The original mark I
mountings allowed -5 to +20 degrees elevation and loading at
any of these angles.
What possible reason to shoot at -5°?
In terms of loading angles note the RN 15 inch mark 1/N turret had
a firing cycle of 30 seconds and could elevate the guns at 5 degrees
a second, so loading angle was not a big cause of slow fire. The
Italian Cavour class firing cycle was also 30 seconds, Littorio 45
seconds.
In any case reading the stories of surface engagements the firing
was often, probably usually, slower than the firing cycles, especially
at long range or at night or in bad weather.
The mark II RN 15 inch gun turret allowed elevation from -5
to +30 degrees with loading from -5 to +20 degrees, these
were fitted in Hood and there were modifications made to give
the earlier turrets similar abilities. The original mark I
mountings allowed -5 to +20 degrees elevation and loading at
any of these angles.
What possible reason to shoot at -5°?
Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
In terms of loading angles note the RN 15 inch mark 1/N turret had
a firing cycle of 30 seconds and could elevate the guns at 5 degrees
a second, so loading angle was not a big cause of slow fire. The
Italian Cavour class firing cycle was also 30 seconds, Littorio 45
seconds.
In the battle off Calabria, during the battleships duel Warspite's 8 guns would fire salvos of one gun per tower, two rounds at Cesare and two at Cavour every 30 seconds.
Cesare's 10 guns would fire "turret group" salvos, an average of five
rounds every 80 seconds, at Warspite. On the Italian ships their own fire
was perceived as definitely slower. Cavour's rate of fire was even slower because it was trailing Cesare and the latter's smoke hampered Cavour's gunnery (against Royal Sovereign).
In any case reading the stories of surface engagements the firing
was often, probably usually, slower than the firing cycles, especially
at long range or at night or in bad weather.
Indeed.
Turret groups, presumably all the forward turret guns fired then all the
aft
guns would result in wider shell dispersal as the shells interfered with
each other in flight.
In fact the real problem appears to be that the 12.6-inch guns would
fire at targets far beyond their optimal combat range. At 25,000 meters >distance a 15-inch shell could pierce through the Cavour class' vertical >armor belt - horizontal protection could be perforated at virtually any >distance. By contrast, at such ranges Warspite and her sister
battleships were largely safe from 12.6-inch, let alone 8-inch AP rounds >(although HE shells might cause severe superstructure damage). So the >Italians could not let the British get too close, but for that very
reason they could not hope to destroy any British battleships.
Would that be the same kind of 15" British naval gun that sits in
front of the Imperial War Museum in London?
The cabbie who took me there when I was in London last June insisted
it was "Big Bertha"
In other words, how much did the standard 15" naval gun change
between WW1 and WW2? I imagine the ammunition changed quite a bit
but did the actual barrel?
In other words, how much did the standard 15" naval gun change
between
WW1 and WW2? I imagine the ammunition changed quite a bit but did
the
actual barrel?
Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:
Turret groups, presumably all the forward turret guns fired then all the
aft guns would result in wider shell dispersal as the shells interfered
with
each other in flight.
The turret groups were three.
It took about 40 seconds for a shell to fly from the muzzle to the target. The first salvos were fired at 29,000 (Cesare) and 31,000 (Cavour) meters range as the two fleets were drawing closer and the loudspeakers around
the battleships were shouting out the traditional artillery battle cry,
"Long Life the King". That was extreme range for the 12.6-in guns -
pre-war regulations stated the optimal combat range for that cannon should have been 19 - 21,000 meters. At about 30,000 meters, observation of the
fall of shot was not easy.
The first salvos were fired to "warm up the guns" and calculate the adjustments and deviations required to get on target more accurately. The second group of salvos (range, 26,400 meters) followed up the first salvo that had fallen nearest the target, but with corrections of +/-800 meters.
At 26,000 meters range Warspite was simultaneously shot at by the heavy cruiser Trento with its 8 8-in guns (24 HE and 8 AP rounds, second, third
and fourth salvos adjusted +1,000 meters. The third salvo was judged on target).
While the British destroyers clearly spotted the cruiser opening up on Warspite, the latter mistook the cruiser's shot for that of Cavour. Which
is a little odd because an 8-in HE shell burst in the water raised a water column 48 meters high lasting 6,5 seconds, whereas a 12.6-in's was 60
meters high and lasted 10 seconds. Data the British were fully cognizant
of.
As for the Italian shell dispersal,
recent researches prove that has been somewhat exaggerated in post-war accounts.
British reports of enemy shot falling rather wide of the mark turn out to mostly refer to "adjustment" salvos.
Accounts also "evolved" over time. Contemporary British reports may speak quite well of the Italian gunnery and its limited shell dispersal - later into 1941, in a memo for his officers Cunningham would grudgingly praise
the Italian destroyers' gunnery, rating it as better than that of his own DDs.
But later accounts (from the London Gazette's onwards) take on a much less lenient attitude.
Actually shell dispersal was probably similar on both sides: the Italians assessed Warspite's shell dispersal as "less than 400 meters", but the 12.6-in guns' dispersal was 267 meters at a range of 21,000 meters.
In fact the real problem appears to be that the 12.6-inch guns would fire
at targets far beyond their optimal combat range. At 25,000 meters
distance a 15-inch shell could pierce through the Cavour class' vertical armor belt - horizontal protection could be perforated at virtually any distance. By contrast, at such ranges Warspite and her sister battleships were largely safe from 12.6-inch, let alone 8-inch AP rounds (although HE shells might cause severe superstructure damage). So the Italians could
not let the British get too close, but for that very reason they could not hope to destroy any British battleships.
So can you please specify exactly how many shells in a salvo
and from which guns on which turrets?
Think of it this way, the cruiser was unlikely to do much damage and
would only complicate the battleship gunnery spotting, also the cruiser
was rather needed to keep the RN cruisers at bay. So it is possible
to mistake the shell splashes for a while. Especially if they think the second Italian battleship is firing.
Can you be more specific, the comment "recent research" is
not evidence.
For example the Wiki article uses Green, Jack & Massignani,
Alessandro (1998). The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940-1943,
Chatam Publishing, London. ISBN 1-885119-61-5 to claim,
So Cunningham wrote the word "grudgingly" or is that a value
judgement added by someone else?
Cunningham is on record of noting good and bad performance on
both sides. Some RN cruisers were bad enough that being their
target was relatively safe.
Let me understand this, you are quoting Warspite in action and at
a longer range using the Italian impressions of dispersal versus the theoretical or gunnery range figure dispersal for the Italians?
Think about what you have just written. At long range Warspite can
really hurt the Italian ships with minimal risk in return. Though in
reality
hits do damage that can hurt even without penetration, note the effect
of Warspite's hit despite non penetration.
So the obvious Italian response is to close the range to where their
guns can penetrate. Use the superiority in numbers of cruisers etc.
Once the Italian battleships lost their speed superiority disengagement
was a sensible action.
Il 13/01/2017 16:19, Geoffrey Sinclair ha scritto:
So can you please specify exactly how many shells in a salvo
and from which guns on which turrets?
Turret I (3 shells) / II + III (4 shells) / IV (3 shells).
Think of it this way, the cruiser was unlikely to do much damage and
would only complicate the battleship gunnery spotting, also the cruiser
was rather needed to keep the RN cruisers at bay. So it is possible
to mistake the shell splashes for a while. Especially if they think the
second Italian battleship is firing.
It is possible the appreciation mistake was caused by some confusion
aboard Warspite. Prior to the engagement they were quite sanguine about
the outcome of the battle, but things were not unfolding as they had forecast.
Before the clash of the battleships, Warspite had been engaged by two
light cruisers, Di Barbiano and Di Giussano. At 3.27 pm a 6-inch shell hit Warspite on the weather deck, knocking out a twin QF 4 in gun and spraying the deck with splinters up to the funnel. The flash of the hit was clearly spotted by the Italians. Immediately afterwards Warspite steered away from the Italians, as detected by the latter's range finders ("enemy hauls to starboard by 180 degrees, escapes our fire").
After the war, the Italian Navy asked the Royal Navy about that flash and
the answer was that it had been one of Warspite's seaplanes set ablaze by
a gun blast and dropped off board. Lately this has been proved untrue,
beyond any doubt.
On the day of the battle Warspite only had one of its two seaplanes, and
that aircraft was flying above the two fleets to observe and direct Warspite's fire.
The Admiralty post-war simply ascribed to Warspite an incident that would instead take place on Malaya a little later, at 4.08 pm - to cover up the minor damage suffered at the hands of the Italians. An entire chapter in a book just published by the Italian Navy Historical Office is devoted to
the intriguing story of the "missing seaplane".
Later during the battleship clash phase, Warspite was hit by an 8-inch
shell fired by the heavy cruiser Trento. A RCNC battle damage report found
at TNA and dated July 31st, 1940 carefully describes all damage suffered
by Warspite (and points out any structural weaknesses to be put right) but puts it down to "aerial bombs", which turns out to be incorrect. No
Italian planes inflicted that damage as demonstrated also by the Mediterranean Fleet's Bombing Survey of August 1940.
The RCNC report mentions an explosion over the aft section that wiped out
the AA weapons and their crews on the roof of Turret X, knocked out a 40
mm Pom Pom (and blew up its ammunition) and a 10 ton crane and caused
minor splinter damage on deck.
The largest splinter found aboard was made of alloy rather than steel, 6 inches long and 4 inches wide, 1/4 inch thick. This corresponds with the magnesium alloy cap of an 8-inch HE shell,
and the description matches perfectly what the Italian sailors saw on Warspite at 3.57 pm - a bright flash aft, and a pall of blue smoke over
that spot (40 mm shells contained Lyddite, picric acid, which when burning gives off blue smoke). There's even photographic evidence of the hit - a
snap taken from aboard Italian ships, hazy and dark because of the anti-reflection filter applied to the lens, but showing a blast on the sea horizon and smoke all around the flash.
Besides, precisely when the shell burst Warspite lost radio touch with its seaplane - and the aerial was located right in the area of the explosion.
At 3.58, Warspite tacked again to starboard, as if to pull away from enemy fire. Italian Ro. 43 seaplanes spotted British destroyers (Nubian and
Mohawk) heading for the Italian fleet apparently to attack it - their battleship must have been in trouble and in need of relief.
By the way, those hits must have killed and/or wounded some sailors. Their names are still unknown as far as we know.
Can you be more specific, the comment "recent research" is
not evidence.
For example the Wiki article uses Green, Jack & Massignani,
Alessandro (1998). The Naval War in the Mediterranean, 1940-1943,
Chatam Publishing, London. ISBN 1-885119-61-5 to claim,
Greene & Massignani's is a good book but outdated. Since 1998 research has gone past it. There are a number of articles, all in Italian language, and
a new book centered upon the battle off Calabria and related sea and
ground operations. Quando Tuonano I Grossi Calibri (When The Big Guns Thunder), Italian Navy Historical Office, 2016. I am the author of one of
the chapters (on the desert war June to November 1940 - I served in the
Army, not in the Navy).
The book comes with the best most detailed - large size, foldable - maps
of the action ever drawn and printed, with captions in both Italian and English, the fruit of a massive painstaking work. I've been privately told that during a meeting of Italian and US Navy top rank officers, they
pulled the maps out of the folder of a copy of the book and had fun "replaying" the battle on them.
So Cunningham wrote the word "grudgingly" or is that a value
judgement added by someone else?
Cunningham is on record of noting good and bad performance on
both sides. Some RN cruisers were bad enough that being their
target was relatively safe.
Cunningham was a gentleman and a honorable man, but propaganda sometimes forced him to use in his writings a tone he probably would not have subscribed. The London Gazette account of various actions in the Mediterranean would have been even harsher on the Italians if he had not adamantly refused to allow some particularly derogatory expressions to be
put into the text. In a letter written to the Admiralty from Bishop's Waltham, where he lived in retirement, he made it clear he didn't want to
see his name associated with verbal abuse levelled at his wartime enemies.
Let me understand this, you are quoting Warspite in action and at
a longer range using the Italian impressions of dispersal versus the
theoretical or gunnery range figure dispersal for the Italians?
I just reported the figures.
While the common wisdom goes that the Italian dispersal was a major
problem of that navy, trial data seem not to support that tenet and battle conditions data are, let's say, open to debate. And while trial and battle conditions performances may well differ, it's unlikely the difference is enormous.
Think about what you have just written. At long range Warspite can
really hurt the Italian ships with minimal risk in return. Though in
reality
hits do damage that can hurt even without penetration, note the effect
of Warspite's hit despite non penetration.
So the obvious Italian response is to close the range to where their
guns can penetrate. Use the superiority in numbers of cruisers etc.
The superiority in number of cruisers (and in caliber of some of them) was more apparent than real. 8-inch heavy cruisers were quite vulnerable to
light cruiser fire, as shown by the not negligible damage on Bolzano. One Italian light cruiser division could not even take part in the battle, and was sarcastically dubbed "the peacetime division" by the other crews.
Closing the range too much meant the chances of seriously hurting the
enemy battleships improved, but the stake became too high. Italy only had
two battleships operational by that time, both inferior to their British counterparts, and Campioni led the fleet aggressively.
Calculated risk is one matter, recklessness is another.
Once the Italian battleships lost their speed superiority disengagement
was a sensible action.
The action went on after the hit on Cesare. Seconds after taking the
punch, the battleship resumed firing sailing at the same speed as before,
and only withdrew a few minutes later when it actually slackened speed. Another complex, and usually overlooked, cruiser and destroyer action followed up.
The point is that throughout the battle the British also steered away ("withdrew") a couple times and sometimes appeared unsteady. They expected
a Trafalgar on the cheap, but when they didn't get the walkover they
expected they showed some signs of nervousness under fire.
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