Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1992.

Chris Manteuffel's thread on "Nationality and accounts of the NW Europe Campaign" inspired me to pull Riviera to the Rhine off my figurative To
Be Read pile. I've been meaning to read it for perhaps twenty years,
ever since I realized that it finally was in print. It is the last
operational history in the venerable United States Army in World War II
series and one of the final volumes published in the series. Another
volume in the Technical Series, The Medical Department: Medical Service
in the European Theater of Operations, was also published in 1992. The
ultimate volume of the series, The Medical Department: Medical Service
in the War against Japan, was published in 1998, fifty-one years after
the first volume was published. Riviera to the Rhine came out nineteen
years after the preceding volume in the ETO series, The Last Offensive,
was published, and fifteen years after the publication of Casino to the
Alps. No mention as to why Riviera to the Rhine was delayed for twenty
years.

The volume starts with the rationale, planning, and arrangements for
what would become Operation Anvil, the Allied landings in Southern
France on 15 August 1944. As you would hope and expect, the discussion
of this material is thorough and well written. The authors are careful
to discuss what the Allies expected to encounter - a weakened but still
tough opponent - and how this affected considerations on loading
priorities (combat heavy) and initial plans. Instead, the landing forces
found an opponent even weaker than expected, in the midst of
redeploying, and ultimately preparing to evacuate Southern France. This
would lead to a continuing theme for these forces: not enough troops, insufficient armor at key points, and tenuous logistics, but always
unexpected gains. While there were numerous details I hadn't known
before or didn't remember, the discussion of which US divisions would be
pulled from Italy for the invasion was surprising. Mark Clark's initial
plan included the US 3d and 45th Infantry Divisions, but also the US 1st Armored Division. Certainly it would seem to make more sense to redeploy
the 1st Armored from Italy than to retain it there. As we know,
ultimately the decision was to use three US infantry divisions,
ultimately choosing the 36th Infantry Division due to its amphibious experience. There had been discussion of using the 85th Infantry
Division as a follow-up prior to selecting the 36th.

A notable feature of this volume is that the discussion of the campaign
moves beyond the usual focus on military operations to encompass more
detail on logistics than usual in the series' operational histories.
There is also substantial discussion of issues of the use of air power, engineering, and other supporting services. Naturally, there is also
reasonable attention paid to inter-Allied cooperation and civil affairs, particularly the transition back to civilian French control.
This drops off once the Anvil forces tie in to SHAEF, though there is
always an underlying thread of logistical issues.

The tie in and the comparative lack of support for the southern flank
provide the theme for the rest of the volume. As has been more common in
recent histories, the conflict between Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers
features strongly. Beginning with dispute over the establishment of
Sixth Army Group, it continues with a struggle over the provision of
additional US troops to the Seventh Army. Logistics provided the
ultimate argument for the switch of Fifteenth Corps from the Third Army
to the Seventh Army. One gains the sense that port capacities provided
the rationale for the reinforcing divisions received by Seventh Army in
October and November: 44th, 100th, and 103d Infantry Divisions, and the
14th Armored Division.

While the Allied forces in Northwest Europe were perennially short of divisions, the discussion of Sixth Army Group operations in October
through January highlights a set of what-if questions. The French First
Army was always hobbled by the lack of trained replacements, especially
in specialists. While it was able to use FFI as light infantry forces,
finding infantry replacements and building up additional necessary
divisions was hard and slow. Adding the limited number of US divisions available stretched available forces thin, limiting offensive options
and keeping divisions in line longer than was good for them. Thus the
French were unable to clear the Belfort Gap in October. Limited US
forces were able to keep a favorable attritional battle going in the
Vosges. Yet there was never enough force to breakthrough the defenses,
which may have been possible.

When sufficient forces were available in November, the ensuing attacks
had the potential to be decisive or at least much more influential than
they turned out to be. The seizure of multiple points along the Rhine,
both in the Strasbourg area and also running north from the Swiss border
to the vicinity of Mulhouse held the promise of potentially allowing a
jump of the Rhine in November. The authors are clear in blaming
Eisenhower and Bradley for reorienting Seventh Army north into the Saar
in support of Third Army. Combined with Hitler's illogical attachment to holding any part of Alsace, this led to the formation of the Colmar
pocket. Naturally this stretched Allied resources further than necessary
and required additional effort in January and February to clear, in
addition to making the Seventh Army more vulnerable to North Wind.

The history concludes after the clearance of the Colmar Pocket in early February 1945. This set the stage to the invasion of Germany proper
covered in The Last Offensive. I was left with a higher opinion of
Devers, Patch, and de Lattre, and a bit of a lower opinion of Truscott.

Overall, the book is a good addition to the series, likely one of the
best overall of the operational histories. It has the usual large number
of photos and maps. There are none of the larger, fold-out maps common
in earlier volumes; every map is in the text, often as individual,
full-page maps. A couple aren't well done - there is one in particular
that has a direct equivalent in the Lorraine Campaign and the level of
detail is noticeably poorer. It does get harder to refer back to maps to accompany the narrative, especially if you're reading the PDF version.

Riviera to the Rhine is available as either a hardback or paperback from multiple sellers, including direct from the US GPO. It's also available
as a free PDF download from http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-10-1/index.html

[I also came to the conclusion that there were just too many First
Armies running around NW Europe in 1944-5: First Canadian, First French,
First German, and First US. Surely there were more integers available.]

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On Monday, May 15, 2017 at 10:00:30 PM UTC-7, Stephen Graham wrote:

Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1992.
No mention as to why Riviera to the Rhine was delayed for twenty
years.

Because of the collapse of the CMH history program post Vietnam. The downgrading of OCMH to CMH in 1973 and then its further downgrading
to a field agency under the Office of the Chief of Staff in 1989
took away much of the autonomy the early authors of the Green Books.
That is why Doc Cole, Mac MacDonald, and most of the other authors
retired then. The original author of RTR retired in 1983. Clarke took
nine more years to finish the manuscript and there are a number of
errors still in it, most embarrassing a death that never occurred.

The CMH BG Collins also retired in 1982 after 12 years of frustration.
He was my Dad's last CO in Germany before they both retired in 1969.
According to my Dad Collins said he was recalled in 1970 to honcho
the restructuring and downgrading and spent most of his time trying to
keep morale from collapsing, the most visible sign being the loss of productivity. Little work was done on Vietnam and they could not get
the Green Books finished, thus the hiatus from the late 1960s to the
early 1990s. All in all it was a mess.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

"Stephen Graham" <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote in message news:envfamFgracU1@mid.individual.net...

Jeffrey J. Clarke and Robert Ross Smith, Riviera to the Rhine, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1992.

Chris Manteuffel's thread on "Nationality and accounts of the NW Europe Campaign" inspired me to pull Riviera to the Rhine off my figurative To Be Read pile. I've been meaning to read it for perhaps twenty years, ever
since I realized that it finally was in print. It is the last operational history in the venerable United States Army in World War II series and one
of the final volumes published in the series. Another volume in the
Technical Series, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of Operations, was also published in 1992. The ultimate volume of
the series, The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War against
Japan, was published in 1998, fifty-one years after the first volume was published. Riviera to the Rhine came out nineteen years after the
preceding volume in the ETO series, The Last Offensive, was published, and fifteen years after the publication of Casino to the Alps. No mention as
to why Riviera to the Rhine was delayed for twenty years.

The volume starts with the rationale, planning, and arrangements for what would become Operation Anvil, the Allied landings in Southern France on 15 August 1944. As you would hope and expect, the discussion of this material
is thorough and well written. The authors are careful to discuss what the Allies expected to encounter - a weakened but still tough opponent - and
how this affected considerations on loading priorities (combat heavy) and initial plans.

The supply plans were also heavy on civil support, given the
reports of shortages.

Instead, the landing forces found an opponent even weaker than expected,
in the midst of redeploying, and ultimately preparing to evacuate Southern France. This would lead to a continuing theme for these forces: not enough troops, insufficient armor at key points, and tenuous logistics, but
always unexpected gains.

The troop issues were essentially the reality of needing to deploy
forces from the US, and what that cost in terms of time.

Also of course the casualties that resulted in units in the US
being stripped of trained men delayed their deployment.

The last 2 armoured divisions arrived in February 1945, the
last 2 infantry in March, the last tank battalion in March, the
last tank destroyer battalion in April, along with the last 8
artillery battalions. Then comes actually deploying them.

The supply claims are interesting, the south benefited from
the ports and associated infrastructure being largely
undamaged, and the rail system less so than in northern
France. Ports in south France landed around 27% of all
US army cargo, excluding bulk fuel over the course of the
campaign

In September and October 1944 the southern ports
discharged about 40% of all US Army cargo, again
excluding bulk fuel. Hence why they were better off then.
They could ship 12,000 tons per day by rail but see later
the problems in winter.

While there were numerous details I hadn't known before or didn't
remember, the discussion of which US divisions would be pulled from Italy
for the invasion was surprising. Mark Clark's initial plan included the US
3d and 45th Infantry Divisions, but also the US 1st Armored Division. Certainly it would seem to make more sense to redeploy the 1st Armored
from Italy than to retain it there. As we know, ultimately the decision
was to use three US infantry divisions, ultimately choosing the 36th
Infantry Division due to its amphibious experience. There had been
discussion of using the 85th Infantry Division as a follow-up prior to selecting the 36th.

A notable feature of this volume is that the discussion of the campaign
moves beyond the usual focus on military operations to encompass more
detail on logistics than usual in the series' operational histories.

Interesting given the various supply histories, including Cross
Channel Attack.

There is also substantial discussion of issues of the use of air power, engineering, and other supporting services.

Much on 1st Tactical Air Force? Like 6th Army Group it tends to
be neglected. The amount of engineer work needed on the supply
system, plus the fixed border defences?

Naturally, there is also reasonable attention paid to inter-Allied cooperation and civil affairs, particularly the transition back to
civilian French control.

Use of German prisoners in things like coal mines?

This drops off once the Anvil forces tie in to SHAEF, though there is
always an underlying thread of logistical issues.

6th Army Group remained officially a Mediterranean formation for
supply purposes until November 1944.

ADSEC advanced section COMZ, between the armies and COMZ.
COMZ, communications zone, rear areas.
CONAD, Continental Advanced Section, ADSEC for 6th Army Group
SOLOC, Southern Lines of Communication, the COMZ for 6th Army Group

On 20th November COMZ gains responsibility for supply to 6th Army
Group, the HQ SOLOC, southern lines of communication takes
command of CONAD and delta base section. Despite being under
COMZ SOLOC still has the right to communicate directly to the
Mediterranean theatre on movements between the Mediterranean
and European theatre. This is needed in November as the US ports
are shipping supplies for southern France and Italy together in bulk.

The US Army supply system in 1944 was very much a work in progress.

My conclusion from the supply histories,

As far as I can tell the US Army logistics system in the ETO between
June 1944 and May 1945 worked properly in around February 1945,
for perhaps no more than two months. Every other time period had a
shortage of equipment and/or a backlog of ships to unload and/or a
backlog of cargo to clear in the rear areas (often causing port, road
or rail congestion) and/or deliveries to the troops being under
requirements. Under the criteria established by General McNair at
least one US army in the ETO was experiencing a supply crisis for all
but two months of the campaign. Artillery ammunition was never
delivered in the quantities the armies wanted, which is not all that surprising, but reserves were often below authorised levels.

According to the British the allied armies imported some 3,477,951
long tons of supplies (Including vehicles?) into France and Belgium
in April 1945. In addition to that there was the civil relief (a near
50:50 mix on average of food and coal not counting liquid fuels).
Dividing the figure for the civil relief tonnage for the second quarter
of 1945 by 3 gives an estimate of 778,852 long tons of such imports
in April 1945, so for an estimate (April times 12) this gives a yearly
tonnage of around 51 million long tons of military and civil relief
cargoes. No wonder the system was strained when you consider the
number of major French ports not working.

The tie in and the comparative lack of support for the southern flank
provide the theme for the rest of the volume. As has been more common in recent histories, the conflict between Eisenhower, Bradley, and Devers features strongly. Beginning with dispute over the establishment of Sixth Army Group, it continues with a struggle over the provision of additional
US troops to the Seventh Army.

Which to an extent the supply problems dictated. It seems clear
6th Army Group was meant to be a supporting force, and this
does not seem to have changed in the minds of Eisenhower or
12th Army Group. They can justify it in terms of terrain and where
the major western German industrial plants were located.

The weakness of the French forces was a real handicap, 6th Army
group looked more powerful on paper than it was, something that
needs to be remembered.

So for Nordwind there were 11 US divisions, (2 armoured) and 9
French (2 armoured) in 6th Army Group.

There were 11 US armoured divisions in France end December 1944
including 1 new arrival.

End December 1944 there were 46 US divisions in France, including
6 new arrivals. So 12th Army Group (when it had all 3 of the other US
armies), had a 2 to 1 divisional count advantage and better than that in firepower terms.

Logistics provided the ultimate argument for the switch of Fifteenth Corps from the Third Army to the Seventh Army.

Yes, from the investigation into the US Army supply system,

On 22nd September Devers announces he can support an extra 3
divisions, and is promptly given XV corps for 7th Army (2nd French
Armoured and the US 79th Infantry divisions). The 6th Army Group
tries to demand the corps come with ammunition but is rebuffed.

One gains the sense that port capacities provided the rationale for the reinforcing divisions received by Seventh Army in October and November:
44th, 100th, and 103d Infantry Divisions, and the 14th Armored Division.

In November 1944 the US starts landing larger trucks in southern
France to re-equip the lighter truck units. Up to six divisions were
diverted from their planned landing in northern France to the
southern ports according to the supply histories.

The 44th arrived in September 1944, the other three listed above
in October.

In September the 26th, 102nd, 104th infantry and 10th armoured
staged from the US direct to France. Then the US reverted to
staging divisions through Britain until January 1945.

All due to the port problems in northern France.

While the Allied forces in Northwest Europe were perennially short of divisions, the discussion of Sixth Army Group operations in October
through January highlights a set of what-if questions. The French First
Army was always hobbled by the lack of trained replacements, especially in specialists. While it was able to use FFI as light infantry forces,
finding infantry replacements and building up additional necessary
divisions was hard and slow.

So essentially the French divisions were often light infantry with
weak heavy weapons support, presumably due to lack of ammunition
weapons and people who knew how to use them.

The theater wide shortage of ammunition and the too low forecasts
of weapons losses also played their part.

Adding the limited number of US divisions available stretched available forces thin, limiting offensive options and keeping divisions in line
longer than was good for them.

This applied across the US line after the Normandy beak out, most
people remember the Eisenhower push to create a US Army reserve
pre Ardennes and failing except for the refitting airborne units.

Meantime Montgomery had XXX corps out of the line. The US had
the forces but many were still in transit or the US.

Thus the French were unable to clear the Belfort Gap in October. Limited
US forces were able to keep a favorable attritional battle going in the Vosges. Yet there was never enough force to breakthrough the defenses,
which may have been possible.

That is a repeated theme and being tried along the line at different
places. The US had to make choices and increases in southern
force activity would have come via decreases elsewhere and so
the ability of the Germans to move defensinve forces.

On 22nd November the 12th Army group could attack until 15th
December exhausting most reserves, the lack of 105 and 155mm
howitzer ammunition would force static operations assuming no
enemy attacks, crossing the Rhine was out of the question unless
the Germans collapsed.

In December the southern rail network is having severe trouble
with the winter weather in the mountains, together with a lack of coal and illness amongst the civilian staff, rail jams grow to the equivalent of 8
days
supply, with the situation becoming worse during January.

When sufficient forces were available in November, the ensuing attacks had the potential to be decisive or at least much more influential than they turned out to be. The seizure of multiple points along the Rhine, both in
the Strasbourg area and also running north from the Swiss border to the vicinity of Mulhouse held the promise of potentially allowing a jump of
the Rhine in November.

And the German forces deployed in the Ardennes in December mounting
a strong counter attack.

And then comes what exactly was on the German side of the Rhine
that was so important. It seems a common theme of cross the Rhine
as if it was the objective. If 6th Army Group kept driving east it has
to clear the Black Forest including, near the Swiss border, mountains
about as high as the Vosges.

Looks like the March 1945 attacks saw much of 7th Army drive
south east behind the Black Forest

The authors are clear in blaming Eisenhower and Bradley for reorienting Seventh Army north into the Saar in support of Third Army.

Yet if the simple map I have is correct crossing near Karlsruhe seems
to avoid much of the forest and high ground on the German side of the
river, it is also the point the pre war Germany/France border and so
defences diverge from the Rhine.

There are many US forces cross the Rhine in 1944 and do well
what ifs around, making it hard for yet another one to gain credibility.

Combined with Hitler's illogical attachment to holding any part of Alsace, this led to the formation of the Colmar pocket. Naturally this stretched Allied resources further than necessary and required additional effort in January and February to clear, in addition to making the Seventh Army more vulnerable to North Wind.

So if Hitler had been more logical both sides would have been
better off but the allies thought they held the initiative.

The history concludes after the clearance of the Colmar Pocket in early February 1945. This set the stage to the invasion of Germany proper
covered in The Last Offensive. I was left with a higher opinion of Devers, Patch, and de Lattre, and a bit of a lower opinion of Truscott.

Devers seems to be the main candidate for the most under rated
US general in the campaign.

Riviera to the Rhine is available as either a hardback or paperback from multiple sellers, including direct from the US GPO. It's also available as
a free PDF download from http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/007/7-10-1/index.html

[I also came to the conclusion that there were just too many First Armies running around NW Europe in 1944-5: First Canadian, First French, First German, and First US. Surely there were more integers available.]

They were all snapped up at the used integer sale, it was the 3.141597...
to 1 offer that did it, had the buyers going round in circles near the pie stands, totally irrational.

You could add the 1st armoured and infantry etc.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On 5/16/17 10:48 AM, Rich wrote:

Because of the collapse of the CMH history program post Vietnam. The downgrading of OCMH to CMH in 1973 and then its further downgrading
to a field agency under the Office of the Chief of Staff in 1989
took away much of the autonomy the early authors of the Green Books.
That is why Doc Cole, Mac MacDonald, and most of the other authors
retired then. The original author of RTR retired in 1983. Clarke took
nine more years to finish the manuscript and there are a number of
errors still in it, most embarrassing a death that never occurred.

The CMH BG Collins also retired in 1982 after 12 years of frustration.
He was my Dad's last CO in Germany before they both retired in 1969. According to my Dad Collins said he was recalled in 1970 to honcho
the restructuring and downgrading and spent most of his time trying to
keep morale from collapsing, the most visible sign being the loss of productivity. Little work was done on Vietnam and they could not get
the Green Books finished, thus the hiatus from the late 1960s to the
early 1990s. All in all it was a mess.

Thanks for the details, Rich. It's not surprising that in the budget
cuts of the 1970s and 1980s, history would get the axe.

I've rarely heard of any big project such as this not having problems
with getting the last few volumes out.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On 5/16/17 10:50 AM, Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

"Stephen Graham" <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote in message news:envfamFgracU1@mid.individual.net...

The volume starts with the rationale, planning, and arrangements for
what would become Operation Anvil, the Allied landings in Southern
France on 15 August 1944. As you would hope and expect, the discussion
of this material is thorough and well written. The authors are careful
to discuss what the Allies expected to encounter - a weakened but
still tough opponent - and how this affected considerations on loading
priorities (combat heavy) and initial plans.

The supply plans were also heavy on civil support, given the
reports of shortages.

That is mentioned as well. The planners didn't realize just how bad the
food situation had grown in France. They did know that they were
expecting a longer campaign in a comparatively high population region
not self-sufficient in food. Added to that was the political problems
posed by an Allied civilian population. More attention needed to be paid
to civilian needs.

The troop issues were essentially the reality of needing to deploy
forces from the US, and what that cost in terms of time.

Also of course the casualties that resulted in units in the US
being stripped of trained men delayed their deployment.

That's the persistent theme of the Western Allies in the European
Theater: issues surrounding the replacement system and proper allocation
and design of forces. Granted, they were trying to build systems and organizations three to four years before actual deployment en masse. The
US practice of stripping men out of mobilizing divisions to use as
replacements and fillers for units entering or in combat had precedent.
It hearkens back to the system of depot divisions used by the AEF in
World War One.

The supply claims are interesting, the south benefited from
the ports and associated infrastructure being largely
undamaged, and the rail system less so than in northern
France. Ports in south France landed around 27% of all
US army cargo, excluding bulk fuel over the course of the
campaign

In September and October 1944 the southern ports
discharged about 40% of all US Army cargo, again
excluding bulk fuel. Hence why they were better off then.
They could ship 12,000 tons per day by rail but see later
the problems in winter.

While southern France's infrastructure was in much shape than northern
France, there were continuing issues due to shortages of trained
individuals.

The other issue facing Sixth Army Group was its distance from any supply source. By the end of September, forces were 5-700 kilometers from
Marseille. The Seventh Army was actually closer to Antwerp by
approximately 250 km compared to Marseille.

A notable feature of this volume is that the discussion of the
campaign moves beyond the usual focus on military operations to
encompass more detail on logistics than usual in the series'
operational histories.

Interesting given the various supply histories, including Cross
Channel Attack.

Well, nothing is more logistics-focused that Logistical Support of the
Armies. What I've read of Cross-Channel Attack most recently was focused
more on logistics than operational detail. But it was hunting specific
detail rather than a more general reading. I could be misjudging
comparative weight.

There is also substantial discussion of issues of the use of air
power, engineering, and other supporting services.

Much on 1st Tactical Air Force? Like 6th Army Group it tends to
be neglected. The amount of engineer work needed on the supply
system, plus the fixed border defences?

Well, Riviera to the Rhine won't tell you everything you always wanted
to know about 1st Tactical Air Force. Much attention is paid to the
issues surrounding a force operating from Corsica and Sardinia before sufficient infrastructure could be rebuilt or built.

There's reasonable attention to the infrastructure issues. The Alpine
front is pretty much neglected. There is some discussion of problems
presented by the Maginot Line fortifications. But much of that turns out
to be a minor issue as the Germans really couldn't properly deploy into
them in sufficient force.

Naturally, there is also reasonable attention paid to inter-Allied
cooperation and civil affairs, particularly the transition back to
civilian French control.

Use of German prisoners in things like coal mines?

Pretty much ignored. It's still primarily an operational history.

The US Army supply system in 1944 was very much a work in progress.

My conclusion from the supply histories,

As far as I can tell the US Army logistics system in the ETO between
June 1944 and May 1945 worked properly in around February 1945,
for perhaps no more than two months. Every other time period had a
shortage of equipment and/or a backlog of ships to unload and/or a
backlog of cargo to clear in the rear areas (often causing port, road
or rail congestion) and/or deliveries to the troops being under
requirements. Under the criteria established by General McNair at
least one US army in the ETO was experiencing a supply crisis for all
but two months of the campaign. Artillery ammunition was never
delivered in the quantities the armies wanted, which is not all that surprising, but reserves were often below authorised levels.

Right. Riviera to the Rhine won't really teach you anything new about
the Allied logistics system in Northwest Europe 1944-5. It mostly
provides a different set of illustrative examples, with an increased
emphasis on rebuilding the French state and army. It just does a better
job than much of what was written in the 1950s and 1960s.

<snip good logistics data>

Which to an extent the supply problems dictated. It seems clear
6th Army Group was meant to be a supporting force, and this
does not seem to have changed in the minds of Eisenhower or
12th Army Group. They can justify it in terms of terrain and where
the major western German industrial plants were located.

Correct. And the authors make that clear, while remaining focused on
their primary topic. At the same time, political considerations meant
that Alsace remained a priority.

Logistics provided the ultimate argument for the switch of Fifteenth
Corps from the Third Army to the Seventh Army.

Yes, from the investigation into the US Army supply system,

On 22nd September Devers announces he can support an extra 3
divisions, and is promptly given XV corps for 7th Army (2nd French
Armoured and the US 79th Infantry divisions). The 6th Army Group
tries to demand the corps come with ammunition but is rebuffed.

As one would expect, Patton's preference was that the corps remain under
his control, while supplied from the South. Not surprisingly, there was
a fair amount of infighting involved in the decision.

One gains the sense that port capacities provided the rationale for
the reinforcing divisions received by Seventh Army in October and
November: 44th, 100th, and 103d Infantry Divisions, and the 14th
Armored Division.

In November 1944 the US starts landing larger trucks in southern
France to re-equip the lighter truck units. Up to six divisions were
diverted from their planned landing in northern France to the
southern ports according to the supply histories.

The 44th arrived in September 1944, the other three listed above
in October.

While these division were landed in Southern France, the intent
originally was to send most them into 12th Army Group, rather than 6th
Army Group. Part of the justification was that the US divisions in 6th
Army Group were all burning out from having been in line too long. There
were also potential issues with the planned diversion of French
divisions to operations against Bordeaux and the other Gironde ports.
One of the running themes in October and November was how long the
French 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division could remain in
active operations before being sent west.

And then comes what exactly was on the German side of the Rhine
that was so important. It seems a common theme of cross the Rhine
as if it was the objective. If 6th Army Group kept driving east it has
to clear the Black Forest including, near the Swiss border, mountains
about as high as the Vosges.

Crossing the Rhine in and of itself was of limited importance,
particularly south of Strasbourg. The authors were looking more at the possibilities north of Strasbourg, focused perhaps most at Karlsruhe, as
you point out. The main thrust of the authors is that, as with many
other points along the front, choices were made that weakened the Allied effort. Some set of mistakes were inevitable - Eisenhower didn't have
the advantage of being a late 20th century wargamer, as so many of his
casual critics were.

There are many US forces cross the Rhine in 1944 and do well
what ifs around, making it hard for yet another one to gain credibility.

Quite true.

Combined with Hitler's illogical attachment to holding any part of
Alsace, this led to the formation of the Colmar pocket. Naturally this
stretched Allied resources further than necessary and required
additional effort in January and February to clear, in addition to
making the Seventh Army more vulnerable to North Wind.

So if Hitler had been more logical both sides would have been
better off but the allies thought they held the initiative.

Isn't much of military history the story of how one side's mistakes play
off against the mistakes of the other side?

The history concludes after the clearance of the Colmar Pocket in
early February 1945. This set the stage to the invasion of Germany
proper covered in The Last Offensive. I was left with a higher opinion
of Devers, Patch, and de Lattre, and a bit of a lower opinion of
Truscott.

Devers seems to be the main candidate for the most under rated
US general in the campaign.

Devers appears to have had a recent mildly hagiographic biography. But
he does seem to be under-valued in terms of his overall contribution to
the US Army effort in World War Two. He kept cropping up in important
places, thanks to being a protege of Marshall. It's just that Eisenhower received more attention.

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"Stephen Graham" <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote in message news:eo23bhF534mU1@mid.individual.net...

On 5/16/17 10:50 AM, Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

"Stephen Graham" <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote in message
news:envfamFgracU1@mid.individual.net...

The volume starts with the rationale, planning, and arrangements for
what would become Operation Anvil, the Allied landings in Southern
France on 15 August 1944. As you would hope and expect, the discussion
of this material is thorough and well written. The authors are careful
to discuss what the Allies expected to encounter - a weakened but
still tough opponent - and how this affected considerations on loading
priorities (combat heavy) and initial plans.

(snip)

The troop issues were essentially the reality of needing to deploy
forces from the US, and what that cost in terms of time.

Also of course the casualties that resulted in units in the US
being stripped of trained men delayed their deployment.

That's the persistent theme of the Western Allies in the European Theater: issues surrounding the replacement system and proper allocation and design
of forces. Granted, they were trying to build systems and organizations
three to four years before actual deployment en masse. The US practice of stripping men out of mobilizing divisions to use as replacements and
fillers for units entering or in combat had precedent. It hearkens back to the system of depot divisions used by the AEF in World War One.

Yes, simply put the US army had never tried to sustain the
size of ground forces in combat it committed to France, it
meant a whole lot of flaws designed into the training, supply
and manpower allocation systems. Fixing them in under a
year was not possible. Simply think of the time required to
agree on changes, then turn out finished product in the US
then get it to the front line in France.

Then add how much time was spent on simply agreeing
who had what and where.

Sort of the story how crated aircraft delivered to Takoradi
in West Africa were immediately counted as on the strength
of the Middle East Command in Egypt. Leading to some
pointed Churchill comments about force sizes and the
Middle East commanders feeling that was somewhat unfair.

(snip)

While southern France's infrastructure was in much shape than northern France, there were continuing issues due to shortages of trained
individuals.

Yes, hence the comments about what happened in winter, the
increase in sickness rates. I could add the problems of
supplying coal to the area.

The other issue facing Sixth Army Group was its distance from any supply source. By the end of September, forces were 5-700 kilometers from
Marseille. The Seventh Army was actually closer to Antwerp by
approximately 250 km compared to Marseille.

While 250 km sounds a lot think about how long it takes a train
to be loaded, travel 700 km and be unloaded, versus a distance
of say 250 km less. By truck the extra distance is a real problem
given the higher maintenance costs of roads and associated
vehicles, but not nearly as much by rail.

The matching of the port unloading rates to the port clearance
rates to the (rail) transport rates to the supply depot handling rates
was more important.

Sending the engine back alone because no empty carriages
were available or trains stopped because of the queue waiting
to unload caused more delays than 250 km more of rail distance.

(snip)

There is also substantial discussion of issues of the use of air
power, engineering, and other supporting services.

Much on 1st Tactical Air Force? Like 6th Army Group it tends to
be neglected. The amount of engineer work needed on the supply
system, plus the fixed border defences?

Well, Riviera to the Rhine won't tell you everything you always wanted to know about 1st Tactical Air Force.

Don't worry, neither does the USAAF history, like 6th Army a
joint US/French force but including RAF French squadrons and
French navy units, so an interesting mix with odd duties like
attacking or at least monitoring the Atlantic ports still held by
the Germans.

Much attention is paid to the issues surrounding a force operating from Corsica and Sardinia before sufficient infrastructure could be rebuilt or built.

There's reasonable attention to the infrastructure issues. The Alpine
front is pretty much neglected.

Yes, an effectively quiet front on the Italian French border, the sort
of WWII trivia contest, who was there, what did they do and did the
lines go all the way to Switzerland.

Followed by the perennial what if they really tried to attack there.

There is some discussion of problems presented by the Maginot Line fortifications. But much of that turns out to be a minor issue as the
Germans really couldn't properly deploy into them in sufficient force.

(snip)

One gains the sense that port capacities provided the rationale for
the reinforcing divisions received by Seventh Army in October and
November: 44th, 100th, and 103d Infantry Divisions, and the 14th
Armored Division.

In November 1944 the US starts landing larger trucks in southern
France to re-equip the lighter truck units. Up to six divisions were
diverted from their planned landing in northern France to the
southern ports according to the supply histories.

The 44th arrived in September 1944, the other three listed above
in October.

While these division were landed in Southern France, the intent originally was to send most them into 12th Army Group, rather than 6th Army Group.

So I misunderstood your point, not where they landed but where
they ended up.

Part of the justification was that the US divisions in 6th Army Group were all burning out from having been in line too long.

Yes but from the Normandy breakout to post Ardennes it was a
common problem for the US. In one sense it is interesting there
does not seem to have been a push to expand 21st Army Group
frontage and not by handing it control of US 9th army.

There were also potential issues with the planned diversion of French divisions to operations against Bordeaux and the other Gironde ports.

Yes, but I thought the result at Brest in September plus the
capture of Antwerp so early fairly rapidly cancelled the ideas
of operations against ports further south. Admittedly this then
increased the problem of adding heavy weapons units to the
French light infantry to make them proper divisions.

One of the running themes in October and November was how long the French
1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division could remain in active operations before being sent west.

That is certainly not something most histories cover. Or for that
matter the rounding up/confining of German forces on the south
France Atlantic coast and hinterland. The short hand is Germans
retreated to their port fortresses more or less watched by FFI and
some allied troops to officially liberate the area then invest the ports
for the rest of the war The allies wanted their regular troops trying
for the Rhine at the time.

And then comes what exactly was on the German side of the Rhine
that was so important. It seems a common theme of cross the Rhine
as if it was the objective. If 6th Army Group kept driving east it has
to clear the Black Forest including, near the Swiss border, mountains
about as high as the Vosges.

Crossing the Rhine in and of itself was of limited importance,
particularly south of Strasbourg. The authors were looking more at the possibilities north of Strasbourg, focused perhaps most at Karlsruhe, as
you point out.

But in deciding 6th Army Group should cover the border to at least
north of Karlsruhe stretched the forces to the point where they could
not make a break through. The dilemma the US army had along
the line.

The what if of the French forces being full divisions, holding the
bank of the Rhine and thinned out to provide forces further north.
Another trivia point, how did the front lines deal with encountering
the Swiss border.

The main thrust of the authors is that, as with many other points along
the front, choices were made that weakened the Allied effort. Some set of mistakes were inevitable - Eisenhower didn't have the advantage of being a late 20th century wargamer, as so many of his casual critics were.

Yes, the trouble for me is how much is hindsight, the US supply
crisis was deep rooted starting with a lack of supply in the US,
and a totally inexperienced and beaurocratic supply system in
theatre, compounded by officially 2 of its armies drew supply
from a different theatre.

I agree there were mistakes, there had to be, my reading says
the US army was, until Antwerp was open, not able to make the
Rhine, even with perfect generalship, because of the lack of
troops and supplies.

On 21st September Von Rundstedt considers his forces to be
the equivalent of 21 Volksgrenadier and 6 to 7 Panzer divisions.
In other words close to a 1 to 1 ratio with the allied forces
operating on the front line, using a HQ count.

And the Germans had lots of terrain advantages plus pre
war fortifications.

I could add the major loss of jerricans which really hindered
the US fuel system.

Combined with Hitler's illogical attachment to holding any part of
Alsace, this led to the formation of the Colmar pocket. Naturally this
stretched Allied resources further than necessary and required
additional effort in January and February to clear, in addition to
making the Seventh Army more vulnerable to North Wind.

So if Hitler had been more logical both sides would have been
better off but the allies thought they held the initiative.

Isn't much of military history the story of how one side's mistakes play
off against the mistakes of the other side?

Yes, you hope you have the initiative to pick off their
mistakes before they pick off yours.

The history concludes after the clearance of the Colmar Pocket in
early February 1945. This set the stage to the invasion of Germany
proper covered in The Last Offensive. I was left with a higher opinion
of Devers, Patch, and de Lattre, and a bit of a lower opinion of
Truscott.

Devers seems to be the main candidate for the most under rated
US general in the campaign.

Devers appears to have had a recent mildly hagiographic biography. But he does seem to be under-valued in terms of his overall contribution to the
US Army effort in World War Two. He kept cropping up in important places, thanks to being a protege of Marshall. It's just that Eisenhower received more attention.

It would seem Eisenhower was rated as a superior allied
commander and those qualities helped with air force and navy
relations. Not sure what, if anything, the USAAF and USN thought
of Devers before we start talking about the British.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

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On Wednesday, May 17, 2017 at 8:38:22 AM UTC-7, Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

It would seem Eisenhower was rated as a superior allied
commander and those qualities helped with air force and navy
relations. Not sure what, if anything, the USAAF and USN thought
of Devers before we start talking about the British.

Devers is an interesting character, when appointed, he was the youngest brigadier general and youngest major general in the Army. He was the
second commander of the Armored Force, where he had mixed results. He
tried to get American tanks upgunned early, but nixed the first 76mm
version of the Medium Tank M4, losing a year in fielding it. He also
was the driving force reversing the decision to accept diesel engines
for tanks and AFV's. When Andrews was killed he replaced him at ETOUSA
and was responsible for the early preparations for OVERLORD before
being shuffled off to the Med so the popular - and newsworthy - Ike
could take over.

Reportedly Ike disliked him intensely, possibly because he was the exact opposite of the "Gee Whiz Kansas Kid" persona Ike had invented for himself.
By most accounts Devers was smart and knew it, failing to suffer fools at
all, let alone gladly. He was quick, decisive, and impatient, but
apparently got along well with the French and British. Postwar he commanded
AGF before his retirement.

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In article <287a056b-b89d-4406-850d-5980f52172be@googlegroups.com>, RichTO90@msn.com (Rich) wrote:

Reportedly Ike disliked him intensely, possibly because he was the
exact opposite of the "Gee Whiz Kansas Kid" persona Ike had invented
for himself.

The pose of "I'm just an ordinary guy" from people who clearly aren't can
get annoying to the British because it wastes time. A lot of British
generals felt at first that someone had been put in charge of them who
wasn't up to the job. They tended to revise that opinion once they'd seen
him manage a few prima donnas.

By most accounts Devers was smart and knew it, failing to suffer
fools at all, let alone gladly. He was quick, decisive, and impatient,
but apparently got along well with the French and British.

They'd take to him at first, because he'd seem like someone who got on
with the job and expressed himself clearly. If he could deliver results,
they'd keep that high opinion; if he messed up, they'd lose confidence in
him.

John

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On 5/17/17 8:38 AM, Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

"Stephen Graham" <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote in message news:eo23bhF534mU1@mid.individual.net...

The other issue facing Sixth Army Group was its distance from any
supply source. By the end of September, forces were 5-700 kilometers
from Marseille. The Seventh Army was actually closer to Antwerp by
approximately 250 km compared to Marseille.

While 250 km sounds a lot think about how long it takes a train
to be loaded, travel 700 km and be unloaded, versus a distance
of say 250 km less. By truck the extra distance is a real problem
given the higher maintenance costs of roads and associated
vehicles, but not nearly as much by rail.

Correct. Rail will almost always be more efficient than road for
logistics. One still measures logistics throughput in tonne-kilometers
per day. Presuming unloading capacities and trackage are uniform, more
supplies can be delivered from Marseille to Lyon than to Epinal with the
same amount of railway equipment. Admittedly, I'm not certain where the
forward railhead was for Sixth Army Group once it entered the Vosges and Belfort Gap area. Presumably I should go look at Logistical Support of
the Armies for that information.

There's reasonable attention to the infrastructure issues. The Alpine
front is pretty much neglected.

Yes, an effectively quiet front on the Italian French border, the sort
of WWII trivia contest, who was there, what did they do and did the
lines go all the way to Switzerland.

Followed by the perennial what if they really tried to attack there.

I'll confess to a curiosity about that front from both sides, fully
recognizing that it offered almost no chance of profitable active
operations. Yet it was always there, absorbing forces: initially the
airborne task force associated with Anvil and the 4th Moroccan Division, supplemented by FFI. Later the newly raised 27th Alpine Division and
converted anti-aircraft gunners.

Part of the justification was that the US divisions in 6th Army Group
were all burning out from having been in line too long.

Yes but from the Normandy breakout to post Ardennes it was a
common problem for the US.

Yes, though the 3d, 36th, and 45th Divisions had been in action prior to
being selected for Anvil, with a limited break compared to those
divisions transferred from the Mediterranean for use in Overlord. In
part it seems that Truscott did a better job of managing his divisions
than some of his counterparts.

In one sense it is interesting there
does not seem to have been a push to expand 21st Army Group
frontage and not by handing it control of US 9th army.

Elsewhere in my TBR piles I have C.J. Dick's From Victory to Stalemate
which may address some of that.

There were also potential issues with the planned diversion of French
divisions to operations against Bordeaux and the other Gironde ports.

Yes, but I thought the result at Brest in September plus the
capture of Antwerp so early fairly rapidly cancelled the ideas
of operations against ports further south. Admittedly this then
increased the problem of adding heavy weapons units to the
French light infantry to make them proper divisions.

One of the running themes in October and November was how long the
French 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division could remain in
active operations before being sent west.

That is certainly not something most histories cover. Or for that
matter the rounding up/confining of German forces on the south
France Atlantic coast and hinterland. The short hand is Germans
retreated to their port fortresses more or less watched by FFI and
some allied troops to officially liberate the area then invest the ports
for the rest of the war The allies wanted their regular troops trying
for the Rhine at the time.

While the Americans and British had less interest in opening Bordeaux
and generally clearing out the remaining German Atlantic garrisons than
the French did, the attraction of another major port in reasonable
repair was real for everyone.

There's this constantly moving date for the dispatch of regular French
units to the Atlantic Coast. On 5 December 1944, the 1st Infantry
Division was pulled out of line in Alsace and started to the Atlantic
Coast, followed by the 1st Armored Division around the 15th. That
movement was cancelled on 18 December. While 1st Armored was able to
return to action relatively quickly, the 1st Infantry Division was
apparently out of action for most of the month. Ultimately, the 2d
Armored Division was sent to the coast in March and April 1945 when the
Gironde enclaves were destroyed.

Another trivia point, how did the front lines deal with encountering
the Swiss border.

There's not as much detail as one might hope for. The presence of the
Swiss border did have an affect on operations. When the French I Corps
made its drive to the Rhine in late November, German counterattacks were
made along a north-south axis terminating at the Swiss border, cutting
off the French main forces in the vicinity of Mulhouse and the Rhine.
The Germans also entertained suspicions that the French were using Swiss
roads to move around German positions. It's an interesting operation.
The lead German infantry regiment opted for internment in Switzerland to surrendering to the French troops.

The role of Switzerland in the 1944-5 campaigns still lacks any real
treatment in English that I know of.

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On Thursday, May 18, 2017 at 12:52:05 AM UTC-4, Stephen Graham wrote:

Rail will almost always be more efficient than road for
logistics. One still measures logistics throughput in tonne-kilometers
per day. Presuming unloading capacities and trackage are uniform, more supplies can be delivered from Marseille to Lyon than to Epinal with the
same amount of railway equipment. Admittedly, I'm not certain where the forward railhead was for Sixth Army Group once it entered the Vosges and Belfort Gap area. Presumably I should go look at Logistical Support of
the Armies for that information.

That assumes the existence of a railroad that connects the
origins and destinations that are desired. That may or may not
exist depending on the area and topography.

A railroad may or may not be buildable depending on the area
and topography.

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"Stephen Graham" <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote in message news:eo4nh3FnuitU1@mid.individual.net...

On 5/17/17 8:38 AM, Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

"Stephen Graham" <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote in message
news:eo23bhF534mU1@mid.individual.net...

The other issue facing Sixth Army Group was its distance from any
supply source. By the end of September, forces were 5-700 kilometers
from Marseille. The Seventh Army was actually closer to Antwerp by
approximately 250 km compared to Marseille.

While 250 km sounds a lot think about how long it takes a train
to be loaded, travel 700 km and be unloaded, versus a distance
of say 250 km less. By truck the extra distance is a real problem
given the higher maintenance costs of roads and associated
vehicles, but not nearly as much by rail.

Correct. Rail will almost always be more efficient than road for
logistics. One still measures logistics throughput in tonne-kilometers per day. Presuming unloading capacities and trackage are uniform, more
supplies can be delivered from Marseille to Lyon than to Epinal with the
same amount of railway equipment.

Agreed, my point is given all the other inefficiencies in the supply
system 500km round trip, or presumably 6 to 10 hours travel,
it not a major factor in throughput. The coal requirements would
matter more if needed near the front line for a return journey.

Against this is in at least the 1944 period the supply people,
like everybody coming from the Mediterranean, had been
doing their jobs in actual operations, not training like most
of those coming from Normandy. That would help. Though
they ended up in a similar situation as the north.

Admittedly, I'm not certain where the forward railhead was for Sixth Army Group once it entered the Vosges and Belfort Gap area. Presumably I should
go look at Logistical Support of the Armies for that information.

Sorry, when I went looking I was only after what they tried to do
during the pursuit, not after things stablised.

A quick read says Epinal, the army group had 2 rail lines,
one Dijon Besancon towards the Belfort gap and one Dijon
Langres Epinal, towards the Saverne gap.

However the December advances pushed the 7th army
beyond comfortable road supply distance. The rail head
was through to Strasbourg on 21 December.

The 7th army regulating station was at Is-sur-Tille where
2,000 rail wagons accumulated during the December
problems. By end January 6th Army Group had 5,000
wagons waiting to be unloaded. They started running
special truck convoy routes.

By mid February things were back to acceptable, the
special truck convoys discontinued.

One of the running themes in October and November was how long the
French 1st Infantry Division and 1st Armored Division could remain in
active operations before being sent west.

That is certainly not something most histories cover. Or for that
matter the rounding up/confining of German forces on the south
France Atlantic coast and hinterland. The short hand is Germans
retreated to their port fortresses more or less watched by FFI and
some allied troops to officially liberate the area then invest the ports
for the rest of the war The allies wanted their regular troops trying
for the Rhine at the time.

While the Americans and British had less interest in opening Bordeaux and generally clearing out the remaining German Atlantic garrisons than the French did, the attraction of another major port in reasonable repair was real for everyone.

Interesting when you consider Strasbourg to Bordeaux was about 10%
further than Strasbourg to Marseille In fact you need to use the
Normandy ports before you are closer.

And I suspect the rail capacity from Marseille to the front would have
been better than the Atlantic ports which seem to have had their
high capacity links more orientated towards Paris. Apparently there
were double track lines on both banks of the Rhone. They had the line
to Lyon by 25 September and Dijon by the end of the month and also
to Besancon

Marseille was the number 1 French port, Le Havre number 2.
While by the end of the campaign the US army was unloading more
cargo at Rouen than at Le Havre.

I did not think Bordeaux was that big a port. I can see the
French wanting it back as it then freed more troops to
create more infantry divisions to invade Germany.

Apparently the original plans were 10 divisions supported from
the southern French ports. Marseille was rated as handling
20,000 tons a day in peacetime.
..

There's this constantly moving date for the dispatch of regular French
units to the Atlantic Coast. On 5 December 1944, the 1st Infantry Division was pulled out of line in Alsace and started to the Atlantic Coast,
followed by the 1st Armored Division around the 15th. That movement was cancelled on 18 December. While 1st Armored was able to return to action relatively quickly, the 1st Infantry Division was apparently out of action for most of the month. Ultimately, the 2d Armored Division was sent to the coast in March and April 1945 when the Gironde enclaves were destroyed.

You have given 3 examples but I presume there are more.

I could add the Bomber Command raid on Royan, at the mouth
of the Gironde on the night of 4/5 January 1945. Lots of French
civilian dead, big dispute about who wanted it and why. There
was a 10 day truce afterwards while the search for survivors
was undertaken.

So it sounds like at the end of 1944 there was the start of a
plan to clear some more Atlantic ports, which was cancelled.
Then revived.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

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On 5/18/2017 10:37 AM, Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

"Stephen Graham" <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote in message news:eo4nh3FnuitU1@mid.individual.net...

Against this is in at least the 1944 period the supply people,
like everybody coming from the Mediterranean, had been
doing their jobs in actual operations, not training like most
of those coming from Normandy. That would help. Though
they ended up in a similar situation as the north.

Well, as you point out, the US hadn't done it before, and the British
had had a generation to forget about things.

Admittedly, I'm not certain where the forward railhead was for Sixth
Army Group once it entered the Vosges and Belfort Gap area. Presumably
I should go look at Logistical Support of the Armies for that
information.

Sorry, when I went looking I was only after what they tried to do
during the pursuit, not after things stablised.

A quick read says Epinal, the army group had 2 rail lines,
one Dijon Besancon towards the Belfort gap and one Dijon
Langres Epinal, towards the Saverne gap.

However the December advances pushed the 7th army
beyond comfortable road supply distance. The rail head
was through to Strasbourg on 21 December.

I'm surprised that wasn't mentioned in the volume. That must have
created that extra frison of excitement when Nordwind kicked off and
Eisenhower wanted 7th Army to pull back to the Vosges. That idea went
over as well as you would expect with the French.

The 7th army regulating station was at Is-sur-Tille where
2,000 rail wagons accumulated during the December
problems. By end January 6th Army Group had 5,000
wagons waiting to be unloaded. They started running
special truck convoy routes.

Is-sur-Tille is further back than I expected but you have to go where
the marshalling yards are.

While the Americans and British had less interest in opening Bordeaux
and generally clearing out the remaining German Atlantic garrisons
than the French did, the attraction of another major port in
reasonable repair was real for everyone.

Interesting when you consider Strasbourg to Bordeaux was about 10%
further than Strasbourg to Marseille In fact you need to use the
Normandy ports before you are closer.

And I suspect the rail capacity from Marseille to the front would have
been better than the Atlantic ports which seem to have had their
high capacity links more orientated towards Paris. Apparently there
were double track lines on both banks of the Rhone. They had the line
to Lyon by 25 September and Dijon by the end of the month and also
to Besancon

I suspect that a significant part of the attraction was being able to
move civil affairs support for a large portion of France to a different
port that was closer.

There's this constantly moving date for the dispatch of regular French
units to the Atlantic Coast. On 5 December 1944, the 1st Infantry
Division was pulled out of line in Alsace and started to the Atlantic
Coast, followed by the 1st Armored Division around the 15th. That
movement was cancelled on 18 December. While 1st Armored was able to
return to action relatively quickly, the 1st Infantry Division was
apparently out of action for most of the month. Ultimately, the 2d
Armored Division was sent to the coast in March and April 1945 when
the Gironde enclaves were destroyed.

You have given 3 examples but I presume there are more.

There was a rolling date for redeployment beginning sometime in October
and continuing. I suspect that a number of staff officers had nervous breakdowns about continually updating plans. On the other hand, if they
were French, they might have had the proper sang-froid to adapt to it.

I could add the Bomber Command raid on Royan, at the mouth
of the Gironde on the night of 4/5 January 1945. Lots of French
civilian dead, big dispute about who wanted it and why. There
was a 10 day truce afterwards while the search for survivors
was undertaken.

It appears to have been order by the commander of the French Army of the Atlantic.

So it sounds like at the end of 1944 there was the start of a
plan to clear some more Atlantic ports, which was cancelled.
Then revived.

Operation Independence, previously Operation Hiatus.

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On 5/18/2017 9:12 AM, Scott M. Kozel wrote:

On Thursday, May 18, 2017 at 12:52:05 AM UTC-4, Stephen Graham wrote:

Rail will almost always be more efficient than road for
logistics. One still measures logistics throughput in tonne-kilometers
per day. Presuming unloading capacities and trackage are uniform, more
supplies can be delivered from Marseille to Lyon than to Epinal with the
same amount of railway equipment. Admittedly, I'm not certain where the
forward railhead was for Sixth Army Group once it entered the Vosges and
Belfort Gap area. Presumably I should go look at Logistical Support of
the Armies for that information.

That assumes the existence of a railroad that connects the
origins and destinations that are desired. That may or may not
exist depending on the area and topography.

Sure. But we're discussing France in the 1940s, just about the peak of railroading. There's an awful lot of track running everywhere. Equipment
and maintenance status are the issues.

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