It's extra weird because the US and the UK continued to be close after the war
ended.
The absolutely enormous- and absolutely critical- work done by the
Soviet Union to defeat the Germans mostly goes ignored in movies, books,
etc.
but that makes sense because the Soviets were our enemies in the Cold War
for most of the next 40 years the majority of accounts available in
English on
the Eastern Front were from the German perspective. The US and the UK, however, to this day seem to bicker like an old married couple.
...over the most difficult logistics imaginable,
After contemplating this for a while, I wonder why this is. Why is what appears to be national score-settling so prevalent? Let me be clear that I'm not just talking about this newsgroup, this is true for published accounts of the campaign as well. It just seems odd that the US and UK worked so well together during the war- certainly better than, say, the Japanese Army worked with the Japanese Navy, both in process and outcome- and yet the books, movies, and even kibitzing of random internet strangers should be so full of recriminations and national blame assignment. What happened during/after the war that led to this state of affairs?
(4) the supposed "closeness" of US and UK governments
was chilled by Venona revelations that both failed to detect Russian penetration of Los Alamos and MI6, each free to blame the laxness
of the other . . .
It is unhelpful to lump Hollywood's general approach to WW2 with any consensus of the world population of (national) historians.
This is wholly
independent of the temptation (still active) to measure either success
or moral virtue by the number of casualties suffered.
cmanteuf@gmail.com wrote:
...over the most difficult logistics imaginable,
That is to laugh.
You want difficult logistics, try the Kokoda Trail.
Or the Hump.
Fundamentally, the popular historical conception of World War Two was
set in the 1950s and 1960s. While the intelligence revelations of the
1970s made some difference, it's really less than perhaps is merited.
As we
know, both series are reluctant to be critical of their respective
senior commanders.
We don't discuss the Huertgen Forest because everyone can look at it and agree that it was just a bad idea in the first place.
And the diving into archives and re-analysis driven as a response to the original historical consensus. I think that there are still a lot of interesting history work being done on the war, which is changing how we view the collaboration of the two nations. I know that my understanding of their relationship has deepened based on works like _Yalta_, _Nuclear Rivals_, and that of Richad Overy.
Have just started reading MacDonald's _Siegfried Line Campaign,_ because I am really curious to see what he says of the Huertgen campaign.
So it was actually reading _A Magnificent Disaster_ by Bennett (a Canadian, so
somewhat out of all this) that led me to this whole line of thinking. While he
is generally even-handed, the conclusion that I drew about the battle was that
plan could not be achieved by the forces that were available.[1] It just doesn't seem possible to me for that plan to work unless the Germans were in a
March-April '45 level of psychological defeat. And the Germans proved themselves once again the masters of ersatz units, and their decision to fight
doomed the plan.
The 101st was assigned way too much of
Hell's Highway to actually be held so it could certainly use an additional division as well, but let's not get greedy.
(Leaving aside that 6th Airborne was still recovering from
Normandy and the 17th Airborne was newly arrived and I'm not sure it was ready
for combat.)
Essentially the claim is Market Garden was close
enough it could have worked, Huertgen had no real
chance...
It struck me today that pretty much all of the most common battles of the
NW Europe '44 campaign discussed here are unusual in that they were nationally joint operations: I daresay that participants in this group,
over the two decades that I have been posting here, have spent literally man-years of time arguing about Anzio[1], Goodwood-Cobra-
Falaise/Argentan, and Market-Garden, largely to the exclusion of much
else in that phase of the war[2]. Those three battles in particular are examples where the outcome wasn't what was desired, but what also distinguishes them is that they were joint across the US and UK.
[1]: Yes, technically not NW Europe '44, but just go with it.
[2]: The NW Europe Campaign from D-Day to V-E Day, this time strictly
defined so as to exclude Italy, saw approximately half of all American casualties in the war. It was most definitely the single most important campaign in the war, from the Western Allied perspective, so the
overall amount of attention it gets makes sense. I'm just questioning
the distribution of attention within the campaign.
It really does seem to be that that distinguishes them: the Huertgen
Forrest was a far bigger catastrophe than M-G, but affected the US
only and from observation of having been here for over 20 years,
doesn't get discussed nearly as much as Market-Garden does. And
it's not just any nationally-joint operation, it has to be specifically US and UK: the next post on the Colmar Pocket won't quite be the first,
but would be damn close.
I think that this goes back to a line I remember from the eminent British historian H.P. Willmott, to the effect that most histories of the Western Allies in Europe treat the US and UK as the main antagonists, and the
SHAEF headquarters as the primary battlefront. Instead of focusing on
how remarkable it is that the Allies went from having no troops north of
Rome to controlling the Elbe river in 11 months, without any ability to
stock up and prepare supplies and over the most difficult logistics imaginable, all of the attention seems to be directed on how Eisenhower supported Patton/Monty (depending on personal perspective) way too
much, and *that* vainglorious idiot managed to cock up a chance to win
the war in six months instead of 11, which *our* vainglorious idiot would have done, if just given a free hand by the dumb Eisenhower.
After contemplating this for a while, I wonder why this is. Why is what appears to be national score-settling so prevalent? Let me be clear
that I'm not just talking about this newsgroup, this is true for published accounts of the campaign as well.
It just seems odd that the US and UK worked so well
together during the war- certainly better than, say, the Japanese Army
worked with the Japanese Navy, both in process and outcome- and
yet the books, movies, and even kibitzing of random internet strangers
should be so full of recriminations and national blame assignment.
What happened during/after the war that led to this state of affairs?
It's extra weird because the US and the UK continued to be close after the war ended. The absolutely enormous- and absolutely critical- work done
by the Soviet Union to defeat the Germans mostly goes ignored in movies, books, etc. but that makes sense because the Soviets were our enemies
in the Cold War and did not release accurate accounts, preferring to
continue their propaganda, so for most of the next 40 years the majority
of accounts available in English on the Eastern Front were from the
German perspective. The US and the UK, however, to this day seem to
bicker like an old married couple.
In terms of published histories the main event was 12th and 21st
Army Groups, within them there are the main event battles, Normandy
(though not necessarily all of it, mostly D-Day, the break outs and
pursuit, including the Falaise pocket and as noted the military politics), >Market-Garden (and Antwerp), the Bulge, things like Remagen Bridge
as a small operation. And remember the Bulge has its Anglo American >controversy over that Montgomery press conference.
Obviously if Falaise had been successful we would
not be discussing Market-Garden and Hurtgen.
On Thu, 04 May 2017 11:30:14 -0400, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:
In terms of published histories the main event was 12th and 21st
Army Groups, within them there are the main event battles, Normandy
(though not necessarily all of it, mostly D-Day, the break outs and >>pursuit, including the Falaise pocket and as noted the military politics), >>Market-Garden (and Antwerp), the Bulge, things like Remagen Bridge
as a small operation. And remember the Bulge has its Anglo American >>controversy over that Montgomery press conference.
This is why General Rohmer's Patton's Gap (which dissected the Falaise
pocket battle and in the end laid 100% of the blame on Monty) created
such a stir when it came out. A (reservist) Canadian air force general
was not SUPPOSED to rain fire and brimstone on Montgomery particularly
in a book where the title seemed to imply the exact opposite even
though it did say in the foreward that he was treating his book as a 'whodunnit' on Falaise.
(Or on another matter whether Monty or the
Canadian commanders f***ed up on the land approaches to Antwerp)
Obviously if Falaise had been successful we would not be discussing Market-Garden and Hurtgen.
"Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:
Essentially the claim is Market Garden was close
enough it could have worked, Huertgen had no real
chance...
Yes, MARKET-GARDEN could have succeeded completely.
(It did capture several bridges and cities, advancing
the front about 70 km. Has anyone made an assessment
of the value in later campaigning of what MARKET-GARDEN
_did_ achieve?)
As to the Huertgen Forest: "no real chance" to do what?
In the end the entire region was taken by the Allies,
though at much higher cost than necessary.
Did the
failure lie in not taking the area in the first week
or month? Or with some smaller number of casualties?
Were the forest battles the least worst option or did the
US Army fall into the same thinking as General Haig in
mid WWI, German defences were one big push away
from falling to pieces, therefore keep attacking, for
example.
On Fri, 05 May 2017 12:35:03 -0400, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:
Were the forest battles the least worst option or did the
US Army fall into the same thinking as General Haig in
mid WWI, German defences were one big push away
from falling to pieces, therefore keep attacking, for
example.
To a very large degree that's what DID happen in July / August 1944 in
the west. There were all kinds of Allied speculation that they had had
'one big push' that gave them most of France and the view was common
even after the failure of Market-Garden that the Germans couldn't hold
on much beyond Christmas.
This is why the Bulge was such a rude shock to many western military
soures. Many thought the war was all over except for the shouting when
the Bulge proved the Germans were not quite as finished as thought.
Once the Allies caught themselves (and basically the clouds over the
Ardennes parted enough to let the RAF / USAAF aerial tank busters be effective the Bulge was over.
One can argue that Varsity (the airborne
assault across the Rhine) was completely superfluous - many do - but
at that point it was a case of Germans preferring to surrender to the
Western allies rather than the Soviets.
[We had one former employee who died about 10 years ago who had been a Canadian military policeman wounded and taken prisoner about 3 weeks
before the end of the war on the East side of the Rhine. He said he
met Canadian POWs who had been captured at Dieppe and had had a very
tough imprisonment - and that he had the world of respect for them -
though by April 1945 the guards were competing with each other to be
"nice" to the Canadians since they all knew the war would soon be over
and their best personal guarantee of safety for them and their
families after the end of hostilities would be an Allied ex-POW
willing to speak to their humane treatment.
He eventually left our employment as he took an apartment with a means
test and the sum total of his old age pension and soldier's pension
with supplements for POW and wounds meant that with his payceque from
us two days a week meant he made too much!
He also took great pleasure in taking part in the D-Day memorials in
Normandy as since he was a French Canadian he was far better treated
by the locals than Americans, Brits and Canadian Anglos]
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