• Nationality and accounts of the NW Europe Campaign

    From cmanteuf@gmail.com@21:1/5 to All on Sun Apr 16 21:39:51 2017
    It struck me today that pretty much all of the most common battles of the NW Europe '44 campaign discussed here are unusual in that they were nationally joint operations: I daresay that participants in this group, over the two decades that I have been posting here, have spent literally man-years of time arguing about Anzio[1], Goodwood-Cobra-Falaise/Argentan, and Market-Garden, largely to the exclusion of much else in that phase of the war[2]. Those three battles in particular are examples where the outcome wasn't what was desired, but what also distinguishes them is that they were joint across the US and UK.

    It really does seem to be that that distinguishes them: the Huertgen Forrest was a far bigger catastrophe than M-G, but affected the US only and from observation of having been here for over 20 years, doesn't get discussed
    nearly as much as Market-Garden does. And it's not just any nationally-joint operation, it has to be specifically US and UK: the next post on the Colmar Pocket won't quite be the first, but would be damn close.

    I think that this goes back to a line I remember from the eminent British historian H.P. Willmott, to the effect that most histories of the Western Allies in Europe treat the US and UK as the main antagonists, and the SHAEF headquarters as the primary battlefront. Instead of focusing on how remarkable it is that the Allies went from having no troops north of Rome to controlling the Elbe river in 11 months, without any ability to stock up and prepare supplies and over the most difficult logistics imaginable, all of the
    attention seems to be directed on how Eisenhower supported Patton/Monty ( depending on personal perspective) way too much, and *that* vainglorious idiot managed to cock up a chance to win the war in six months instead of 11, which *our* vainglorious idiot would have done, if just given a free hand by
    the dumb Eisenhower.

    After contemplating this for a while, I wonder why this is. Why is what
    appears to be national score-settling so prevalent? Let me be clear that I'm not just talking about this newsgroup, this is true for published accounts of the campaign as well. It just seems odd that the US and UK worked so well together during the war- certainly better than, say, the Japanese Army worked with the Japanese Navy, both in process and outcome- and yet the books,
    movies, and even kibitzing of random internet strangers should be so full of recriminations and national blame assignment. What happened during/after the war that led to this state of affairs?

    It's extra weird because the US and the UK continued to be close after the war ended. The absolutely enormous- and absolutely critical- work done by the Soviet Union to defeat the Germans mostly goes ignored in movies, books, etc. but that makes sense because the Soviets were our enemies in the Cold War and did not release accurate accounts, preferring to continue their propaganda, so for most of the next 40 years the majority of accounts available in English on the Eastern Front were from the German perspective. The US and the UK,
    however, to this day seem to bicker like an old married couple.

    Thanks,

    Chris Manteuffel

    [1]: Yes, technically not NW Europe '44, but just go with it.
    [2]: The NW Europe Campaign from D-Day to V-E Day, this time strictly defined so as to exclude Italy, saw approximately half of all American casualties in the war. It was most definitely the single most important campaign in the war, from the Western Allied perspective, so the overall amount of attention it
    gets makes sense. I'm just questioning the distribution of attention within
    the campaign.

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  • From Don Phillipson@21:1/5 to All on Tue Apr 18 12:01:09 2017
    <cmanteuf@gmail.com> wrote in message news:5968c77c-f33b-40eb-b3e8-e1e3c051efa4@googlegroups.com...

    It's extra weird because the US and the UK continued to be close after the war
    ended.

    This is open to doubt cf. (1) the US government's assertion of control
    of all nuclear science (withdrawing the wartime promise to share results
    of all pooled research, then passing the McMahon Act )
    (2) UK election in 1945 of an avowedly "socialist" government,
    (3) general American hostility to the restoration of the
    prewar empires. Effective co-operation resumed only after
    (a) the Truman doctrine 1947 (initially concerning Greece),
    (b) improvised but successful collaboration in the Berlin Blockade
    and resistance to Russian pressure in Germany, leading ultimately
    to NATO in 1949. Even so
    (4) the supposed "closeness" of US and UK governments
    was chilled by Venona revelations that both failed to detect Russian penetration of Los Alamos and MI6, each free to blame the laxness
    of the other . . .

    The absolutely enormous- and absolutely critical- work done by the
    Soviet Union to defeat the Germans mostly goes ignored in movies, books,
    etc.
    but that makes sense because the Soviets were our enemies in the Cold War

    It is unhelpful to lump Hollywood's general approach to WW2 with any
    consensus of the world population of (national) historians. When Quentin Tarantino's presentation of WW2 earns a profit in the US entertainment
    market, serious historians throw up their hands . . . This is wholly independent of the temptation (still active) to measure either success
    or moral virtue by the number of casualties suffered.

    for most of the next 40 years the majority of accounts available in
    English on
    the Eastern Front were from the German perspective. The US and the UK, however, to this day seem to bicker like an old married couple.

    Both these points seem normal i.e. what we ought to have expected.
    --
    Don Phillipson
    Carlsbad Springs
    (Ottawa, Canada)

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  • From Rich Rostrom@21:1/5 to cmanteuf@gmail.com on Tue Apr 18 16:47:18 2017
    cmanteuf@gmail.com wrote:

    ...over the most difficult logistics imaginable,

    That is to laugh.

    You want difficult logistics, try the Kokoda Trail.

    Or the Hump.

    Even transport along the North African coast
    was harder. "A tactician's paradise and a
    quartermaster's hell."

    By comparison, NW Europe was _easy_. And Italy
    wasn't that much harder. (German demolitions
    were not particularly thorough.)
    --
    The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

    http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

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  • From Stephen Graham@21:1/5 to cmanteuf@gmail.com on Wed Apr 19 00:29:42 2017
    On 4/16/17 6:39 PM, cmanteuf@gmail.com wrote:
    After contemplating this for a while, I wonder why this is. Why is what appears to be national score-settling so prevalent? Let me be clear that I'm not just talking about this newsgroup, this is true for published accounts of the campaign as well. It just seems odd that the US and UK worked so well together during the war- certainly better than, say, the Japanese Army worked with the Japanese Navy, both in process and outcome- and yet the books, movies, and even kibitzing of random internet strangers should be so full of recriminations and national blame assignment. What happened during/after the war that led to this state of affairs?

    Chris,

    This isn't as detailed as your post deserves.

    Fundamentally, the popular historical conception of World War Two was
    set in the 1950s and 1960s. While the intelligence revelations of the
    1970s made some difference, it's really less than perhaps is merited.

    The hallmarks of the 1950s and 1960s are that the principal Western
    Allied commanders are still alive, for the most part. The bulk of the
    official histories for the UK and US were published in this period,
    which can form the intellectual underpinnings of the arguments. As we
    know, both series are reluctant to be critical of their respective
    senior commanders.

    And the salient feature of the period, as you allude to, is the Cold
    War. So when the questions are asked as to how we got into this mess,
    what options are available for blame?

    You discuss what you're familiar with (the UK and US war records), with
    a focus on one theater. And you focus on a couple of major events
    because they do offer the opportunity to blame the other guy, as well as
    being flashy operations.

    We don't discuss the Huertgen Forest because everyone can look at it and
    agree that it was just a bad idea in the first place.

    Colmar Pocket? Partly that's intra-service rivalry. No-one talks about
    the 6th Army Group and Jacob Devers. The relevant volume of the Big
    Green Wall, Riviera to the Rhine wasn't published until 1992, nineteen
    years after the penultimate volume, The Last Offensive. (I have to
    confess that I still haven't read it, though I have an electronic copy
    on my iPad.) No-one reads French well enough to read the French
    histories, except Louis Capdebosq.

    Stephen

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  • From cmanteuf@gmail.com@21:1/5 to Don Phillipson on Sat Apr 22 14:39:19 2017
    On Tuesday, April 18, 2017 at 12:01:12 PM UTC-4, Don Phillipson wrote:

    (4) the supposed "closeness" of US and UK governments
    was chilled by Venona revelations that both failed to detect Russian penetration of Los Alamos and MI6, each free to blame the laxness
    of the other . . .

    Sure, the the US and UK had their issues, never tried to deny it. But those issues pale in comparison to the issues between them and France even, leave alone them and the USSR. I'm sure that there were a lot of hurt feelings after the war- heck, there were a lot of bruised feelings *during* the war, as
    Brooke and Marshall can both attest, but fundamentally, the two nations continued to align closely, even in the 1950's. e.g. since 1958 the UK has essentially copied the US warhead design (using their own indigenous fissile material).

    It is unhelpful to lump Hollywood's general approach to WW2 with any consensus of the world population of (national) historians.

    When discussing issues of fact, I certainly agree. When discussing how the war is viewed in the popular memory, the movie Patton contributed far more to how the war is remembered and viewed amongst English-speakers than any combination of books. Even on a newsgroup like this you will occasionally see posted falsehoods
    invented by the movie (e.g. that German tanks used diesel fuel which made them burn less than American tanks).

    This is wholly
    independent of the temptation (still active) to measure either success
    or moral virtue by the number of casualties suffered.

    Yes, the Soviets suffered far more casualties than the US and UK did, and largely that was because Stalin was one of the most evil men in history, just
    a bare half-step better than Hitler himself. But they did conduct most of the attrition of the German land forces. Without that the NW Europe '44 campaign would have been essentially impossible, IMO.

    Chris Manteuffel

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  • From cmanteuf@gmail.com@21:1/5 to Rich Rostrom on Sat Apr 22 14:38:39 2017
    On Tuesday, April 18, 2017 at 4:47:20 PM UTC-4, Rich Rostrom wrote:
    cmanteuf@gmail.com wrote:

    ...over the most difficult logistics imaginable,

    That is to laugh.

    You want difficult logistics, try the Kokoda Trail.

    Or the Hump.

    Okay, to correct what I said, I was trying to say that compared to the other continental [1] land wars (Eastern Front, France 1940, Japan in China) the Allies in the NW Europe Campaign had the most difficult logistical situation: their forces consumed supplies (fuel and artillery ammo) at absolutely prodigious rates, they had the sea/rail disadvantage, and the transportation network had been thoroughly wrecked (mostly by them, to be fair).

    You are correct that no one was conducting multi-army group warfare across the Kokoda Trail or the Hump, because the logistics there absolutely forbid it. I was just focusing on situations where it was possible to conduct that sort of warfare, and the Allied situation in the NW Europe '44 campaign was the worst of those situations.

    [1]: More than three army/a single army group in scale

    Chris Manteuffel

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  • From cmanteuf@gmail.com@21:1/5 to Stephen Graham on Sun Apr 23 00:28:25 2017
    On Wednesday, April 19, 2017 at 12:29:45 AM UTC-4, Stephen Graham wrote:
    Fundamentally, the popular historical conception of World War Two was
    set in the 1950s and 1960s. While the intelligence revelations of the
    1970s made some difference, it's really less than perhaps is merited.

    And the diving into archives and re-analysis driven as a response to the original historical consensus. I think that there are still a lot of interesting history work being done on the war, which is changing how we view the collaboration of the two nations. I know that my understanding of their relationship has deepened based on works like _Yalta_, _Nuclear Rivals_, and that of Richad Overy.

    As we
    know, both series are reluctant to be critical of their respective
    senior commanders.

    Have just started reading MacDonald's _Siegfried Line Campaign,_ because I am really curious to see what he says of the Huertgen campaign.

    We don't discuss the Huertgen Forest because everyone can look at it and agree that it was just a bad idea in the first place.

    So it was actually reading _A Magnificent Disaster_ by Bennett (a Canadian, so somewhat out of all this) that led me to this whole line of thinking. While he is generally even-handed, the conclusion that I drew about the battle was that plan could not be achieved by the forces that were available.[1] It just doesn't seem possible to me for that plan to work unless the Germans were in a March-April '45 level of psychological defeat. And the Germans proved themselves once again the masters of ersatz units, and their decision to fight doomed the plan.

    But some British observers obviously disagree, and argue that if only the
    101st had moved a little faster and seized the Son bridge and Eindhoven on D+1 or whatnot everything would have been fine. I guess it's okay to blame another countries soldiers as well in a way that we are reluctant to blame our own?

    [1]: Details: Obviously there needed to be more force to hold Arnhem bridges and bridgehead and LZ in depth against the German counter attacks, so that should have been a two division drop. In addition, Groesbeek Ridge really did need to be held, and having one division try and take the Nijmegan bridges *and* hold that ridge in strength is just asking too much, so that should have been two different divisions as well. The 101st was assigned way too much of Hell's Highway to actually be held so it could certainly use an additional division as well, but let's not get greedy. As it was, the 3rd Battalion 504th captured the Nijmegan road bridge only because of an absolutely amazing
    display of soldiering- the sort that, if necessary to make your plan work, is
    a pretty good sign that your plan sucks.

    But, of course, there weren't enough transport aircraft to drop the three existing divisions, so finding the transports to drop two more divisions was clearly impractical. My general attitude is that since pilots are so self- confident, when they say that they can't do something, in general one should believe them, but even if they attempted a double lift it wouldn't solve this problem: the two lifts would still be 10 hours apart, which is just far too much time for airborne troops who so rely on the element of surprise. The
    enemy will be on total alert, reinforce all the key points, etc. in those ten hours, and so you need to be able to drop at least major portions simultaneously. And
    doing a five division simultaneous lift was way beyond anything the Allies were
    capable of. (Leaving aside that 6th Airborne was still recovering from
    Normandy and the 17th Airborne was newly arrived and I'm not sure it was ready for combat.)

    Chris Manteuffel

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  • From Stephen Graham@21:1/5 to cmanteuf@gmail.com on Wed Apr 26 19:56:23 2017
    On 4/22/2017 9:28 PM, cmanteuf@gmail.com wrote:

    And the diving into archives and re-analysis driven as a response to the original historical consensus. I think that there are still a lot of interesting history work being done on the war, which is changing how we view the collaboration of the two nations. I know that my understanding of their relationship has deepened based on works like _Yalta_, _Nuclear Rivals_, and that of Richad Overy.

    It's a great period for history of the war. Enough time has passed to
    let it be treated more as history than recent events. _Yalta_ and Overy
    have been quite good. I've been reading more heavily on Weimar Germany
    and revising some of my thoughts on that period.

    It's just taking a while for newer ideas to make their way out into the
    world at large.

    Have just started reading MacDonald's _Siegfried Line Campaign,_ because I am really curious to see what he says of the Huertgen campaign.

    Especially as he was just south of it as a company commander in the 2nd Infantry Division.

    So it was actually reading _A Magnificent Disaster_ by Bennett (a Canadian, so
    somewhat out of all this) that led me to this whole line of thinking. While he
    is generally even-handed, the conclusion that I drew about the battle was that
    plan could not be achieved by the forces that were available.[1] It just doesn't seem possible to me for that plan to work unless the Germans were in a
    March-April '45 level of psychological defeat. And the Germans proved themselves once again the masters of ersatz units, and their decision to fight
    doomed the plan.

    Of course the presumption was that the Germans were in an equivalent
    state to March-April 1945 and would just crack.

    I haven't read Bennett. My big research dive on Market-Garden was done
    just before he published.

    The 101st was assigned way too much of
    Hell's Highway to actually be held so it could certainly use an additional division as well, but let's not get greedy.

    In theory, 50th Division and then 8th and 12th Corps on the flanks
    should have relieved or supplemented the 101st's defense. We know how
    well that worked out.

    (Leaving aside that 6th Airborne was still recovering from
    Normandy and the 17th Airborne was newly arrived and I'm not sure it was ready
    for combat.)

    6th Airborne had only been pulled out for rebuilding after Normandy
    earlier in September. On the other hand, I'm not sure throwing 17th
    Airborne into Market-Garden was any worse than having to throw all those expensively-trained paratroopers into line as infantry during the
    Ardennes crisis.

    The really simply explanation I've settled on is having expensive toys
    and wanting to do something with them. You look at the trail of
    discarded plans for the airborne in August and September 1944 and what
    other conclusion can you reach? That and the failure to plan based on
    the most-constrained asset: the troop transports. There's also the
    question of why exactly you need to drop 1st Airborne Corps HQ on the
    initial drop rather than half of a British air-landing battalion.

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  • From Rich Rostrom@21:1/5 to Geoffrey Sinclair on Thu May 4 13:02:00 2017
    "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:

    Essentially the claim is Market Garden was close
    enough it could have worked, Huertgen had no real
    chance...

    Yes, MARKET-GARDEN could have succeeded completely.
    (It did capture several bridges and cities, advancing
    the front about 70 km. Has anyone made an assessment
    of the value in later campaigning of what MARKET-GARDEN
    _did_ achieve?)

    As to the Huertgen Forest: "no real chance" to do what?
    In the end the entire region was taken by the Allies,
    though at much higher cost than necessary. Did the
    failure lie in not taking the area in the first week
    or month? Or with some smaller number of casualties?
    --
    The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

    http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

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  • From Geoffrey Sinclair@21:1/5 to All on Thu May 4 11:30:14 2017
    <cmanteuf@gmail.com> wrote in message news:5968c77c-f33b-40eb-b3e8-e1e3c051efa4@googlegroups.com...
    It struck me today that pretty much all of the most common battles of the
    NW Europe '44 campaign discussed here are unusual in that they were nationally joint operations: I daresay that participants in this group,
    over the two decades that I have been posting here, have spent literally man-years of time arguing about Anzio[1], Goodwood-Cobra-
    Falaise/Argentan, and Market-Garden, largely to the exclusion of much
    else in that phase of the war[2]. Those three battles in particular are examples where the outcome wasn't what was desired, but what also distinguishes them is that they were joint across the US and UK.

    [1]: Yes, technically not NW Europe '44, but just go with it.
    [2]: The NW Europe Campaign from D-Day to V-E Day, this time strictly
    defined so as to exclude Italy, saw approximately half of all American casualties in the war. It was most definitely the single most important campaign in the war, from the Western Allied perspective, so the
    overall amount of attention it gets makes sense. I'm just questioning
    the distribution of attention within the campaign.

    I am not sure I could link Goodwood and Cobra as joint, beyond the
    Army group being a UK/US one.

    I can understand why Goodwood is mentioned via some pre
    attack claims made for it becoming the break out Cobra became
    a week later, which have been turned into a nationalist race. Claims
    that appear to have been made in part to secure the air support,
    hence why some air commanders in particular were unimpressed.

    21st Army group spent much of the campaign with a US army under
    command, either 1st or 9th. One of the more interesting contributions
    would be what General Simpson of 9th Army thought of the arrangement.

    One of the main drivers in discussions is the appearance of the
    partisans, the ones sure it is others that were the failures and the opinionated, sure they are right, the rest of humanity wrong. You
    can see the same thing in joint operations between army/navy/air
    with the preferred arm the one let down by the others.

    Those with the strongest opinions tend to keep repeating them
    long and loud, those whose opinions are furtherest from the truth
    need to keep repeating them long and loud in the hope they
    become the perceived truth.

    The appearance of partisan opinion generally triggers an increase
    in traffic, plenty of people want to correct the record.

    Trying to come up with a summary of why some events are more
    discussed versus others has the problem so many people have
    become involved, which means lots of primary and secondary etc.
    reasons are invoked.

    It really does seem to be that that distinguishes them: the Huertgen
    Forrest was a far bigger catastrophe than M-G, but affected the US
    only and from observation of having been here for over 20 years,
    doesn't get discussed nearly as much as Market-Garden does. And
    it's not just any nationally-joint operation, it has to be specifically US and UK: the next post on the Colmar Pocket won't quite be the first,
    but would be damn close.

    Market Garden was the operation of hope, if it worked the allies ended
    up with a bridgehead across the Rhine. Huertgen forest was the grind,
    with general agreement it was a mistake. Essentially the claim is
    Market Garden was close enough it could have worked, Huertgen had
    no real chance, so not surprising some decide if only that unit/attack
    had worked in Market Garden and ignore Huertgen.

    How about the amount of discussion on say the clearing of the channel
    ports, excluding Antwerp?

    Note how late the US army history came out on 6th Army Group/
    7th Army operations. Even in the US it seems to be treated as a
    side line, like it followed the other armies around, or the weak
    resistance it faced from southern France to the German border
    continued all war.

    An English language history of the French First Army?

    In terms of published histories the main event was 12th and 21st
    Army Groups, within them there are the main event battles, Normandy
    (though not necessarily all of it, mostly D-Day, the break outs and
    pursuit, including the Falaise pocket and as noted the military politics), Market-Garden (and Antwerp), the Bulge, things like Remagen Bridge
    as a small operation. And remember the Bulge has its Anglo American controversy over that Montgomery press conference.

    With side lines into equipment like tanks.

    That is not the whole campaign, histories tend to largely skip
    when the lines were static, which was most of the time, the
    action and movement draw the eye.

    I think that this goes back to a line I remember from the eminent British historian H.P. Willmott, to the effect that most histories of the Western Allies in Europe treat the US and UK as the main antagonists, and the
    SHAEF headquarters as the primary battlefront. Instead of focusing on
    how remarkable it is that the Allies went from having no troops north of
    Rome to controlling the Elbe river in 11 months, without any ability to
    stock up and prepare supplies and over the most difficult logistics imaginable, all of the attention seems to be directed on how Eisenhower supported Patton/Monty (depending on personal perspective) way too
    much, and *that* vainglorious idiot managed to cock up a chance to win
    the war in six months instead of 11, which *our* vainglorious idiot would have done, if just given a free hand by the dumb Eisenhower.

    I would disagree with Wilmot, in that most histories do not treat
    the US/UK as the main antagonists. I would agree it is likely anybody
    trying to write the history runs into understanding problems. The UK,
    Canada, France and US armies, navies and air forces had and still
    have real differences in their cultures and therefore how they work
    and even how the define success. Understanding one service's way
    of war does not transfer to another's, so each publication draws a
    form of counter publication.

    Overlaid on this is the British could not maintain their mid 1944
    army and navy, while the US was still expanding. So British
    army formations were broken up or sent to reserve while US
    strength was so large and growing that some US divisions in
    Europe saw very little combat.

    Also of course the military tends to tell its personnel about how it is
    the best, or their unit is the best, after all people are effectively
    betting their lives so you want to believe about having the best
    chance, and how those beliefs flow through into judgements.

    As has been pointed out the logistics of some other campaigns,
    like the fight across the New Guinea mountains, were harder, it is
    also relative, the allies had to supply 3 army groups and 3 tactical
    air forces on the continent, across the sea (Britain) or ocean (US),
    plus help feed, clothe and shelter large populations, how that proved
    a real strain relative to the transport resources actually available,
    the major cost in switching transport modes, and the resources
    needed to run and repair the transport system.

    After contemplating this for a while, I wonder why this is. Why is what appears to be national score-settling so prevalent? Let me be clear
    that I'm not just talking about this newsgroup, this is true for published accounts of the campaign as well.

    While there are the clearly partisan accounts consider confirmation
    bias, once you start looking for something you tend to find it.

    There is also the inevitable problem that things like biographies
    tend to have an author who has strong opinions on the subject,
    and how that flows through. If you admire/dislike someone that
    affects the way they are presented.

    In day to day terms imagine two politicians from different parties
    saying exactly the same thing and how people interpret them
    according to party labels, not just the content. Add the way the
    system tries to hang labels (slogans) on parties and people.

    Also during the war there were very real differences in strategy
    and tactics between the US and UK, and exploring them is
    fertile ground for the partisan.

    It just seems odd that the US and UK worked so well
    together during the war- certainly better than, say, the Japanese Army
    worked with the Japanese Navy, both in process and outcome- and
    yet the books, movies, and even kibitzing of random internet strangers
    should be so full of recriminations and national blame assignment.
    What happened during/after the war that led to this state of affairs?

    The case study for the real enemy is the other service, not the
    people we are at war with, is WWII Japan.

    You can turn it around and say it is healthy the UK/US histories
    point out the flaws in the commanders and plans.

    During the war as far as North West Europe is concerned the personality
    of Montgomery looms large, he made it easy for people to dislike him,
    that has to feed into histories. The well known move by various mainly
    British air commanders to remove him in Normandy was not a US
    versus UK but air force versus army.

    It is interesting to note how the Overlord supply plan, with its steady
    daily advance and neatly marked maps with "here by D+x" has become
    some sort of measurement of the Normandy Campaign, that is at least
    partly due it being a reason in the push to remove Montgomery. The
    saying no plan survives the first encounter with the enemy but the
    territorial advances in the Overlord supply plan should have, at least to
    D+50 or so. Followed by the disconnect of how the planned D+365
    line was reached around D+90.

    How about the landing craft allocations? Pacific versus Europe in
    strategic terms but usually put as Admiral King or just the USN
    versus the rest. Or in historian terms Wilmot versus Morrison,
    Wilmot's claim, Morrison's rebuttal.

    The human tendency to remember the failures more than the
    successes, so those outside the main focus of a given history tend
    to be mentioned more when they hurt, not help, before we talk about
    offloading responsibility for failures or overclaiming successes.

    Publications of diaries, where people often let out their worries and
    scathing judgements has fuelled the situation. Once one is published
    it tends to result in more in similar style, but with different insults. As well as that come the memoirs, how self serving they are perceived
    to be, how much they criticise others.

    The general rule seems to be the further from the front line someone
    was the more likely politics, whether with the service, inter service or
    inter country became more important as motivation.

    Running a military unit in combat takes a real amount of skill, the
    bigger the unit the more skill required just to have the unit able to
    take part in combat. The difference between the different
    commander's performance is real but narrow. As a an analogy
    pick the worst performing professional football team of the season
    and how badly the team did versus the others in the competition
    and then what that worst team would to to a semi professional or
    amateur team. I should add the massive amount commentary on
    why the professional teams won or lost or better still will win or lose
    versus similar opinions in military histories.

    It's extra weird because the US and the UK continued to be close after the war ended. The absolutely enormous- and absolutely critical- work done
    by the Soviet Union to defeat the Germans mostly goes ignored in movies, books, etc. but that makes sense because the Soviets were our enemies
    in the Cold War and did not release accurate accounts, preferring to
    continue their propaganda, so for most of the next 40 years the majority
    of accounts available in English on the Eastern Front were from the
    German perspective. The US and the UK, however, to this day seem to
    bicker like an old married couple.

    As far as I am aware the German Army memoirs tended to put
    their disagreements with fellow officers in professional terms,
    not personal. They tend to use Hitler as the general purpose
    reason for failures. The USSR has Stalin. FDR and Churchill
    largely stayed out of military operations, that leaves the various
    commanders as the ones how did or did not and so more
    likely to have their personality analysed.

    I would certainly say some US/UK histories tend to bicker, or are
    more open about the way militaries are made up of humans with
    flaws and how success and failure can be reduced to was it worth
    it? We achieved the mission but note the number of casualties,
    success or failure?

    Material meant to entertain is the more likely to simplify and stereotype
    as well as the tourist accounts are the ones we end up with when we
    only have a passing interest in a subject.

    Steam trains, most people know they existed, few can say what a
    4-6-2 locomotive means, few could name a design. Perhaps the
    Flying Scotsman but not the actual locomotive designation, perhaps
    how it was so fast and non stop and the way it had a tunnel through
    its tender to enable crew relief. How about the special parts of the
    line where the engine could scoop up replacement water without
    needing to stop? And you can dive into the discussions on who
    built the best steam locomotives, or worst, say Francis Webb as
    your candidate. Or did you largely skip/discard the information
    in this paragraph, because it was not WWII material?

    The more the story is simplified the more we end up with good
    and bad guy labels, and the human tendency to use us as
    examples of good and not us as examples of bad, Overlay that
    with a group who are sure they were the best despite what
    others or the evidence suggests and the back and forth over
    what was a success. Finally add those who want to generate
    controversy (it sells) or are partisan.

    The histories will concentrate on the "main battles", D-Day, parts
    of Normandy, Cobra/Falaise, the pursuit across France (lots
    of movement and why did it stop there) Market Garden, Antwerp
    and Bulge, hence why 6th Army Group seems ignored. The way
    the 1945 battles often seem like they are afterthoughts as the
    allies apparently pursued a defeated and depleted Germany army,
    ignoring the hard fights to the Rhine setting up what followed.

    All the main battles were essentially joint, or at least had enough
    of the other country to invite comment. The rest seems to be
    human nature given the hundreds of millions able to comment.

    After puzzling over this reply for a few days I still do not think it
    has come out right, but enough.

    Geoffrey Sinclair
    Remove the nb for email.

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  • From The Horny Goat@21:1/5 to gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au on Thu May 4 15:34:10 2017
    On Thu, 04 May 2017 11:30:14 -0400, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:

    In terms of published histories the main event was 12th and 21st
    Army Groups, within them there are the main event battles, Normandy
    (though not necessarily all of it, mostly D-Day, the break outs and
    pursuit, including the Falaise pocket and as noted the military politics), >Market-Garden (and Antwerp), the Bulge, things like Remagen Bridge
    as a small operation. And remember the Bulge has its Anglo American >controversy over that Montgomery press conference.

    This is why General Rohmer's Patton's Gap (which dissected the Falaise
    pocket battle and in the end laid 100% of the blame on Monty) created
    such a stir when it came out. A (reservist) Canadian air force general
    was not SUPPOSED to rain fire and brimstone on Montgomery particularly
    in a book where the title seemed to imply the exact opposite even
    though it did say in the foreward that he was treating his book as a 'whodunnit' on Falaise. (Or on another matter whether Monty or the
    Canadian commanders f***ed up on the land approaches to Antwerp)

    Obviously if Falaise had been successful we would not be discussing Market-Garden and Hurtgen.

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  • From Rich Rostrom@21:1/5 to The Horny Goat on Fri May 5 00:10:26 2017
    The Horny Goat <lcraver@home.ca> wrote:

    Obviously if Falaise had been successful we would
    not be discussing Market-Garden and Hurtgen.

    ????

    What is being claimed here? That if the Falaise
    Pocket had been completely closed, the German
    front in the west would have collapsed completely,
    and the Allies would have advanced to the Rhine?

    Estimates of the German forces that escaped the
    pocket range from 20,000 to 100,000, but nearly
    all historians agree that the fleeing Germans
    lost nearly all their equipment.

    I really doubt that the escapees from Falaise
    added very much to the German forces that were
    rallied in Lorraine and the Rhineland.
    --
    The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

    http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

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  • From Geoffrey Sinclair@21:1/5 to The Horny Goat on Fri May 5 12:07:16 2017
    I think I should add the battles that attract are the possibles,
    where a different result could have happened if only.

    "The Horny Goat" <lcraver@home.ca> wrote in message news:4tvmgctnrku5ptlntufq0c15gt52e7gipn@4ax.com...
    On Thu, 04 May 2017 11:30:14 -0400, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:

    In terms of published histories the main event was 12th and 21st
    Army Groups, within them there are the main event battles, Normandy
    (though not necessarily all of it, mostly D-Day, the break outs and >>pursuit, including the Falaise pocket and as noted the military politics), >>Market-Garden (and Antwerp), the Bulge, things like Remagen Bridge
    as a small operation. And remember the Bulge has its Anglo American >>controversy over that Montgomery press conference.

    This is why General Rohmer's Patton's Gap (which dissected the Falaise
    pocket battle and in the end laid 100% of the blame on Monty) created
    such a stir when it came out. A (reservist) Canadian air force general
    was not SUPPOSED to rain fire and brimstone on Montgomery particularly
    in a book where the title seemed to imply the exact opposite even
    though it did say in the foreward that he was treating his book as a 'whodunnit' on Falaise.

    The attempts to close the gap were initially Canadian operations.
    Operation Totalize was done before any ideas about closing a
    gap at Falaise, on 7 August, the reported scale of the attack
    made the German leadership start talking of withdrawal.

    The Mortain counter attack went in on 7 August, when it failed
    Hitler ordered a second attack on 9 August. Events overtook
    this, and on the 10th Kluge started talking about calling off the
    attack, on the 11th the plan was some withdrawals to then
    concentrate with the view to launching another attack on the 14th.

    On the 13th Sepp Deitrich started talking about evacuating
    Normandy. On the same day US XV corps advance was halted.

    On the 14th Hitler's orders were for a three Panzer division assault
    on US XV corps in the Alencon-Carrouges area. Meantime
    operation Tractable was launched with the objective of Falaise,
    it came within 3 miles and was halted. The US army advance
    towards 21st Army Group has halted.

    There are German formations opposing the US forces.

    15th August allied landings start in Southern France.

    On the night of the 16th the German withdrawal began, on the
    same day the US captured Chartres. The Canadians capture
    Falaise.

    On 17 August Eisenhower was talking about abandoning the
    pre invasion plan of consolidating on the Seine to await better
    supply lines. US army captures Orleans. The decision is made
    to close the Falaise Gap but some distance beyond the Falaise
    Argentan line to ensure a firm encirclement.

    Early morning 18 August the Polish Armoured Division moves.

    On the 19th of August 3rd Army started receiving supplies by air.

    On 20 August the Falaise gap was sealed,supported by 45
    batteries of artillery the 2nd French Armoured Division and the
    US 9oth Infantry division link with the Poles after 2 days of fighting.
    The US XV corps established a bridgehead across the Seine
    down stream from Paris. SHAEF started talking about going to
    the Rhine.

    German attacks manage to open gaps that allow thousands
    of troops to escape from the pocket.

    The allies come up with a plan for the US forces to
    attack along the south bank of the Seine, trapping the
    German troops outside the Falaise pocket.

    On 21 August the Falaise pocket battle is effectively over,
    estimates vary over how many escaped, since for example
    the Luftwaffe began pulling out its AA formations about a
    week before the pocket was closed. Tens of thousands
    seems to be the consensus.

    On 22 August the US army crossed the Seine upstream from
    Paris.

    On 24 August the US attack along the Seine bank halts at
    Elbeuf, around 30 miles from the sea, German rear guards
    setting ambushes have significantly slowed the advance.
    Paris is liberated.

    Given the situation in early to mid August 1944 why is it wrong
    to assume the forces in Normandy, 1st US, 1st Canadian
    and 2nd British armies are incapable of closing the Falaise
    Gap without the aid of the US forces on the other side of the
    pocket? Or for that matter closing the gap as soon as possible
    would be worthwhile while the allies realised Hitler was thinking
    of counter attack, not withdrawal? Versus a long deep hook
    into the rear of Army Group B.

    The do it better clearly assumes the US forces could have
    advanced further without compromising the strength of the
    cordon nor the long hook moves to cross the Seine before
    the Germans could mount a defence there. So something
    like a quick advance to meet 21st Army Group which then
    feeds plenty of troops into the perimeter enabling the US
    forces to contract their lines.

    Simply put the scale of the fighting indicates it is unlikely
    the allies could have easily closed the pocket and the US
    forces had the longer supply lines and were competing for
    supplies with the forces moving towards the Seine.

    Furthermore allied intelligence had reported
    there were large numbers of German troops outside the
    potential pocket. Finally it made military sense to try and
    obtain bridgeheads over the Seine before the Germans
    could defend the river properly.

    On 1st September the allied forces across the Seine
    engaged in the pursuit are 1st Canadian Army 2 armoured
    and 4 infantry divisions, 2nd British Army 3 armoured and 5
    infantry divisions, 1st US army 4 armoured and 6 infantry
    divisions, 3rd US army 2 armoured and 4 infantry divisions,
    total 30 divisions, 11 armoured.

    (Or on another matter whether Monty or the
    Canadian commanders f***ed up on the land approaches to Antwerp)

    The what if for Market Garden starts well before the landings, the ability
    of the troops that took Antwerp to interdict at least the bridges to
    South Beveland. Historically lots of 15th Army troops and equipment
    were ferried out and helped repel the airborne assault and rebuild the
    front line generally. Then comes mounting the operation earlier.

    Obviously if Falaise had been successful we would not be discussing Market-Garden and Hurtgen.

    No. There were more troops inside the pocket than allied intelligence
    thought but still plenty outside, the race to the Seine helped net lots
    of German prisoners and even more equipment given the way the
    Seine bridges were down. The forces that were in Normandy needed
    a lot of refitting and replenishment before being effective again.

    II SS panzer corps was outside the pocket.

    The allies took around 200,000 prisoners in August and September 1944.

    Geoffrey Sinclair
    Remove the nb for email.

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  • From Geoffrey Sinclair@21:1/5 to All on Fri May 5 12:35:03 2017
    "Rich Rostrom" <rrostrom@comcast.net> wrote in message news:rrostrom-FFC921.11590004052017@news.eternal-september.org...
    "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:

    Deleted text.

    Market Garden was the operation of hope, if it worked the allies ended
    up with a bridgehead across the Rhine. Huertgen forest was the grind,
    with general agreement it was a mistake.

    Essentially the claim is Market Garden was close
    enough it could have worked, Huertgen had no real
    chance...

    Yes, MARKET-GARDEN could have succeeded completely.
    (It did capture several bridges and cities, advancing
    the front about 70 km. Has anyone made an assessment
    of the value in later campaigning of what MARKET-GARDEN
    _did_ achieve?)

    No, feel free to do so. Generally the lack of movement for
    months afterwards and the direction of the advances when
    they happened indicate the September advance was not
    that important.

    As to the Huertgen Forest: "no real chance" to do what?

    That is the claim.

    It is not my claim. However only questions rather than
    a contribution like the basic facts and therefore some
    idea of how good and bad can be judged.

    I note the wiki article.

    In the end the entire region was taken by the Allies,
    though at much higher cost than necessary.

    So paying a higher cost than necessary is some sort
    of success? The idea the thin lines in the Ardennes were
    in part due to the forest battles?

    Did the
    failure lie in not taking the area in the first week
    or month? Or with some smaller number of casualties?

    How about versus what the original timetable and
    objectives were?

    How about how suitable the terrain was and the way the
    US Army escalated the attacks rather than breaking them
    off despite the lack of progress? How about an analysis of
    what options were available, in terms of terrain, defences
    and troops, including the do nothing option.

    Were the forest battles the least worst option or did the
    US Army fall into the same thinking as General Haig in
    mid WWI, German defences were one big push away
    from falling to pieces, therefore keep attacking, for
    example.

    Geoffrey Sinclair
    Remove the nb for email.

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  • From The Horny Goat@21:1/5 to gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au on Fri May 5 17:37:48 2017
    On Fri, 05 May 2017 12:35:03 -0400, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:


    Were the forest battles the least worst option or did the
    US Army fall into the same thinking as General Haig in
    mid WWI, German defences were one big push away
    from falling to pieces, therefore keep attacking, for
    example.

    To a very large degree that's what DID happen in July / August 1944 in
    the west. There were all kinds of Allied speculation that they had had
    'one big push' that gave them most of France and the view was common
    even after the failure of Market-Garden that the Germans couldn't hold
    on much beyond Christmas.

    This is why the Bulge was such a rude shock to many western military
    soures. Many thought the war was all over except for the shouting when
    the Bulge proved the Germans were not quite as finished as thought.

    Once the Allies caught themselves (and basically the clouds over the
    Ardennes parted enough to let the RAF / USAAF aerial tank busters be
    effective the Bulge was over. One can argue that Varsity (the airborne
    assault across the Rhine) was completely superfluous - many do - but
    at that point it was a case of Germans preferring to surrender to the
    Western allies rather than the Soviets.

    [We had one former employee who died about 10 years ago who had been a
    Canadian military policeman wounded and taken prisoner about 3 weeks
    before the end of the war on the East side of the Rhine. He said he
    met Canadian POWs who had been captured at Dieppe and had had a very
    tough imprisonment - and that he had the world of respect for them -
    though by April 1945 the guards were competing with each other to be
    "nice" to the Canadians since they all knew the war would soon be over
    and their best personal guarantee of safety for them and their
    families after the end of hostilities would be an Allied ex-POW
    willing to speak to their humane treatment.

    He eventually left our employment as he took an apartment with a means
    test and the sum total of his old age pension and soldier's pension
    with supplements for POW and wounds meant that with his payceque from
    us two days a week meant he made too much!

    He also took great pleasure in taking part in the D-Day memorials in
    Normandy as since he was a French Canadian he was far better treated
    by the locals than Americans, Brits and Canadian Anglos]

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  • From Geoffrey Sinclair@21:1/5 to The Horny Goat on Sun May 7 10:32:05 2017
    "The Horny Goat" <lcraver@home.ca> wrote in message news:8arpgcp641ejrv7id51livuq40potvc4rs@4ax.com...
    On Fri, 05 May 2017 12:35:03 -0400, "Geoffrey Sinclair" <gsinclairnb@froggy.com.au> wrote:


    Were the forest battles the least worst option or did the
    US Army fall into the same thinking as General Haig in
    mid WWI, German defences were one big push away
    from falling to pieces, therefore keep attacking, for
    example.

    To a very large degree that's what DID happen in July / August 1944 in
    the west. There were all kinds of Allied speculation that they had had
    'one big push' that gave them most of France and the view was common
    even after the failure of Market-Garden that the Germans couldn't hold
    on much beyond Christmas.

    I would not put it into the July/August period, more late August,
    September and early October, with a steady increase in optimism
    after Falaise and the closing up to the Seine.

    The Red Ball Express started on 24 August but as of late August
    the supply people were over estimating what they had and how
    much they could deliver. However on 30 August came the lack
    of fuel messages. On 31 August in one of those I wish I had not
    said that statements, SHAEF G-2 says "end of war in Europe
    within sight, almost within reach". Also 90 to 95% of all US Army
    supplies in France are in Normandy.

    About this time the supply officers do a calculation on a thrust to Berlin, assuming the allies make the Rhine by 15 September and Antwerp is
    open at 1,500 tons per day. It needed 489 truck companies, 347 were
    available, stripping other divisions would give 181 truck companies, airlift would give the equivalent of another 60 truck companies (2,000 tons/day).
    Three British and 2 US corps, 3 to Berlin, 1 to Bremen-Hamburg, and 1 to Frankfurt-Magdeburg. Ten US divisions (1 in Paris, 9 in Normandy)
    grounded and 12 "quiescent" (6 in Brittany, 3 in Frankfurt-Metz, 3 in Rhur-Koblenz). One US corps would make it to Berlin on reduced rations.

    By end August the US supply system has stopped following the
    pre invasion steady advance plan, opening dumps that are
    rapidly left behind the advancing armies and switches to keep
    everything moving pursuit method, just as the advance stops,
    it will be some weeks before the stop is accepted as reality
    and the system reverts to creating supply dumps near the
    front line and stocking them. When reversion to non pursuit
    supply is first floated the armies object, delaying the change.

    On 4 September the mood of optimism is reinforced by the realisation
    the allied armies are closer to Germany than they were on 11th November
    1918 and that Germany's eastern allies are deserting it, just like Austria Hungary in 1918.

    On 11th September a patrol of 1st Army are the first US troops into
    German territory, near Aachen. Third and 7th armies join hands.
    At the start of the Octagon conference the Combined Chiefs of Staff
    agree with General Eisenhower's intention to continue to strike towards Germany as a higher priority than opening the ports. The CCS do note
    the ports will be needed before bad weather sets in. Both 1st and 3rd
    Armies report they have the fuel and ammunition needed to advance
    to the Rhine.

    The pursuit had halted, then Market Garden failed. Aachen did
    not surrender until 22 October.

    This is why the Bulge was such a rude shock to many western military
    soures. Many thought the war was all over except for the shouting when
    the Bulge proved the Germans were not quite as finished as thought.

    I think the amount of fighting when any allied army tried to advance
    from mid September to mid December was the reality check. The
    German attack was definitely a shock, the allies had been so used
    to knowing what the Germans were doing at the strategic level, plus
    the belief like the Luftwaffe the German army could or would only defend.

    Once the Allies caught themselves (and basically the clouds over the
    Ardennes parted enough to let the RAF / USAAF aerial tank busters be effective the Bulge was over.

    I would say the ground defences had stopped the attack before
    any major direct battlefield support was given, things like the heavy
    bombers hitting the marshalling yards to the battlefield had started
    just after the initial attack. The December 23 allied air operations
    were heavily opposed, the 9th AF lost 32 bombers plus write offs,
    so on the 24th it was more anti Luftwaffe operations.

    One can argue that Varsity (the airborne
    assault across the Rhine) was completely superfluous - many do - but
    at that point it was a case of Germans preferring to surrender to the
    Western allies rather than the Soviets.

    Quite costly in terms of paratroops and aircrew versus the amphibious
    advance across the Rhine.

    [We had one former employee who died about 10 years ago who had been a Canadian military policeman wounded and taken prisoner about 3 weeks
    before the end of the war on the East side of the Rhine. He said he
    met Canadian POWs who had been captured at Dieppe and had had a very
    tough imprisonment - and that he had the world of respect for them -
    though by April 1945 the guards were competing with each other to be
    "nice" to the Canadians since they all knew the war would soon be over
    and their best personal guarantee of safety for them and their
    families after the end of hostilities would be an Allied ex-POW
    willing to speak to their humane treatment.

    Some of the British paratroops taken prisoner at Arnhem starved
    to death before liberation. The moving of prisoners to try and avoid
    their liberation made food and shelter hard to find. And given the
    situation militarily pointless.

    He eventually left our employment as he took an apartment with a means
    test and the sum total of his old age pension and soldier's pension
    with supplements for POW and wounds meant that with his payceque from
    us two days a week meant he made too much!

    Presumably the usual rules reducing his other payments.

    He also took great pleasure in taking part in the D-Day memorials in
    Normandy as since he was a French Canadian he was far better treated
    by the locals than Americans, Brits and Canadian Anglos]

    Knowing the language is always a help. Having the (distant)
    relationship even better.

    Geoffrey Sinclair
    Remove the nb for email.

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