What if FDR -- shortly after the Gilbert and Marshall islands campaign -- ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary? This would mean abandoning the Marianas campaign and B-29 raids on Japan (at least from
the Central Pacific).
At least five Allied airborne divisions were available in the ETO around
this time.
On 1/13/2017 7:50 AM, Paul Sturrock wrote:Because Germany was the greatest threat (as he acknowledged) and Japan
What if FDR -- shortly after the Gilbert and Marshall islands campaign -- ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary? This would mean abandoning the Marianas campaign and B-29 raids on Japan (at least from
the Central Pacific).
Why would he do that?
This is tantamount to reversing the decision on
where to invade Europe, rejecting all of the analysis that says Normandy
is the best spot to land. If that decision is made, there's no need to
bring forces from the Pacific; you have all of the forces already in
Britain available.
This is very much imposing hindsight: taking a problem that became
apparent in late September, and trying to cure it in April or May.
No-one had any reason to suspect that events in Northwest Europe would
play out as they did.
You should review operational planning and
expected timings for the conquest of France. In particular, look at Map
III in Cross-Channel Attack: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-XChannel/maps/ USA-E-XChannel-IV.jpg
Note the D+90 line, which corresponds to September 6th.
In the meantime, this is a decision to do nothing beyond local
operations in the Pacific Theater during 1944. You are stripping
virtually the entire amphibious fleet from the Pacific. No Marianas operations, no Philippine operations, just local operations in the New
Guinea area.
At least five Allied airborne divisions were available in the ETO around this time.
Only four - the US 17th Airborne Division had just arrived in theater
and was not available for operations. In addition, the British 6th
Airborne Division is still rebuilding from Normandy. Components were in
line on the Continent until early September. On the other hand, the 52nd Infantry Division is available for air transport.
And as Market Garden showed, there was limited troop carrier
availability, limiting the practical airborne force to two divisions for
the initial drop.
On Friday, January 13, 2017 at 10:46:23 AM UTC-6, Stephen Graham wrote:
On 1/13/2017 7:50 AM, Paul Sturrock wrote:campaign --
What if FDR -- shortly after the Gilbert and Marshall islands
meanordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary? This would
abandoning the Marianas campaign and B-29 raids on Japan (at least from
the Central Pacific).
Why would he do that?Because Germany was the greatest threat (as he acknowledged) and Japan
could be defeated by the submarine fleet alone. Of course, he never
would have
done it, but he could have as commander-in-chief.
This is tantamount to reversing the decision onNormandy
where to invade Europe, rejecting all of the analysis that says
is the best spot to land. If that decision is made, there's no need to bring forces from the Pacific; you have all of the forces already in Britain available.
Did anyone in the ETO think we had more than enough manpower to defeat Germany? Were they ever so confident prior to and after the Normandy
landings that they didn't desire additional forces, even before the
bloodbath on
the beaches, the hedgerows and at Caen?
This is very much imposing hindsight: taking a problem that became
apparent in late September, and trying to cure it in April or May.
Agreed. Total hindsight on my part. But while I think it's amazing
what the
Allies accomplished in such a short time, it seems to me they never
took full
advantage of their incomparable amphibious and airborne capabilities. And
I believe the Allies had their eyes on Antwerp prior to the Normandy landings.
No-one had any reason to suspect that events in Northwest Europe would
play out as they did.
But no matter how things played out or were projected to play out,
wouldn't
a surprise landing in the Scheldt and the earlier capture of Antwerp
help the
Allies in France? I would think a powerful assault so close to the Ruhr, placing hundreds of thousands of Germans between two Allied hosts, with Antwerp to keep follow-on forces supplied would be advantageous.
Yes, they did not expect a total collapse of the Germans. All the more
reason to plan a surprise landing in their rear.
And as Market Garden showed, there was limited troop carrierfor
availability, limiting the practical airborne force to two divisions
the initial drop.
Weren't there complaints about the troop carriers making only one drop
that day instead of two, seeing as the drop zones were so close to
Britain?
There's also the issue of the waste of resources and time that such a redeployment would take. It took months of effort and tens of thousands
of tons of shipping to get troops into the Central Pacific in the first place. Your scenario tosses all that out the window. It also puts a significant amount of force out of action for the two months or so it
takes to transfer from the Central Pacific to the Atlantic.
Stephen Graham <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote:
There's also the issue of the waste of resources and time that such a
redeployment would take. It took months of effort and tens of thousands
of tons of shipping to get troops into the Central Pacific in the first
place. Your scenario tosses all that out the window. It also puts a
significant amount of force out of action for the two months or so it
takes to transfer from the Central Pacific to the Atlantic.
Two months or so? That's wildly, absurdly optimistic.
Which makes the idea of doing this _secretly_ utterly
fantastic.
What if FDR -- shortly after the Gilbert and Marshall islands campaign -- ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary? This would mean abandoning the Marianas campaign and B-29 raids on Japan (at least from
the Central Pacific).
Nimitz is ordered to move his forces, as secretly as possible, to the
North
Sea or English Channel by early August at the latest, and rapidly conduct
an amphibious assault on the Scheldt estuary in concert with U.S. and
British airborne divisions.
No one in the ETO is told about the upcoming assault, and the Normandy landings and campaign take place as scheduled. Airborne units in Britain
are ordered to prepare for a big operation to take place around the
projected
date of the Scheldt estuary landings. Only a handful of officers in the airborne and troop carrier units are told about the real target, and not until a
week or two before Nimitz' forces arrive.
The fleet will not make landfall -- unless it can be done secretly --
until
it reaches the Scheldt estuary. Something akin to Task Group 50.17, with
its 24 oilers, 3 hospital ships and numerous escorts will accompany the invasion fleet.
The fleet has two routes that avoid the Panama Canal (in order to maintain the element of surprise): Either rounding the Horn, with its awful conditions, or cruising far to the south in the Indian Ocean on a westerly course, passing beneath the Cape of Good Hope into the Atlantic. It takes
38 days at 15 knots to go from Pearl Harbor to Antwerp via the Horn, and
47
days via the Indian Ocean.
The Antwerp invasion fleet departs Pearl Harbor on June 5, 1944, the same date on which the invasion fleet for Saipan set out.
At Nimitz' disposal are the same forces used at Saipan and the Battle of
the
Philippine Sea, including the V Amphibious Corps and the Fifth Fleet. As
best as I can determine, the following forces took part in the Saipan and Philippine Sea battles:
7 fleet carriers, 8 light carriers, 7 escort carriers
956 carrier-based aircraft
15 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers 58 destroyers
37 troop transports, 11 cargo ships, 5 LSDs, 47 LSTs, 10 APDs
185 DUKWs, 300-415 LVTs.
2 reinforced Marine divisions
1 reinforced Army infantry division
Note: one additional reinforced Marine division and one additional
reinforced Army division were used for the Tinian assault
About 250,000 men were in the Seabees at war's end; perhaps
50,000-100,000 could be allocated in mid-1944 for the rehabilitation
and operation of Antwerp's port facilities after its seizure. Perhaps
nearby Rotterdam will also be captured and require the Seabees'
expertise.
At least five Allied airborne divisions were available in the ETO around
this time.
England and its airfields are nearby to provide additional air support; London is 200 miles from Antwerp.
The Battle of the Scheldt provides us with detailed information on German defenses in the estuary, which should give us some idea of how an
enormous amphibious/airborne assault would fare.
Antwerp is only 134 miles from Dortmund in the eastern Ruhr. Once
Antwerp is captured and open to cargo ships, the Ruhr becomes
vulnerable to envelopment, which would spell the end for Germany.
On 1/13/2017 10:12 AM, Paul Sturrock wrote:
On Friday, January 13, 2017 at 10:46:23 AM UTC-6, Stephen Graham wrote:
On 1/13/2017 7:50 AM, Paul Sturrock wrote:
What if FDR . . . ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt
estuary?
Actually, no, FDR did not have the authority to unilaterally change world-wide Allied strategy. At a minimum, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Churchill, and Curtin would have had to agree.
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