• FDR to Nimitz: Seize Antwerp

    From Paul Sturrock@21:1/5 to All on Fri Jan 13 10:50:59 2017
    What if FDR -- shortly after the Gilbert and Marshall islands campaign -- ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary? This would mean abandoning the Marianas campaign and B-29 raids on Japan (at least from
    the Central Pacific).

    Nimitz is ordered to move his forces, as secretly as possible, to the North
    Sea or English Channel by early August at the latest, and rapidly conduct
    an amphibious assault on the Scheldt estuary in concert with U.S. and
    British airborne divisions.

    No one in the ETO is told about the upcoming assault, and the Normandy
    landings and campaign take place as scheduled. Airborne units in Britain
    are ordered to prepare for a big operation to take place around the projected date of the Scheldt estuary landings. Only a handful of officers in the airborne and troop carrier units are told about the real target, and not until a
    week or two before Nimitz' forces arrive.

    The fleet will not make landfall -- unless it can be done secretly -- until
    it reaches the Scheldt estuary. Something akin to Task Group 50.17, with
    its 24 oilers, 3 hospital ships and numerous escorts will accompany the invasion fleet.

    The fleet has two routes that avoid the Panama Canal (in order to maintain
    the element of surprise): Either rounding the Horn, with its awful
    conditions, or cruising far to the south in the Indian Ocean on a westerly course, passing beneath the Cape of Good Hope into the Atlantic. It takes
    38 days at 15 knots to go from Pearl Harbor to Antwerp via the Horn, and 47 days via the Indian Ocean.

    The Antwerp invasion fleet departs Pearl Harbor on June 5, 1944, the same
    date on which the invasion fleet for Saipan set out.

    At Nimitz' disposal are the same forces used at Saipan and the Battle of the Philippine Sea, including the V Amphibious Corps and the Fifth Fleet. As
    best as I can determine, the following forces took part in the Saipan and Philippine Sea battles:

    7 fleet carriers
    8 light carriers
    7 escort carriers
    956 carrier-based aircraft

    15 battleships
    8 heavy cruisers
    13 light cruisers
    58 destroyers

    37 troop transports
    11 cargo ships
    5 LSDs
    47 LSTs
    10 APDs
    185 DUKWs
    300-415 LVTs

    2 reinforced Marine divisions
    1 reinforced Army infantry division
    Note: one additional reinforced Marine division and one additional
    reinforced Army division were used for the Tinian assault

    About 250,000 men were in the Seabees at war's end; perhaps
    50,000-100,000 could be allocated in mid-1944 for the rehabilitation
    and operation of Antwerp's port facilities after its seizure. Perhaps
    nearby Rotterdam will also be captured and require the Seabees'
    expertise.

    At least five Allied airborne divisions were available in the ETO around
    this time.

    England and its airfields are nearby to provide additional air support;
    London is 200 miles from Antwerp.

    The Battle of the Scheldt provides us with detailed information on German defenses in the estuary, which should give us some idea of how an
    enormous amphibious/airborne assault would fare.

    Antwerp is only 134 miles from Dortmund in the eastern Ruhr. Once
    Antwerp is captured and open to cargo ships, the Ruhr becomes
    vulnerable to envelopment, which would spell the end for Germany.

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  • From Stephen Graham@21:1/5 to Paul Sturrock on Fri Jan 13 11:46:21 2017
    On 1/13/2017 7:50 AM, Paul Sturrock wrote:
    What if FDR -- shortly after the Gilbert and Marshall islands campaign -- ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary? This would mean abandoning the Marianas campaign and B-29 raids on Japan (at least from
    the Central Pacific).

    Why would he do that? This is tantamount to reversing the decision on
    where to invade Europe, rejecting all of the analysis that says Normandy
    is the best spot to land. If that decision is made, there's no need to
    bring forces from the Pacific; you have all of the forces already in
    Britain available.

    This is very much imposing hindsight: taking a problem that became
    apparent in late September, and trying to cure it in April or May.
    No-one had any reason to suspect that events in Northwest Europe would
    play out as they did. You should review operational planning and
    expected timings for the conquest of France. In particular, look at Map
    III in Cross-Channel Attack: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-XChannel/maps/USA-E-XChannel-IV.jpg Note the D+90 line, which corresponds to September 6th.

    In the meantime, this is a decision to do nothing beyond local
    operations in the Pacific Theater during 1944. You are stripping
    virtually the entire amphibious fleet from the Pacific. No Marianas
    operations, no Philippine operations, just local operations in the New
    Guinea area.

    At least five Allied airborne divisions were available in the ETO around
    this time.

    Only four - the US 17th Airborne Division had just arrived in theater
    and was not available for operations. In addition, the British 6th
    Airborne Division is still rebuilding from Normandy. Components were in
    line on the Continent until early September. On the other hand, the 52nd Infantry Division is available for air transport.

    And as Market Garden showed, there was limited troop carrier
    availability, limiting the practical airborne force to two divisions for
    the initial drop.

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  • From Paul Sturrock@21:1/5 to Stephen Graham on Fri Jan 13 13:12:10 2017
    On Friday, January 13, 2017 at 10:46:23 AM UTC-6, Stephen Graham wrote:
    On 1/13/2017 7:50 AM, Paul Sturrock wrote:
    What if FDR -- shortly after the Gilbert and Marshall islands campaign -- ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary? This would mean abandoning the Marianas campaign and B-29 raids on Japan (at least from
    the Central Pacific).

    Why would he do that?
    Because Germany was the greatest threat (as he acknowledged) and Japan
    could be defeated by the submarine fleet alone. Of course, he never would have done it, but he could have as commander-in-chief.

    This is tantamount to reversing the decision on
    where to invade Europe, rejecting all of the analysis that says Normandy
    is the best spot to land. If that decision is made, there's no need to
    bring forces from the Pacific; you have all of the forces already in
    Britain available.

    Did anyone in the ETO think we had more than enough manpower to defeat
    Germany? Were they ever so confident prior to and after the Normandy
    landings that they didn't desire additional forces, even before the bloodbath on
    the beaches, the hedgerows and at Caen?

    This is very much imposing hindsight: taking a problem that became
    apparent in late September, and trying to cure it in April or May.

    Agreed. Total hindsight on my part. But while I think it's amazing what the Allies accomplished in such a short time, it seems to me they never took full advantage of their incomparable amphibious and airborne capabilities. And
    I believe the Allies had their eyes on Antwerp prior to the Normandy landings.

    No-one had any reason to suspect that events in Northwest Europe would
    play out as they did.

    But no matter how things played out or were projected to play out, wouldn't
    a surprise landing in the Scheldt and the earlier capture of Antwerp help the Allies in France? I would think a powerful assault so close to the Ruhr, placing hundreds of thousands of Germans between two Allied hosts, with
    Antwerp to keep follow-on forces supplied would be advantageous.

    You should review operational planning and
    expected timings for the conquest of France. In particular, look at Map
    III in Cross-Channel Attack: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA-E-XChannel/maps/ USA-E-XChannel-IV.jpg
    Note the D+90 line, which corresponds to September 6th.

    Yes, they did not expect a total collapse of the Germans. All the more
    reason to plan a surprise landing in their rear.

    In the meantime, this is a decision to do nothing beyond local
    operations in the Pacific Theater during 1944. You are stripping
    virtually the entire amphibious fleet from the Pacific. No Marianas operations, no Philippine operations, just local operations in the New
    Guinea area.

    Yes, that's right. Put the Japanese on hold until the far more dangerous
    threat is ended, then returning to finish the job after our submarines fatally weaken them.

    At least five Allied airborne divisions were available in the ETO around this time.

    Only four - the US 17th Airborne Division had just arrived in theater
    and was not available for operations. In addition, the British 6th
    Airborne Division is still rebuilding from Normandy. Components were in
    line on the Continent until early September. On the other hand, the 52nd Infantry Division is available for air transport.

    Thanks for the info, sir.

    And as Market Garden showed, there was limited troop carrier
    availability, limiting the practical airborne force to two divisions for
    the initial drop.

    Weren't there complaints about the troop carriers making only one drop
    that day instead of two, seeing as the drop zones were so close to Britain?

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  • From Stephen Graham@21:1/5 to Paul Sturrock on Fri Jan 13 14:21:04 2017
    On 1/13/2017 10:12 AM, Paul Sturrock wrote:
    On Friday, January 13, 2017 at 10:46:23 AM UTC-6, Stephen Graham wrote:
    On 1/13/2017 7:50 AM, Paul Sturrock wrote:
    What if FDR -- shortly after the Gilbert and Marshall islands
    campaign --
    ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary? This would
    mean
    abandoning the Marianas campaign and B-29 raids on Japan (at least from
    the Central Pacific).

    Why would he do that?
    Because Germany was the greatest threat (as he acknowledged) and Japan
    could be defeated by the submarine fleet alone. Of course, he never
    would have
    done it, but he could have as commander-in-chief.

    Actually, no, FDR did not have the authority to unilaterally change
    world-wide Allied strategy. At a minimum, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Churchill, and Curtin would have had to agree.

    It was also not apparent that Japan could be defeated solely by the
    submarine fleet. For instance, that did nothing about the deployed
    forces on the Asian mainland. At a minimum, you're condemning thousands
    of civilians to death each day that the war in Asia stretches on.

    There's also the issue of the waste of resources and time that such a redeployment would take. It took months of effort and tens of thousands
    of tons of shipping to get troops into the Central Pacific in the first
    place. Your scenario tosses all that out the window. It also puts a
    significant amount of force out of action for the two months or so it
    takes to transfer from the Central Pacific to the Atlantic.

    This is tantamount to reversing the decision on
    where to invade Europe, rejecting all of the analysis that says
    Normandy
    is the best spot to land. If that decision is made, there's no need to bring forces from the Pacific; you have all of the forces already in Britain available.

    Did anyone in the ETO think we had more than enough manpower to defeat Germany? Were they ever so confident prior to and after the Normandy
    landings that they didn't desire additional forces, even before the
    bloodbath on
    the beaches, the hedgerows and at Caen?

    Until late September at the earliest, the Allies always had more troops
    in the ETO than they could use effectively in Northwest Europe. That's
    how, for instance, they were able to relieve the 82nd and 101st US
    Airborne Divisions in July. I'd have to go back through and check dates,
    but I believe there were always a minimum of three divisions available
    in Britain for deployment. That's above and beyond the airborne.

    This is very much imposing hindsight: taking a problem that became
    apparent in late September, and trying to cure it in April or May.

    Agreed. Total hindsight on my part. But while I think it's amazing
    what the
    Allies accomplished in such a short time, it seems to me they never
    took full
    advantage of their incomparable amphibious and airborne capabilities. And
    I believe the Allies had their eyes on Antwerp prior to the Normandy landings.

    They always had their eye on Antwerp. It's just that the operational
    evaluation was that the cost of a direct invasion was simply too high.
    The Germans were expecting an amphibious thrust into the Low Countries
    or the Pas de Calais. One of the issues is that a direct thrust on
    Antwerp implies that the Germans will be motivated to thoroughly
    demolish the port.

    No-one had any reason to suspect that events in Northwest Europe would
    play out as they did.

    But no matter how things played out or were projected to play out,
    wouldn't
    a surprise landing in the Scheldt and the earlier capture of Antwerp
    help the
    Allies in France? I would think a powerful assault so close to the Ruhr, placing hundreds of thousands of Germans between two Allied hosts, with Antwerp to keep follow-on forces supplied would be advantageous.

    If it just results in an Anzio situation, there's no real point in doing
    so, and more hazards.

    Yes, they did not expect a total collapse of the Germans. All the more
    reason to plan a surprise landing in their rear.

    You should take a look at the number of airborne operations planned and
    then scrubbed because of progress. Airborne operations are a lot easier
    to plan and stage than a major amphibious operation, especially if
    you're transferring forces from the Pacific.

    And as Market Garden showed, there was limited troop carrier
    availability, limiting the practical airborne force to two divisions
    for
    the initial drop.

    Weren't there complaints about the troop carriers making only one drop
    that day instead of two, seeing as the drop zones were so close to
    Britain?

    They did two drops on the first day of Market Garden. It was the later
    days that the pace slowed, largely because of crew fatigue and hazards
    of operating at night.

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  • From Rich Rostrom@21:1/5 to Stephen Graham on Sat Jan 14 11:07:21 2017
    Stephen Graham <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote:

    There's also the issue of the waste of resources and time that such a redeployment would take. It took months of effort and tens of thousands
    of tons of shipping to get troops into the Central Pacific in the first place. Your scenario tosses all that out the window. It also puts a significant amount of force out of action for the two months or so it
    takes to transfer from the Central Pacific to the Atlantic.

    Two months or so? That's wildly, absurdly optimistic.

    One can't take an enormous military force from _here_
    and plop it over _there_ and expect it to function the
    same. Before this huge fleet could be deployed in the
    ETO, there would have to be at least a year of intense
    preparations, including the establishment of very
    extensive base facilities in British ports, and supply
    chains back to the US.

    Which makes the idea of doing this _secretly_ utterly
    fantastic.
    --
    The real Velvet Revolution - and the would-be hijacker.

    http://originalvelvetrevolution.com

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  • From Stephen Graham@21:1/5 to Rich Rostrom on Sat Jan 14 11:32:30 2017
    On 1/14/17 8:07 AM, Rich Rostrom wrote:
    Stephen Graham <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote:

    There's also the issue of the waste of resources and time that such a
    redeployment would take. It took months of effort and tens of thousands
    of tons of shipping to get troops into the Central Pacific in the first
    place. Your scenario tosses all that out the window. It also puts a
    significant amount of force out of action for the two months or so it
    takes to transfer from the Central Pacific to the Atlantic.

    Two months or so? That's wildly, absurdly optimistic.

    I freely admit that I was simply accounting for transit time. There are
    any number of issues not accounted for. Other things not mentioned
    include reconditioning troops after being on ship for a couple of
    months, the lack of US Marine replacements in the ETO, additional supply complications, etc.

    Which makes the idea of doing this _secretly_ utterly
    fantastic.

    The bigger point is really that there are forces already available in
    theater or adjacent that could meet the operational requirements, if
    there was any need to. If nothing else, there are the Dragoon forces
    coming out of the MTO.

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  • From Geoffrey Sinclair@21:1/5 to All on Sun Jan 15 11:57:59 2017
    "Paul Sturrock" <psturroc@gmail.com> wrote in message news:aa4829fa-08bd-4b85-a2ba-65ce82ce809d@googlegroups.com...
    What if FDR -- shortly after the Gilbert and Marshall islands campaign -- ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt estuary? This would mean abandoning the Marianas campaign and B-29 raids on Japan (at least from
    the Central Pacific).

    This would mean Nimitz was operating to a very different timetable
    to Eisenhower.

    The final plan Overlord had a 30 day pause for logistic reasons at the
    D+90 line, the Seine, since it was expected that only 12 US divisions
    could be supported at the river at D+90 and a 12 division assault would
    be the first assault across the river. These plans had been made late,
    "even dangerously so from a logistical point of view".

    Nimitz is ordered to move his forces, as secretly as possible, to the
    North
    Sea or English Channel by early August at the latest, and rapidly conduct
    an amphibious assault on the Scheldt estuary in concert with U.S. and
    British airborne divisions.

    No one in the ETO is told about the upcoming assault, and the Normandy landings and campaign take place as scheduled. Airborne units in Britain
    are ordered to prepare for a big operation to take place around the
    projected
    date of the Scheldt estuary landings. Only a handful of officers in the airborne and troop carrier units are told about the real target, and not until a
    week or two before Nimitz' forces arrive.

    The fleet will not make landfall -- unless it can be done secretly --
    until
    it reaches the Scheldt estuary. Something akin to Task Group 50.17, with
    its 24 oilers, 3 hospital ships and numerous escorts will accompany the invasion fleet.

    So a fleet train and assault fleet plus the carrier forces all trying to fit into the southern North Sea.

    Note the port capacity and internal transport systems of Britain
    were highly stressed in the summer of 1944, trying to import enough
    to support the local economy and military while exporting two army
    groups with full air support to France and keeping them supplied.

    Adding the USN carrier fleet alone would cause major problems.
    Fuel in bulk, the need to set up replacement aircraft pools and so on.

    The fleet has two routes that avoid the Panama Canal (in order to maintain the element of surprise): Either rounding the Horn, with its awful conditions, or cruising far to the south in the Indian Ocean on a westerly course, passing beneath the Cape of Good Hope into the Atlantic. It takes
    38 days at 15 knots to go from Pearl Harbor to Antwerp via the Horn, and
    47
    days via the Indian Ocean.

    Now effectively double that for the support ships and understand all ships would need resupply of food etc. for the crews in the Atlantic, plus fuel. before any operations could start. Think about how fit the troops would
    be after months at sea.

    Simply put the deployments would be noticed, starting with the negative
    that the axis had lost track of them.

    The Antwerp invasion fleet departs Pearl Harbor on June 5, 1944, the same date on which the invasion fleet for Saipan set out.

    At Nimitz' disposal are the same forces used at Saipan and the Battle of
    the
    Philippine Sea, including the V Amphibious Corps and the Fifth Fleet. As
    best as I can determine, the following forces took part in the Saipan and Philippine Sea battles:

    7 fleet carriers, 8 light carriers, 7 escort carriers
    956 carrier-based aircraft

    According to Max Hastings for Overlord the allied air forces in
    Britain had some 9,901 fighters and bombers. Then add the
    transports and Coastal Command.

    15 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, 13 light cruisers 58 destroyers

    IJN end May 1944, including under repair, 3 fleet, 7 light fleet, 4 escort carriers, 9 battleships,14 heavy and 16 light cruisers, 44 modern
    destroyers.

    June to December 1944 the IJN added 4 carriers, counting Shinano.

    The allied positions in the Pacific, even in New Guinea, were effectively isolated garrisons that were vulnerable to interdiction. The removal of
    the 5th fleet means the IJN have naval superiority. The allies halt or even start to go backwards.

    The size of the suitable airstrip locations meant the land based air
    forces at any given garrison could be overwhelmed by the enemy
    carrier fleet turning up. That started to change as the fighting
    neared Asia.

    The USAAF strength, including reserves and second line combat
    types, deployed from Alaska through the Pacific to Burma came
    to 6,421 end May 1944, the European theater, read Britain, held
    10,637, the Mediterranean held 4,828.

    Pacific Ocean areas 824 aircraft, Solomons and New Guinea
    (Far East Air Forces) 3,403, China/Burma/India 1,776, Alaska
    256. Plus 162 aircraft of the 20th Air Force in India. Note these
    figures include 901 transports, 51 trainers and 369 communications
    aircraft.

    If you use the Max Hastings figures the nominal 7,834 front line
    USAAF combat types present in Britain in May 1944 gave a
    US combat strength of 5,061. Note Hastings's 9,901 allied combat
    aircraft strength meant an effective strength of 7,774, or 78%.

    To put it another way about half the USAAF aircraft strength in
    Britain in May/June 1944 was first line in a combat unit and
    able to fly.

    The Far East Air Forces end May 1944 had 2,456 first line combat
    types from Guadalcanal to Darwin. Then add the allied air forces.

    37 troop transports, 11 cargo ships, 5 LSDs, 47 LSTs, 10 APDs
    185 DUKWs, 300-415 LVTs.

    2 reinforced Marine divisions
    1 reinforced Army infantry division
    Note: one additional reinforced Marine division and one additional
    reinforced Army division were used for the Tinian assault

    As of end May 1944 the US military still had 44 divisions still in the
    US, including 1 Marine, end August it was down to 32 divisions,
    including 2 Marine.

    The US units in the Pacific were set up to handle attacking dug in
    infantry on isolated battlefields, not a continent with panzer armies
    available for counter attacks.

    All up the US had deployed 23 divisions in the Pacific to end May.

    About 250,000 men were in the Seabees at war's end; perhaps
    50,000-100,000 could be allocated in mid-1944 for the rehabilitation
    and operation of Antwerp's port facilities after its seizure. Perhaps
    nearby Rotterdam will also be captured and require the Seabees'
    expertise.

    The port capacity to land the troops to capture, hold and repair the
    ports was actually a problem in France. Also given how badly wrecked
    many of the northern French ports the allies captured unless Antwerp is
    taken with days the prize will be lost.

    At least five Allied airborne divisions were available in the ETO around
    this time.

    The divisions used in Normandy were to an extent still refitting, the
    reality is the air transport lift could not handle 5 divisions. Hence the multiple lifts for Market-Garden, which was a nominal 3 division
    assault, similar for Overlord.

    The US 17th Airborne division officially arrived in Britain in August.

    England and its airfields are nearby to provide additional air support; London is 200 miles from Antwerp.

    Essentially the 5th fleet was limited to a strike radius of 200 miles and
    did not have the sea room to operate in the North Sea. Draw an arc
    say 150 miles from Antwerp and see how much ocean there is.

    The Battle of the Scheldt provides us with detailed information on German defenses in the estuary, which should give us some idea of how an
    enormous amphibious/airborne assault would fare.

    Weeks of heavy bomber air strikes on Walcheren, the need to clear
    the various river defences. The lack of suitable beaches for a
    multi division assault. For around 40 miles north of Scheldt estuary,
    to the Hook of Holland, you are effectively assaulting islands with only
    a small number of bridges connecting them to other islands or the
    mainland, and you start the best part of 50 miles from Antwerp, even
    coming ashore around Zeebrugge and Ostend leaves you 50 miles
    to go.

    Antwerp is only 134 miles from Dortmund in the eastern Ruhr. Once
    Antwerp is captured and open to cargo ships, the Ruhr becomes
    vulnerable to envelopment, which would spell the end for Germany.

    Essentially once Antwerp was open alongside the other Atlantic
    and Mediterranean ports the allies could finally funnel in all the forces
    they had plus supply them. Then comes actually shipping the forces.

    To end September 1944 the US deployed 32 divisions in France,
    that is after the southern landings, out of the peak of 61 divisions.
    It took until the end of January 1945 for the last of the US army
    divisions to leave Britain (2 infantry, 1 armoured).

    The only thing the Pacific could supply to the European theatre
    that would really make a difference was assault shipping, either
    to speed up/increase the size or build up in Normandy or to enable
    the southern landings to happen earlier and/or bigger.

    Moving land forces from one side of the world to the other makes
    little sense when plenty of other forces were available in the US.
    Moving the main USN fleet from the Pacific hands the initiative
    back to the IJN. Trying to take the Marianas 6 months after the
    historical invasions would mean more and better trained Japanese
    defenders.

    Geoffrey Sinclair
    Remove the nb for email.

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  • From Stephen Graham@21:1/5 to All on Sun Jan 15 19:03:24 2017
    Just for amusement value, this is the location of every US Army and
    Marine Corps division as of 1 September 1944. It's a little difficult
    figuring out where some of the Marine divisions are following the
    Marshall Islands operations.

    In summary, there are 6 armored and 17 infantry divisions in France, of
    which three infantry divisions are besieging Brest, one is in defensive positions along the Loire River, one armored division is besieging
    Lorient, and three are in the Rhone valley as a result of Operation
    Dragoon.

    One armored and four infantry divisions are in Italy, with elements of a
    fifth infantry division split between the United States and Italy.

    One airborne and two infantry divisions are training in the UK, along
    with two more airborne divisions on standby for further operations.

    Two infantry and one armored divisions are in transit from the US to
    Europe.

    In the Pacific, one division is in transit to Guadacanal for training.
    One is in the Admiralty Islands, two are on Bougainville, one on New
    Britain, one on New Caledonia, nine on New Guinea, one in the New
    Hebrides, four(?) in the Marshalls, one in the Russel Islands, four in
    Hawaii, and one scattered in garrisons. Of these, two are preparing for
    the invasion of Peleliu. Two are preparing to invade Morotai. Eleven are rebuilding or training for the invasion of the Philippines.

    Finally, in the continental United States, there are one airborne, eight armored, twenty-three infantry, and one Marine division. Of those, four
    armored and eight infantry divisions embarked for Europe in September
    and October 1944, and thus were presumably deployable at the beginning
    of September. The other divisions were either still in training or were
    being stripped for replacements and would have to be refilled.

    Division Location 1 Sep 1944 Activity
    11th Airborne New Guinea Training for Philippines
    13th Airborne United States embarked 25 Jan 1945
    17th Airborne United Kingdom training
    82nd Airborne United Kingdom standby for airborne operations
    101st Airborne United Kingdom standby for airborne operations

    1st Armored Italy
    2nd Armored Belgium
    3rd Armored France
    4th Armored France
    5th Armored France
    6th Armored France blockading Lorient
    7th Armored France
    8th Armored United States embarked 7 Nov 1944
    9th Armored In transit to Europe embarked 26 Aug 1944
    10th Armored United States embarked 13 Sep 1944
    11th Armored United States embarked 29 Sep 1944
    12th Armored United States embarked 20 Sep 1944
    13th Armored United States embarked 18 Jan 1945
    14th Armored United States embarked 14 Oct 1944
    16th Armored United States embarked 5 Feb 1945
    20th Armored United States embarked 6 Feb 1945

    1st Cavalry Admiralty Islands Rebuilding/Training for Philippines

    1st Infantry France
    2nd Infantry France siege of Brest
    3rd Infantry France Dragoon
    4th Infantry France
    5th Infantry France
    6th Infantry New Guinea garrison
    7th Infantry Hawaii Rebuilding/Training for Philippines
    8th Infantry France siege of Brest
    9th Infantry France
    10th Infantry United States embarked Dec 1944
    24th Infantry New Guinea Rebuilding/Training for Philippines
    25th Infantry New Caledonia Rebuilding/Training for Philippines
    26th Infantry In transit to Europe embarked 26 Aug 1944
    27th Infantry New Hebrides Rebuilding from Marshall Islands
    operations
    28th Infantry France
    29th Infantry France siege of Brest
    30th Infantry France
    31st Infantry New Guinea training for Morotai operation
    32nd Infantry New Guinea training for Morotai operation
    33rd Infantry New Guinea garrison
    34th Infantry Italy
    35th Infantry France
    36th Infantry France Dragoon
    37th Infantry Bougainville Rebuilding/Training for Philippines
    38th Infantry New Guinea Training for Philippines
    40th Infantry New Britain garrison
    41st Infantry New Guinea garrison
    42nd Infantry United States embarked Nov 1944
    43rd Infantry New Guinea Rebuilding/Training for Philippines
    44th Infantry United States embarked 5 Sep 1944
    45th Infantry France Dragoon
    63rd Intantry United States embarked 25 Nov 1944
    65th Infantry United States embarked 10 Jan 1945
    66th Infantry United States embarked Nov 1944
    69th Infantry United States embarked Dec 1944
    70th Infantry United States embarked Dec 1944
    71st Infantry United States embarked 26 Jan 1945
    75th Infantry United States embarked 14 Nov 1944
    76th Infantry United States embarked 10 Dec 1944
    77th Infantry Guam Rebuilding/Training for Philippines
    78th Infantry United States embarked 14 Oct 1944
    79th Infantry France
    80th Infantry France
    81st Infantry Hawaii Preparing for assault on Peleliu 15 Sep 1944
    83rd Infantry France defense along Loire
    84th Infantry United States embarked 20 Sep 1944
    85th Infantry Italy
    86th Infantry United States embarked 19 Feb 1945
    87th Infantry United States embarked 17 Oct 1944
    88th Infantry Italy rest and training for Arno River assault
    89th Infantry United States embarked 10 Jan 1945
    90th Infantry France
    91st Infantry Italy
    92nd Infantry United States embarked Aug/Sep 1944
    93rd Infantry Pacific "scattered locations mostly garrison
    and labor duty"
    94th Infantry United Kingdom training
    95th Infantry United Kingdom training
    96th Infantry Hawaii Training for Philippines
    97th Infantry United States embarked 19 Feb 1945
    98th Infantry Hawaii garrison
    99th Infantry United States embarked 30 Sep 1944
    100th Infantry United States embarked 6 Oct 1944
    102nd Infantry United States embarked 12 Sep 1944
    103rd Infantry United States embarked 6 Oct 1944
    104th Infantry In transit to Europe embarked 27 Aug 1944
    106th Infantry United States embarked 10 Nov 1944
    Americal Bougainville Training for Philippines

    1st Marine Russell Islands Preparing for assault on Peleliu 15
    Sep 1944
    2nd Marine Tinian? Rebuilding from Marshall Islands operations
    3rd Marine Guam Rebuilding from Marshall Islands operations
    4th Marine Tinian? Rebuilding from Marshall Islands operations
    5th Marine United States embarked sometime in late 1944
    6th Marine en route to Guadacanal 1st Prov Bde from Guam; 29th
    Marines from Hawaii

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  • From Don Phillipson@21:1/5 to Stephen Graham on Tue Jan 17 13:13:45 2017
    On 1/13/2017 10:12 AM, Paul Sturrock wrote:
    On Friday, January 13, 2017 at 10:46:23 AM UTC-6, Stephen Graham wrote:
    On 1/13/2017 7:50 AM, Paul Sturrock wrote:
    What if FDR . . . ordered Nimitz to seize Antwerp and the Scheldt
    estuary?

    "Stephen Graham" <graham1@speakeasy.net> wrote in message news:edsn6sFofg4U1@mid.individual.net...

    Actually, no, FDR did not have the authority to unilaterally change world-wide Allied strategy. At a minimum, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Churchill, and Curtin would have had to agree.

    Not least, Nimitz was theatre commander for the Central Pacific just
    as Eisenhower was Supreme Allied Commander of all allied forces
    in Europe. Transferring Nimitz would also require either terminating
    his supreme command status or else making him a unique
    exception to Eisenhower as SACEUR.
    --
    Don Phillipson
    Carlsbad Springs
    (Ottawa, Canada)

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    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)