Russia Sows Far-Reaching Chaos Using Crimea as a Base
By S.C.M. Paine, May 16, 2023, WSJ

The West should support Ukraine’s goal of retaking Crimea not only because the peninsula is sovereign Ukrainian territory but also because retaking it would deprive Russia of Sevastopol, the best naval base on the Black Sea.

Until Russia loses Sevastopol, the Middle East and the Horn of Africa will continue to churn as Moscow retains veto power over regional peace, which it has had since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

Andrei Gromyko, Soviet foreign minister from 1957-1985, once observed of the Middle East: “As long as the region remains tense, the Soviet Union is assured a role there.” In peacetime, an outside country with a 3rd-rate economy like Russia would have
little influence in the Middle East. Yet so long as the region remains unstable, Russia can insert itself as a power broker and veto peace plans by arming the side less willing to settle. As Putin has demonstrated, it is easy to fuel conflicts, and as
the U.S. has discovered, it is difficult to end them. It is time to take the veto card from Putin’s hand.

Without Sevastopol, Russia can’t easily support military operations in the Middle East or Africa. Military interventions require soldiers as well as substantial heavy equipment and logistical support, which primarily come by sea. As long as Russia
controls Sevastopol, it can support its Syrian bases in Tartus and Latakia via the Bosporus. With those bases secure, Russia can reach further along the Eastern Mediterranean coastline and into the Horn of Africa. The loss of Sevastopol would cut this
ability at the root. Novorossiysk, the main Black Sea commercial port within Russia, is no substitute. Apart from its lack of naval facilities, it is located at the sea’s eastern extremity and, unlike Sevastopol, is a coastal breakwater, not a
defensible natural harbor.

Without Sevastopol, Russian naval ships would have to reach the Mediterranean with its other 3 fleets: its Baltic Fleet, based in distant Kaliningrad, Russia’s enclave surrounded by North Atlantic Treaty Organization members; its even more distant
Northern Fleet, based in Severomorsk, in the Arctic Circle; and its remote Pacific Fleet, based on the Kamchatka Peninsula, about as far away from Russia’s industrial base as it could be. Moreover, Russia lacks bases between these locations and the
Mediterranean. The transit distances are huge. The Suez Canal would be essential to shorten the Pacific Fleet’s voyage, which explains Russia’s persistent focus on the waterways that govern access to it—the Eastern Mediterranean and Red seas.

During the Cold War, when Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, the U.S.S.R. projected military power from Sevastopol to a string of bases. With the exceptions of Syria, Ethiopia and Yemen, host countries, including Albania, Egypt and Somalia, found the
U.S.S.R. to be a difficult guest and serially expelled its forces. The replacement bases in Syria for Egypt and Ethiopia for Somalia were inferior to the lost ports of Alexandria and Berbera. Nothing replaced the lost submarine base in Albania. By the
end of the Cold War, Russia had only a single foreign naval base: Tartus, Syria.

Three years ago, Putin, via his Wagner Group proxies, put out feelers for a base in Sudan, which is now engulfed in civil war. Wagner’s African business model entails providing paramilitary services to keep dictators in power in return for control over
lucrative mines, the proceeds from which fund Putin. Playing factions against each other through these deals, as occurred in Sudan, is also part of Wagner’s model to maximize Russian, not African, returns on investment. Wagner’s Internet Research
Agency has simultaneously spread lies on social media. The long-term effect on regional economic growth of these frozen conflicts is disastrous.

The lack of Mediterranean bases once handicapped the Soviets. It meant they had little say in the outcomes of 1956 Suez Crisis, when the U.S. prevented Israel, France and Britain from overturning Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal, or the 1958
Lebanon Crisis, when U.S. Marines waded by curious bathers after they landed for a mission to keep the Christian president in power. The Soviets sought naval bases in Yugoslavia, Albania and Egypt but were rejected until 1967, when Israel took the Golan
Heights from Syria, the West Bank from Jordan, and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt.

Afterward Egypt provided Soviet bases to prevent Israel from launching such an offensive again. In the ensuing War of Attrition, when Egypt unsuccessfully tried to regain Sinai, Soviet pilots and surface-to-air missiles imposed sufficient costs on Israel
to force a cease-fire. Soviet support enabled Syria and Egypt to attempt to reclaim their territories in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. They failed but inflicted damage on Israel.

Once Egypt removed the U.S.S.R. from the equation by abrogating their friendship treaty in 1976, it was able to unfreeze its conflict with Israel and sign the Camp David Accords of 1978, which restored Sinai to Egypt and established diplomatic relations
between Cairo and Tel Aviv.

Today the Palestinian, Lebanese, Syrian, Libyan, Yemeni, Ethiopian, Somali and Sudanese conflicts remain frozen at great cost to those countries and the region. The Wagner Group operates in Syria, Libya and Sudan, as well as farther afield in the Central
African Republic, Mali, Mozambique and Chad. Without adequate bases, Russia couldn’t easily sustain these ventures. Sevastopol is the root of the problem. It’s time to uproot it.

Ms. Paine is a professor of history and grand strategy at the U.S. Naval War College.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-sows-far-reaching-chaos-using-crimea-as-a-base-sevastopol-ukraine-48ba3360

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