• Will Europe Be the World's Biggest Loser?

    From ltlee1@21:1/5 to All on Mon May 22 09:46:26 2023
    "Russia's war against Ukraine, the Sino-American rivalry, and the rise of new middle powers is spurring a profound reorganization of the international order that will leave Europe at a distinct disadvantage.
    ...
    the broader danger for the international system stems not from the war in Ukraine (Russia is too weak to pose a truly global threat), but from the deterioration of US-China relations. True, notwithstanding China’s bellicose rhetoric over Taiwan and its
    aggressive naval exercises in the waters around the island, the confrontation so far is less military than economic, technological, and political. But that is cold comfort, because it is an intensifying zero-sum conflict.

    Some of the biggest losers in this confrontation are likely to be Japan and Europe. Chinese firms have built massive production capacities in the automobile industry – especially in electric vehicles (EVs) – and are now poised to outcompete the
    European and Japanese automakers that have long been globally dominant.

    Making matters worse, America’s own response to Chinese competition is to pursue an industrial policy that will come at European and Japanese manufacturers’ expense. Recent legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act, for example, provides large
    subsidies for cars produced in the US. From the US perspective, such policies kill two birds with one stone: protecting large domestic manufacturers and providing them with incentives to pursue EV development.

    The eventual outcome will be a thorough reorganization of the global auto industry, with Japan and Europe (primarily Germany) losing competitiveness and market share. And lest we forget, this major economic development represents merely the beginning of
    a much larger global confrontation and strategic reordering.

    Not only must Europe take great pains to preserve its economic model during this reorganization of the global economy. It also must manage high energy costs, the growing digital technology gap vis-à-vis the two superpowers, and the urgent need for
    increased defense spending to counter the new threat from Russia. All these priorities will grow even more urgent as the next US presidential election approaches, given the distinct possibility that Donald Trump could return to the White House.

    Europe thus finds itself especially disadvantaged. It resides in an increasingly dangerous region, yet it remains a confederation of sovereign nation-states that have never mustered the will to achieve true integration – even after two world wars and
    the decades-long Cold War. In a world dominated by large states with growing military budgets, Europe still is not a real power.

    Whether that remains the case is up to Europeans. The world will not wait for Europe to grow up. If Europe is going to confront today’s global reordering, it had better start soon – or, preferably, yesterday. "

    https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-biggest-loser-in-multipolar-world-by-joschka-fischer-2023-05

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From ltlee1@21:1/5 to All on Wed May 24 04:53:21 2023
    On Monday, May 22, 2023 at 12:46:27 PM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:
    "Russia's war against Ukraine, the Sino-American rivalry, and the rise of new middle powers is spurring a profound reorganization of the international order that will leave Europe at a distinct disadvantage.
    ...
    the broader danger for the international system stems not from the war in Ukraine (Russia is too weak to pose a truly global threat), but from the deterioration of US-China relations. True, notwithstanding China’s bellicose rhetoric over Taiwan and
    its aggressive naval exercises in the waters around the island, the confrontation so far is less military than economic, technological, and political. But that is cold comfort, because it is an intensifying zero-sum conflict.

    Some of the biggest losers in this confrontation are likely to be Japan and Europe. Chinese firms have built massive production capacities in the automobile industry – especially in electric vehicles (EVs) – and are now poised to outcompete the
    European and Japanese automakers that have long been globally dominant.

    Making matters worse, America’s own response to Chinese competition is to pursue an industrial policy that will come at European and Japanese manufacturers’ expense. Recent legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act, for example, provides
    large subsidies for cars produced in the US. From the US perspective, such policies kill two birds with one stone: protecting large domestic manufacturers and providing them with incentives to pursue EV development.

    The eventual outcome will be a thorough reorganization of the global auto industry, with Japan and Europe (primarily Germany) losing competitiveness and market share. And lest we forget, this major economic development represents merely the beginning
    of a much larger global confrontation and strategic reordering.

    Not only must Europe take great pains to preserve its economic model during this reorganization of the global economy. It also must manage high energy costs, the growing digital technology gap vis-à-vis the two superpowers, and the urgent need for
    increased defense spending to counter the new threat from Russia. All these priorities will grow even more urgent as the next US presidential election approaches, given the distinct possibility that Donald Trump could return to the White House.

    Europe thus finds itself especially disadvantaged. It resides in an increasingly dangerous region, yet it remains a confederation of sovereign nation-states that have never mustered the will to achieve true integration – even after two world wars and
    the decades-long Cold War. In a world dominated by large states with growing military budgets, Europe still is not a real power.

    Whether that remains the case is up to Europeans. The world will not wait for Europe to grow up. If Europe is going to confront today’s global reordering, it had better start soon – or, preferably, yesterday. "

    https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-biggest-loser-in-multipolar-world-by-joschka-fischer-2023-05

    Joschka Fischer had succinctly summed up Europe's predicament: In a world dominated by large states, Europe still is not
    a real power. But this is the predicament of most states under a Westphalia world order. And a confederation of sovereign
    nation-states that have never mustered the will to achieve true integration as well as part of a security structure such as NATO
    could only delay the day of reckoning without really escaping the predicament.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From ltlee1@21:1/5 to All on Mon May 29 06:46:56 2023
    On Wednesday, May 24, 2023 at 7:54:14 AM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:
    On Monday, May 22, 2023 at 12:46:27 PM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:
    "Russia's war against Ukraine, the Sino-American rivalry, and the rise of new middle powers is spurring a profound reorganization of the international order that will leave Europe at a distinct disadvantage.
    ...
    the broader danger for the international system stems not from the war in Ukraine (Russia is too weak to pose a truly global threat), but from the deterioration of US-China relations. True, notwithstanding China’s bellicose rhetoric over Taiwan and
    its aggressive naval exercises in the waters around the island, the confrontation so far is less military than economic, technological, and political. But that is cold comfort, because it is an intensifying zero-sum conflict.

    Some of the biggest losers in this confrontation are likely to be Japan and Europe. Chinese firms have built massive production capacities in the automobile industry – especially in electric vehicles (EVs) – and are now poised to outcompete the
    European and Japanese automakers that have long been globally dominant.

    Making matters worse, America’s own response to Chinese competition is to pursue an industrial policy that will come at European and Japanese manufacturers’ expense. Recent legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act, for example, provides
    large subsidies for cars produced in the US. From the US perspective, such policies kill two birds with one stone: protecting large domestic manufacturers and providing them with incentives to pursue EV development.

    The eventual outcome will be a thorough reorganization of the global auto industry, with Japan and Europe (primarily Germany) losing competitiveness and market share. And lest we forget, this major economic development represents merely the beginning
    of a much larger global confrontation and strategic reordering.

    Not only must Europe take great pains to preserve its economic model during this reorganization of the global economy. It also must manage high energy costs, the growing digital technology gap vis-à-vis the two superpowers, and the urgent need for
    increased defense spending to counter the new threat from Russia. All these priorities will grow even more urgent as the next US presidential election approaches, given the distinct possibility that Donald Trump could return to the White House.

    Europe thus finds itself especially disadvantaged. It resides in an increasingly dangerous region, yet it remains a confederation of sovereign nation-states that have never mustered the will to achieve true integration – even after two world wars
    and the decades-long Cold War. In a world dominated by large states with growing military budgets, Europe still is not a real power.

    Whether that remains the case is up to Europeans. The world will not wait for Europe to grow up. If Europe is going to confront today’s global reordering, it had better start soon – or, preferably, yesterday. "

    https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-biggest-loser-in-multipolar-world-by-joschka-fischer-2023-05
    Joschka Fischer had succinctly summed up Europe's predicament: In a world dominated by large states, Europe still is not
    a real power. But this is the predicament of most states under a Westphalia world order. And a confederation of sovereign
    nation-states that have never mustered the will to achieve true integration as well as part of a security structure such as NATO
    could only delay the day of reckoning without really escaping the predicament.

    And of course smaller nations would be in worse situation.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From ltlee1@21:1/5 to All on Tue Aug 22 08:58:16 2023
    On Monday, May 22, 2023 at 12:46:27 PM UTC-4, ltlee1 wrote:
    "Russia's war against Ukraine, the Sino-American rivalry, and the rise of new middle powers is spurring a profound reorganization of the international order that will leave Europe at a distinct disadvantage.
    ...
    the broader danger for the international system stems not from the war in Ukraine (Russia is too weak to pose a truly global threat), but from the deterioration of US-China relations. True, notwithstanding China’s bellicose rhetoric over Taiwan and
    its aggressive naval exercises in the waters around the island, the confrontation so far is less military than economic, technological, and political. But that is cold comfort, because it is an intensifying zero-sum conflict.

    Some of the biggest losers in this confrontation are likely to be Japan and Europe. Chinese firms have built massive production capacities in the automobile industry – especially in electric vehicles (EVs) – and are now poised to outcompete the
    European and Japanese automakers that have long been globally dominant.

    Making matters worse, America’s own response to Chinese competition is to pursue an industrial policy that will come at European and Japanese manufacturers’ expense. Recent legislation such as the Inflation Reduction Act, for example, provides
    large subsidies for cars produced in the US. From the US perspective, such policies kill two birds with one stone: protecting large domestic manufacturers and providing them with incentives to pursue EV development.

    The eventual outcome will be a thorough reorganization of the global auto industry, with Japan and Europe (primarily Germany) losing competitiveness and market share. And lest we forget, this major economic development represents merely the beginning
    of a much larger global confrontation and strategic reordering.

    Not only must Europe take great pains to preserve its economic model during this reorganization of the global economy. It also must manage high energy costs, the growing digital technology gap vis-à-vis the two superpowers, and the urgent need for
    increased defense spending to counter the new threat from Russia. All these priorities will grow even more urgent as the next US presidential election approaches, given the distinct possibility that Donald Trump could return to the White House.

    Europe thus finds itself especially disadvantaged. It resides in an increasingly dangerous region, yet it remains a confederation of sovereign nation-states that have never mustered the will to achieve true integration – even after two world wars and
    the decades-long Cold War. In a world dominated by large states with growing military budgets, Europe still is not a real power.

    Whether that remains the case is up to Europeans. The world will not wait for Europe to grow up. If Europe is going to confront today’s global reordering, it had better start soon – or, preferably, yesterday. "

    https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-biggest-loser-in-multipolar-world-by-joschka-fischer-2023-05


    Europe's present predicament is that it is not a real power.
    Is "Eurowhiteness", a new book by by Hans Kundnani, a fellow at Chatham House, its ticket out?

    https://www.economist.com/europe/2023/08/17/having-shaken-off-nationalism-europe-risks-civilisationalism

    "But of late some have tended to think of Europe in civilisational terms, an idea rooted not just in laws and
    institutions but in history, culture and identity. To be European in that meaning is to be of a place, to belong
    there, and therefore for others not to belong. That has unsettling implications for those who live in Europe yet
    do not look traditionally European. Might eight decades of EU integration accidentally foment a form of ugly,
    pan-continental bigotry?
    ...
    Surely the rout of any and all forms of nationalism (apart from the odd populist) is one of the EU’s signature
    achievements? Not so fast. Hannah Arendt, a German political theorist, warned in 1948 that one day people
    might find a way to become “as narrowly and chauvinistically European as they were formerly German, Italian,
    or French”. Mr Kundnani does not suggest that skinheads with tattoos of EU flags will soon start roaming the
    streets of Brussels and Strasbourg. But he describes what he thinks is a “civilisational turn” in Europe of late.
    It comes not just among the likes of Mr Orban. Emmanuel Macron, France’s president, has defended the idea
    of promoting European civilisation, the better to fend off rivals in China, America and beyond. ...

    Mr Kundnani admits it is not easy to pin down where this civilisational turn comes from. In a sense, it is a
    return to Europe’s roots: the emergence of country-first nationalism from the 18th century onwards came when
    the continent’s common religious identity started to fade. Now it is the nation-state that is itself fading, seen
    as inadequate in the face of global challenges which only a united continent can tackle. (Mr Kundnani also
    indulges in a bit of left-wing rhetoric by pinning the blame on neoliberalism.)

    That coincided with another change. Until recently, Europe was an unabashed believer in its model, keen to export
    its softer version of capitalism and societal welfare. But since the euro-zone miasma in the 2010s, and after an
    ugly refugee crisis in 2015, its confidence has taken a knock. Europe sees itself surrounded by threats, whether
    from a rising China or Trumpism. Touting the idea of a civilisation capable of defending its interests is comforting
    stuff. Mr Macron speaks often of a “Europe that protects”. Josep Borrell, the EU’s foreign-policy chief, calls Europe
    a “garden” that needs to fend off the “jungle” beyond its borders."

    Extra bonus of Eurowhiteness:
    "More broadly, the continent’s welcome integration in recent decades has created a notable blind spot, Mr Kundnani
    argues. Defeating nationalism for the purposes of EU integration meant dwelling on the pinnacle of the horror it
    created. Thus it was the Holocaust which Europe remembered as the one thing it had to “never again” allow to happen.
    The role of (some) European countries in brutally colonising vast swathes of the globe was thereby swept under the
    carpet."

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)