"Seven misunderstandings regarding this transition must be debunked to understand China’s approach toward global governance.
First, American multilateralism vs. Chinese multilateralism. ...
American multilateralism contributed to world peace and prosperity, but the developing world has unfortunately been ignored or little heard. Failure to produce the hoped-for results backfires on the reputation of American multilateralism. Chinese
multilateralism builds upon American multilateralism, and it is well positioned to correct the latter’s defects by being responsive to the particular needs of developing countries, while maintaining a rules-based, high-standard system, as exhibited by
the success of its development initiatives.
Second, hegemony vs. self-restraint. ... In the World Bank, the United States has been blocking shareholder realignment reforms in favor of emerging economies, delaying the implementation of the official shareholding formula known as the 2016 Dynamic
Formula. For example, China would have held over 12 percent of shares under that formula, instead of merely 6 percent now. Similarly, in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), negotiations over a new shareholder formula that is supposed to increase the
voice of emerging economies, including China and other BRICS countries, have dragged on for over a decade.
A hegemon has two composite elements: it must be powerful (that is a prerequisite) and then based on its power, impose its will on others. Holding a veto power is one thing; to abuse it is another. In its cultural gene, China is not a missionary society
and it chooses to influence others by inducing respect rather than by conversion.
Third, high vs. feasible standards. A major characteristic of Chinese multilateralism is the promotion of high and feasible standards. ...
Fourth, rule of law vs. role of law. The development community has been urged to think differently about aid, in particular, to think not only about the rule of law but also about the role of law. For finding that an institution has power, it is enough
that the exercise of the power may further the purpose of the institution, and that it is not inconsistent with existing law.
This, dubbed a teleological methodology, enables an international organization to adapt to new environments by flexibly interpreting its laws. The methodology empowered the AIIB to combat the Covid-19 pandemic through a $20 billion crisis recovery
facility, as well as to embrace the BRI and administer MCDF.
Fifth, adversary checks vs. advisory engagement. Good corporate governance is integral to the success of an institution. The AIIB has a built-in oversight mechanism “to ensure proper checks and balances” between its non-resident board and management.
To find out where the degree of “properness” lies along a spectrum is key.
Sixth, competition vs. cooperation. Forging a cooperative external relationship, particularly with those established ones, is key to the success of a newcomer. The failure of Japan’s proposal to establish the Asian Monetary Fund, a replica of the
International Monetary Fund in 1997, proves that the established institution tends to view a newcomer as a threat, rather than a partner.
Seventh, alliance vs. partnership. China has persevered with its goal of “rejuvenating the nation.” To make this happen, it tends to concentrate on continuous self-improvement while avoiding making enemies. The Chinese dream is predestined on a
harmonious world environment, contrasting the U.S.-branded hegemony— “either with us or against us.” China’s mentality decides the mantra of its diplomacy as looking for “partnerships rather than alliances.”"
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/seven-myths-about-chinas-approach-global-governance-203777
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