• THE NE WIN DOCTRINE: A Systematic Campaign of Hatred (1/2)

    From Zomi for Federalization and Democra@21:1/5 to All on Sun Jun 5 16:31:58 2016
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    "The Ne Win Docrine" -- Why the Fascists Did Anti-"Union Spirit" Activities
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    Zomi for Federalization and Democratization of Burma
    11/25/11

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    "Nga Kan Thay Yin, Nga Swe Paw Lein Me"
    (When the Blind (Man) Dies, the Squint-Eyed (Man) Will Appear)

    OK. Nga Ne Win has passed away. And Nga Than Shwe and Nga Thein Sein
    have appeared, inheriting the Ne Win Doctrine, which is a systematic
    campaign of hatred.
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    THE NE WIN DOCTRINE:
    A Systematic Campaign of Hatred

    By Vum Son, Ph.D. (1937-2005)
    Written sometime before 2003, perhaps in 1997

    The Union of Burma is the amalgamation of formerly independent
    kingdoms of Arakan, Burma, and Mon, princely states of the Shan and
    Karennis, chiefdoms of the Zomi (Chin) and Kachin, and independent
    communities of the Karen. The Union of Burma was formed by the
    Panglong agreement of the Zomi (Chin), Kachin, Shan, and the Burman.
    However, the agreement encompasses the Arakanese, Mon, Karenni and
    Karen, who were proud nations and communities and who had distinct and
    unique identities different from the Burman, Zomi (Chin), Kachin, or
    Shan.

    In the constitution drafted in 1947, Bogyoke Aung San promised the non-
    Burman equality and autonomy. After the death of Aung San, however, U
    Nu and the AFPFL amended the draft constitution, betraying both the
    letter and spirit of the Panglong agreement. The amendments
    invalidated the recognition of the formerly proud nations of Arakan,
    Zomi (Chin), Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon and the Shan. Therefore,
    serious trouble was looming for Burma at independence.

    Shortly after Burma's independence in 1948, the Karen, followed by
    several other non-Burman nationalities, rose up in arms to fight for independence. At the height of the Karen rebellion and underground
    movement of the communists, soldiers defected en masse from the Burma
    Rifles and other army units (e.g., the Karen Rifles). Out of the five battalions of Burma Rifles, only about two thousand soldiers were
    loyal to the union government. Because of the Karen rebellion, the
    government forced numerous non-Burmans holding key positions in the
    army to retire. Among those forced to retire were General Smith Dun,
    the commanding officer of the Burma Army, Saw Shi Sho, the chief of
    the air force, Brigadier Saw Kya Doe, chief of operations, and all
    Karen nationals, to name a few. These positions were then assigned
    only to ethnic Burmans. General Ne Win, a Sino-Burman, and a member of
    the "Thirty Comrades" became the Commanding Officer of the Burma Army.
    He was also made the Defence Minister of the Union government.

    General Ne Win became ambitious and requested to be made the Prime
    Minister. The civilian government dismissed him back to barracks. Ne
    Win realized that to become the Prime Minister of Burma or to be able
    to run the country, he needed to be the commanding officer of a large
    army, and from that day on he worked on a scheme that eventually made
    him the oppressor of the peoples of Burma for forty years. That scheme
    might be called the "Ne Win Doctrine".



    Premise of the Ne Win Doctrine:

    To become the ruler of the country as the commanding officer of the
    Burma Army, the army must be large and strong. The requisite for
    having a strong army is that the army must have a strong and sizeable
    enemy.

    How could the Burma Army have a strong enemy? The answer lies in the
    history of Burma and the history of the members of the Union of Burma.



    History of Ethnic Conflict

    There are no known facts about the ethnic conflicts prior to the
    Burmese King Anawrahta, who became king in the eleventh century. Long
    before the Burman descended from the high regions of Tibet and
    northwestern China to the present Burma in the seventh or eight
    century AD the Mon had established their kingdom in lower Burma, and
    the Arakanese in Arakan. Our knowledge of Burman history started with
    the king Anawrahta because of the aggressiveness of the Burman, who in
    the course of time attacked and were attacked by Arakan, Mon and Shan.
    The history of the Thai, Assamese, and Meitei (Manipuris) describes
    the immense cruelty of the Burman forces. Because of their notoriety, historians concentrated on the Burman history and unjustly gave little attention to the history of the other groups in the region. This one-
    sided view of history has had a catastrophic effect on the modern
    relationships between the ethnic groups because the Burmese military
    can convince outsiders that there is only the history of the Burman
    and the other people are anonymous.

    In fact, there were many ethnic conflicts among the peoples that
    constitute Burma today. Most notably, the Burman and the Mon engaged
    in a great contest of power against each other. To a lesser extent,
    extended wars were fought between Arakan and Shan against the Burman.
    The Karen apparently did not establish a powerful enough system to
    challenge the Burmese leadership, but they were subjected to high
    taxation and forced to work for the Burman. The Burman had no
    interest, authority, or influence on the outlying areas, such as the
    Zomi (Chin), Naga and Kachin. In all their wars, the opponents of the
    Burman know them as most brutal, and most cruel. The brutality and
    cruelty of the Burmese Army in post-colonial Burma has only carried on
    the tradition of Burman behaviour.



    Development of the Doctrine

    With the mistrust and turbulent history between the Burman and the non-
    Burman, Ne Win had the means by which to create a powerful enemy that
    would justify a large army for him to command. Thus, he created the Ne
    Win doctrine.



    Ne Win Doctrine

    Create an enemy of the non-Burman by driving them to military
    resistance. Drive them to military resistance by exploiting the
    political unrest in Burma.

    The political situation facilitated Ne Win's plan to exacerbate the
    non-Burman and Burman mistrust. As soon as the Union of Burma was
    formed, the AFPFL, who dominated the politics of Burma, initiated
    ethnic conflict. The AFPFL betrayed the Panglong agreement by adopting
    a quasi-federal constitution. Although the constitution allowed some
    non-Burman nationalities the status of national states, the
    constitution gave the power of the state to the central government,
    which was the government of Burma proper or the government of the
    Burman. The states were governed by the central government, with no
    possible self-determination. They were practically the colonies of the
    Burman. The constitution refused to recognize the Mon and the
    Arakanese statehood, denying them recognition as distinct ethnic
    groups. The constitution also declared the Burman language as the
    common language, marginalizing the non-Burman nationalities.

    Furthermore, when Ne Win assumed the post of Commanding Officer, U Nu,
    the prime minister of Burma, proclaimed martial law in some regions of
    the Shan state in response to the formidable Karen forces scattered in
    many parts of Burma including the Shan State. However, the Karen were
    severely beaten at Insein and were no longer a threat to the
    government of Burma by the mid-fifties. General Ne Win needed the
    continuation of the Karen rebellion and other existing civil wars to
    maintain the strength of the Burma Army. Therefore, the Burma Army
    units created renewed hatred for the Burman by roaming Karen villages
    to create victims. Thus began the implementation of the Ne Win
    Doctrine, making the Non-Burman fear and hate the Burman and leading
    them to armed resistance.



    Implementation of the Doctrine

    The main feature of the doctrine was to make the Burma Army above the
    law wherever there was insurgency or rebellion. The army could do
    whatever they wanted in the countryside where there were disturbances.
    But its purpose was never to quell rebellion. The people had no rights whatsoever. As soon as the Burma Army came to an area, the people lost
    their rights to their land, property, and even their own children.
    Worst of all, they lost the right to their own lives. On the other
    hand, the officers and men of the army could do whatever they wanted.
    From stealing the property of the people, beating the people, raping
    the women, and killing people singularly or en masse, they do not have
    to report to any other authority. They were not accountable to any law
    and there was no authority for the people to complain to. The Burma
    Army was an independent entity. The people, if they dared, could
    complain to the army authorities who had laid out the policies and had
    drawn up the guidelines for these atrocities. Their policies were to
    make the people hate them. If there were complaints by the people that
    meant the people had not learned their lesson. It meant more brutality
    towards the community.

    The army came mainly to dehumanize the people regardless of whether
    they belonged to the rebels or not. They were treated as if they were
    animals. The army was the law. These brutalities produced endless
    atrocities. And these brutalities and atrocities brought incalculable
    damage to the army's credibility and to national unity. The soldiers
    were seduced by the power of their guns and the tacit encouragement
    from their superiors. They adhered to the philosophy of being
    invincible and they created wars where there were none before. The
    result was racial hatred.

    The army usually came to villages fully informed about the people. The
    Burma Army units usually came after a battle was fought between the
    rebel group and the Burma Army. They had knowledge about the men from
    the village who were in the rebellion. Usually the army called all the villagers to a meeting ground, usually a football field, and executed
    a popular leader of the community. The person was executed not because
    he was an enemy of the Burma Army but because the Burma Army had
    learned that by doing so, they forced the recruitment of youngsters to
    the rebel army, thereby creating a large enemy for the Burma Army. If
    Burma Army soldiers had died in a battle with the rebel group, the
    army unit came to the villages to punish the people of the villages.
    The army then killed civilians from these villages at least double in
    number to the soldiers killed in the battle.

    The doctrine was to deepen the suspicion and hatred that had existed
    between the non-Burman and the Burman in pre-colonial and British
    Burma. It was to create hatred among the non-Burman against the Burman
    because the Burma Army was run by the Burman. Officers and men of the
    Burma Army treated the population with cruel, humiliating, and
    degrading inhuman practices. When the army units came to villages they
    went from house to house and took anything they wanted. They killed
    domestic animals to substantiate their meager rations. The army
    encouraged Burman soldiers to marry non-Burman women. The soldiers
    were made to understand that to molest and rape women in the
    "disturbed" areas was no crime. There was no punishment for such
    misdeeds. The army burned villages and were instructed to destroy and
    burn Christian Churches and Muslim mosques. During the communist
    rebellion non-Burman class battalions were sent to areas controlled by
    the communists. These class battalions destroyed Buddhist temples and
    killed the people including women and children. The point was to make
    the Burman hate the non-Burman. The army employed forced labour in
    disturbed areas, which were created by the Army itself. The army
    demanded porters from the villages who were not paid. It was forced
    porter conscription. One of the main reasons for all of this cruel
    treatment was the forever prolongation of the civil war. Without the
    civil war a strong Burma army was not necessary. Only cruel treatment
    of the people guaranteed the continuation of armed rebellion.



    Results of the Doctrine on the Non-Burman

    In all of the civil conflicts in Burma, even during parliamentary
    democracy, the Burma Army sought military solutions to their problems.
    Putting an end to the rebellion would have been easy if a political
    solution had been sought. Instead, the Burma Army was systematically campaigning for hate. The hatred of the military by the people
    guaranteed the increase of volunteers for the non-Burman ethnic
    rebellion. After the campaign of hate for 10 years, there was a strong rebellion in Burma so that a strong enough army was created to contain
    the rebellion. Ne Win fostered this strong rebellion by applying the
    doctrine to each of the ethic groups in Burma.



    Karen

    The Karen lived side-by-side with the Burman in the delta region and
    had suffered atrocities under Burman kings. During the rule of Burmese
    kings, the relationship between Karen and Burman was not friendly.
    Karens suffered from high taxation and racial discrimination. There
    was always animosity between the two communities. Although living side- by-side, the Karen and Burman seldom intermarried because of the
    hatred existing between them. There had always been a racially
    motivated segregation between the Burman and the Karen. They stood on
    opposite sides of the firing line when the Japanese invaded Burma
    during WW II. They committed atrocities against each other and the
    animosity between them further deepened. The Karen did not want to be
    a part of independent Burma. However, they lived intermingled with the
    Burman and a solution to their problems was difficult to solve.
    Britain refused to listen to the Karens' demand for separation from
    the Burman.

    Because the Karen were honest and trustworthy, the British hired them
    into their armed forces and civil administration. At the end of WW II,
    the Karen dominated both of these parts of government. When
    independence was imminent for Burma after the end of the war, the
    Karen sought all avenues available to them to separate themselves from
    the Burman, but they failed. In 1949, the Karen formed the Karen
    National Defence Organization to protect Karen villages from the
    Burman. The formation of this organization started the Karen rebellion
    in 1949.

    The Karen and communist defections in the army left only a small army contingent loyal to the government. In other words, the Karen at one
    time were close to taking the capital Rangoon. The few remaining Zomi
    (Chin) and Kachin rifles battalions stood their ground and saved the
    Rangoon government from falling. The Karen were driven out of Insein,
    a satellite Karen town of Rangoon.

    Thus, the Karen situation could explode any time unless they could
    agree with the Burman terms to build a state together.

    General Ne Win and his officers never wanted peace. The Karens could
    have easily been beaten if a political solution had been sought. The
    Burmese government refused to discuss the Karen problems with Karen
    leaders. It was left to the military to solve the Karen problem. The
    Burma Army could have beaten the Karen rebellion if they had fought
    with good intentions. Often times Zomi (Chin) or Kachin forces of the
    Burman Army had beaten Karen units. When the Zomi (Chin) units thought
    that they could eliminate the Karen unit, the Zomi (Chin Rifles) were
    ordered to withdraw and the Karen units were allowed to regroup. The
    Karen survived with mounting losses in life and material, and Ne Win
    continued to build his army with the excuse of the Karen threat.

    The last stronghold of the Karen at Manerplaw was not attacked for
    over twenty years because the Burma Army wanted to show that they had
    a strong enemy. Only when Manerplaw became the second capital of
    Burma, where all democracy-loving people assembled, and the
    international media was informed of the brutality of the Burman did
    the Burma Army feel the need to attack. Manerplaw was not easily
    taken, but for a two-hundred-thousand strong army to beat a fifteen
    thousand man army should not be that difficult a task.



    Arakan and Mon

    Arakan and Mon were independent nations before they were overrun by
    Burman kings. Because these people were colonies of the Burman for a
    long period of time, and because they were Buddhists and intermarried
    with the Burman, the Burman leadership believed that they were already
    absorbed into Burman society. The Burman leadership therefore found no
    reason to negotiate with the people of Arakan and Mon. On the other
    side, the Arakanese and Mon felt that they had been freed from Burman colonization when the British gave independence to the Union of Burma.
    In independent Burma, they wanted the recognition of their unique
    ethnic national identity and their rights as a nation. But the Burman leadership completely miscalculated the nationality feelings and
    endeavour of the Arakan and Mon.

    Like the Karen, the Mon and the Arakanese had been at war with the
    Burman before the British came. During those wars, the Burman treated
    both the Mon and Arakanese brutally. The people of Mon and Arakan
    regarded the British occupation of their land as the end of Burman colonization. Ironically, the British introduction of schools and the
    teaching of Burmese in the schools was instrumental in transforming
    Arakan and Mon society into one much closer to Burmese society.
    Although animosity and hatred existed between the Burman and
    Arakanese, and Mon, they share the same religion and intermarry. The
    Arakanese and the Mon could have easily been content if the Burman
    leadership had given them their rightful position in the society of
    the independent Union of Burma. Luckily for Ne Win, the Burman
    leadership, beginning with General Aung San, completely miscalculated
    the national feelings of the Arakanese and the Mon. They believed that
    the Arakan and Mon had fully and completely integrated into Burman
    society. The Burman leadership did not recognize their unique national identity. Therefore, an insurgency started at the end of 1946, even
    before independence was attained.

    General Ne Win only needed a little push for the Arakanese and Mon to
    rise up in arms and mobilize their national feelings. Cases of
    atrocities committed against them as punishment for disturbances
    quickly intensified the hatred of the Burman that already existed from
    the past. The Burma Army used small uprisings as an excuse to send a
    large contingent to terrorize villages that were situated in the
    nearby areas. The Burma Army simply applied the Ne Win doctrine. In
    response, the Arakan and Mon created an independence movement. General
    San Yu was the commander of the Burma Army contingent in Arakan for
    fifteen years before he became the president of Burma under Ne Win's
    Burma Socialist Program Party.



    Karenni

    The Karenni were independent when Burma was under colonialism, but
    when Burma became independent, the Karenni became a part of Burma
    (viz. a colony of Burma). Thus, without proper agreement for equality
    in the new independent state of Burma, the Karenni would always demand
    their rights and independence.

    Like the Arakanese and Mon, the Karennis fought to regain their
    independence just after Burma's independence. Instead of realizing
    their goal of independence, they were drawn into the Ne Win doctrine.
    As the Karenni rebellion grew, so did the army stationed in the
    Karenni State. The AFPFL authorities in Rangoon resorted to a military
    solution to the Karenni conflict, putting the fate of the people of
    the Karenni in the hands of the brutal Burma Army under Ne Win. He, of
    course, immediately applied his doctrine of making the people hate the
    Burman. Where the Burma Army set foot into any territory it was to
    terrorize the inhabitants. The Karenni were no exception. The
    government of the AFPFL had created a new front for the Burma Army.



    Shan

    Unlike the Arakan, Mon, and Karen, the Shan had never been completely subjugated by the Burman in historic times. On the contrary, the Shan
    had at one time ruled the Burman. Historically, the Burman and Shan
    dealt with each other as equals and there was mutual respect for each
    other. The ruling Saophas were mostly well-educated and versed in
    politics and world affairs.

    General Ne Win was able to extend his doctrine to the Federated Shan
    States when the Karen rebellion spilled over to Taungyi, the Shan
    capital, in 1950. Then the remnants of the Chinese Kuomintang (KMT)
    forces infiltrated the Shan State from China and gave the government
    even more reason to send troops there. The placing of most of the
    regions of the Shan State under martial law by the U Nu government
    delivered the Shans into the evil claws of Ne Win and his Burma Army,
    the Tatmadaw. The Burma Army saw the martial law as their god-sent
    opportunity to terrorize the Shan population. Among the Burman men,
    the fair-skinned Shan women were a prized commodity to exploit. When
    the General encouraged his soldiers to marry Shan women, it was like a dream-come-true to the soldiers. The Burma Army gave promotions to
    those who married ordinary Shan women. Those who married a Shan
    princess were made officers (if the soldier was an NCO). If the
    soldier was an officer, the officer received a double promotion. The
    purpose of the marriage policy was not purely the Burmanization of the
    Shan, but it was rather to reap hatred. The soldier thus hunted Shan
    women for marriage or for other purposes. They ambushed Shan women on
    their way to their fields, and if the women tried to run, the soldiers
    would shoot at them. They killed some women and raped many. Shan women
    were so afraid of the Burma Army that they hid on seeing army
    vehicles. A Shan elder said, "I could bear it when they took away my
    chicken, pigs, and property. I could bear it when they burned down my
    house. But I cannot bear it when they abuse my wife and daughter in
    front of me." The soldiers commonly looted Shan property and hunted
    their domestic animals to supplement their meager rations. Prominent
    and well-loved Shans disappeared without a trace. After ten years of
    the army presence, the Shan youth could no longer bear the oppression
    and degradation. The Shan youth, led by university students, rose up
    in arms in the late fifties. By then, many non-Burman ethnic groups
    had stood in arms against the Burma Army. Ne Win had once again driven
    the Shan to rebel against his army. The Ne Win doctrine was
    successfully implemented and was working in the Shan State.

    The destruction of Shan society through opium was also mainly the work
    of Ne Win and the military. The growing of opium and the opium trade
    may have been started by the KMT and international drug smugglers, but
    the Burma Army was the authority in the Shan state. Without the tacit
    approval of the military, the opium production could not have
    continued. The Burma Army used the excuse that the military could not
    control opium production in the Shan State because of the Shan
    rebellion. This excuse was extremely misleading because, as explained
    above, the military was the cause of the rebellion. The military and
    Ne Win benefited by the drug trade because they were the main
    transports of the drug inside Burma. A major aim of the Ne Win
    Doctrine was to destroy the Shan social establishment. The production
    of opium and heroin enhanced the implementation of the Doctrine, and
    Ne Win would apply that part of the doctrine elsewhere.



    Kachin

    The Kachin State is rich in natural resources. Many Kachin profited
    from the large jade deposits, which are found in Kachin land. The
    Kachin served loyally in the British Burma Army and in post-
    independence Burma. There had never been problems with the Kachin
    until 1960. But soon U Nu came to the aid of Ne Win. During the
    election campaign in 1960, U Nu made an election promise to make
    Buddhism the state religion if he was given the mandate to govern
    Burma. He won the election and Buddhism did become the state religion.
    Because of these events, the Kachin formed the Kachin Independence Organization, initiating a rebellion against the ruling government of
    Burma. The Burma Army immediately applied the Ne Win doctrine in the
    Kachin State. By the time the Kachin Independent Army signed a cease-
    fire agreement after thirty years of civil war, Kachin villages had
    lost much of their previous relative wealth. Total destruction of the
    Kachin society and Kachin properties resulted and the Burma Army is in
    every corner of the Kachin land. The Kachin have traded their rights
    as human beings and their right to be treated as an equal by the
    Burman for a cease fire.



    Communists and Wa

    The Burman communists met the same fate as the non-Burma ethnic
    insurgency. Zomi (Chin), Karen, Burman, and Kachin battalions were
    deployed to fight the communists. As with the Karen, the communists
    were attacked, allowed to regroup, and attacked again. Within a few
    years after independence, the communists were no longer a formidable
    force because, unlike the non-Burma ethnic groups, the Ne Win doctrine
    could not make the Burman hate the Burman, perhaps because they
    understood what the Burma Army was doing. Whenever the communists had
    a stronghold, the Burma Army terrorized the local people. When the
    villagers were tired of the harassment from the Burma Army and the
    taxation of the communists, they simply moved away. Unlike the
    nonBurman, they did not have elaborate housing and they could easily
    farm somewhere else. The communists regained their momentum only when
    they moved to the Chinese border and persuaded the Wa to fight for
    them. When the Ne Win doctrine was applied to the Wa, the Wa started
    to hate the Burman of the Burma Army. The racial hatred transferred to
    hatred of their Burmese communist masters. They eventually overthrew
    the Burman communists and started an ethnic war against the Burman.
    Because of the huge assistance given by China to the Burma communist
    party, there were incentives for the Wa young men to join the
    communists. The price tag was high for the Wa. Almost every Wa
    household lost a son or a family member in the conflict. After the Wa
    signed the cease-fire agreement with the Burma Army, the Wa ran drug
    production and trade under more peaceful circumstances. Due to the Wa rebellion, a powerful contingent of the Burma Army was needed and the
    Burma Army fulfilled its purpose controlling the drug trade.



    Zomi (Chin)

    Historically, the Zomi (Chin)and the Burman did not have much contact.
    Their interaction was mostly limited to mutual raiding, including
    taking war prisoners as slaves. Being in the remote areas of the
    hills, the Zomis (Chins) were isolated from the valley-dwelling
    Burman. Consequently, they never dominated one another, or had any
    other diplomatic relations.

    For forty years since joining the Burman, the Zomi (Chin) Hills
    continued on relatively quietly because there was no reason for the Ne
    Win army to go there. General Ne Win and most Burmans had never been
    to the Zomi (Chin) Hills themselves, and perceived it to be a very
    primitive area whose simple inhabitants had neither the ability nor
    the will to develop their country. However, when Ne Win visited the
    Zomi (Chin) Hills in 1955 as the commanding officer of the Burma Army,
    he saw that the Chins were not as primitive as he had thought.
    Moreover, he realized that the Zomis (Chins) lived in bigger houses
    than the average Burman. Whereas most Burmans lived in bamboo thatch
    houses, the Zomi (Chin) used wooden planks as walls with wooden floors
    and corrugated iron or slate as their roofs. Ne Win would wait and
    find a way to apply his doctrine.

    In the late 1970s, the BSPP under Ne Win began to grow opium in the
    Zomi (Chin) Hills. They had found this strategy successful in the Shan
    State, where the army had been stationed since 1950. Army officers
    profited by transporting the drug and were able to addict many of the
    people by making the drug easily accessible. The Burman then could
    easily acquire their property.

    The growing of opium in the Zomi (Chin) Hills today means nothing less
    than the ruin of the future of the Zomi (Chin) people. It was reported
    that heroin is being refined in Tahan, Tedim, and Tamu under military supervision. This is clearly an attempt to destroy the Zomi (Chin)
    people in order to be able to control them. Until now, Ne Win was
    incapable of making the Zomi (Chin) hate the Burman. Soon he will
    destroy the Zomi (Chin) people as more and more people become addicted
    to heroin.

    The Zomi (Chins) were drawn to the same fate as other ethnic groups
    only after the 1988 general uprising against the practice of the Ne
    Win doctrine in the whole of Burma. Three Zomi (Chin) men formed the
    Chin National Front (CNF) in 1988 in India. The CNF was formed as an
    armed independence movement and grew to about fifty members, mostly
    Zomi (Chin) students who fled to Mizoram in India. The CNF had no
    money, arms, or supporters in 1988, but its existence was enough to
    serve as an excuse for the Burma army to destroy the Zomi (Chin)
    social establishment. In 1980, there was only a Burma Army company in
    the Chin Hills. By 1995 ten thousand Burma Army soldiers were
    stationed in the Zomi (Chin) Hills not necessarily to fight the CNF
    but to instill hatred and fear for the Burman consistent with applying
    the doctrine.



    Results of the Doctrine on the Union

    In 1958, after leading the Burma army for almost ten years, General Ne
    Win felt that his army was strong enough to overthrow the government
    of the Union of Burma under U Nu. Ne Win's subordinates gave U Nu the
    ultimatum that the Burma Army was going to take over power either
    peacefully or by force. U Nu cleverly announced on the Burma Radio
    that he had requested General Ne Win to take over the administration
    of the country until the general election, which was to be held soon.
    Because such a transfer was legal under the 1947 constitution, the
    general attained what he wanted but was still bound by the
    constitution. However, at that time several high ranking army officers
    opposed a military dictatorship. Once again General Ne Win had to go
    back to the barracks. Within a few months of his return, he forced out
    all the officers that might oppose his next attempt to take over.

    Ne Win remained the prime minister as well as the commanding general
    of the Burma Army from 1958 to 1960. In that time, he steadily raised
    the strength of the army. At a conference in Taungyi in 1961, non-
    Burman parliamentarians and politicians, led by Shan leaders,
    requested the amendment of the constitution, which would have given
    the non-Burman more autonomy in their affairs, equality among ethnic
    groups, less interference by the central government authorities in the non-Burman ethnic regions, and a fair distribution of the nation's
    money. Ne Win understood what they wanted. If there was equality and
    peace in Burma, he had no chance to ever rule the country.

    By 1962, almost all the non-Burman ethnic groups were up in arms
    against the government of the union. All non-Burman ethnic people had
    only hatred and distrust for the Burman and the Burman-led government.
    By that time, General Ne Win had built a strong enough army to control
    the whole country at gun point. In March 1962, Ne Win staged a coup
    d'état and seized power. The future held more rebellion and more
    oppression to instill hatred. From a two-thousand-man Burma Rifles,
    plus two battalions each for the Chin and Kachin in 1950, the Burma
    Army rose to number 180,000 in 1988.



    Ne Win's Miscalculation: The Doctrine Worked Too Well

    The application of the Ne Win doctrine raised the non-Burman ethnic
    rebellion to approximately 60,000 soldiers in 1988. The end of the
    Socialist Program Party and a mass pro-democracy uprising in 1988
    paralyzed the government in Rangoon and the Burma Army was in a very
    weak position. They were short of arms and ammunition because they
    concentrated their fighting forces in the non-Burman ethnic areas.
    Moreover, there were many high-ranking officers who supported the pro- democracy movement. These officers refused the order to shoot into the
    crowd on September 1988. The result of the 1990 election showed
    clearly that the majority of the members of the armed forces were pro- democracy. Had the non-Burman army seized the opportunity and marched
    towards Rangoon, the Burma Army would have had no means nor will to

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