• The Other Special Relationship

    From zinn@21:1/5 to All on Tue Jul 12 08:07:46 2022
    XPost: talk.politics.guns, alt.fan.rush-limbaugh, sac.politics
    XPost: alt.politics.democrats

    This week, President Joe Biden will visit Israel as part of a longer tour
    of the Middle East. The visit was stimulated by an invitation in April
    from former prime minister Naftali Bennett. Just three months later, Biden
    will face a caretaker government heading for elections and an agenda
    dominated by high oil prices and hopes of containing Russian influence. Relations with the Palestinian Authority have also been roiled by an inconclusive State Department report about the death of the Palestinian- American journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. Despite these unsettled conditions,
    we can expect Biden to echo John F. Kennedy in proclaiming a "special relationship" between the United States and the State of Israel.

    But why should that special relationship exist? There is an obvious
    difference in scale between America's 330 million inhabitants and
    continental territories and the state of Israel, which comprises around 10 million people in a territory the size of New Jersey. There are also ideological differences. At least since World War II, many Americans have embraced a creedal nationalism open to everyone who consents to the Constitution and its underlying principles. According to a law passed in
    2018, by contrast, Israel is the "nation state of the Jewish People,"
    which offers legal citizenship but not full inclusion to ethnic and
    religious minorities. While its relative power is waning, the United
    States remains the world's only superpower and sustains military,
    political, and economic connections throughout the world. Israel's
    interests have grown far-flung compared with the state's early days. But
    they remain focused on its immediate neighborhood.

    Walter Russell Mead's The Arc of a Covenant is the most recent attempt to resolve this question. The book ranges widely through periods and sources.
    At bottom, though, Mead argues that American culture has a deep affinity
    for the idea of a Jewish state in the biblical promised land.

    Although it does not require personal faith, Mead argues that affinity has religious origins. It was born from the British Reformation, which
    emphasized widespread reading of the Bible, including portions of what Christians consider the "Old Testament" focused on the political history
    of the Israelites. English-speaking Protestants also developed theologies
    of covenant, according to which God establishes legal arrangements with
    human peoples, conditional on their fulfillment of divine purposes. Above
    all, many Protestants concluded that God was not yet done with the Jews.
    While proclaiming Scotland, England, or Britain's American colonies to be
    a kind of "new Israel," they also insisted that the Lord was still working
    on and through the original chosen people.

    These ideas were particularly influential among the Puritan settlers of
    New England, whose identification with the biblical narrative is reflected
    in towns called Salem or Sharon and multitudinous sons named Joseph,
    Samuel, and Josiah. But they were nationalized and, to some extent,
    secularized in the late 18th century, when the liberation of the biblical Israel from slavery became one of the favored metaphors of the
    revolutionary period. As the independent United States expanded, Americans
    also found inspiration in the narrative of a covenantal people struggling through the wilderness. This version of manifest destiny would later be refracted through popular narratives of Western settlement. Encouraged by Hollywood, Americans still perceive Israelis as heroic bearers of
    civilization defending themselves against savage resistance.

    Unlike more apologetic accounts, Mead is careful to acknowledge that philo-Hebraic religion and popular culture did not necessarily involve
    friendly attitudes toward living Jews. American Christians were mostly horrified by the kind of murderous Jew-hatred that became increasingly
    evident in Europe as the 19th century wore on. As persecution and violence drove more Jews to the United States, though, Jews were often included—and sometimes emphasized—in arguments that undesirable immigration threatened liberty, prosperity, and virtue. Mead points out that sympathy for the
    nascent Zionist movement offered a kind of escape valve for old-stock
    Americans who were squeamish about the increasing Jewish population but
    also allergic to outright anti-Semitism. The Jews were a nation, with the
    same dignity and rights as all the others, the logic went. Therefore, they should inhabit their own land and practice their own customs rather than subverting, intentionally or otherwise, the American way of life.

    The implication that Jews deserve a home of their own, but at a safe
    distance, helps explain the historical resistance of most American Jews to
    the Zionist movement. Among the paradoxes of the "special relationship" is
    that it often seems to connect American Christians with Israeli Jews,
    leaving their American cousins out of the picture. Before the Second World
    War, the American Jewish establishment distanced itself from Zionism,
    insisting that the United States was the modern promised land. It was only after the exposure of Nazi horrors and the recognition that the United
    States would not accept large numbers of Jewish refugees that many
    American Jews embraced Zionism—usually at the level of abstract principle rather than as a personal goal. Some of the old resistance has even
    returned in recent years. Inclined to religious and political liberalism,
    the American Jewish community has drifted away from an increasingly
    Orthodox and hawkish Israeli society.

    Mead is not naïve about the geopolitical incentives that drew the United
    States closer to Israel around the middle of the 20th century. The book's
    most original chapters explain how American strategists came to regard
    Israel as an ally in the Cold War. This process was slower and more
    tentative than conventional accounts suggest. When Kennedy offered his
    dramatic assurance to Meir, Mead notes, France and West Germany were still Israel's major suppliers of weapons. And Kennedy's goal was not to unleash Israeli power, but provide security assurances that might dissuade Israel
    from pursuing nuclear weapons.

    Still, Mead mounts a compelling critique of what he calls "Vulcan
    theory"—a reference not to Star Trek but to the 19th-century theory that irregularities in the orbit of Mercury were caused by a hitherto unknown
    planet (dubbed "Vulcan" by the French astronomer Urbain Le Verrier). Mead adopts the term to describe a different way of accounting for the
    apparently disproportionate role of Israel in American foreign policy. In
    this view, cultural affinities and overlapping priorities are not
    sufficient explanations of the close, though not codified, alliance. There
    must be some sinister explanation, often linked to the dual loyalties of
    Jews or eschatological hopes of evangelical Christians.

    But there's no need to make such dubious assumptions. American support for
    the state of Israel since 1948 is sufficiently explained by mainstream
    public opinion, including a predilection for the perceived underdog. Nor
    are these views limited to the right, which now dominates the "pro-Israel" issue. Before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, in fact, enthusiasm for Israel
    was more characteristic of the American left, which saw the Jewish state
    not only as the haven of an embattled minority but also a model of
    democratic socialism. This perception of Israel was somewhat
    mythological—as is the image of a Jewish Sparta that has largely replaced
    it. But that doesn't mean it wasn't sincerely believed by many ordinary Americans—or the politicians who took their opinions seriously.

    But Mead's riposte to Vulcan theory isn't limited to Middle East policy.
    This large, somewhat ungainly book exceeds the boundaries of its nominal subject in mounting a case against any attempt to reduce American foreign policy to the mechanistic calculation of quantifiable interests. This kind
    of Vulcanism—more like Spock than Le Verrier—simply fails to understand
    the influence of ideas, culture, and history on America's intensely
    moralistic politics. Although it's unlikely to change any readers' views
    about U.S. relations with Israel, The Arc of a Covenant sheds welcome
    light on why they have been—and remain—so distinctively, often
    frustratingly, special.

    The Arc of a Covenant: The United States, Israel, and the Fate of the
    Jewish People
    by Walter Russell Mead
    Knopf, 672 pp., $35

    Samuel Goldman, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University, is the author of After Nationalism and God's
    Country: Christian Zionism in America.

    https://freebeacon.com/policy/the-other-special-relationship/

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