ในวันที่ วันจันทร์ที่ 23 มีนาคม ค.ศ. 1998 เวลา 15 นาฬิกา 00 นาที 00 วินาที UTC+7 Sanpawat เขียนว่า:

Rerngchai's men let him
down
In the second part of a special
series on the baht-defence policy,
Vatchara Charoonsantikul and Thanong
Khanthong investigate why former
central bank governor Rerngchai
Marakanond made no decision on the
baht policy.
EVEN a forthnight before the Bank of
Thailand's fateful decision to float
the baht on July 2, 1997, Rerngchai
Marakanond, the then central bank
governor, did not receive any
meaningful feedback from his general,
Dr Chaiyawat Wibulswasdi, the then
deputy governor, over how the central
bank would deal with the
badly-bruised fixed exchange rate
regime.
Ever since the May attack, Rerngchai
could not sleep and felt that he was
about to have a nervous breakdown.
The currency situation had been
getting worse each cruel passing day
after that blood-soaked battle when
the central bank had fiercely
defended the baht from a global
attack that literally emanated from
every international financial centre.
Between May 9 to 16, the central
bank's dealers from the Banking
Department sold as much as US$20.51
billion to defend the integrity of
the currency peg system, but also
succeeded in regaining around US$3.12
billion from some of the tyro
speculators. However, the central
bank was slowly losing strength,
suffering from internal bleeding.
Capital was flowing out of its
reserves at the rate of $400 to $500
million a day on account of the panic
in the country that the baht would
not survive a devaluation.
In spite of the crisis, Rerngchai was
not given any foreign exchange policy
options from his top top lieutenants:
Chaiyawat, Siri Garnjaroendee, the
assistant governor, Thanya
Sirivedhin, another assistant
governor, Kleo-thong Hetrakul, the
chief economist, and Bandid
Nijathaworn, director of the Banking
Department. Chaiyawat's stubborn
faith in the integrity of the
currency peg system prevailed over
the collective decision-making body
because of his overwhelming stature.
Siri and Thanya were inclined to back
off from a go-for-broke strategy to
defend the baht, yet they could not
bring themselves to changing
Chaiyawat's conviction or influencing
the governor otherwise. Bandid shared
Chaiyawat's faith.
Since Chaiyawat had all the
macroeconomic figures in his hands,
his authority was not challenged. The
whole team continued to pursue the
macroeconomic objectives of
tightening the fiscal and monetary
policy, tackling the real estate
problems, restoring confidence to the
financial institutions and
considering a possible change of the
currency regime.
These were the policy priorities of
Rerngchai's team. The baht would be
defended at all costs until these
measures were put in place to restore
confidence. Chaiyawat would not touch
the currency regime in any way.
Underlying his fears was the fact
that Thailand would not be able to
contain the financial market turmoil
and could easily become another
Mexico if the central bank changed
its currency regime.
For most of the time, Rerngchai
passed Chaiyawat's excuse of not
touching the fixed exchange rate
system to Dr Amnuay Viravan, the then
deputy prime minister and finance
minister. Amnuay was consulted over
the matter, yet the whole team
appeared incapable of making any
decisions. Rerngchai would admit
later that he was not a technical man
and had high respect for Chaiyawat
and the central bank's top brains.
How could he make any decisions on
adjusting, changing or abolishing the
fixed exchange rate system when his
own team said they were not ready?
On one occasion, Chaiyawat tried to
defend the status quo to the
frustrated MR Chatu Mongkol Sonakul,
the then permanent secretary for
finance, who joined in most of the
top-secret meetings on Thailand's
foreign exchange policy. The two
often clashed on the baht policy. At
the safe house of Phongsathorn
Siriyothin, Amnuay's chief aide,
Chatu Mongkol at one point said: ''Do
you think that all the other people
are fools and don't understand what
you are doing.''
Attacks on the baht became stronger
on May 8th after a relatively quiet
March and April. In the February
attack, the central bank was
confident that it won the battle. The
situation was much graver in May.
This time George Soros, the big-time
speculator and his good friends aimed
to take the Thai fixed exchange rate
system apart.
Four days later Bandid Nijathaworn,
the director of the Banking
Department, completed a strictly
confidential report to his immediate
supervisor, Siri, to inform him about
the baht defence strategy. As of May
9th, Bandid wrote, the BOT's net
foreign exchange reserves stood at
US$17.74 billion due to a big jump of
the foreign exchange swap obligations
to US$18.86 billion.
These swap obligations -- contracts
to sell the US dollar for the baht
with settlements due on a certain
date in the future -- were the
missiles that had been fired out from
the central bank's arsenal to defend
the baht and tackle the liquidity
problem. The advantage of swap
contracts was that the central bank's
foreign exchange reserves would be
camouflaged until the settlements
were made.
These reserve positions were so
confidential that Bandid had to carry
his reports around personally, for
fears of a leak. The speculators
would have loved to learn about the
central bank's swap obligations, for
the figures would tell them the level
of remaining ammunition the central
bank had. They realised that critical
level of the central bank's usable
reserves was US$16 billion, which had
to be maintained at all time to back
the Thai currency or banknote. Timing
this figure with Bt25.00 would
produce the Thai money of Bt400
billion in circulation at that time.
Even with the sharp plunge of usable
reserves, Bandid insisted on asking
Siri's permission to continue to buy
time and defend the baht until the
country's structural problems could
be resolved. He called for a need to
design a limit at which the central
bank would intervene in the foreign
exchange markets to defend the baht
or revise the currency regime. In the
meantime, Bandid suggested that the
central bank enter into swap
contracts with the neighbouring
central banks or directly borrow US
dollars from the financial markets to
supply it with the new ammunition to
defend the baht.
Bandid's suggestions simply reflected
a status quo in a time of
desperation.
(Wednesday: The foreign exchange
policy options that were not there)
The Nation

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