• about Ukrainian history

    From Oleg Smirnov@21:1/5 to All on Sun Jul 18 18:58:25 2021
    XPost: soc.culture.ukrainian, relcom.politics, alt.history

    Putin has written an article. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> EN <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> RU

    Besides the current transient issues, it's useful because it inter alia includes a brief review of the Ukraine's history since ancient time to the modern post-Soviet period. It's not a Putin's "original research", of
    course, it's based on the set of notable and basic facts commonly known in Russia and near Russia. It's compact and pretty accurate.

    So it's recommended for reading to any interested one.

    Ukrainian Kiev-controlled outlets have issued numerous responses (they are
    very attentive to what is said in Russia). I have scanned them and haven't found someone who disputed the facts. Those who pusrue anti-Russia agenda, mostly issued claims like "it's all is more propaganda and disinformation", some issued acrimonies, but no one dared to refute specifically (like
    "this claim is wrong" or "this is a misinterpretation"), which means they
    have nothing but empty obstructionist noise against the facts.

    * * *

    After the anti-constitutional and anti-democratic coup in 2014, the neo- Ukrainanin nationalists together with their foreign supporters were
    desperate to falsify the Ukraine's history, and some drivelous claims were added to the Wikipedia and elsewhere. Popular sources like the Wikipedia
    cannot be considered reliable nowadays when it comes to politicaly charged "hot" issies. They said recently that it has become "a big nasty complex
    game" <https://bit.ly/2US6KWI>.

    * * *

    The below are some considerations from myself.

    After the 13th century Mongol invasion, the north-eastern part of Russia
    fell into a vassalage to the Golden Horde, and the rest soon shifted under direct Polish rule. Later, while 'Moskovia' increasingly freed itself from
    the dependence, the very opposite process took place for the Poland's
    Russians. When the Moscow-led state became recognizable and strong, the Poland's Russians were a distinguishable group within the Polish state,
    but in no way a state. Since the 15th century, foreigners applied the term 'Russia' mainly to the Moscow state, - because it was commonly seen as the contemporary continuation of Russia.

    Besides, there was also a discernment between "big" or "great" Russia (the Moscow-Novgorod state) and "little" or "minor" Russia (the Poland's area). These "big" and "little" terms were invented not by the Muscovites but by
    the Byzantine Orthodox church, which at the time patronized the both
    "great" and "minor" Russias. The Russian Russia was called 'great' not
    just because of its political significance, but also because it was much
    larger in size <https://bit.ly/3euSrOX>. The nothern part of Russia hadn't
    been ravaged by the nomadic looters, and the Russian expansion north and
    and north-east continued even during the "Mongol Yoke" period.

    Oppressive colonial policies toward the Russians in Poland led to a series
    of uprisings since the late 16th century, until one of them (which
    happened even without any support from Moscow) turned out successful, and
    thus, in the 1650s, a large part of the Poland's Russian area had switched
    to Russia. The increased pressure against the 'minor' Russians in Poland happened not for no reason, it was correlated with the internal weakening
    of Russia, which led it to the Time of Troubles since the late 16th
    century. The Time of Troubles, the events within Poland, and then the
    Russian recovery from the Time of Troubles and the start of transition of "minor Russia" into Russia from Poland was, overally, one complex trend of
    the regional development.

    The term "Ukraine" literally meant "borderland", - it was originally used
    in this literal sense, but after adding the part of the Poland's Russian
    area to Russia, the actual borderland shifted westward, so the term was expanded to the whole new area. I.e. the area between the previous literal borderland and the new literal borderland started to be called Borderland
    (the Ukraine) in more figurative sense, and thus it had become a proper
    noun. The size of this area in the 17th century was much smaller than the present day Ukraine. Later, most of the rest of the Poland's Russian area
    was retaken by Russia, so "the Ukraine" was expanded further westward.

    The Poland's Russians considered themselves Russians, ie. the same people
    as the Muscovites, which may be seen from many sources (various writings
    and poetries left by various authors who were living within 'minor Russia'
    in the 15-17th centuries). The Poles called them Russian as well. However, until the 19th century, there was no national sentiment close to the
    modern meaning. Knowledge of ancestry, religious affiliation and language
    were the basis for an identity. The "minor Russians" started to better
    realize some differences from the Muscovites after most part of the "minor Russia" had been included into Russia. Colonization had left its marks.

    In the 18th century, Russia shifted its "borderland" southward up to the
    Black Sea through conquest of the Crimean Khanate (a formation somewhat analogous to the Barbary Pirates in the west-European context). The new
    lands (non-domesticated steppe, originally) were named Novorossiya, and
    then, in the Soviet design, they were included into the Soviet Ukraine.
    The present day territory of the Ukraine is a Soviet product. The Soviets generously appended to the post-Poland area not only the Novorossiya lands
    in the south, but also some non-Ukrainian lands in the east (Donbas and
    more), - so, the 'true' Ukraine (the post-Poland lands) is less than half
    of the post-Soviet Ukraine. Ukrainization of the whole territory happened within the USSR.

    The Soviet generosity at the time is not an exaggeratioon, it was
    doctrinally motivated by the [naive] Communist expectations. They believed
    that the World Communism may be achieved in quite a close future, and then ethnicities / nations / states will simply become of little significance.
    So the Soviet republics formed.

    * * *

    Among the present day Russians, there's a variety of Russian nationalisms (every nationalism is linked with some common experience in the past, and Russia had many [sharp] turns). There are different kinds of nationalism
    among the Ukrainians as well. The kind driving the post-coup development
    is not from the grassroots. The Ukrainians did not know much good from
    their western colonizers. This post-2014-coup neo-Ukrainian nationalism is linked with a part of their ruling class that believes it would be more prestigious to attach the Ukraine to Europe, and alienate it from Russia.
    After the 2014 coup, life of the regular people in the Ukraine turned to
    the worse, but their ruling class has become closer to the West, so they continue to indoctrinate the populace that their course is good for them.

    The problem with this neo-Ukrainian kind of nationalism is that it
    basically cannot be non-hostile to Russia. Every nationalism / patriotism
    needs some 'anchors': its national heroes and victories, national cultural achievents. In the case of the Ukraine, most of their decent national
    heroes and victories and achievements turn to be inextricably linked with Russia in some or another way. So the neo-patriotic ideologists, who serve
    for the post-coup regime, desperately seek to find or invent something
    'purely Ukrainian'. In their desperation, they pick up some ugly persons
    from the past (eg. those served to the German Nazis) and misrepresent them
    as heroes. They pick up some controversial and dubious 'heroes' from more distant past too. They seek to invent fictitious history, not only through distorted interpretation of real historical facts, but even in a frankly blatant mythical way.

    Borscht Question may serve as a comic illustration of this desperation.
    Borscht is an ancient and common east-Slavic/Baltic dish, it was invented
    long before apperance of the Ukraine, but they struggle fiercely to make
    the world believe that borscht is solely 'ukrainian'. This is pathetic.
    And the English Wikipedia article attributes it strictly to the Ukraine, despite that at the time when borscht was invented there was neither the Ukraine nor an idea of the Ukraine, and it's even impossible to claim it
    was invented within the lands of the present day Ukraine. The only special
    link between borscht and the Ukraine is that the Ukrainians love borscht
    more than other peoples who also eat it. It would be similar as if tea was attributed to Russia because the Russians love it more than other nations.

    Given that the Ukrainian history is organically inseparable from Russia,
    the neo-Ukrainian nationalism needs concepts that would artificially
    alienate populace from Russia. For this, they have invented two narrative
    lines (which don't go very well with each other). The first is that Russia
    was a persistent oppressor and enemy of the Ukrainians since the very
    ancient time (some feuds in the 12th century within the early Russia are misinterpreted in this way). The second is essentially racist-like, which suggests the Ukrainians are True Slavs whereas the Russians are "finno- mongolic genetic rabble" (this idea was picked up from the Polish Catholic ideologists). The both are for ignorant people, but it's enough for a part
    of the populace that accepts it. Another part can't accept it, and this is
    why the post-coup regime faces not just "dissidents", but the internal insurgency. Russia cannot stay apart from these issues, so it has accepted Crimea and won't abandon its support for the Donbas resistance.

    I tend to believe the post-coup Ukraine won't last too long. It's
    impossible to build something reliable and durable on the basis of hateful
    and dense falsities. The fact the Western policy makers have chosen to
    support the neo-Ukrainian nationalism means they've chosen enmity towards Russia. All their righteous "democracy-values" rhetorics are undermined by
    the fact they back up a baser and hateful agenda with action. I also tend
    to believe that one day these folks will get what they deserve.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Oleg Smirnov@21:1/5 to All on Sun Jul 18 19:04:33 2021
    XPost: soc.culture.ukrainian, relcom.politics, alt.history

    some issued acrimonies, but no one dared to refute specifically (like
    "this claim is wrong" or "this is a misinterpretation"), which means they have nothing but empty obstructionist noise against the facts.

    I've also scanned "western" responses to the Putin's essay. They are quite many, and the whole scenery is about the same ugly. Most part of the
    responses represents an attept to undermine the essay's message with noise
    made up of non-specific phrasings and acrimonies. One rampant German clown
    has boldly written "historians .. found scores of inconsistencies, logical fallacies and plain fact-rigging" <https://tinyurl.com/yeamyqwj>. It would
    be nice if someone pointed specifically to at least one critic who managed
    to find at least one specific contradiction, logical error or "plain fact- rigging" in the essay.

    Many 'critics' abuse strawman fallacy in their responces by claiming that
    Putin rejects the very idea of the Ukraine's independence and the like, -
    one should read the essay theirselves to know it's not really the case.

    I managed to find only one response taking the history review more or less honestly <http://tinyurl.com/yg2z3p9j>, but the writer doesn't dispute the history as such, only speculates on how it could be applied politically.

    One pig-like freak at the Atlantic Council was so much excited that issued
    two articles with a break of two days: <https://tinyurl.com/yf4v9hfy> and <https://tinyurl.com/yjtc2yr2>. And the both are under #Disinformation tag.
    Of course, there's no any specific / factual rebuttals but only high-flown rhetorics with cliches like "myths and conspiracy theories". To compensate
    for the lack of specifics in his rants, the pig fellow referred to "senior fellow Anders Aslund" who "branded the article a masterclass in disinformation", so the readers are supposed to believe that Aslund has presented some arguments about what specifically dis-informative is there.

    The Aslund's response is really extraordinary because this is, so far, the
    only response that tries to dispute something specific about history, so I answer some of his claims below.

    | <https://tinyurl.com/dw3htsw4> project-syndicate.org
    | Putin begins his tale in Ancient Rus, where Russians, Ukrainians, and
    | Belarusians were united by one language and - after the "baptism of
    | Russia" into the Orthodox religion - one faith until the fifteenth
    | century. Even amid fragmentation, Putin writes, the people perceived
    | Russia as their shared motherland.

    The Aslund's first lie is that he points to the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians in the context of Ancient Rus. At the time, the Ukrainians or
    the Belarusians simply did not exist, were not known, such names did not
    exist, the areas of the present day Ukraine or Belarus were not somehow "delineated" or "singled out" from the rest of then early Russia. Compare
    it with what Putin wrote and feel the difference: "Russians, Ukrainians,
    and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus".

    "Fragmentation" of the early Russia (due to sharing of inheritance between
    sons of one ruling dynasty) happened mainly since the 12th century. Indeed
    it was perceived at the time like 'brotherly' feuds within a family, - in contrast to attitudes towards 'non-Russian' neighbors. Old chronicles and Russian/Belarusian/Ukrainian folklore clearly testify to this.

    About "the Orthodox religion .. until the fifteenth century", - it was a
    part of the Poland's oppression against 'minor' Russians since the 15th
    century when it started pressuring them to convert to the Catholicism.

    | According to this (OS: Which?) narrative, the Polish-Russian War of
    | 1605-18 was, for the people, "liberating." Ukrainians were "reunited"
    | with the rest of the Russian Orthodox people, forming "little Russia,"

    Here is the Aslund's greater lie where he sarcastically claims that Russia
    took the Ukrainians forcibly from Poland, - as a result of "Polish-Russian
    War of 1605-18" (while blatant Putin seeks to claim it was 'liberation').

    The passage is utterly ridiculous and reveals the Aslund's utter ignorance about the history, which is proportional to his unhealthy self-conceit.
    One should better learn about the Polish participation in the Russian Time
    of Troubles. The Polish-Russian War of 1605-18 ended with defeat of Russia,
    and Russia had lost quite large territories to Poland.

    The "little Russia" term, as I've written above, was not invented *after* joining the Poland's Russian area to Russia. It existed long before that.
    It didn't represent a Moscow's arrogant or patronical attitide, the "minor Russians" themselves willingly used this term with regard to themselves,
    which may be seen in historical documents from the 15 - 18th centuries.

    | In Putin's story, the creation of Novorossiya in 1764 and the expansion
    | of the Russian Empire also reflected the will of the people. "The
    | integration of the western Russian lands into the common state ..

    The cited Pitin's sentence does not apply to Novorossiya, - one should
    read the article to see that the sentence starts the summary conclusions
    part after review of the developments throughout the 16 - 18th centuries.

    | But Putin suggests that the shared language - separated only by
    | "regional linguistic features and dialects" - all but nullifies the
    | possibility that Ukraine could have developed its own culture. For
    | example, while Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's national poet, wrote poems
    | in Ukrainian, he wrote prose mainly in Russian. Similarly, Nikolai Gogol
    | - born in the Poltava Governorate of Ukraine, then part of the Russian
    | Empire - was a "patriot of Russia," and wrote in the Russian language.
    | "How can this heritage be divided between Russia and Ukraine?"

    Here the ignorant moron abuses the strawman fallacy. Putin has not said
    that the Ukrainians don't have their cultural specifics, he simply points
    to the fact that it's hardly separable from Russia. Because, yes, the historical figures like Shevchenko and Gogol, and not only, can not be attributed either solely to Russia or solely to the Ukraine. They are both
    as Russian as Ukrainian, and this is a matter of fact, regardless of what [mis]interpretations one would like to derive from this fact.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Steve Hayes@21:1/5 to All on Mon Jul 19 05:04:40 2021
    XPost: soc.culture.ukrainian, relcom.politics, alt.history
    XPost: soc.history

    On Sun, 18 Jul 2021 18:58:25 +0300, "Oleg Smirnov" <os333@netc.eu>

    Putin has written an article. ><http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> EN ><http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181> RU

    Besides the current transient issues, it's useful because it inter alia >includes a brief review of the Ukraine's history since ancient time to the >modern post-Soviet period. It's not a Putin's "original research", of
    course, it's based on the set of notable and basic facts commonly known in >Russia and near Russia. It's compact and pretty accurate.

    Thank you for this.
    Steve Hayes from Tshwane, South Africa
    Web: http://www.khanya.org.za/stevesig.htm
    Blog: http://khanya.wordpress.com
    E-mail - see web page, or parse: shayes at dunelm full stop org full stop uk

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)