https://jonathanturley.org/2022/12/31/eleventh-circuit-rejects-transgender-students-challenge-to-bathroom-policy
Eleventh Circuit Rejects Transgender Students Challenge to Bathroom Policy
On December 30, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit handed down a major opinion in in Adams v. School Board of St.
Johns County, Florida. The court ruled 7-4 against a statutory and >constitutional challenge of a transgender student to a district policy >requiring students to use bathrooms corresponding to their biological
sex. Given the countervailing decision of the Fourth Circuit in G.G. v. >Gloucester County, there is now a conflict in the circuits that could
prompt a Supreme Court review. The Court expressly stated that it was
not ruling on this question in its 2020 decision in Bostock v. Clayton >County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
Adams brought the challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the >Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1, and Title IX of the >Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.
Judge Barbara Lagoa wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by
Chief Judge Bill Pryor and Judges Newsom, Branch, Grant, Luck, and
Brasher. Judges Wilson, Jordan, Rosenbaum, and Jill Pryor each wrote >dissenting opinions.
The court reversed the decision of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida. Judge Timothy Corrigan enjoined the
policy and awarded $1,000 in compensation to Adams. Corrigans decision
was particularly notable in his interpretation of the word sex under
Title IX, which the Eleventh Circuit ultimately rejected (as discussed >below).
What happened next was interesting. A divided appellate panel affirmed
the district court over a dissent from Chief Judge Pryor. Adams ex rel. >Kesper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir.
2020). The Court then explained:
After a member of this Court withheld the mandate, the panel majority
sua sponte withdrew its initial opinion and issued a revised opinion,
again affirming the district court over a revised dissent but on grounds
that were neither substantively discussed in the initial panel opinion
nor substantively made by any party before the district court or this
Court.2 Adams ex rel. Kesper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 3 F.4th
1299, 130304 (11th Cir. 2021); id. at 1321 (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
We then granted the School Boards petition for rehearing en banc and
vacated the panels revised opinion. Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of
St. Johns Cnty., 9 F.4th 1369, 1372 (11th Cir. 2021).
Judge Lagoa begins the majority opinion by describing the dispute as >involving the unremarkableand nearly universalpractice of separating >school bathrooms based on biological sex. In analyzing the
straightforward claims, Lagoa laid out the facts and holding:
Adams, who identifies as a male, argues that the policy violates
Adamss rights because, as a transgender student, Adams cannot use the >bathroom that corresponds to the sex with which Adams identifies. Which
is to say, Adams argues that by facially discriminating between the two >sexes, the School Boards bathroom policy also necessarily discriminates >against transgender students. We disagree with Adamss theory that
separation of bathrooms on the basis of biological sex necessarily >discriminates against transgender students.
On the Equal Protection question, the court ruled that intermediate
scrutiny applies to the case and that the district needs only show that
the policy (1) advances an important governmental objective and (2) is >substantially related to that objective. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S.
at 724. The court found both criteria satisfied because the policy
is clearly related toindeed, is almost a mirror ofits objective of >protecting the privacy interests of students to use the bathroom away
from the opposite sex and to shield their bodies from the opposite sex
in the bathroom, which, like a locker room or shower facility, is one of
the spaces in a school where such bodily exposure is most likely to occur.
On the Title IX issue, the court held that the statute allows schools to >provide separate bathrooms on the basis of biological sex.
That is exactly what the School Board has done in this case; it has
provided separate bathrooms for each of the biological sexes. And to >accommodate transgender students, the School Board has provided
single-stall, sex-neutral bathrooms, which Title IX neither requires nor >prohibits. Nothing about this bathroom policy violates Title IX.
Moreover, under the Spending Clauses clear-statement rule, the term
sex, as used within Title IX, must unambiguously mean something other
than biological sexwhich it does notin order to conclude that the
School Board violated Title IX. The district courts contrary conclusion
is not supported by the plain and ordinary meaning of the word sex and >provides ample support for subsequent litigants to transform schools
living facilities, locker rooms, showers, and sports teams into
sex-neutral areas and activities. Whether Title IX should be amended to >equate gender identity and transgender status with sex should be
left to Congressnot the courts.
Judge Lagoa went further in a separate concurrence:
Affirming the district courts order and adopting Adamss definition of
sex under Title IX to include gender identity or transgender
status would have had repercussions far beyond the bathroom door. There >simply is no limiting principle to cabin that definition of sex to the >regulatory carve-out for bathrooms under Title IX, as opposed to the >regulatory carve-out for sports or, for that matter, to the statutory
and regulatory carve-outs for living facilities, showers, and locker
rooms. And a definition of sex beyond biological sex would not only
cut against the vast weight of drafting-era dictionary definitions and
the Spending Clauses clear-statement rule but would also force female >student athletes to compete against students who have a very
significant biological advantage, including students who have the size
and strength of a male but identify as female. Id. at 177980. Such a >propositioni.e., commingling both biological sexes in the realm of
female athleticswould threaten[] to undermine one of [Title IXs]
major achievements, giving young women an equal opportunity to
participate in sports. Id. at 1779.
Judge Jordan takes issue with the analysis and, while agreeing that >intermediate scrutiny applies, finds a clear violation of the
Constitution, noting an inherent contradiction in the policy:
The School Board did not allow Drew Adams, a transgender student, to
use the boys bathroom. As explained below, however, the School Boards >policy allows a transgender student just like Drew to use the boys
bathroom if he enrolls after transition with documents listing him as
male. Because such a student poses the same claimed safety and privacy >concerns as Drew, the School Boards bathroom policy can only be
justified by administrative convenience. And when intermediate scrutiny >applies, administrative convenience is an insufficient justification for
a gender-based classification.
Judge Wilson attacked the medical claims of the district in a separate >dissent and suggests that it is based on the indeterminacy of gender at >birth:
Underlying this sex-assigned-at-matriculation bathroom policy, however,
is the presumption that biological sex is accurately determinable at
birth and that it is a static or permanent biological determination. In
other words, the policy presumes it does not need to accept amended >documentation because a students sex does not change. This presumption
is both medically and scientifically flawed. After considering a more >scientific and medical perspective on biological sex, it is clear that
the bathroom policys refusal to accept updated medical documentation is >discriminatory on the basis of sex.
In her dissent, Judge Jill Pryor rejected the accommodation of a gender >neutral bathroom:
Each time teenager Andrew Adams needed to use the bathroom at his
school, Allen D. Nease High School, he was forced to endure a
stigmatizing and humiliating walk of shamepast the boys bathrooms and
into a single-stall gender neutral bathroom. The experience left him >feeling unworthy, like something that needs to be put away. The reason
he was prevented from using the boys bathroom like other boys? He is a >transgender boy.
To start, the majority opinion simply declareswithout any basisthat a >persons biological sex is comprised solely of chromosomal structure
and birth-assigned sex. So, the majority opinion concludes, a persons
gender identity has no bearing on this case about equal protection for a >transgender boy. The majority opinion does so in disregard of the record >evidenceevidence the majority does not contestwhich demonstrates that >gender identity is an immutable, biological component of a persons sex.
It is a fascinating set of opinions (which also includes a dissent from
Judge Rosenbaum). With the conflict with the Fourth Circuit, it would
make for an ideal basis for the Court to consider the constitutional and >statutory issues by granting a petition for writ of certiorari.
The accommodation of the gender neutral bathroom makes this policy >particularly interesting for review. While some would argue that this
amounts to a gender version of separation but equal, the district
sought a middle position on the controversy. However, much turns on the >definition of sex under Title IX.
Adams and others relied upon the Supreme Courts recent decision in
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). That case involved >employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq, and Justice
Neil Gorsuch wrote in the 6-3 decision that it is impossible to
discriminate against a person based on their sexual orientation or
gender identity without discriminating based on sex. (Justices Thomas,
Alito, and Kavanaugh dissented).
However, the Court expressly stated that it was not ruling on this issue:
Under Title VII, . . . we do not purport to address bathrooms, locker
rooms, or anything else of the kind. The only question before us is
whether an employer who fires someone simply for being homosexual or >transgender has discharged or otherwise discriminated against that
individual because of such individuals sex.
The Biden Administration, however, has issued a Notice of Interpretation >through the U.S. Department of Educations Office for Civil Rights that
it will enforce Title IXs prohibition on discrimination on the basis of
sex to include: (1) discrimination based on sexual orientation; and (2) >discrimination based on gender identity.
Here is the opinion: Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida
On Sat, 31 Dec 2022 11:08:49 -0800, Michael Ejercito
<MEjercit@HotMail.com> wrote:
https://jonathanturley.org/2022/12/31/eleventh-circuit-rejects-transgender-students-challenge-to-bathroom-policy
Eleventh Circuit Rejects Transgender Student’s Challenge to Bathroom Policy
On December 30, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit handed down a major opinion in in Adams v. School Board of St.
Johns County, Florida. The court ruled 7-4 against a statutory and
constitutional challenge of a transgender student to a district policy
requiring students to use bathrooms corresponding to their biological
sex. Given the countervailing decision of the Fourth Circuit in G.G. v.
Gloucester County, there is now a conflict in the circuits that could
prompt a Supreme Court review. The Court expressly stated that it was
not ruling on this question in its 2020 decision in Bostock v. Clayton
County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
Adams brought the challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and Title IX of the
Education Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.
Judge Barbara Lagoa wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by
Chief Judge Bill Pryor and Judges Newsom, Branch, Grant, Luck, and
Brasher. Judges Wilson, Jordan, Rosenbaum, and Jill Pryor each wrote
dissenting opinions.
The court reversed the decision of the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida. Judge Timothy Corrigan enjoined the
policy and awarded $1,000 in compensation to Adams. Corrigan’s decision
was particularly notable in his interpretation of the word “sex” under >> Title IX, which the Eleventh Circuit ultimately rejected (as discussed
below).
What happened next was interesting. A divided appellate panel affirmed
the district court over a dissent from Chief Judge Pryor. Adams ex rel.
Kesper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir.
2020). The Court then explained:
“After a member of this Court withheld the mandate, the panel majority
sua sponte withdrew its initial opinion and issued a revised opinion,
again affirming the district court over a revised dissent but on grounds
that were neither substantively discussed in the initial panel opinion
nor substantively made by any party before the district court or this
Court.2 Adams ex rel. Kesper v. Sch. Bd. of St. Johns Cnty., 3 F.4th
1299, 1303–04 (11th Cir. 2021); id. at 1321 (Pryor, C.J., dissenting).
We then granted the School Board’s petition for rehearing en banc and
vacated the panel’s revised opinion. Adams ex rel. Kasper v. Sch. Bd. of >> St. Johns Cnty., 9 F.4th 1369, 1372 (11th Cir. 2021).”
Judge Lagoa begins the majority opinion by describing the dispute as
involving “the unremarkable—and nearly universal—practice of separating
school bathrooms based on biological sex.” In analyzing the
“straightforward” claims, Lagoa laid out the facts and holding:
“Adams, who identifies as a male, argues that the policy violates
Adams’s rights because, as a transgender student, Adams cannot use the
bathroom that corresponds to the sex with which Adams identifies. Which
is to say, Adams argues that by facially discriminating between the two
sexes, the School Board’s bathroom policy also necessarily discriminates >> against transgender students. We disagree with Adams’s theory that
separation of bathrooms on the basis of biological sex necessarily
discriminates against transgender students.”
On the Equal Protection question, the court ruled that intermediate
scrutiny applies to the case and that the district needs only show that
the policy (1) advances an important governmental objective and (2) is
substantially related to that objective. Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S.
at 724. The court found both criteria satisfied because the policy
“is clearly related to—indeed, is almost a mirror of—its objective of >> protecting the privacy interests of students to use the bathroom away
from the opposite sex and to shield their bodies from the opposite sex
in the bathroom, which, like a locker room or shower facility, is one of
the spaces in a school where such bodily exposure is most likely to occur.”
On the Title IX issue, the court held that the statute allows schools to
provide separate bathrooms on the basis of biological sex.
“That is exactly what the School Board has done in this case; it has
provided separate bathrooms for each of the biological sexes. And to
accommodate transgender students, the School Board has provided
single-stall, sex-neutral bathrooms, which Title IX neither requires nor
prohibits. Nothing about this bathroom policy violates Title IX.
Moreover, under the Spending Clause’s clear-statement rule, the term
“sex,” as used within Title IX, must unambiguously mean something other >> than biological sex—which it does not—in order to conclude that the
School Board violated Title IX. The district court’s contrary conclusion >> is not supported by the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “sex” and >> provides ample support for subsequent litigants to transform schools’
living facilities, locker rooms, showers, and sports teams into
sex-neutral areas and activities. Whether Title IX should be amended to
equate “gender identity” and “transgender status” with “sex” should be
left to Congress—not the courts.”
Judge Lagoa went further in a separate concurrence:
Affirming the district court’s order and adopting Adams’s definition of >> “sex” under Title IX to include “gender identity” or “transgender >> status” would have had repercussions far beyond the bathroom door. There >> simply is no limiting principle to cabin that definition of “sex” to the >> regulatory carve-out for bathrooms under Title IX, as opposed to the
regulatory carve-out for sports or, for that matter, to the statutory
and regulatory carve-outs for living facilities, showers, and locker
rooms. And a definition of “sex” beyond “biological sex” would not only
cut against the vast weight of drafting-era dictionary definitions and
the Spending Clause’s clear-statement rule but would also force female
student athletes “to compete against students who have a very
significant biological advantage, including students who have the size
and strength of a male but identify as female.” Id. at 1779–80. Such a >> proposition—i.e., commingling both biological sexes in the realm of
female athletics—would “threaten[] to undermine one of [Title IX’s]
major achievements, giving young women an equal opportunity to
participate in sports.” Id. at 1779.
Judge Jordan takes issue with the analysis and, while agreeing that
intermediate scrutiny applies, finds a clear violation of the
Constitution, noting an inherent contradiction in the policy:
“The School Board did not allow Drew Adams, a transgender student, to
use the boys’ bathroom. As explained below, however, the School Board’s >> policy allows a transgender student just like Drew to use the boys’
bathroom if he enrolls after transition with documents listing him as
male. Because such a student poses the same claimed safety and privacy
concerns as Drew, the School Board’s bathroom policy can only be
justified by administrative convenience. And when intermediate scrutiny
applies, administrative convenience is an insufficient justification for
a gender-based classification.”
Judge Wilson attacked the medical claims of the district in a separate
dissent and suggests that it is based on the indeterminacy of gender at
birth:
“Underlying this sex-assigned-at-matriculation bathroom policy, however, >> is the presumption that biological sex is accurately determinable at
birth and that it is a static or permanent biological determination. In
other words, the policy presumes it does not need to accept amended
documentation because a student’s sex does not change. This presumption
is both medically and scientifically flawed. After considering a more
scientific and medical perspective on biological sex, it is clear that
the bathroom policy’s refusal to accept updated medical documentation is >> discriminatory on the basis of sex.”
In her dissent, Judge Jill Pryor rejected the accommodation of a gender
neutral bathroom:
Each time teenager Andrew Adams needed to use the bathroom at his
school, Allen D. Nease High School, he was forced to endure a
stigmatizing and humiliating walk of shame—past the boys’ bathrooms and >> into a single-stall “gender neutral” bathroom. The experience left him >> feeling unworthy, like “something that needs to be put away.” The reason >> he was prevented from using the boys’ bathroom like other boys? He is a
transgender boy.
…
To start, the majority opinion simply declares—without any basis—that a >> person’s “biological sex” is comprised solely of chromosomal structure >> and birth-assigned sex. So, the majority opinion concludes, a person’s
gender identity has no bearing on this case about equal protection for a
transgender boy. The majority opinion does so in disregard of the record
evidence—evidence the majority does not contest—which demonstrates that >> gender identity is an immutable, biological component of a person’s sex.”
It is a fascinating set of opinions (which also includes a dissent from
Judge Rosenbaum). With the conflict with the Fourth Circuit, it would
make for an ideal basis for the Court to consider the constitutional and
statutory issues by granting a petition for writ of certiorari.
The accommodation of the gender neutral bathroom makes this policy
particularly interesting for review. While some would argue that this
amounts to a gender version of “separation but equal,” the district
sought a middle position on the controversy. However, much turns on the
definition of “sex” under Title IX.
Adams and others relied upon the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020). That case involved
employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, § 701 et seq., as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq, and Justice
Neil Gorsuch wrote in the 6-3 decision that it is impossible to
discriminate against a person based on their sexual orientation or
gender identity without discriminating based on sex. (Justices Thomas,
Alito, and Kavanaugh dissented).
However, the Court expressly stated that it was not ruling on this issue:
“Under Title VII, . . . we do not purport to address bathrooms, locker
rooms, or anything else of the kind. The only question before us is
whether an employer who fires someone simply for being homosexual or
transgender has discharged or otherwise discriminated against that
individual “because of such individual’s sex.”
The Biden Administration, however, has issued a Notice of Interpretation
through the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights that
it will enforce Title IX’s prohibition on discrimination on the basis of >> sex to include: (1) discrimination based on sexual orientation; and (2)
discrimination based on gender identity.
Here is the opinion: Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida
You and your freak trannie friends should hold it in until you get
home. You have a double whammy; you're both a he/she and a gook. Those
are two fucked-up things to be.
Loose Cannon wrote:
On Sat, 31 Dec 2022 11:08:49 -0800, Michael EjercitoMangina, I am a normal man, and it is immoral for you to call me a
<MEjercit@HotMail.com> wrote:
https://jonathanturley.org/2022/12/31/eleventh-circuit-rejects-transgender-students-challenge-to-bathroom-policy
Eleventh Circuit Rejects Transgender Students Challenge to Bathroom Policy >>>
Here is the opinion: Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida
You and your freak trannie friends should hold it in until you get
home. You have a double whammy; you're both a he/she and a gook. Those
are two fucked-up things to be.
gook.
In other news, a couple will be expecting another baby.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FSwF9ZiYaVw
What a beautiful family!
The same can not be said about your character, for your character is
hideous!
You are a Nazi.
As a Nazi, you are, above all else
On Sun, 22 Jan 2023 18:45:51 -0800, Michael EjercitoI am a normal man.
<MEjercit@HotMail.com> wrote:
Loose Cannon wrote:
On Sat, 31 Dec 2022 11:08:49 -0800, Michael EjercitoMangina, I am a normal man, and it is immoral for you to call me a
<MEjercit@HotMail.com> wrote:
https://jonathanturley.org/2022/12/31/eleventh-circuit-rejects-transgender-students-challenge-to-bathroom-policy
Eleventh Circuit Rejects Transgender Student’s Challenge to Bathroom Policy
Here is the opinion: Adams v. School Board of St. Johns County, Florida >>>
You and your freak trannie friends should hold it in until you get
home. You have a double whammy; you're both a he/she and a gook. Those
are two fucked-up things to be.
gook.
Right away you've lied twice. You are neither normal nor a man.
I callYou call me a normal man!
you a gook because you are a gook. What else should I call you, slope?
Nithing, there is no bestiality nor smut; there is heterosexuality, matrimony, and pregnancy!
In other news, a couple will be expecting another baby.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FSwF9ZiYaVw
What a beautiful family!
Posting bestiality smut like that should be a criminal offense
The same can not be said about your character, for your character is
hideous!
You are a Nazi.
Thank you
As a Nazi, you are, above all else
I knew that already but thanks for admitting it.
"You on the other hand are a gook. As a gook, you belove everythingChris never wrote that.
but jews. There's nothing lower than a jew"
- Christopher Morton
I am wonderfully hungry!
In that case gook, EAT SHIT!!
In the meantime, checkl out this picture.
https://i.ytimg.com/vi/_C36KR-7zB0/frame0.jpg
Michael
What the fuck is with the size of that gook's head? He's definitely
some kind of retarded freak. This cheerleader obviously is feeling
sorry for the deformed creature.
On Sun, 19 Mar 23 13:53:47 UTC, Loose Sphincter, the unhappily married gay neo-nazitard, whined again:
Those jew bitches are disgusting!
http://gawker.com/woman-accused-of-seducing-teen-neighbor-is-infamous-all-1702308807
The 23-year-old Florida woman arrested Monday for allegedly having sex
with her 15-year-old neighbor was accused in 2012 of having sex with
at least two dogs.
STILL no proof that she was Jewish, after you've been posting your identical lies for years already, you lying and forging piece of neo-nazi shit?
On Mon, 20 Mar 2023 15:38:33 -0400, Loose Sphincter, the unhappily married gay neo-nazitard, now FORGING as BTov, whined again:
In the meantime, checkl out this picture.
https://i.ytimg.com/vi/_C36KR-7zB0/frame0.jpg
Michael
What the fuck is with the size of that gook's head? He's definitely
some kind of retarded freak. This cheerleader obviously is feeling
sorry for the deformed creature.
LOL Poor miserable gay neo-nazitard can't understand that those whom he considers "inferior" are actually superior to him! Loose Sphincter, it
ALWAYS has been like that and ALWAYS will be like that. Learn to accept it! LOL
what do you get when you cross a nigger with a gorilla?
...a dumber gorilla.
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