[continued from previous message]
In the longer term these developments could transform the nature of combat in ways that we can now only glimpse faintly:
During the century ahead, as our ability to modify fundamental life processes continues its rapid advance, we will be able not only to devise additional ways to destroy life but will also become able to manipulate it--including the processes of cognition,
development, reproduction, and inheritance. A world in which these capabilities are widely employed for hostile purposes would be a world in which the very nature of conflict had radically changed. Therein could lie unprecedented opportunities for
violence, coercion, repression, or subjugation... At present we appear to be approaching a crossroads--a time that will test whether biotechnology, like all major predecessor technologies, will come to be intensively exploited for hostile purposes, or
whether our species will find the collective wisdom to take a different course...[9]
Clearly such a prospect deserves careful analysis and wide-ranging debate. National and international security are not well-served by ignoring the issues and allowing the world to creep towards new biochemical and biological weapons, as departments of
defense and justice in the developed world continue to explore their utility for short-term tactical goals. We owe it to the children of the world to consider carefully the course we elect, rather than thoughtlessly allowing momentum to carry us forward
down one fork in the road ahead.
[1] For a brief discussion of some of these technologies, and their application to drug and weapon development, see Wheelis, Biotechnology and biochemical weapons. Nonproliferation Review, 9 No.1, 48-53. Available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol09/91/
91whee.htm
[2] For a discussion of some of the bioregulators with potential for hostile use, see Dando, The danger to the Chemical Weapons Convention from incapacitating chemicals, available at
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/scwc/cwcrcp/cwcrcp_4.pdf
[3] An exception is pathogens that have alternative hosts. Ebola virus, for instance, with a very high human lethality and low human-to-human transmissibility, could not persist in nature without an alternative host in which its lethality is lower and
its transmissibility higher.
[4] For an analysis of the relationship between incapacitation and lethality see Klotz et al, Beware the siren's song: why "non-lethal" chemical agents are lethal (available at
http://microbiology.ucdavis.edu/faculty/mwheelis/sirens_song.pdf).
[5] See Wheelis, "Non-lethal" chemical weapons: a Faustian bargain. Issues in Science and Technology Spring 2003, 74-78. Available at
http://microbiology.ucdavis.edu/faculty/mwheelis/IST_paper.pdf; and "Non-lethal weapons, the CWC and the BWC. Chemical
and Biological Weapons Conventions Bulletin No. 61. September 2003. Available at
http://fas-www.harvard.edu:80/~hsp/pdf.html.
[6] For a draft of such a treaty, see A draft convention to prohibit chemical and biological weapons under international law. Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions Bulletin No. 42, December 1998, 1-5. available at
http://fas-www.harvard.edu:80/~hsp/
bulletin/cbwcb42.pdf
[7] See Tucker, Preventing terrorist access to dangerous pathogens: the need for international biosecurity standards. Disarmament Diplomacy No. 66 (September 2002), 8-12. Available at
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd66/66op2.htm
[8] See Fink et al, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism. National Research Council, in press ; and Steinbrunner and Harris, . Issues in Science and Technology Spring 2003, 74-78. Available at
http://search.nap.edu/issues/19.3/steinbruner.htm
[9] Meselson, "Averting the hostile exploitation of biotechnology," Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions Bulletin 48, 16-19 (2000). Available at www.harvard.edu:80/~hsp/bulletin/cbwcb48.pdf
http://www.politicsandthelifesciences.org/Biosecurity_course_folder/readings/wheelis.html
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