Is there another way? Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister, thinks so. At his home in the leafy town of Ra’anana a few miles north of Tel Aviv, he spells out what he calls his “squeeze approach” — a plan that is original in its conception and
unexpected in its conclusion.

“What’s important is to not play along with the lines that Hamas wrote for us,” he says. “I think there’s a much less costly way to go about things.”

Hamas’s master plan, as Bennett sees it, is roughly as follows: Provoke, via its gruesome massacres on Oct. 7, a massive Israeli ground invasion. Force Israeli troops to fight for weeks or months on unfamiliar and terrifying ground, causing thousands
of casualties. Dribble out opportunities for hostage releases or cease-fires as a way of weakening Israel’s resolve and obtaining material concessions, particularly fuel. Bleed the Israeli economy dry by requiring the country to keep its citizen army
mobilized for months. Count on diplomatic pressure and Israel’s well-known low tolerance for high casualties to get Jerusalem to call it quits after a few weeks of war, just as it often has in the past.

What Bennett envisions is to turn Hamas’s current assets into liabilities. Five in particular: terrain, time, triggers, the world’s attention and the hostages.

Militarily, the plan he sketches begins by having Israel establish a security zone in Gaza two kilometers deep while also cutting the territory in half, somewhere between Gaza City and Khan Younis. Already, nearly 800,000 Gazans have fled from north to
south despite efforts by Hamas to keep them in place. Two humanitarian corridors, subject to Israeli controls, will allow civilians still trapped in the north to move south. Israel will permit water, food and medicine to reach the south and will create
medical and humanitarian safe havens in the buffer zone.

This is the most manpower- and firepower-intensive part of Bennett’s plan, but it does not involve a thrust into the heart of Gaza’s cities. It leaves the north of Gaza completely cut off — above all, of energy. “There’s a reason they’re
asking for fuel,” he says of Hamas’s recent attempts to trade hostages for gas. “They’re asking for fuel not for their citizens but for their tunnels,” which are used exclusively by Hamas fighters and their allies.

Gaining this kind of control means that Israel isolates the battlefield — a core requirement in any successful war and a time-tested way of protecting civilians. It allows most of Israel’s reservists to go home, relieving the heavy strain on the
economy. It eases the crisis on the international stage while doing nothing to release Hamas from its chokehold.

Most important, it allows Israel to conduct what Bennett describes as an “ongoing and persistent series of targeted ground raids” over a long period without the need to occupy cities in force.

Smaller raids tend to produce fewer deaths, particularly civilian casualties, and less physical destruction, at least when compared with airstrikes or artillery fire. They play to the unique skills of Israel’s special forces. They reduce the chances of
a triggering event in which large numbers of civilian casualties prompt Hezbollah to open a front in the north or Palestinians in the West Bank to start a third intifada. And they minimize the exposure of regular Israeli infantry to the hazards of dense
urban combat.

“I don’t want to get into a Viet Cong-type war of tunnels,” Bennett says. “I want to surprise them by letting them dry out in the tunnels. Imagine a Hamas terrorist waiting in one of those tunnels with his weapons. The one thing he doesn’t
expect is to be stuck there for nine months with no logistics backing, running out of food, cold, wet and miserable.”

As for the hostages, Bennett recognizes there are no easy answers. But he thinks Hamas has begun to realize that “holding babies, the elderly and foreign citizens is an inherent liability, given that they want public sympathy.” In the meantime, Hamas
will probably do everything it can to keep the hostages alive and reasonably healthy, if only because they are useless to it when dead. This, too, is a drain on the group’s dwindling resources.

Bennett sees the war lasting months, even years, much like the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The long timetable imposes a need for patience on an Israeli public justifiably hungry for vengeance and victory. But the cumulative result of his
concept would be the complete destruction of Hamas’s war-fighting capacity and the deaths of thousands of its fighters.

There’s a coda to his plan. At some point, any Hamas fighters who remain in Gaza will be offered the chance for passage to a third country — Algeria, maybe, or Qatar, where Hamas has financial patrons. While Bennett dislikes the linkage, safe passage
may be the price Israel is willing to pay in the end for the freedom of remaining hostages.

“It would be like Beirut in 1982, when Yasir Arafat and all of his terrorists got on a boat and left Lebanon forever,” Bennett says, recalling the Palestinian leader’s forced eviction to Tunisia under Israel’s siege of the city. At that point,
the displaced people of southern Gaza might choose to return to their homes, and the displaced people of southern Israel could confidently opt to go back to theirs.

More: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-strategy-bennett.html

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

In article <5121bbf8-5a17-465f-b2f3-91e687899b93n@googlegroups.com>, davidbrown20782@gmail.com says...

Is there another way? Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister, thinks so. At his home in the leafy town of Ra?anana a few miles north of Tel Aviv, he spells out what he calls his ?squeeze approach? ? a plan that is original in its conception and

unexpected in its conclusion.

?What?s important is to not play along with the lines that Hamas wrote for us,? he says. ?I think there?s a much less costly way to go about things.?

Hamas?s master plan, as Bennett sees it, is roughly as follows: Provoke, via its gruesome massacres on Oct. 7, a massive Israeli ground invasion. Force Israeli troops to fight for weeks or months on unfamiliar and terrifying ground, causing thousands

of casualties. Dribble out opportunities for hostage releases or cease-fires as a way of weakening Israel?s resolve and obtaining material concessions, particularly fuel. Bleed the Israeli economy dry by requiring the
country to keep its citizen army mobilized for months. Count on diplomatic pressure and Israel?s well-known low tolerance for high casualties to get Jerusalem to call it quits after a few weeks of war, just as it often has in the past.

What Bennett envisions is to turn Hamas?s current assets into liabilities. Five in particular: terrain, time, triggers, the world?s attention and the hostages.

Militarily, the plan he sketches begins by having Israel establish a security zone in Gaza two kilometers deep while also cutting the territory in half, somewhere between Gaza City and Khan Younis. Already, nearly 800,000 Gazans have fled from north to

south despite efforts by Hamas to keep them in place. Two humanitarian corridors, subject to Israeli controls, will allow civilians still trapped in the north to move south. Israel will permit water, food and medicine to
reach the south and will create medical and humanitarian safe havens in the buffer zone.

This is the most manpower- and firepower-intensive part of Bennett?s plan, but it does not involve a thrust into the heart of Gaza?s cities. It leaves the north of Gaza completely cut off ? above all, of energy. ?There?s a reason they?re asking for

fuel,? he says of Hamas?s recent attempts to trade hostages for gas. ?They?re asking for fuel not for their citizens but for their tunnels,? which are used exclusively by Hamas fighters and their allies.

Gaining this kind of control means that Israel isolates the battlefield ? a core requirement in any successful war and a time-tested way of protecting civilians. It allows most of Israel?s reservists to go home, relieving the heavy strain on the

economy. It eases the crisis on the international stage while doing nothing to release Hamas from its chokehold.

Most important, it allows Israel to conduct what Bennett describes as an ?ongoing and persistent series of targeted ground raids? over a long period without the need to occupy cities in force.

Smaller raids tend to produce fewer deaths, particularly civilian casualties, and less physical destruction, at least when compared with airstrikes or artillery fire. They play to the unique skills of Israel?s special forces. They reduce the chances of

a triggering event in which large numbers of civilian casualties prompt Hezbollah to open a front in the north or Palestinians in the West Bank to start a third intifada. And they minimize the exposure of regular Israeli
infantry to the hazards of dense urban combat.

?I don?t want to get into a Viet Cong-type war of tunnels,? Bennett says. ?I want to surprise them by letting them dry out in the tunnels. Imagine a Hamas terrorist waiting in one of those tunnels with his weapons. The one thing he doesn?t expect is to

be stuck there for nine months with no logistics backing, running out of food, cold, wet and miserable.?

As for the hostages, Bennett recognizes there are no easy answers. But he thinks Hamas has begun to realize that ?holding babies, the elderly and foreign citizens is an inherent liability, given that they want public sympathy.? In the meantime, Hamas

will probably do everything it can to keep the hostages alive and reasonably healthy, if only because they are useless to it when dead. This, too, is a drain on the group?s dwindling resources.

Bennett sees the war lasting months, even years, much like the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The long timetable imposes a need for patience on an Israeli public justifiably hungry for vengeance and victory. But the cumulative result of his

concept would be the complete destruction of Hamas?s war-fighting capacity and the deaths of thousands of its fighters.

There?s a coda to his plan. At some point, any Hamas fighters who remain in Gaza will be offered the chance for passage to a third country ? Algeria, maybe, or Qatar, where Hamas has financial patrons. While Bennett dislikes the linkage, safe passage

may be the price Israel is willing to pay in the end for the freedom of remaining hostages.

?It would be like Beirut in 1982, when Yasir Arafat and all of his terrorists got on a boat and left Lebanon forever,? Bennett says, recalling the Palestinian leader?s forced eviction to Tunisia under Israel?s siege of the city. At that point, the

displaced people of southern Gaza might choose to return to their homes, and the displaced people of southern Israel could confidently opt to go back to theirs.

More: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-strategy-bennett.html

Hamas killed babys on purpose. Fuck Hamas and none of your crybaby shit
will change that.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 1:45:48 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <5121bbf8-5a17-465f...@googlegroups.com>,
davidbr...@gmail.com says...

Is there another way? Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister, thinks so. At his home in the leafy town of Ra?anana a few miles north of Tel Aviv, he spells out what he calls his ?squeeze approach? ? a plan that is original in its conception and

unexpected in its conclusion.

?What?s important is to not play along with the lines that Hamas wrote for us,? he says. ?I think there?s a much less costly way to go about things.?

Hamas?s master plan, as Bennett sees it, is roughly as follows: Provoke, via its gruesome massacres on Oct. 7, a massive Israeli ground invasion. Force Israeli troops to fight for weeks or months on unfamiliar and terrifying ground, causing thousands

of casualties. Dribble out opportunities for hostage releases or cease-fires as a way of weakening Israel?s resolve and obtaining material concessions, particularly fuel. Bleed the Israeli economy dry by requiring the

country to keep its citizen army mobilized for months. Count on diplomatic pressure and Israel?s well-known low tolerance for high casualties to get Jerusalem to call it quits after a few weeks of war, just as it often has in the past.

What Bennett envisions is to turn Hamas?s current assets into liabilities. Five in particular: terrain, time, triggers, the world?s attention and the hostages.

Militarily, the plan he sketches begins by having Israel establish a security zone in Gaza two kilometers deep while also cutting the territory in half, somewhere between Gaza City and Khan Younis. Already, nearly 800,000 Gazans have fled from north

to south despite efforts by Hamas to keep them in place. Two humanitarian corridors, subject to Israeli controls, will allow civilians still trapped in the north to move south. Israel will permit water, food and medicine to

reach the south and will create medical and humanitarian safe havens in the buffer zone.

This is the most manpower- and firepower-intensive part of Bennett?s plan, but it does not involve a thrust into the heart of Gaza?s cities. It leaves the north of Gaza completely cut off ? above all, of energy. ?There?s a reason they?re asking for

fuel,? he says of Hamas?s recent attempts to trade hostages for gas. ?They?re asking for fuel not for their citizens but for their tunnels,? which are used exclusively by Hamas fighters and their allies.

Gaining this kind of control means that Israel isolates the battlefield ? a core requirement in any successful war and a time-tested way of protecting civilians. It allows most of Israel?s reservists to go home, relieving the heavy strain on the

economy. It eases the crisis on the international stage while doing nothing to release Hamas from its chokehold.

Most important, it allows Israel to conduct what Bennett describes as an ?ongoing and persistent series of targeted ground raids? over a long period without the need to occupy cities in force.

Smaller raids tend to produce fewer deaths, particularly civilian casualties, and less physical destruction, at least when compared with airstrikes or artillery fire. They play to the unique skills of Israel?s special forces. They reduce the chances

of a triggering event in which large numbers of civilian casualties prompt Hezbollah to open a front in the north or Palestinians in the West Bank to start a third intifada. And they minimize the exposure of regular Israeli

infantry to the hazards of dense urban combat.

?I don?t want to get into a Viet Cong-type war of tunnels,? Bennett says. ?I want to surprise them by letting them dry out in the tunnels. Imagine a Hamas terrorist waiting in one of those tunnels with his weapons. The one thing he doesn?t expect is

to be stuck there for nine months with no logistics backing, running out of food, cold, wet and miserable.?

As for the hostages, Bennett recognizes there are no easy answers. But he thinks Hamas has begun to realize that ?holding babies, the elderly and foreign citizens is an inherent liability, given that they want public sympathy.? In the meantime, Hamas

will probably do everything it can to keep the hostages alive and reasonably healthy, if only because they are useless to it when dead. This, too, is a drain on the group?s dwindling resources.

Bennett sees the war lasting months, even years, much like the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The long timetable imposes a need for patience on an Israeli public justifiably hungry for vengeance and victory. But the cumulative result of his

concept would be the complete destruction of Hamas?s war-fighting capacity and the deaths of thousands of its fighters.

There?s a coda to his plan. At some point, any Hamas fighters who remain in Gaza will be offered the chance for passage to a third country ? Algeria, maybe, or Qatar, where Hamas has financial patrons. While Bennett dislikes the linkage, safe passage

may be the price Israel is willing to pay in the end for the freedom of remaining hostages.

?It would be like Beirut in 1982, when Yasir Arafat and all of his terrorists got on a boat and left Lebanon forever,? Bennett says, recalling the Palestinian leader?s forced eviction to Tunisia under Israel?s siege of the city. At that point, the

displaced people of southern Gaza might choose to return to their homes, and the displaced people of southern Israel could confidently opt to go back to theirs.

More: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-strategy-bennett.html

Hamas killed babys on purpose. Fuck Hamas and none of your crybaby shit
will change that.

So you know more and know better, than a former Israeli prime minister.
Got it.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

In article <bd45d663-c822-4e1a-b4ed-f02b25afc37bn@googlegroups.com>, jebediah.grainger2@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 1:45:48�PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <5121bbf8-5a17-465f...@googlegroups.com>,
davidbr...@gmail.com says...

Is there another way? Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister, thinks so. At his home in the leafy town of Ra?anana a few miles north of Tel Aviv, he spells out what he calls his ?squeeze approach? ? a plan that is original in its conception and

unexpected in its conclusion.

?What?s important is to not play along with the lines that Hamas wrote for us,? he says. ?I think there?s a much less costly way to go about things.?

Hamas?s master plan, as Bennett sees it, is roughly as follows: Provoke, via its gruesome massacres on Oct. 7, a massive Israeli ground invasion. Force Israeli troops to fight for weeks or months on unfamiliar and terrifying ground, causing

thousands of casualties. Dribble out opportunities for hostage releases or cease-fires as a way of weakening Israel?s resolve and obtaining material concessions, particularly fuel. Bleed the Israeli economy dry by requiring the

country to keep its citizen army mobilized for months. Count on diplomatic pressure and Israel?s well-known low tolerance for high casualties to get Jerusalem to call it quits after a few weeks of war, just as it often has in the past.

What Bennett envisions is to turn Hamas?s current assets into liabilities. Five in particular: terrain, time, triggers, the world?s attention and the hostages.

Militarily, the plan he sketches begins by having Israel establish a security zone in Gaza two kilometers deep while also cutting the territory in half, somewhere between Gaza City and Khan Younis. Already, nearly 800,000 Gazans have fled from

north to south despite efforts by Hamas to keep them in place. Two humanitarian corridors, subject to Israeli controls, will allow civilians still trapped in the north to move south. Israel will permit water, food and medicine
to

reach the south and will create medical and humanitarian safe havens in the buffer zone.

This is the most manpower- and firepower-intensive part of Bennett?s plan, but it does not involve a thrust into the heart of Gaza?s cities. It leaves the north of Gaza completely cut off ? above all, of energy. ?There?s a reason they?re asking for

fuel,? he says of Hamas?s recent attempts to trade hostages for gas. ?They?re asking for fuel not for their citizens but for their tunnels,? which are used exclusively by Hamas fighters and their allies.

Gaining this kind of control means that Israel isolates the battlefield ? a core requirement in any successful war and a time-tested way of protecting civilians. It allows most of Israel?s reservists to go home, relieving the heavy strain on the

economy. It eases the crisis on the international stage while doing nothing to release Hamas from its chokehold.

Most important, it allows Israel to conduct what Bennett describes as an ?ongoing and persistent series of targeted ground raids? over a long period without the need to occupy cities in force.

Smaller raids tend to produce fewer deaths, particularly civilian casualties, and less physical destruction, at least when compared with airstrikes or artillery fire. They play to the unique skills of Israel?s special forces. They reduce the

chances of a triggering event in which large numbers of civilian casualties prompt Hezbollah to open a front in the north or Palestinians in the West Bank to start a third intifada. And they minimize the exposure of regular
Israeli

infantry to the hazards of dense urban combat.

?I don?t want to get into a Viet Cong-type war of tunnels,? Bennett says. ?I want to surprise them by letting them dry out in the tunnels. Imagine a Hamas terrorist waiting in one of those tunnels with his weapons. The one thing he doesn?t expect

is to be stuck there for nine months with no logistics backing, running out of food, cold, wet and miserable.?

As for the hostages, Bennett recognizes there are no easy answers. But he thinks Hamas has begun to realize that ?holding babies, the elderly and foreign citizens is an inherent liability, given that they want public sympathy.? In the meantime,

Hamas will probably do everything it can to keep the hostages alive and reasonably healthy, if only because they are useless to it when dead. This, too, is a drain on the group?s dwindling resources.

Bennett sees the war lasting months, even years, much like the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The long timetable imposes a need for patience on an Israeli public justifiably hungry for vengeance and victory. But the cumulative result of

his concept would be the complete destruction of Hamas?s war-fighting capacity and the deaths of thousands of its fighters.

There?s a coda to his plan. At some point, any Hamas fighters who remain in Gaza will be offered the chance for passage to a third country ? Algeria, maybe, or Qatar, where Hamas has financial patrons. While Bennett dislikes the linkage, safe

passage may be the price Israel is willing to pay in the end for the freedom of remaining hostages.

?It would be like Beirut in 1982, when Yasir Arafat and all of his terrorists got on a boat and left Lebanon forever,? Bennett says, recalling the Palestinian leader?s forced eviction to Tunisia under Israel?s siege of the city. At that point, the

displaced people of southern Gaza might choose to return to their homes, and the displaced people of southern Israel could confidently opt to go back to theirs.

More: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-strategy-bennett.html

Hamas killed babys on purpose. Fuck Hamas and none of your crybaby shit will change that.

So you know more and know better, than a former Israeli prime minister.
Got it.

I didn't say that. There you go again. I know Hamas targeted babys and
women. That is all that matters. Stop trying to spin shit around. So far
you have run from 8 threads that YOU started.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 5:01:52 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <bd45d663-c822-4e1a...@googlegroups.com>,
jebediah....@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 1:45:48 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <5121bbf8-5a17-465f...@googlegroups.com>, davidbr...@gmail.com says...

Is there another way? Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister, thinks so. At his home in the leafy town of Ra?anana a few miles north of Tel Aviv, he spells out what he calls his ?squeeze approach? ? a plan that is original in its conception and

unexpected in its conclusion.

?What?s important is to not play along with the lines that Hamas wrote for us,? he says. ?I think there?s a much less costly way to go about things.?

Hamas?s master plan, as Bennett sees it, is roughly as follows: Provoke, via its gruesome massacres on Oct. 7, a massive Israeli ground invasion. Force Israeli troops to fight for weeks or months on unfamiliar and terrifying ground, causing

thousands of casualties. Dribble out opportunities for hostage releases or cease-fires as a way of weakening Israel?s resolve and obtaining material concessions, particularly fuel. Bleed the Israeli economy dry by requiring the

country to keep its citizen army mobilized for months. Count on diplomatic pressure and Israel?s well-known low tolerance for high casualties to get Jerusalem to call it quits after a few weeks of war, just as it often has in the past.

What Bennett envisions is to turn Hamas?s current assets into liabilities. Five in particular: terrain, time, triggers, the world?s attention and the hostages.

Militarily, the plan he sketches begins by having Israel establish a security zone in Gaza two kilometers deep while also cutting the territory in half, somewhere between Gaza City and Khan Younis. Already, nearly 800,000 Gazans have fled from

north to south despite efforts by Hamas to keep them in place. Two humanitarian corridors, subject to Israeli controls, will allow civilians still trapped in the north to move south. Israel will permit water, food and medicine

to

reach the south and will create medical and humanitarian safe havens in the buffer zone.

This is the most manpower- and firepower-intensive part of Bennett?s plan, but it does not involve a thrust into the heart of Gaza?s cities. It leaves the north of Gaza completely cut off ? above all, of energy. ?There?s a reason they?re asking

for fuel,? he says of Hamas?s recent attempts to trade hostages for gas. ?They?re asking for fuel not for their citizens but for their tunnels,? which are used exclusively by Hamas fighters and their allies.

Gaining this kind of control means that Israel isolates the battlefield ? a core requirement in any successful war and a time-tested way of protecting civilians. It allows most of Israel?s reservists to go home, relieving the heavy strain on the

economy. It eases the crisis on the international stage while doing nothing to release Hamas from its chokehold.

Most important, it allows Israel to conduct what Bennett describes as an ?ongoing and persistent series of targeted ground raids? over a long period without the need to occupy cities in force.

Smaller raids tend to produce fewer deaths, particularly civilian casualties, and less physical destruction, at least when compared with airstrikes or artillery fire. They play to the unique skills of Israel?s special forces. They reduce the

chances of a triggering event in which large numbers of civilian casualties prompt Hezbollah to open a front in the north or Palestinians in the West Bank to start a third intifada. And they minimize the exposure of regular

Israeli

infantry to the hazards of dense urban combat.

?I don?t want to get into a Viet Cong-type war of tunnels,? Bennett says. ?I want to surprise them by letting them dry out in the tunnels. Imagine a Hamas terrorist waiting in one of those tunnels with his weapons. The one thing he doesn?t expect

is to be stuck there for nine months with no logistics backing, running out of food, cold, wet and miserable.?

As for the hostages, Bennett recognizes there are no easy answers. But he thinks Hamas has begun to realize that ?holding babies, the elderly and foreign citizens is an inherent liability, given that they want public sympathy.? In the meantime,

Hamas will probably do everything it can to keep the hostages alive and reasonably healthy, if only because they are useless to it when dead. This, too, is a drain on the group?s dwindling resources.

Bennett sees the war lasting months, even years, much like the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The long timetable imposes a need for patience on an Israeli public justifiably hungry for vengeance and victory. But the cumulative result of

his concept would be the complete destruction of Hamas?s war-fighting capacity and the deaths of thousands of its fighters.

There?s a coda to his plan. At some point, any Hamas fighters who remain in Gaza will be offered the chance for passage to a third country ? Algeria, maybe, or Qatar, where Hamas has financial patrons. While Bennett dislikes the linkage, safe

passage may be the price Israel is willing to pay in the end for the freedom of remaining hostages.

?It would be like Beirut in 1982, when Yasir Arafat and all of his terrorists got on a boat and left Lebanon forever,? Bennett says, recalling the Palestinian leader?s forced eviction to Tunisia under Israel?s siege of the city. At that point,

the displaced people of southern Gaza might choose to return to their homes, and the displaced people of southern Israel could confidently opt to go back to theirs.

More: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-strategy-bennett.html

Hamas killed babys on purpose. Fuck Hamas and none of your crybaby shit will change that.

So you know more and know better, than a former Israeli prime minister. Got it.

I didn't say that. There you go again. I know Hamas targeted babys and

women. That is all that matters.

Note to Hamas: Next time, just come to America and shoot up people with AR-15s.
Skeeter won't care if you do that!

Stop trying to spin shit around.
IRONY.dd

So far

you have run from 8 threads that YOU started.

I'll start threads when I want and I'll close them when I please, and there's not a single thing you can do about it.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

In article <cff67b35-da09-4d56-ab06-8accda38ecc4n@googlegroups.com>, jebediah.grainger2@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 5:01:52�PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <bd45d663-c822-4e1a...@googlegroups.com>,
jebediah....@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 1:45:48 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <5121bbf8-5a17-465f...@googlegroups.com>, davidbr...@gmail.com says...

Is there another way? Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister, thinks so. At his home in the leafy town of Ra?anana a few miles north of Tel Aviv, he spells out what he calls his ?squeeze approach? ? a plan that is original in its conception

and unexpected in its conclusion.

?What?s important is to not play along with the lines that Hamas wrote for us,? he says. ?I think there?s a much less costly way to go about things.?

Hamas?s master plan, as Bennett sees it, is roughly as follows: Provoke, via its gruesome massacres on Oct. 7, a massive Israeli ground invasion. Force Israeli troops to fight for weeks or months on unfamiliar and terrifying ground, causing

thousands of casualties. Dribble out opportunities for hostage releases or cease-fires as a way of weakening Israel?s resolve and obtaining material concessions, particularly fuel. Bleed the Israeli economy dry by requiring
the

country to keep its citizen army mobilized for months. Count on diplomatic pressure and Israel?s well-known low tolerance for high casualties to get Jerusalem to call it quits after a few weeks of war, just as it often has in the past.

What Bennett envisions is to turn Hamas?s current assets into liabilities. Five in particular: terrain, time, triggers, the world?s attention and the hostages.

Militarily, the plan he sketches begins by having Israel establish a security zone in Gaza two kilometers deep while also cutting the territory in half, somewhere between Gaza City and Khan Younis. Already, nearly 800,000 Gazans have fled from

north to south despite efforts by Hamas to keep them in place. Two humanitarian corridors, subject to Israeli controls, will allow civilians still trapped in the north to move south. Israel will permit water, food and
medicine

to

reach the south and will create medical and humanitarian safe havens in the buffer zone.

This is the most manpower- and firepower-intensive part of Bennett?s plan, but it does not involve a thrust into the heart of Gaza?s cities. It leaves the north of Gaza completely cut off ? above all, of energy. ?There?s a reason they?re asking

for fuel,? he says of Hamas?s recent attempts to trade hostages for gas. ?They?re asking for fuel not for their citizens but for their tunnels,? which are used exclusively by Hamas fighters and their allies.

Gaining this kind of control means that Israel isolates the battlefield ? a core requirement in any successful war and a time-tested way of protecting civilians. It allows most of Israel?s reservists to go home, relieving the heavy strain on

the economy. It eases the crisis on the international stage while doing nothing to release Hamas from its chokehold.

Most important, it allows Israel to conduct what Bennett describes as an ?ongoing and persistent series of targeted ground raids? over a long period without the need to occupy cities in force.

Smaller raids tend to produce fewer deaths, particularly civilian casualties, and less physical destruction, at least when compared with airstrikes or artillery fire. They play to the unique skills of Israel?s special forces. They reduce the

chances of a triggering event in which large numbers of civilian casualties prompt Hezbollah to open a front in the north or Palestinians in the West Bank to start a third intifada. And they minimize the exposure of regular

Israeli

infantry to the hazards of dense urban combat.

?I don?t want to get into a Viet Cong-type war of tunnels,? Bennett says. ?I want to surprise them by letting them dry out in the tunnels. Imagine a Hamas terrorist waiting in one of those tunnels with his weapons. The one thing he doesn?t

expect is to be stuck there for nine months with no logistics backing, running out of food, cold, wet and miserable.?

As for the hostages, Bennett recognizes there are no easy answers. But he thinks Hamas has begun to realize that ?holding babies, the elderly and foreign citizens is an inherent liability, given that they want public sympathy.? In the meantime,

Hamas will probably do everything it can to keep the hostages alive and reasonably healthy, if only because they are useless to it when dead. This, too, is a drain on the group?s dwindling resources.

Bennett sees the war lasting months, even years, much like the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The long timetable imposes a need for patience on an Israeli public justifiably hungry for vengeance and victory. But the cumulative result

of his concept would be the complete destruction of Hamas?s war-fighting capacity and the deaths of thousands of its fighters.

There?s a coda to his plan. At some point, any Hamas fighters who remain in Gaza will be offered the chance for passage to a third country ? Algeria, maybe, or Qatar, where Hamas has financial patrons. While Bennett dislikes the linkage, safe

passage may be the price Israel is willing to pay in the end for the freedom of remaining hostages.

?It would be like Beirut in 1982, when Yasir Arafat and all of his terrorists got on a boat and left Lebanon forever,? Bennett says, recalling the Palestinian leader?s forced eviction to Tunisia under Israel?s siege of the city. At that point,

the displaced people of southern Gaza might choose to return to their homes, and the displaced people of southern Israel could confidently opt to go back to theirs.

More: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-strategy-bennett.html

Hamas killed babys on purpose. Fuck Hamas and none of your crybaby shit will change that.

So you know more and know better, than a former Israeli prime minister. Got it.

I didn't say that. There you go again. I know Hamas targeted babys and

women. That is all that matters.

Note to Hamas: Next time, just come to America and shoot up people with AR-15s.
Skeeter won't care if you do that!

Now would you like to explain how you got that out of what I said? Why
do liberals lies and put words in peoples mouths?

Stop trying to spin shit around.
IRONY.dd

Like you did up there? ^

So far

you have run from 8 threads that YOU started.

I'll start threads when I want and I'll close them when I please, and there's not a single thing you can do about it.

Like a 5th grader who didn't get his way.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 7:55:19 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <cff67b35-da09-4d56...@googlegroups.com>,
jebediah....@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 5:01:52 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <bd45d663-c822-4e1a...@googlegroups.com>, jebediah....@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 1:45:48 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <5121bbf8-5a17-465f...@googlegroups.com>, davidbr...@gmail.com says...

Is there another way? Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister, thinks so. At his home in the leafy town of Ra?anana a few miles north of Tel Aviv, he spells out what he calls his ?squeeze approach? ? a plan that is original in its conception

and unexpected in its conclusion.

?What?s important is to not play along with the lines that Hamas wrote for us,? he says. ?I think there?s a much less costly way to go about things.?

Hamas?s master plan, as Bennett sees it, is roughly as follows: Provoke, via its gruesome massacres on Oct. 7, a massive Israeli ground invasion. Force Israeli troops to fight for weeks or months on unfamiliar and terrifying ground, causing

thousands of casualties. Dribble out opportunities for hostage releases or cease-fires as a way of weakening Israel?s resolve and obtaining material concessions, particularly fuel. Bleed the Israeli economy dry by requiring

the

country to keep its citizen army mobilized for months. Count on diplomatic pressure and Israel?s well-known low tolerance for high casualties to get Jerusalem to call it quits after a few weeks of war, just as it often has in the past.

What Bennett envisions is to turn Hamas?s current assets into liabilities. Five in particular: terrain, time, triggers, the world?s attention and the hostages.

Militarily, the plan he sketches begins by having Israel establish a security zone in Gaza two kilometers deep while also cutting the territory in half, somewhere between Gaza City and Khan Younis. Already, nearly 800,000 Gazans have fled

from north to south despite efforts by Hamas to keep them in place. Two humanitarian corridors, subject to Israeli controls, will allow civilians still trapped in the north to move south. Israel will permit water, food and

medicine

to

reach the south and will create medical and humanitarian safe havens in the buffer zone.

This is the most manpower- and firepower-intensive part of Bennett?s plan, but it does not involve a thrust into the heart of Gaza?s cities. It leaves the north of Gaza completely cut off ? above all, of energy. ?There?s a reason they?re

asking for fuel,? he says of Hamas?s recent attempts to trade hostages for gas. ?They?re asking for fuel not for their citizens but for their tunnels,? which are used exclusively by Hamas fighters and their allies.

Gaining this kind of control means that Israel isolates the battlefield ? a core requirement in any successful war and a time-tested way of protecting civilians. It allows most of Israel?s reservists to go home, relieving the heavy strain on

the economy. It eases the crisis on the international stage while doing nothing to release Hamas from its chokehold.

Most important, it allows Israel to conduct what Bennett describes as an ?ongoing and persistent series of targeted ground raids? over a long period without the need to occupy cities in force.

Smaller raids tend to produce fewer deaths, particularly civilian casualties, and less physical destruction, at least when compared with airstrikes or artillery fire. They play to the unique skills of Israel?s special forces. They reduce the

chances of a triggering event in which large numbers of civilian casualties prompt Hezbollah to open a front in the north or Palestinians in the West Bank to start a third intifada. And they minimize the exposure of regular

Israeli

infantry to the hazards of dense urban combat.

?I don?t want to get into a Viet Cong-type war of tunnels,? Bennett says. ?I want to surprise them by letting them dry out in the tunnels. Imagine a Hamas terrorist waiting in one of those tunnels with his weapons. The one thing he doesn?t

expect is to be stuck there for nine months with no logistics backing, running out of food, cold, wet and miserable.?

As for the hostages, Bennett recognizes there are no easy answers. But he thinks Hamas has begun to realize that ?holding babies, the elderly and foreign citizens is an inherent liability, given that they want public sympathy.? In the

meantime, Hamas will probably do everything it can to keep the hostages alive and reasonably healthy, if only because they are useless to it when dead. This, too, is a drain on the group?s dwindling resources.

Bennett sees the war lasting months, even years, much like the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The long timetable imposes a need for patience on an Israeli public justifiably hungry for vengeance and victory. But the cumulative

result of his concept would be the complete destruction of Hamas?s war-fighting capacity and the deaths of thousands of its fighters.

There?s a coda to his plan. At some point, any Hamas fighters who remain in Gaza will be offered the chance for passage to a third country ? Algeria, maybe, or Qatar, where Hamas has financial patrons. While Bennett dislikes the linkage, safe

passage may be the price Israel is willing to pay in the end for the freedom of remaining hostages.

?It would be like Beirut in 1982, when Yasir Arafat and all of his terrorists got on a boat and left Lebanon forever,? Bennett says, recalling the Palestinian leader?s forced eviction to Tunisia under Israel?s siege of the city. At that point,

the displaced people of southern Gaza might choose to return to their homes, and the displaced people of southern Israel could confidently opt to go back to theirs.

More: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-strategy-bennett.html

Hamas killed babys on purpose. Fuck Hamas and none of your crybaby shit
will change that.

So you know more and know better, than a former Israeli prime minister.
Got it.

I didn't say that. There you go again. I know Hamas targeted babys and

women. That is all that matters.

Note to Hamas: Next time, just come to America and shoot up people with AR-15s.
Skeeter won't care if you do that!

Now would you like to explain how you got that out of what I said? Why
do liberals lies and put words in peoples mouths?

Stop trying to spin shit around.
IRONY.dd

Like you did up there? ^

So far

you have run from 8 threads that YOU started.

I'll start threads when I want and I'll close them when I please, and there's not a single thing you can do about it.

Like a 5th grader who didn't get his way.

Again, IRONY

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

Jebediah Grainger <jebediah.grainger2@gmail.com> wrote:

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 5:01:52 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <bd45d663-c822-4e1a...@googlegroups.com>,
jebediah....@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 1:45:48 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <5121bbf8-5a17-465f...@googlegroups.com>,
davidbr...@gmail.com says...

Is there another way? Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister,
thinks so. At his home in the leafy town of Ra?anana a few miles
north of Tel Aviv, he spells out what he calls his ?squeeze approach? >>>>> ? a plan that is original in its conception and unexpected in its conclusion.

?What?s important is to not play along with the lines that Hamas
wrote for us,? he says. ?I think there?s a much less costly way to go about things.?

Hamas?s master plan, as Bennett sees it, is roughly as follows:
Provoke, via its gruesome massacres on Oct. 7, a massive Israeli
ground invasion. Force Israeli troops to fight for weeks or months on >>>>> unfamiliar and terrifying ground, causing thousands of casualties.
Dribble out opportunities for hostage releases or cease-fires as a
way of weakening Israel?s resolve and obtaining material concessions, >>>>> particularly fuel. Bleed the Israeli economy dry by requiring the

country to keep its citizen army mobilized for months. Count on
diplomatic pressure and Israel?s well-known low tolerance for high
casualties to get Jerusalem to call it quits after a few weeks of war, >>>> just as it often has in the past.

What Bennett envisions is to turn Hamas?s current assets into
liabilities. Five in particular: terrain, time, triggers, the world?s >>>>> attention and the hostages.

Militarily, the plan he sketches begins by having Israel establish a >>>>> security zone in Gaza two kilometers deep while also cutting the
territory in half, somewhere between Gaza City and Khan Younis.
Already, nearly 800,000 Gazans have fled from north to south despite >>>>> efforts by Hamas to keep them in place. Two humanitarian corridors,
subject to Israeli controls, will allow civilians still trapped in
the north to move south. Israel will permit water, food and medicine

to

reach the south and will create medical and humanitarian safe havens
in the buffer zone.

This is the most manpower- and firepower-intensive part of Bennett?s >>>>> plan, but it does not involve a thrust into the heart of Gaza?s
cities. It leaves the north of Gaza completely cut off ? above all,
of energy. ?There?s a reason they?re asking for fuel,? he says of
Hamas?s recent attempts to trade hostages for gas. ?They?re asking
for fuel not for their citizens but for their tunnels,? which are
used exclusively by Hamas fighters and their allies.

Gaining this kind of control means that Israel isolates the
battlefield ? a core requirement in any successful war and a
time-tested way of protecting civilians. It allows most of Israel?s
reservists to go home, relieving the heavy strain on the economy. It >>>>> eases the crisis on the international stage while doing nothing to
release Hamas from its chokehold.

Most important, it allows Israel to conduct what Bennett describes as >>>>> an ?ongoing and persistent series of targeted ground raids? over a
long period without the need to occupy cities in force.

Smaller raids tend to produce fewer deaths, particularly civilian
casualties, and less physical destruction, at least when compared
with airstrikes or artillery fire. They play to the unique skills of >>>>> Israel?s special forces. They reduce the chances of a triggering
event in which large numbers of civilian casualties prompt Hezbollah >>>>> to open a front in the north or Palestinians in the West Bank to
start a third intifada. And they minimize the exposure of regular

Israeli

infantry to the hazards of dense urban combat.

?I don?t want to get into a Viet Cong-type war of tunnels,? Bennett
says. ?I want to surprise them by letting them dry out in the
tunnels. Imagine a Hamas terrorist waiting in one of those tunnels
with his weapons. The one thing he doesn?t expect is to be stuck
there for nine months with no logistics backing, running out of food, >>>>> cold, wet and miserable.?

As for the hostages, Bennett recognizes there are no easy answers.
But he thinks Hamas has begun to realize that ?holding babies, the
elderly and foreign citizens is an inherent liability, given that
they want public sympathy.? In the meantime, Hamas will probably do
everything it can to keep the hostages alive and reasonably healthy, >>>>> if only because they are useless to it when dead. This, too, is a
drain on the group?s dwindling resources.

Bennett sees the war lasting months, even years, much like the
campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The long timetable imposes a >>>>> need for patience on an Israeli public justifiably hungry for
vengeance and victory. But the cumulative result of his concept would >>>>> be the complete destruction of Hamas?s war-fighting capacity and the >>>>> deaths of thousands of its fighters.

There?s a coda to his plan. At some point, any Hamas fighters who
remain in Gaza will be offered the chance for passage to a third
country ? Algeria, maybe, or Qatar, where Hamas has financial
patrons. While Bennett dislikes the linkage, safe passage may be the >>>>> price Israel is willing to pay in the end for the freedom of remaining hostages.

?It would be like Beirut in 1982, when Yasir Arafat and all of his
terrorists got on a boat and left Lebanon forever,? Bennett says,
recalling the Palestinian leader?s forced eviction to Tunisia under
Israel?s siege of the city. At that point, the displaced people of
southern Gaza might choose to return to their homes, and the
displaced people of southern Israel could confidently opt to go back to theirs.

More: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-strategy-bennett.html

Hamas killed babys on purpose. Fuck Hamas and none of your crybaby shit >>>> will change that.

So you know more and know better, than a former Israeli prime minister.
Got it.

I didn't say that. There you go again. I know Hamas targeted babys and

women. That is all that matters.

Note to Hamas: Next time, just come to America and shoot up people with AR-15s.
Skeeter won't care if you do that!

Stop trying to spin shit around.
IRONY.dd

So far

you have run from 8 threads that YOU started.

I'll start threads when I want and I'll close them when I please, and
there's not a single thing you can do about it.

In two decades punctuated of whining your way across Usenet, can you point
us to one single thread you closed when you pleased?

Didn’t think so, impotent gimp.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

Ja-Son-Wan-Kenobi Has the High Ground <davidbrown20782@gmail.com> wrote:

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 7:55:19 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <cff67b35-da09-4d56...@googlegroups.com>,
jebediah....@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 5:01:52 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <bd45d663-c822-4e1a...@googlegroups.com>,
jebediah....@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 1:45:48 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <5121bbf8-5a17-465f...@googlegroups.com>,
davidbr...@gmail.com says...

Is there another way? Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister,
thinks so. At his home in the leafy town of Ra?anana a few miles >>>>>>> north of Tel Aviv, he spells out what he calls his ?squeeze
approach? ? a plan that is original in its conception and unexpected in its
conclusion.

?What?s important is to not play along with the lines that Hamas >>>>>>> wrote for us,? he says. ?I think there?s a much less costly way to go about things.?

Hamas?s master plan, as Bennett sees it, is roughly as follows:
Provoke, via its gruesome massacres on Oct. 7, a massive Israeli >>>>>>> ground invasion. Force Israeli troops to fight for weeks or months >>>>>>> on unfamiliar and terrifying ground, causing thousands of
casualties. Dribble out opportunities for hostage releases or
cease-fires as a way of weakening Israel?s resolve and obtaining material
concessions, particularly fuel. Bleed the Israeli economy dry by requiring

the

country to keep its citizen army mobilized for months. Count on
diplomatic pressure and Israel?s well-known low tolerance for high >>>>>> casualties to get Jerusalem to call it quits after a few weeks of
war, just as it often has in the past.

What Bennett envisions is to turn Hamas?s current assets into
liabilities. Five in particular: terrain, time, triggers, the
world?s attention and the hostages.

Militarily, the plan he sketches begins by having Israel establish >>>>>>> a security zone in Gaza two kilometers deep while also cutting the >>>>>>> territory in half, somewhere between Gaza City and Khan Younis.
Already, nearly 800,000 Gazans have fled from north to south
despite efforts by Hamas to keep them in place. Two humanitarian >>>>>>> corridors, subject to Israeli controls, will allow civilians still >>>>>>> trapped in the north to move south. Israel will permit water, food and >> medicine

to

reach the south and will create medical and humanitarian safe havens >>>>>> in the buffer zone.

This is the most manpower- and firepower-intensive part of
Bennett?s plan, but it does not involve a thrust into the heart of >>>>>>> Gaza?s cities. It leaves the north of Gaza completely cut off ?
above all, of energy. ?There?s a reason they?re asking for fuel,? >>>>>>> he says of Hamas?s recent attempts to trade hostages for gas.
?They?re asking for fuel not for their citizens but for their
tunnels,? which are used exclusively by Hamas fighters and their allies.

Gaining this kind of control means that Israel isolates the
battlefield ? a core requirement in any successful war and a
time-tested way of protecting civilians. It allows most of Israel?s >>>>>>> reservists to go home, relieving the heavy strain on the economy. >>>>>>> It eases the crisis on the international stage while doing nothing >>>>>>> to release Hamas from its chokehold.

Most important, it allows Israel to conduct what Bennett describes >>>>>>> as an ?ongoing and persistent series of targeted ground raids? over >>>>>>> a long period without the need to occupy cities in force.

Smaller raids tend to produce fewer deaths, particularly civilian >>>>>>> casualties, and less physical destruction, at least when compared >>>>>>> with airstrikes or artillery fire. They play to the unique skills >>>>>>> of Israel?s special forces. They reduce the chances of a triggering >>>>>>> event in which large numbers of civilian casualties prompt
Hezbollah to open a front in the north or Palestinians in the West >>>>>>> Bank to start a third intifada. And they minimize the exposure of regular

Israeli

infantry to the hazards of dense urban combat.

?I don?t want to get into a Viet Cong-type war of tunnels,? Bennett >>>>>>> says. ?I want to surprise them by letting them dry out in the
tunnels. Imagine a Hamas terrorist waiting in one of those tunnels >>>>>>> with his weapons. The one thing he doesn?t expect is to be stuck >>>>>>> there for nine months with no logistics backing, running out of
food, cold, wet and miserable.?

As for the hostages, Bennett recognizes there are no easy answers. >>>>>>> But he thinks Hamas has begun to realize that ?holding babies, the >>>>>>> elderly and foreign citizens is an inherent liability, given that >>>>>>> they want public sympathy.? In the meantime, Hamas will probably do >>>>>>> everything it can to keep the hostages alive and reasonably
healthy, if only because they are useless to it when dead. This, >>>>>>> too, is a drain on the group?s dwindling resources.

Bennett sees the war lasting months, even years, much like the
campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The long timetable imposes >>>>>>> a need for patience on an Israeli public justifiably hungry for
vengeance and victory. But the cumulative result of his concept
would be the complete destruction of Hamas?s war-fighting capacity >>>>>>> and the deaths of thousands of its fighters.

There?s a coda to his plan. At some point, any Hamas fighters who >>>>>>> remain in Gaza will be offered the chance for passage to a third >>>>>>> country ? Algeria, maybe, or Qatar, where Hamas has financial
patrons. While Bennett dislikes the linkage, safe passage may be >>>>>>> the price Israel is willing to pay in the end for the freedom of remaining hostages.

?It would be like Beirut in 1982, when Yasir Arafat and all of his >>>>>>> terrorists got on a boat and left Lebanon forever,? Bennett says, >>>>>>> recalling the Palestinian leader?s forced eviction to Tunisia under >>>>>>> Israel?s siege of the city. At that point, the displaced people of >>>>>>> southern Gaza might choose to return to their homes, and the
displaced people of southern Israel could confidently opt to go back to theirs.

More: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-strategy-bennett.html

Hamas killed babys on purpose. Fuck Hamas and none of your crybaby shit >>>>>> will change that.

So you know more and know better, than a former Israeli prime minister. >>>>> Got it.

I didn't say that. There you go again. I know Hamas targeted babys and

women. That is all that matters.

Note to Hamas: Next time, just come to America and shoot up people with AR-15s.
Skeeter won't care if you do that!

Now would you like to explain how you got that out of what I said? Why
do liberals lies and put words in peoples mouths?

Stop trying to spin shit around.
IRONY.dd

Like you did up there? ^

So far

you have run from 8 threads that YOU started.

I'll start threads when I want and I'll close them when I please, and
there's not a single thing you can do about it.

Like a 5th grader who didn't get his way.

Again, IRONY

You’re not ironic. You’re an imbecile.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

In article <e398b3cb-c8f1-4bec-b76f-00a1b81f97fan@googlegroups.com>, davidbrown20782@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 7:55:19�PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <cff67b35-da09-4d56...@googlegroups.com>,
jebediah....@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 5:01:52 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <bd45d663-c822-4e1a...@googlegroups.com>, jebediah....@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 1:45:48 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <5121bbf8-5a17-465f...@googlegroups.com>, davidbr...@gmail.com says...

Is there another way? Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister, thinks so. At his home in the leafy town of Ra?anana a few miles north of Tel Aviv, he spells out what he calls his ?squeeze approach? ? a plan that is original in its

conception and unexpected in its conclusion.

?What?s important is to not play along with the lines that Hamas wrote for us,? he says. ?I think there?s a much less costly way to go about things.?

Hamas?s master plan, as Bennett sees it, is roughly as follows: Provoke, via its gruesome massacres on Oct. 7, a massive Israeli ground invasion. Force Israeli troops to fight for weeks or months on unfamiliar and terrifying ground, causing

thousands of casualties. Dribble out opportunities for hostage releases or cease-fires as a way of weakening Israel?s resolve and obtaining material concessions, particularly fuel. Bleed the Israeli economy dry by
requiring

the

country to keep its citizen army mobilized for months. Count on diplomatic pressure and Israel?s well-known low tolerance for high casualties to get Jerusalem to call it quits after a few weeks of war, just as it often has in the past.

What Bennett envisions is to turn Hamas?s current assets into liabilities. Five in particular: terrain, time, triggers, the world?s attention and the hostages.

Militarily, the plan he sketches begins by having Israel establish a security zone in Gaza two kilometers deep while also cutting the territory in half, somewhere between Gaza City and Khan Younis. Already, nearly 800,000 Gazans have fled

from north to south despite efforts by Hamas to keep them in place. Two humanitarian corridors, subject to Israeli controls, will allow civilians still trapped in the north to move south. Israel will permit water, food and

medicine

to

reach the south and will create medical and humanitarian safe havens in the buffer zone.

This is the most manpower- and firepower-intensive part of Bennett?s plan, but it does not involve a thrust into the heart of Gaza?s cities. It leaves the north of Gaza completely cut off ? above all, of energy. ?There?s a reason they?re

asking for fuel,? he says of Hamas?s recent attempts to trade hostages for gas. ?They?re asking for fuel not for their citizens but for their tunnels,? which are used exclusively by Hamas fighters and their allies.

Gaining this kind of control means that Israel isolates the battlefield ? a core requirement in any successful war and a time-tested way of protecting civilians. It allows most of Israel?s reservists to go home, relieving the heavy strain

on the economy. It eases the crisis on the international stage while doing nothing to release Hamas from its chokehold.

Most important, it allows Israel to conduct what Bennett describes as an ?ongoing and persistent series of targeted ground raids? over a long period without the need to occupy cities in force.

Smaller raids tend to produce fewer deaths, particularly civilian casualties, and less physical destruction, at least when compared with airstrikes or artillery fire. They play to the unique skills of Israel?s special forces. They reduce

the chances of a triggering event in which large numbers of civilian casualties prompt Hezbollah to open a front in the north or Palestinians in the West Bank to start a third intifada. And they minimize the exposure of
regular

Israeli

infantry to the hazards of dense urban combat.

?I don?t want to get into a Viet Cong-type war of tunnels,? Bennett says. ?I want to surprise them by letting them dry out in the tunnels. Imagine a Hamas terrorist waiting in one of those tunnels with his weapons. The one thing he doesn?t

expect is to be stuck there for nine months with no logistics backing, running out of food, cold, wet and miserable.?

As for the hostages, Bennett recognizes there are no easy answers. But he thinks Hamas has begun to realize that ?holding babies, the elderly and foreign citizens is an inherent liability, given that they want public sympathy.? In the

meantime, Hamas will probably do everything it can to keep the hostages alive and reasonably healthy, if only because they are useless to it when dead. This, too, is a drain on the group?s dwindling resources.

Bennett sees the war lasting months, even years, much like the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The long timetable imposes a need for patience on an Israeli public justifiably hungry for vengeance and victory. But the cumulative

result of his concept would be the complete destruction of Hamas?s war-fighting capacity and the deaths of thousands of its fighters.

There?s a coda to his plan. At some point, any Hamas fighters who remain in Gaza will be offered the chance for passage to a third country ? Algeria, maybe, or Qatar, where Hamas has financial patrons. While Bennett dislikes the linkage,

safe passage may be the price Israel is willing to pay in the end for the freedom of remaining hostages.

?It would be like Beirut in 1982, when Yasir Arafat and all of his terrorists got on a boat and left Lebanon forever,? Bennett says, recalling the Palestinian leader?s forced eviction to Tunisia under Israel?s siege of the city. At that

point, the displaced people of southern Gaza might choose to return to their homes, and the displaced people of southern Israel could confidently opt to go back to theirs.

More: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-strategy-bennett.html

Hamas killed babys on purpose. Fuck Hamas and none of your crybaby shit
will change that.

So you know more and know better, than a former Israeli prime minister.
Got it.

I didn't say that. There you go again. I know Hamas targeted babys and

women. That is all that matters.

Note to Hamas: Next time, just come to America and shoot up people with AR-15s.
Skeeter won't care if you do that!

Now would you like to explain how you got that out of what I said? Why
do liberals lies and put words in peoples mouths?

Stop trying to spin shit around.
IRONY.dd

Like you did up there? ^

So far

you have run from 8 threads that YOU started.

I'll start threads when I want and I'll close them when I please, and there's not a single thing you can do about it.

Like a 5th grader who didn't get his way.

Again, IRONY

If you only knew what that meant.

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)

On Wednesday, November 1, 2023 at 10:13:55 AM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <e398b3cb-c8f1-4bec...@googlegroups.com>,
davidbr...@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 7:55:19 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <cff67b35-da09-4d56...@googlegroups.com>, jebediah....@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 5:01:52 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <bd45d663-c822-4e1a...@googlegroups.com>, jebediah....@gmail.com says...

On Tuesday, October 31, 2023 at 1:45:48 PM UTC-4, Skeeter wrote:

In article <5121bbf8-5a17-465f...@googlegroups.com>, davidbr...@gmail.com says...

Is there another way? Naftali Bennett, a former prime minister, thinks so. At his home in the leafy town of Ra?anana a few miles north of Tel Aviv, he spells out what he calls his ?squeeze approach? ? a plan that is original in its

conception and unexpected in its conclusion.

?What?s important is to not play along with the lines that Hamas wrote for us,? he says. ?I think there?s a much less costly way to go about things.?

Hamas?s master plan, as Bennett sees it, is roughly as follows: Provoke, via its gruesome massacres on Oct. 7, a massive Israeli ground invasion. Force Israeli troops to fight for weeks or months on unfamiliar and terrifying ground,

causing thousands of casualties. Dribble out opportunities for hostage releases or cease-fires as a way of weakening Israel?s resolve and obtaining material concessions, particularly fuel. Bleed the Israeli economy dry by

requiring

the

country to keep its citizen army mobilized for months. Count on diplomatic pressure and Israel?s well-known low tolerance for high casualties to get Jerusalem to call it quits after a few weeks of war, just as it often has in the past.

What Bennett envisions is to turn Hamas?s current assets into liabilities. Five in particular: terrain, time, triggers, the world?s attention and the hostages.

Militarily, the plan he sketches begins by having Israel establish a security zone in Gaza two kilometers deep while also cutting the territory in half, somewhere between Gaza City and Khan Younis. Already, nearly 800,000 Gazans have fled

from north to south despite efforts by Hamas to keep them in place. Two humanitarian corridors, subject to Israeli controls, will allow civilians still trapped in the north to move south. Israel will permit water, food and

medicine

to

reach the south and will create medical and humanitarian safe havens in the buffer zone.

This is the most manpower- and firepower-intensive part of Bennett?s plan, but it does not involve a thrust into the heart of Gaza?s cities. It leaves the north of Gaza completely cut off ? above all, of energy. ?There?s a reason they?re

asking for fuel,? he says of Hamas?s recent attempts to trade hostages for gas. ?They?re asking for fuel not for their citizens but for their tunnels,? which are used exclusively by Hamas fighters and their allies.

Gaining this kind of control means that Israel isolates the battlefield ? a core requirement in any successful war and a time-tested way of protecting civilians. It allows most of Israel?s reservists to go home, relieving the heavy strain

on the economy. It eases the crisis on the international stage while doing nothing to release Hamas from its chokehold.

Most important, it allows Israel to conduct what Bennett describes as an ?ongoing and persistent series of targeted ground raids? over a long period without the need to occupy cities in force.

Smaller raids tend to produce fewer deaths, particularly civilian casualties, and less physical destruction, at least when compared with airstrikes or artillery fire. They play to the unique skills of Israel?s special forces. They reduce

the chances of a triggering event in which large numbers of civilian casualties prompt Hezbollah to open a front in the north or Palestinians in the West Bank to start a third intifada. And they minimize the exposure of

regular

Israeli

infantry to the hazards of dense urban combat.

?I don?t want to get into a Viet Cong-type war of tunnels,? Bennett says. ?I want to surprise them by letting them dry out in the tunnels. Imagine a Hamas terrorist waiting in one of those tunnels with his weapons. The one thing he doesn?

t expect is to be stuck there for nine months with no logistics backing, running out of food, cold, wet and miserable.?

As for the hostages, Bennett recognizes there are no easy answers. But he thinks Hamas has begun to realize that ?holding babies, the elderly and foreign citizens is an inherent liability, given that they want public sympathy.? In the

meantime, Hamas will probably do everything it can to keep the hostages alive and reasonably healthy, if only because they are useless to it when dead. This, too, is a drain on the group?s dwindling resources.

Bennett sees the war lasting months, even years, much like the campaign against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The long timetable imposes a need for patience on an Israeli public justifiably hungry for vengeance and victory. But the cumulative

result of his concept would be the complete destruction of Hamas?s war-fighting capacity and the deaths of thousands of its fighters.

There?s a coda to his plan. At some point, any Hamas fighters who remain in Gaza will be offered the chance for passage to a third country ? Algeria, maybe, or Qatar, where Hamas has financial patrons. While Bennett dislikes the linkage,

safe passage may be the price Israel is willing to pay in the end for the freedom of remaining hostages.

?It would be like Beirut in 1982, when Yasir Arafat and all of his terrorists got on a boat and left Lebanon forever,? Bennett says, recalling the Palestinian leader?s forced eviction to Tunisia under Israel?s siege of the city. At that

point, the displaced people of southern Gaza might choose to return to their homes, and the displaced people of southern Israel could confidently opt to go back to theirs.

More: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/27/opinion/israel-hamas-strategy-bennett.html

Hamas killed babys on purpose. Fuck Hamas and none of your crybaby shit
will change that.

So you know more and know better, than a former Israeli prime minister.
Got it.

I didn't say that. There you go again. I know Hamas targeted babys and

women. That is all that matters.

Note to Hamas: Next time, just come to America and shoot up people with AR-15s.
Skeeter won't care if you do that!

Now would you like to explain how you got that out of what I said? Why do liberals lies and put words in peoples mouths?

Stop trying to spin shit around.
IRONY.dd

Like you did up there? ^

So far

you have run from 8 threads that YOU started.

I'll start threads when I want and I'll close them when I please, and there's not a single thing you can do about it.

Like a 5th grader who didn't get his way.

Again, IRONY

If you only knew what that meant.

I know better than you do.

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