This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa
incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of
other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been
even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false.
It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence.
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely
nevertheless.
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-little-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of
other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false. It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence.
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely nevertheless.
Henry -
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as
"these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in
the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes
towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is
broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace??
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating.
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but
I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further &
better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died.
2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec
4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier. 5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C,
& there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for
wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a
wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm.
At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely
steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with
occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30
- 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the
sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible
but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface?
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from 2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide
up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully
buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed
four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather
more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox
to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch,
adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in
cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water
close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels
& prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5
after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss
of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes.
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane
behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the
English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it
the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning
of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then
it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
--
Carl Douglas Racing Shells -
Fine Small-Boats/AeRoWing Low-drag Riggers/Advanced Accessories
Write: Harris Boatyard, Laleham Reach, Chertsey KT16 8RP, UK
Find: tinyurl.com/2tqujf
Email: ca...@carldouglasrowing.com Tel: +44(0)1932-570946 Fax: -563682
URLs: carldouglasrowing.com & now on Facebook @ CarlDouglasRacingShells
---
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify, >>>A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa
incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of
other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been >>> even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time
novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false. >>> It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence.
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the >>> emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely
nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon
after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with
ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as
"these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in
the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes
towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is
broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace?? >>
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do
rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating.
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but
I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further &
better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died.
2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat
country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec
4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier. >> 5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C,
& there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for
wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a
wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm.
At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely
steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with
occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30
- 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the
sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible
but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface?
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay
people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that
battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from
2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many
shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still
lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide
up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully
buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent
water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant
end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed
four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather
more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox
to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if
wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch,
adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in
cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water
close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels
& prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5
after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss
of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when
chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes.
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid
restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a
devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a
volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane
behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the
English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it
the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning
of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then
it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this
without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless
inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-little-
The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize whileperpendicular to the wind.
As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
On 06/04/2021 18:02, don Vickers wrote:little-wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa
incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of
other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been >>> even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time >>> novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false. >>> It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence. >>>
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the
emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely
nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon >> after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with
ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as
"these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in
the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes
towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is
broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace??
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do >> rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating.
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but >> I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further &
better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died.
2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat >> country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec >> 4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier.
5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C,
& there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for
wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a
wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm. >> At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely
steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with
occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30 >> - 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the
sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible
but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface?
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay >> people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that
battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from >> 2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many >> shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still >> lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide
up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully
buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent >> water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant >> end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed
four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather
more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox >> to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if >> wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch,
adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in
cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water
close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels >> & prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5
after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss >> of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when >> chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes. >>
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid
restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a
devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a
volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane
behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the
English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it
the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning >> of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then >> it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this
without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless >> inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
perpendicular to the wind.The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize while
As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
Thank you, Don.
So capsize it was (not a common event), & a stern coxed 4. Avoiding
capsize is feasible in similar conditions, provided the crew sit still & keep oars perpendicular to the boat, but that may require a level of
calm & awareness beyond an inexperienced crew in such conditions. One
would want to turn quickly to get end-on to the waves, which may have
unduly exposed them those beam waves.
On a wide lake squalls can arrive largely unseen & unsuspected as
precursors of a coming gale. The crew boated at ~08:30, the 06:30
forecast having been for winds 11-14mph, increasing to 17mph by 11:00. (Earlier reports suggested winds of 20-25mph, which would have
corresponded well enough with 1ft waves). Steady wind speed predictions often ignore tendency for gusts. I note there was a rule about not
boating in winds >14mph.
The commentary on USRowing rules is interesting, in having no quoted
mention of full shell buoyancy (a FISA standard) but with advice to
carry PFDs in the boat. Effective PFDs do exist which do _not_
incommode rowers, & IMHO they should be mandatory wear when water temperatures fall below certain limits.
As indicated in the latest report, the crew tried to swim ashore. We
don't know the distance but, if the water was as cold as previously suggested, & if that swim took over a minute in normal temperatures,
then it was almost certain that some would lose all swimming ability &
drown long before reaching safety. If the boat was also not fully
buoyant, swimming away is the more understandable as it would then seem
to offer little support & the crew in the water would already be
suffering from the cold & consequent failing grip strength.
Hindsight is a terrible thing. Worse still would be litigation over
this. One must hope that lawyers do not get involved as nothing they
might do will bring back the dead. The vital thing is for all of rowing
to learn from this dreadful accident & do those simple things which,
without impairing the sport, can make rowing that much safer. Sadly, we
seem too often to ignore warnings & precedents, as a result repeating
the same old mistakes.
Carl
--
Carl Douglas Racing Shells -
Fine Small-Boats/AeRoWing Low-drag Riggers/Advanced Accessories
Write: Harris Boatyard, Laleham Reach, Chertsey KT16 8RP, UK
Find: tinyurl.com/2tqujf
Email: ca...@carldouglasrowing.com Tel: +44(0)1932-570946 Fax: -563682
URLs: carldouglasrowing.com & now on Facebook @ CarlDouglasRacingShells
---
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
On Tuesday, 6 April 2021 at 20:10:28 UTC+1, carl wrote:little-wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On 06/04/2021 18:02, don Vickers wrote:
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify, >>>>>A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa
incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of >>>>> other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been >>>>> even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time >>>>> novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false. >>>>> It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence. >>>>>
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the >>>>> emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely
nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon >>>> after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with
ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as
"these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in
the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes
towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is
broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace?? >>>>
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do >>>> rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating. >>>>
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but >>>> I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further &
better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died.
2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat >>>> country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec >>>> 4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier. >>>> 5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C, >>>> & there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for >>>> wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a
wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm. >>>> At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely
steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with
occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30 >>>> - 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the
sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible
but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface?
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay >>>> people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that >>>> battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from >>>> 2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many >>>> shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still >>>> lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide >>>> up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully
buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent >>>> water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant >>>> end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed
four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather
more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox >>>> to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if >>>> wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch,
adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in >>>> cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water
close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels >>>> & prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5 >>>> after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss >>>> of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when >>>> chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes. >>>>
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid
restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a >>>> devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a
volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane
behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the
English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it
the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning >>>> of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then >>>> it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this >>>> without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless >>>> inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
perpendicular to the wind.
The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize while
Thank you, Don.
As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
So capsize it was (not a common event), & a stern coxed 4. Avoiding
capsize is feasible in similar conditions, provided the crew sit still &
keep oars perpendicular to the boat, but that may require a level of
calm & awareness beyond an inexperienced crew in such conditions. One
would want to turn quickly to get end-on to the waves, which may have
unduly exposed them those beam waves.
On a wide lake squalls can arrive largely unseen & unsuspected as
precursors of a coming gale. The crew boated at ~08:30, the 06:30
forecast having been for winds 11-14mph, increasing to 17mph by 11:00.
(Earlier reports suggested winds of 20-25mph, which would have
corresponded well enough with 1ft waves). Steady wind speed predictions
often ignore tendency for gusts. I note there was a rule about not
boating in winds >14mph.
The commentary on USRowing rules is interesting, in having no quoted
mention of full shell buoyancy (a FISA standard) but with advice to
carry PFDs in the boat. Effective PFDs do exist which do _not_
incommode rowers, & IMHO they should be mandatory wear when water
temperatures fall below certain limits.
As indicated in the latest report, the crew tried to swim ashore. We
don't know the distance but, if the water was as cold as previously
suggested, & if that swim took over a minute in normal temperatures,
then it was almost certain that some would lose all swimming ability &
drown long before reaching safety. If the boat was also not fully
buoyant, swimming away is the more understandable as it would then seem
to offer little support & the crew in the water would already be
suffering from the cold & consequent failing grip strength.
Hindsight is a terrible thing. Worse still would be litigation over
this. One must hope that lawyers do not get involved as nothing they
might do will bring back the dead. The vital thing is for all of rowing
to learn from this dreadful accident & do those simple things which,
without impairing the sport, can make rowing that much safer. Sadly, we
seem too often to ignore warnings & precedents, as a result repeating
the same old mistakes.
Carl
--
I read the linked articles as stating that the crew had passed swim tests and that water temp was 40F and that the boat was pependicular to the waves when a large one swamped them.the boat went down. The suggestion being that all less experienced crews need to be accompanied by THEIR OWN safety launch.
The unknowns in this tragedy are really down to the experience of the crew. Passing a swim test isn't the same as confidence and ability in water and also how fit the crew was and their boat experience and how wet and cold they might have got before
A wooden boat, however swamped would still have some bouyancy but does that apply to more recent resin constructions?
pgk
On 07/04/2021 10:29, Peter wrote:little-wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On Tuesday, 6 April 2021 at 20:10:28 UTC+1, carl wrote:
On 06/04/2021 18:02, don Vickers wrote:
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa >>>>> incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of >>>>> other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been
even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time >>>>> novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false.
It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence.
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the
emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely
nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon >>>> after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with
ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as >>>> "these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in >>>> the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes >>>> towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is
broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace??
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do
rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating. >>>>
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but >>>> I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further &
better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died.
2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat >>>> country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec >>>> 4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier.
5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C, >>>> & there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for >>>> wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a >>>> wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm. >>>> At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely
steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with
occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30 >>>> - 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the >>>> sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible >>>> but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface?
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay >>>> people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that >>>> battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from
2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many >>>> shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still
lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide >>>> up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully >>>> buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent >>>> water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant
end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed
four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather >>>> more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox
to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if >>>> wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch, >>>> adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in >>>> cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water >>>> close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels >>>> & prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5 >>>> after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss >>>> of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when
chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes. >>>>
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid
restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a >>>> devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a >>>> volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane
behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the >>>> English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it >>>> the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning >>>> of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then >>>> it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this >>>> without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless
inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
perpendicular to the wind.
The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize while
Thank you, Don.
As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
So capsize it was (not a common event), & a stern coxed 4. Avoiding
capsize is feasible in similar conditions, provided the crew sit still & >> keep oars perpendicular to the boat, but that may require a level of
calm & awareness beyond an inexperienced crew in such conditions. One
would want to turn quickly to get end-on to the waves, which may have
unduly exposed them those beam waves.
On a wide lake squalls can arrive largely unseen & unsuspected as
precursors of a coming gale. The crew boated at ~08:30, the 06:30
forecast having been for winds 11-14mph, increasing to 17mph by 11:00.
(Earlier reports suggested winds of 20-25mph, which would have
corresponded well enough with 1ft waves). Steady wind speed predictions >> often ignore tendency for gusts. I note there was a rule about not
boating in winds >14mph.
The commentary on USRowing rules is interesting, in having no quoted
mention of full shell buoyancy (a FISA standard) but with advice to
carry PFDs in the boat. Effective PFDs do exist which do _not_
incommode rowers, & IMHO they should be mandatory wear when water
temperatures fall below certain limits.
As indicated in the latest report, the crew tried to swim ashore. We
don't know the distance but, if the water was as cold as previously
suggested, & if that swim took over a minute in normal temperatures,
then it was almost certain that some would lose all swimming ability &
drown long before reaching safety. If the boat was also not fully
buoyant, swimming away is the more understandable as it would then seem >> to offer little support & the crew in the water would already be
suffering from the cold & consequent failing grip strength.
Hindsight is a terrible thing. Worse still would be litigation over
this. One must hope that lawyers do not get involved as nothing they
might do will bring back the dead. The vital thing is for all of rowing >> to learn from this dreadful accident & do those simple things which,
without impairing the sport, can make rowing that much safer. Sadly, we >> seem too often to ignore warnings & precedents, as a result repeating
the same old mistakes.
Carl
--
the boat went down. The suggestion being that all less experienced crews need to be accompanied by THEIR OWN safety launch.I read the linked articles as stating that the crew had passed swim tests and that water temp was 40F and that the boat was pependicular to the waves when a large one swamped them.
The unknowns in this tragedy are really down to the experience of the crew. Passing a swim test isn't the same as confidence and ability in water and also how fit the crew was and their boat experience and how wet and cold they might have got before
This whole event is so unfortunate, but seemingly avoidable, if only with less severe consequences.A wooden boat, however swamped would still have some bouyancy but does that apply to more recent resin constructions?
pgk
Hi Peter -
Good points, but may I clarify a couple of them?
My understanding is that the boat was parallel with the advancing wave-fronts when rolled over? Certainly a more plausible scenario.
A wooden boat is no more buoyant than a honeycomb/synthetic fibre
composite. The buoyancy comes from volumetric displacement of water,
and a ~2mm thick laminated wood hull is thinner, & thus displaces less
water per unit of hull area, than a composite hull perhaps 5mm thick &
of similar areal mass. But, in reality, the crucial element of the
shell's buoyancy is provided by the sum of all enclosed volumes that lie below the existing waterline (whether in normal or swamped condition).
When swamped, the hull skin's thickness x area contributes but a part of this displacement while major contributions come from the fully-enclosed
bow & stern compartments &, most importantly, from the other enclosed volumes including, in particular, those easily enclosable (but still too often left open, due sadly to institutional ignorance & neglect) volumes
of the spaces below the slide beds which can contribute ~40kg of added flotation capacity/uplift per person.
An additional contribution to flotation for a swamped shell comes from
the partial immersion of the legs and buttocks of the seated crew. Yes,
that water may be cold, but it is far better to have cold legs than to
chill the torso by quitting an otherwise floating shell and attempting
to swim.
Unfortunately, it seems the Iowa crew was thrown from the boat as it
rolled over & thus had severely limited options. Which is where
personal flotation devices (which really need not incommode rowers in
modern designs) would have been so helpful.
Carl
--
Carl Douglas Racing Shells -
Fine Small-Boats/AeRoWing Low-drag Riggers/Advanced Accessories
Write: Harris Boatyard, Laleham Reach, Chertsey KT16 8RP, UK
Find: tinyurl.com/2tqujf
Email: ca...@carldouglasrowing.com Tel: +44(0)1932-570946 Fax: -563682
URLs: carldouglasrowing.com & now on Facebook @ CarlDouglasRacingShells
---
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
On Wednesday, April 7, 2021 at 8:57:57 AM UTC-4, carl wrote:little-wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On 07/04/2021 10:29, Peter wrote:
On Tuesday, 6 April 2021 at 20:10:28 UTC+1, carl wrote:
On 06/04/2021 18:02, don Vickers wrote:
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa >>>>> incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of >>>>> other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been
even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time
novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false.
It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence.
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the
emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely >>>>> nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon
after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with >>>> ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as >>>> "these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in >>>> the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes >>>> towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is >>>> broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace??
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do
rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating.
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but
I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further & >>>> better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died. >>>> 2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat
country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec
4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier.
5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C,
& there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for
wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a >>>> wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm.
At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely
steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with >>>> occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30
- 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the >>>> sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible >>>> but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface? >>>>
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay
people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that
battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from
2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many
shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still
lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide
up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully >>>> buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent
water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant
end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed >>>> four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather >>>> more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox
to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if
wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch, >>>> adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in
cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water >>>> close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels
& prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5
after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss
of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when
chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes.
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid
restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a
devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a >>>> volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane
behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the >>>> English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it >>>> the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning
of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then
it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this
without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless
inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
perpendicular to the wind.
The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize while
Thank you, Don.
As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
So capsize it was (not a common event), & a stern coxed 4. Avoiding
capsize is feasible in similar conditions, provided the crew sit still &
keep oars perpendicular to the boat, but that may require a level of
calm & awareness beyond an inexperienced crew in such conditions. One >> would want to turn quickly to get end-on to the waves, which may have >> unduly exposed them those beam waves.
On a wide lake squalls can arrive largely unseen & unsuspected as
precursors of a coming gale. The crew boated at ~08:30, the 06:30
forecast having been for winds 11-14mph, increasing to 17mph by 11:00. >> (Earlier reports suggested winds of 20-25mph, which would have
corresponded well enough with 1ft waves). Steady wind speed predictions >> often ignore tendency for gusts. I note there was a rule about not
boating in winds >14mph.
The commentary on USRowing rules is interesting, in having no quoted
mention of full shell buoyancy (a FISA standard) but with advice to
carry PFDs in the boat. Effective PFDs do exist which do _not_
incommode rowers, & IMHO they should be mandatory wear when water
temperatures fall below certain limits.
As indicated in the latest report, the crew tried to swim ashore. We
don't know the distance but, if the water was as cold as previously
suggested, & if that swim took over a minute in normal temperatures,
then it was almost certain that some would lose all swimming ability & >> drown long before reaching safety. If the boat was also not fully
buoyant, swimming away is the more understandable as it would then seem >> to offer little support & the crew in the water would already be
suffering from the cold & consequent failing grip strength.
Hindsight is a terrible thing. Worse still would be litigation over
this. One must hope that lawyers do not get involved as nothing they
might do will bring back the dead. The vital thing is for all of rowing >> to learn from this dreadful accident & do those simple things which,
without impairing the sport, can make rowing that much safer. Sadly, we >> seem too often to ignore warnings & precedents, as a result repeating >> the same old mistakes.
Carl
--
before the boat went down. The suggestion being that all less experienced crews need to be accompanied by THEIR OWN safety launch.I read the linked articles as stating that the crew had passed swim tests and that water temp was 40F and that the boat was pependicular to the waves when a large one swamped them.
The unknowns in this tragedy are really down to the experience of the crew. Passing a swim test isn't the same as confidence and ability in water and also how fit the crew was and their boat experience and how wet and cold they might have got
It should go without saying, but, anyone else with suggestions/recomendations would also be appreciated...A wooden boat, however swamped would still have some bouyancy but does that apply to more recent resin constructions?
pgk
Hi Peter -
Good points, but may I clarify a couple of them?
My understanding is that the boat was parallel with the advancing wave-fronts when rolled over? Certainly a more plausible scenario.
A wooden boat is no more buoyant than a honeycomb/synthetic fibre composite. The buoyancy comes from volumetric displacement of water,
and a ~2mm thick laminated wood hull is thinner, & thus displaces less water per unit of hull area, than a composite hull perhaps 5mm thick &
of similar areal mass. But, in reality, the crucial element of the
shell's buoyancy is provided by the sum of all enclosed volumes that lie below the existing waterline (whether in normal or swamped condition).
When swamped, the hull skin's thickness x area contributes but a part of this displacement while major contributions come from the fully-enclosed bow & stern compartments &, most importantly, from the other enclosed volumes including, in particular, those easily enclosable (but still too often left open, due sadly to institutional ignorance & neglect) volumes of the spaces below the slide beds which can contribute ~40kg of added flotation capacity/uplift per person.
An additional contribution to flotation for a swamped shell comes from
the partial immersion of the legs and buttocks of the seated crew. Yes, that water may be cold, but it is far better to have cold legs than to chill the torso by quitting an otherwise floating shell and attempting
to swim.
Unfortunately, it seems the Iowa crew was thrown from the boat as it rolled over & thus had severely limited options. Which is where
personal flotation devices (which really need not incommode rowers in modern designs) would have been so helpful.
Carl
--
Carl Douglas Racing Shells -
Fine Small-Boats/AeRoWing Low-drag Riggers/Advanced Accessories
Write: Harris Boatyard, Laleham Reach, Chertsey KT16 8RP, UK
Find: tinyurl.com/2tqujf
Email: ca...@carldouglasrowing.com Tel: +44(0)1932-570946 Fax: -563682 URLs: carldouglasrowing.com & now on Facebook @ CarlDouglasRacingShells
---This whole event is so unfortunate, but seemingly avoidable, if only with less severe consequences.
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
Carl, you mention specific PFD's that do not negatively affect the rowers. Can you elaborate/recommend, if not for a specific make/model, but maybe key bullet points for which we should look when seeking these out for ourselves or crew members?
Thanks in advance as always...
On Wednesday, April 7, 2021 at 8:57:57 AM UTC-4, carl wrote:little-wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On 07/04/2021 10:29, Peter wrote:
On Tuesday, 6 April 2021 at 20:10:28 UTC+1, carl wrote:
On 06/04/2021 18:02, don Vickers wrote:
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa >>>>>>> incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of >>>>>>> other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been
even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time >>>>>>> novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false.
It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence. >>>>>>>
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the
emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely
nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon >>>>>> after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with
ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as >>>>>> "these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in >>>>>> the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes >>>>>> towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is >>>>>> broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace??
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do >>>>>> rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating. >>>>>>
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but >>>>>> I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further & >>>>>> better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died.
2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat >>>>>> country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec >>>>>> 4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier.
5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C, >>>>>> & there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for >>>>>> wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a >>>>>> wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm. >>>>>> At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely
steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with
occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30 >>>>>> - 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the >>>>>> sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible >>>>>> but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface?
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay >>>>>> people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that >>>>>> battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from >>>>>> 2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many >>>>>> shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still >>>>>> lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide >>>>>> up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully >>>>>> buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent >>>>>> water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant >>>>>> end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed >>>>>> four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather >>>>>> more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox >>>>>> to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if >>>>>> wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch, >>>>>> adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in >>>>>> cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water >>>>>> close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels >>>>>> & prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5 >>>>>> after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss >>>>>> of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when >>>>>> chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes. >>>>>>
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid
restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a >>>>>> devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a >>>>>> volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane
behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the >>>>>> English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it >>>>>> the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning >>>>>> of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then >>>>>> it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this >>>>>> without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless >>>>>> inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
perpendicular to the wind.
The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize while
the boat went down. The suggestion being that all less experienced crews need to be accompanied by THEIR OWN safety launch.Thank you, Don.
As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
So capsize it was (not a common event), & a stern coxed 4. Avoiding
capsize is feasible in similar conditions, provided the crew sit still & >>>> keep oars perpendicular to the boat, but that may require a level of
calm & awareness beyond an inexperienced crew in such conditions. One
would want to turn quickly to get end-on to the waves, which may have
unduly exposed them those beam waves.
On a wide lake squalls can arrive largely unseen & unsuspected as
precursors of a coming gale. The crew boated at ~08:30, the 06:30
forecast having been for winds 11-14mph, increasing to 17mph by 11:00. >>>> (Earlier reports suggested winds of 20-25mph, which would have
corresponded well enough with 1ft waves). Steady wind speed predictions >>>> often ignore tendency for gusts. I note there was a rule about not
boating in winds >14mph.
The commentary on USRowing rules is interesting, in having no quoted
mention of full shell buoyancy (a FISA standard) but with advice to
carry PFDs in the boat. Effective PFDs do exist which do _not_
incommode rowers, & IMHO they should be mandatory wear when water
temperatures fall below certain limits.
As indicated in the latest report, the crew tried to swim ashore. We
don't know the distance but, if the water was as cold as previously
suggested, & if that swim took over a minute in normal temperatures,
then it was almost certain that some would lose all swimming ability & >>>> drown long before reaching safety. If the boat was also not fully
buoyant, swimming away is the more understandable as it would then seem >>>> to offer little support & the crew in the water would already be
suffering from the cold & consequent failing grip strength.
Hindsight is a terrible thing. Worse still would be litigation over
this. One must hope that lawyers do not get involved as nothing they
might do will bring back the dead. The vital thing is for all of rowing >>>> to learn from this dreadful accident & do those simple things which,
without impairing the sport, can make rowing that much safer. Sadly, we >>>> seem too often to ignore warnings & precedents, as a result repeating
the same old mistakes.
Carl
--
I read the linked articles as stating that the crew had passed swim tests and that water temp was 40F and that the boat was pependicular to the waves when a large one swamped them.
The unknowns in this tragedy are really down to the experience of the crew. Passing a swim test isn't the same as confidence and ability in water and also how fit the crew was and their boat experience and how wet and cold they might have got before
A wooden boat, however swamped would still have some bouyancy but does that apply to more recent resin constructions?Hi Peter -
pgk
Good points, but may I clarify a couple of them?
My understanding is that the boat was parallel with the advancing
wave-fronts when rolled over? Certainly a more plausible scenario.
A wooden boat is no more buoyant than a honeycomb/synthetic fibre
composite. The buoyancy comes from volumetric displacement of water,
and a ~2mm thick laminated wood hull is thinner, & thus displaces less
water per unit of hull area, than a composite hull perhaps 5mm thick &
of similar areal mass. But, in reality, the crucial element of the
shell's buoyancy is provided by the sum of all enclosed volumes that lie
below the existing waterline (whether in normal or swamped condition).
When swamped, the hull skin's thickness x area contributes but a part of
this displacement while major contributions come from the fully-enclosed
bow & stern compartments &, most importantly, from the other enclosed
volumes including, in particular, those easily enclosable (but still too
often left open, due sadly to institutional ignorance & neglect) volumes
of the spaces below the slide beds which can contribute ~40kg of added
flotation capacity/uplift per person.
An additional contribution to flotation for a swamped shell comes from
the partial immersion of the legs and buttocks of the seated crew. Yes,
that water may be cold, but it is far better to have cold legs than to
chill the torso by quitting an otherwise floating shell and attempting
to swim.
Unfortunately, it seems the Iowa crew was thrown from the boat as it
rolled over & thus had severely limited options. Which is where
personal flotation devices (which really need not incommode rowers in
modern designs) would have been so helpful.
Carl
This whole event is so unfortunate, but seemingly avoidable, if only with less severe consequences.
Carl, you mention specific PFD's that do not negatively affect the rowers. Can you elaborate/recommend, if not for a specific make/model, but maybe key bullet points for which we should look when seeking these out for ourselves or crew members?
Thanks in advance as always...
On 07/04/2021 20:09, bnw...@gmail.com wrote:little-wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On Wednesday, April 7, 2021 at 8:57:57 AM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 07/04/2021 10:29, Peter wrote:
On Tuesday, 6 April 2021 at 20:10:28 UTC+1, carl wrote:
On 06/04/2021 18:02, don Vickers wrote:
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa >>>>>>> incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of >>>>>>> other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been
even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time
novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false.
It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence.
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the
emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely >>>>>>> nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon
after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with >>>>>> ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as >>>>>> "these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in >>>>>> the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes >>>>>> towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is >>>>>> broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace??
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do
rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating.
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but
I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further & >>>>>> better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died. >>>>>> 2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat
country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec
4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier.
5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C,
& there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for
wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a >>>>>> wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm.
At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely >>>>>> steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with >>>>>> occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30
- 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the >>>>>> sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible >>>>>> but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface? >>>>>>
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay
people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that
battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from
2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many
shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still
lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide
up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully >>>>>> buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent
water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant
end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed >>>>>> four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather >>>>>> more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox
to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if
wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch, >>>>>> adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in
cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water >>>>>> close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels
& prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5
after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss
of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when
chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes.
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid >>>>>> restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a
devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a >>>>>> volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane >>>>>> behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the >>>>>> English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it >>>>>> the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning
of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then
it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this
without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless
inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
perpendicular to the wind.
The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize while
before the boat went down. The suggestion being that all less experienced crews need to be accompanied by THEIR OWN safety launch.Thank you, Don.
As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
So capsize it was (not a common event), & a stern coxed 4. Avoiding >>>> capsize is feasible in similar conditions, provided the crew sit still &
keep oars perpendicular to the boat, but that may require a level of >>>> calm & awareness beyond an inexperienced crew in such conditions. One >>>> would want to turn quickly to get end-on to the waves, which may have >>>> unduly exposed them those beam waves.
On a wide lake squalls can arrive largely unseen & unsuspected as
precursors of a coming gale. The crew boated at ~08:30, the 06:30
forecast having been for winds 11-14mph, increasing to 17mph by 11:00. >>>> (Earlier reports suggested winds of 20-25mph, which would have
corresponded well enough with 1ft waves). Steady wind speed predictions >>>> often ignore tendency for gusts. I note there was a rule about not
boating in winds >14mph.
The commentary on USRowing rules is interesting, in having no quoted >>>> mention of full shell buoyancy (a FISA standard) but with advice to >>>> carry PFDs in the boat. Effective PFDs do exist which do _not_
incommode rowers, & IMHO they should be mandatory wear when water
temperatures fall below certain limits.
As indicated in the latest report, the crew tried to swim ashore. We >>>> don't know the distance but, if the water was as cold as previously >>>> suggested, & if that swim took over a minute in normal temperatures, >>>> then it was almost certain that some would lose all swimming ability & >>>> drown long before reaching safety. If the boat was also not fully
buoyant, swimming away is the more understandable as it would then seem >>>> to offer little support & the crew in the water would already be
suffering from the cold & consequent failing grip strength.
Hindsight is a terrible thing. Worse still would be litigation over >>>> this. One must hope that lawyers do not get involved as nothing they >>>> might do will bring back the dead. The vital thing is for all of rowing >>>> to learn from this dreadful accident & do those simple things which, >>>> without impairing the sport, can make rowing that much safer. Sadly, we >>>> seem too often to ignore warnings & precedents, as a result repeating >>>> the same old mistakes.
Carl
--
I read the linked articles as stating that the crew had passed swim tests and that water temp was 40F and that the boat was pependicular to the waves when a large one swamped them.
The unknowns in this tragedy are really down to the experience of the crew. Passing a swim test isn't the same as confidence and ability in water and also how fit the crew was and their boat experience and how wet and cold they might have got
Thanks CarlThis whole event is so unfortunate, but seemingly avoidable, if only with less severe consequences.A wooden boat, however swamped would still have some bouyancy but does that apply to more recent resin constructions?Hi Peter -
pgk
Good points, but may I clarify a couple of them?
My understanding is that the boat was parallel with the advancing
wave-fronts when rolled over? Certainly a more plausible scenario.
A wooden boat is no more buoyant than a honeycomb/synthetic fibre
composite. The buoyancy comes from volumetric displacement of water,
and a ~2mm thick laminated wood hull is thinner, & thus displaces less
water per unit of hull area, than a composite hull perhaps 5mm thick &
of similar areal mass. But, in reality, the crucial element of the
shell's buoyancy is provided by the sum of all enclosed volumes that lie >> below the existing waterline (whether in normal or swamped condition).
When swamped, the hull skin's thickness x area contributes but a part of >> this displacement while major contributions come from the fully-enclosed >> bow & stern compartments &, most importantly, from the other enclosed
volumes including, in particular, those easily enclosable (but still too >> often left open, due sadly to institutional ignorance & neglect) volumes >> of the spaces below the slide beds which can contribute ~40kg of added
flotation capacity/uplift per person.
An additional contribution to flotation for a swamped shell comes from
the partial immersion of the legs and buttocks of the seated crew. Yes, >> that water may be cold, but it is far better to have cold legs than to
chill the torso by quitting an otherwise floating shell and attempting
to swim.
Unfortunately, it seems the Iowa crew was thrown from the boat as it
rolled over & thus had severely limited options. Which is where
personal flotation devices (which really need not incommode rowers in
modern designs) would have been so helpful.
Carl
Carl, you mention specific PFD's that do not negatively affect the rowers. Can you elaborate/recommend, if not for a specific make/model, but maybe key bullet points for which we should look when seeking these out for ourselves or crew members?
Thanks in advance as always...
You might want to look into this:
https://rowsafeusa.org/pfds/
and for comparison into this: https://www.britishrowing.org/sites/default/files/rowsafe/2-1-SafetyAids-v1.pdf
this might give some helpful info: https://camprandallrc.org/faqs/tips-info/boathouse-rules/
There has been interest in rowable PFDs in Germany. Maybe one of our
German correspondents (e.g. Henning Lippke) may have something to
contribute on that?
Also:
https://www.lifejackets.co.uk/Lifejackets-Rowing.htm https://www.rowperfect.co.uk/product/rowing-life-jacket/
I hope that will be enough get started on?
Cheers -
Carl
--
Carl Douglas Racing Shells -
Fine Small-Boats/AeRoWing Low-drag Riggers/Advanced Accessories
Write: Harris Boatyard, Laleham Reach, Chertsey KT16 8RP, UK
Find: tinyurl.com/2tqujf
Email: ca...@carldouglasrowing.com Tel: +44(0)1932-570946 Fax: -563682
URLs: carldouglasrowing.com & now on Facebook @ CarlDouglasRacingShells
---
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
On 07/04/2021 20:09, bnw...@gmail.com wrote:little-wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On Wednesday, April 7, 2021 at 8:57:57 AM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 07/04/2021 10:29, Peter wrote:
On Tuesday, 6 April 2021 at 20:10:28 UTC+1, carl wrote:
On 06/04/2021 18:02, don Vickers wrote:
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa >>>>>>> incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of >>>>>>> other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been
even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time
novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false.
It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence.
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the
emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely >>>>>>> nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon
after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with >>>>>> ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as >>>>>> "these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in >>>>>> the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes >>>>>> towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is >>>>>> broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace??
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do
rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating.
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but
I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further & >>>>>> better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died. >>>>>> 2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat
country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec
4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier.
5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C,
& there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for
wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a >>>>>> wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm.
At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely >>>>>> steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with >>>>>> occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30
- 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the >>>>>> sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible >>>>>> but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface? >>>>>>
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay
people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that
battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from
2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many
shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still
lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide
up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully >>>>>> buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent
water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant
end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed >>>>>> four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather >>>>>> more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox
to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if
wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch, >>>>>> adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in
cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water >>>>>> close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels
& prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5
after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss
of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when
chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes.
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid >>>>>> restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a
devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a >>>>>> volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane >>>>>> behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the >>>>>> English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it >>>>>> the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning
of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then
it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this
without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless
inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
perpendicular to the wind.
The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize while
before the boat went down. The suggestion being that all less experienced crews need to be accompanied by THEIR OWN safety launch.Thank you, Don.
As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
So capsize it was (not a common event), & a stern coxed 4. Avoiding >>>> capsize is feasible in similar conditions, provided the crew sit still &
keep oars perpendicular to the boat, but that may require a level of >>>> calm & awareness beyond an inexperienced crew in such conditions. One >>>> would want to turn quickly to get end-on to the waves, which may have >>>> unduly exposed them those beam waves.
On a wide lake squalls can arrive largely unseen & unsuspected as
precursors of a coming gale. The crew boated at ~08:30, the 06:30
forecast having been for winds 11-14mph, increasing to 17mph by 11:00. >>>> (Earlier reports suggested winds of 20-25mph, which would have
corresponded well enough with 1ft waves). Steady wind speed predictions >>>> often ignore tendency for gusts. I note there was a rule about not
boating in winds >14mph.
The commentary on USRowing rules is interesting, in having no quoted >>>> mention of full shell buoyancy (a FISA standard) but with advice to >>>> carry PFDs in the boat. Effective PFDs do exist which do _not_
incommode rowers, & IMHO they should be mandatory wear when water
temperatures fall below certain limits.
As indicated in the latest report, the crew tried to swim ashore. We >>>> don't know the distance but, if the water was as cold as previously >>>> suggested, & if that swim took over a minute in normal temperatures, >>>> then it was almost certain that some would lose all swimming ability & >>>> drown long before reaching safety. If the boat was also not fully
buoyant, swimming away is the more understandable as it would then seem >>>> to offer little support & the crew in the water would already be
suffering from the cold & consequent failing grip strength.
Hindsight is a terrible thing. Worse still would be litigation over >>>> this. One must hope that lawyers do not get involved as nothing they >>>> might do will bring back the dead. The vital thing is for all of rowing >>>> to learn from this dreadful accident & do those simple things which, >>>> without impairing the sport, can make rowing that much safer. Sadly, we >>>> seem too often to ignore warnings & precedents, as a result repeating >>>> the same old mistakes.
Carl
--
I read the linked articles as stating that the crew had passed swim tests and that water temp was 40F and that the boat was pependicular to the waves when a large one swamped them.
The unknowns in this tragedy are really down to the experience of the crew. Passing a swim test isn't the same as confidence and ability in water and also how fit the crew was and their boat experience and how wet and cold they might have got
This whole event is so unfortunate, but seemingly avoidable, if only with less severe consequences.A wooden boat, however swamped would still have some bouyancy but does that apply to more recent resin constructions?Hi Peter -
pgk
Good points, but may I clarify a couple of them?
My understanding is that the boat was parallel with the advancing
wave-fronts when rolled over? Certainly a more plausible scenario.
A wooden boat is no more buoyant than a honeycomb/synthetic fibre
composite. The buoyancy comes from volumetric displacement of water,
and a ~2mm thick laminated wood hull is thinner, & thus displaces less
water per unit of hull area, than a composite hull perhaps 5mm thick &
of similar areal mass. But, in reality, the crucial element of the
shell's buoyancy is provided by the sum of all enclosed volumes that lie >> below the existing waterline (whether in normal or swamped condition).
When swamped, the hull skin's thickness x area contributes but a part of >> this displacement while major contributions come from the fully-enclosed >> bow & stern compartments &, most importantly, from the other enclosed
volumes including, in particular, those easily enclosable (but still too >> often left open, due sadly to institutional ignorance & neglect) volumes >> of the spaces below the slide beds which can contribute ~40kg of added
flotation capacity/uplift per person.
An additional contribution to flotation for a swamped shell comes from
the partial immersion of the legs and buttocks of the seated crew. Yes, >> that water may be cold, but it is far better to have cold legs than to
chill the torso by quitting an otherwise floating shell and attempting
to swim.
Unfortunately, it seems the Iowa crew was thrown from the boat as it
rolled over & thus had severely limited options. Which is where
personal flotation devices (which really need not incommode rowers in
modern designs) would have been so helpful.
Carl
Carl, you mention specific PFD's that do not negatively affect the rowers. Can you elaborate/recommend, if not for a specific make/model, but maybe key bullet points for which we should look when seeking these out for ourselves or crew members?
Thanks in advance as always...
You might want to look into this:
https://rowsafeusa.org/pfds/
and for comparison into this: https://www.britishrowing.org/sites/default/files/rowsafe/2-1-SafetyAids-v1.pdf
this might give some helpful info: https://camprandallrc.org/faqs/tips-info/boathouse-rules/
There has been interest in rowable PFDs in Germany. Maybe one of our
German correspondents (e.g. Henning Lippke) may have something to
contribute on that?
Also:
https://www.lifejackets.co.uk/Lifejackets-Rowing.htm https://www.rowperfect.co.uk/product/rowing-life-jacket/
I hope that will be enough get started on?
Cheers -
Carl
--
Carl Douglas Racing Shells -
Fine Small-Boats/AeRoWing Low-drag Riggers/Advanced Accessories
Write: Harris Boatyard, Laleham Reach, Chertsey KT16 8RP, UK
Find: tinyurl.com/2tqujf
Email: ca...@carldouglasrowing.com Tel: +44(0)1932-570946 Fax: -563682
URLs: carldouglasrowing.com & now on Facebook @CarlDouglasRacingShells
---
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
On Tuesday, 6 April 2021 at 20:10:28 UTC+1, carl wrote:little-wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On 06/04/2021 18:02, don Vickers wrote:
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa
incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of >>> other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been
even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time >>> novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false.
It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence.
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the
emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely
nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon >> after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with
ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as
"these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in >> the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes
towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is
broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace??
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do
rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating. >>
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but >> I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further &
better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died.
2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat >> country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec >> 4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier.
5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C, >> & there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for >> wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a
wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm. >> At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely
steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with
occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30 >> - 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the
sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible >> but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface?
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay >> people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that >> battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from
2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many >> shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still
lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide >> up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully
buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent >> water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant
end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed
four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather >> more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox
to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if >> wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch,
adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in >> cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water
close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels >> & prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5 >> after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss >> of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when
chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes. >>
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid
restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a >> devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a >> volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane
behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the
English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it >> the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning >> of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then >> it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this >> without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless
inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
perpendicular to the wind.The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize while
the boat went down. The suggestion being that all less experienced crews need to be accompanied by THEIR OWN safety launch.As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
Thank you, Don.
So capsize it was (not a common event), & a stern coxed 4. Avoiding capsize is feasible in similar conditions, provided the crew sit still & keep oars perpendicular to the boat, but that may require a level of
calm & awareness beyond an inexperienced crew in such conditions. One would want to turn quickly to get end-on to the waves, which may have unduly exposed them those beam waves.
On a wide lake squalls can arrive largely unseen & unsuspected as precursors of a coming gale. The crew boated at ~08:30, the 06:30
forecast having been for winds 11-14mph, increasing to 17mph by 11:00. (Earlier reports suggested winds of 20-25mph, which would have corresponded well enough with 1ft waves). Steady wind speed predictions often ignore tendency for gusts. I note there was a rule about not
boating in winds >14mph.
The commentary on USRowing rules is interesting, in having no quoted mention of full shell buoyancy (a FISA standard) but with advice to
carry PFDs in the boat. Effective PFDs do exist which do _not_
incommode rowers, & IMHO they should be mandatory wear when water temperatures fall below certain limits.
As indicated in the latest report, the crew tried to swim ashore. We
don't know the distance but, if the water was as cold as previously suggested, & if that swim took over a minute in normal temperatures,
then it was almost certain that some would lose all swimming ability & drown long before reaching safety. If the boat was also not fully
buoyant, swimming away is the more understandable as it would then seem
to offer little support & the crew in the water would already be
suffering from the cold & consequent failing grip strength.
Hindsight is a terrible thing. Worse still would be litigation over
this. One must hope that lawyers do not get involved as nothing they
might do will bring back the dead. The vital thing is for all of rowing
to learn from this dreadful accident & do those simple things which, without impairing the sport, can make rowing that much safer. Sadly, we seem too often to ignore warnings & precedents, as a result repeating
the same old mistakes.
Carl
--
Carl Douglas Racing Shells -
Fine Small-Boats/AeRoWing Low-drag Riggers/Advanced Accessories
Write: Harris Boatyard, Laleham Reach, Chertsey KT16 8RP, UK
Find: tinyurl.com/2tqujf
Email: ca...@carldouglasrowing.com Tel: +44(0)1932-570946 Fax: -563682 URLs: carldouglasrowing.com & now on Facebook @ CarlDouglasRacingShells
---I read the linked articles as stating that the crew had passed swim tests and that water temp was 40F and that the boat was pependicular to the waves when a large one swamped them.
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
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The unknowns in this tragedy are really down to the experience of the crew. Passing a swim test isn't the same as confidence and ability in water and also how fit the crew was and their boat experience and how wet and cold they might have got before
A wooden boat, however swamped would still have some bouyancy but does that apply to more recent resin constructions?
pgk
On Wednesday, April 7, 2021 at 5:29:01 AM UTC-4, Peter wrote:little-wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On Tuesday, 6 April 2021 at 20:10:28 UTC+1, carl wrote:
On 06/04/2021 18:02, don Vickers wrote:
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa >>>>>> incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of >>>>>> other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been >>>>>> even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time >>>>>> novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false. >>>>>> It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence. >>>>>>
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the
emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely
nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon >>>>> after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with
ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as
"these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in >>>>> the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes
towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is
broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace??
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do >>>>> rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating. >>>>>
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but >>>>> I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further &
better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died.
2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat >>>>> country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec >>>>> 4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier.
5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C, >>>>> & there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for >>>>> wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a
wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm. >>>>> At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely
steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with
occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30 >>>>> - 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the
sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible >>>>> but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface?
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay >>>>> people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that >>>>> battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from >>>>> 2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many >>>>> shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still >>>>> lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide >>>>> up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully >>>>> buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent >>>>> water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant >>>>> end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed
four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather >>>>> more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox >>>>> to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if >>>>> wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch,
adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in >>>>> cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water
close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels >>>>> & prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5 >>>>> after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss >>>>> of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when >>>>> chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes. >>>>>
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid
restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a >>>>> devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a >>>>> volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane
behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the >>>>> English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it >>>>> the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning >>>>> of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then >>>>> it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this >>>>> without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless >>>>> inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
perpendicular to the wind.
The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize while
the boat went down. The suggestion being that all less experienced crews need to be accompanied by THEIR OWN safety launch.I read the linked articles as stating that the crew had passed swim tests and that water temp was 40F and that the boat was pependicular to the waves when a large one swamped them.Thank you, Don.
As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
So capsize it was (not a common event), & a stern coxed 4. Avoiding
capsize is feasible in similar conditions, provided the crew sit still & >>> keep oars perpendicular to the boat, but that may require a level of
calm & awareness beyond an inexperienced crew in such conditions. One
would want to turn quickly to get end-on to the waves, which may have
unduly exposed them those beam waves.
On a wide lake squalls can arrive largely unseen & unsuspected as
precursors of a coming gale. The crew boated at ~08:30, the 06:30
forecast having been for winds 11-14mph, increasing to 17mph by 11:00.
(Earlier reports suggested winds of 20-25mph, which would have
corresponded well enough with 1ft waves). Steady wind speed predictions
often ignore tendency for gusts. I note there was a rule about not
boating in winds >14mph.
The commentary on USRowing rules is interesting, in having no quoted
mention of full shell buoyancy (a FISA standard) but with advice to
carry PFDs in the boat. Effective PFDs do exist which do _not_
incommode rowers, & IMHO they should be mandatory wear when water
temperatures fall below certain limits.
As indicated in the latest report, the crew tried to swim ashore. We
don't know the distance but, if the water was as cold as previously
suggested, & if that swim took over a minute in normal temperatures,
then it was almost certain that some would lose all swimming ability &
drown long before reaching safety. If the boat was also not fully
buoyant, swimming away is the more understandable as it would then seem
to offer little support & the crew in the water would already be
suffering from the cold & consequent failing grip strength.
Hindsight is a terrible thing. Worse still would be litigation over
this. One must hope that lawyers do not get involved as nothing they
might do will bring back the dead. The vital thing is for all of rowing
to learn from this dreadful accident & do those simple things which,
without impairing the sport, can make rowing that much safer. Sadly, we
seem too often to ignore warnings & precedents, as a result repeating
the same old mistakes.
Carl
--
Carl Douglas Racing Shells -
Fine Small-Boats/AeRoWing Low-drag Riggers/Advanced Accessories
Write: Harris Boatyard, Laleham Reach, Chertsey KT16 8RP, UK
Find: tinyurl.com/2tqujf
Email: ca...@carldouglasrowing.com Tel: +44(0)1932-570946 Fax: -563682
URLs: carldouglasrowing.com & now on Facebook @ CarlDouglasRacingShells
---
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
The unknowns in this tragedy are really down to the experience of the crew. Passing a swim test isn't the same as confidence and ability in water and also how fit the crew was and their boat experience and how wet and cold they might have got before
A wooden boat, however swamped would still have some bouyancy but does that apply to more recent resin constructions?
pgk
Little Wall Lake, where the ISU accident occurred, is about 250 acres (100 hectares) with a maximum depth of about 13 ft (4 m). Because it's round and flat, water temperatures vary but have been reported at 40f +/- f (1.7 - 7.2 c). The issue of windspeeds is less well known, as the cox reported the lake calm when they set out but videos of the rescue efforts clearly showed whitecaps with relatively strong winds. Beyond this, I can add a little more information, some of which I believe has appeared
I will add three points without feigning IMHO. The first is that I see no good reason why rowers aren't advised to wear PFDs on cold water, i.e., below 50f/10c. Especially novices! USRowing has historically taken the position that they don't have theauthority to set safety standards -- something that is untrue -- and has continually failed to recommend that PFDs be worn on cold water. If young rowers took the recommendation to put on a PFD on cold water as seriously as they take the "requirement" to
Secondly, too much attention is being given to the absence of a launch in this instance. USRowing recommends that a launch be within 100 yards on cold water. That's better than being a mile away or still at the dock, but a launch was right alongsideMohammed Ramzan when he drowned at Northwestern University in 2017, launches were nearby when John Steve Catilo drowned on the Potomac River, and Dzmitry Ryshkevich was surrounded by professional personnel when he drowned at the World Championships. We
Finally, it is worth noting that the emergency response time in this instance was pretty good. Very few emergency response teams (fire/ems) maintain personnel on station and fewer still maintain any professional response teams on the water. Under thebest of circumstances, after a 911 call is received the dispatcher still has to tone out (alert) the appropriate agencies and then response teams (boat and trailer drivers, EMS, etc) have to be assembled. Only once those teams have been assembled can
It should go without saying that a person in cold water without a PFD usually can't survive until professional help arrives.
Marc Messing
RowSafeUSA.Org
RowSafeUSA@Gmail.com
On 09/05/2021 19:45, Marc Messing wrote:little-wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On Wednesday, April 7, 2021 at 5:29:01 AM UTC-4, Peter wrote:
On Tuesday, 6 April 2021 at 20:10:28 UTC+1, carl wrote:
On 06/04/2021 18:02, don Vickers wrote:
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa >>>>>> incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of >>>>>> other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been
even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time
novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false.
It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence.
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the
emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely >>>>>> nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon
after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with >>>>> ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as >>>>> "these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in >>>>> the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes >>>>> towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is >>>>> broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace??
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do
rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating. >>>>>
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but
I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further & >>>>> better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died. >>>>> 2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat
country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec
4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier.
5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C, >>>>> & there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for >>>>> wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a >>>>> wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm.
At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely
steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with >>>>> occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30
- 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the >>>>> sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible >>>>> but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface? >>>>>
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay
people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that >>>>> battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from
2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many
shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still
lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide >>>>> up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully >>>>> buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent
water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant
end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed >>>>> four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather >>>>> more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox
to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if
wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch, >>>>> adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in >>>>> cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water >>>>> close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels
& prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5 >>>>> after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss
of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when
chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes.
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid
restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a >>>>> devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a >>>>> volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane
behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the >>>>> English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it >>>>> the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning
of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then
it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this >>>>> without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless
inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
perpendicular to the wind.
The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize while
the boat went down. The suggestion being that all less experienced crews need to be accompanied by THEIR OWN safety launch.I read the linked articles as stating that the crew had passed swim tests and that water temp was 40F and that the boat was pependicular to the waves when a large one swamped them.Thank you, Don.
As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
So capsize it was (not a common event), & a stern coxed 4. Avoiding
capsize is feasible in similar conditions, provided the crew sit still & >>> keep oars perpendicular to the boat, but that may require a level of
calm & awareness beyond an inexperienced crew in such conditions. One >>> would want to turn quickly to get end-on to the waves, which may have >>> unduly exposed them those beam waves.
On a wide lake squalls can arrive largely unseen & unsuspected as
precursors of a coming gale. The crew boated at ~08:30, the 06:30
forecast having been for winds 11-14mph, increasing to 17mph by 11:00. >>> (Earlier reports suggested winds of 20-25mph, which would have
corresponded well enough with 1ft waves). Steady wind speed predictions >>> often ignore tendency for gusts. I note there was a rule about not
boating in winds >14mph.
The commentary on USRowing rules is interesting, in having no quoted
mention of full shell buoyancy (a FISA standard) but with advice to
carry PFDs in the boat. Effective PFDs do exist which do _not_
incommode rowers, & IMHO they should be mandatory wear when water
temperatures fall below certain limits.
As indicated in the latest report, the crew tried to swim ashore. We
don't know the distance but, if the water was as cold as previously
suggested, & if that swim took over a minute in normal temperatures,
then it was almost certain that some would lose all swimming ability & >>> drown long before reaching safety. If the boat was also not fully
buoyant, swimming away is the more understandable as it would then seem >>> to offer little support & the crew in the water would already be
suffering from the cold & consequent failing grip strength.
Hindsight is a terrible thing. Worse still would be litigation over
this. One must hope that lawyers do not get involved as nothing they
might do will bring back the dead. The vital thing is for all of rowing >>> to learn from this dreadful accident & do those simple things which,
without impairing the sport, can make rowing that much safer. Sadly, we >>> seem too often to ignore warnings & precedents, as a result repeating >>> the same old mistakes.
Carl
--
Carl Douglas Racing Shells -
Fine Small-Boats/AeRoWing Low-drag Riggers/Advanced Accessories
Write: Harris Boatyard, Laleham Reach, Chertsey KT16 8RP, UK
Find: tinyurl.com/2tqujf
Email: ca...@carldouglasrowing.com Tel: +44(0)1932-570946 Fax: -563682 >>> URLs: carldouglasrowing.com & now on Facebook @ CarlDouglasRacingShells >>>
---
This email has been checked for viruses by AVG.
https://www.avg.com
The unknowns in this tragedy are really down to the experience of the crew. Passing a swim test isn't the same as confidence and ability in water and also how fit the crew was and their boat experience and how wet and cold they might have got before
A wooden boat, however swamped would still have some bouyancy but does that apply to more recent resin constructions?
pgk
speeds is less well known, as the cox reported the lake calm when they set out but videos of the rescue efforts clearly showed whitecaps with relatively strong winds. Beyond this, I can add a little more information, some of which I believe has appearedLittle Wall Lake, where the ISU accident occurred, is about 250 acres (100 hectares) with a maximum depth of about 13 ft (4 m). Because it's round and flat, water temperatures vary but have been reported at 40f +/- f (1.7 - 7.2 c). The issue of wind
authority to set safety standards -- something that is untrue -- and has continually failed to recommend that PFDs be worn on cold water. If young rowers took the recommendation to put on a PFD on cold water as seriously as they take the "requirement" toI will add three points without feigning IMHO. The first is that I see no good reason why rowers aren't advised to wear PFDs on cold water, i.e., below 50f/10c. Especially novices! USRowing has historically taken the position that they don't have the
Mohammed Ramzan when he drowned at Northwestern University in 2017, launches were nearby when John Steve Catilo drowned on the Potomac River, and Dzmitry Ryshkevich was surrounded by professional personnel when he drowned at the World Championships. WeSecondly, too much attention is being given to the absence of a launch in this instance. USRowing recommends that a launch be within 100 yards on cold water. That's better than being a mile away or still at the dock, but a launch was right alongside
best of circumstances, after a 911 call is received the dispatcher still has to tone out (alert) the appropriate agencies and then response teams (boat and trailer drivers, EMS, etc) have to be assembled. Only once those teams have been assembled canFinally, it is worth noting that the emergency response time in this instance was pretty good. Very few emergency response teams (fire/ems) maintain personnel on station and fewer still maintain any professional response teams on the water. Under the
It should go without saying that a person in cold water without a PFD usually can't survive until professional help arrives.
Marc Messing
RowSafeUSA.Org
RowSa...@Gmail.com
All very well put, Marc. And no less that I'd have expected from you.
So - many thanks.
Some points I might add:
John Steve Catilo drowned because he fell into the water & his
driverless launch circled him until he was lost. A kayaker saw what had happened & made a bee line, but from some distance, so was too late. My understanding (I had some involvement in the aftermath of this case) is
that no launches were close enough to render timely assistance, or they
were unaware that there was a problem before it was too late.
This happened only a few weeks after 3 eights, on 2 separate days, had swamped & sunk on that same wide, exposed river & the rowers were
rescued not by club launches but by the Fire Department.
John Steve was ejected into the water when he accidentally started the
motor 'in gear'. Because the kill cords were locked away in the club
office he lacked that essential safety device which would have
immediately stopped the boat & thus, in all probability, have ensured
his survival. Because the club's PFDs had been taken to pad boats for trailing to a regatta, he also had no PFD to keep him afloat when in difficulties. An all-round good guy, & a promising student, was thus
lost in front of a learn-to-row eight of young teens.
The case of para sculler Dzmitry Ryshkevich remains clouded, unless
others know better. From evidence I have seen, a bolt or bolts on one
side of his wing rigger (equipped of course with pontoons) failed. This detached that side of his boat from the rigger. His boat then rolled, putting undue strain on the attachment points on the other side of the
boat, which then broke away. So despite the pontoons, Dzmitry's boat capsized.
As a para sculler, Dzmitry was strapped into his seat. I heard that his
feet were also strapped into the shoes. I understand that, despite
being under water, he was able to free his feet & may have just managed
to unstrap his body from the seat. I don't know how long this all took
but it may have been some time, during which - as he was training hard
at the time - he may have been under significant respiratory stress.
There's an element of surmise in those details but they appear to tally.
As a launch reached him, Dzmitry did get his head above water but,
before anyone could get hold of him, he slipped under &, when found once more, could not be resuscitated.
It was being said around that time that perhaps a nut had come loose, &
that lock-nuts should therefore be mandatory. My own hunch is that a
nut or nuts may have stripped (perhaps from repeated tightening - we
tend to over-tighten small bolts, or to fatigue them, by repeatedly
checking their tightness). Whatever, I understand that the relevant
bolts in the undamaged part of the boat were missing when the boat was recovered & never found.
As well as underlining the problem of getting a rescue launch there in
time (as both cases do) I wonder what is being done to ensure that a
para sculler can be immediately released in the event of a mishap. I
think this is possible, & have a few ideas, but other pressing matters
have unfortunately intruded upon my time since I first learned in more detail the circumstances surrounding Dzmitry's tragic loss.
Carl
--
Carl Douglas Racing Shells -
Fine Small-Boats/AeRoWing Low-drag Riggers/Advanced Accessories
Write: Harris Boatyard, Laleham Reach, Chertsey KT16 8RP, UK
Find: tinyurl.com/2tqujf
Email: ca...@carldouglasrowing.com Tel: +44(0)1932-570946 Fax: -563682
URLs: carldouglasrowing.com & now on Facebook @ CarlDouglasRacingShells
On Sunday, May 9, 2021 at 6:09:19 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:little-wall-lake-deaths/7082723002/>
On 09/05/2021 19:45, Marc Messing wrote:
On Wednesday, April 7, 2021 at 5:29:01 AM UTC-4, Peter wrote:
On Tuesday, 6 April 2021 at 20:10:28 UTC+1, carl wrote:
On 06/04/2021 18:02, don Vickers wrote:
On Thursday, April 1, 2021 at 2:44:35 PM UTC-4, carl wrote:
On 01/04/2021 17:44, Henry Law wrote:There is an update to this tragedy: Iowa State Crew Club president said lake was 'like glass' before deadly accident <https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2021/04/04/isu-crew-president-rowers-surprised-wind-waves-before-capsize-accident-
On Thu, 01 Apr 2021 07:05:07 -0700, Robin Harries wrote:Henry -
This thread has just been posted on r/rowing. It's impossible to verify,
A great deal of uninformed speculation about the cause of the Iowa >>>>>>>> incident, which is unfortunate, but lots of first-time experience of >>>>>>>> other incidents in similar conditions which (for those of us who've been
even near one) have the ring of truth about them.
I hope to find that the assertion that two of the four were first-time >>>>>>>> novices, afloat without a safety launch in wintery conditions, is false.
It had better be; otherwise there's a valid charge of gross negligence.
Our club is having a drive on heel release cord length at the moment; the
emphasis should be there all the time, granted, but it's timely >>>>>>>> nevertheless.
Thanks for your measured comments. I heard about this tragedy very soon >>>>>>> after it had happened, and of course the reportage was awash with >>>>>>> ill-informed comments.
The stuff about heel restraints, which a reddit poster describes as >>>>>>> "these peices of string (normally a shoelace) that keep your heels in >>>>>>> the boat, and don't let the shoes lift up too far" is possibly
misinformed (see later) but sadly typifies the despicable attitudes >>>>>>> towards rower safety whereby a bootlace of indeterminate length is >>>>>>> broadly considered a safety device. Would trust your life to a shoe-lace??
Most disturbing is the usual presumption of a capsize - "for how else do
rowers end up swimming?" What a pity folk can't stop idly speculating. >>>>>>>
I deplore the knee-jerk resort to typical "blame culture" reaction, but >>>>>>> I do favour a careful listing of the possibilities in order of
probability. Let's explore just a little way, then await further & >>>>>>> better information - what do we know so far?
1. It seems to have been a 4+ as 5 people were immersed & 2 died. >>>>>>> 2. This was on a lake, measuring about 1000m x 1700m, set in open, flat >>>>>>> country with very little natural shelter.
3. The wind was variously described as blowing at 20-25mph or 9-11m/sec >>>>>>> 4. The lake is relatively shallow - a depression left by a former glacier.
5. The water temperature has been variously given as 37-40F or 3-4.5C, >>>>>>> & there had until recently been freezing conditions.
So the water would have been cold & rough. Crew shells are not fit for >>>>>>> wave heights as little as 20cm/8". If you take a fetch of 1.5km & a >>>>>>> wind speed of 10m/sec, expect a significant wave height of around 20cm. >>>>>>> At 12m/sec wind speed it might be 24cm waves. But wind is rarely >>>>>>> steady, & wave heights are never uniform but form a spectrum with >>>>>>> occasional "rogue" waves rather larger than those around them (up to 30 >>>>>>> - 50% higher). These will rapidly fill a shell by slopping over the >>>>>>> sides. The next issue is that the shape of the lake, & depth
variations, can create areas of increased wave height.
The first question to ask is: did the boat actually capsize (possible >>>>>>> but less usual) or was it swamped & sank below the water surface? >>>>>>>
In rough conditions an inexperienced crew could indeed capsize, but lay >>>>>>> people love to jump to ignorant conclusions.
However, there are no excuses for under-buoyant shells. We fought that >>>>>>> battle in the UK for 10 years (against unprincipled UK officialdom) from
2000 until FISA mandated full shell buoyancy, but I know that very many >>>>>>> shells in the USA have never been assessed for adequate buoyancy & still
lack the fully-enclosed under-seat compartments which would a) provide >>>>>>> up to 40kg of added buoyancy per seat (making eights and fours fully >>>>>>> buoyant such that they remain safely rowable when swamped) & b) prevent >>>>>>> water already in the boat from rushing to & depressing the least buoyant
end.
A further question concerns type of shell: we think it was a coxed >>>>>>> four, but was it bow steers or stern? With bow steers you have rather >>>>>>> more open volume for water to fill, & it is significantly harder for cox
to extract themselves if the boat is swamped or inverted, especially if >>>>>>> wearing bulky clothing.
Other questions include: presence or otherwise of a capable launch, >>>>>>> adequacy of clothing (multilayer, close-fitting kit is a life-saver in >>>>>>> cold immersion as it keeps an insulating layer of non-flowing water >>>>>>> close to the body), self-rescue instructions, supervision, skill levels >>>>>>> & prior assessment of conditions.
Finally, at those indicated water temperatures to have lost 2 out of 5 >>>>>>> after sudden & prolonged immersion is an unsurprising result - the loss >>>>>>> of limb strength through automatic restriction of blood circulation when
chilled can be rapid, rendering a person unable to swim within minutes. >>>>>>>
One can understand that young people, after many months of Covid >>>>>>> restrictions, might tend to throw caution to the winds, but this was a >>>>>>> devastating & probably preventable outcome. One of my colleagues is a >>>>>>> volunteer with the RNLI on the R Thames & is aghast at the inane >>>>>>> behaviour of so many "de-mob happy" boaters following the end of the >>>>>>> English Covid lock-down.
Finally, while no one meant this to happen, the blame game (& with it >>>>>>> the denial of blame) may well take precedence over the careful learning >>>>>>> of lessons & proper support for the bereaved. If people messed up, then >>>>>>> it will be far more useful to all if they can be allowed to admit this >>>>>>> without having to go into denial mode in order to defend their doubtless
inadvertent errors.
Our thoughts go to all affected -
Carl
perpendicular to the wind.
The club president was the coxswain in what the article indicates was a stern loader. The club doesn't have a launch; or a dock. The club doesn't require swimming tests. The article indicates the boat did actually did actually capsize while
the boat went down. The suggestion being that all less experienced crews need to be accompanied by THEIR OWN safety launch.I read the linked articles as stating that the crew had passed swim tests and that water temp was 40F and that the boat was pependicular to the waves when a large one swamped them.Thank you, Don.
As any experienced rower knows, the wave through and peaks while the boat is parallel to the wave motion makes the boat very unstable and requires good blade control.
So capsize it was (not a common event), & a stern coxed 4. Avoiding
capsize is feasible in similar conditions, provided the crew sit still & >>>>> keep oars perpendicular to the boat, but that may require a level of >>>>> calm & awareness beyond an inexperienced crew in such conditions. One >>>>> would want to turn quickly to get end-on to the waves, which may have >>>>> unduly exposed them those beam waves.
On a wide lake squalls can arrive largely unseen & unsuspected as
precursors of a coming gale. The crew boated at ~08:30, the 06:30
forecast having been for winds 11-14mph, increasing to 17mph by 11:00. >>>>> (Earlier reports suggested winds of 20-25mph, which would have
corresponded well enough with 1ft waves). Steady wind speed predictions >>>>> often ignore tendency for gusts. I note there was a rule about not
boating in winds >14mph.
The commentary on USRowing rules is interesting, in having no quoted >>>>> mention of full shell buoyancy (a FISA standard) but with advice to
carry PFDs in the boat. Effective PFDs do exist which do _not_
incommode rowers, & IMHO they should be mandatory wear when water
temperatures fall below certain limits.
As indicated in the latest report, the crew tried to swim ashore. We >>>>> don't know the distance but, if the water was as cold as previously
suggested, & if that swim took over a minute in normal temperatures, >>>>> then it was almost certain that some would lose all swimming ability & >>>>> drown long before reaching safety. If the boat was also not fully
buoyant, swimming away is the more understandable as it would then seem >>>>> to offer little support & the crew in the water would already be
suffering from the cold & consequent failing grip strength.
Hindsight is a terrible thing. Worse still would be litigation over
this. One must hope that lawyers do not get involved as nothing they >>>>> might do will bring back the dead. The vital thing is for all of rowing >>>>> to learn from this dreadful accident & do those simple things which, >>>>> without impairing the sport, can make rowing that much safer. Sadly, we >>>>> seem too often to ignore warnings & precedents, as a result repeating >>>>> the same old mistakes.
Carl
--
Carl Douglas Racing Shells -
Fine Small-Boats/AeRoWing Low-drag Riggers/Advanced Accessories
Write: Harris Boatyard, Laleham Reach, Chertsey KT16 8RP, UK
Find: tinyurl.com/2tqujf
Email: ca...@carldouglasrowing.com Tel: +44(0)1932-570946 Fax: -563682 >>>>> URLs: carldouglasrowing.com & now on Facebook @ CarlDouglasRacingShells >>>>>
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The unknowns in this tragedy are really down to the experience of the crew. Passing a swim test isn't the same as confidence and ability in water and also how fit the crew was and their boat experience and how wet and cold they might have got before
speeds is less well known, as the cox reported the lake calm when they set out but videos of the rescue efforts clearly showed whitecaps with relatively strong winds. Beyond this, I can add a little more information, some of which I believe has appearedA wooden boat, however swamped would still have some bouyancy but does that apply to more recent resin constructions?
pgk
Little Wall Lake, where the ISU accident occurred, is about 250 acres (100 hectares) with a maximum depth of about 13 ft (4 m). Because it's round and flat, water temperatures vary but have been reported at 40f +/- f (1.7 - 7.2 c). The issue of wind
authority to set safety standards -- something that is untrue -- and has continually failed to recommend that PFDs be worn on cold water. If young rowers took the recommendation to put on a PFD on cold water as seriously as they take the "requirement" to
I will add three points without feigning IMHO. The first is that I see no good reason why rowers aren't advised to wear PFDs on cold water, i.e., below 50f/10c. Especially novices! USRowing has historically taken the position that they don't have the
Mohammed Ramzan when he drowned at Northwestern University in 2017, launches were nearby when John Steve Catilo drowned on the Potomac River, and Dzmitry Ryshkevich was surrounded by professional personnel when he drowned at the World Championships. We
Secondly, too much attention is being given to the absence of a launch in this instance. USRowing recommends that a launch be within 100 yards on cold water. That's better than being a mile away or still at the dock, but a launch was right alongside
best of circumstances, after a 911 call is received the dispatcher still has to tone out (alert) the appropriate agencies and then response teams (boat and trailer drivers, EMS, etc) have to be assembled. Only once those teams have been assembled can
Finally, it is worth noting that the emergency response time in this instance was pretty good. Very few emergency response teams (fire/ems) maintain personnel on station and fewer still maintain any professional response teams on the water. Under the
All very well put, Marc. And no less that I'd have expected from you.
It should go without saying that a person in cold water without a PFD usually can't survive until professional help arrives.
Marc Messing
RowSafeUSA.Org
RowSa...@Gmail.com
So - many thanks.
Some points I might add:
John Steve Catilo drowned because he fell into the water & his
driverless launch circled him until he was lost. A kayaker saw what had
happened & made a bee line, but from some distance, so was too late. My
understanding (I had some involvement in the aftermath of this case) is
that no launches were close enough to render timely assistance, or they
were unaware that there was a problem before it was too late.
This happened only a few weeks after 3 eights, on 2 separate days, had
swamped & sunk on that same wide, exposed river & the rowers were
rescued not by club launches but by the Fire Department.
John Steve was ejected into the water when he accidentally started the
motor 'in gear'. Because the kill cords were locked away in the club
office he lacked that essential safety device which would have
immediately stopped the boat & thus, in all probability, have ensured
his survival. Because the club's PFDs had been taken to pad boats for
trailing to a regatta, he also had no PFD to keep him afloat when in
difficulties. An all-round good guy, & a promising student, was thus
lost in front of a learn-to-row eight of young teens.
The case of para sculler Dzmitry Ryshkevich remains clouded, unless
others know better. From evidence I have seen, a bolt or bolts on one
side of his wing rigger (equipped of course with pontoons) failed. This
detached that side of his boat from the rigger. His boat then rolled,
putting undue strain on the attachment points on the other side of the
boat, which then broke away. So despite the pontoons, Dzmitry's boat
capsized.
As a para sculler, Dzmitry was strapped into his seat. I heard that his
feet were also strapped into the shoes. I understand that, despite
being under water, he was able to free his feet & may have just managed
to unstrap his body from the seat. I don't know how long this all took
but it may have been some time, during which - as he was training hard
at the time - he may have been under significant respiratory stress.
There's an element of surmise in those details but they appear to tally.
As a launch reached him, Dzmitry did get his head above water but,
before anyone could get hold of him, he slipped under &, when found once
more, could not be resuscitated.
It was being said around that time that perhaps a nut had come loose, &
that lock-nuts should therefore be mandatory. My own hunch is that a
nut or nuts may have stripped (perhaps from repeated tightening - we
tend to over-tighten small bolts, or to fatigue them, by repeatedly
checking their tightness). Whatever, I understand that the relevant
bolts in the undamaged part of the boat were missing when the boat was
recovered & never found.
As well as underlining the problem of getting a rescue launch there in
time (as both cases do) I wonder what is being done to ensure that a
para sculler can be immediately released in the event of a mishap. I
think this is possible, & have a few ideas, but other pressing matters
have unfortunately intruded upon my time since I first learned in more
detail the circumstances surrounding Dzmitry's tragic loss.
Carl
--
Carl, you and I have some small differences in understanding of these accident details, but they are very small.
What concerns me most about our understanding of these fatal and many near-fatal accidents is that we rarely critical details. Often, in the case of non-fatal accidents, there are no details at all because the parties involved say nothing for fear ofexposing liability. In the case of fatal accidents, the official investigating parties don't know the right questions to ask. Additionally, here in the US, coroner's reports may or may not be available depending on state law. When an experienced 71-year
In the case of Ryshkevich, it is a shame, if not scandalous, that no official accident report is available (or was available when I last checked). The reason I was given by WR was that they couldn't release information until official governmentfindings have been released. To the extent that that may be true, I regard it as inexcusable. It has been almost two years since his death and if we better understood the actual contributing elements we might better prevent another similar accident. My
Just a few minutes after posting the above I came across this announcement of a safety seminar via Zoom by USRowing for tomorrow, 13-May-2021:
Topic Safety, Safety, Safety - Making Sure You're REALLY Ready to get Back to the Waterothers.
Description
USRowing Safety Committee members Rachel LeMieux (Chair) and Matt Logue will discuss minimum guidelines for safe Rowing practices. They will cover many topics including: Weather, Water Conditions, Emergency Plans/Rules, Coast Guard regulations, among
Time May 13, 2021 07:00 PM in Eastern Time (US and Canada)
URL: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_WZYxEpniTZKz1DtgfacONQ
don Vickers
Just a few minutes after posting the above I came across this announcement of a safety seminar via Zoom by USRowing for tomorrow, 13-May-2021:
Topic Safety, Safety, Safety - Making Sure You're REALLY Ready to get Back to the Waterothers.
Description
USRowing Safety Committee members Rachel LeMieux (Chair) and Matt Logue will discuss minimum guidelines for safe Rowing practices. They will cover many topics including: Weather, Water Conditions, Emergency Plans/Rules, Coast Guard regulations, among
Time May 13, 2021 07:00 PM in Eastern Time (US and Canada)
URL: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_WZYxEpniTZKz1DtgfacONQ
don Vickers
There were clearly some horribly poor choices made in the Iowa State tragedy. Carl made a great case of the culture problem at the top of the blazer hierarchy. I suggest there is also a culture issue that likely played into the tragedy in this case.This is a culture where the boat is only a minor consideration of the sport. Carl has posted here here very well about the lack of boatmanship. I wonder how much the kids in this tragedy understood about being ON and IN the water.
It would seem a good thing to have the various national rowing organizations place a bit more emphasis on the BOAT and WATER aspects of the sport. We can always dream because this seems highly unlikely.surface. The reports of the accident indicate that the two kids that drowned started swimming to, apparently opposite, shore. This could have been as little as 200 meters and as much as 500 meters. That is an exceptionally long distance to swim in water
One would hope that the ISU rowing team required swim tests. As a part of my high school swim tests, we were also lectured about safety procedures. One of the core messages in that lecture was to NEVER leave the boat even it was totally under the
I had the experience of being in an almost identical situation when I was in my first year of rowing as a 14-year-old. The difference was that we had a launch and a coach to provide leadership. Being in that icy water was very debilitating.north to south and 1.5 k east to west.
The lake in which this occurred, Little Wall Lake <https://www.google.com/maps/place/Little+Wall+Lake/@42.2691266,-93.6450937,2652m/data=!3m2!1e3!4b1!4m5!3m4!1s0x87ee0e90c589a4f5:0x5392df7181a19553!8m2!3d42.2686405!4d-93.6382472>, is just over 1 k
For what little it is worth,
don Vickers
Don,
Thanks for the heads-up on the USR meeting.
Did you come across that on their website, or through some other notification?
Marc
On Wednesday, May 12, 2021 at 2:45:21 PM UTC-4, don Vickers wrote:
Just a few minutes after posting the above I came across this announcement of a safety seminar via Zoom by USRowing for tomorrow, 13-May-2021:
others.Topic Safety, Safety, Safety - Making Sure You're REALLY Ready to get Back to the Water
Description
USRowing Safety Committee members Rachel LeMieux (Chair) and Matt Logue will discuss minimum guidelines for safe Rowing practices. They will cover many topics including: Weather, Water Conditions, Emergency Plans/Rules, Coast Guard regulations, among
Marc,Time May 13, 2021 07:00 PM in Eastern Time (US and Canada)
URL: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_WZYxEpniTZKz1DtgfacONQ
don Vickers
On Wednesday, May 12, 2021 at 5:44:37 PM UTC-4, Marc Messing wrote:
Don,
Thanks for the heads-up on the USR meeting.
Did you come across that on their website, or through some other notification?
Marc
On Wednesday, May 12, 2021 at 2:45:21 PM UTC-4, don Vickers wrote:
Just a few minutes after posting the above I came across this announcement of a safety seminar via Zoom by USRowing for tomorrow, 13-May-2021:
among others.Topic Safety, Safety, Safety - Making Sure You're REALLY Ready to get Back to the Water
Description
USRowing Safety Committee members Rachel LeMieux (Chair) and Matt Logue will discuss minimum guidelines for safe Rowing practices. They will cover many topics including: Weather, Water Conditions, Emergency Plans/Rules, Coast Guard regulations,
Time May 13, 2021 07:00 PM in Eastern Time (US and Canada)
URL: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_WZYxEpniTZKz1DtgfacONQ
Marc,don Vickers
The notification I saw was a Tweet from USRowing. While it is a great that they are running this virtual meeting they certainly don't seem interested in promoting or advertising it.
don
They have never convinced me of their interest in promoting safety.work." I wrote her back and said "Safety, in particular youth safety, should be a top priority for USRowing, but it isn't," and then went through a litany of their failures in this regard.
When Amanda Kraus took over as CEO last year I wrote her a brief note of congratulations and my interest in youth safety standards. She assured me "Safety is the number one priority at USRowing and it's good to hear from others who are aligned on this
I also called to speak with her immediately after the ISU accident and was told she was unavailable because she was on vacation. Less than six months in her new position as CEO of USR, in the days following a fatal accident she was on vacation andunavailable to return calls.
USR and I have different views on what a commitment to safety means.
Marc
On Thursday, May 13, 2021 at 7:58:29 AM UTC-4, don Vickers wrote:
On Wednesday, May 12, 2021 at 5:44:37 PM UTC-4, Marc Messing wrote:
Don,
Thanks for the heads-up on the USR meeting.
Did you come across that on their website, or through some other notification?
Marc
On Wednesday, May 12, 2021 at 2:45:21 PM UTC-4, don Vickers wrote:
Just a few minutes after posting the above I came across this announcement of a safety seminar via Zoom by USRowing for tomorrow, 13-May-2021:
among others.Topic Safety, Safety, Safety - Making Sure You're REALLY Ready to get Back to the Water
Description
USRowing Safety Committee members Rachel LeMieux (Chair) and Matt Logue will discuss minimum guidelines for safe Rowing practices. They will cover many topics including: Weather, Water Conditions, Emergency Plans/Rules, Coast Guard regulations,
Time May 13, 2021 07:00 PM in Eastern Time (US and Canada)
URL: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_WZYxEpniTZKz1DtgfacONQ
Marc,don Vickers
The notification I saw was a Tweet from USRowing. While it is a great that they are running this virtual meeting they certainly don't seem interested in promoting or advertising it.
don
After tonight's webinar I'll soften my view on USR slightly. They're trying; they're just very timid and have persuaded themselves they don't have the authority to set minimum standards.work." I wrote her back and said "Safety, in particular youth safety, should be a top priority for USRowing, but it isn't," and then went through a litany of their failures in this regard.
Marc
On Thursday, May 13, 2021 at 12:57:43 PM UTC-4, Marc Messing wrote:
They have never convinced me of their interest in promoting safety.
When Amanda Kraus took over as CEO last year I wrote her a brief note of congratulations and my interest in youth safety standards. She assured me "Safety is the number one priority at USRowing and it's good to hear from others who are aligned on this
unavailable to return calls.
I also called to speak with her immediately after the ISU accident and was told she was unavailable because she was on vacation. Less than six months in her new position as CEO of USR, in the days following a fatal accident she was on vacation and
among others.
USR and I have different views on what a commitment to safety means.
Marc
On Thursday, May 13, 2021 at 7:58:29 AM UTC-4, don Vickers wrote:
On Wednesday, May 12, 2021 at 5:44:37 PM UTC-4, Marc Messing wrote:
Don,
Thanks for the heads-up on the USR meeting.
Did you come across that on their website, or through some other notification?
Marc
On Wednesday, May 12, 2021 at 2:45:21 PM UTC-4, don Vickers wrote:
Just a few minutes after posting the above I came across this announcement of a safety seminar via Zoom by USRowing for tomorrow, 13-May-2021:
Topic Safety, Safety, Safety - Making Sure You're REALLY Ready to get Back to the Water
Description
USRowing Safety Committee members Rachel LeMieux (Chair) and Matt Logue will discuss minimum guidelines for safe Rowing practices. They will cover many topics including: Weather, Water Conditions, Emergency Plans/Rules, Coast Guard regulations,
Marc,
Time May 13, 2021 07:00 PM in Eastern Time (US and Canada)
URL: https://us02web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_WZYxEpniTZKz1DtgfacONQ >>>>>
don Vickers
The notification I saw was a Tweet from USRowing. While it is a great that they are running this virtual meeting they certainly don't seem interested in promoting or advertising it.
don
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