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Home»News»RAND: What the U.S. Navy Really Needs, by Dr. Bradley Martin

USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78)
The first-in-class aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) steams
in the Atlantic Ocean, Nov. 7, 2022. Exercise Silent Wolverine is a
U.S.-led, combined training exercise that tests Ford-class aircraft
carrier capabilities through integrated high-end naval warfare scenarios alongside participating allies in the Eastern Atlantic Ocean. The Gerald
R. Ford Carrier Strike Group is conducting their first deployment in the
U.S. Naval Forces Europe area of operations. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jackson Adkins)
RAND: What The U.S. Navy Really Needs, By Dr. Bradley Martin
RAND Corporation’s Dr. Bradley Martin, a retired U.S. Navy captain, and Director, Institute for Supply Chain Security, returns to answer a Naval
News question, “What does the U.S. Navy really need in the future?”
Peter Ong 19 Nov 2023

Dr. Bradley Martin has been featured in Naval News in his January 2023
RAND commentary on the “DDG(X) Next-Generation U.S. Navy Destroyer.”

The U.S. Navy in late 2023 faces many challenges with budgetary
Continuing Resolutions, the burden of demanding logistics, Readiness,
and requirements, missed recruitment goals, and peer nations’ military buildups, pacing threats, and pressure. Furthermore, Admiral Michael
Gilday recently retired from his four-year term as the U.S. Navy’s Chief
of Naval Operations (CNO) and Admiral Lisa Franchetti was elected to CNO
in August 2023. Thus, I asked Dr. Martin what does he believe the U.S.
Navy really needs in the future. My question was open-ended and can
include anything from more amphibious ships to more shipyards to more
smart munitions, or newly designed warships, seaplanes and floatplanes,
to innovative technological concepts. What does the analyst suggest for
the U.S. Navy five, ten, and fifteen years into the future? Dr. Martin responded with this exclusive insightful answer for Naval News.

What the US Navy Really Needs by Brad Martin
The US Navy is a worldwide force that carries out a variety of different missions. It is in some ways a victim of its own success in that for
decades there has been no Navy comparable to it in terms of reach and
overall capability. The relative number of ships does not tell the
whole story. For example, a US Navy Nimitz-class aircraft carrier can
readily generate 100 to 120 strike sorties per day, which no other navy
could even begin to match. Similarly, while some competitors such as
Russia and China have capable submarine forces, no Navy comes close to
the US submarine force in terms of technological sophistication, giving
it major advantages in sea control, and power projection capability.

However, the US Navy does face challenges that require resolution in
next three years and then in the next decade, and many revolve around
the overall lack of ready force structure.

First, the US Navy has not overall developed a strategy to guide force structure development and to a very large degree is effectively on “auto-pilot” for force development and force planning. The Department
of the Navy identifies key missions in documents such as its “navigation plan” SECNAV STRATEGIC GUIDANCE_100721.PDF (defense.gov), but these do
not suffice as guidance as to how the force might be used and the kinds
of threat it is likely to face.

So, to a degree, we on the outside are inferring things about what the
Navy might actually need and use rather than specifying what a strategic
vision might tell us. However, some things do appear to be clear.

The immediate term (0-3 years)
Building a bigger or more capable fleet is not done overnight. Ships
take years to construct and deliver. Aircraft have a shorter timeline
but they are still not equivalent to mass-produced vehicles. To a very
large degree, the Navy as it exists is the Navy that will be available
for the next five years at least. The biggest challenge with the current
Navy revolves around the readiness of the fleet to complete even simple missions.

Our research over the last several years has found that surface ships
have consistently been delayed finishing shipyard maintenance periods
and almost always experience growth in the size and extent of
maintenance periods. Among the reasons for the recently publicized
failure of the Navy’s cruiser modification program is a lack of
industrial capacity for performing the work, as well as conditions that
were found on Ticonderoga-class ships as they were worked on.

USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000)
USS Zumwalt (DDG-1000) arrived at Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula MS
19 for a major 2-year modernization that will see large launch tubes for hypersonic Conventional Prompt Strike missiles replace the two 155mm
Advanced Gun Systems. HII photo.
To a very large degree, the issue with surface ship maintenance, with
its knock-on effects on other readiness, revolves around simply not
following the plans that the Navy itself promulgated for conducting
essential maintenance. Part of doing better overall is to identify and
fully fund the ship repair requirement. This is neither glamorous nor
will it be inexpensive. But, the alternative is for ships to get older
and in worse repair at exactly the time that a robust fleet presence is
needed in multiple theaters.

Nuclear attack submarines have experienced maintenance delays also – sometimes quite significant – but the causes are different from the
surface fleet. Here the issues are associated with a shortfall of
experienced personnel in government-owned naval shipyards. Through a
process that goes back to the 1990s, shipyards lost capacity and shed
personnel and only began adding them back in the last decade as it
became clear that the workforce was aging and not being replaced. The
Navy has been working to rectify this situation over time, but we are
again facing a situation where the current force might not be ready for
some very plausible near-term challenges.

Also in the immediate term, the Navy tries to maintain presence in areas
of interest, but the cycle of extended deployment, followed by deferred maintenance, leads to more deployment extension, with predictable
impacts on material readiness. This cycle reached a level of
unsustainability during the COVID-19 pandemic, where ships were
sometimes underway continuously – as in not even stops in liberty ports
– for over eight months at a time. Naval presence can be an extremely valuable addition toward the nation’s ability to deal with crises, but presence without some clear purpose simply is not sustainable. The
Navy’s normal impulse is to “say yes” to demands for activity essential to security. But, in doing so without clearly stating the overall
readiness impact, it may take forces away from more essential missions.

Finally, the Navy desperately needs to ensure that the nation has an
adequate industrial base to support a surge in munitions demand. We saw
from the war in Ukraine that the demand for some kinds of munitions may
be far beyond our existing inventory and indeed far beyond our ability
to refill that inventory. In the immediate term, the Navy must identify
its more critical munitions and parts and ensure that an adequate supply
is available to the deployed force. More importantly, the Navy has to
identify whether the suppliers even have the capacity to meet the
demand. Adding missing capacity is not something that can be done in
the short term, but it is possible to at least identify the scale of the problem.

These all point to a need for investment in infrastructure, maintenance,
and whatever kinds of readiness-promoting activity that can be generated without necessarily demanding time underway or out of homeport. Virtual trainers [can help] for replicating events that might previously have
been covered in underway training periods.

The mid-term (2-7 years)
The Navy can provide unique value to the nation, but doing so requires connection between national goals and the desired outcomes. The brings
us back around to the problem of the Navy not having formulated a clear connection between its force structure and the nation’s strategic goals.
Establishing this connection will remain a priority in future years.

But, a few things can be inferred even without well-developed guidance.
First is that the challenges of operating in a contested environment
will not diminish but likely increase. In areas such as the East Asian littoral, the People’s Liberation Army is likely to retain the
capability and capacity to track and engage almost any surface ship.
Submarines will be a key capability for operating in these kinds of environments, and there will also be an increasing need to rely on
unmanned systems that can be generated in large quantity.

However, even as capability to track and engage targets will increase,
the need for world-wide presence likely will not decrease, and this
points toward a need for more ships that can operate in a variety of environments, not just in the most heavily contested. These kinds of
vessels will, moreover, likely require crews to carry out events such as engagement or potentially activities relating to ensuring – and possibly restricting to adversaries – international commerce, such as visit,
board, search, and seizure.

The Littoral Combat Ship was intended to be a “low-end” combatant that could be used in environments where a Navy presence might be desired but
would not require the full capabilities of a combatant such as a
destroyer. The Constellation-class frigate may serve well in the role
of an all-purpose smaller combatant but there is a distinct danger of it becoming only a little less expensive than already existing surface
combatants. The propensity to move the capability away from a frigate
to a destroyer should be strongly resisted.A major shortfall for the
Navy, which should be addressed in the mid-term even if not fully
realized until the longer term, is the lack of logistics and sustainment shipping. The strategic sealift fleet is old and needs to be
recapitalized, or at least replaced with foreign-made carriers capable
of being modified to move military cargo over inter-ocean distances.
The Navy combat logistics force, which is specifically intended to
support deployed Navy ships, also faces issues of age and capacity.

However, one area of joint interest that does not seem to have gained
much attention is water-bone intra-theater lift, which refers to the
movement of materiel from a strategic port of debarkation – a major transportation node – to points of actual need in theater. This is not solely a Navy but a joint requirement, and unfortunately one that no
service has seen fit to address. In theaters that involve mostly land operations – such as in Europe or the Middle East – the US Army
routinely performs this service. Similarly, in every case where air
delivery is the preferable option, responsibility falls to the Air
Force. However, when the natural mode of transportation is sealift, as
is the case in the Pacific, no service has claimed the mission. Looked
at simply from the perspective of the mode and the environment, it is
difficult to explain why the Navy is not the lead service.

Related to the issue of in-theater logistics and sustainment, the Navy
also needs expeditionary repair and refit capabilities, similar to
destroyer and submarine tenders that it had at one time in ample supply.
For issues ranging from repair of specifically military gear to
ordnance reload, deployable tenders are essential. While completely new
hulls are unlikely to be available in the mid-term, some vessels, such
as the expeditionary fast transport class, may work as an interim solution.

US Navy and USMC Demonstrate 'Lightning Carrier' Concept
Amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LHA- 7) , departs Naval Air Station
North Island, Calif., April 7, 2022. Tripoli completed flight deck
operations with 20 F-35B Lightning II jets from Marine Fighter Attack
Squadrons 211 and 225, Marine Aircraft Group 13, and 3rd Marine Aircraft
Wing, as well as Marine Operational Test and Evaluation Squadron 1, as
part of the U.S. Marine Corps’ Lightning carrier concept demonstration.
The Lightning carrier concept demonstration shows Tripoli and other
amphibious assault ships are capable of operating as dedicated
fixed-wing strike platforms when needed, capable of bringing fifth
generation Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing aircraft wherever they are
required. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Sgt. Samuel Ruiz)
We have not yet discussed amphibious capabilities nor carrier aviation.
This is not because they do not represent important parts of naval force architecture but because to a degree their future is relatively well determined. Up through the periods we are discussing, the Navy will keep nuclear-power carriers with integrated air wings and escorts, and the
Navy will operate ships embarking Marines organized into Marine Air
Ground Task Forces.

However, as both the Navy and Marine Corps evolve toward more
distributed concepts of operation, there may be value in considering how aviation platforms might be used interchangeably between Navy and Marine missions. The F-35B short take-off vertical landing variant gives
amphibious assault ships a level of aviation capability never previously available. This alone does not bring the capabilities of an integrated
air wing, such as airborne early warning or electronic attack which are
at present available only on catapult equipped full-size aircraft
carriers. But, it does bring a level of capability for sea control and
limited strike that was previously not envisioned for amphibious forces.
As unmanned capabilities evolve to allow airborne early warning or
electronic attack payloads, these may require less deck space and might
not require catapult launch. This may even further expand the
flexibility and value of smaller aviation support ships.

The long-term (5-15 years)
Advances in autonomy and in the endurance of unmanned systems will
likely result in these becoming more and more a part of fleet
architecture. For example, there are missions where it would be very
hazardous to use submarines – such as port surveillance or mining – and missions where a proliferation of unmanned surface targets would reduce
the chances of detection and engagement of a manned surface ships. Small
aerial drones may greatly improve the ability of ships and aircraft to
target potential enemies attempting to exploit littoral cover.

Unmanned aerial systems launched from ships in large numbers and
networked with one another and manned systems may reach the point where
they can carry out a large portion of air-air missions and some strike
missions in contested areas.

Submarine strike will also grow in importance as submarines add capacity
for a variety of different missiles. US submarine ability to avoid
detection by adversary anti-submarine systems is likely to remain robust.

Columbia-Class Submarine
Artist rendering of Columbia-class submarine (US Navy image)
However, what will still remain a challenge is having sufficient numbers
of every kind of vessel to maintain a worldwide presence. This includes
in places where the unique advantages of Marines operating from
amphibious shipping are likely to remain important for decades to come.
Clearly these will not be useful capabilities in areas where nations
maintain a significant capability to target and engage ships. But, they
will continue to be helpful in places where some amount of military
force may be needed, but not necessarily at a level necessary to assault
and occupy contested territory.

But, for both amphibious ships and smaller surface combatants, the need
to be present and able to react to disruptions in worldwide supply
chains will become even more important as the world continues to rely on
trade. Even if trade diminishes between the US and China, supply chains
have become so widely distributed and subject to interruption that a
worldwide military presence may be advisable to possibly respond to
instability in areas where instability can have broad effects. As a
point of reference, navies and trade routes have long been associated.
This is not to suggest that the US Navy could or should react to every
instance of instability. It’s to suggest that a worldwide Navy with
adequate numbers is essential to a country with worldwide trading and
financial interests.

This brings us back to questions of logistics and sustainment. The Navy
has historically designed ships to last decades and manned them with
sufficient crew to perform maintenance between industrial
availabilities. This has proven to be a difficult system to operate in
the face of deferred maintenance, difficulty recruiting people for
sometimes very tedious watchstanding and industrial labor. Ships in
particular must become less maintenance intensive, which involves
designing ease of maintenance into the ship from the time of delivery.
This practice can add to the expense of delivery. If the ship has
multiple functions automated and uses advanced materials to make parts, external surfaces, ducting, piping and the whole range of peripheral
systems longer-lasting, the ship will likely be more expensive at
delivery. But, it will over a life cycle, ultimately be less expensive
in terms of manpower and maintenance expense. More attention to
sustainment in design is not something that can readily be done with
ships in service. It will be a long-term process.

Conversely, some things will be best thought of as disposable and bought
with only enough to last for a limited number of missions, maybe one.
This adaptation will require use of civilian technology, for example in autonomous drones, and does not rely on the cumbersome process of
requirements development and acquisition that govern Major Defense
Acquisition Programs.

Future planning does need to recognize that some of the assumptions
concerning industrial base and labor availability that guided the United
States through its 20th century wars, including the Cold War, no longer
obtain. That world changed. The Navy must change as well to meet the
new challenge.

Naval News also asked Dr. Martin’s RAND colleague, Dr. Scott Savitz, the
same question.

TAGS U.S. Navy
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AUTHORS

Posted by : Peter Ong
Peter Ong is a Freelance Writer with United States and International
Federation of Journalists (IFJ) media credentials and lives in
California. Peter has a Bachelor's Degree in Technical Writing/Graphic
Design and a Master's Degree in Business. He writes articles for
defense, maritime and emergency vehicle publications.

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