XPost: aalt.war.world-war-two

Mats Andersson
·
Follow
M Sc. in Physics & Computer Science, Uppsala University (Graduated 1991)10h

Was Nazi Germany “on the cusp” of acquiring atomic weaponry?
No, not anywhere even remotely close.

After the war was over in Europe, German nuclear scientists were placed
in house arrest in the south of England – all in the same house, where everything was bugged so that the British authorities could listen to
their conversations. When the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the scientists understood immediately what had happened.

As the scale of the Manhattan Project became apparent to them, it was
clear from their discussions – and from what is known about how the
Nazis ran things – that Nazi Germany would have been totally incompetent
to run a similar project.

First of all, the Manhattan Project had up to a staggering 100,000
people working on it. The Nazi nuclear programme never had more than 20 scientists attached to it.

Secondly, the Nazi way of doing any major project was to give two groups
the same goal, and every reason to undermine each other. That the Nazis
were competent organisers is a piece of Nazi propaganda that people tend
to believe to this day – in reality, they couldn’t organise their way
out of a wet paper bag. Their favoured management method, the Leadership Principle, is fundamentally flawed and actively rewards incompetence and corruption; Nazi Germany was insanely corrupt, with officials stealing everything that wasn’t nailed down and demanding payment under the table
for everything. The main reason why they only had 20 scientists was that
they were totally unable to run a bigger operation.

None of this was actually known during the war – which was why the
Allies, helped by people from occupied Norway, undertook the daring raid
on the heavy water production at Rjukan. They feared that if Hitler got
access to heavy water, he could build plants for enriching uranium. In
reality, there was never any real danger; they could actually have
supplied him with enriched uranium themselves, and the Nazis would still
have failed to build a working nuclear weapon before May 1945.

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Profile photo for Gustavo Sánchez Muñoz
Gustavo Sánchez Muñoz
· 9h
‘Why the Allies Won’, by Richard Overy is a classic and very interesting book that debunks myths like those that you comment. Spoiler: The Nazi
systems of management were astoundlingly incompetent competitive
cliques. The question is not so much ‘Why did they not win’ but ‘How on Earth did they manage to hold for so long’. And the answer is as complex
as the answers to ‘Why did the Allies won’.

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Dominic Johnson
· 4h
Our systems were little better, but at least we tried to stop repeating mistakes.

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Clayton Badeaux
· 2h
At least until the War ended. Then we went right back to trying the same
stupid thing over and over, even though it had never worked.

Erin Winslow
What kinds of things?
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Nick Cooper
· 10h
On the other hand, the Nazis spent more money on rocket research than
the cost of the Manhattan Project, and Van Braun’s little empire was far
more comparable to it than the minuscule Nazi atomic bomb programme.

Profile photo for MisterBethany .
MisterBethany .
· 9h
Well, rocketry was pretty well established in German science and
practical engineering long before the Nazi era, so there was a lot more
to build on. But their rockets and other projets were definately
hamstrung by all the things Mats mentioned above. Yes, they were
genuinely in advance of the Allies, but didn’t achieve anything near the potential.

(I’ve always thought they’d have done better to improve and refine the Fiesler 103 pulse jet cruise missile(the V1) and launch massive shoals
of them, rather than spending a lot of time and resources on the
relatively ineffective V2 rockets. But either way an effective result
would have depended on, simply, a different philosophy at the top. And everything else, like at AA missiles, ws too little too late and not
working right anyway)

Nick Cooper
Sure, going down the road of rockets rather than atoms was a false
economy, but the point was that the scale of work on rockets was
comparable to the Manhattan Project. The A-4/V-2 was technically
impressive, but its warhead was only marginally larger than the Fi
103/V-1, which only cost a tenth of the price. Money would have been
better spent on improving the V-1 and associated delivery methods, but
luckily it wasn’t!
Profile photo for Duncan Cairncross
Duncan Cairncross
· 2h
True - but until the atom bomb was developed that was simply a blind
alley - liquid fuelled rockets were a massive NEGATIVE for the German
war effort

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"a425couple" wrote in message news:L8f2N.24053$_z39.9709@fx34.iad...

(I’ve always thought they’d have done better to improve and refine the Fiesler 103 pulse jet cruise missile(the V1) and launch massive shoals
of them, rather than spending a lot of time and resources on the
relatively ineffective V2 rockets. But either way an effective result
would have depended on, simply, a different philosophy at the top. And everything else, like at AA missiles, ws too little too late and not
working right anyway)

-------------------------------------------

USAAF + RAF bombers delivered as much explosive in one day and night as the rockets did for the entire war.

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"a425couple" wrote in message news:L8f2N.24053$_z39.9709@fx34.iad...

Well, rocketry was pretty well established in German science and
practical engineering long before the Nazi era, so there was a lot more
to build on. But their rockets and other projets were definately
hamstrung by all the things Mats mentioned above. Yes, they were
genuinely in advance of the Allies, but didn’t achieve anything near the potential.

----------------------

The only reason they turned to rockets was their failure to develop escorted strategic bombing. The lone advocate of heavy bombers died in a crash in
1936, caused by gust locks not removed from the ailerons. The same oversight destroyed the B-17 prototype and initiated the checklist. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Walther_Wever_(general)
"However, after his death, other strategists, like Ernst Udet and Hans Jeschonnek favored smaller aircraft as they did not expend as much material
and manpower. They were proponents of the dive-bomber (Junkers Ju 87) and
the doctrine of close support and destruction of the opposing air forces on
the 'battle-ground' rather than through attacking enemy industry."

Defeating an enemy army offered a quick victory while creating a heavy
bomber force to attack industry was an unacceptable admission of tactical failure and a long war of attrition, a repeat of WW1.

Germany wasn't so much ahead of the Allies as differently focused, U-Boot vs destroyer, fighter vs bomber. They fought in a relatively small area they
could drive to while the Allies had to operate all over the planet. German fighter planes largely fought over or near their own forces and territory,
they had short range like the Spitfire. German heavy tanks could retreat
over intact bridges while Allied tanks needed to be light enough to cross rivers on temporary portable ones.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bailey_bridge
"A Bailey bridge has the advantages of requiring no special tools or heavy equipment to assemble. The wood and steel bridge elements were small and
light enough to be carried in trucks and lifted into place by hand, without
the use of a crane."
"After one section is complete it is typically pushed forward over rollers
on the bridgehead, and another section built behind it."

To support tanks the bridge needed an upper row of horizontal trusses, assembled directly onto the lower ones from the bed of the truck that
brought them. "Light" meant 600 Lbs, but armies have plenty of manpower. Muzzleloading field artillery weighing 1000-2000 Lbs was moved by hand
during battles. I use Army field rigging methods to move green oak logs weighing upwards of 2000 Lbs onto my sawmill. https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/tm3_34x86.pdf

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XPost: aalt.war.world-war-two

On 07/11/2023 00:02, a425couple wrote:

Mats Andersson
 ·
Follow
M Sc. in Physics & Computer Science, Uppsala University (Graduated 1991)10h

Was Nazi Germany “on the cusp” of acquiring atomic weaponry?
No, not anywhere even remotely close.

After the war was over in Europe, German nuclear scientists were placed
in house arrest in the south of England – all in the same house, where everything was bugged so that the British authorities could listen to
their conversations. When the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the scientists understood immediately what had happened.

The reality is the German nuclear weapons was doomed from the start
because the Nazis didnt understand the concept of cooperation. Before
the USA was even in the war the British passed on all they had to the
USA. The result was developments such as the cavity magnetron which
allowed compact airborne radar meant the western allies had superior
night fighters. The Luftwaffe got tied in with group think with heavy
bombers.

There was an interesting parallel in that both the Luftwaffe and RAF
tried bombers with two very powerful engines which turned out to be
unreliable, He177 in Germany and the Manchester with the RAF.

Avro and the RAF ditched the Rolly-Royce Vulture and started mass
producing the Lancaster, by the end of the war 7,377 had beein built, in Germany made just 1,169 which were chronically unreliable, highly
unreliable and the loss rate from engine failure was higher than the
combat losses.

The Germans split their nuclear program into 3 each of them competing
with the other rather than sharing with their own colleagues, the result
was in 1945 they hadnt even managed to achieve criticallity and had not
even started a bomb design. Heisenberg was working on the assumption
that between 1 and 10 TONS of plutonium or U-235 was neede3d to produce
a single bomb.

After the war the Americans found that while Japan had not managed to
achieve criticallity either they were at least heading in the right
direction.

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"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message news:uijg7f$2ckom$1@dont-email.me...

On 07/11/2023 00:02, a425couple wrote:

Mats Andersson
·
Follow
M Sc. in Physics & Computer Science, Uppsala University (Graduated
1991)10h

Was Nazi Germany “on the cusp” of acquiring atomic weaponry?
No, not anywhere even remotely close.

After the war was over in Europe, German nuclear scientists were placed in house arrest in the south of England – all in the same house, where everything was bugged so that the British authorities could listen to
their conversations. When the bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the scientists understood immediately what had happened.

The reality is the German nuclear weapons was doomed from the start
because the Nazis didnt understand the concept of cooperation. Before
the USA was even in the war the British passed on all they had to the
USA. The result was developments such as the cavity magnetron which
allowed compact airborne radar meant the western allies had superior
night fighters. The Luftwaffe got tied in with group think with heavy
bombers.

<<< Ultra, Huff-Duff, the Merlin, the 76mm tank cannon and the Bailey bridge were also valuable British contributions. >>>

There was an interesting parallel in that both the Luftwaffe and RAF
tried bombers with two very powerful engines which turned out to be
unreliable, He177 in Germany and the Manchester with the RAF.

<<< The American doubled engine effort didn't go far either. https://airandspace.si.edu/collection-objects/allison-v-3420-23-v-3420-b10-double-v-engine/nasm_A19660386000
Due to flame travel rate the cylinders were considered to be at maximum practical size and only more of them could increase horsepower. German aero engine cylinder displacement was substantially larger than Allied engines
but they achieved only similar power. >>>

Avro and the RAF ditched the Rolly-Royce Vulture and started mass
producing the Lancaster, by the end of the war 7,377 had beein built, in Germany made just 1,169 which were chronically unreliable, highly
unreliable and the loss rate from engine failure was higher than the
combat losses.

The Germans split their nuclear program into 3 each of them competing
with the other rather than sharing with their own colleagues, the result
was in 1945 they hadnt even managed to achieve criticallity and had not
even started a bomb design. Heisenberg was working on the assumption
that between 1 and 10 TONS of plutonium or U-235 was neede3d to produce
a single bomb.

<<< My theory is that the scientists understood that Boron contamination
from the purification process would poison a graphite moderator, and gambled that uneducated Nazi officials wouldn't catch on that they were scheming to look busy without producing results. >>>

After the war the Americans found that while Japan had not managed to
achieve criticallity either they were at least heading in the right
direction.

-----------------------------------

Setting up two or more organizations that compete against each other to pick
a winner was standard Nazi practice, They had two armies, the Wehrmacht and
the Waffen SS, two military headquarters OKW and OKH, three security
agencies, the Gestapo, Sicherheitsdienst (SD) and Abwehr. The smarter ones divided the task and all survived. Before gaining power they had two
separate street gangs, the Sturmabteilung (SA) and the Schutzstaffel (SS).
The SA proved too strongly Communist to cooperate with the industrialists
who were vital to rearmament, and was liquidated in the Night of the Long Knives.

Before taking power and facing the inherent failures of Socialism the Nazis were true to their name of National (i.e. not Marxist) Socialists. Once in control they had to abandon ideology and do what worked, as Lenin had with
his New Economic Policy which Russia fumbled but China has succeeded with.

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On 10/11/2023 02:53, Jim Wilkins wrote:

<<< My theory is that the scientists understood that Boron contamination
from the purification process would poison a graphite moderator, and
gambled that uneducated Nazi officials wouldn't catch on that they were scheming to look busy without producing results. >>>

Well the captured physicists at Farm Hall naively believed the British
would not be so ungentlemeny as to listen in on them but of course every
single room was bugged and all conversations recorded and translated.

They got number of things spectacularly wrong including the boron issue
and the critical mass of U-235 or Plutonium needed to make a bomb. As I
recall Heisenberg had told them it could be anything between tens of
kilograms and tens of tons. He had not actually calculated the value as
at that time they had no working reactor and only milligrams of U-235 so
it was run as a purely academic project and the scientists under
Heisenberg accepted his figures. The simple fact is the Soviets had got
further on these issues than Germany did although that was in large part
down to the information Klaus Fuchs passed on from Los Alamos.

After hearing about the Hiroshima bomb he did the full calculations and
came up with figures in the right ball park. This was down in part to
the deference to senior people within any German research project, if Heisenberg said something it was assumed to be true.

The Farm Hall Transcripts are worth a read and can be found online here. https://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/English101.pdf

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"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message news:uil4kh$2q74t$1@dont-email.me...

Well the captured physicists at Farm Hall naively believed the British
would not be so ungentlemeny as to listen in on them but of course every
single room was bugged and all conversations recorded and translated.

------------------------------

Or perhaps like Roosevelt at Yalta they suspected but didn't care, since British captivity protected them from Gestapo diehards. In the 70's I knew several Germans who fondly remembered "the good old days", and even worked
for one, who taught me some Yiddish, which is mostly a dialect of German. I
was allowed into the closed back room of a German bookstore where all the
WW2 memorabilia was concealed. It seemed more acceptable to have been pro
than anti Nazi. As with Communists and the ultra-religious I appear neutral, non-judgmental, and usually listen to the more intelligent of their
positions without arguing. That's how I learn.

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"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message news:uil4kh$2q74t$1@dont-email.me...

On 10/11/2023 02:53, Jim Wilkins wrote:

<<< My theory is that the scientists understood that Boron contamination
from the purification process would poison a graphite moderator, and
gambled that uneducated Nazi officials wouldn't catch on that they were scheming to look busy without producing results. >>>

Well the captured physicists at Farm Hall naively believed the British
would not be so ungentlemeny as to listen in on them but of course every
single room was bugged and all conversations recorded and translated.

They got number of things spectacularly wrong including the boron issue
and the critical mass of U-235 or Plutonium needed to make a bomb. As I
recall Heisenberg had told them it could be anything between tens of
kilograms and tens of tons. He had not actually calculated the value as
at that time they had no working reactor and only milligrams of U-235 so
it was run as a purely academic project and the scientists under
Heisenberg accepted his figures. The simple fact is the Soviets had got
further on these issues than Germany did although that was in large part
down to the information Klaus Fuchs passed on from Los Alamos.

After hearing about the Hiroshima bomb he did the full calculations and
came up with figures in the right ball park. This was down in part to
the deference to senior people within any German research project, if Heisenberg said something it was assumed to be true.

The Farm Hall Transcripts are worth a read and can be found online here. https://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/English101.pdf

----------------------------

I've read the transcripts several times.
"After hearing about the Hiroshima bomb he did the full calculations and
came up with figures in the right ball park."
That's the uncertainty (Unsicherheit) that Heisenberg should be remembered
and thanked for.

I think he was purposely inflating the numbers to deceive party officials
who he knew had no alternate source for them. I suspect that the purpose of
the Copenhagen meeting with Bohr was to determine what could plausibly and safely be falsified to sabotage the project, based on who else Bohr knew to understand the physics. and at Farm Hall they didn't trust each others'
hidden loyalties enough admit it. As Canaris showed there was a serious conflict in being pro-German but anti-Nazi.

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On 10/11/2023 12:23, Jim Wilkins wrote:

"Keith Willshaw"  wrote in message news:uil4kh$2q74t$1@dont-email.me...

On 10/11/2023 02:53, Jim Wilkins wrote:

<<< My theory is that the scientists understood that Boron
contamination from the purification process would poison a graphite
moderator, and gambled that uneducated Nazi officials wouldn't catch
on that they were scheming to look busy without producing results. >>>

Well the captured physicists at Farm Hall naively believed the British
would not be so ungentlemeny as to listen in on them but of course every single room was bugged and all conversations recorded and translated.

They got number of things spectacularly wrong including the boron issue
and the critical mass of U-235 or Plutonium needed to make a bomb. As I recall Heisenberg had told them it could be anything between tens of kilograms and tens of tons. He had not actually calculated the value as
at that time they had no working reactor and only milligrams of U-235 so
it was run as a purely academic project and the scientists under
Heisenberg accepted his figures. The simple fact is the Soviets had got further on these issues than Germany did although that was in large part
down to the information Klaus Fuchs passed on from Los Alamos.

After hearing about the Hiroshima bomb he did the full calculations and
came up with figures in the right ball park. This was down in part to
the deference to senior people within any German research project, if Heisenberg said something it was assumed to be true.

The Farm Hall Transcripts are worth a read and can be found online here. https://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/English101.pdf

----------------------------

I've read the transcripts several times.
"After hearing about the Hiroshima bomb he did the full calculations and
came up with figures in the right ball park."
That's the uncertainty (Unsicherheit) that Heisenberg should be
remembered and thanked for.

I think he was purposely inflating the numbers to deceive party
officials who he knew had no alternate source for them. I suspect that
the purpose of the Copenhagen meeting with Bohr was to determine what
could plausibly and safely be falsified to sabotage the project, based
on who else Bohr knew to understand the physics. and at Farm Hall they
didn't trust each others' hidden loyalties enough admit it. As Canaris
showed there was a serious conflict in being pro-German but anti-Nazi.

Its possible but most of the German physicists were simply realists who recognised that the scale of the German program and the resources
allocated meant that there was no realistic chance of progress
especially when divided between 3 groups who barely talked to each
other. It is clear that most of the resources they had were focussed on producing an operational reactor, which they referred to as an
Uranmaschine (uranium machine). They never did get it to work while
Reactor 1 in Chicago went critical in December 1942.

The thing for the Germans was that they were diverting so much of their resources to the V1 and V2 projects that they simply did not have the
resouces to progress the projects, for example they never produced
anything like enough heavy water. They were well behind as Frisch and
Peierls were in 1940 when they had determined the mass of fissile
material for a bomb. They were of course 2 of the German jewish
scientists who had fled the country. It is telling that a high
percentage of the top physicists in the Manhattan prject had either been expelled fled from or fled the German regime. For a long time Heisenberg
had extreme problems from the Gestapo who considered him as
untrustworthy as he had been unwilling to sack jewish physicists.

The man nominally in charge of the project was Kurt Diebner was also the director of the Nuclear Research Council and a Reich Planning Officer
for the German Army. Nobody wanted to make promises they could not keep
and the military was demanding the so called vengeance weapons in the
form of the V1, V2 and V3.

The latter at Mimoyecques would have been capable of firing 600 rounds
per hour at London but just as they were ready to go the RAF dropped 6
ton ground penetrating bombs and put it permanently out of action.

This was standard practise for the RAF and USAAF by 1944. Dont bomb it
at the start, wait until they have spent the time and resources building
the facility and then destroy it. The game changer was the Tallboy and
617 squadron RAF who had modified Lancasters, could carry 6 and 10 ton
ground penetrating bombs and were trained in precision bombing.

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"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message news:uiqk58$3r8m$1@dont-email.me...

The thing for the Germans was that they were diverting so much of their resources to the V1 and V2 projects that they simply did not have the
resouces to progress the projects, for example they never produced
anything like enough heavy water.
-------------------------------------

The other massive drain was the Walter peroxide engine for U-Boote. The
piping had to be made from scarce nickel and chromium to minimize explosive decomposition. This book describes how the aircraft engine designers
struggled to make exhaust valves sufficiently durable despite decreasing allocations of nickel. https://www.amazon.com/Secret-Horsepower-Race-Western-Development/dp/1911658506

The transmission gears of the Panzer V suffered frequent failure because
they couldn't be made from strong and tough nickel steel, plus the special machinery to cut herringbone gears was no longer available so they had to
make do with straight spur gears which could be cut on common machine tools; I've cut some myself on my very basic milling machine.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Herringbone_gear
Since the teeth mesh continuously there's no jump and impact as one tooth
pair separates and the next engages, which is necessary with straight cut
gears unless they are perfectly shaped and aligned, impractical in high
volume production because cutting tools cut smaller as they wear.

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"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message news:uiqk58$3r8m$1@dont-email.me...

The game changer was the Tallboy and
617 squadron RAF who had modified Lancasters, could carry 6 and 10 ton
ground penetrating bombs and were trained in precision bombing.

--------------------------------

US B-17s could drop the British-designed Disney concrete penetrating bomb by slinging it under the wings, as the bomb bay's length was limited to the distance between the front and rear wing spars which support it. High wing bombers such as the B-24 and Lanc weren't restricted that way. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disney_bomb

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XPost: aalt.war.world-war-two

On 11/9/23 12:42, Keith Willshaw wrote:

On 07/11/2023 00:02, a425couple wrote:

Mats Andersson
  ·
Follow
M Sc. in Physics & Computer Science, Uppsala University (Graduated
1991)10h

Was Nazi Germany “on the cusp” of acquiring atomic weaponry?
No, not anywhere even remotely close.

After the war was over in Europe, German nuclear scientists were
placed in house arrest in the south of England – all in the same
house, where everything was bugged so that the British authorities
could listen to their conversations. When the bombs were dropped on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the scientists understood immediately what had
happened.

The reality is the German nuclear weapons was doomed from the start
because the Nazis didnt understand the concept of cooperation. Before
the USA was even in the war the British passed on all they had to the
USA. The result was developments such as the cavity magnetron which
allowed compact airborne radar meant the western allies had superior
night fighters. The Luftwaffe got tied in with group think with heavy bombers.

There was an interesting parallel in that both the Luftwaffe and RAF
tried bombers with two very powerful engines which turned out to be unreliable, He177 in Germany and the Manchester with the RAF.

Avro and the RAF ditched the Rolly-Royce Vulture and started mass
producing the Lancaster, by the end of the war 7,377 had beein built, in Germany made just 1,169 which were chronically unreliable, highly
unreliable and the loss rate from engine failure was higher than the
combat losses.

The Germans split their nuclear program into 3 each of them competing
with the other rather than sharing with their own colleagues, the result
was in 1945 they hadnt even managed to achieve criticallity and had not
even started a bomb design.  Heisenberg was working on the assumption
that between 1 and 10 TONS of plutonium or U-235 was neede3d to produce
a single bomb.

After the war the Americans found that while Japan had not managed to
achieve criticallity either they were at least heading in the right direction.

Yes to "heading in the right direction."
IIRC their program was centered in a Tokyo University.
They were short on assets (and certainly no Xerox copies
or electronic off site storage capabilities).
So after the firebombing of Tokyo, the project was kind
of dead in the water and unable to make progress.

As Admiral Jessie Oldendorf said, "Never give a sucker
an even break !"
When you have the advantage on an enemy that wants
to kill you, keep hitting until they are finished!

After Hiroshima they sent their best expert down to inspect.
He understood it. But foolishly advised the War Cabinet
that the US would be unable to repeat for a long time.

Best book - https://www.amazon.com/Downfall-End-Imperial-Japanese-Empire/dp/0141001461

You purchased this edition on November 20, 2009. | View this order |
View Your Books
Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire
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Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire Paperback – May 1, 2001
by Richard B. Frank (Author)
4.7 4.7 out of 5 stars 322 ratings 4.2 on Goodreads 1,068 ratings

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In a riveting narrative that includes information from newly
declassified documents, acclaimed historian Richard B. Frank gives a scrupulously detailed explanation of the critical months leading up to
the dropping of the atomic bomb. Frank explains how American leaders
learned in the summer of 1945 that their alternate strategy to end the
war by invasion had been shattered by the massive Japanese buildup on
Kyushu, and that intercepted diplomatic documents also revealed the
dismal prospects of negotiation. Here also, for the first time, is a comprehensive account of how Japan's leaders were willing to risk
complete annihilation to preserve the nation's existing order. Frank's comprehensive account demolishes long-standing myths with the stark
realities of this great historical controversy.

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