XPost: sci.military.naval

Abhirup Sengupta
Military Aviation EnthusiastFri

Is the US Navy overestimating the missile defense system like Russia
did? If China shoots 10 missiles at a major warship, what are the
chances that none hit the ship?
We’ve some excellent answers already. Mr. Tim Blizzard’s insight into
the Aegis Combat system is worth reading. There’s a huge difference
between the capabilities of Aegis Missile Defence and S-300/400, the
former isn’t just exponentially more capable but tested and scrutinised
far more extensively. The SM-3 alone has 40 live-fire tests against
Medium- and Intermediate-range ballistic missiles, with the last one
involving an ICBM target. The Aegis BMD have had more live-fire tests
against ballistic missiles than S-400 had against any target. From
separating warheads and manoeuvrable RV inside the atmosphere to
simultaneous interception of exo-atmospheric ballistic missile and
sea-skimming cruise missiles.[1] If people actually looked into the
number and kind of test Aegis BMD have done over the last 20 years and
compared it to BMD programs in other countries, they’d realise just how
far ahead it really is. Despite this the US Navy’s doctrine doesn’t
solely rely on Aegis for dealing with PLA’s growing arsenal of AShMs, especially anti-ship ballistic missiles (DF-21D & DF-26).

In 2014 long before the first test of DF-21D against a maritime target,
the US Navy’s 7th Fleet tested rapid deployment of a new carbon fibre
based obscurant that could absorb radar and IR radiation. It could be
rapidly deployed by the Carrier Strike Group (CSG) across a large area
and remain effective for long duration, for example the older M56 Coyote
could generate 90 minutes of visible obscurant.


When faced with a large-scale attack it could be used to create ‘safe zones’ that practically blind AShMs. An advantage of using this on Naval vessels is that they’ve plenty of space to accommodate smoke generators.

Both USN and Royal Navy have a long record of using Inflatable Decoys
like IDS300 or FDS3 which are carried on Mk 59 launch tubes on almost
every ship in a CSG. These are retro-reflectors that mimic the RCS of
the ship, appearing as a more juicy target and can keep floating for
several hours after deployment.


These are primarily intended to be used as a countermeasure against
AShMs but can easily be employed in an asymmetric role. For instance,
the CSG can deploy a number of inflatable decoys over a large area which
can significantly degrade the enemy’s ability to reliably detect and
target them as their long-range Surveillance aircraft struggle to
distinguish between decoys and actual ships.

Of course, advancement in radars made it more difficult to deceive
modern seekers on AShMs using completely passive decoys like IDS300 (at
least when they’re in proximity to real ships). This is why the USN in cooperation with Australia developed sophisticated active decoys like
Nulka, a hovering decoy that mimics the RCS and EM signature of a ship
in order to lure AShMs in terminal phase.


A Nulka launched from USS America during a test

This is in addition to constantly improved Surface Electronic Warfare
(SEWIP) SLQ-32(V)7 on Aegis ships and Carriers that allow them to
actively jam AShMs from longer ranges. The point being, USN have
invested in a large number of soft-kill measures to defend against
modern AShMs instead of relying solely on Missile Defence system, no
matter how good. This is what a layered Defence looks like.

In 2016 USS Mason operating off the coast of Yemen was attacked multiple
times by PLA’s C-802 AShMs, in one instance by a salvo of 5 AShMs. The
Aegis and ship’s crew performed as expected – 4 were intercepted by SM-2 and the last one was lured by Nulka. Granted that C-802 isn’t the
greatest AShM out there but you won’t be attacking a major ship in the Pacific from point-blank range as Houthi rebels did with Mason
(Bab-el-Mandeb strait is about 32 km wide). Nor would you find a major
ship operating in the Pacific without E-2 support as was the case.

So you need far more than 10 AShMs of any kind to have a reasonable odds
of hitting a US Carrier or an Aegis platform, especially in the Pacific
theatre having USN’s largest and most advanced fleet. But here’s the
thing though, hitting a Carrier will kill several hundred to over a
thousand Americans. The last time someone inflicted that kind of
casualty to US military in a decapacitation strike, it didn’t end so
well for the attacker. At least the IJN had a comparable fleet and
experience in Naval combat, unlike PLAN today. I’m not sure what would
be worse for China, failing to hit a Nimitz/Ford in a confrontation with
the US after decades of boasting their Anti-ship ballistic missile
arsenal or successfully hitting one and killing a thousand US sailors in
the process. Food for thought.

Footnotes

[1] Abhirup Sengupta's answer to Is it true that Arleigh-Burke-class
destroyers with SPY-1 radars using PESA single-band technology cannot
detect low altitude threats when operating in ballistic missile defense
mode?
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