• FAA Proposes Rule To Require Remote Identification Of Drones (4/19)

    From Larry Dighera@21:1/5 to All on Fri Dec 27 05:53:15 2019
    [continued from previous message]

    operating nearby. Facility operators could use remote identification information to know about
    UAS operating near an airport, airfield, or heliport, regardless of
    the airspace in which the
    facility is located. This would provide a level of awareness that is
    currently unavailable for those
    facilities and the aircraft operating nearby. For example, an aircraft preparing to take off from an
    airport in Class G airspace may have access to greater information
    (e.g., number and location of
    UAS, types of operations conducted in the airspace, etc.) than
    currently available.
    4. Compliance and Enforcement
    The safety of the airspace of the United States largely depends on
    aircraft operators
    following the prescribed rules and being accountable for their
    actions. The FAA needs the ability
    to identify aircraft and their owners to ensure adequate oversight of
    the operations (e.g., facilitate
    the identification of noncompliant or unauthorized operations). When
    unsafe operations are
    discovered, the FAA is required to adequately address safety issues
    that may adversely affect the
    airspace of the United States as well as people and property on the
    ground. To accomplish this,
    the FAA needs a means to locate UAS operators – in near real-time, if
    necessary – to take
    immediate or subsequent action to mitigate safety issues or security
    threats. Thus, the FAA
    believes that the remote identification requirements in this proposed
    rule are necessary to ensure
    the safety of the airspace of the United States.
    If an operator is unwilling or unable to comply with, or is
    deliberately flouting
    regulations, the FAA could employ legal enforcement action, including
    civil penalties and
    certificate actions, as appropriate, to address violations and help
    deter future violations. Civil
    penalties for violations of the federal aviation regulations range
    from a maximum per violation
    penalty of $1,466, for individual operators, to $33,333 for large
    companies. In addition,
    Congress granted the FAA authority to assess civil penalties of up to
    $20,000 against an
    individual who operates a UAS and in so doing knowingly or recklessly interferes with a law
    enforcement, emergency response, or wildfire suppression activity. The
    FAA may take
    enforcement action against anyone who conducts an unauthorized UAS
    operation or operates a
    UAS in a way that endangers the safety of the airspace of the United
    States. This authority is
    designed to protect users of the airspace as well as people and
    property on the ground.
    B. Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM)
    The FAA, in an effort to further integrate UAS into the airspace of
    the United States, is
    collaborating with other government agencies and industry stakeholders
    to develop unmanned
    aircraft systems traffic management (UTM) separate from, but
    complementary to, the ATM
    system. The term “UTM” refers to a set of third-party services and an all-encompassing
    framework for managing multiple UAS operations. This vision for UTM
    includes services for
    flight planning, communications, separation, and weather, among
    others. The FAA believes that
    remote identification facilitates the long-term implementation of UTM
    by providing greater
    awareness of all aircraft, including unmanned aircraft, operating in a particular area. UTM would
    help enable increased UAS operations in both controlled and
    uncontrolled airspace, including
    airspace where no air traffic separation services are currently
    The vision for UTM18 relies on third parties’ ability to supply
    services, under FAA’s
    regulatory authority, where such services do not currently exist. The
    FAA envisions communitybased traffic management, where UAS operators
    have the responsibility for the coordination,
    execution, and management of a safe operating environment. UTM would
    be designed to support
    the demand and expectations for a broad spectrum of UAS operations
    with ever-increasing
    complexity and risk.
    The concept of UTM is predicated on layers of information sharing and
    exchange, from
    operator to operator, aircraft to aircraft, and operator to the FAA,
    to achieve safe operations.

    18 https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/docs/2018-UTM-ConOps-v1.0.pdf
    Operators would share their flight intent with each other and
    coordinate to de-conflict and safely
    separate trajectories. Remote identification is a crucial first step
    in the development of these
    UTM services.
    C. Facilitating Beyond Visual Line of Sight Operations
    Providing a means to conduct routine BVLOS operations is a critical
    step in the
    integration of UAS operations in the airspace of the United States.
    The technologies and
    procedures necessary to enable BVLOS operations have been the focus of
    past and current
    research by the FAA and others.
    19 The research indicated that for UAS to conduct safe, routine
    BVLOS operation, UAS should be able to detect both cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft
    (manned and unmanned) so they can maintain a safe distance from those
    aircraft. Cooperative
    aircraft are those that are providing information that identifies the
    location of the aircraft,
    typically through a standardized and receivable electronic radio
    frequency broadcast or other
    type of transmission. Non-cooperative aircraft are those that are not
    providing any information
    regarding their location.
    A UAS that broadcasts or transmits remote identification information
    would contribute to
    a cooperative operating environment. Operators of UAS could use remote identification
    information available from a Remote ID USS or broadcast directly from
    other unmanned aircraft
    to know the location of UAS operating nearby. Such data could be used
    in UAS detect-and-avoid
    and aircraft-to-aircraft communication systems to aid in unmanned
    aircraft collision avoidance.

    https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/integration_pilot_program/; https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/completed/; http://www.assureuas.org/projects/detectandavoid.php
    Under UTM, when the locations of other unmanned aircraft become known,
    the UAS operators
    would be able to maintain a safe distance from those aircraft.
    Although remote identification of UAS does not, in and of itself,
    permit BVLOS
    operations, it is a key stepping stone to the future ability to
    conduct those operations. Without
    remote identification of UAS, BVLOS operations on a large scale are
    not feasible, and the
    foundational building blocks of UTM – which is necessary to enable
    routine BVLOS operations
    – are not established.
    D. National Security and Law Enforcement Efforts
    This proposed rule would serve the public interest by assisting
    government efforts to
    address illegal activity and protect national security. The safety and
    security benefits described in
    this section are consistent with the FAA’s responsibilities to assist
    law enforcement agencies in
    their efforts to enforce laws related to regulation of controlled
    substances, to the extent consistent
    with aviation safety,
    20 and to prescribe regulations necessary for safety in air commerce
    national security.21
    Federal, State, and local law enforcement and national security
    agencies have expressed
    their desire for new regulations to reduce and address the security
    threats associated with illegal
    or threatening UAS operations as well as the ability to discriminate
    between compliant and noncompliant operations. The FAA recognizes the increasing availability and potential use of UAS
    for illegal activities such as the carrying and smuggling of
    controlled substances, illicit drugs,
    and other dangerous or hazardous payloads; the unlawful invasion of
    privacy; illegal surveillance

    20 49 U.S.C. 40101(d).
    21 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5).
    and reconnaissance; the weaponization of UAS; sabotaging of critical infrastructure; property
    theft; disruption; and harassment. The misuse of UAS for these
    purposes presents a direct threat
    to public safety. Such misuse also presents a hazard to safety in air
    commerce. Such risks are
    multiplied with the increasing sophistication of technology, the
    availability of UAS equipment,
    and the proliferation of UAS operations across the airspace of the
    United States.
    Unmanned aircraft operators who know they cannot easily be identified
    are more likely
    to engage in careless, reckless, or dangerous behavior because they
    believe they will not be
    caught. These operators could engage in evasive maneuvering to avoid
    pursuit, violate airspace
    restrictions, engage in unauthorized night or BVLOS operations, fly
    too close to other aircraft, or
    operate in weather conditions beyond the capability of the unmanned
    aircraft or the person flying
    it. Such behavior could create severe safety hazards not only to other
    manned and unmanned
    aircraft in the surrounding airspace, but also to persons and property
    on the ground.
    Additionally, UAS operators that do not comply with applicable law
    create a unique
    security challenge. On average, six sightings of UAS allegedly
    conducting unauthorized
    operations are reported to the FAA each day. Additionally, based on
    information provided by
    other U.S. Government agencies, there may be many additional UAS
    sightings involving
    unauthorized or illegal operations not reported to the FAA. Although
    collisions with aircraft are
    rare, there have been two confirmed unmanned aircraft collisions with
    manned aircraft: an Army
    Blackhawk helicopter in New York City in September 2017, and a small twin-engine passenger
    aircraft approaching Quebec City’s Jean Lesage International Airport
    in October 2017. In all of
    these circumstances, remote identification could have enabled
    immediate identification of the
    UAS and enabled law enforcement to find the location of the control
    station for near real-time
    response and investigation.
    Owners of critical infrastructure, airports, and venues for mass
    gatherings have expressed
    concern over the security of their facilities after sightings of UAS
    of unknown identity and
    intent. Many sightings are at night, when it may be more difficult to
    see and identify the
    unmanned aircraft or find the operator. Owners and facility managers
    of sports stadiums and
    other open-air venues are particularly concerned, given the
    concentration of people present
    during an event. Malicious UAS activities designed to disrupt and gain
    media attention are a
    distinct threat with the potential to inflict delays, fear, injuries,
    and significant economic losses
    across a variety of critical infrastructure sectors, including
    airports, public facilities, and energy
    production infrastructure.
    On April 11, 2019, numerous spectators visually spotted a UAS
    operating during a Major
    League Baseball game.22 Although law enforcement were able to
    eventually identify the operator
    within 24 hours due to a municipally-owned detection system, remote identification would likely
    have allowed them to find the operator and control station much more
    quickly and address the
    issue in real time. After law enforcement confiscated the UAS involved
    in the April 2019
    incident and were able to review its flight log, they learned that the
    operator had flown over a
    previous World Series game at the same stadium—violating an FAA
    Temporary Flight
    Restriction and numerous safety regulations.
    A UAS that was not approved to operate over people was used to drop
    pamphlets over
    large crowds outside a concert venue and a university event in May,
    2019, in Sacramento,

    22 https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/redsox/2019/04/13/drone-fenway-park-juvenile/3457190002/.
    Accessed June 11, 2019.
    California.23 This event was similar to two incidents in 2017 when a
    UAS was used to drop
    leaflets at two California National Football League games.24 Although
    security and law
    enforcement personnel at the stadium used rudimentary tactics to
    eventually identify the accused
    operator, the lack of remote identification made real-time location of
    the operator impossible.
    Security professionals have raised concerns that unmanned aircraft
    that have not been
    determined to be safe to fly over a large gathering of people may pose
    a safety hazard, and a
    UAS dropping objects could potentially pose a greater threat by
    releasing hazardous substances
    or creating a stampede of frightened spectators fleeing the area.
    Although social media postings
    helped identify the operator in some cases, such information rarely
    helps law enforcement
    officers address a potential threat in real time.
    Multiple pilot reports of a UAS approximately 10 miles away from
    Newark Airport led to
    a disruption in arrivals in January 2019 that impacted other airports
    on the East Coast for several
    hours.26 The more than 30-hour disruption of flights at London’s
    Gatwick Airport in December
    2018,27 as well as brief disruptions at airports in Dubai,28 Dublin,
    29 and Frankfurt30 within the
    last year, further demonstrate the potential for significant
    operational and financial impact from
    the presence of an unauthorized UAS in and around an airport. UAS
    operators have not been

    23 https://www.newsweek.com/drone-used-drop-nazi-leaflets-ariana-grande-concert-sacramento-bites-bridge1414933.
    Accessed June 11, 2019.
    24 https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndca/pr/sacramento-area-resident-charged-flying-drone-over-nfl-games-violationnational-defense.
    Accessed June 10, 2019.
    25 Id.
    26 https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2019/01/22/drone-activity-halts-air-traffic-newark-libertyinternational-airport/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c0e920a9e756.
    Accessed June 11, 2019.
    27 https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/dec/21/gatwick-airport-reopens-limited-number-of-flights-dronedisruption.
    Accessed June 11, 2019.
    28 http://www.digitaljournal.com/tech-and-science/technology/q-a-recent-airport-shutdowns-need-droneinterdiction-technology/article/543680.
    Accessed June 11, 2019.
    29 https://dronelife.com/2019/02/22/flights-were-grounded-at-dublin-airport-after-another-drone-sighting/.
    June 11, 2019.
    30 https://www.ecnmag.com/news/2019/03/drone-sightings-interrupt-germanys-frankfurt-airport.
    Accessed June 10,
    identified in any of these airport events. Remote identification of
    UAS would potentially prevent
    disruptions such as these by enabling real time action by the FAA,
    airport facilities, and law
    Remote identification would also aid in preventing terrorist attacks.
    Recent reports in the
    news including the Islamic State of Iraq and Ash-Sham’s modifications
    of commercial UAS,
    the assassination attempt of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela,
    32 a foiled plot in the United Kingdom
    to fly an unmanned aircraft into an airliner,
    33 and a bomb-laden unmanned aircraft flown by
    Huthi forces and detonated over a military parade in Yemen34
    illustrate the ways in which UAS
    may be used to threaten life, critical infrastructure, and national
    security. Remote identification
    of UAS would enable national security agencies and law enforcement to
    quickly identify
    potential threats and act to prevent such incidents.
    The use of UAS to smuggle contraband into correctional facilities is
    also increasingly
    common.35 Even inexpensive consumer-grade UAS models have sufficient
    payload and technical
    capabilities to carry illicit and dangerous items over prison walls.
    Recent efforts by law
    enforcement, for example, have included the investigation and
    prosecution of an individual who
    illegally operated a consumer-grade UAS with the intent to deliver
    contraband (marijuana) into a
    Georgia state prison. The prosecution ultimately resulted in a guilty
    plea in the Middle District of

    31 https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/07/Islamic-State-and-Drones-Release-Version.pdf.
    Accessed June 11,
    32 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-45073385. Accessed
    June 9, 2019.
    33 https://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-news/724185/Terror-drone-plot-Britain-UK-spies-foil.
    Accessed June 11,
    34 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/houthi-drones-kill-several-at-yemeni-military-paradeidUSKCN1P40N9.
    Accessed June 11, 2019.
    35 https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/prisons-try-to-stop-drones-from-delivering-drugs-porn-and-cellphones-toinmates/2016/10/12/645fb102-800c-11e6-8d0c-fb6c00c90481_story.html?utm_term=.22b0427db4d0.
    June 11, 2019.
    Georgia to a charge of operating an aircraft eligible for registration
    knowing that the aircraft is
    not registered to facilitate a controlled substance offense. The
    defendant received a sentence of
    48 months in prison.36 Remote identification will assist law
    enforcement in their efforts to find
    and stop operators who attempt to engage in similar conduct.
    Four Federal departments37 have the authority to deploy counter-UAS
    systems to detect
    and mitigate credible threats posed by UAS.38 Remote identification of
    UAS would provide these
    departments with increased awareness of UAS operations conducted
    across certain geographical
    areas of interest. That information would aid the determination of
    whether UAS represent a
    threat that must be met with counter-UAS capabilities. In particular,
    remote identification would
    provide these departments with crucial information about the owner of
    the UAS, and the control
    station’s location in near real-time, supplementing and enriching
    information obtained via UAS
    detection capabilities. The FAA believes that the ability to identify
    the owner and the location of
    the control station would help these Federal agencies to more
    accurately assess risk and take
    action commensurate with that risk.
    In addition, certain public safety activities have been hampered by
    the inability to identify
    UAS and their locations. While there are numerous examples, in one
    case, a UAS interfered with
    a police helicopter assisting with a cliff rescue;39 in another case,
    a UAS interfered with a police
    helicopter assisting a fire response.40 In 2017, a helicopter
    performing security for the United

    36 https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdga/pr/illegal-drone-operator-sentenced-attempting-drop-drugs-georgia-stateprison.
    37 Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Justice.
    38 10 U.S.C. 130i; 50 U.S.C. 2661; 6 U.S.C. 124n.
    39 https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/01/30/pacifica-drone-operator-arrested-for-interfering-with-helicopterrescue-mission/
    40 https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/College-Park-Man-Arrested-For-Flying-Drone-Near-5-Alarm-FireMonday-420369903.html
    Nations General Assembly struck an unmanned aircraft, causing more
    than $100,000 worth of
    damage to the helicopter.41 Remote identification would enable the
    FAA, first responders, and
    law enforcement officers to more easily determine who is operating in
    the airspace, providing
    important information to help determine appropriate responses to
    ensure the safety and security
    of the airspace of the United States and the people on the ground.
    Although Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies are
    responsible for the
    investigation and prosecution of illegal activities, the FAA retains
    the regulatory and civil
    enforcement authority and oversight over aviation activities that
    create hazards and pose threats
    to the safety of flight in air commerce. Both safety and security
    enforcement are extremely
    difficult absent a remote identification requirement that enables the
    prompt and accurate
    identification of UAS and operators.
    V. Related International Activities
    The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) does not
    prescribe any remote
    identification equipage for UAS. However, as of the date of
    publication of this proposed rule,
    ICAO advisory groups are developing material addressing UTM and UAS
    operations under
    instrument flight rules (IFR). The European Union, the Direction
    Générale de l’Aviation Civile
    (France Civil Aviation Authority), and the Civil Aviation
    Administration Denmark (Denmark
    Civil Aviation Authority) have also proposed various actions and
    advisory group activity for
    remote identification.

    41 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-drone/u-s-probing-collision-between-civilian-drone-armyhelicopter-idUSKBN1CA1Z0
    With the exception of Italy and Qatar, no individual ICAO-member Civil
    Authority has remote identification requirements for UAS. The Italian
    Civil Aviation Authority
    requires aircraft with a maximum takeoff weight of more than 55 pounds
    (25kg) to have certain
    equipage that transmits flight parameters and owner/operator data.
    Aircraft compliant with these
    requirements must also meet data storage standards. The Qatar Civil
    Aviation Authority requires
    that certain UAS operations be conducted with prescribed geo-fencing
    and electronic
    identification systems.
    In May 2017, the European Commission published a notice of proposed
    which included proposed rules for remote identification. That proposed amendment would
    require UAS to broadcast a unique physical serial number of the
    unmanned aircraft compliant
    with standard ANSI/CTA-2063, the geographical position of the unmanned
    aircraft and its height
    above the takeoff point, the direction and speed of the unmanned
    aircraft, and the geographical
    position of the unmanned aircraft takeoff point. During the first half
    of 2019, the European
    Commission finalized and adopted the following rules for remote
    identification: (1) the
    Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 on
    unmanned aircraft
    systems and on third-country operators of unmanned aircraft systems,
    and (2) the Commission
    Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 on the rules and procedures for the
    operation of unmanned aircraft. The regulations address the design and operational requirements
    for unmanned aircraft and include a requirement for unmanned aircraft
    to be individually
    identifiable, but do not impose a European standard for remote
    As adopted, the regulations require the local broadcast of information
    about an unmanned
    aircraft in operation, including the marking of the unmanned aircraft
    to demonstrate conformity
    with the applicable requirements, so that the information may be
    obtained without physical
    access to the unmanned aircraft. The remote identification
    requirements adopted by the European
    Commission include the following:
    (a) Allowing the upload of the UAS operator registration number in
    accordance with
    Article 14 of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/947 and exclusively
    following the process
    provided by the registration system;
    (b) Ensuring, in real time during the whole duration of the flight,
    the direct periodic
    broadcast from the unmanned aircraft using an open and documented
    transmission protocol, of
    the following data, in a way that they can be received directly by
    existing mobile devices within
    the broadcasting range:
    (1) the UAS operator registration number;
    (2) the unique physical serial number of the unmanned aircraft
    compliant with standard
    (3) the geographical position of the unmanned aircraft and its height
    above the surface or
    take-off point;
    (4) the route course measured clockwise from true north and ground
    speed of the
    unmanned aircraft; and
    (5) the geographical position of the remote pilot or, if not
    available, the take-off point.
    (c) Ensuring that the user cannot modify the data mentioned under
    paragraph (b)(2)
    through (5).
    VI. Aviation Rulemaking Committee
    On July 15, 2016, Congress passed the FAA Extension, Safety, and
    Security Act of 2016
    (Pub. L. 114-190). Pursuant to section 2202 of that Act, the
    Administrator and the Secretary
    were tasked with convening industry stakeholders to facilitate the
    development of consensus
    standards for remotely identifying operators and owners of UAS and
    associated unmanned
    aircraft. As part of the standards development, the Administrator was
    directed to consider:
    (1) requirements for remote identification of UAS; (2) requirements
    for different classifications
    of UAS; and (3) the feasibility of the development and operation of a
    publicly accessible online
    database of unmanned aircraft and operators, and criteria for
    exclusion from the database.
    To comply with the Congressional mandate, on May 4, 2017, the
    Administrator chartered
    the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Identification (ID) and Tracking
    Aviation Rulemaking
    Committee (ARC) (UAS-ID ARC) to inform the FAA on technologies
    available for remote
    identification and tracking of UAS and to make recommendations for how
    remote identification
    and tracking could be implemented.42 The FAA charged the UAS-ID ARC
    with the following
    three objectives:
    ? Identify, categorize, and recommend available and emerging
    technology for the
    remote identification and tracking of UAS.
    ? Identify the requirements for meeting the security and public safety
    needs of the law
    enforcement, homeland defense, and national security communities for
    the remote
    identification and tracking of UAS.

    42 The UAS-ID ARC was composed of 74 members representing aviation
    community and industry member
    organizations, law enforcement agencies and public safety
    organizations, manufacturers, researchers, and standards
    bodies that are involved in the promotion and production of UAS and in addressing security issues surrounding the
    operation of UAS.
    ? Evaluate the feasibility and affordability of available technical
    solutions, and
    determine how well those technologies address the needs of the law
    enforcement and
    air traffic control communities. Develop evaluation criteria and characteristics for
    making decisions, and rate the available technical solutions provided.
    The Administrator was also tasked with submitting a report to Congress regarding any
    standards developed and issuing regulations based on the standards
    developed. On
    June 30, 2017, the Administrator sent a letter to the Chairman of the
    Commerce, Science, and
    Transportation Committee detailing the FAA’s considerations and
    efforts in supporting the
    development and implementation of Remote ID standards.
    A. ARC Recommendations Final Report
    The members of the UAS-ID ARC were organized into working groups.
    Working Group
    One (WG1) was tasked with identifying, categorizing, and recommending
    available and
    emerging technologies for the remote identification and tracking of
    UAS. WG1 identified and
    analyzed eight viable technology solutions, falling into two broad
    categories: (1) direct broadcast
    solutions; and (2) network publishing solutions.
    43 A detailed discussion of the eight viable
    technology solutions, as well as tables summarizing WG1’s analysis of
    those solutions can be
    found in the ARC Recommendations Final Report (Recommendations
    Report), available in the
    docket for this rulemaking.
    Working Group Two (WG2) was tasked with identifying the requirements
    for meeting
    the security and public safety needs of the law enforcement, homeland
    defense, and national

    43 The eight viable technology solutions WG1 identified are: (1)
    Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
    (ADS-B); (2) Low Power Direct RF; (3) Networked Cellular; (4)
    Satellite; (5) SW-based Flight Notification with
    Telemetry; (6) Unlicensed Integrated C2; (7) Physical Indicator; and
    (8) Visual Light Encoding.
    security communities for the remote identification and tracking of
    UAS. WG2 identified two
    general categories of UAS ID and tracking needs: (1) incident
    investigation; and (2) active
    monitoring of heightened awareness areas. To achieve the goals of both categories, WG2
    determined that all UAS meeting certain threshold requirements would
    need to be tracked,
    whether passively or actively, from commencement to termination of
    each operation.44 WG2
    further concluded that information regarding the position of the
    aircraft, the location of the
    control station, and the identity of the remote pilot would help
    maintain a safe and secure
    environment for the general public and public safety officials.
    The working groups presented their findings and conclusions to the
    full UAS-ID ARC for
    consideration in making its recommendations. The UAS-ID ARC submitted
    Recommendations Report to the FAA on September 30, 2017. Although some decisions were
    not unanimous, the ARC reached general agreement on many of its recommendations.
    1. Applicability of Remote ID and Tracking Requirements
    In its Recommendations Report, the ARC presented two options for an applicability
    threshold for the ID and tracking requirements and recommended the FAA
    give due
    consideration to both of those options.
    Option 1: All UAS are required to comply with remote identification
    and tracking
    requirements except under any of the following circumstances:

    44 WG2 determined that UAS with either of the following
    characteristics should be required to comply with remote
    identification and tracking requirements: (1) those that have the
    ability to navigate between more than one point
    without direct and active control of the pilot; or (2) those that have
    a range from control station greater than 400 feet
    and real-time remotely viewable sensor.
    45 Appendix D of the ARC’s Recommendations Report contains dissenting
    opinions submitted by ARC members, as
    well as a chart showing a breakdown of how ARC members voted on the
    final report. The Recommendations Report
    is available in the docket for this rulemaking.
    ? The unmanned aircraft is operated within visual line of sight of the
    remote pilot and is
    designed to not be capable of flying beyond 400 feet of the remote
    ? The unmanned aircraft is operated in compliance with 14 CFR part
    101, unless the
    unmanned aircraft:
    o Is equipped with advanced flight systems technologies that enable
    the aircraft
    to navigate from one point to another without continuous input and
    from the remote pilot.
    o Is equipped with a real-time downlinked remote sensor that provides
    remote pilot the capability of navigating the aircraft beyond visual
    line of
    sight of the remote pilot.
    ? The UAS is operated under ATC and contains the equipment associated
    with such
    operations (including ADS-B, transponder, and communication with ATC).
    ? The UAS operation is exempt from ID and tracking requirements by the
    FAA (e.g.,
    for the purposes of law enforcement, security or defense, or under an
    FAA waiver).
    Option 2: UAS with either of the following characteristics are
    required to comply with
    remote identification and tracking requirements:
    ? Ability of the aircraft to navigate between more than one point
    without direct and
    active control of the pilot.
    ? Range from control station greater than 400 feet and real-time
    remotely viewable

    46 The ARC noted that it is not intending to encompass drone racing at
    very low altitudes on a closed course that
    may be authorized by operation, by location, or some other mechanism.
    The ARC also recommended that, regardless of which option for
    applicability the FAA
    chooses, UAS operating under the following circumstances be exempt
    from the remote
    identification and tracking requirement:
    ? The UAS is operated under ATC and contains the equipment associated
    with such
    operations (including ADS-B, transponder, and communication with ATC).
    ? The UAS operation is exempt from ID and tracking requirements by the
    FAA (e.g.,
    for the purposes of law enforcement, security or defense, or under an
    FAA waiver).
    The ARC further recommended the FAA do the following regarding the applicability of
    remote identification and tracking requirements:
    ? Include a waiver mechanism in the remote identification and tracking
    ? Apply the remote identification and tracking requirements to the
    remote pilot, not to
    the manufacturer of the UAS.
    ? Require manufacturers to label their products to indicate whether
    they are capable of
    meeting applicable remote identification and tracking requirements.
    ? Consider whether unmanned aircraft equipped with advanced flight
    technologies that are strictly for safety purposes and that keep the
    aircraft within
    visual line of sight of the remote pilot, such as a “return to home”
    feature, should be
    exempt from remote identification and tracking requirements, provided
    the safety
    features cannot be readily altered or reprogrammed.
    Some ARC members objected to both of the applicability options

    [continued in next message]

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)