• Air Force Researchers Call for National Electromagnetic Attack Preparat

    From Larry Dighera@21:1/5 to All on Thu Aug 29 07:05:04 2019
    http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2019/August%202019/Air-Force-Researchers-Call-for-National-Electromagnetic-Attack-Preparation.aspx

    Air Force Researchers Call for National Electromagnetic Attack
    Preparation

    8/14/2019

    —JOHN A. TIRPAK


    Employees at the ?US Embassy in Havana, Cuba, shown here on March 22,
    2016, and the US embassy in China were diagnosed with traumatic brain
    injuries after being exposed to focused electromagnetic waves over
    several months. State Department photo.

    Everyday Americans aren’t worried enough about the threat of a massive electromagnetic attack, according to a new, 130-page Air University
    report on electromagnetic spectrum vulnerabilities. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/LP_0004_ELECTROMAGNETIC_DEFENSE_TASK_FORCE_2_2019.PDF

    During the Cold War, the public was aware of the threat of nuclear
    attack and took it seriously, participants in the Electromagnetic Task
    Force’s 2019 study said. They concluded the US should mount a similar
    national campaign encouraging individuals, the military, and industry
    to adopt electromagnetic protection and resilience plans, just as
    citizens built bomb shelters during the Cold War.

    An electromagnetic pulse attack is essentially a surge of energy,
    caused by a nuclear detonation or a solar storm, that could overload electronics and cause them to fail. While national leaders and
    industry are more aware of the potential impacts, the Air University
    study said, an effort akin to the “Smokey Bear” wildfire-prevention
    initiative could better alert the public.

    The second annual study http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2019/April%202019/Air-University-to-Host-Second-Electromagnetic-Defense-Summit.aspx
    , undertaken by hundreds of scholars, industry experts, and military
    officers earlier this year, argued that the proliferation of
    “efficient but delicate” computers, networks, and other electronic infrastructure leaves the US particularly vulnerable to
    electromagnetic attacks on a grand scale.

    The idea that the US could suffer from such an attack isn’t new, and
    experts differ on its potential consequences. In March, President
    Donald Trump signed an executive order calling for a
    whole-of-government approach to understanding and protecting against
    EMP incidents.

    In response to a Joint Chiefs of Staff inquiry into where the
    Pentagon’s blind spots to such attacks lie and how to counter
    potential incidents, the AU report’s authors said new complications
    are popping up at a “shocking pace.” China is one particular country
    to watch in EMS systems development, study participants said.

    The biggest problem, according to the task force: there’s no national
    or military plan to recover from and retaliate against an
    electromagnetic pulse attack. The study recommended that the
    Department of Homeland Security and US Northern Command should create
    that plan together and regularly practice it.

    Study participants looked to the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and
    other natural disasters and said social norms would break down in “as
    little as 72 hours” following an electromagnetic attack. National
    planners need to study “the psychology of human desperation,
    starvation, and living without the rule of law” in building response
    and recovery blueprints, and be prepared to provide resources in the
    event of a long-term blackout, the report continued.

    Four doctoral candidates opined https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/29/trump-issued-an-executive-order-prepare-an-emp-attack-what-is-it-should-you-worry/
    in the Washington Post earlier this year that an EMP “could lead to
    deaths by shutting down medical, transportation, communication,
    banking, finance, food and water systems”—effects like those of
    Hurricane Katrina, but on a national scale.

    But those researchers said the potential impact of an EMP attack may
    be overstated.

    “There’s little cause for concern about an EMP attack in isolation,
    because a nuclear EMP attack would be just that: a nuclear attack,”
    the four said in a Post op-ed. “Such brazen aggression would prompt an overwhelming—and most likely nuclear—American response. Such
    deterrence makes it unlikely a nuclear EMP attack would happen in the
    first place.”

    High-powered microwave weapons and space weather events pose a more
    likely threat than EMPs, the four writers argued.

    “Working to better understand the hazards to US infrastructure may be
    a good investment to evaluate if greater protection against EMPs is
    worth pursuing,” the op-ed writers said.

    The Air Force pointed to the microwave problem as well. The AU report
    recalled that employees at the US embassies in China and Cuba were
    “diagnosed with traumatic brain injuries typically associated with
    some sort of shock or blow to the head,” following exposure to focused electromagnetic waves over several months within the past few years.

    “The internal temperature of the victim’s brains had been raised by an
    external electromagnetic source, triggering a response similar to
    concussive industries,” the report stated.

    HPM weapons development—which the Air Force is also pursuing—signals a
    push into the gray area of nontraditional warfare where bad actors can invisibly target victims, according to the report. The success of the
    embassy attacks “will likely inspire other able actors to use similar
    means to influence targets,” the AU report noted.

    The Air Force report argued that until recently, the Defense
    Department and its industrial suppliers grossly misunderstood
    electromagnetic spectrum threats and who should be in charge of
    defending against them. Leaders should have a common understanding of
    what these attacks can do and work to adapt future technologies to
    those possibilities, the report said.

    The development of 5G wireless networks, for example, offers an
    opportunity to make that new national infrastructure resilient from
    the start, the Air Force report said. 5G is more susceptible to power disruptions than 4G networks, the report’s authors argued, adding that
    they see 5G as less resilient than previous versions. That view is not
    shared across the Defense Department, which said in May that a 5G
    network “would be more resilient and less susceptible to attacks,”
    without specifying what kind.

    However, the task force also noted that it might be a good idea to
    hang on to earlier generations of technology—4G networks and
    compatible systems, inertial navigation systems, even telephone land
    lines—as backups, should primary electronics be taken out. --------------------------------------------------------------------

    https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/03/29/trump-issued-an-executive-order-prepare-an-emp-attack-what-is-it-should-you-worry/

    Trump issued an executive order to prepare for an EMP attack. What is
    it, and should you worry?

    Nah. But the U.S. should get ready for a very similar threat — from
    the sun.

    The mushroom cloud of the first test of a hydrogen bomb, as
    photographed on Enewetak, an atoll in the Pacific Ocean, in 1952.
    (HO/REUTERS)

    By Christopher W. Blair ,
    Casey Mahoney ,
    Shira E. Pindyck and
    Joshua A. Schwartz March 29

    No, you don’t need to worry about a nuclear EMP. Here’s why.

    “Only James Bond can save the world from an awesome space weapon that
    — in one short pulse — could destroy the earth!” That’s the plot of “GoldenEye,” in which bad guys attempt to use an electromagnetic pulse
    (EMP) weapon to destroy Britain’s electrical grid and send it back to
    the Stone Age.

    President Trump believes the danger of an EMP is not just a Hollywood
    plot device. He recently announced an executive order https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-coordinating-national-resilience-electromagnetic-pulses/
    meant to protect the United States from an EMP, directing federal
    agencies to coordinate in assessing, planning and guarding against its
    risks from human and natural sources.

    But what is an EMP, and do we really need to worry about it? If it is
    a real threat, will this new executive order make a difference?

    What is an EMP?

    An EMP is a high-intensity surge of energy that can disrupt or destroy electronics by, essentially, overloading them. There are two ways an
    EMP could potentially pose a large-scale threat to U.S. security.

    The first is through the detonation of a nuclear warhead at high
    altitude. We know this because, in 1962, the U.S. tested a nuclear
    bomb 250 miles above the Pacific Ocean. The test led to electronic
    disturbance 900 miles away in Hawaii. Specifically, streetlights were
    blown out, telephones went dead, and U.S., British and Soviet
    satellites were damaged.

    The second is through a natural solar superstorm, known as a
    geomagnetic disturbance (GMD), which has about a 10 percent chance of
    occurring every decade, according to NASA. An event like this took
    place in 1859 and caused telegraph circuits to catch on fire.

    Though an EMP is not directly harmful to people, it could lead to
    deaths by shutting down medical, transportation, communication,
    banking, finance, food and water systems. In the worst possible
    scenario, a large-scale EMP could have effects like Hurricane Katrina
    but on a national scale.

    [Candidate Trump criticized Obama's use of executive power. President
    Trump likes to use executive power.]

    Should you worry about EMPs? Probably not that much.

    In the doomsday scenarios politicians like to talk about, an adversary
    like North Korea could detonate a nuclear weapon above the United
    States, causing an EMP to knock out the electrical grid.
    Theoretically, any country with nuclear weapons could do this.
    Fortunately, there’s little cause for concern about an EMP attack in
    isolation, because a nuclear EMP attack would be just that: a nuclear
    attack. Such brazen aggression would prompt an overwhelming — and most
    likely nuclear — American response. Such deterrence makes it unlikely
    a nuclear EMP attack would happen in the first place.

    Nor is it likely that an EMP could be used to prevent U.S.
    retaliation, as our nuclear infrastructure is already designed to
    withstand such an attack. And nuclear-armed submarines deployed across
    the world would not be affected by an EMP directed against the
    continental United States.

    Thus, the prospect of nuclear retaliation will almost certainly deter
    rival governments.

    [Are nuclear weapons keeping the India-Pakistan crisis from escalating
    — or making it more dangerous?]

    Technical challenges make an EMP attack harder still. It isn’t clear
    that an EMP would have the devastating effects that some predict.
    Public data are scarce, but Nobel Prize-winning physicist Jack
    Steinberger says their destructive capacity is overstated. EMPs’
    effects depend on many factors, like the altitude of detonation, the
    yield of the warhead and the strength of Earth’s magnetic field. This
    all makes it hard to predict how much damage an EMP will cause,
    reducing its strategic value for governments that have only one chance
    to inflict damage before being destroyed by the response.

    Nor is it likely that terrorist groups could conduct a large-scale EMP
    attack against the United States. Doing so would require acquiring
    both a powerful nuclear warhead and a sophisticated ballistic missile
    able to detonate at high altitude. Governments have many reasons not
    to give nuclear weapons to terrorists. And if by some small chance
    terrorists managed to acquire such technology, would they really risk
    it on a relatively untested concept?

    [The Trump administration wants to sell the Saudis nuclear technology,
    without an agreement. That's alarming.]

    A more likely terrorist attack scenario is via a high-power microwave
    (HPM) device, as this kind of weapon is relatively simple and cheap to
    build — the kind that’s been suspected of causing the mysterious
    illnesses that have struck the U.S. diplomatic staff in Havana.
    However, such a weapon would probably affect electronic devices within
    only a one-mile range and thus does not pose the strategic threat that
    a nuclear EMP might.

    What should we be worried about? The sun.

    While solar GMDs occur rarely, they can indeed interrupt power for an
    entire city — as happened in Quebec for nearly nine hours in 1989.
    That has the same kind of disruptive potential as a nuclear EMP.

    How would a natural GMD blast be different from other large-scale
    natural disasters like a hurricane? Time. Electromagnetic incidents
    occur within seconds or even milliseconds over large areas of the
    country, the relative unpredictability of which could undermine
    disaster response. In areas where the power infrastructure is
    especially interconnected, failures could cascade.

    There’s also an important difference between nuclear EMPs and solar
    GMDs. The former requires an attacker intent on and capable of
    launching such a threat. The latter is an inevitable, natural event.
    For a lot of reasons, governments and terrorists are highly unlikely
    to launch an EMP attack. Space weather events, on the other hand,
    happen with some regularity. The first might occur; the second
    eventually will.

    What comes next for Trump’s EMP order?

    A nuclear EMP may very well be less likely than a GMD. But either way,
    we don’t know whether further investments into U.S. resilience can
    reduce the impact. Working to better understand the hazards to U.S. infrastructure may be a good investment to evaluate if greater
    protection against EMPs is worth pursuing.

    Will Trump’s executive order help accomplish this? Perhaps. But the
    burden of proof remains on the administration to demonstrate whether
    taxpayer dollars invested in resilience are worth taking away from
    other national policy priorities.

    Christopher W. Blair (@cwblair10) is a PhD candidate in international
    relations at the University of Pennsylvania.

    Casey Mahoney (@caseymahoney) is a PhD student in political science at
    the University of Pennsylvania and was Nunn-Lugar Fellow at the U.S.
    Department of Defense from 2013 to 2017.

    Shira E. Pindyck (@spindyck) is a PhD candidate in international
    relations at the University of Pennsylvania.

    Joshua A. Schwartz (@JoshuaASchwartz) is a PhD candidate in
    international relations at the University of Pennsylvania. ------------------------------------------------------------------

    https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-coordinating-national-resilience-electromagnetic-pulses/

    Executive Order on Coordinating National Resilience to Electromagnetic
    Pulses
    INFRASTRUCTURE & TECHNOLOGY

    Issued on: March 26, 2019
    SHARE:


    menuALL NEWS
    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
    laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

    Section 1. Purpose. An electromagnetic pulse (EMP) has the potential
    to disrupt, degrade, and damage technology and critical infrastructure
    systems. Human-made or naturally occurring EMPs can affect large
    geographic areas, disrupting elements critical to the Nation’s
    security and economic prosperity, and could adversely affect global
    commerce and stability. The Federal Government must foster
    sustainable, efficient, and cost-effective approaches to improving the
    Nation’s resilience to the effects of EMPs.

    Sec. 2. Definitions. As used in this order:

    (a) “Critical infrastructure” means systems and assets, whether
    physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity
    or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating
    impact on security, national economic security, national public health
    or safety, or any combination of those matters.

    (b) “Electromagnetic pulse” is a burst of electromagnetic energy.
    EMPs have the potential to negatively affect technology systems on
    Earth and in space. A high-altitude EMP (HEMP) is a type of
    human-made EMP that occurs when a nuclear device is detonated at
    approximately 40 kilometers or more above the surface of Earth. A
    geomagnetic disturbance (GMD) is a type of natural EMP driven by a
    temporary disturbance of Earth’s magnetic field resulting from
    interactions with solar eruptions. Both HEMPs and GMDs can affect
    large geographic areas.

    (c) “National Critical Functions” means the functions of government
    and the private sector so vital to the United States that their
    disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating
    effect on security, national economic security, national public health
    or safety, or any combination thereof.

    (d) “National Essential Functions” means the overarching
    responsibilities of the Federal Government to lead and sustain the
    Nation before, during, and in the aftermath of a catastrophic
    emergency, such as an EMP that adversely affects the performance of
    Government.

    (e) “Prepare” and “preparedness” mean the actions taken to plan,
    organize, equip, train, and exercise to build and sustain the
    capabilities necessary to prevent, protect against, mitigate the
    effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the
    greatest risk to the security of the Nation. These terms include the prediction and notification of impending EMPs.

    (f) A “Sector-Specific Agency” (SSA) is the Federal department or
    agency that is responsible for providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise as well as leading, facilitating, or supporting
    the security and resilience programs and associated activities of its designated critical infrastructure sector in the all-hazards
    environment. The SSAs are those identified in Presidential Policy
    Directive 21 of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security
    and Resilience).

    Sec. 3. Policy. (a) It is the policy of the United States to
    prepare for the effects of EMPs through targeted approaches that
    coordinate whole-of-government activities and encourage private-sector engagement. The Federal Government must provide warning of an
    impending EMP; protect against, respond to, and recover from the
    effects of an EMP through public and private engagement, planning, and investment; and prevent adversarial events through deterrence,
    defense, and nuclear nonproliferation efforts. To achieve these
    goals, the Federal Government shall engage in risk-informed planning, prioritize research and development (R&D) to address the needs of
    critical infrastructure stakeholders, and, for adversarial threats,
    consult Intelligence Community assessments.

    (b) To implement the actions directed in this order, the Federal
    Government shall promote collaboration and facilitate information
    sharing, including the sharing of threat and vulnerability
    assessments, among executive departments and agencies (agencies), the
    owners and operators of critical infrastructure, and other relevant stakeholders, as appropriate. The Federal Government shall also
    provide incentives, as appropriate, to private-sector partners to
    encourage innovation that strengthens critical infrastructure against
    the effects of EMPs through the development and implementation of best practices, regulations, and appropriate guidance.

    Sec. 4. Coordination. (a) The Assistant to the President for
    National Security Affairs (APNSA), through National Security Council
    staff and in consultation with the Director of the Office of Science
    and Technology Policy (OSTP), shall coordinate the development and implementation of executive branch actions to assess, prioritize, and
    manage the risks of EMPs. The APNSA shall, on an annual basis, submit
    a report to the President summarizing progress on the implementation
    of this order, identifying gaps in capability, and recommending how to
    address those gaps.

    (b) To further the Federal R&D necessary to prepare the Nation for
    the effects of EMPs, the Director of OSTP shall coordinate efforts of
    agencies through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC).
    The Director of OSTP, through the NSTC, shall annually review and
    assess the R&D needs of agencies conducting preparedness activities
    for EMPs, consistent with this order.

    Sec. 5. Roles and Responsibilities. (a) The Secretary of State
    shall:

    (i) lead the coordination of diplomatic efforts with United States
    allies and international partners regarding enhancing resilience to
    the effects of EMPs; and

    (ii) in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the heads of
    other relevant agencies, strengthen nuclear nonproliferation and
    deterrence efforts, which would reduce the likelihood of an EMP attack
    on the United States or its allies and partners by limiting the
    availability of nuclear devices.

    (b) The Secretary of Defense shall:

    (i) in cooperation with the heads of relevant agencies and with
    United States allies, international partners, and private-sector
    entities as appropriate, improve and develop the ability to rapidly characterize, attribute, and provide warning of EMPs, including
    effects on space systems of interest to the United States;

    (ii) provide timely operational observations, analyses, forecasts,
    and other products for naturally occurring EMPs to support the mission
    of the Department of Defense along with United States allies and
    international partners, including the provision of alerts and warnings
    for natural EMPs that may affect weapons systems, military operations,
    or the defense of the United States;

    (iii) conduct R&D and testing to understand the effects of EMPs on
    Department of Defense systems and infrastructure, improve capabilities
    to model and simulate the environments and effects of EMPs, and
    develop technologies to protect Department of Defense systems and infrastructure from the effects of EMPs to ensure the successful
    execution of Department of Defense missions;

    (iv) review and update existing EMP-related standards for Department
    of Defense systems and infrastructure, as appropriate;

    (v) share technical expertise and data regarding EMPs and their
    potential effects with other agencies and with the private sector, as appropriate;

    (vi) incorporate attacks that include EMPs as a factor in defense
    planning scenarios; and

    (vii) defend the Nation from adversarial EMPs originating outside of
    the United States through defense and deterrence, consistent with the
    mission and national security policy of the Department of Defense.

    (c) The Secretary of the Interior shall support the research,
    development, deployment, and operation of capabilities that enhance understanding of variations of Earth’s magnetic field associated with
    EMPs.

    (d) The Secretary of Commerce shall:

    (i) provide timely and accurate operational observations, analyses, forecasts, and other products for natural EMPs, exclusive of the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense set forth in subsection
    (b)(ii) of this section; and

    (ii) use the capabilities of the Department of Commerce, the private
    sector, academia, and nongovernmental organizations to continuously
    improve operational forecasting services and the development of
    standards for commercial EMP technology.

    (e) The Secretary of Energy shall conduct early-stage R&D, develop
    pilot programs, and partner with other agencies and the private
    sector, as appropriate, to characterize sources of EMPs and their
    couplings to the electric power grid and its subcomponents, understand associated potential failure modes for the energy sector, and
    coordinate preparedness and mitigation measures with energy sector
    partners.

    (f) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall:

    (i) provide timely distribution of information on EMPs and credible associated threats to Federal, State, and local governments, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and other stakeholders;

    (ii) in coordination with the heads of any relevant SSAs, use the
    results of risk assessments to better understand and enhance
    resilience to the effects of EMPs across all critical infrastructure
    sectors, including coordinating the identification of national
    critical functions and the prioritization of associated critical
    infrastructure at greatest risk to the effects of EMPs;

    (iii) coordinate response to and recovery from the effects of EMPs on
    critical infrastructure, in coordination with the heads of appropriate
    SSAs;

    (iv) incorporate events that include EMPs as a factor in
    preparedness scenarios and exercises;

    (v) in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs, conduct R&D to
    better understand and more effectively model the effects of EMPs on
    national critical functions and associated critical infrastructure —
    excluding Department of Defense systems and infrastructure — and
    develop technologies and guidelines to enhance these functions and
    better protect this infrastructure;

    (vi) maintain survivable means to provide necessary emergency
    information to the public during and after EMPs; and

    (vii) in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and
    informed by intelligence-based threat assessments, develop quadrennial
    risk assessments on EMPs, with the first risk assessment delivered
    within 1 year of the date of this order.

    (g) The Director of National Intelligence shall:

    (i) coordinate the collection, analysis, and promulgation, as
    appropriate, of intelligence-based assessments on adversaries’
    capabilities to conduct an attack utilizing an EMP and the likelihood
    of such an attack; and

    (ii) provide intelligence-based threat assessments to support the
    heads of relevant SSAs in the development of quadrennial risk
    assessments on EMPs.

    (h) The heads of all SSAs, in coordination with the Secretary of
    Homeland Security, shall enhance and facilitate information sharing
    with private-sector counterparts, as appropriate, to enhance
    preparedness for the effects of EMPs, to identify and share
    vulnerabilities, and to work collaboratively to reduce
    vulnerabilities.

    (i) The heads of all agencies that support National Essential
    Functions shall ensure that their all­hazards preparedness planning sufficiently addresses EMPs, including through mitigation, response,
    and recovery, as directed by national preparedness policy.

    Sec. 6. Implementation. (a) Identifying national critical functions
    and associated priority critical infrastructure at greatest risk.

    (i) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of
    Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and other
    agencies as appropriate, shall identify and list the national critical functions and associated priority critical infrastructure systems,
    networks, and assets, including space-based assets that, if disrupted,
    could reasonably result in catastrophic national or regional effects
    on public health or safety, economic security, or national security.
    The Secretary of Homeland Security shall update this list as
    necessary.

    (ii) Within 1 year of the identification described in subsection
    (a)(i) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
    coordination with the heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall,
    using appropriate government and private-sector standards for EMPs,
    assess which identified critical infrastructure systems, networks, and
    assets are most vulnerable to the effects of EMPs. The Secretary of
    Homeland Security shall provide this list to the President, through
    the APNSA. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall update this list
    using the results produced pursuant to subsection (b) of this section,
    and as necessary thereafter.

    (b) Improving understanding of the effects of EMPs.

    (i) Within 180 days of the identification described in subsection
    (a)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
    coordination with the heads of SSAs and in consultation with the
    Director of OSTP and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall
    review test data — identifying any gaps in such data — regarding the
    effects of EMPs on critical infrastructure systems, networks, and
    assets representative of those throughout the Nation.

    (ii) Within 180 days of identifying the gaps in existing test data,
    as directed by subsection (b)(i) of this section, the Secretary of
    Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of SSAs and in
    consultation with the Director of OSTP and the heads of other
    appropriate agencies, shall use the sector partnership structure
    identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan to develop
    an integrated cross-sector plan to address the identified gaps. The
    heads of agencies identified in the plan shall implement the plan in collaboration with the private sector, as appropriate.

    (iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and as appropriate
    thereafter, the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the heads of
    other agencies and the private sector, as appropriate, shall review
    existing standards for EMPs and develop or update, as necessary,
    quantitative benchmarks that sufficiently describe the physical
    characteristics of EMPs, including waveform and intensity, in a form
    that is useful to and can be shared with owners and operators of
    critical infrastructure.

    (iv) Within 4 years of the date of this order, the Secretary of the
    Interior shall complete a magnetotelluric survey of the contiguous
    United States to help critical infrastructure owners and operators
    conduct EMP vulnerability assessments.

    (c) Evaluating approaches to mitigate the effects of EMPs.

    (i) Within 1 year of the date of this order, and every 2 years
    thereafter, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
    the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, and in consultation with the
    Director of OSTP, the heads of other appropriate agencies, and
    private-sector partners as appropriate, shall submit to the President,
    through the APNSA, a report that analyzes the technology options
    available to improve the resilience of critical infrastructure to the
    effects of EMPs. The Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and Homeland
    Security shall also identify gaps in available technologies and
    opportunities for future technological developments to inform R&D
    activities.

    (ii) Within 180 days of the completion of the activities directed by subsections (b)(iii) and (c)(i) of this section, the Secretary of
    Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of other agencies
    and in consultation with the private sector as appropriate, shall
    develop and implement a pilot test to evaluate available engineering
    approaches for mitigating the effects of EMPs on the most vulnerable
    critical infrastructure systems, networks, and assets, as identified
    in subsection (a)(ii) of this section.

    (iii) Within 1 year of the date of this order, the Secretary of
    Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of relevant SSAs,
    and in consultation with appropriate regulatory and utility
    commissions and other stakeholders, shall identify regulatory and non regulatory mechanisms, including cost recovery measures, that can
    enhance private-sector engagement to address the effects of EMPs.

    (d) Strengthening critical infrastructure to withstand the effects of
    EMPs.

    (i) Within 90 days of completing the actions directed in subsection
    (c)(ii) of this section, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
    coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy and in
    consultation with the heads of other appropriate agencies and with the
    private sector as appropriate, shall develop a plan to mitigate the
    effects of EMPs on the vulnerable priority critical infrastructure
    systems, networks, and assets identified under subsection (a)(ii) of
    this section. The plan shall align with and build on actions
    identified in reports required by Executive Order 13800 of May 11,
    2017 (Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure). The Secretary of Homeland Security shall implement
    those elements of the plan that are consistent with Department of
    Homeland Security authorities and resources, and report to the APNSA
    regarding any additional authorities and resources needed to complete
    its implementation. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
    coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Energy, shall update
    the plan as necessary based on results from the actions directed in

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