• GPS Jamming Tests Frustrate Pilots, Controllers (6/6)

    From Larry Dighera@21:1/5 to D-Lite on Tue Oct 12 08:08:57 2021
    [continued from previous message]

    precision farming.
    HSOAC’s research determined that other sectors and applications are also willing to pay for
    increased precision, such as surveying, construction, shipping
    (containerized), and location7 The user-needs analysis (PNT data) is
    attached as Appendix C of this report.
    based services. Not surprising, these were some of the same industries RTI International assessed
    to have the highest economic impacts from a GPS outage.
    Provisioning Position and Navigation Services
    Table 5 depicts real-time position and navigation solutions submitted by industry during the RFI
    process compared to examples of application-specific precision requirements. Additional
    comparisons are contained in HSOAC’s report submitted to DHS.
    Table 5*
    Real-Time Precision Requirement Examples with Bounded Precision
    Over the
    <10cm =10cm–< 1m 1–< 5m = 5–10m 10–20m >20m
    GPS (Aug) Meets Precision Meets Precision Meets Precision Meets Precision
    Meets Precision Meets Precision
    GPS (UnAug) Not close to req. precision Not close to req. precision Not
    close to req. precision Meets Precision Meets Precision Meets Precision
    eLORAN Not close to req. precision Not close to req. precision Not close to req. precision Not close to req. precision Not close to req. precision Meets Precision
    STL Not close to req. precision Not close to req. precision Not close to
    req. precision Not close to req. precision Not close to req. precision Meets Precision
    NextNav Not close to req. precision Not close to req. precision Meets
    Precision Meets Precision Meets Precision Meets Precision
    Locata Meets Precision Meets Precision Meets Precision Meets Precision Meets Precision Meets Precision
    Meets Precision Precision within factor of 5 Not close to req. precision *System performance parameters are as reported by the submitter and have not been validated by the
    government. Actual system performance must be assessed as part of any acquisition effort.
    As mentioned earlier, GPS alone cannot meet many of the precision position
    and navigation
    requirements without augmentation. Generally, any precision requirement
    below 5m will require
    some form of augmentation (this may change soon with dual frequency, carrier phase-based
    GNSS chips). As Table 5 depicts, only two systems can meet this requirement, but only in the
    areas they are deployed. Even if the backup requirements are expanded to the
    5m that GPS can
    provide, it will not expand the available backup options or significantly reduce risk. While some
    position and navigation systems can outperform GPS, they are localized applications and face
    challenges scaling to a national or regional level (see Table 3).
    Industries adopt high-precision position and navigation services only when there is a business
    case to do so. However, even within industries heavily dependent on
    precision position and
    navigation, not all users will adopt precision applications due to the increased cost. For example,
    a farm would need to be sufficiently large to offset the cost of equipment
    and fees associated
    with precision farming. A 2014 U.S. Department of Agriculture report
    estimated that 70 percent
    of U.S. farms were under 197 acres.8 HSOAC assessed that a farm would need
    to have a
    minimum acreage between 200 and 2,100 acres to justify the expense
    associated with precision
    8 United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service, Farms and Farmland, Census of
    Agriculture Highlights (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 2014).
    Consequently, it is not cost effective for 70 percent of U.S. farms to
    adopt precision
    farming. This highlights the price sensitivity associated with the adoption
    of additional position
    and navigation systems.
    Understanding the Augmentation Market Space
    By whatever means funded, all augmentation systems require interested
    investors or sponsors. In
    the public sector, per NSPD-39, agencies requiring augmentations to GPS are required to fund
    the augmentation in their budgets. In the private sector, companies have developed, and continue
    to develop, capabilities to deliver high-accuracy position and navigation services through GPS
    augmentation or other means. These services are sold to industries who are willing to pay for this
    level of accuracy. If the U.S. Government were to provide a free backup and complementary
    system, similar to the free utility of GPS, the government would have to consider the
    repercussions of such a system in the marketplace. A free government system would negatively
    impact commercially available PNT systems by directly competing with them.
    V. Backup Considerations
    Up to this point, this report has detailed PNT accuracy and precision requirements and the
    systems that can deliver PNT to meet those requirements, relying primarily
    on HSOAC’s
    research. To assist with an analysis of alternatives on viable backup system(s), HSOAC
    delineated the risks that critical infrastructure users are attempting to mitigate and analyzed how
    a backup impacts said risks. DHS frames this risk in three general
    scenarios. This unclassified
    report will not discuss potential causes, only the effects on GPS and GNSS availability.
    • Scenario 1: Signals in the GPS band are unavailable or unreliable due to spectrum
    interference (jamming or spoofing) within the United States. This
    interference is limited
    in geographic area and duration.
    • Scenario 2: GPS and GNSS systems are unavailable nationwide due to events such as a
    geomagnetic disturbance. GPS and GNSS are expected to return to normal operations
    within days.
    • Scenario 3: GPS signals are no longer available, and restoration of
    services cannot be
    Temporary Disruptions
    Though the U.S. Government provides GPS for free, this does not remove the obligation of the
    end user to plan for its short-term disruption. Since no utility is
    perfectly reliable, users plan
    appropriately, implementing backups and contingency plans to assure
    continuity of business. In
    the case of electricity during major disasters such as hurricanes, critical functions continue
    despite power outages because users made appropriate contingency plans and
    are able to use
    alternate power sources until mainline power is restored. In the first two scenarios critical
    9 Richard Mason et al., Analyzing a More Resilient National Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Capability
    (Washington, D.C.: Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, 2019).
    infrastructure users can use this traditional utility disruption mitigation approach—resorting to
    local power backups.
    Planning for temporary disruptions can vary depending on the nature of the function. At one end
    of the spectrum, there are safety-of-life applications that require
    significant investment to enable
    graceful degradation and maintenance of an acceptable level of performance. Returning to the
    electricity example, hospitals invest significant resources ensuring backup power sources are
    available and maintained. On the other end of the spectrum, there are applications that will
    simply be deferred until signals are available, similar to retailers being unable to serve patrons
    until power is restored.
    Long-Term Disruptions
    The unique nature of GNSS systems requires the United States Government to consider a
    scenario where GPS and other GNSS are no longer available. Addressing this issue requires an
    entirely different approach to backup capabilities. Returning to the electricity model, end users
    assume that electricity will eventually be restored and delivered in the
    same format as before the
    disruption (direct current). Users do not plan for a backup delivery system which would
    necessitate not only the construction of a new distribution model, but the replacement or
    modification of all end user equipment. In contrast, should GNSS become unavailable and
    critical infrastructure be required to move to an alternate PNT source, it would not only likely
    require a new delivery system, but also widespread adoption of the alternate system’s end user
    equipment, such as the procurement of upgraded receivers and antennae that would receive a
    signal other than GNSS.
    If the Federal Government plans to require backup capabilities for a sudden, long-term disruption
    to GPS, the concept for a backup must change. If the Nation is to react to
    such an event, then
    there must not only be a distribution system in place, but also the end user equipment. If either
    the delivery method or the ability to receive the PNT data is unavailable,
    the system will not
    work. Moving users to this model will be challenging. There are three ways
    to influence user
    willingness to adopt alternate systems:
    1. Availability of a PNT service that is at least as economically or operationally beneficial
    as GPS.
    2. Require (through regulation or government policy) adoption of alternate
    PNT sources.
    3. Availability of a non-GPS PNT service that is compatible with GPS
    equipment, and
    would be therefore transparent to most GPS users.
    Option (1) represents the current operating environment where GPS is ineffective, and industry
    adopts alternate systems to provide PNT sources. In applications where safety-of-life requires
    PNT assurance, industry uses alternate and backup systems to maintain that assurance. In
    addition, one backup service is unlikely to meet all PNT requirements.
    Because of these
    dynamics, providing a government alternate to existing PNT systems is
    unlikely to significantly
    change the nation’s risk profile unless it is heavily subsidized (and
    therefore anti-competitive) or
    there are other incentives to adopt.
    Option (2) could provide incentives necessary to reduce the nation’s risk profile. Currently there
    is no authoritative or regulatory requirement for adopting any backup or complementary system
    to GPS. However, the U.S. Government could regulate public/private entities that own and
    operate critical infrastructure assets that rely on PNT to adopt alternate sources for
    backup/complementary purposes. Doing so would not necessarily require
    fielding additional
    complementary PNT capabilities but it would set an outcome-oriented
    framework to require
    certain critical infrastructure to invest in resilience.
    Option (3) is a different approach where government and industry would collaborate to enable
    behavioral and design changes to enhance resilience. For example, as foreign GNSS systems,
    such as Galileo, come online, industry is integrating the new systems on the same chipset and
    using the same antenna as GPS. By emulating form factor and not
    significantly changing the
    size, weight, and power requirements, Galileo will provide some degree of backup capability
    depending on the cause for disruption.
    If, for example, a commercially available PNT system were integrated with existing GNSS
    chipsets and hardware, the U.S. Government could incentivize inclusion of
    these capabilities
    onto GNSS chipsets sold in the U.S. During normal operations, these capabilities would only be
    available to subscribers. Should a largescale GPS disruption occur, the government would then at
    least have the capability to deliver service to all users in an emergency regardless of subscription
    based on need. If the government pursues this option, the requirements would expand to:
    • GPS and backup receivers co-exist within the current GNSS form factors.
    • GPS and backup receivers are integrated on a PNT chipset.
    • Antennas and other hardware support both GNSS and backup signals.
    • The system can provide PNT data to all users regardless of subscription status during a
    long-term disruption to GPS.
    If any of the systems that can meet critical infrastructure’s timing requirements can be effectively
    integrated with GPS equipment, there could be significant risk reduction benefits for timing
    applications. Since none of the systems meet all position and navigation requirements, the impact
    to position and navigation resilience will be less substantial. To ensure widespread adoption,
    newly adopted systems must have capabilities matching GPS and would be more readily adopted
    if they provide capabilities not native to GPS.
    The department’s analysis leads it to conclude there are steps the U.S. Government can take in
    the near term, in concert with industry, to enhance PNT resilience that
    would be more effective
    than endorsing and investing in a single backup system. Government and
    industry can achieve
    effective risk mitigation by influencing owner and operator planning and investment, broadening
    education efforts about the criticality of PNT services, enabling innovation
    in the market space,
    working to promote technical interoperability and adopting the principles contained in Executive
    Order 13905, Strengthening National Resilience Through Responsible Use of Positioning,
    Navigation, and Timing Services.
    Furthermore, overreliance on a government endorsed or provided system can
    cause negative
    impacts. For example, telecommunications providers deploy high-quality oscillators (clocks) that
    enable systems to operate without an external timing source for days, weeks, and potentially
    months before services are significantly degraded. If operators deploy a primary timing system
    (GPS), an alternate timing system (foreign GNSS), and an “un-jammable” third system endorsed
    by the government and paid for by the operator, will they continue to
    install high end oscillators?
    The U.S. Government must assess how businesses will react to changes in the
    PNT ecosystem to
    guard against undesirable, unintended consequences.
    As the research detailed in this report demonstrates, there is no single intervention that the U.S.
    Government can make to ensure risk elimination of a GPS disruption. However, there are smart,
    market-oriented solutions that will contribute to enhanced resilience that
    the U.S. Government
    should continue to promote, enable and stimulate.
    VI. Departmental Plan for Meeting the Requirements
    Department of Homeland Security
    Since the enactment of the FY17 NDAA, DHS has aggressively pursued efforts
    to define the
    PNT operating environment for U.S. critical infrastructure. Most of the work
    in this report is
    based on DHS efforts. Based on our findings throughout these studies, CISA
    has provided valueadded information at various interagency and private
    sector outreach conferences (when
    available). CISA has posted Information Papers and Best Practice information
    on the website
    gps.gov. As DHS transitions from the “requirements” definition phase, the department looks to
    governing documents to define roles and responsibilities.
    DHS will continue its efforts to fulfill requirements established in PPD-21, Critical Infrastructure
    Security and Resilience, as they relate to PNT. DHS will continue to work
    with the interagency
    and the private sector to identify vulnerabilities associated with use of
    PNT services and work to
    minimize the associated risk to infrastructure. Because DHS has been
    actively engaged in the
    identification and mitigation of risk associated with PNT, DHS does not
    foresee any significant
    changes to our resourcing requirements in this mission space. The department will maintain
    current PNT resourcing levels to support security and resilience efforts.
    DHS will continue coordination with DOT to support DOT as they execute their responsibilities
    under the National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018.
    A. List of Abbreviations/Acronyms
    AoA Assessment of Alternatives
    CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
    DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security
    DOD U.S. Department of Defense
    DOT U.S. Department of Transportation
    FY Fiscal Year
    GLONASS Globalnaya navigatsionnaya sputnikovaya Sistema
    GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System
    GPS Global Positioning System
    HSOAC Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center
    LORAN Long-Range Navigation
    LTE Long-Term Evolution
    MBS Metropolitan Beacon System
    NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
    NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
    NRMC National Risk Management Center
    NSPD National Security Presidential Directive
    PL Public Law
    PNT Position, Navigation, and Timing
    RF Radio Frequency
    RFI Request for Information
    STL Satellite Time and Location
    USNO U.S. Naval Observatory
    UTC Coordinated Universal Time
    B. Bibliography
    Mason, Richard, James Bonomo, Timothy Conley, Ryan Consaul, David Frelinger, David
    Galvan, Dahlia Goldfeld, et al. Analyzing a More Resilient National Positioning,
    Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Capability (Washington, D.C.: Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center, 2019).
    O’Connor, Alan, Michael Gallaher, Kyle Clark-Sutton, Daniel Lapidus, Zack Oliver, Troy Scott,
    Dallas Wood, Manuel Gonzalez, Elizabeth Brown, Joshua Fletcher. Economic Benefits
    of the Global Positioning System (GPS) (Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International,
    2019), ES-4. https://www.rti.org/sites/default/files/gps_finalreport.pdf. President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Critical Foundations: Protecting
    America's Infrastructures (Washington, D.C.: United States Government,
    1997), A-19.
    Sadlier, Greg, Rasmus Flytkjaer, Farooq Sabri, Daniel Herr. The economic
    impact on the UK of
    a disruption to GNSS (London, UK: London Economics, 2017), iii. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-economic-impact-on-the-uk-of-adisruption-to-gnss.
    United States Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service. Farms and
    Farmland, Census of Agriculture Highlights (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Agriculture, 2014). https://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Online_Resources/Highlights/Farms_a
    United States Department of Homeland Security. National Risk Estimate: Risks
    to U.S. Critical
    Infrastructure from Global Positioning Disruptions (Washington, D.C.: United States
    Department of Homeland Security, 2010), 3.
    United States Government. National Security Presidential Directive 39: U.S. Space-Based
    Position, Navigation, and Timing Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Government,
    Additional reference not used in the report:
    Socio-Economic Benefits Study: Scoping the value of CORS and Grave D (Irving Levenson
    Revised 2009) https://www.ngs.noaa.gov/PUBS_LIB/Socio-EconomicBenefitsofCORSandGRAV-D.pdf
    C. User Needs Framework
    Reported User Needs for Timing Accuracy
    Critical Sector Application Accuracy Range
    Communications /
    Mobile Applications10 Billing, alarms 1 to 500 µs
    Internet Protocol delay monitoring µ 5 to 100 µs
    Call handoff/continuation11 10 to 30 µs
    Node-to-node communication 7 to 9 µs
    Network routers and switches, network backhaul12 4 to 5 µs
    Time stamping/event management 2 to 5 µs
    Long-term evolution (LTE) Time -Division Duplexing (TDD)
    (large cell) WiMax-TDD (some configurations) 1.5 to 5 µs
    ULTRA-TDD 1 to 1.5 µs
    LTE-TDD (small-cell) 1 to 1.5 µs
    Handoffs in WiMax-TDD (some configurations) 1 µs
    Communications13 Conversational video (livestreaming) 1 µs
    Conversational voice 150 µs
    Mission-critical data 100 µs
    Mission-critical delay sensitivity signaling 75 µs
    Vehicle-to-Everything messages 50 µs
    Network routers and switches14 50 µs
    Grandmaster clock15 1.5 µs to 50 µs
    Electricity Physical/video security 1 s
    Network security 1 µs
    Sequence of event recorder 1 µs
    Protective relays-coordinated controls 1 µs
    Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) – offline 1 µs
    Emergency Services Public safety answering point Sub 1 s
    Simulcast Land Mobile Radio (LMR) Systems 2 µs
    First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) 1.5 µs
    Financial Services Manual security trading 1 s
    Automated security trading 50 µs
    Computer system clocks and time stamping 100 µs to 50 µs
    Non-high-frequency trading (ESMA MiFID-2) 1 µs
    High-frequency trading (ESMA MiFID-2) 50 µs
    Source: Cavitt, et al. (2018)
    10 Applies to 20, 30, LTE-FDD, and LTE-A, except where otherwise noted. 11 Applies to 20, 30, LTE-FDD, and LTE-A, except where otherwise noted. 12 Violation of timing requirement expected to have relatively minor impact. 13 Applies to Synchronous Optical Networking (SONEn, Time-Division Multiplexing (TDM), Ethernet, and ultrahigh-speed Ethernet. 14 Violation of timing requirement expected to have relatively minor impact. 15 Violation of timing requirement expected to have relatively minor impact.
    Reported User Needs for Positioning Accuracy
    Critical Sector Application Position Accuracy Range
    Chemicals Tracking chemicals through supply chain 1-5 m
    Inspection and monitoring of equipment, pipes,
    and assets Sub 1 m
    Chemical Cleanup Sub 1 m
    Commercial Facilities Construction Sub 1 m
    Location-based marketing and sales Sub 5 m
    Communications Geographical service extension Sub 5 m
    Wireless signal strength measurement Sub 5 m
    Service and fleet management Sub 5 m
    Public safety alert management Sub 10 m
    Dams Monitoring deformations in dams and
    infrastructure (structural integrity) 1 cm horizontal 2 cm vertical
    Monitoring deformations in landforms and
    waterways Sub 0.5m
    Construction of dams Sub 10 cm
    Emergency Services Strategic deployment of resources (large
    incidents) Sub 1 m
    Dispatch and routing (routine incidents) Sub 1 m
    Public safety alert management Sub 10 m
    Energy Seismic exploration (land and marine)
    1 m for seismic exploration
    10 cm for hydrographic mapping
    1 m for docking
    Dynamic positioning – drilling 10 cm for dredging and
    Construction 1 m for cable and pipe laying
    Financial Services Tracking assets such as cash 15 m
    Risk assessment
    1 m for drone to evaluate specific
    5 to track consumer auto
    Loan loss mitigation/ measurement
    1 m for drone to evaluate specific
    5 to track automotive collateral
    Food and Agriculture Mapping farms Sub 1 m
    Piloting farm equipment Sub 1 m
    Variable rate technology Sub 1 m
    Food sourcing Sub sm
    Food control Sub sm
    Government Facilities Workforce/asset tracking Sub 1 m
    Base planning/coordination Sub sm
    Student tracking systems Sub sm
    Defendant/parolee tracker Sub 1 m
    Healthcare and Public
    Health Health data mapping Sub 1 m
    Location-based services to direct patients to
    health services Sub 5 m
    Telemedicine and response Sub sm
    Nuclear Reactors,
    Materials, and Waste
    Tracking materials and waste through supply
    chain 1-5 m
    Inspection and monitoring of facilities 1 cm
    Monitoring crustal deformations at nuclear waste Sub 1 m
    Critical Sector Application Position Accuracy Range
    disposal site
    Water and Wastewater Equipment mapping, monitoring, and tracking Sub 1 m
    Survey and mapping of landforms and waterways 1 cm
    Fleet management Sub 5 m
    Source: Thompson, et al. (2018).
    Reported User Needs for Navigation Accuracy in Transportation
    Critical Sector Application Position Accuracy Range
    Aviation Oceanic phase of flight 7.4km
    En route flight 3.7km
    Terminal flight 750m
    Non-Precision Approach (NPA) 220m
    Approach Procedure with Vertical Guidance (APV)
    16 m horizontal
    20 m vertical (APV-I)
    8m vertical (APV-II)
    Maritime Cat-I landing 16 m horizontal 4-6m
    Cat-II landing 7.5 m horizontal 1 m
    Cat-III landing 3 m horizontal 1 m
    Road Vehicle to
    Infrastructure Ocean navigation 10m
    (V21) Applications Pot approach and restricted waters 10m
    Road Vehicle to
    Vehicle (V2V) Inland waterways 2-10m
    Applications Port 1m
    Road 5m
    Lane 1.1m
    Where-in-lane 0.7m
    Road 5m
    Lane 1.5m
    Where-in-lane 1.0m
    Source: Tralli, et al. (2018b).

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