[continued from previous message]

the airspace violation. Obama asked Iran to return the drone. Iran is said
to have produced drones based on the captured RQ-170.


Contents
1 Capture of the drone
2 US acknowledgement
3 Complaint to UN Security Council
4 Request for return by the United States
5 Reverse engineering of the drone
6 Decoded footage obtained from captured US drone
7 See also
8 References
Capture of the drone

Images of the RQ-170 Sentinel taken from a US Army recognition manual
The government of Iran announced that the aircraft was brought down by its cyber warfare unit stationed near Kashmar and "brought down with minimum damage"[4] They said the aircraft was detected in Iranian airspace 225 kilometers (140 mi) from the border with Afghanistan.[5]

The government of the United States initially claimed that its forces in Afghanistan had lost control of a UAV on 4 December 2011 and that there was
a possibility that this is the vehicle that crashed near Kashmar. According
to unnamed U.S. officials, a U.S. UAV operated by the Central Intelligence Agency was flying on the Afghan side of the Afghanistan–Iran border when its operators lost control of the vehicle.[6][7] There have been reports that "foreign officials and American experts who have been briefed on the effort" state that the crashed UAV was taking part in routine surveillance of
Iranian nuclear facilities inside Iranian airspace.[8]

The drone appeared to be largely intact, except for possible minor visible damage on its left wing. Dan Goure, an analyst at the Lexington Institute, stated the largely intact airframe ruled out the possibility of an engine or navigational malfunction: "Either this was a cyber/electronic warfare attack system that brought the system down or it was a glitch in the command-and-control system."[9] At least one US source admitted that Iran
could have interrupted the data-link and brought it to a soft landing.[10]
Some US officials stated the drone broke into three pieces during impact.
They claimed that it was reassembled for display purposes and was painted by Iran to hide the damage.[11]

The U.S. Department of Defense released a statement acknowledging that it
had lost control of a UAV during the previous week, claiming that it was "flying a mission over western Afghanistan" when control was lost. The statement did not specify the model of the aircraft. The U.S. government
also stated that it was still investigating the cause of the loss.[12]

A Christian Science Monitor article relates an Iranian engineer's assertion that the drone was captured by jamming both satellite and land-originated control signals to the UAV, followed up by a GPS spoofing attack that fed
the UAV false GPS data to make it land in Iran at what the drone thought was its home base in Afghanistan. Stephen Trimble from Flight Global assumes UAV guidance could have been targeted by 1L222 Avtobaza radar jamming and
deception system supplied to Iran by Russia.[13] In an interview for Nova,
U.S. retired Lt. General David Deptula also said "There was a problem with
the aircraft and it landed in an area it wasn't supposed to land".[14][15]

American aeronautical engineers dispute this, pointing out that as is the
case with the MQ-1 Predator, the MQ-9 Reaper, and the Tomahawk, "GPS is not
the primary navigation sensor for the RQ-170... The vehicle gets its flight path orders from an inertial navigation system".[16] Inertial navigation continues to be used on military aircraft despite the advent of GPS because
GPS signal jamming and spoofing are relatively simple operations.[17]

US acknowledgement
On 5 December 2011, U.S. military sources confirmed that the remains of an RQ-170 had been captured by Iranian forces. Media reports indicated that various U.S. officials declined to confirm whether or not the drone in the video released by Iranian state television was authentic.[18] On 8 December 2011, a senior U.S. official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told the Washington Post that the U.S. cannot be certain the drone shown was real because the U.S. does not have access to it, but also stated that "We have
no indication that it was brought down by hostile fire."[12] A second senior U.S. military official said that a major question is how the drone could
have remained "virtually intact," given the high altitude from which it is
said to have crashed. U.S. Navy Captain John Kirby, a Pentagon spokesman,
told a news conference on 8 December 2011 that Pentagon analysts were
examining the video.[19] Both Kirby and fellow spokesman George Little would not comment further on whether the U.S. military believed the drone was the
one missing, both did say that the missing drone had not been recovered.[19] Later that day, CBS reported that the US officials had confirmed in private
the authenticity of the drone shown by the Iranians.[20]

On 6 December 2011, U.S. officials acknowledged that a drone crashed in or
near Iranian airspace and that this belonged to the CIA and not to ISAF as
was earlier stated. U.S. officials did not state that the drone shown on Iranian television was actually a real RQ-170 (which has been public
knowledge since 2009),[21] although a former U.S. official confirmed that
the drone shown on the Iranian state media was a U.S. RQ-170, used for surveillance of Tehran's nuclear facilities.[citation needed]

Complaint to UN Security Council
On 9 December 2011, Iran lodged a formal complaint to the United Nations Security Council over the UAV violating its airspace. Iran's U.N. ambassador stated in the letter that "My government emphasizes that this blatant and unprovoked air violation by the United States government is tantamount to an act of hostility against the Islamic Republic of Iran in clear contravention
of international law, in particular, the basic tenets of the United Nations Charter."[22]

Request for return by the United States
On 12 December 2011, the U.S. administration asked Iran to return the
captured U.S. drone.[23] The day before, on 11 December, General Salami
stated that "no nation welcomes other countries' spy drones in its
territory, and no one sends back the spying equipment and its information
back to the country of origin."[24] On 13 December 2011, Defence Minister of Iran, dismissed the request and said "Instead of apologising to the Iranian nation, it is brazenly asking for the drone back." And the ministry
spokesman, Mehmanparast, stated that "it seems he [Obama] has forgotten that Iran’s airspace was violated, spying operations were undertaken,
international laws were violated and that Iran’s internal affairs were interfered with... . Instead of an official apology and admitting to this violation, they are making this request."[25]

Former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney criticized Obama's decisions on the drone, saying that, after the aircraft went down, the president should have ordered an airstrike within Iran: "The right response to that would have
been to go in immediately after it had gone down and destroy it. You can do that from the air ... and, in effect, make it impossible for them to benefit from having captured that drone." Instead, "he asked nicely for them to
return it, and they aren't going to".[26]

On 17 January 2012, an Iranian company said it would send miniature, pink,
toy versions of the captured drone to President Obama as a response to the request for sending the drone back.[27]

Reverse engineering of the drone
Main articles: Shahed 171 Simorgh and Saegheh (UAV)
On 10 December 2011, Iran announced that it intended to carry out reverse engineering on the captured RQ-170 Sentinel stealth aircraft.[citation
needed] In April 2012, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed to have succeeded in extracting the entirety of the data collected by the drone and
are currently in the process of building a replica of the aircraft.[28] Iran claimed to have been approached by countries, including China and Russia, seeking information on the drone.[29] Although U.S. officials expressed
concern over the possibility of China or Russia receiving the drone's technology, they cast doubt on whether Iran could replicate the technology
of the aircraft, as well as the amount of intelligence data available, due
to the precautions installed for malfunctioning drones.[30]

In May 2014, Iranian state TV displayed what was claimed to be a reverse-engineered RQ-170. Sources familiar with the RQ-170's design say
that the Iranian RQ-170 is merely a static mock-up rather than a flyable aircraft.[31] In November 2014 Iran claimed to have carried out a successful test flight of an aircraft based on reverse engineering of the RQ-170.[32]

The semi-official Tasnim news agency of Iran reported in September 2016 that
a UAV named Sa'egheh, similar in appearance to the RQ-170 Sentinel, had been built. It was said to be able to carry four precision-guided bombs; the
range was not stated.[33]

The Israeli military shot down a Sa'egheh drone during the February 2018 Israel–Syria incident. Israeli media reported that the UAV's design was
indeed largely based on the RQ-170, IAF Brigadier General Tomer Bar said
that the drone was quite advanced and emulated western technology.[34]

Decoded footage obtained from captured US drone
On 7 February 2013, Iran released video footage allegedly from the RQ-170 stealth plane. They claim the footage shows the drone coming in for a
landing at the Kandahar base. Commander of the Aerospace Division of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Brigadier General Amir-Ali Hajizadeh said in February that all the data on the downed drone was "fully
decoded."[35]

See also
Iran portalUnited States portalPolitics portalAviation portal
Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defense Force
Yasir (UAV) – An Iranian UAV based on an American type that was captured in
a similar incident
Saegheh (UAV), the design of which is alleged to be inspired by RQ-170
Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752
Iran Air Flight 655
2019 Iranian shoot-down of American drone
References
Peterson, Scott; Faramarzi, Payam (2011). "Exclusive: Iran hijacked US
drone, says Iranian engineer". csmonitor.com. Retrieved 15 December 2011.
Mungin, Lateef (22 October 2013). "Iran claims released footage is from
downed U.S. drone". CNN.
"Obama says U.S. has asked Iran to return drone aircraft". CNN. CNN Wire Staff. 22 October 2013.
Maroney, Sean. "Iranian Video Displays Alleged US Drone". Voice of America. Retrieved 13 December 2011.
"Iran Says No To Returning U.S. Drone, But Hints At Deal". Rferl.org. Retrieved 13 December 2011.
"Iran shows film of captured US drone". BBC News. 8 December 2011.
Retrieved 12 December 2011.
U.S. officials, analysts differ on whether drone in Iran TV video is real. CNN.com. (8 December 2011) Retrieved 12 December 2011.
Shane, Scott; Sanger, David E (7 December 2011). "Drone Crash in Iran
Reveals Secret U.S. Surveillance Effort". The New York Times. Retrieved 13 December 2011.
Dave Majumdar (9 December 2011). "Iran's captured RQ-170: How bad is the damage?". Air Force Times.
Majumdar, Dave (12 May 2014). "Iranian Copy of U.S. Unmanned Stealth
Aircraft is a Fake". USNI News.
"US official: Iran assembled drone like puzzle". Ynetnews.com. 20 June
1995. Retrieved 24 August 2014.
Jaffe, Greg; Erdbrink, Thomas (5 December 2011). "Iran says it downed U.S. stealth drone; Pentagon acknowledges aircraft downing". The Washington Post. Retrieved 5 December 2011.
"About the FlightGlobal Group - Blogs Announcement - flightglobal.com".
Scott Peterson; Payam Faramarzi (15 December 2011). "Exclusive: Iran
hijacked US drone, says Iranian engineer". Christian Science Monitor.
David A. Deptula, Lt. General, USAF (Retired) (23 January 2013). "Nova -
Rise of the Drones". Event occurs at "0:37". Retrieved 24 January 2013.
Meade, Sean. "Ares". Aviation Week. Retrieved 24 August 2014.
"Iran Says It Will Display More Us & Israeli Drones". aviationintel. 16 December 2011. Retrieved 1 May 2012.
Rick Gladstone (8 December 2011). "Iran Shows Video It Says Is of U.S.
Drone". the New York Times.
"U.S. officials, analysts differ on whether drone in Iran TV video is
real". CNN. 8 December 2011.
U.S. official: Iran does have our drone. CBS News (8 December 2011).
Retrieved 12 December 2011.
"After drone was lost, CIA tried a head fake". The Washington Post. 6
December 2011. Retrieved 8 December 2011.
"General: Iran won't return U.S. drone it claims to have". CNN. 11 December 2011. Retrieved 28 November 2013.
"Obama appeals to Iran to give back downed US drone". The New York Times. 9 December 2011. Retrieved 11 December 2011.
"General: Iran won't return U.S. drone it claims to have". CNN. 11 December 2011. Archived from the original on 12 December 2011. Retrieved 13 December 2011.
"Iran says captured US drone is their 'property' now". The Daily Telegraph.
13 December 2011. Retrieved 13 December 2011.
"Obama says the U.S. has asked Iran to return drone aircraft". CNN. 13 December 2011. Retrieved 13 December 2011.
Shirzad Bozorgmehr. "Iranian company wants to send toy drone to Obama - CNN.com". CNN. Retrieved 15 September 2016.
"Iran says it has gleaned data from U.S. spy drone". San Francisco
Chronicle. 22 April 2012. Retrieved 23 April 2012.
"Russia, China seek info on US drone held by Iran". Fox News. 19 April
2012. Retrieved 23 April 2012.
"Officials challenge Iran claims on US drone – despite concerns about value
to Russia, China". Fox News. 23 April 2012.
"Iranian Copy of U.S. Unmanned Stealth Aircraft is a Fake". USNI News. 12
May 2014. Retrieved 15 September 2016.
"Iran carries successful test flight of reverse-engineered RQ-170". 10 November 2014. Archived from the original on 10 November 2014. Retrieved 10 November 2014.
"Iran builds attack drone similar to captured US model, local media say".
The Guardian. 2 October 2016. Retrieved 2 October 2016.
Gross, Judah Ari (10 February 2018). "Iranian UAV that entered Israeli airspace seems to be American stealth knock-off". The Times of Israel. Retrieved 12 February 2018.
"Iran shows 'hacked US spy drone' video footage". BBC News. 7 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

https://www.aopa.org/news-and-media/all-news/2018/march/14/keeping-nextgen-on-the-air
KEEPING NEXTGEN ON THE AIR
AS GPS NAVIGATION GROWS, SO DOES GPS INTERFERENCE
March 14, 2018
By AOPA ePublishing staff
An AOPA-co-chaired task group that studied how to keep civil aircraft
flights on course when military training and testing interfere with GPS services used for navigation has issued a wide-ranging set of
recommendations to the FAA.

Satellite-based navigation is becoming the norm.
Satellite-based navigation is becoming the norm. iStock photo.
GPS interference has many causes, but the task group focused on GPS interference resulting from Department of Defense activity.

GPS is rapidly becoming the dominant air-navigation technology under the
FAA’s NextGen modernization program, and the pace of the advance is sure to accelerate as more aircraft take on Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out systems before a mandated compliance date
of Jan. 1, 2020.

By their nature, signals from GPS are fragile due to their very low power,
so as the FAA modernizes the National Airspace System, it is essential to ensure that alternate navigation aids and capabilities are available if GPS becomes unavailable.
National Security Presidential Directive 39 directs the Department of Transportation to, “… develop, acquire, operate, and maintain backup positioning, navigation, and timing capabilities that can support critical transportation, homeland security, and other critical civil and commercial infrastructure applications within the United States, in the event of a disruption of the Global Positioning System …” The same U.S. policy directs
the Department of Defense to “train, equip, test, and exercise U.S. military forces and national security capabilities in operationally realistic
conditions that include denial of the Global Positioning System.”

When military exercises intentionally degrade GPS signals—necessary to
simulate “operationally realistic conditions” in training—the impact on civilian aircraft has been mixed. Sometimes the impact of a GPS signal
outage on an aircraft is nothing at all. Much depends, say experts, on the aircraft’s altitude, the terrain, and the navigation equipment on board. However, sometimes the impact is more significant.

One incident from April 2016 has come to exemplify what can happen: It documented an Embraer Phenom 300 entering a Dutch roll and emergency descent after its yaw damper disengaged when the aircraft’s dual attitude and
heading reference systems responded differently to the GPS signal outage.

Numerous aircraft have reported the loss of navigation signals in affected airspace; some have been observed to “disappear” from their ADS-B-plotted tracks in dead spots, to reappear in zones of better signal reception.

And because it is very difficult to predict how loss of GPS signals may
affect an aircraft’s navigation and flight control systems, this is the dilemma: Is it better for an aircraft to reroute to avoid the frequently expansive swaths of airspace depicted graphically on GPS-testing notices to airmen? Can better methods be found to quantify the risks?

Degraded navigation, the loss of ADS-B, and the failure of GPS-dependent control systems aren’t the only impacts on civil aviation from what the FAA calls “intentional interference events.” There’s also economic risk for businesses like aerial surveying companies that fly GPS-based grids, and who may be unable to operate during an interference event.

The uncertainties also highlight the need for the FAA to keep NextGen’s VOR-based backup system in good working order, urged the panel that studied
the problem.

Quantifying the problem
Its report, Operational Impacts of Intentional GPS Interference, is a
must-read for aircraft operators who want to understand the knowns, the unknowns, and the future planning designed to make interference events—which tripled in number from 2012 to 2017—non-issues for civilian aircraft, said
Rune Duke, AOPA senior director of airspace, air traffic, and security.

Duke co-chaired the Radio Technical Commission for Aviation’s GPS
Interference Task Group with Capt. Wes Googe, technical pilot and manager of airspace optimization for American Airlines. Robert Sweet, a senior manager
in the Air Traffic Organization, served as the coordinator for input by the FAA’s technical operations and technical experts.

The task group came into being in May 2017 after the FAA requested that
RTCA, which studies technical questions for government agencies, recommend
ways to accommodate aviation’s “increased reliance” on GPS simultaneously
with the Department of Defense’s increased need to hold exercises that
include GPS interference for national security and defense training.

The FAA requested that the task group focus on quantifying the impact of interference events on the National Airspace System and recommend follow-up actions ranging from better depictions of the events, based on their likely interference profile, to analyzing how pilots are alerted to the activity,
to creating new training materials for pilots and air traffic controllers.

In its letter to RTCA, the FAA cited an AOPA survey that found that more
than a third of general aviation pilots had experienced a GPS outage, and
more than 60 percent “were concerned about the impact” of intentional GPS interference.

“The task group started meeting in August and delivered the recommendation report to RTCA’s tactical operations committee at its March 1 meeting,” Duke said. “The committee approved the report and submitted it to the FAA for
their action. The next steps are for the FAA to review the recommendations
and report back on their concurrence and, if applicable, an implementation plan.”

Sweet added that the FAA “is working to carefully balance the reliance of
air traffic on GPS with our military’s need to conduct GPS testing and
training activities. This task group’s recommendations will help bring key challenges and potential solutions into better focus.”

In 25 recommendations, the report pinpoints improvement opportunities, and
it calls out the FAA where it believes the agency has failed to make
existing processes work.

According to one recommendation for better online information distribution, “The preflight resources available online for pilots are fragmented and obscure. The FAA has failed to maintain several of these websites, yet they were still publicly available until recently.”

In some instances, it said, information is complete but hard to find.

“The Flight Advisory notices are an important resource for pilots but they
are housed on an obscure website and can provide misleading information,”
notes the next recommendation. “The FAA should continue publishing and
emailing the Flight Advisory notices as they do provide valuable information
to users; however, where they are hosted today has limited visibility for a pilot preparing for a flight. It is important the FAA relocate and integrate these notices with the NOTAM on NOTAM Search, which is the default location
for NOTAM related information.”

Anomaly reporting
The recommendations also flagged conflicting FAA guidance to pilots on reporting GPS anomalies. “Paragraph E in each Flight Advisory states ‘pilots are encouraged to report anomalies only when ATC assistance is required.’
This guidance is repeated in Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) paragraph 1-1-13, but this guidance is counter to FAR 91.187. Pilots operating under
IFR are required at all times to ‘report as soon as practical to ATC any malfunctions of navigational, approach, or communication equipment occurring
in flight.’ It is important paragraph E in the Flight Advisory and AIM paragraph 1-1-13 are modified to be consistent with the regulatory
obligation of all pilots.”

The report recommended new language stating, “Pilots experiencing an anomaly should advise appropriate ATC facility and report online using FAA GPS
Anomaly Reporting Form.”

Duke strongly advocates for pilots to use the online GPS anomaly reporting form, noting that reports conveyed by radio to ATC may not go much further
than the controlling facility. By contrast, anomalies reported online become the subject of investigations, sometimes including the investigator calling back the pilot who reports an event to request more information.

ADS-B permits some anomalies to be well documented—which could help improve future GPS-testing notams. “With ADS-B flight track data, we can see the
impact of the interference with images of aircraft flying into interference areas and disappearing. Leveraging the ADS-B data can help us come up with better models of where the interference is and how to inform pilots,” he
said.

In some cases where problem areas were identified in the report, Duke said,
the FAA and Department of Defense are already on the case, such as examining possible ways to reduce the graphical impact areas described in GPS testing notams from radii of hundreds of miles, especially in airspace where the
only expected impact on GPS reception is near the notam area’s center.

Also, the FAA is developing new pilot guidance, including new language to be included in the Aeronautical Information Manual. The FAA is also considering
a new Advisory Circular “that will detail the long list of mitigations the
FAA has in place for these events,” Duke added.

With safety of civilian flights in mind, a key operational precaution
already in place between the Department of Defense and the FAA requires a military interference event being stopped if the weather is less than a 5,000-foot ceiling and/or five miles visibility at a GPS-only airport when
an aircraft needs access to that airport.

“This is an important mitigation that will become more robust and enforced based on this group’s work,” he said.

Panel co-chair Googe noted that the airline industry considers the
Department of Defense’s efforts with GPS interference “critical to the
security of the country yet also a complicating factor in the conduction of
GPS dependent NextGen programs in the NAS going forward. The RTCA-sponsored intentional GPS interference work group provided the aviation community and
FAA a forum to fully understanding the impact of these events, effectiveness
of the associated NOTAM service, and the education process for all concerned
to operate safely during these events.”

Moving forward, “It is imperative that the Alternative Position Navigation Timing document (APNT) describe a collaborative roadmap that defines the
level of Required Navigation Performance (RNP) and associated equipage
expected in order to meet the current and future needs of all operators in
the National Airspace System during any GPS interference event,” he said, referring to the FAA project that investigates alternatives for
high-precision backup for GPS other than the legacy navigation systems currently designated to provide coverage in an outage.

The report also notes that, although the task group focused on intentional
and planned GPS interference events, other factors including “solar weather, illegal personal GPS jammers, unlicensed GPS repeaters or spoofing” must be addressed by the FAA as well. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/report-on-pnt-backup-complementary-capabilities-to-gps_508.pdf
Report on Positioning, Navigation,
and Timing (PNT) Backup and
Complementary Capabilities to the
Global Positioning System (GPS)
National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year
2017 Report to Congress: PNT Requirements,
and Analysis of Alternatives
April 8, 2020
i
Message from the Director, Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
April 8, 2020
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), specifically
the National Risk Management Center (NRMC) within the
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), in
coordination with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT),
prepared the following report: Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing (PNT) Backup and Complementary Capabilities to the
Global Positioning System (GPS).
This document was compiled pursuant to the joint departmental
report requirement in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (PUBLIC LAW 114–328,
Sec.1618). Included in this report is an overview and a summary
of conclusions.
• This report is submitted on behalf of DHS and represents civil PNT
concerns. The U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) already submitted its report for DOD-related efforts.
• DHS is the national coordinator for the operational security of the
Nation’s critical
infrastructure, and DOT has some sector-specific responsibility for the Transportation
Sectors (Maritime, Aviation, Railways, and Roadways). DOT and DHS PNT representatives have been involved in the progress of the studies conducted, and all three
departments (DHS, DOD, and DOT) have reviewed the information in the studies and
this final report.
• Pursuant to congressional requirements, CISA NRMC prepared this report on behalf of
the Federal government. This report used details from the requirement
studies conducted
in 2017 and 2018 by non-governmental organizations on behalf of DHS.
• The legislative requirements (see Section I) for “Section 1618” of the
FY17 NDAA (P.L.
114-328; December 23, 2016) to provide PNT capability information to backup
and
complement GPS are included in this report. This report also includes the
DHS
conclusions from the requirements studies and the Analysis of Alternative
(AoA) (nonacquisition) research conducted in 2017 and 2018. All these
studies are available to
Congress upon request.
• The National Timing Resilience and Security Act of 2018 (PL 115-282) made
the
Secretary of Transportation responsible for establishing requirements for
the procurement
of a land-based, resilient, and reliable alternative timing system as a complement to and
backup for the timing component of GPS, and a report to Congress setting
forth a plan for
such a system as well as an assessment of the advantages of such a system.
This report
does not intend to address this requirement, which was finalized after DHS’ analysis was
underway; however, the timing requirements for Federal and Critical Infrastructure users
ii
contained in this report are applicable to any subsequent DOT effort.
The Committee leadership and/or their designated representative receiving
this report are as
follows:
Chairman Adam Smith
House Armed Services Committee
Ranking Member Mac Thornberry
House Armed Services Committee
Chairman James Inhofe
Senate Armed Services Committee
Ranking Member Jack Reed
Senate Armed Services Committee
Chairwoman Eddie Bernice Johnson
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Ranking Member Frank Lucas
House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology
Chairman Roger Wicker
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
Ranking Member Maria Cantwell
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee
Chairman Ron Johnson
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Ranking Member Gary Peters
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Chairman Bennie Thompson
House Committee on Homeland Security
Ranking Member Mike Rogers
House Committee on Homeland Security
Chairman Peter A. DeFazio
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Ranking Member Sam Graves
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
iii
If you have any questions, please contact CISA Legislative Affairs at (703) 235-2080.
Sincerely,
Christopher C. Krebs
iv
Executive Summary
Overview
The Global Positioning System (GPS) has become the definitive position, navigation, and timing
(PNT) source in the United States due to its capabilities, availability, and lack of end user fees.
These factors have led to widespread adoption of, and potential overreliance on, GPS. While
other PNT systems are available, GPS’ low end user cost and ubiquity have limited the adoption
of other PNT systems for widespread use.
Adoption and use of PNT systems, other than GPS, are generally driven by operational needs
such as accuracy, security, or availability that GPS cannot provide. These operational needs can
justify the cost of other PNT services for specific critical infrastructure application. However,
these additional costs also present market challenges for broader adoption
of non-GNSS systems.
Industries that see the value in non-GNSS services adopt them, but without regulatory
requirements or positive benefit-cost equations, adoption of non-GNSS
services is unlikely. This
report will provide details of the requirements for PNT and the analysis of alternatives that may
drive the government’s decision to move forward with investments in backup and/or
complementary capabilities to GPS for Critical Infrastructure and critical commercial
applications.
Purpose
“Section 1618” of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) (P.L.
114-328; December 23, 2016) requires the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) to
address the needs for a GPS backup by identifying and assessing viable alternate technologies
and systems. The Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center (HSOAC) conducted an indepth assessment of PNT systems currently used in the United States for DHS and DOT. This
report is a summary and analysis of that assessment and provides recommendations for the
Federal Government’s next steps in efforts to increase the resilience of US Critical Infrastructure
to disruption of GPS services.
Key Findings and Considerations
As detailed in section V of this report, DHS recommends that responsibility
for mitigating
temporary- GPS outages be the responsibility of the individual user and not

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