• Kudos Kamikazi Kramer

    From Larry Dighera@21:1/5 to All on Fri Aug 20 15:09:08 2021
    On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 14:20:48 -0700 (PDT), Geoff Rove <jgrove24@hotmail.com> wrote:

    After kramer hit Aeromexico in the LAX airspace in 1987, advanced collision avoidance gear was mandated and I had worry free flights every since.

    Advanced technology (transponder beacon) is a good thing.

    However, your statement reveals that you haven't flown in Los Angeles basin airspace in the past three decades. Burning a taxi light to enhance conspicuity is about all non-TCAS equipped VFR flights can hope for, unless
    the PIC is receiving radar traffic advisory service from ATC.


    AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION PUBLICATION (AIP)
    https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/media/AIP.pdf
    Page: ENR 1.1-28
    25.3 The FAA has a voluntary pilot safety program,
    Operation Lights On, to enhance the see-and-avoid
    concept. Pilots are encouraged to turn on their landing
    lights during takeoff; i.e., either after takeoff
    clearance has been received or when beginning
    takeoff roll. Pilots are further encouraged to turn on
    their landing lights when operating below
    10,000 feet, day or night, especially when operating
    within 10 miles of any airport or in conditions of
    reduced visibility and in areas where flocks of birds
    may be expected; i.e., coastal areas, lake areas,
    around refuse dumps, etc. Although turning on
    aircraft lights does enhance the see-and-avoid
    concept, pilots should not become complacent about
    keeping a sharp lookout for other aircraft. Not all
    aircraft are equipped with lights, and some pilots may
    not have their lights turned on. Aircraft manufactur-
    ers’ recommendations for operation of landing lights
    and electrical systems should be observed.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Geoff Rove@21:1/5 to All on Fri Aug 20 14:20:48 2021
    After kramer hit Aeromexico in the LAX airspace in 1987, advanced collision avoidance gear was mandated and I had worry free flights every since.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Jim Pennino@21:1/5 to Larry Dighera on Fri Aug 20 15:52:29 2021
    Larry Dighera <LDighera@att.net> wrote:
    On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 14:20:48 -0700 (PDT), Geoff Rove <jgrove24@hotmail.com> wrote:

    After kramer hit Aeromexico in the LAX airspace in 1987, advanced collision avoidance gear was mandated and I had worry free flights every since.

    Advanced technology (transponder beacon) is a good thing.

    However, your statement reveals that you haven't flown in Los Angeles basin airspace in the past three decades. Burning a taxi light to enhance conspicuity is about all non-TCAS equipped VFR flights can hope for, unless the PIC is receiving radar traffic advisory service from ATC.

    Does the phrase "ADS-B requirement" mean anything to you?

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Larry Dighera@21:1/5 to All on Sat Aug 21 11:27:03 2021
    On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 15:52:29 -0700, Jim Pennino <jimp@gonzo.specsol.net>
    wrote:

    Larry Dighera <LDighera@att.net> wrote:
    On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 14:20:48 -0700 (PDT), Geoff Rove <jgrove24@hotmail.com> >> wrote:

    After kramer hit Aeromexico in the LAX airspace in 1987, advanced collision avoidance gear was mandated and I had worry free flights every since.

    Advanced technology (transponder beacon) is a good thing.

    However, your statement reveals that you haven't flown in Los Angeles basin >> airspace in the past three decades. Burning a taxi light to enhance
    conspicuity is about all non-TCAS equipped VFR flights can hope for, unless >> the PIC is receiving radar traffic advisory service from ATC.

    Does the phrase "ADS-B requirement" mean anything to you?


    ADS-B is a flawed corporate attempt to replace terrestrial radars with a
    system that is more easily integrated into Boeing's ATC product under the dubious guise of saving money by decommissioning radar sites.

    ADS-B is dependent on GPS, a weak satellite-based signal, thus prone to
    failure from a number of natural and manmade sources. Unlike radar, ADS-B broadcasts can easily be spoofed by a pernicious flight to provide deceptive position and other data. (I will refrain from providing examples of how
    that deception may be used for nefarious goals.)

    All aircraft in all classes of airspace are not required to be ADS-B
    equipped.

    When/if satellite communications are/become unavailable, terrestrial radar
    will be sorely missed. It's only a matter of time.

    So, ADS-B is a corporate boondoggle, and has little to do with true flight-safety IMNSHO.

    Why do you ask?

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Jim Pennino@21:1/5 to Larry Dighera on Sat Aug 21 12:01:20 2021
    Larry Dighera <LDighera@att.net> wrote:
    On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 15:52:29 -0700, Jim Pennino <jimp@gonzo.specsol.net> wrote:

    Larry Dighera <LDighera@att.net> wrote:
    On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 14:20:48 -0700 (PDT), Geoff Rove <jgrove24@hotmail.com> >>> wrote:

    After kramer hit Aeromexico in the LAX airspace in 1987, advanced collision avoidance gear was mandated and I had worry free flights every since.

    Advanced technology (transponder beacon) is a good thing.

    However, your statement reveals that you haven't flown in Los Angeles basin >>> airspace in the past three decades. Burning a taxi light to enhance
    conspicuity is about all non-TCAS equipped VFR flights can hope for, unless >>> the PIC is receiving radar traffic advisory service from ATC.

    Does the phrase "ADS-B requirement" mean anything to you?


    ADS-B is a flawed corporate attempt to replace terrestrial radars with a system that is more easily integrated into Boeing's ATC product under the dubious guise of saving money by decommissioning radar sites.

    Just how is ADS-B flawed?

    Be precise.

    You do understand that it is becoming a world wide standard?

    There are currently 31 operational GPS satellites and they cover the
    entire planet and about 70 additional GNSS satellites.

    How many ground based radar sites would you need to cover just the USA
    to include Alaska and Hawaii? How do you power and maintain the ones in
    the Pacific between the West Coast and Hawaii?

    How many ground based radar sites would you need to cover the entire
    planet and how would you power and maintain them in areas near the North
    and South poles as well as across the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian,
    Southern and Arctic Oceans?

    How could ground based radar provide information about nearby aircraft
    to other aircraft without ADS-B?

    ADS-B is dependent on GPS, a weak satellite-based signal, thus prone to failure from a number of natural and manmade sources. Unlike radar, ADS-B broadcasts can easily be spoofed by a pernicious flight to provide deceptive position and other data. (I will refrain from providing examples of how
    that deception may be used for nefarious goals.)

    How is GPS a weak signal?

    Be precise.

    Radar is trivialy spoofed and people have been doing so since shortly
    after the invention of radar.

    All aircraft in all classes of airspace are not required to be ADS-B equipped.

    True, however you specifically mentioned the Los Angeles basin.

    What can you fly and where could you fly an airplane in the Los Angeles
    basin without ADS-B?

    When/if satellite communications are/become unavailable, terrestrial radar will be sorely missed. It's only a matter of time.

    If satellite communications become unavailable, you will have FAR bigger
    things to worry about than the failure of ADS-B.

    Maintaining terrestrial radar is a PITA and I do not miss it at all.

    So, ADS-B is a corporate boondoggle, and has little to do with true flight-safety IMNSHO.

    Likely because you don't seem to understand it nor ever used it on a
    long cross country through areas of very dense traffic.

    Why do you ask?

    You do NOT really want me to answer that.

    If it were up to me, ADS-B would be required for ANYTHING that flies
    above 500 feet AGL.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Geoff Rove@21:1/5 to Larry Dighera on Sun Aug 22 13:17:03 2021
    On Friday, August 20, 2021 at 5:09:17 PM UTC-5, Larry Dighera wrote:
    On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 14:20:48 -0700 (PDT), Geoff Rove <jgro...@hotmail.com> wrote:
    After kramer hit Aeromexico in the LAX airspace in 1987, advanced collision avoidance gear was mandated and I had worry free flights every since.
    Advanced technology (transponder beacon) is a good thing.

    However, your statement reveals that you haven't flown in Los Angeles basin airspace in the past three decades. Burning a taxi light to enhance conspicuity is about all non-TCAS equipped VFR flights can hope for, unless the PIC is receiving radar traffic advisory service from ATC.


    AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION PUBLICATION (AIP) https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/media/AIP.pdf
    Page: ENR 1.1-28
    25.3 The FAA has a voluntary pilot safety program,
    Operation Lights On, to enhance the see-and-avoid
    concept. Pilots are encouraged to turn on their landing
    lights during takeoff; i.e., either after takeoff
    clearance has been received or when beginning
    takeoff roll. Pilots are further encouraged to turn on
    their landing lights when operating below
    10,000 feet, day or night, especially when operating
    within 10 miles of any airport or in conditions of
    reduced visibility and in areas where flocks of birds
    may be expected; i.e., coastal areas, lake areas,
    around refuse dumps, etc. Although turning on
    aircraft lights does enhance the see-and-avoid
    concept, pilots should not become complacent about
    keeping a sharp lookout for other aircraft. Not all
    aircraft are equipped with lights, and some pilots may
    not have their lights turned on. Aircraft manufactur-
    ers’ recommendations for operation of landing lights
    and electrical systems should be observed.

    I flew at least 70 commercial flights over the last 30 years and am fortunate that no wondering Orvilles hit my airliner.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)
  • From Larry Dighera@21:1/5 to All on Mon Aug 23 07:42:49 2021
    On Sat, 21 Aug 2021 12:01:20 -0700, Jim Pennino <jimp@gonzo.specsol.net>
    wrote:

    Larry Dighera <LDighera@att.net> wrote:
    On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 15:52:29 -0700, Jim Pennino <jimp@gonzo.specsol.net>
    wrote:

    Larry Dighera <LDighera@att.net> wrote:
    On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 14:20:48 -0700 (PDT), Geoff Rove <jgrove24@hotmail.com>
    wrote:

    After kramer hit Aeromexico in the LAX airspace in 1987, advanced collision avoidance gear was mandated and I had worry free flights every since.

    Advanced technology (transponder beacon) is a good thing.

    However, your statement reveals that you haven't flown in Los Angeles basin
    airspace in the past three decades. Burning a taxi light to enhance
    conspicuity is about all non-TCAS equipped VFR flights can hope for, unless
    the PIC is receiving radar traffic advisory service from ATC.

    Does the phrase "ADS-B requirement" mean anything to you?


    ADS-B is a flawed corporate attempt to replace terrestrial radars with a
    system that is more easily integrated into Boeing's ATC product under the
    dubious guise of saving money by decommissioning radar sites.

    Just how is ADS-B flawed?

    Be precise.

    You do understand that it is becoming a world wide standard?

    There are currently 31 operational GPS satellites and they cover the
    entire planet and about 70 additional GNSS satellites.

    How many ground based radar sites would you need to cover just the USA
    to include Alaska and Hawaii? How do you power and maintain the ones in
    the Pacific between the West Coast and Hawaii?

    How many ground based radar sites would you need to cover the entire
    planet and how would you power and maintain them in areas near the North
    and South poles as well as across the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian,
    Southern and Arctic Oceans?

    How could ground based radar provide information about nearby aircraft
    to other aircraft without ADS-B?

    ADS-B is dependent on GPS, a weak satellite-based signal, thus prone to
    failure from a number of natural and manmade sources. Unlike radar, ADS-B >> broadcasts can easily be spoofed by a pernicious flight to provide deceptive >> position and other data. (I will refrain from providing examples of how
    that deception may be used for nefarious goals.)

    How is GPS a weak signal?

    Be precise.

    Radar is trivialy spoofed and people have been doing so since shortly
    after the invention of radar.

    All aircraft in all classes of airspace are not required to be ADS-B
    equipped.

    True, however you specifically mentioned the Los Angeles basin.

    What can you fly and where could you fly an airplane in the Los Angeles
    basin without ADS-B?

    When/if satellite communications are/become unavailable, terrestrial radar >> will be sorely missed. It's only a matter of time.

    If satellite communications become unavailable, you will have FAR bigger >things to worry about than the failure of ADS-B.

    Maintaining terrestrial radar is a PITA and I do not miss it at all.

    So, ADS-B is a corporate boondoggle, and has little to do with true
    flight-safety IMNSHO.

    Likely because you don't seem to understand it nor ever used it on a
    long cross country through areas of very dense traffic.

    Why do you ask?

    You do NOT really want me to answer that.

    If it were up to me, ADS-B would be required for ANYTHING that flies
    above 500 feet AGL.


    Have a look here: https://groups.google.com/g/rec.aviation.piloting/c/Iew66r0knhQ/m/G9eueTVECQAJ
    ADS-B is dependent on weak satellite radio signals for positional data
    of the aircraft in which it is installed. As you mentioned, such a
    system is vulnerable to the vagaries of electromagnetic propagation,
    including solar coronal mass ejections, as well as spoofing by the ADS-B
    cockpit equipment and higher powered radio transmitters potentially
    overwhelming the satellite signal and taking control ...

    <https://homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Humphreys.pdf>
    STATEMENT ON THE VULNERABILITY OF CIVIL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND
    OTHER SYSTEMS TO CIVIL GPS SPOOFING TODD HUMPHREYS THE UNIVERSITY OF
    TEXAS AT AUSTIN
    1. Summary
    Military Global Positioning System (GPS) signals have long been
    encrypted to prevent counterfeiting and unauthorized use. Civil GPS
    signals, on the other hand, were designed as an open standard,
    freely-accessible to all.

    These virtues have made civil GPS enormously popular, but the
    transparency and predictability of its signals give rise to a dangerous
    weakness: they can be easily counterfeited, or spoofed. Like Monopoly
    money, civil GPS signals have a detailed structure but no built-in
    protection against counterfeiting. Civil GPS is the most popular
    unauthenticated protocol in the world.

    The vulnerability of civil GPS to spoofing has serious implications for
    civil unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as was recently illustrated by a
    dramatic remote hijacking of a UAV at White Sands Missile Range. The
    demonstration was conducted by the University of Texas Radionavigation
    Laboratory at the behest of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
    From a standoff range of a half mile, the University spoofer
    commandeered the UAV and induced it to plummet toward the desert floor.
    The results of this demonstration will no doubt factor into the Federal
    Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) plans for integrating UAVs into the
    national airspace.

    Hacking a UAV by GPS spoofing is but one expression of a larger problem:
    insecure civil GPS technology has over the last two decades been
    absorbed deeply into critical systems within our national
    infrastructure. Besides UAVs, civil GPS spoofing also presents a danger
    to manned aircraft, maritime craft, communications systems, banking and
    finance institutions, and the national power grid. ...



    https://groups.google.com/g/rec.aviation.piloting/c/qxGOjj8tY-4/m/788xIg0lk0oJ
    This satellite-based approach to NextGen Air Traffic Control is flawed.
    While it permits defense contractors to deploy their market-ready
    technology and wrest control of the skies from the federal government,
    it significantly reduces air safety and opens a chink in the armor
    against terrorism.


    <http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/NBAA-Raises-Concerns-Over-ADS-B-Security-224160-1.html>
    NBAA Raises Concerns Over ADS-B Security

    By Mary Grady | May 26, 2015

    The FAA's plans regarding ADS-B, or automatic dependent
    surveillance-broadcast services, don't offer enough protection for
    operators' privacy, security and business competitiveness, NBAA
    President Ed Bolen said in an op-ed this week.

    "ADS-B transmits an unencrypted, real-time signal that includes the
    aircraft's Mode S transponder code, its call sign, aircraft type,
    position and airspeed, as determined by the aircraft's own GPS-based
    avionics," Bolen wrote. "Anyone with the right equipment can capture
    that real-time data and potentially use it for nefarious purposes."
    Bolen said NBAA is concerned that its members' flights could be tracked
    by competitors trying to deduce their next business moves.

    NBAA and other advocates prevailed in 2011 when they raised similar
    concerns
    <http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/New_Barr_Rules_206694-1.html>
    about an FAA policy that would have made flight data public without the
    option for operators to block it. "We believe people should not have to
    surrender their security or privacy just because they board a
    general-aviation airplane," Bolen wrote. NBAA will continue to monitor
    the situation with regard to ADS-B and will advocate for change. ADS-B
    is a cornerstone of NextGen air traffic modernization, and the FAA has
    mandated that aircraft operating in airspace that now requires a Mode C
    transponder must be equipped with ADS-B Out by Jan. 1, 2020.


    https://groups.google.com/g/rec.aviation.piloting/c/x0b12EM5-Fg/m/pxhypMeTBwAJ
    Another Boeing Boondoggle Creates Potential Hazard In Skies Over Los Angeles

    Call me Chicken Little, but....

    I take issue with this quote from the following article:

    "The Metroplex system relies on sophisticated automation and global
    positioning satellites that will let controllers and pilots know exactly
    where aircraft are at all times instead of waiting every nine to 12
    seconds
    for radar signals to bounce back."

    In fact, controllers will not KNOW the correct position of aircraft at
    all. ATC
    will know the position each aircraft reports via the GPS-based ADS/B system.
    That's significantly less certain than the empirical evidence provided
    by
    physically bouncing a radio signal off the aircraft, as it has been
    demonstrated that weak satellite signals can be overridden with more powerful
    terrestrial-based radio transmitters, and satellites are vulnerable to solar
    disturbances such as Solar Mass Ejections. It also opens the specter of
    ATC
    spoofing and the hazards to national security that potentially poses.

    Further, with all the aircraft in the very congested Los Angeles skies
    operating at reduced separation standard distances, what ATC procedure
    has been
    SHOWN to be safe when the satellite link suddenly fails and all those airborne
    passengers suddenly find themselves in much closer proximity to each
    other than
    has ever happened before? Surly, radar will be a fall-back safety net,
    so
    there is no public financial incentive to purchase, deploy, train, and operate
    such a satellite-based ATC system. It's inherently more hazardous due to its
    reduced separation minimums. I would speculate that it only benefits the
    airline industry and primarily contractor(s) installing Metroplex at the
    expense of the tax payer, and paves the way for a reduction in the ATC
    controller workforce due to increased computerized automation. If the
    controller workforce is reduced, who will manually control the increased
    traffic density of marginally separated flights when the system goes
    down?

    Who the hell is in charge here, the profiteers or those charged with keeping
    the skies safe?




    https://groups.google.com/g/rec.aviation.piloting/c/aGzV7DL9oQM/m/w-cQ5yCFCAAJ Russia has figured out how to jam U.S. drones in Syria, officials say
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    Larry Dighera
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    Apr 10, 2018, 6:43:05 AM
    to


    The FAA intends to abandon radar, and rely on GPS-based ADS-B for
    NextGen ATC despite its proven vulnerability. Space-based satellite communications signals are puny and easily overwhelmed by ground-based
    higher powered transmitters, but NextGen is dependent on satellite communications. Is this a good idea or folly?


    ------------------------

    https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/russia-has-figured-out-how-jam-u-s-drones-syria-n863931

    Russia has figured out how to jam U.S. drones in Syria, officials say

    Four U.S. officials said Russia's signal scrambling has seriously
    affected military operations.

    by Courtney Kube / Apr.10.2018 / 1:32 AM ET

    An unarmed U.S. Shadow drone is launched in this undated photograph,
    released on January 5, 2011.AAI Corporation via Reuters /
    WASHINGTON — The Russian military has been jamming some U.S. military
    drones operating in the skies over Syria, seriously affecting American
    military operations, according to four U.S. officials.

    The Russians began jamming some smaller U.S. drones several weeks ago,
    the officials said, after a series of suspected chemical weapons
    attacks on civilians in rebel-held eastern Ghouta. The Russian
    military was concerned the U.S. military would retaliate for the
    attacks and began jamming the GPS systems of drones operating in the
    area, the officials explained.

    Jamming, which means blocking or scrambling a drone's reception of a
    signal from a GPS satellite, can be uncomplicated, according to Dr.
    Todd Humphreys, the director of the Radionavigation Laboratory at the University of Texas at Austin.

    Israel shoots down Iranian drone, sparking attack
    00:22
    "GPS receivers in most drones can be fairly easily jammed," he said

    Humphreys, an expert on the spoofing and jamming of GPS, warns this
    could have a significant impact on U.S. drones, causing them to
    malfunction or even crash. "At the very least it could cause some
    serious confusion" for the drone operator on the ground if the drone
    reports an incorrect position or is lost, he said.

    U.S. analysts first caught the Russian military jamming drones in
    eastern Ukraine four years ago, after the invasion of Crimea,
    according to Humphreys. He said the jammers were initially detected as
    faint signals from space, bouncing off the earth's surface. The
    jammers "had a pretty significant impact" on the United Nations
    surveillance drones that were attempting to monitor the area,
    grounding the fleet for days and halting intelligence gathering from
    the air.

    The Defense Department will not say whether the jamming is causing
    drones to crash, citing operational security. "The U.S. military
    maintains sufficient countermeasures and protections to ensure the
    safety of our manned and unmanned aircraft, our forces and the
    missions they support," said Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon.

    A U.S. Air Force MQ-1B Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),
    carrying a Hellfire missile lands at a secret air base after flying a
    mission in the Persian Gulf region on January 7, 2016. The drones
    impacted to date by Russian jamming are smaller surveillance aircraft,
    as opposed to the larger Predators and Reapers that often operate in
    combat environments. John Moore / Getty Images File
    But one official confirmed the tactic is having an operational impact
    on U.S. military operations in Syria.

    The officials said the equipment being used was developed by the
    Russian military and is very sophisticated, proving effective even
    against some encrypted signals and anti-jamming receivers. The drones
    impacted so far are smaller surveillance aircraft, as opposed to the
    larger Predators and Reapers that often operate in combat environments
    and can be armed.

    Dr. Humphreys says that though the attacks occur in cyberspace, the
    results are still serious.

    "They are a little less hostile looking than a kinetic bullet but
    sometimes the effect can be just as damaging," he said. "It's like
    shooting at them with radio waves instead of bullets." =============================================


    https://groups.google.com/g/rec.aviation.piloting/c/Mhk_XEjVfng/m/eiOAFdGkAwAJ GPS Jamming: Major Threat To Drones
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    One wonders how this forecast of "GPS (or GNSS) jamming and spoofing"
    might impact ADS-B and NextGen (not to mention GPS approaches) both
    dependent on GPS?


    https://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/GPS-Jamming-Major-Threat-to-Drone-230749-1.html

    GPS Jamming: Major Threat To Drones

    By Paul Bertorelli | April 30, 2018

    As drones multiply, as they are expected to do, incidents of GPS (or
    GNSS) jamming and spoofing are expected to rise in concert during the
    next decade. That poses not just a threat of loss of the vehicles, but
    also to nearby aircraft and unaware people on the ground, according to
    Jeremy Bennington of Spirent, a company that specializes in jamming
    and spoofing defense. Bennington spoke at the AUVSI XPONENTIAL Expo in
    Denver this week and sketched a threat that’s not yet emergent, but
    will escalate enough to require drone manufacturers to harden their
    aircraft against interference.

    Bennington said more than 150,000 incidents of jamming or spoofing
    have been recorded, affecting aircraft, ships and ground vehicles. And
    it’s not a hard thing to do. “If you want jam GPS, get your credit
    card out. It’s really rather easily done,” he told a group of
    XPONENTIAL attendees. The event is organized by the Association of
    Unmanned Vehicle Systems International and although dominated by
    aircraft systems, land and marine vehicles are also represented. And
    all of them have been jammed or spoofed.

    In one incident in Hanover, Germany, Bennington said, a GPS emulator
    being used for maintenance disrupted inbound aircraft navigation and
    actually electronically moved the runway threshold. It took
    authorities hours to find the source. NASA’s ASRS has recorded more
    than 100 incidents of interference, some serious enough to cause
    aircraft to lose position data. While jamming splatters the signal,
    spoofing actually fools the GNSS receiver into believing it’s
    somewhere else. In one well-known incident in the Mediterranean Sea,
    more than 20 ships were spoofed into believing their positions were
    miles away from their true location.

    Drones are beginning to use a method called sensor fusion—cross
    checking position with radar, lidar or inertial systems—to defeat
    spoofing, but these systems add cost and weight. Bennington says the
    industry will have to respond sooner than later. “We will see the
    impact as more drones enter service,” he said.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Jim Pennino@21:1/5 to Since you didn't bother to directly on Mon Aug 23 09:19:54 2021
    Larry Dighera <LDighera@att.net> wrote:

    Since you didn't bother to directly address anything I said, it is all
    snipped.


    Have a look here: https://groups.google.com/g/rec.aviation.piloting/c/Iew66r0knhQ/m/G9eueTVECQAJ
    ADS-B is dependent on weak satellite radio signals for positional data
    of the aircraft in which it is installed. As you mentioned, such a
    system is vulnerable to the vagaries of electromagnetic propagation,
    including solar coronal mass ejections, as well as spoofing by the ADS-B
    cockpit equipment and higher powered radio transmitters potentially
    overwhelming the satellite signal and taking control ...

    It is all a bunch of arm waving, ignorant nonsense.

    Those "weak satellite radio signals" are at about -135 dBm which, if you
    knew anything at all about RF propagation in general and line of sight communications in particular, which you obviously don't, you would know
    this is more than enough signal strength for reliable communications.

    GPS frequencies are at about 200 times higher ithen that where the "vagaries
    of electromagnetic propagation" have an effect.

    If there is a solar coronal mass ejection that hits the Earth, you will
    have FAR bigger things to worry about than GPS.

    The rest is just Chicken Little bull shit.

    <snip remaining unread>

    Since ALL RF communications is subject to spoofing and jamming,
    including ground radar, what would you suggest for an alternative?

    Maybe a system of towers across the planet using signal mirrors?

    OK, so you are mad because the AN system was turned off and all you can
    do now is bitch about ADS-B and remain totally ignorant of the advantages
    of the system over ground based radar.

    Get over it.

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
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  • From Larry Dighera@21:1/5 to All on Mon Aug 23 11:48:17 2021
    On Mon, 23 Aug 2021 09:19:54 -0700, Jim Pennino <jimp@gonzo.specsol.net>
    wrote:

    Those "weak satellite radio signals" are at about -135 dBm which, if you
    knew anything at all about RF propagation in general and line of sight >communications in particular, which you obviously don't, you would know
    this is more than enough signal strength for reliable communications.

    Jim,

    While you may hold a degree in engineering, it's obviously not in electrical engineering.

    According to the dBm to mW conversion Calculators here: <https://www.rapidtables.com/convert/power/dBm_to_mW.html>, and <https://inductivetwig.com/pages/dbm-to-mw-converter> -135 dBm equals 3.1622776602e-14 Miliwats or 3.1622776601683796e-14 Miliwats respectively.
    FCC Part 15 unlicensed radio transmitters are limited to 15 mW. That is low enough for the US government to consider radio signals of that power level
    to pose little probability of interfering with other services. If your GPS power figure of -135 dBm is correct, it is five time less than what the
    federal government considers a relevant radio signal. I'm sure you are
    aware that one Miliwatt is 0.001 Watts. You've got to agree that 3/1000
    Watts is a pitifully weak signal.

    If the information published on this page: <http://gpsinformation.net/main/gpspower.htm> is correct, the GPS signals is even weaker than -135 dBm when it reaches the earth:

    "How much POWER do the GPS Satellites output on the 1575mhz L1
    frequency?

    One of our anonymous newgroup readers gave this correct answer..

    In the frequency allocation filing the L1 C/A power is listed as 25.6
    Watts. The Antenna gain is listed at 13 dBi. Thus, based on the
    frequency allocation filing, the power would be about 500 Watts (27
    dBW).

    Now, the free space path loss from 21000 km is about 182 dB. Take the
    500 Watts (27 dBW) and subtract the free space path loss (27 - 182) and
    you get -155 dBW. The end of life spec is -160 dBW, which leaves a 5 dB
    margin."


    GPS frequencies are at about 200 times higher ithen that where the "vagaries >of electromagnetic propagation" have an effect.


    Are you able to cite a reasonable source that corroborates your dubious assertion?


    If there is a solar coronal mass ejection that hits the Earth, you will
    have FAR bigger things to worry about than GPS.


    Actually, solar coronal mass ejections occur quite frequently. Fortunately, they are seldom aimed at Earth.

    https://www.jpl.nasa.gov/nmp/st5/SCIENCE/cme.html

    "The frequency of CMEs varies with the 11 year solar cycle. At solar
    minimum we observe about one a week. Near solar maximum we observe an
    average of two to three CMEs per day."

    You can educate yourself about CMEs here: https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/sunearth/spaceweather/index.html#q4
    Solar Storm and Space Weather - Frequently Asked Questions

    And here: https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/sunearth/spaceweather/index.html#q13
    "Changes in the ionosphere during geomagnetic storms interfere with
    high-frequency radio communications and Global Positioning System (GPS)
    navigation."

    And here: https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/02/05/349121/how-can-the-solar-cycle-threaten-technology-on-earth/
    "The truth is we’ve skated through the solar maxima of the last century
    with few problems, apart from having to ground flights occasionally
    (like in Sweden in November 2015, when a solar flare caused radar
    malfunctions) or dealing with damaged GPS or electrical equipment."

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  • From Jim Pennino@21:1/5 to Larry Dighera on Mon Aug 23 13:10:46 2021
    Larry Dighera <LDighera@att.net> wrote:
    On Mon, 23 Aug 2021 09:19:54 -0700, Jim Pennino <jimp@gonzo.specsol.net> wrote:

    Those "weak satellite radio signals" are at about -135 dBm which, if you >>knew anything at all about RF propagation in general and line of sight >>communications in particular, which you obviously don't, you would know >>this is more than enough signal strength for reliable communications.

    Jim,

    While you may hold a degree in engineering, it's obviously not in electrical engineering.

    Actually I have a BSEE, been an amateur radio operator for about a half century, have worked on radars and IFF (that's transponder to you) as
    well as electronic warfare, and spent some time while getting the BSEE
    working as an avionics technician.

    What are your RF credentials?

    <snip totally irrelevant crap about FCC Part 15>

    If the information published on this page: <http://gpsinformation.net/main/gpspower.htm> is correct, the GPS signals is even weaker than -135 dBm when it reaches the earth:

    Nope, it just shows you know nothing about RF.

    you get -155 dBW. The end of life spec is -160 dBW, which leaves a 5 dB

    dBm and dBW are two different units like pounds and kilograms, but that
    is irrelevant as I know you know nothing about the subject of receiver sensitivity.

    GPS frequencies are at about 200 times higher ithen that where the "vagaries >>of electromagnetic propagation" have an effect.

    Also you obviously know nothing about antenna gain or propagation of
    anykind.

    Are you able to cite a reasonable source that corroborates your dubious assertion?

    Thousands of them, how many do you want?

    FYI, "vagaries of electromagnetic propagation" are pretty much over at
    about 30 Mhz and will very occasionally extend up to 100 Mhz. GPS runs
    at about 1500 Mhz.

    Also, the term "electromagnetic propagation" generally refers to
    propagation between two points on the Earth, not between a point on the
    to a point in space.

    If one were to listen to your sage advice, all the amateur radio
    operators on the planet would give up satellite communications with hand
    held radios and whip antennas because what they have been doing for many decades is obviously impossible.

    If there is a solar coronal mass ejection that hits the Earth, you will >>have FAR bigger things to worry about than GPS.


    Actually, solar coronal mass ejections occur quite frequently. Fortunately, they are seldom aimed at Earth.

    Yeah, so what?

    It only counts if one hits, just like an asteroid or anything else
    comming from space.

    Been hit by an ateroid lately?

    Perhaps in your zeal to bad mouth ADS-B you missed the words "hits the
    Earth".

    <snip irrelevant crap>

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