On Sat, 21 Aug 2021 12:01:20 -0700, Jim Pennino <
jimp@gonzo.specsol.net>
wrote:
Larry Dighera <LDighera@att.net> wrote:
On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 15:52:29 -0700, Jim Pennino <jimp@gonzo.specsol.net>
wrote:
Larry Dighera <LDighera@att.net> wrote:
On Fri, 20 Aug 2021 14:20:48 -0700 (PDT), Geoff Rove <jgrove24@hotmail.com>
wrote:
After kramer hit Aeromexico in the LAX airspace in 1987, advanced collision avoidance gear was mandated and I had worry free flights every since.
Advanced technology (transponder beacon) is a good thing.
However, your statement reveals that you haven't flown in Los Angeles basin
airspace in the past three decades. Burning a taxi light to enhance
conspicuity is about all non-TCAS equipped VFR flights can hope for, unless
the PIC is receiving radar traffic advisory service from ATC.
Does the phrase "ADS-B requirement" mean anything to you?
ADS-B is a flawed corporate attempt to replace terrestrial radars with a
system that is more easily integrated into Boeing's ATC product under the
dubious guise of saving money by decommissioning radar sites.
Just how is ADS-B flawed?
Be precise.
You do understand that it is becoming a world wide standard?
There are currently 31 operational GPS satellites and they cover the
entire planet and about 70 additional GNSS satellites.
How many ground based radar sites would you need to cover just the USA
to include Alaska and Hawaii? How do you power and maintain the ones in
the Pacific between the West Coast and Hawaii?
How many ground based radar sites would you need to cover the entire
planet and how would you power and maintain them in areas near the North
and South poles as well as across the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian,
Southern and Arctic Oceans?
How could ground based radar provide information about nearby aircraft
to other aircraft without ADS-B?
ADS-B is dependent on GPS, a weak satellite-based signal, thus prone to
failure from a number of natural and manmade sources. Unlike radar, ADS-B >> broadcasts can easily be spoofed by a pernicious flight to provide deceptive >> position and other data. (I will refrain from providing examples of how
that deception may be used for nefarious goals.)
How is GPS a weak signal?
Be precise.
Radar is trivialy spoofed and people have been doing so since shortly
after the invention of radar.
All aircraft in all classes of airspace are not required to be ADS-B
equipped.
True, however you specifically mentioned the Los Angeles basin.
What can you fly and where could you fly an airplane in the Los Angeles
basin without ADS-B?
When/if satellite communications are/become unavailable, terrestrial radar >> will be sorely missed. It's only a matter of time.
If satellite communications become unavailable, you will have FAR bigger >things to worry about than the failure of ADS-B.
Maintaining terrestrial radar is a PITA and I do not miss it at all.
So, ADS-B is a corporate boondoggle, and has little to do with true
flight-safety IMNSHO.
Likely because you don't seem to understand it nor ever used it on a
long cross country through areas of very dense traffic.
Why do you ask?
You do NOT really want me to answer that.
If it were up to me, ADS-B would be required for ANYTHING that flies
above 500 feet AGL.
Have a look here:
https://groups.google.com/g/rec.aviation.piloting/c/Iew66r0knhQ/m/G9eueTVECQAJ
ADS-B is dependent on weak satellite radio signals for positional data
of the aircraft in which it is installed. As you mentioned, such a
system is vulnerable to the vagaries of electromagnetic propagation,
including solar coronal mass ejections, as well as spoofing by the ADS-B
cockpit equipment and higher powered radio transmitters potentially
overwhelming the satellite signal and taking control ...
<
https://homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Humphreys.pdf>
STATEMENT ON THE VULNERABILITY OF CIVIL UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND
OTHER SYSTEMS TO CIVIL GPS SPOOFING TODD HUMPHREYS THE UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS AT AUSTIN
1. Summary
Military Global Positioning System (GPS) signals have long been
encrypted to prevent counterfeiting and unauthorized use. Civil GPS
signals, on the other hand, were designed as an open standard,
freely-accessible to all.
These virtues have made civil GPS enormously popular, but the
transparency and predictability of its signals give rise to a dangerous
weakness: they can be easily counterfeited, or spoofed. Like Monopoly
money, civil GPS signals have a detailed structure but no built-in
protection against counterfeiting. Civil GPS is the most popular
unauthenticated protocol in the world.
The vulnerability of civil GPS to spoofing has serious implications for
civil unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), as was recently illustrated by a
dramatic remote hijacking of a UAV at White Sands Missile Range. The
demonstration was conducted by the University of Texas Radionavigation
Laboratory at the behest of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
From a standoff range of a half mile, the University spoofer
commandeered the UAV and induced it to plummet toward the desert floor.
The results of this demonstration will no doubt factor into the Federal
Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) plans for integrating UAVs into the
national airspace.
Hacking a UAV by GPS spoofing is but one expression of a larger problem:
insecure civil GPS technology has over the last two decades been
absorbed deeply into critical systems within our national
infrastructure. Besides UAVs, civil GPS spoofing also presents a danger
to manned aircraft, maritime craft, communications systems, banking and
finance institutions, and the national power grid. ...
https://groups.google.com/g/rec.aviation.piloting/c/qxGOjj8tY-4/m/788xIg0lk0oJ
This satellite-based approach to NextGen Air Traffic Control is flawed.
While it permits defense contractors to deploy their market-ready
technology and wrest control of the skies from the federal government,
it significantly reduces air safety and opens a chink in the armor
against terrorism.
<
http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/NBAA-Raises-Concerns-Over-ADS-B-Security-224160-1.html>
NBAA Raises Concerns Over ADS-B Security
By Mary Grady | May 26, 2015
The FAA's plans regarding ADS-B, or automatic dependent
surveillance-broadcast services, don't offer enough protection for
operators' privacy, security and business competitiveness, NBAA
President Ed Bolen said in an op-ed this week.
"ADS-B transmits an unencrypted, real-time signal that includes the
aircraft's Mode S transponder code, its call sign, aircraft type,
position and airspeed, as determined by the aircraft's own GPS-based
avionics," Bolen wrote. "Anyone with the right equipment can capture
that real-time data and potentially use it for nefarious purposes."
Bolen said NBAA is concerned that its members' flights could be tracked
by competitors trying to deduce their next business moves.
NBAA and other advocates prevailed in 2011 when they raised similar
concerns
<
http://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/New_Barr_Rules_206694-1.html>
about an FAA policy that would have made flight data public without the
option for operators to block it. "We believe people should not have to
surrender their security or privacy just because they board a
general-aviation airplane," Bolen wrote. NBAA will continue to monitor
the situation with regard to ADS-B and will advocate for change. ADS-B
is a cornerstone of NextGen air traffic modernization, and the FAA has
mandated that aircraft operating in airspace that now requires a Mode C
transponder must be equipped with ADS-B Out by Jan. 1, 2020.
https://groups.google.com/g/rec.aviation.piloting/c/x0b12EM5-Fg/m/pxhypMeTBwAJ
Another Boeing Boondoggle Creates Potential Hazard In Skies Over Los Angeles
Call me Chicken Little, but....
I take issue with this quote from the following article:
"The Metroplex system relies on sophisticated automation and global
positioning satellites that will let controllers and pilots know exactly
where aircraft are at all times instead of waiting every nine to 12
seconds
for radar signals to bounce back."
In fact, controllers will not KNOW the correct position of aircraft at
all. ATC
will know the position each aircraft reports via the GPS-based ADS/B system.
That's significantly less certain than the empirical evidence provided
by
physically bouncing a radio signal off the aircraft, as it has been
demonstrated that weak satellite signals can be overridden with more powerful
terrestrial-based radio transmitters, and satellites are vulnerable to solar
disturbances such as Solar Mass Ejections. It also opens the specter of
ATC
spoofing and the hazards to national security that potentially poses.
Further, with all the aircraft in the very congested Los Angeles skies
operating at reduced separation standard distances, what ATC procedure
has been
SHOWN to be safe when the satellite link suddenly fails and all those airborne
passengers suddenly find themselves in much closer proximity to each
other than
has ever happened before? Surly, radar will be a fall-back safety net,
so
there is no public financial incentive to purchase, deploy, train, and operate
such a satellite-based ATC system. It's inherently more hazardous due to its
reduced separation minimums. I would speculate that it only benefits the
airline industry and primarily contractor(s) installing Metroplex at the
expense of the tax payer, and paves the way for a reduction in the ATC
controller workforce due to increased computerized automation. If the
controller workforce is reduced, who will manually control the increased
traffic density of marginally separated flights when the system goes
down?
Who the hell is in charge here, the profiteers or those charged with keeping
the skies safe?
https://groups.google.com/g/rec.aviation.piloting/c/aGzV7DL9oQM/m/w-cQ5yCFCAAJ Russia has figured out how to jam U.S. drones in Syria, officials say
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Apr 10, 2018, 6:43:05 AM
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The FAA intends to abandon radar, and rely on GPS-based ADS-B for
NextGen ATC despite its proven vulnerability. Space-based satellite communications signals are puny and easily overwhelmed by ground-based
higher powered transmitters, but NextGen is dependent on satellite communications. Is this a good idea or folly?
------------------------
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/military/russia-has-figured-out-how-jam-u-s-drones-syria-n863931
Russia has figured out how to jam U.S. drones in Syria, officials say
Four U.S. officials said Russia's signal scrambling has seriously
affected military operations.
by Courtney Kube / Apr.10.2018 / 1:32 AM ET
An unarmed U.S. Shadow drone is launched in this undated photograph,
released on January 5, 2011.AAI Corporation via Reuters /
WASHINGTON — The Russian military has been jamming some U.S. military
drones operating in the skies over Syria, seriously affecting American
military operations, according to four U.S. officials.
The Russians began jamming some smaller U.S. drones several weeks ago,
the officials said, after a series of suspected chemical weapons
attacks on civilians in rebel-held eastern Ghouta. The Russian
military was concerned the U.S. military would retaliate for the
attacks and began jamming the GPS systems of drones operating in the
area, the officials explained.
Jamming, which means blocking or scrambling a drone's reception of a
signal from a GPS satellite, can be uncomplicated, according to Dr.
Todd Humphreys, the director of the Radionavigation Laboratory at the University of Texas at Austin.
Israel shoots down Iranian drone, sparking attack
00:22
"GPS receivers in most drones can be fairly easily jammed," he said
Humphreys, an expert on the spoofing and jamming of GPS, warns this
could have a significant impact on U.S. drones, causing them to
malfunction or even crash. "At the very least it could cause some
serious confusion" for the drone operator on the ground if the drone
reports an incorrect position or is lost, he said.
U.S. analysts first caught the Russian military jamming drones in
eastern Ukraine four years ago, after the invasion of Crimea,
according to Humphreys. He said the jammers were initially detected as
faint signals from space, bouncing off the earth's surface. The
jammers "had a pretty significant impact" on the United Nations
surveillance drones that were attempting to monitor the area,
grounding the fleet for days and halting intelligence gathering from
the air.
The Defense Department will not say whether the jamming is causing
drones to crash, citing operational security. "The U.S. military
maintains sufficient countermeasures and protections to ensure the
safety of our manned and unmanned aircraft, our forces and the
missions they support," said Pentagon spokesman Eric Pahon.
A U.S. Air Force MQ-1B Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV),
carrying a Hellfire missile lands at a secret air base after flying a
mission in the Persian Gulf region on January 7, 2016. The drones
impacted to date by Russian jamming are smaller surveillance aircraft,
as opposed to the larger Predators and Reapers that often operate in
combat environments. John Moore / Getty Images File
But one official confirmed the tactic is having an operational impact
on U.S. military operations in Syria.
The officials said the equipment being used was developed by the
Russian military and is very sophisticated, proving effective even
against some encrypted signals and anti-jamming receivers. The drones
impacted so far are smaller surveillance aircraft, as opposed to the
larger Predators and Reapers that often operate in combat environments
and can be armed.
Dr. Humphreys says that though the attacks occur in cyberspace, the
results are still serious.
"They are a little less hostile looking than a kinetic bullet but
sometimes the effect can be just as damaging," he said. "It's like
shooting at them with radio waves instead of bullets." =============================================
https://groups.google.com/g/rec.aviation.piloting/c/Mhk_XEjVfng/m/eiOAFdGkAwAJ GPS Jamming: Major Threat To Drones
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Larry Dighera
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May 2, 2018, 8:48:21 AM
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One wonders how this forecast of "GPS (or GNSS) jamming and spoofing"
might impact ADS-B and NextGen (not to mention GPS approaches) both
dependent on GPS?
https://www.avweb.com/avwebflash/news/GPS-Jamming-Major-Threat-to-Drone-230749-1.html
GPS Jamming: Major Threat To Drones
By Paul Bertorelli | April 30, 2018
As drones multiply, as they are expected to do, incidents of GPS (or
GNSS) jamming and spoofing are expected to rise in concert during the
next decade. That poses not just a threat of loss of the vehicles, but
also to nearby aircraft and unaware people on the ground, according to
Jeremy Bennington of Spirent, a company that specializes in jamming
and spoofing defense. Bennington spoke at the AUVSI XPONENTIAL Expo in
Denver this week and sketched a threat that’s not yet emergent, but
will escalate enough to require drone manufacturers to harden their
aircraft against interference.
Bennington said more than 150,000 incidents of jamming or spoofing
have been recorded, affecting aircraft, ships and ground vehicles. And
it’s not a hard thing to do. “If you want jam GPS, get your credit
card out. It’s really rather easily done,” he told a group of
XPONENTIAL attendees. The event is organized by the Association of
Unmanned Vehicle Systems International and although dominated by
aircraft systems, land and marine vehicles are also represented. And
all of them have been jammed or spoofed.
In one incident in Hanover, Germany, Bennington said, a GPS emulator
being used for maintenance disrupted inbound aircraft navigation and
actually electronically moved the runway threshold. It took
authorities hours to find the source. NASA’s ASRS has recorded more
than 100 incidents of interference, some serious enough to cause
aircraft to lose position data. While jamming splatters the signal,
spoofing actually fools the GNSS receiver into believing it’s
somewhere else. In one well-known incident in the Mediterranean Sea,
more than 20 ships were spoofed into believing their positions were
miles away from their true location.
Drones are beginning to use a method called sensor fusion—cross
checking position with radar, lidar or inertial systems—to defeat
spoofing, but these systems add cost and weight. Bennington says the
industry will have to respond sooner than later. “We will see the
impact as more drones enter service,” he said.
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