From the "facts" stated in the Part 135 operator's Cross Complaint <https://ca-times.brightspotcdn.com/62/13/e4ec26a24263a3677a804fe8cd6d/countersuit.pdf>,
it is likely ATC personnel deviated from ATC regulations while working
the flight that fatally injured the pilot and eight passengers.

A PIC who relies on Radar Traffic Advisories (Flight Following) for
terrain clearance is a fool. I find no mention of ATC providing
terrain clearance nor weather information under section 2-1-21 TRAFFIC ADVISORIES in Air Traffic Control Order JO 7110.65Y: https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/media/Order/7110.65Y_ATC_Bsc_w_Chg_1_2_dtd_7-16-20.pdf

SVFR requires the PIC to remain clear of clouds (§91.157 https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?SID=28e42f42f7966327ca1dc1716c36bf2f&mc=true&node=pt14.2.91&rgn=div5#se14.2.91_1157
); implicit in the sudden descent immediately before impacting the
terrain is the PIC's apparent loss of situational awareness likely the
result of visual loss of horizon and ground reference IMNSHO.

Given the poor weather conditions, a prudent PIC would have thoroughly
planned the flight well in advance of departure, including programming
his avionics to prevent operating below safe altitudes without
warning.

Of course, these are only my personal opinions and speculations.

-------------------------------------- https://www.avweb.com/flight-safety/accidents-ntsb/helicopter-company-files-lawsuit-against-controllers-in-bryant-crash
Helicopter Company Files Lawsuit Against Controllers In Bryant Crash
Kate O'Connor August 26, 202023

Image: NTSB
Island Express Helicopters has filed a lawsuit alleging that two air
traffic controllers are responsible for the crash of a company
Sikorsky S-76B helicopter <https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/kobe-bryant-killed-in-helicopter-crash/> that killed retired NBA star Kobe Bryant and eight others last
January. The cross-complaint asserts that the accident was caused by
“a series of erroneous acts and/or omissions” committed by the
controllers, including a “… failure to properly communicate
termination of radar flight following … incomplete position relief
briefing, and … lack of knowledge of current weather conditions.” It
further claims that a controller contributed to the crash by
“monopolizing the Pilot’s attention during the critical phase of the
flight by making multiple radio calls, requiring transponder ident,
and requesting the Pilot to state where he was and what his intentions
were.”

Island Express’ lawsuit (PDF) was filed in the Superior Court of
California, County of Los Angeles. The individuals listed in the
filing are employed by the FAA as air traffic controllers at the
Southern California Terminal Radar Approach Control Facility (TRACON).
To date, four lawsuits related to the accident have been filed against
Island Express, including one by Bryant’s widow, Vanessa, which
alleges negligence by the pilot for flying in unsafe weather
conditions.

As previously reported by AVweb, https://www.avweb.com/flight-safety/accidents-ntsb/charter-company-in-bryant-crash-operated-vfr-only/
Island Express holds a Part 135 operating certificate for on-demand,
VFR-only operations. A preliminary report https://ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/DCA20MA059-Investigative-Update.pdf (PDF) released by the NTSB last February stated that no evidence of
mechanical failure https://www.avweb.com/aviation-news/kobe-bryant-crash-prelim-no-evidence-of-mechanical-failure/
had been found in the crash, which occurred on Jan. 26, 2020, in
Calabasas, California. It further noted that visibility was poor in
the area of the accident due to low clouds and mist. According to the
report, the pilot had requested and received a special VFR clearance.
The final NTSB accident report has not yet been issued.



23 COMMENTS
James B. August 27, 2020 at 1:20 am
I took a look at the NTSB PDF, which has eye-witness photos (thanks to
cell phones and nearby surveillance cameras) and terrain info. I can
only imagine how fortunate the investigators felt after getting those.

Two things stand out:

1) Flying SVFR in mist below hilltops is very high risk, even in a
helicopter. (The operator was VFR-only, though this was a large
helicopter configured for 8 pax, originally 12-pax.) It’s a shame that
it wasn’t an IFR flight. I think too many US EMS and charter
helicopter operators are VFR, thus the high accident rate.

2) It’s the duty of the operator to not submit pax to high-risk
flights like that, since their expectation is just to pay the fare and
make it to their destination. Probably SVFR in mist should not be
allowed in that area, especially below hilltops.

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YARS . August 27, 2020 at 6:18 am
“It’s YOUR fault, for letting me do something stupid.”
Shakespeare was right.

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PHOTO 1 . August 27, 2020 at 9:38 am
Bottom line pilot’s decision

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Tom O. August 27, 2020 at 3:54 pm
Darwin was right..!!!

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Rich K. August 27, 2020 at 10:06 am
I totally agree with YARS.

And now, in one hand, I’ll just take a drink of my latte, make a phone
call with my other hand , and ooops!!!…keep on driving my SUV. Now,
where’s my cigarettes? Was that a stop sign back there? I am so cool!

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Jim L. August 27, 2020 at 10:11 am
This lawsuit is all about insurance company lawyers. The aviation
company’s insurance is going to have to pay beaucoup monies to the
passengers, so that insurance company is looking for any possible way
to recoup money to minimize their losses. It’s known as subrogation in
the insurance biz

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Jim P. August 27, 2020 at 10:21 am
Let me get this straight, since this company’s flight director wasn’t courageous enough to question this pilot’s decision to fly themselves,
they are suing the FAA for not asking this pilot over the radio, “Why
are you flying VFR in these conditions today? Are you insane?” Perhaps
they should sue the FAA for not pulling their own charter certificate,
too.

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John M. August 27, 2020 at 12:08 pm
You gotta love the American legal system. No matter what happens, no
matter how badly you screw up, you can always find someone else to
blame.

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Larry S. August 27, 2020 at 12:18 pm
Anyone who flies around LA regularly knows about the marine layer and
how it behaves. Things usually don’t get better as you approach the
shoreline when it’s active. A VFR certificate — even in a helicopter —
is not a license to scud run under those conditions. And if you scud
run, you sure as heck wouldn’t do it in the area of foothills where
this accident occurred. I’d venture to guess that most of us have scud
run at one time or another but we knew where we were and where the
hills, mountains or other impediments to safe flight were. This pilot
was trying to fly a contact freeway approach, got in over his head and
— instead of hollering “Uncle” and climbing — he continued. How does
that 3 C’s mneumonic go … “Climb, confess and comply?”

Not discussed but underlying the issues here is the fact that each and
every time we get into an airplane with passengers, it is OUR
responsibility as PIC to keep them safe … even when it ultimately
boils down to saying, “No” … we can’t get there under these
conditions. That’s the lesson I took away from this evolution.

If lawyers want to convolute the clear facts of this accident, that’s
an entirely different story. ATC didn’t tell the pilot to “turn left
heading 180 and descend” so … that’s that. It’s just too bad — in my
mind — that litigants aren’t held accountable for the full cost of
frivolous lawsuits.

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Mauro H. August 28, 2020 at 4:22 am
Scud running in a multi-million dollar machine wanting to save a few
bucks from an IFR certificattion. A PIC straps onto his/her
responsibilities, and an operator delegates his/her responsibilities
to the PIC. The passengers simply put their trust into those hands.
The controllers offer a service that can (sometimes must) be declined.

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Peter B. August 28, 2020 at 4:27 am
Quote As previously reported by AVweb, Island Express holds a Part 135 operating certificate for on-demand, VFR-only operations. Unquote.
Just how is this ANY controllers fault?

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Marc M. August 28, 2020 at 8:09 am
It’s just the lawyer dance. They will make a lot of dough off this.
Could have been avoided if the pilot had some cajones and told his
“VIPs” they might have to have someone drive them that morning.

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Mauro H. August 28, 2020 at 8:36 am
This is not called ‘cojones’ but simply taking your responsibilities
seriosly.

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David C. August 28, 2020 at 9:04 am
You are both correct. In the fly for hire business at this level, lots
of pushy customers and the resultant pushy bosses/company owners.
“What do you mean we can’t go?” is the most common phrase heard
usually followed immediately by”why am I paying you all this money?”.
The time to settle this issue is the first time high dollar clients
show up with their check books in hand. It takes a lot of courage for
an owner or chief pilot to tell that client that there will be times
that the aircraft won’t move for safety reasons. Selling that concept
will likely be tough, sort of like trying to convince financial people
that training and safety are important and cost effective concepts.

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Larry S. August 28, 2020 at 12:46 pm
You bring up a good secondary salient point, David. Beyond PIC responsibilities, what was the Chief Pilot doing in this evolution?
There should have been a system of checks and balances in the go /
no-go decision making with weather like on the day of the accident. I
can understand the ‘owner’ wanting to get the VIP to his desired
destination but the Chief Pilot is the middle man. Seems to me that
the VIP should have been told that there was a high likelihood that
they would not be able to get him to his destination via air and that
IF he chose to go, a RTB might be necessary. As soon as the chopper
had to circle to get past KBUR, that should have happened.

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roger a. August 28, 2020 at 8:11 am
Although it’s total BS, it’s just standard legal maneuvering just to
deflect as much blame as possible in the eyes of the jurors and
hopefully reduce the judgement against the company and pilot by a few
bucks. And, the complaint says part of the issue is the controllers to
not properly terminate radar contact. Here’s the transcript. It
clearly has, “Van Nuys tower will work you through. Radar service is terminated.” Pretty damn clear, and radar contact was never again
established. His SVFR routing was to provided geographical separation
while in the surface area. He followed visual routing around the north
side while IFR traffic was launched south of him and sent southbound.
Oh well. https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/nba/kobe-bryant-helicopter-audio-released/ar-BBZmQ1V

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David C. August 28, 2020 at 8:57 am
Apparently this company and their shyster lawyers think that it was
harassment to actually dare ask where this guy was to find him on
radar. I sure hope that the folks that utilize these type services out
there (and anywhere) take a good hard luck at what they are laying
their money out for. Is it the “convenience” or is it “convenience
with appropriate levels of safety?”

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David C. August 28, 2020 at 9:20 am
For those that are old enough to remember, the USAF T-39 ( Sabre 40 )
was a fun aircraft to fly and about as simple as it came. No frill what-so-ever, like effective anti-skid until almost at the end of it’s
AF career. Was tasked as a young Captain to go from Ramstein AB to
Frankfurt Rhine Main one horribly rainy day in the late 70’s to pick
up an AF 3-star and 3 others and take them to Italy. In those days the
25s at EDAF were long and pure, ungrooved concrete. Rain was deluging
but vis was okay at about a half mile. Well, did 3 unplanned touch and
goes because after rolling forever without anti-skid or thrust
reverse, couldn’t even remotely begin to slow down. Went back to EDAR,
landed on the porous friction asphalt of the freshly redone 27 there
and a helo went to get the General. He was mad when he got to EDAR and
we started on to destination. He sniped at the two of us driving for
the two hour flight. On the ramp in Italy, I was able to get him off
to one side for a second and, because he was a pilot also. asked him
what his real issue was? I asked if he had ever flown the Sabre and he
said “no”. I asked if he understood all that had happened before the
helo came to get him. Again, “no”. So I laid the tale out and then
asked him if a crumpled pile of aluminum off the end of of the runway
at EDAF was worth it. Again he said, “No”. A month later the squadron
got a nice letter from him thanking us for running him around along
with a personal note to the other pilot and I apologizing for his
attitude. I can only assume that his good sense as a pilot finally
kicked in.
Unfortunately, way too many civilian executives are not aviators at
all and will not tolerate any level of what they consider
inconvenience. That said, crashes like the one referenced in this
article will continue in the future. As aviators, we can only pray
they are few and far between.

Log in to leave a comment
David C. August 28, 2020 at 9:23 am
For those that are old enough to remember, the USAF T-39 ( Sabre 40 )
was a fun aircraft to fly and about as simple as it came. No frills what-so-ever, like effective anti-skid until almost at the end of it’s
AF career. Was tasked as a young Captain to go from Ramstein AB to
Frankfurt Rhine Main one horribly rainy day in the late 70’s to pick
up an AF 3-star and 3 others and take them to Italy. In those days the
25s at EDAF were long and pure, ungrooved concrete. Rain was deluging
but vis was okay at about a half mile. Well, did 3 unplanned touch and
goes because after rolling forever without anti-skid or thrust
reverse, couldn’t even remotely begin to slow down. Went back to EDAR,
landed on the porous friction asphalt of the freshly redone 27 there
and a helo went to get the General. He was mad when he got to EDAR and
we started on to destination. He sniped at the two of us driving for
the two hour flight. On the ramp in Italy, I was able to get him off
to one side for a second and, because he was a pilot also, asked him
what his real issue was? I asked if he had ever flown the Sabre and he
said “no”. I asked if he understood all that had happened before the
helo came to get him. Again, “no”. So I laid the tale out and then
asked him if a crumpled pile of aluminum off the end of of the runway
at EDAF was worth it. Again he said, “No”. A month later the squadron
got a nice letter from him thanking us for running him around along
with a personal note to the other pilot and I apologizing for his
attitude. I can only assume that his good sense as a pilot finally
kicked in.
Unfortunately, way too many civilian executives are not aviators at
all and will not tolerate any level of what they consider
inconvenience. That said, crashes like the one referenced in this
article will continue in the future. As aviators, we can only pray
they are few and far between.

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David C. August 28, 2020 at 9:24 am
They need a way to be able to self-edit these posts.

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Jim L. August 28, 2020 at 10:48 am
Agreed – you click (either purposefully or accidentally) and it’s gone
forever with no way of changing something you forgot or missed ??

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G B. August 28, 2020 at 11:08 am
So pilots communicating with him distracted him? Aviate, navigate and communicate. If he did not want to talk to controllers he should not
have requested SVFR and stayed on the ground. -------------------------------------------

https://ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/DCA20MA059-Investigative-Update.pdf

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National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, D.C. 20594
Aircraft Accident Investigative Update

On January 26, 2020, at 0945 Pacific standard time (PST), a Sikorsky
S-76B helicopter, N72EX,
collided with hilly terrain near the city of Calabasas, California.
The pilot and eight passengers
were fatally injured, and the helicopter was destroyed by impact
forces and fire. The helicopter
was operated by Island Express Helicopters Inc. under Title 14 Code of
Federal Regulations
(CFR) Part 135 as an on-demand passenger visual flight rules (VFR)
flight from John WayneOrange County Airport, (KSNA), Santa Ana,
California, to Camarillo Airport, (KCMA),
Camarillo, California.
The NTSB launched a go-team consisting of an investigator-in-charge
from the Major
Investigations division and specialists in operations, human
performance, airworthiness,
powerplants, aerial imagery, air traffic control (ATC), meteorology, maintenance records, and
site control.
Parties to the investigation include the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Island Express
Helicopters, Sikorsky, and the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association. The Transportation
Safety Board of Canada is participating in the investigation as an
accredited representative, as is
Pratt and Whitney Canada as a technical advisor. The investigative
team was also assisted on
scene by numerous other federal, state and local law enforcement and
public safety agencies.
The wreckage was located in the foothills of the Santa Monica
mountains, in a mountain bike
park. The impact site was on an approximate 34° slope. The impact
crater was 24 feet-by-15 feet
in diameter and 2 feet deep.
E PLUR IBUS UNUM
NATIONAL TRA S PORTATION
B OAR D
SAFE T Y
N
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Figure 1a. Google Earth map of wreckage area – southern (directions
reference true north)
Figure 1b. Google Earth map of wreckage area – northern
All significant components of the helicopter were located within the
wreckage area. Examination
of the main and tail rotor assemblies found damage consistent with
powered rotation at the time
of impact. The initial point of impact consisted of highly fragmented
cabin and cockpit debris.
The vertical pylon and horizontal stabilizer were located about 40
feet below (downhill from) the
Blade sections
Main fuselage and engines
Main rotor hub
Large blade segment (off map)
90 ft 050 deg from hub
60 ft, 006 deg 77 ft, 347 deg
3 of 11
impact crater. A witness mark consistent with the length and width of
a rotor blade and
containing fragments of rotor blade skin and honeycomb was positioned perpendicular to the
direction of the debris line and directly above the impact crater. One
piece of 2-inch diameter
tree branch was cut cleanly in 3 locations (similar to saw cuts) about
30 feet prior to the initial
impact crater. Approximately 95% of the main rotor blades were
recovered. All four blades
exhibited similar damage consisting of midspan bending, pocket
separation, blade tip separation,
and leading-edge indentations and scuffing.
The main wreckage was about 127 feet from the impact crater along a
347° true bearing (335°
magnetic) and consisted of the empennage/tailboom, both engines,
avionics boxes, and portions
of the cockpit instrument panel. The entire fuselage/cabin and both
engines were subjected to a
postcrash fire. The cockpit was highly fragmented. The instrument
panel was destroyed and most
instruments were displaced from their panel mounts. Flight controls
were fragmented and fire
damaged.
The engines were found lying inverted near the empennage in the burned
area. The accessory
gearboxes and parts of the inlet cases of both engines were thermally destroyed. Viewable
sections of the engines showed no evidence of an uncontained or
catastrophic internal failure.
The No. 2 engine first-stage compressor blades exhibited tip curl in
the direction opposite of
rotation, consistent with powered rotation at the time of impact. The
engines were recovered for
detailed disassembly examination.
ATC communications and radar data indicate the flight departed KSNA
about 0906 PST. N72EX
proceeded to the north-northwest at an altitude of about 700 to 800
feet mean sea level (msl)
under visual flight rules (VFR). At 0920, as the aircraft neared the
Burbank class C airspace, the
pilot requested to transition the area along Highway 101. The current
Burbank weather
observation reported instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions. In
response to the pilot’s request,
the air traffic controller advised that cloud tops were reported at
2,400 feet msl and queried the
pilot’s intentions; the pilot then requested a special VFR clearance
(an ATC authorization to
proceed in controlled airspace at less than VFR weather minima). The
air traffic controller
advised that the pilot would need to hold for a short time due to IFR
traffic, which the pilot
acknowledged. At 0932, ATC cleared the pilot of N72EX to transition
the class C surface area
following the I-5 freeway, maintaining special VFR conditions at or
below 2,500 feet. The pilot
acknowledged with a correct readback and climbed to approximately
1,400 feet msl (600 feet
agl). In response to query, the pilot replied to the Burbank ATC that
he would follow Highway
118 and “loop around VNY [Van Nuys Airport]” to follow Highway 101.
ATC acknowledged
and coordinated.
At 0939, as N72EX was passing west of Van Nuys at 1,500 feet msl, the
VNY controller asked
the pilot if he was in VFR conditions. The pilot replied “VFR
conditions, one thousand five
hundred,” and the VNY controller advised him to contact Southern
California Terminal Radar
Approach Control (SCT) for radar advisory services.
4 of 11
The pilot reported to SCT that the flight was going to Camarillo at
1,500 feet. The SCT
controller advised that he would not be able to maintain radar contact
at that altitude and
terminated services. The SCT controller was subsequently relieved by a different controller. At
0945, the pilot of N72EX again contacted SCT and advised he was
climbing above cloud layers
and requested advisory services. The second controller was not aware
of the aircraft, as services
had previously been terminated, so asked the pilot to identify the
flight. The SCT controller then
asked the pilot his intentions, to which he replied he was climbing to
4,000 feet. There were no
further transmissions.
Radar/ADS-B data indicate the aircraft was climbing along a course
aligned with Highway 101
just east of the Las Virgenes exit. Between Las Virgenes and Lost
Hills Road, the aircraft
reached 2,300 feet msl (approximately 1,500 feet above the highway,
which lies below the
surrounding terrain) and began a left turn. Eight seconds later, the
aircraft began descending and
the left turn continued. The descent rate increased to over 4,000 feet
per minute (fpm), ground
speed reached 160 knots. The last ADS-B target was received at 1,200
feet msl approximately
400 feet southwest of the accident site.
Figure 2a. Overall Radar/ADS-B track of N72EX
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Figure 2b. Zoomed in depiction of ADS-B returns of last 1 minute of
flight.
Figure 3. Still image from drone video duplicating the flightpath of
N72EX at position/altitude of
last ADS-B target
At the time of the accident, the automated surface observing system
(as augmented by ATC) at
VNY, located about 11 nautical miles east-northeast of the accident
site at an elevation of about
6 of 11
800 feet, reported a calm wind, visibility of 2.5 statute miles in
haze and an overcast ceiling of
1,100 feet above ground level.
An ALERTWildfire camera image (figure 4) taken at 0944 PST looking
southeast toward the
city of Van Nuys, as publicized on the National Weather Service (NWS)
Los Angeles Twitter
account, depicted the top of the cloud layer to the east of the
accident site. The NWS analyzed
the top of the cloud layer to be about 2,400 feet above mean sea level
near the terrain in the
foreground of the image.
Figure 4. Camera image from 0944 PST
Videos and photos taken by the public in the area of the accident also
depict fog and low clouds
obscuring the hilltops. Figure 5a was taken by a witness on the
mountain bike trail about 0950.
The witness stated that the area was surrounded by mist. He said he
began to hear the sound of a
helicopter, which he described as appropriate for a helicopter flying
while in a powered
condition. He perceived the sound getting louder and saw a blue and
white helicopter emerge
from the clouds passing from left to right directly to his left. He
judged it to be moving fast,
travelling on a forward and descending trajectory. It started to roll
to the left such that he caught
a glimpse of its belly. He observed it for 1 to 2 seconds, before it
impacted terrain about 50 feet
below his position.
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Figure 5a. Witness photo of accident site and weather conditions.
Figure 5b was taken by a nearby resident about 5 minutes after the
accident from a location
about 4,000 feet west of the site at an elevation of 750 feet msl.
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Figure 5b. Resident photograph.
Figure 6 is a still frame from a security video obtained from a road maintenance yard adjacent to
Moreau Road and Highway 101 depicting the helicopter proceeding
westward along the highway
and disappearing into the clouds.
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Figure 6. Still frame from security video showing N72EX flying into
clouds (circled in red)
The helicopter was not equipped with a flight data recorder or cockpit
voice recorder (CVR) nor
was it required to be for the accident flight. The helicopter was
equipped with a four-axis
automatic flight control system, electronic flight instrument system,
radio altimeter, and ADS-B
transponder. It was also equipped with a flight management system
(FMS). The airworthiness
group retained the FMS computer to examine it for any available
recorded data stored in
memory, and also retained two flight control computers, four gyros,
and the standby attitude
indicator for further examination. A number of personal electronic
devices were recovered from
the wreckage and will be examined for any relevant data.
Figure 7. Exemplar photo of N72EX
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Figure 8. Photo of N72EX cockpit
The helicopter, serial number 760379, was manufactured in 1991 in a 12-passenger seat
configuration and equipped with two Pratt & Whitney PT6B-36A turbine
engines. The helicopter
used a four-blade, fully articulated main rotor system, four-blade
anti-torque system, and
retractable landing gear. After the sale to Island Express in 2015,
the helicopter was converted to
an 8-passenger seat configuration with two pilot stations up front and
eight passengers in the
rear, separated by a bulkhead with sliding acrylic windows. Passenger
seating was 2 fouroccupant divans, one facing forward, the other
rearward.
Maintenance records show the helicopter had 4716.1 hours at the time
of the accident. There
were no outstanding airworthiness directives or minimum equipment list
items, and all
inspections were up to date.
The pilot, age 50, had worked for Island Express for about 10 years.
According to FAA records,
the pilot held an FAA commercial certificate with ratings for
helicopter and instrument
helicopter, as well as an FAA instructor certificate for flight,
instrument, and ground instruction.
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His most recent FAA second-class medical certificate was issued on
July 3, 2019, with a
limitation stating, “must have glasses for near vision.” At the time
of his last medical application,
he reported 8,200 total hours of flight experience. The pilot logged
about 1,250 total hours in the
S76 helicopter. His most recent flight review, including proficiency
training in inadvertent entry
into instrument meteorological conditions (IIMC) and unusual attitude
recovery, was conducted
in a helicopter with EUROSAFETY International on May 8, 2019. The
pilot received
satisfactory grades for these maneuvers.
Island Express Helicopters held an FAA Part 135 operating certificate,
number ISHA094F, for
on-demand VFR-only operations, since 1998 and conducted offshore oil
industry support flights
and charter flights. The company’s operations specifications document
listed six helicopters
including the accident aircraft: 1 SK-76A, 2 SK-76B, 2 AS-350-B2 and 1 AS-350-BA. Some
charter flights were coordinated through a third-party broker, OC
Helicopters, Santa Ana,
California. At the time of the accident, Island Express Helicopters
had 25 employees, including 6
pilots.
Additional information will be released as warranted. --------------------------------------


https://ca-times.brightspotcdn.com/62/13/e4ec26a24263a3677a804fe8cd6d/countersuit.pdf

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1
CROSS-COMPLAINT; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Michael J. Terhar [State Bar No. 89491]
Ross Cunningham [Pro Hac Vice]
Don Swaim [Pro Hac Vice]
D. Todd Parrish [State Bar No. 173392]
CUNNINGHAM SWAIM, LLP
2 North Lake Avenue, Suite 550
Pasadena, California 91101
Telephone: (626) 765-3000
Facsimile: (626) 765-3030
Email: mterhar@cunninghamswaim.com
rcunningham@cunninghamswaim.com
dswaim@cunninghamswaim.com
tparrish@cunninghamswaim.com
Attorneys for Defendants and Cross-Complainants,
ISLAND EXPRESS HELICOPTERS, INC., a
California Corporation; and ISLAND EXPRESS
HOLDING CORP., a California Corporation
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CIVIL UNLIMITED
MATTHEW MAUSER, an individual and as
Successor in Interest to CHRISTINA
MAUSER; PENELOPE MAUSER, a minor,
by and through her Guardian MATTHEW
MAUSER; THOMAS MAUSER, a minor, by
and through his Guardian MATTHEW
MAUSER; IVY MAUSER, a minor, by and
through her Guardian MATTHEW MAUSER,

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ISLAND EXPRESS HELICOPTERS, INC., a
California Corporation; ISLAND EXPRESS
HOLDING CORP., a California Corporation;
and DOES 1-50,

Defendants.
ISLAND EXPRESS HELICOPTERS,
INC., a California Corporation; and
ISLAND EXPRESS HOLDING CORP., a
California Corporation,
Cross-Complainants,
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Case No.: 20STCV14973
(Related to Cases: (LEAD)
20STCV07492, 20STCV14963,
20STCV17897)
Assigned to:
Dept.: NW-W
CROSS-COMPLAINT FOR
INDEMNITY AND DECLARATORY
RELIEF; DEMAND FOR JURY
TRIAL
Complaint Filed: April 20, 2020
Trial Date: None Set
Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los
Angeles on 08/19/2020 05:29 PM Sherri R. Carter, Executive
Officer/Clerk of Court, by S. Romero,Deputy Clerk
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CROSS-COMPLAINT; DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
vs.
KYLE LARSEN, Individually; MATTHEW
CONLEY, Individually; and ROES 1 through
50,
Cross-Defendants.
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COMES NOW, Defendants and Cross-Complainants, ISLAND EXPRESS
HELICOPTERS, INC., a California Corporation; and ISLAND EXPRESS
HOLDING
CORP., a California Corporation (herein “Cross-Complainants”), and
against CrossDefendants, KYLE LARSEN; MATTHEW CONLEY; and ROES 1
through 50,
(collectively, “Cross-Defendants”), and alleges, on the information
and belief:
1. Cross-Complainant Island Express Helicopters, Inc., a California
Corporation
is a California corporation located in Long Beach, California.
2. Cross-Complainant Island Express Holding Corp., a California
Corporation is
a California corporation located in Fillmore, California.
3. Cross-Defendant Kyle Larson (“Larson”) is an individual residing in California.
4. Cross-Defendant Matthew Conley (“Conley”) is an individual residing
in
California.
5. The true names and capacities, whether individual corporate,
associate or
otherwise of cross-defendants, Roes 1 through 50 are unknown to Cross-Complainants who,
therefore, name said cross-defendant by such fictitious names and Cross-Complainants will
ask leave of court to amend the cross-complaint to show the true names
and capacities of
such fictitiously named cross-defendants when the same have been
ascertained. CrossComplainants are informed and believe, and based

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