• revolutionary legal principle

    From Bernie Cosell@21:1/5 to All on Fri Sep 3 17:49:16 2021
    From what I've read, the "trick" in the Texas anti-abortion law is
    something that hasn't been seen before. Are there other instances of that
    kind of tactic? If not, kudos, of sorts, to whomever came up with it.

    As a political [not legal, apologies] matter this could rein in the Supreme Court on other "social" issues. What if they made it a similar no-risk third-party tort to refuse service to someone who is gay? Or to a school district that restricted LGBT students' use of facilities? Or even noise regulations or overtime parking?

    another political comment [apologies, again :o)] I think the Supreme
    Court's decision was scandalous. Not because of its substance but because
    I thought that in questions of sort-of "uncharted territory" they would act
    to minimize the harm while lower courts sorted out the details.

    /Bernie\
    --
    Bernie Cosell Fantasy Farm Fibers
    bernie@fantasyfarm.com Pearisburg, VA
    --> Too many people, too few sheep <--

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  • From Stuart O. Bronstein@21:1/5 to Bernie Cosell on Fri Sep 3 20:42:55 2021
    Bernie Cosell <bernie@fantasyfarm.com> wrote:

    From what I've read, the "trick" in the Texas anti-abortion law is
    something that hasn't been seen before. Are there other instances
    of that kind of tactic? If not, kudos, of sorts, to whomever came
    up with it.

    It hasn't been tried before in this way (as far as I am aware of)
    because it isn't proper, it isn't legal and in the end it won't hold
    up. I think all the Supreme Court justices know that. But five of
    them wanted to unambiguously signal that Roe v. Wade is over.

    As a political [not legal, apologies] matter this could rein in
    the Supreme Court on other "social" issues. What if they made it
    a similar no-risk third-party tort to refuse service to someone
    who is gay? Or to a school district that restricted LGBT
    students' use of facilities? Or even noise regulations or
    overtime parking?

    I'll guarantee that if a state copies the Texas law word for word but
    exchanged "gun ownership" for "abortion" the Court wouldn't be nearly
    as kind to it.

    another political comment [apologies, again :o)] I think the
    Supreme Court's decision was scandalous. Not because of its
    substance but because I thought that in questions of sort-of
    "uncharted territory" they would act to minimize the harm while
    lower courts sorted out the details.

    That's normally what courts do. In this case they apparently wanted
    to maximize the harm, so that when they overturn Roe v. Wade but also
    disallow the Texas statute, people will be relieved rather than
    outraged.

    --
    Stu
    http://DownToEarthLawyer.com

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  • From Barry Gold@21:1/5 to Bernie Cosell on Sat Sep 4 06:54:57 2021
    On 9/3/2021 5:49 PM, Bernie Cosell wrote:
    From what I've read, the "trick" in the Texas anti-abortion law is
    something that hasn't been seen before. Are there other instances of that kind of tactic? If not, kudos, of sorts, to whomever came up with it.

    As a political [not legal, apologies] matter this could rein in the Supreme Court on other "social" issues. What if they made it a similar no-risk third-party tort to refuse service to someone who is gay? Or to a school district that restricted LGBT students' use of facilities? Or even noise regulations or overtime parking?

    another political comment [apologies, again :o)] I think the Supreme
    Court's decision was scandalous. Not because of its substance but because
    I thought that in questions of sort-of "uncharted territory" they would act to minimize the harm while lower courts sorted out the details.

    /Bernie\


    An excellent analysis of why the Supreme Court's handling of this case
    was ill-considered:

    https://reason.com/2021/09/03/conservatives-should-worry-about-the-texas-abortion-law-too/?utm_medium=email

    Basically, anti-gun states could use the exact same technique to put gun
    stores out of business. Or anything else they don't like but which is
    supposed to be protected by the Constitution.

    --
    I do so have a memory. It's backed up on DVD... somewhere...

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  • From Mike Anderson@21:1/5 to Stuart O. Bronstein on Sat Sep 4 17:48:22 2021
    On 9/3/2021 11:42 PM, Stuart O. Bronstein wrote:
    Bernie Cosell <bernie@fantasyfarm.com> wrote:

    From what I've read, the "trick" in the Texas anti-abortion law is
    something that hasn't been seen before. Are there other instances
    of that kind of tactic? If not, kudos, of sorts, to whomever came
    up with it.

    It hasn't been tried before in this way (as far as I am aware of)
    because it isn't proper, it isn't legal and in the end it won't hold
    up. I think all the Supreme Court justices know that. But five of
    them wanted to unambiguously signal that Roe v. Wade is over.

    As a political [not legal, apologies] matter this could rein in
    the Supreme Court on other "social" issues. What if they made it
    a similar no-risk third-party tort to refuse service to someone
    who is gay? Or to a school district that restricted LGBT
    students' use of facilities? Or even noise regulations or
    overtime parking?

    I'll guarantee that if a state copies the Texas law word for word but exchanged "gun ownership" for "abortion" the Court wouldn't be nearly
    as kind to it.

    another political comment [apologies, again :o)] I think the
    Supreme Court's decision was scandalous. Not because of its
    substance but because I thought that in questions of sort-of
    "uncharted territory" they would act to minimize the harm while
    lower courts sorted out the details.

    That's normally what courts do. In this case they apparently wanted
    to maximize the harm, so that when they overturn Roe v. Wade but also disallow the Texas statute, people will be relieved rather than
    outraged.

    "Minimize the harm" may be subjective to an extent. If they see abortion
    as being the harm (and not that the harm is to the rights of the
    pregnant female), then they may see a stay of execution as causing more
    harm.

    But how can Texas even think this would hold up as-is or even anywhere
    close to it? Stu may be right in that it may be the thinking of "yeah,
    SCOTUS overturns this law and then we we pass one later that's not as
    bad, people will be saying 'it could have been worse.'"

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  • From Elle N@21:1/5 to Bernie Cosell on Wed Sep 8 23:02:34 2021
    On Friday, September 3, 2021 at 6:49:20 PM UTC-6, Bernie Cosell wrote:
    As a political [not legal, apologies] matter this could rein in the Supreme Court on other "social" issues. What if they made it a similar no-risk third-party tort to refuse service to someone who is gay? Or to a school district that restricted LGBT students' use of facilities? Or even noise regulations or overtime parking?


    Once a bona fide plaintiff comes along and sues in a private civil action under the Texas Heartbeat Act, I expect the courts to refuse to enforce the statute on the same grounds as that used in SCOTUS's 1948 Shelley v. Kraemer
    decision.

    In Shelley v. Kraemer, SCOTUS agreed that private parties could abide
    by racially restrictive covenants. Contractual terms can be whatever.
    But SCOTUS then roared: Private parties may not seek judicial
    enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant, because judicial enforcement would be a state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    As plaintiffs sue in private civil actions pursuant to the Texas Heartbeat
    Act, I expect the courts will start throwing out the suits on pretty much
    the same grounds as the 1948 Supreme Court decision: A court's
    enforcement of the Texas Heartbeat statute is a state action that
    violates the Fourteenth amendment. 

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  • From Mike Anderson@21:1/5 to Elle N on Fri Sep 10 06:37:00 2021
    On 9/9/2021 2:02 AM, Elle N wrote:
    On Friday, September 3, 2021 at 6:49:20 PM UTC-6, Bernie Cosell wrote:
    As a political [not legal, apologies] matter this could rein in the Supreme >> Court on other "social" issues. What if they made it a similar no-risk
    third-party tort to refuse service to someone who is gay? Or to a school
    district that restricted LGBT students' use of facilities? Or even noise
    regulations or overtime parking?


    Once a bona fide plaintiff comes along and sues in a private civil action under
    the Texas Heartbeat Act, I expect the courts to refuse to enforce the statute on the same grounds as that used in SCOTUS's 1948 Shelley v. Kraemer decision.

    In Shelley v. Kraemer, SCOTUS agreed that private parties could abide
    by racially restrictive covenants. Contractual terms can be whatever.
    But SCOTUS then roared: Private parties may not seek judicial
    enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant, because judicial enforcement would be a state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    As plaintiffs sue in private civil actions pursuant to the Texas Heartbeat Act, I expect the courts will start throwing out the suits on pretty much
    the same grounds as the 1948 Supreme Court decision: A court's
    enforcement of the Texas Heartbeat statute is a state action that
    violates the Fourteenth amendment.


    There's nothing in the law dealing with race or making any racial
    distinctions.

    However, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/459/116/) seems to deal
    with EXACTLY this very thing.

    "A Massachusetts statute (§ 16C) vests in the governing bodies of
    schools and churches the power to prevent issuance of liquor licenses
    for premises within a 500-foot radius of the church or school by
    objecting to the license applications."

    "Held: Section 16C violates the Establishment Clause. Pp. 459 U. S. 120-127.

    Section 16C is not simply a legislative exercise of zoning power but
    delegates to private, nongovernmental entities power [...] ordinarily
    vested in governmental agencies"

    "Section 16C substitutes the unilateral and absolute power of a church
    for the reasoned decisionmaking of a public legislative body acting on
    evidence and guided by standards on issues with significant economic and political implications,"

    What would be really interesting is the way the Texas law says that any section, paragraph, phrase or word can be severed from the rest and will
    remain in effect even if other parts are struck down.

    The law basically says two things of interest here:

    1) Private parties can enforce it via civil suits.

    2) State entities are NOT to enforce it.

    If SCOTUS says (1) is unconstitutional along the lines of Larkin vs
    Grendel's Den, Inc, then it's severed and the rest of the law remains in effect, *including* (2). So now Texas is in the "egg on the face"
    position of having a law that can't be enforced.

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  • From A. C.@21:1/5 to Mike Anderson on Fri Sep 10 09:11:07 2021
    On Friday, September 10, 2021 at 7:37:03 AM UTC-6, Mike Anderson wrote:
    On 9/9/2021 2:02 AM, Elle N wrote:
    On Friday, September 3, 2021 at 6:49:20 PM UTC-6, Bernie Cosell wrote:
    As a political [not legal, apologies] matter this could rein in the Supreme
    Court on other "social" issues. What if they made it a similar no-risk
    third-party tort to refuse service to someone who is gay? Or to a school >> district that restricted LGBT students' use of facilities? Or even noise >> regulations or overtime parking?


    Once a bona fide plaintiff comes along and sues in a private civil action under
    the Texas Heartbeat Act, I expect the courts to refuse to enforce the statute
    on the same grounds as that used in SCOTUS's 1948 Shelley v. Kraemer decision.

    In Shelley v. Kraemer, SCOTUS agreed that private parties could abide
    by racially restrictive covenants. Contractual terms can be whatever.
    But SCOTUS then roared: Private parties may not seek judicial
    enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant, because judicial enforcement
    would be a state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    As plaintiffs sue in private civil actions pursuant to the Texas Heartbeat Act, I expect the courts will start throwing out the suits on pretty much the same grounds as the 1948 Supreme Court decision: A court's
    enforcement of the Texas Heartbeat statute is a state action that
    violates the Fourteenth amendment.

    There's nothing in the law dealing with race or making any racial distinctions.

    That's not the point. The 1948 SCOTUS decision said the courts, being
    state agents, cannot enforce violations of the constitution. Denying
    someone housing because of their race violates the 14th amendment.


    However, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/459/116/) seems to deal
    with EXACTLY this very thing.


    Thank you for this citation. This case appears to be getting traction
    in the media. I saw someone reference it in the comments section
    of a major online newspaper.

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  • From Mike Anderson@21:1/5 to A. C. on Fri Sep 10 11:13:15 2021
    On 9/10/2021 12:11 PM, A. C. wrote:
    On Friday, September 10, 2021 at 7:37:03 AM UTC-6, Mike Anderson wrote:
    On 9/9/2021 2:02 AM, Elle N wrote:
    On Friday, September 3, 2021 at 6:49:20 PM UTC-6, Bernie Cosell wrote:
    As a political [not legal, apologies] matter this could rein in the Supreme
    Court on other "social" issues. What if they made it a similar no-risk >>>> third-party tort to refuse service to someone who is gay? Or to a school >>>> district that restricted LGBT students' use of facilities? Or even noise >>>> regulations or overtime parking?


    Once a bona fide plaintiff comes along and sues in a private civil action under
    the Texas Heartbeat Act, I expect the courts to refuse to enforce the statute
    on the same grounds as that used in SCOTUS's 1948 Shelley v. Kraemer
    decision.

    In Shelley v. Kraemer, SCOTUS agreed that private parties could abide
    by racially restrictive covenants. Contractual terms can be whatever.
    But SCOTUS then roared: Private parties may not seek judicial
    enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant, because judicial enforcement
    would be a state action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

    As plaintiffs sue in private civil actions pursuant to the Texas Heartbeat >>> Act, I expect the courts will start throwing out the suits on pretty much >>> the same grounds as the 1948 Supreme Court decision: A court's
    enforcement of the Texas Heartbeat statute is a state action that
    violates the Fourteenth amendment.

    There's nothing in the law dealing with race or making any racial
    distinctions.

    That's not the point. The 1948 SCOTUS decision said the courts, being
    state agents, cannot enforce violations of the constitution. Denying
    someone housing because of their race violates the 14th amendment.

    Elle said:

    "Once a bona fide plaintiff comes along and sues in a private civil
    action under the Texas Heartbeat Act, I expect the courts to refuse to
    enforce the statute on the same grounds as that used in SCOTUS's 1948
    Shelley v. Kraemer decision."

    and then:

    "Private parties may not seek judicial enforcement of a racially
    restrictive covenant, because judicial enforcement would be a state
    action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."

    Saying that "SCOTUS said that...judicial enforcement would be a state
    action in violation of the Constitution" (notice the last word there)
    would be applicable. But saying that (as an example) "judicial
    enforcement would be a state action in violation of the Four Amendment"
    in reference to a case where someone wanted to buy a gun or "judicial enforcement would be a state action in violation of the first Amendment"
    in reference to a case where police searched a home would make no sense
    at all.

    However, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982)
    (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/459/116/) seems to deal
    with EXACTLY this very thing.


    Thank you for this citation. This case appears to be getting traction
    in the media. I saw someone reference it in the comments section
    of a major online newspaper.

    This one seems very applicable and as well as easier to work with in the general sense of "you can't pass off enforcement of the law to private
    parties" and gets away from the whole "abortion is a (chose one of the following) [travesty|god-given-right]" hot potato.

    The case was couched some as a "separation of state and church" issue
    but it can also be looked at as applicable in a case of Bernie's
    original "Or even noise regulations or overtime parking?" Now an
    apartment complex may have the right to enforce noise restrictions or
    parking rules on the property but the Texas law would be like saying
    that the person who lives in the house across town can drive by and then
    order a tow-truck to come tow a car from the apartment that's taking up
    two parking spaces "just because I wanted to teach them a lesson."

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  • From John Levine@21:1/5 to All on Fri Sep 10 12:31:46 2021
    According to Mike Anderson <prabbit237@gmail.com.com>:
    However, Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982)
    (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/459/116/) seems to deal
    with EXACTLY this very thing.

    I happened to live within walking distance of Grendel's at the time. The decision was a big deal locally (finally Grendel's can serve beer) and
    got a lot of coverage in the national press.

    The case was couched some as a "separation of state and church" issue
    but it can also be looked at as applicable in a case of Bernie's
    original "Or even noise regulations or overtime parking?" ...

    The decision cited an earlier case, California v. LaRue, which said that
    the state could prohibit nude dancing in bars, distinguishing them because
    the government itself made that rule rather than delegating it to someone
    else. The case was decided on the Establishment clause but it was clear
    that the issue was the delegation, not the regulation.



    --
    Regards,
    John Levine, johnl@taugh.com, Primary Perpetrator of "The Internet for Dummies",
    Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly

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