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On 02 Jul 2022, Rudy Canoza <notgenx33@gmail.com> posted some news:RL3wK.388279$J0r9.88077@fx11.iad:

Here is what it isn't: anything that the American hero Cassidy
Hutchinson said to the Jan 6 committee. For one thing, something can
only formally be hearsay if it is said in court, and she wasn't
testifying in court.

Here is how the federal rules of evidence define hearsay:

Hearsay. “Hearsay” means a statement that:

(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current
trial or
hearing; and

(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in
the statement.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_801

What was the hero Ms. Hutchinson testifying to in the committee
hearing? Was she testify to:

1. What Trump did with the vehicle and the Secret Service agent; or
2. What Tony Ornato told her that Trump did

It was the latter, of course. She was testifying about what Ornato
said, *not* about what Trump did. Ms. Hutchinson's statement, which
is about what Ornato told her, was made in the hearing. Ms.
Hutchinson testifying about what Ornato said to her is not hearsay.
Ornato's statement to Ms. Hutchinson cannot be used by Ms. Hutchinson
to testify about what Trump did, but she wasn't testifying to that.

Hearsay:

Ms. Hutchinson: "Trump grabbed the steering wheel and then
grabbed Engel's
neck."
Ms. Cheney: "How do you know that Trump did that?"
Ms. Hutchinson: "Tony Ornato told me."

_Not_ hearsay:

Ms. Hutchinson: "Tony Ornato said that Trump grabbed the steering
wheel and
then grabbed Engle's neck."
Ms. Cheney: "How do you know Ornato said that?"
Ms. Hutchinson: "Because he said it *to me*."

In the first, Ms. Hutchinson would be testifying about Trump's
actions, and it would be hearsay because she didn't witness them. In
the second, she is testifying about Ornato's speech, and she *did*
witness it, so it isn't hearsay.

This is settled, and the right-wingnuts are stupid fucking morons.

You're citing the wrong reference to support your argument. That's
usually the case for Democrats who use hormonal urges instead of their
brains.

I'd offer the observation that since the note is in her handwriting, it
could have been made at any time convenient to the gainful intent of questionable witness, Cassidy Hutchinson. It should be disallowed as not credible.

I have a note in my deskdrawer that a retired postmaster from Arkansas saw President Donald Trump in Thurmond, West Virginia on January 6, 2021. It
has the same credibility as Cassidy.

Hearsay

"LAW -
the report of another person's words by a witness, which is usually
disallowed as evidence in a court of law."

https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/fre/rule_803

Rule 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay
Primary tabs
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:

(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an
event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant
perceived it.

(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or
condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement
that it caused.

(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of
the declarant�s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or
plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition (such as mental
feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not including a statement of memory
or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to
the validity or terms of the declarant�s will.

(4) Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. A statement that:

(A) is made for � and is reasonably pertinent to � medical diagnosis or treatment; and

(B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations;
their inception; or their general cause.

(5) Recorded Recollection. A record that:

(A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to testify fully and accurately;

(B) was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness�s memory; and

(C) accurately reflects the witness�s knowledge.

If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received as
an exhibit only if offered by an adverse party.

(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by � or from information transmitted by � someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of
a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for
profit;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or
another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and

(E) neither the opponent does not show that the source of information nor
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

(7) Absence of a Record of a Regularly Conducted Activity. Evidence that a matter is not included in a record described in paragraph (6) if:

(A) the evidence is admitted to prove that the matter did not occur or
exist;

(B) a record was regularly kept for a matter of that kind; and

(C) neither the opponent does not show that the possible source of the information nor or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

(8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if:

(A) it sets out:

(i) the office�s activities;

(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not
including, in a criminal case, a matter observed by law-enforcement
personnel; or

(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case,
factual findings from a legally authorized investigation; and

(B) neither the opponent does not show that the source of information nor
or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

(9) Public Records of Vital Statistics. A record of a birth, death, or marriage, if reported to a public office in accordance with a legal duty.

(10) Absence of a Public Record. Testimony � or a certification under Rule
902 � that a diligent search failed to disclose a public record or
statement if:

(A) the testimony or certification is admitted to prove that

(i) the record or statement does not exist; or

(ii) a matter did not occur or exist, if a public office regularly kept a record or statement for a matter of that kind; and

(B) in a criminal case, a prosecutor who intends to offer a certification provides written notice of that intent at least 14 days before trial, and
the defendant does not object in writing within 7 days of receiving the
notice � unless the court sets a different time for the notice or the objection.

(11) Records of Religious Organizations Concerning Personal or Family
History. A statement of birth, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce,
death, relationship by blood or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept record of a religious organization.

(12) Certificates of Marriage, Baptism, and Similar Ceremonies. A
statement of fact contained in a certificate:

(A) made by a person who is authorized by a religious organization or by
law to perform the act certified;

(B) attesting that the person performed a marriage or similar ceremony or administered a sacrament; and

(C) purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time after it.

(13) Family Records. A statement of fact about personal or family history contained in a family record, such as a Bible, genealogy, chart, engraving
on a ring, inscription on a portrait, or engraving on an urn or burial
marker.

(14) Records of Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. The record
of a document that purports to establish or affect an interest in property
if:

(A) the record is admitted to prove the content of the original recorded document, along with its signing and its delivery by each person who
purports to have signed it;

(B) the record is kept in a public office; and

(C) a statute authorizes recording documents of that kind in that office.

(15) Statements in Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. A
statement contained in a document that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the document�s purpose � unless later dealings with the property are inconsistent with
the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.

(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A statement in a document that was prepared before January 1, 1998, and whose authenticity is established.

(17) Market Reports and Similar Commercial Publications. Market
quotations, lists, directories, or other compilations that are generally
relied on by the public or by persons in particular occupations.

(18) Statements in Learned Treatises, Periodicals, or Pamphlets. A
statement contained in a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if:

(A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct examination; and

(B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert�s admission or testimony, by another expert�s testimony, or by judicial
notice.

If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as
an exhibit.

(19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History. A reputation among
a person�s family by blood, adoption, or marriage � or among a person�s associates or in the community � concerning the person�s birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, death, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history.

(20) Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History. A reputation in
a community � arising before the controversy � concerning boundaries of
land in the community or customs that affect the land, or concerning
general historical events important to that community, state, or nation.

(21) Reputation Concerning Character. A reputation among a person�s
associates or in the community concerning the person�s character.

(22) Judgment of a Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final judgment of conviction if:

(A) the judgment was entered after a trial or guilty plea, but not a nolo contendere plea;

(B) the conviction was for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment
for more than a year;

(C) the evidence is admitted to prove any fact essential to the judgment;
and

(D) when offered by the prosecutor in a criminal case for a purpose other
than impeachment, the judgment was against the defendant.

The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.

(23) Judgments Involving Personal, Family, or General History, or a
Boundary. A judgment that is admitted to prove a matter of personal,
family, or general history, or boundaries, if the matter:

(A) was essential to the judgment; and

(B) could be proved by evidence of reputation.

(24) [Other Exceptions .] [Transferred to Rule 807.]

Notes
(Pub. L. 93�595, �1, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1939; Pub. L. 94�149, �1(11),
Dec. 12, 1975, 89 Stat. 805; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Oct. 1, 1987; Apr. 11,
1997, eff. Dec. 1, 1997; Apr. 17, 2000, eff. Dec. 1, 2000; Apr. 26, 2011,
eff. Dec. 1, 2011; Apr. 16, 2013, eff. Dec. 1, 2013; Apr. 25, 2014, eff.
Dec. 1, 2014.)

Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules

The exceptions are phrased in terms of nonapplication of the hearsay rule, rather than in positive terms of admissibility, in order to repel any implication that other possible grounds for exclusion are eliminated from consideration.

The present rule proceeds upon the theory that under appropriate
circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in
person at the trial even though he may be available. The theory finds vast support in the many exceptions to the hearsay rule developed by the common
law in which unavailability of the declarant is not a relevant factor. The present rule is a synthesis of them, with revision where modern
developments and conditions are believed to make that course appropriate.

In a hearsay situation, the declarant is, of course, a witness, and
neither this rule nor Rule 804 dispenses with the requirement of firsthand knowledge. It may appear from his statement or be inferable from
circumstances.

See Rule 602.

Exceptions (1) and (2). In considerable measure these two examples
overlap, though based on somewhat different theories. The most significant practical difference will lie in the time lapse allowable between event
and statement.

The underlying theory of Exception [paragraph] (1) is that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negative the likelihood of
deliberate of conscious misrepresentation. Moreover, if the witness is the declarant, he may be examined on the statement. If the witness is not the declarant, he may be examined as to the circumstances as an aid in
evaluating the statement. Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 340�341
(1962).

The theory of Exception [paragraph] (2) is simply that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication. 6
Wigmore �1747, p. 135. Spontaneity is the key factor in each instance,
though arrived at by somewhat different routes. Both are needed in order
to avoid needless niggling.

While the theory of Exception [paragraph] (2) has been criticized on the
ground that excitement impairs accuracy of observation as well as
eliminating conscious fabrication, Hutchins and Slesinger, Some
Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28
Colum.L.Rev. 432 (1928), it finds support in cases without number. See
cases in 6 Wigmore �1750; Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 1245 (statements as to cause
of or responsibility for motor vehicle accident); Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 149 (accusatory statements by homicide victims). Since unexciting events are
less likely to evoke comment, decisions involving Exception [paragraph]
(1) are far less numerous. Illustrative are Tampa Elec. Co. v. Getrost,
151 Fla. 558, 10 So.2d 83 (1942); Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1,
161 S.W.2d 474 (1942); and cases cited in McCormick �273, p. 585, n. 4.

With respect to the time element, Exception [paragraph] (1) recognizes
that in many, if not most, instances precise contemporaneity is not
possible, and hence a slight lapse is allowable. Under Exception
[paragraph] (2) the standard of measurement is the duration of the state
of excitement. �How long can excitement prevail? Obviously there are no
pat answers and the character of the transaction or event will largely determine the significance of the time factor.� Slough, Spontaneous
Statements and State of Mind, 46 Iowa L.Rev. 224, 243 (1961); McCormick
�272, p. 580.

Participation by the declarant is not required: a nonparticipant may be
moved to describe what he perceives, and one may be startled by an event
in which he is not an actor. Slough, supra; McCormick, supra; 6 Wigmore
�1755; Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 300.

Whether proof of the startling event may be made by the statement itself
is largely an academic question, since in most cases there is present at
least circumstantial evidence that something of a startling nature must
have occurred. For cases in which the evidence consists of the condition
of the declarant (injuries, state of shock), see Insurance Co. v. Mosely,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.), 397, 19 L.Ed. 437 (1869); Wheeler v. United States, 93 U.S.A.App. D.C. 159, 211 F.2d 19 (1953); cert. denied 347 U.S. 1019, 74
S.Ct. 876, 98 L.Ed. 1140; Wetherbee v. Safety Casualty Co., 219 F.2d 274
(5th Cir. 1955); Lampe v. United States, 97 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 229 F.2d 43 (1956). Nevertheless, on occasion the only evidence may be the content of
the statement itself, and rulings that it may be sufficient are described
as �increasing,� Slough, supra at 246, and as the �prevailing practice,� McCormick �272, p. 579. Illustrative are Armour & Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 78 Colo. 569, 243 P. 546 (1926); Young v. Stewart, 191 N.C.
297, 131 S.E. 735 (1926). Moreover, under Rule 104(a) the judge is not
limited by the hearsay rule in passing upon preliminary questions of fact.

Proof of declarant's perception by his statement presents similar considerations when declarant is identified. People v. Poland, 22 Ill.2d
175, 174 N.E.2d 804 (1961). However, when declarant is an unidentified bystander, the cases indicate hesitancy in upholding the statement alone
as sufficient, Garrett v. Howden, 73 N.M. 307, 387 P.2d 874 (1963); Beck
v. Dye, 200 Wash. 1, 92 P.2d 1113 (1939), a result which would under appropriate circumstances be consistent with the rule.

Permissible subject matter of the statement is limited under Exception [paragraph] (1) to description or explanation of the event or condition,
the assumption being that spontaneity, in the absence of a startling
event, may extend no farther. In Exception [paragraph] (2), however, the statement need only �relate� to the startling event or condition, thus affording a broader scope of subject matter coverage. 6 Wigmore ��1750,
1754. See Sanitary Grocery Co. v. Snead, 67 App.D.C. 129, 90 F.2d 374
(1937), slip-and-fall case sustaining admissibility of clerk's statement,
�That has been on the floor for a couple of hours,� and Murphy Auto Parts
Co., Inc. v. Ball, 101 U.S.App.D.C. 416, 249 F.2d 508 (1957), upholding admission, on issue of driver's agency, of his statement that he had to
call on a customer and was in a hurry to get home. Quick, Hearsay,
Excitement, Necessity and the Uniform Rules: A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4),
6 Wayne L.Rev. 204, 206�209 (1960).

Similar provisions are found in Uniform Rule 63(4)(a) and (b); California Evidence Code �1240 (as to Exception (2) only); Kansas Code of Civil
Procedure �60�460(d)(1) and (2); New Jersey Evidence Rule 63(4).

Exception (3) is essentially a specialized application of Exception
[paragraph] (1), presented separately to enhance its usefulness and accessibility. See McCormick ��265, 268.

The exclusion of �statements of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed� is necessary to avoid the virtual destruction of
the hearsay rule which would otherwise result from allowing state of mind, provable by a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for an inference of
the happening of the event which produced the state of mind). Shepard v.
United States, 290 U.S. 96, 54 S.Ct. 22, 78 L.Ed. 196 (1933); Maguire, The Hillmon Case�Thirty-three Years After, 38 Harv.L.Rev. 709, 719�731 (1925); Hinton, States of Mind and the Hearsay Rule, 1 U.Chi.L.Rev. 394, 421�423 (1934). The rule of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillman, 145 U.S. 285, 12
S.Ct. 909, 36 L.Ed. 706 (1892), allowing evidence of intention as tending
to prove the doing of the act intended, is of course, left undisturbed.

The carving out, from the exclusion mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
of declarations relating to the execution, revocation, identification, or
terms of declarant's will represents an ad hoc judgment which finds ample reinforcement in the decisions, resting on practical grounds of necessity
and expediency rather than logic. McCormick �271, pp. 577�578; Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 588, 62 A.L.R.2d 855. A similar recognition of the need for and practical value of this kind of evidence is found in California Evidence
Code �1260.

Exception (4). Even those few jurisdictions which have shied away from generally admitting statements of present condition have allowed them if
made to a physician for purposes of diagnosis and treatment in view of the patient's strong motivation to be truthful. McCormick �266, p. 563. The
same guarantee of trustworthiness extends to statements of past conditions
and medical history, made for purposes of diagnosis or treatment. It also extends to statements as to causation, reasonably pertinent to the same purposes, in accord with the current trend, Shell Oil Co. v. Industrial Commission, 2 Ill.2d 590, 119 N.E.2d 224 (1954); McCormick �266, p. 564;
New Jersey Evidence Rule 63(12)(c). Statements as to fault would not
ordinarily qualify under this latter language. Thus a patient's statement
that he was struck by an automobile would qualify but not his statement
that the car was driven through a red light. Under the exception the
statement need not have been made to a physician. Statements to hospital attendants, ambulance drivers, or even members of the family might be
included.

Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay exception, as not
within its guarantee of truthfulness, statements to a physician consulted
only for the purpose of enabling him to testify. While these statements
were not admissible as substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to
state the basis of his opinion, including statements of this kind. The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to be made by juries.
The rule accordingly rejects the limitation. This position is consistent
with the provision of Rule 703 that the facts on which expert testimony is based need not be admissible in evidence if of a kind ordinarily relied
upon by experts in the field.

Exception (5). A hearsay exception for recorded recollection is generally recognized and has been described as having �long been favored by the
federal and practically all the state courts that have had occasion to
decide the question.� United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 770 (2d Cir.
1965), citing numerous cases and sustaining the exception against a
claimed denial of the right of confrontation. Many additional cases are
cited in Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 473, 520. The guarantee of trustworthiness is found in the reliability inherent in a record made while events were still fresh in mind and accurately reflecting them. Owens v. State, 67 Md. 307,
316, 10 A. 210, 212 (1887).

The principal controversy attending the exception has centered, not upon
the propriety of the exception itself, but upon the question whether a preliminary requirement of impaired memory on the part of the witness
should be imposed. The authorities are divided. If regard be had only to
the accuracy of the evidence, admittedly impairment of the memory of the witness adds nothing to it and should not be required. McCormick �277, p.
593; 3 Wigmore �738, p. 76; Jordan v. People, 151 Colo. 133, 376 P.2d 699 (1962), cert. denied 373 U.S. 944, 83 S.Ct. 1553, 10 L.Ed.2d 699; Hall v. State, 223 Md. 158, 162 A.2d 751 (1960); State v. Bindhammer, 44 N.J. 372,
209 A.2d 124 (1965). Nevertheless, the absence of the requirement, it is believed, would encourage the use of statements carefully prepared for
purposes of litigation under the supervision of attorneys, investigators,
or claim adjusters. Hence the example includes a requirement that the
witness not have �sufficient recollection to enable him to testify fully
and accurately.� To the same effect are California Evidence Code �1237 and
New Jersey Rule 63(1)(b), and this has been the position of the federal
courts. Vicksburg & Meridian R.R. v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 99, 7 S.Ct. 118, 30 L.Ed. 299 (1886); Ahern v. Webb, 268 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1959); and see
N.L.R.B. v. Hudson Pulp and Paper Corp., 273 F.2d 660, 665 (5th Cir.
1960); N.L.R.B. v. Federal Dairy Co., 297 F.2d 487 (1st Cir. 1962). But
cf. United States v. Adams, 385 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1967).

No attempt is made in the exception to spell out the method of
establishing the initial knowledge or the contemporaneity and accuracy of
the record, leaving them to be dealt with as the circumstances of the particular case might indicate. Multiple person involvement in the process
of observing and recording, as in Rathbun v. Brancatella, 93 N.J.L. 222,
107 A. 279 (1919), is entirely consistent with the exception.

Locating the exception at this place in the scheme of the rules is a
matter of choice. There were two other possibilities. The first was to
regard the statement as one of the group of prior statements of a
testifying witness which are excluded entirely from the category of
hearsay by Rule 801(d)(1). That category, however, requires that declarant
be �subject to cross-examination,� as to which the impaired memory aspect
of the exception raises doubts. The other possibility was to include the exception among those covered by Rule 804. Since unavailability is
required by that rule and lack of memory is listed as a species of unavailability by the definition of the term in Rule 804(a)(3), that
treatment at first impression would seem appropriate. The fact is,
however, that the unavailability requirement of the exception is of a
limited and peculiar nature. Accordingly, the exception is located at this point rather than in the context of a rule where unavailability is
conceived of more broadly.

Exception (6) represents an area which has received much attention from
those seeking to improve the law of evidence. The Commonwealth Fund Act
was the result of a study completed in 1927 by a distinguished committee
under the chairmanship of Professor Morgan. Morgan et al., The Law of
Evidence: Some Proposals for its Reform 63 (1927). With changes too minor
to mention, it was adopted by Congress in 1936 as the rule for federal
courts. 28 U.S.C. �1732. A number of states took similar action. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1936 promulgated the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act, 9A U.L.A. 506, which has acquired a substantial following in the states. Model Code Rule 514 and Uniform Rule 63(13) also deal with the subject. Difference of varying degrees of
importance exist among these various treatments.

These reform efforts were largely within the context of business and
commercial records, as the kind usually encountered, and concentrated considerable attention upon relaxing the requirement of producing as
witnesses, or accounting for the nonproduction of, all participants in the process of gathering, transmitting, and recording information which the
common law had evolved as a burdensome and crippling aspect of using
records of this type. In their areas of primary emphasis on witnesses to
be called and the general admissibility of ordinary business and
commercial records, the Commonwealth Fund Act and the Uniform Act appear
to have worked well. The exception seeks to preserve their advantages.

On the subject of what witnesses must be called, the Commonwealth Fund Act eliminated the common law requirement of calling or accounting for all participants by failing to mention it. United States v. Mortimer, 118 F.2d
266 (2d Cir. 1941); La Porte v. United States, 300 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1962); McCormick �290, p. 608. Model Code Rule 514 and Uniform Rule 63(13)
did likewise. The Uniform Act, however, abolished the common law
requirement in express terms, providing that the requisite foundation
testimony might be furnished by �the custodian or other qualified
witness.� Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, �2; 9A U.L.A. 506. The exception follows the Uniform Act in this respect.

The element of unusual reliability of business records is said variously
to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying
upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing
job or occupation. McCormick ��281, 286, 287; Laughlin, Business Entries
and the Like, 46 Iowa L.Rev. 276 (1961). The model statutes and rules have sought to capture these factors and to extend their impact by employing
the phrase �regular course of business,� in conjunction with a definition
of �business� far broader than its ordinarily accepted meaning. The result
is a tendency unduly to emphasize a requirement of routineness and repetitiveness and an insistence that other types of records be squeezed
into the fact patterns which give rise to traditional business records.
The rule therefore adopts the phrase �the course of a regularly conducted activity� as capturing the essential basis of the hearsay exception as it
has evolved and the essential element which can be abstracted from the
various specifications of what is a �business.�

Amplification of the kinds of activities producing admissible records has
given rise to problems which conventional business records by their nature avoid. They are problems of the source of the recorded information, of
entries in opinion form, of motivation, and of involvement as participant
in the matters recorded.

Sources of information presented no substantial problem with ordinary
business records. All participants, including the observer or participant furnishing the information to be recorded, were acting routinely, under a
duty of accuracy, with employer reliance on the result, or in short �in
the regular course of business.� If, however, the supplier of the
information does not act in the regular course, an essential link is
broken; the assurance of accuracy does not extend to the information
itself, and the fact that it may be recorded with scrupulous accuracy is
of no avail. An illustration is the police report incorporating
information obtained from a bystander: the officer qualifies as acting in
the regular course but the informant does not. The leading case, Johnson
v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930), held that a report thus
prepared was inadmissible. Most of the authorities have agreed with the decision. Gencarella v. Fyfe, 171 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1948); Gordon v.
Robinson, 210 F.2d 192 (3d Cir. 1954); Standard Oil Co. of California v.
Moore, 251 F.2d 188, 214 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 356 U.S. 975, 78
S.Ct. 1139, 2 L.Ed.2d 1148; Yates v. Bair Transport, Inc., 249 F.Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1148. Cf. Hawkins v. Gorea Motor
Express, Inc., 360 F.2d 933 (2d Cir 1966). Contra, 5 Wigmore �1530a, n. 1,
pp. 391�392. The point is not dealt with specifically in the Commonwealth
Fund Act, the Uniform Act, or Uniform Rule 63(13). However, Model Code
Rule 514 contains the requirement �that it was the regular course of that business for one with personal knowledge * * * to make such a memorandum
or record or to transmit information thereof to be included in such a memorandum or record * * *.� The rule follows this lead in requiring an informant with knowledge acting in the course of the regularly conducted activity.

Entries in the form of opinions were not encountered in traditional
business records in view of the purely factual nature of the items
recorded, but they are now commonly encountered with respect to medical diagnoses, prognoses, and test results, as well as occasionally in other
areas. The Commonwealth Fund Act provided only for records of an �act, transaction, occurrence, or event,� while the Uniform Act, Model Code Rule
514, and Uniform Rule 63(13) merely added the ambiguous term �condition.�
The limited phrasing of the Commonwealth Fund Act, 28 U.S.C. �1732, may
account for the reluctance of some federal decisions to admit diagnostic entries. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 66, 147 F.2d
297 (1945); Lyles v. United States, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 254 F.2d 725
(1957), cert. denied 356 U.S. 961, 78 S.Ct. 997, 2 L.Ed.2d 1067; England
v. United States, 174 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1949); Skogen v. Dow Chemical
Co., 375 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1967). Other federal decisions, however, experienced no difficulty in freely admitting diagnostic entries. Reed v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers, 123 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1941);

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