• [PATCH 0/2 v8] oom: capture unreclaimable slab info in oom message

    From Michal Hocko@21:1/5 to Tetsuo Handa on Mon Oct 2 13:30:02 2017
    On Thu 28-09-17 13:36:57, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
    On 2017/09/28 6:46, Yang Shi wrote:
    Changelog v7 —> v8:
    * Adopted Michal’s suggestion to dump unreclaim slab info when unreclaimable slabs amount > total user memory. Not only in oom panic path.

    Holding slab_mutex inside dump_unreclaimable_slab() was refrained since V2 because there are

    mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
    kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL);
    mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);

    users. If we call dump_unreclaimable_slab() for non OOM panic path, aren't we introducing a risk of crash (i.e. kernel panic) for regular OOM path?

    yes we are

    We can try mutex_trylock() from dump_unreclaimable_slab() at best.
    But it is still remaining unsafe, isn't it?

    using the trylock sounds like a reasonable compromise.
    --
    Michal Hocko
    SUSE Labs

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  • From Yang Shi@21:1/5 to Michal Hocko on Mon Oct 2 22:50:04 2017
    On 10/2/17 4:20 AM, Michal Hocko wrote:
    On Thu 28-09-17 13:36:57, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
    On 2017/09/28 6:46, Yang Shi wrote:
    Changelog v7 —> v8:
    * Adopted Michal’s suggestion to dump unreclaim slab info when unreclaimable slabs amount > total user memory. Not only in oom panic path.

    Holding slab_mutex inside dump_unreclaimable_slab() was refrained since V2 >> because there are

    mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
    kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL);
    mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);

    users. If we call dump_unreclaimable_slab() for non OOM panic path, aren't we
    introducing a risk of crash (i.e. kernel panic) for regular OOM path?

    yes we are

    We can try mutex_trylock() from dump_unreclaimable_slab() at best.
    But it is still remaining unsafe, isn't it?

    using the trylock sounds like a reasonable compromise.

    OK, it sounds we reach agreement on trylock. Will solve those comments
    in v9.

    Thanks,
    Yang



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  • From Yang Shi@21:1/5 to Tetsuo Handa on Mon Oct 2 22:50:09 2017
    On 9/30/17 4:00 AM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
    Yang Shi wrote:
    On 9/28/17 1:45 PM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
    Yang Shi wrote:
    On 9/28/17 12:57 PM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
    Yang Shi wrote:
    On 9/27/17 9:36 PM, Tetsuo Handa wrote:
    On 2017/09/28 6:46, Yang Shi wrote:
    Changelog v7 -> v8:
    * Adopted Michal$B!G(Bs suggestion to dump unreclaim slab info when unreclaimable slabs amount > total user memory. Not only in oom panic path.

    Holding slab_mutex inside dump_unreclaimable_slab() was refrained since V2
    because there are

    mutex_lock(&slab_mutex);
    kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL);
    mutex_unlock(&slab_mutex);

    users. If we call dump_unreclaimable_slab() for non OOM panic path, aren't we
    introducing a risk of crash (i.e. kernel panic) for regular OOM path? >>>>>>
    I don't see the difference between regular oom path and oom path other >>>>>> than calling panic() at last.

    And, the slab dump may be called by panic path too, it is for both >>>>>> regular and panic path.

    Calling a function that might cause kerneloops immediately before calling panic()
    would be tolerable, for the kernel will panic after all. But calling a function
    that might cause kerneloops when there is no plan to call panic() is a bug.

    I got your point. slab_mutex is used to protect the list of all the
    slabs, since we are already in oom, there should be not kmem cache
    destroy happen during the list traverse. And, list_for_each_entry() has >>>> been replaced to list_for_each_entry_safe() to make the traverse more
    robust.

    I consider that OOM event and kmem chache destroy event can run concurrently
    because slab_mutex is not held by OOM event (and unfortunately cannot be held
    due to possibility of deadlock) in order to protect the list of all the slabs.

    I don't think replacing list_for_each_entry() with list_for_each_entry_safe()
    makes the traverse more robust, for list_for_each_entry_safe() does not defer
    freeing of memory used by list element. Rather, replacing list_for_each_entry()
    with list_for_each_entry_rcu() (and making relevant changes such as
    rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock()/synchronize_rcu()) will make the traverse safe.

    I'm not sure if rcu could satisfy this case. rcu just can protect
    slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy list, which is used by SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
    slabs.

    I'm not sure why you are talking about SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU.
    What I meant is that

    Upon registration:

    // do initialize/setup stuff here
    synchronize_rcu(); // <= for dump_unreclaimable_slab()
    list_add_rcu(&kmem_cache->list, &slab_caches);

    Upon unregistration:

    list_del_rcu(&kmem_cache->list);
    synchronize_rcu(); // <= for dump_unreclaimable_slab()
    // do finalize/cleanup stuff here

    then (if my understanding is correct)

    rcu_read_lock();
    list_for_each_entry_rcu(s, &slab_caches, list) {
    if (!is_root_cache(s) || (s->flags & SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT))
    continue;

    memset(&sinfo, 0, sizeof(sinfo));
    get_slabinfo(s, &sinfo);

    if (sinfo.num_objs > 0)
    pr_info("%-17s %10luKB %10luKB\n", cache_name(s),
    (sinfo.active_objs * s->size) / 1024,
    (sinfo.num_objs * s->size) / 1024);
    }
    rcu_read_unlock();

    will make dump_unreclaimable_slab() safe.

    Thanks for the detailed description. However, it sounds this change is
    too much for slub, I'm not sure if this may change the subtle behavior
    of slub.

    trylock sounds like a good alternative.

    Yang



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