I think introducing a fixed time limit on a GR is a bad idea, for
various reasons.
[[PGP Signed Part:No public key for 2DFC519954181296 created at 2021-10-22T19:42:07+0200 using RSA]]
Hi all,
Let me start by apologizing for taking this long to send this email. The attentive reader will have noticed my name in Russ' original draft as
one of the people who reviewed it. When Russ sent his initial proposal,
I started drafting a large response that I lost due to a silly mistake
on my end. Life then intervened, and I didn't have time to follow up
until now.
That said,
I think introducing a fixed time limit on a GR is a bad idea, for
various reasons.
First of all, no matter how careful we choose a time limit based on historical precedence, I think it is naive to assume we will be able to
come up with a time limit that will always work for all future GR
proposals. Some issues are contentious, and they take time to work
through them. In my reading, the longest we have ever taken to decide on
a vote was for GR 2006-003, where the initial proposal was sent in June
but the eventual vote only opened in September[1].
An argument that has been brought forward to avoid that problem is that
it is theoretically possible to discuss matters on this list before
starting the formal procedure. While that is true, I would like to point
out that the whole reason for the introduction of this time limit is so
that people can't game the system by using procedural measures to delay
the vote, possibly indefinitely. If we don't want to allow people to
delay the vote, we should *also* not allow people to game the system by forcing a vote prematurely, through proposing a formal GR when someone
else offers incomplete ideas that they would have preferred to see
discussed first. Again, I would point to GR 2006-003 where something
along those lines happened[1].
I fear that in order to avoid that pitfall, people may wish to discuss
things in private amongst themselves rather than posting something to
the -vote list when they want to start looking at a problem, which will
give them an unfair time advantage.
Additionally, it is not always possible to foresee all of the complexity
in a problem space; we may be quite a bit into the formal discussion of
the ballot when we decide that there are some significant issues that
require exploring and which would benefit from more time. If everyone involved agrees that this is a good thing, then I think we should allow
for that possibility; the proposed procedure does not do so, and I fear
that this may result in rushed proposals that are suboptimal and do not resolve the issue at hand.
An argument that has been brought forward to remedy this is that it is theoretically possible to advance a vote for the default option in such
a case. While this is true, that is problematic: first of all, it will
delay the resolution of the situation by a significantly larger amount
of time (you will need to go through a complete vote only to have to do
the whole process over again). I think it is relevant in this context
that we only managed to do this one time in the history of the project,
in a vote where I can't help but feel like the proponents of the vote
tried to game the system (2006-005[2]).
We might have been able to use this for 2004-004, but alas.
Additionally, I believe that proposing we vote the default option more
often is antithesis to what we *should* be doing. I think a GR vote
should generally be the final answer to an issue we are dealing with,
and that in order to do that, we should ensure that the ballot is
complete, with all relevant options represented. I don't think we get
that if we introduce a rigid timeline that cannot be diverted from in exceptional situations.
I hear and agree with the argument against such a procedure; having a
way to delay the vote which everyone can trigger opens the system up to abuse, which could allow the vote to be delayed indefinitely if
formulated badly. I believe the answer to that is not to remove the
option to delay the vote entirely, but to restrict the conditions under
which such a delay can be invoked; only provide it to the DPL, or
provide only a limited number of delays, or allow a majority of people
who proposed options that are already on the ballot to object, or
something along those lines. The goal should be to end up with a
procedure where *can* extend the discussion period if discussions are actually still happening and we believe it is valid, without allowing
people who want to avoid any vote from happening entirely to delay
things indefinitely.
Additionally, this proposal does not remedy what I think is another
issue we have with our procedure, which I have been wanting to resolve
one way or the other for quite a while but have no idea how to do so;
the "I want to create a ballot with all possible options" antipattern.
We had a few cases of this over the years (at least two that I can
remember), usually by well-intentioned people who want to get things to
a vote quickly, but I honestly believe it creates more problems than it attempts to solve.
Writing an option that does not represent your own personal opinion is extremely difficult at best, and is probably not even possible at all.
This means you'll get proposals from people who actually hold an opinion
very close to what you wrote down that you'll then need to evaluate to
decide whether this improves the ballot option, or whether it changes
the option into something different entirely and thus should be a
separate ballot option instead. To deal with such a proposal from the
point of view of someone who feels one of the options is
almost-but-not-quite something you can vote for can be very frustrating,
as I experienced first-hand in https://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2019/11/msg00032.html .
I also believe that a ballot with options that were written by people
who do not support that option will usually result in a cluttered
ballot, with various options that are almost but not quite the same
thing, and options that are irrelevant noise and which will never win. I think this behavior should be discouraged if not outright forbidden (although, again, I'm not sure how to forbid them), and would note that adding a strict time limit seems more likely to create private
discussions (as I've explained above) and therefore to me seems more
likely to result in this antipattern.
I'm not submitting a formal draft to go against yours at this point
(although I do have the beginnings of one), because I would like to see whether I'm alone in this opinion or not, where only in the latter case
it would make sense to continue down this path.
Thanks for your thoughts,
[1] In the case of 2006-003, I started a discussion on -vote in order to
start the debate before formally proposing a GR, intending to
explore the problem before starting to build the ballot. The first
follow-up to that mail however was a formal GR proposal by Manoj,
which then started the procedure. It was not contentious vote
though, and I think technically the vote may have expired at least
once, although I'm not 100% sure about that -- it involved a few
amendments resetting the timer and the DPL extending the minimum
discussion period after one of them, so the details are a bit
muddy.
[2] In 2006-005, Denis Barbier proposed a vote to recall the project
leader. The DPL then delegated the authority to vary the discussion
and voting periods to him and Loïc Minier. Denis chose to not accept
any amendments and reduced the discussion time to the minimum, and
called for a vote while, in my opinion, the discussion was still in
full force.
a vote to recall the project leader.
To fully achieve what Wouter is calling for would therefore *also* require
a constitutional change.
To fully achieve what Wouter is calling for would therefore *also* require
a constitutional change. It's not a preservation of the existing status
quo. I know Wouter knows that, but I wanted to make sure it was explicit
for everyone else.
Wouter> I hear and agree with the argument against such a procedure;"Wouter" == Wouter Verhelst <wouter@debian.org> writes:
I agree that if a sufficient part of the project wants to continue the discussion, we should be able to do that.
I just don't see how to accomplish that in a way that is better than
what Russ proposes without being open to abuse.
However there is one area of agreement, and I'll focus there.
I agree that if a sufficient part of the project wants to continue the discussion, we should be able to do that.
I just don't see how to accomplish that in a way that is better than
what Russ proposes without being open to abuse.
With this process, we could also default the minimum discussion time to
be much shorter (say, one week or so); then if there is much to discuss, after 6 days or so someone could suggest "we're clearly not there yet,
let's extend the discussion" and we can extend with this process.
6. The project leader may, at any point in the process, set the
discussion period to any length between 1 and 3 weeks, except that
they may not do so in a way that causes the discussion period to end
within 48 hours of when this change is made, unless that would
require them to set a discussion time beyond three weeks.
10. When a time extension has received the required number of seconds,
the discussion time is extended to end 72 hours from when the
extension was first proposed.
Wouter> However, the problem I see with strict timings that cannot"Wouter" == Wouter Verhelst <wouter@debian.org> writes:
On 10/24/21 2:01 PM, Wouter Verhelst wrote:
6. The project leader may, at any point in the process, set the
discussion period to any length between 1 and 3 weeks, except that
they may not do so in a way that causes the discussion period to end
within 48 hours of when this change is made, unless that would
require them to set a discussion time beyond three weeks.
What is the purpose/intent of the "unless" here? If the discussion period is coming right up on (< 48 hours) 3 weeks, can the DPL truncate it using this?
10. When a time extension has received the required number of seconds,
the discussion time is extended to end 72 hours from when the
extension was first proposed.
This wording might need some tweaking for clarity/anti-abuse. Specifically, if I ask for and receive an "extension" when there was more than 72 hours left already, what happens?
I also believe that a ballot with options that were written by people
who do not support that option will usually result in a cluttered
ballot, with various options that are almost but not quite the same
thing, and options that are irrelevant noise and which will never win. I think this behavior should be discouraged if not outright forbidden (although, again, I'm not sure how to forbid them),
Wouter and I are going to disagree on this, but I actually think that
the work I did during the latest systemd vote significantly helped move
the discussion forward. By trying to listen to various sides and trying
to present several options I think I managed to frame the process in a
way that was more constructive.
I'm sure that process can be refined. But I'd rather see DPLs do that
work more rather than less.
I also don't want to see that work restricted to the DPL. In many cases
I'd rather see ballot options drafted by people in the middle rather
than by strong proponents of a polarized position.
1) Remember that we want to move toward secret ballots.
"Nikolaus" == Nikolaus Rath <Nikolaus@rath.org> writes:
Interesting:-)
I'd have to think hard about whether to rank that proposal above or
below FD.
I prefer Russ's option, but given your goals I agree this sounds like a
good way to achieve them.
On Oct 22 2021, Wouter Verhelst <wouter@debian.org> wrote:
I also believe that a ballot with options that were written by people
who do not support that option will usually result in a cluttered
ballot, with various options that are almost but not quite the same
thing, and options that are irrelevant noise and which will never win. I think this behavior should be discouraged if not outright forbidden (although, again, I'm not sure how to forbid them),
How about something like this?
"My proposing or seconding a ballot option, every proposer/amender
commits to rank this option above FD and (in case of multiple ballot
options) higher than at least half of all the options. Should the proposer/amender's ballot not confirm reflect this at the time of the
vote, proposer's/amender's vote will not be counted."
"Wouter" == Wouter Verhelst <wouter@debian.org> writes:
"Wouter" == Wouter Verhelst <wouter@debian.org> writes:
Wouter> Can you shed some light on your opinion here? I've tried to
Wouter> build an option that I hope can achieve some form of
Wouter> consensus, and I would like to know whether I have succeeded
Wouter> in doing so. I don't think I'll change much if not, but it
Wouter> would be useful information nonetheless.
Russ's option has a maximum time for discussions.
Yours does not.
I also think this system makes the voting process more open to proceduralmanipulation than my proposal (although this is more a gut feeling than anything concrete, and it's arguable), and essentially forecloses the
Russ> This analysis is very sensitive to the percentage of people in"Russ" == Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org> writes:
makes it very easy to extend it ....
This will probably happen for all but the most urgent and
uncontroversial GRs.
On Sun, Nov 7, 2021 at 3:53 PM Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org> wrote:
makes it very easy to extend it .... This will probably happen for all
but the most urgent and uncontroversial GRs.
Didn't we just see the opposite?
In the most recent referendum, the decisive argument for shortening was
the existence of hardened fronts rather than a lack of controversy. Sam suspected that people had made up their minds. [1]
I don't understand the question.
That system does not currently exist, and therefore this could
not have happened
On Sun, Nov 7, 2021 at 5:13 PM Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org> wrote:
I don't understand the question. That system does not currently exist,
and therefore this could not have happened
Without wanting to take up too much bandwidth, I believe that deductive
logic misses key insights. [1]
More broadly, you are not the only one who thinks I have strange
feathers. I mean, what is this guy talking about? He has so much to
learn! Perhaps this short video [2] can shed some light on how two
parties might examine the same subject from two sides. In some form, it
will solve Debian's social issues.
Maybe you could
try rephrasing in the hope that I may understand a different version of
the question better?
The question did not have an answer. [1] To avoid pain, the project
prefers shorter discussions on controversial topics. It is the opposite
of what you wrote.
If your point is, instead, that Wouter's general system is undesirable
yes, I largely agree
On Mon, Nov 8, 2021 at 9:49 AM Russ Allbery <rra@debian.org> wrote:
If your point is, instead, that Wouter's general system is undesirable
yes, I largely agree
Without reflecting on either proposal, I merely cautioned that
constitutional amendments should be based on sound premises.
As to the point between you and Wouter, is there perhaps a simpler
measure when a discussion is over—such as one week without a proposal
that attracted at least three novel supporters (in total)?
I wonder if you could make the system even simpler, producing a scheme
that has some admirable simplicity advantages over my proposal.
Something like this:
1. The discussion period starts when a draft resolution is proposed and
sponsored. The length of the discussion period starts at 1 week.
2. An extension to the discusison period may be proposed and sponsored
according to the requirements for a new resolution. As soon as a
discussion period extension reaches the required number of sponsors, it
takes effect and cannot be withdrawn.
3. The first two times the discussion period is extended add an additional
week to the length of the discussion period. Subsequent extensions add
an additional 72 hours.
4. The proposer and sponsors of an extension to the discussion period may
not propose or sponsor any additional extensions to the discussion
period for the same General Resolution.
5. The discussion period may not be extended beyond six weeks.
and then drop not only the language about extending the discussion period when the ballot changes but also all the language for the DPL varying the length of the discussion period, and use this system as the only mechanism for changing the length of the discussion period.
Dear all,
I am interested in this informal proposal from Russ, which has not
received much explicit feedback:
On Sun 07 Nov 2021 at 03:53PM -08, Russ Allbery wrote:
I wonder if you could make the system even simpler, producing a scheme
that has some admirable simplicity advantages over my proposal.
Something like this:
1. The discussion period starts when a draft resolution is proposed and
sponsored. The length of the discussion period starts at 1 week.
2. An extension to the discusison period may be proposed and sponsored
according to the requirements for a new resolution. As soon as a
discussion period extension reaches the required number of sponsors, it
takes effect and cannot be withdrawn.
3. The first two times the discussion period is extended add an additional
week to the length of the discussion period. Subsequent extensions add
an additional 72 hours.
4. The proposer and sponsors of an extension to the discussion period may
not propose or sponsor any additional extensions to the discussion
period for the same General Resolution.
5. The discussion period may not be extended beyond six weeks.
and then drop not only the language about extending the discussion period when the ballot changes but also all the language for the DPL varying the length of the discussion period, and use this system as the only mechanism for changing the length of the discussion period.
I have been studying Wouter's formal proposal and believe that the only substantive difference with the quoted text is that where the quoted
text has a hard limit on the discussion period, Wouter's proposal
instead has a mechanism for objecting to further extensions.
Would someone else be able to confirm this reading, please?
If I'm right, I am considering proposing a third choice which is
identical to Wouter's, except it would drop the mechanism for objecting
to extensions beyond four weeks and reimpose a maximum discussion
period, which I am thinking of setting to four weeks.
You may of course do so, but I think it creates a system that
incorporates the worst of both worlds. My proposed system allows one to extend the time at all time (while making it progressively harder as
time goes on), because I believe it is better to have a system that
allows that flexibility when necessary than to have a system with a
rigid, unchangeable limit.
If you *do* prefer that limit, then I think it makes more sense to have
a system like Russ's, where time is extended when a ballot option is
added, but not past your time limit. His system is procedurally much
simpler than mine, but has the downside that it creates what I think is
an unacceptable hard limit. If you believe three weeks is too short,
might it not be better to propose a system like Russ's, but with the
hard limit at four weeks rather than three?
I don't really like the procedural complexity that my system creates,
but I think that disadvantage outweighs the disadvantage that the rigid
limit in Russ's proposal creates.
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