XPost: linux.debian.project, linux.debian.security
Since the below mentioned analysis of Debian's security, and that too
compared to other distros, is not very well-known outside of Debian
project(it didn't come up in any internet searches, the web of trust
gets mentioned but there is not much explanation on it), I suggest
writing in somewhere in Debian wiki or blog post.
I am willing to write that as well if the Debian project does not have
any problems.
i believe the answer is in the question. debian is based on
distributed trust. i did the analysis (took 3 weeks): it is literally
the only distro in the world with an inviolate chain of trust from a
large keyring dating back 20 years that is itself GPG-signed as a
package, with a package distribution chain from source where all
components within the chain up to release are unbroken and inviolate.
take ubuntu for example: whilst it has the exact same technology the
size of the developer pool, comprising the web of trust, is both much
smaller and also controlled by one Corporation: Canonical. Canonical
says "jump", the developers ask "how high".
take Suse, Fedora etc: their RPM packages break the chain of trust by
failing to properly include a GPG Signature of the Release (i do not
recall the exact details, i did the analysis 4 years ago)
take Archlinux: their community is vulnerable to unverified github
repositories being abandoned, a hacker re-registering them, and a trojan uploaded and distributed automatically.
i won't even bother going into the absolute moronic practice of
"trusting" HTTPS: node, pypi, etc should be blindingly obviously
untrustworthy, with the website being a prime hacking target if nothing
else.
even GNU packages are hopelessly inadequately secure as far as social
engineering and hacking are concerned.
debian is not a single centralised repository, it is controlled by
no-one. you have to compromise hundreds of independent developers before
you make any headway, and as a result it was trusted by e.g. the
Venezuelan Government as the basis for their own distro, many years ago.
there is not even a centralised dependency on a website: packages may
be securely distributed by Carrier Pigeon or printed out on paper and
OCR scanned if you really want to because there is a full GPG Chain and Checksums, right back to the source code.
and that (GPG Chains) basically, is the key. anyone stupid enough to
do something stupid is going to be throwing away their reputation, not
just within the debian project as a maintainer, but for life.
you abuse your position as a maintainer by putting in trojan code,
because that trojan package had to be GPG Signed, you have to make a
*public and irreversible declaration* which will remain in historical
archives for the rest of your life and beyond.
this would result in catastrophic consequences for not just their
involvement in debian (which would be terminated with prejudice), but
because their GPG Signature on the trojan package is public, inviolate
and irrevocable, it would also have catastrophic consequences for their
career in IT because nobody would ever trust them in a position of responsibility, ever again. they'd be flipping burgers for the rest of
their life.
fundamentally, then, you are assuming that there is "one controller
of debian", which is false. there are literally hundreds of
*independent* developers, all of whom know their responsibility, all of
whom know that they have all other independent developers keeping an eye
on them.
this makes debian pretty much the only distro that could be trusted
to remain true to humanity and to its principles and its charter. even
when some of them (you know who you are) are when it comes down to it
not very nice people, they can at least be trusted to do the right thing.
--
Ravi Dwivedi,
https://ravidwivedi.in
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