[continued from previous message]

patient and adjust the timing and pressure of the pumping accordingly.

The innovation begun by the earlier MIT class, and now being rapidly
refined and tested by the new team, was to devise a mechanical system
to do the squeezing and releasing of the Ambu bag, since this is not
something that a person could be expected to do for any extended
period. But it is crucial for such a system to not damage the bag and
to be controllable, so that the amount of air and pressures being
delivered can be tailored to the particular patient. The device must
be very reliable, since an unexpected failure of the device could be
fatal, but as designed by the MIT team, the bag can be immediately
operated manually.

MIT E-Vent Unit 002 Undergoing Testing, Image by MD

The team is particularly concerned about the potential for well-meaning but inexperienced do-it-yourselfers to try to reproduce such a system without
the necessary clinical knowledge or expertise with hardware that can operate for days; around 1 million cycles would be required to support a ventilated patient over a two-week period. Furthermore, it requires code that is fault-tolerant, since ventilators are precision devices that perform a life-critical function. To help curtail the spread of misinformation or poorly-thought-out advice, the team has added to their website verified information resources on the clinical use of ventilators and the
requirements for training and monitoring in using such systems. All of this information is freely available at e-vent.mit.edu/.

``We are releasing design guidance (clinical, mechanical,
electrical/controls, testing) on a rolling basis as it is developed and documented,'' one team member says. ``We encourage capable clinical-engineering teams to work with their local resources, while
following the main specs and safety information, and we welcome any input
other teams may have.''

The researchers emphasize that this is not a project for typical do-it-yourselfers to undertake, since it requires specialized understanding
of the clinical-technical interface, and the ability to work in
consideration of strict U.S. Food and Drug Administration specifications and guidelines.

Such devices ``have to be manufactured according to FDA requirements, and should be utilized [only] under the supervision of a clinician. The
Department of Health and Human Services released a notice stating that all medical interventions related to Covid-19 are no longer subject to
liability, but that does not change our burden of care. At present, we are awaiting FDA feedback about the project. Ultimately, our intent is to seek
FDA approval. That process takes time, however,'' a team member said.

The all-volunteer team is working without funding and operating anonymously
for now because many of them have already been swamped by inquiries from
people wanting more information, and are concerned about being overwhelmed
by calls that would interfere with their work on the project. ``We
would really, really like to just stay focused,'' says one team
member. ``And that's one of the reasons why the website is
so essential, so that we can communicate with anyone who wants to read about what we are doing, and also so that others across the world can communicate with us.''

``The primary consideration is patient safety. So we had to establish what we're calling minimum clinical functional requirements,'' that is, the
minimum set of functions that the device would need to perform to be both
safe and useful, says one of the team members, who is both an engineer and
an MD. He says one of his jobs is to translate between the specialized languages used by the engineers and the medical professionals on the team.

That determination of minimum requirements was made by a team of physicians with broad clinical backgrounds, including anesthesia and critical care, he says. In parallel, the group set to work on designing, building, and testing
an updated prototype. Initial tests revealed the high loads that actual use incurs, and some weaknesses that have already been addressed so that, in the words of team co-leads, ``Even the professor can kick it across the room.''
In other words, early attempts focused on super ``makeability'' were too optimistic.

New versions have already been fabricated and are being prepared for
additional functional tests. Already, the team says there is enough
detailed information on their website to allow other teams to work in
parallel with them, and they have also included links to other teams
that are working on similar design efforts.

In under a week the team has gone from empty benches to their first
realistic tests of a prototype. One team member says that in the less
than a week full they have been working, motivated by reports of
doctors already having to ration ventilators, and the intense focus
the diverse group has brought to this project, they have already
generated ``multiple theses worth'' of research.

The cross-disciplinary nature of the group has been crucial, one team member says. ``The most exciting times and when the team is really moving fast are when we have an a design engineer, sitting next to a controls engineer,
sitting next to the fabrication expert, with an anesthesiologist on WebEx,
all solid modeling, coding, and spreadsheeting in parallel. We are
discussing the details of everything from ways to track patients' vital
signs data to the best sources for small electric motors.''

The intensity of the work, with people putting in very long hours every day, has been tiring but hasn't dulled their enthusiasm. ``We all work together,
and ultimately the goal is to help people, because people's lives understandably hang in the balance,'' he said.

The team can be contacted via their website [https://e-vent.mit.edu/].

David L. Chandler writes about energy, engineering, and materials
science for the MIT News Office.

[Contribution info omitted for RISKS. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 08:29:02 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren@vortex.com>
Subject: MIT Will Post Free Plans Online for an Emergency Ventilator That
Can Be Built for $100

https://scitechdaily.com/mit-posts-free-plans-online-for-an-emergency-ventilator-that-can-be-built-for-100/

I've been arguing for weeks that there's no good reason that ventilators
have to be so expensive and complex as the ones routinely used today, when
not having any kind of ventilator means DEATH for so many patients.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2020 11:05:01 -0700
From: Rob Slade <rmslade@shaw.ca>
Subject: A computer virus expert looks at CoVID-19

First off, let me say that, while "virus" was and is a reasonably good
choice as a term for replicating malware, it doesn't do to push the analogy
too far. A computer; any computer, even a supercomputer; is a fairly simple entity in comparison with the complexity of the human body. And it's easy
to say whether or not a computer is infected with a computer virus. It's pretty quantum. Either the computer is infected or not. Either a computer virus is running in memory or it's not.

When I worked in the isolation ward and in industrial first aid, I learned a lot of things that later pointed out just how different biological and
computer viruses were. And, when you study the various fields of science, which I did, it's easy to analyze some of the factors that determine how viruses work.

In comparison to a computer, any body is more akin to, well, the Internet itself. A network of billions of computers (all the cells in your body),
any one of which may or may not be infected.

A computer virus is just code. I have several thousand computer viruses in
the office with me. Hundreds of them are on each of the computers I have.
They are of almost no risk to anyone, since they are all on either floppy
disks (those are of no risk to anyone who doesn't *have* a floppy disk drive anymore) or in "zoo" directories. They aren't going to execute. They won't replicate unless I copy them somewhere. (No, don't ask. We old malware researchers are funny that way.)

A biological virus is alive. Actually, get a few microbiologists in a room together, and making that statement is a good way to start an argument.
There are a large number of factors that we generally consider necessary for life that viruses don't have. But we *can* say that viruses are, at some point, viable and will replicate (under the right conditions), and, at
another point, are not viable, and won't replicate.

It's rather difficult to say that a person (a body) is infected or not. I probably have some rhinovirus in me somewhere, but I don't (at the moment)
have a cold (that I know of). I probably have some flu virus (viruses?) in
me somewhere, but I don't have the flu. There is a progression in most
virus infections. You get a virus on or in you. (Actually, it's probably
more than one "copy" of the same virus. Infectious disease people talk
about viral "load," in reference to the number of viruses that you need to infect, or that you have, or that you shed when/while you are infectious.)
Your body has defences that are running all the time to fight off viruses, bacteria, parasites, and other things that shouldn't be in your body. But
if there are enough copies of the virus, they may either get past or
overwhelm your defences and start to replicate.

At that point, you probably can be said to be infected, but you probably
don't know it yet. The virus is attacking and spreading in your body, but
not to the point of causing symptoms yet. That is why you can be infected,
and infectious, before you realize it.

The virus replicates by inserting it's own genetic material into one of your cells, and getting the cell to reproduce it (generally destroying your cell
in the process). (CoVID-19's genetic material is RNA rather than DNA, but since we use RNA in the process of recreating our own DNA this is not a problem. For CoVID-19. It *is* kind of a problem for us.) Viruses tend to have certain types of cells that they prefer. CoVID-19 prefers lung tissue (among other types). Once a virus has started to reproduce on a large scale
in your body, the fact that you are losing some of your cells, and the fight that your defences are making against the virus, starts to produce symptoms.
At this point you are infected, and infectious, and probably know something
is wrong.

Your defences have some generic ways to identify and fight off intruders. (These are akin to the change detection or activity monitoring types of computer antivirus programs.) But, when an infection actually takes hold,
your defences start to learn how to recognize and target the specific infection. This process often involves antigens. (This is similar to
computer virus signature scanning types of antiviral programs.) (We'll come back to antigens.) These defences may, initially, create additional
symptoms, or make the existing symptoms worse, but, eventually, they will
build up and overwhelm the specific virus, drive it--well, not away
completely, but to a very low level--and cure you. If the infection doesn't kill you first. As your defences are getting the better of the virus, you
are still somewhat infected, and still shedding copies of the virus, and therefore are still infectious, but your symptoms are disappearing and you
are feeling better.

I've mentioned the issue of viruses being alive versus being viable.
CoVID-19 seems to need to be wet to be viable. It travels between people in drops of water or mucus. (Very small drops, so we call them droplets.) The virus itself can't exist (or, at least, isn't viable) as a single virus with
no water that can be breathed out and hang in the air for some time,
bouncing between air molecules. Some viruses can; we call them aerosols
(and there are other types of small particles that hang in the air that we
call aerosols); but CoVID-19 doesn't seem to be able to do this. (Sometimes people say that coughing aerosolizes your saliva, but the droplets with
water are much bigger than true aerosols.) The droplets have to be big
enough to contain water for the CoVID-19 virus to be viable, in order to be infectious, so that means that the droplets are heavy, and therefore fall
out of the air fairly quickly and can't travel very far from the person who produced them. (This is where the "six feet"/"two metres"/"fingertip to fingertip" rules come from, and why we now talk about social distancing,
which sounds cute but isn't accurate, or physical distancing, which is more accurate but isn't as catchy as a phrase.)

This is why masks *aren't* very effective at preventing people from
*getting* the virus (although they do help in some specific and dangerous situations where you are encountering a number of people with a high viral
load who are coughing up droplets a lot). Masks *are* somewhat more
effective at preventing people who *are* sick from spreading infections,
since the masks, even just dust masks, catch the droplets. If you get the virus, you probably won't breath it in. You will probably touch a surface
(any surface, even the surface of yourself or another person) where a
droplet has landed, and then touch the mucus membranes of your eyes, nose,
or mouth, which are nice and moist and CoVID-19 really likes. And remains viable. And infects. (Are your eyes getting itchy just thinking about
this? When was the last time you touched your eyes because they felt itchy? You touch your face a lot more than you realize. This is why constant hand-washing, with soap, or hand sanitizing, is important. The outer
envelope of a coronavirus is mostly a layer of fat, and, if you know
chemistry, it easy to see why coronaviruses *really* don't like soap or alcohol.)

You may have heard that CoVID-19 can be detected in air hours after an
infected person has been there. You may have heard that CoVID-19 can be detected on surfaces up to three days after an infected person has been
there (depending on the type of surface). There is a difference between
"can be detected" and "is viable." Remember that our current tests for CoVID-19 are checking for strings of the RNA of the virus, in the same way
that computer antivirus programs check for strings of code that are unique
to the computer virus. The virus, or fragments of the virus (even if not
wet or viable), can hang in the air, or be on surfaces, and be detected by
RNA tests, long after it has ceased to be viable and infectious.

(There is another type of test, one form of which is currently under trial, involving the antigens we spoke of earlier. This type of test will not
detect the virus directly, but detects whether someone has been sufficiently exposed to the virus to develop specific defences to it. This would
indicate that a person has had the virus, and then recovered (or is recovering), whether or not they demonstrated any symptoms. This test will tell us other, different, things about the virus and how it spreads, particularly about how many people in a given population get infected.)

We are security professionals. We deal with risk. We know that risk
*always* involves probability. A biological infection situation is not quantum. It is not "if you leave the house you will get infected." It is
"if you leave the house there is a higher likelihood you will become
infected." Biological virus infection involves proximity to an infected person, time of exposure, that person's viral load, number of proximal contacts, and a number of other factors. And all of the various factors involve probabilities.

The probabilities can add up. If you pass someone on the street or in a
store, there is maybe a one in a million chance you will get infected.
(Don't quote me on the "million." It's just for this example.) That isn't big. If you own a pool there is twice that chance that you will die by drowning, but many people *accept* that risk. We could *avoid* the risk of infection by not going out, but then there is a risk we could starve to
death, so we have to calculate and balance those risks. But if we encounter ten people at that store, those risks add up, so now we are at one in a
hundred thousand. And if we go to ten stores, then we go to one in ten thousand. And if we keep that up for ten days then we go to one in a
thousand, and if we keep it up for three months we are at one percent.
Which starts to sound like it might be a bit dangerous when the *impact* is that we might die.

So we have rules. But the rules are based on probabilities. It's not that
at six feet you are safe but at five foot six inches you will be infected,
but that it is unlikely that droplets will easily jump six feet. They will more easily jump three feet, although it's still not guaranteed. Rinsing
your hands with water will get rid of 80% of germs on your hands. Washing
with soap and water for 20 seconds and the proper process will get rid of
99.9% of germs. But, if you are pretty sure that you've touched something
that might be dangerous, but you can't right now, wash thoroughly but you
can, right now, rinse your hands, then rinsing your hands right now is
better than doing nothing. (Although you should make sure you wash your
hands thoroughly, as soon as you can.) All of our "six feet," "wash hands," "don't congregate" rules are risk *mitigation*.

(No, for those students of risk management, there is no risk *transfer* in
this scenario.)

And remember the tests that can't tell the difference between viable and
dead viruses, and the studies that say the virus can live on surfaces for
three days (if metal or plastic) or four hours (if copper or cardboard or
steel but in direct sunlight)? It's not that all the virus copies stay
alive for seventy two hours and then die on the seventy third. Copies of
the virus are dying all the time, and after a certain number of hours half
of them are dead, and after that same number of hours half of the remaining ones are dead, and all that time the viral load is going down and the probability that there will be enough copies of the virus to actually infect you is reducing.

So, you calculate the risks, and assess them, the same way that you
calculate that it is unlikely that you will be stabbed to death if you go to
a party. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/kamloops-party-stabbing- 1.5514085

(Wait. You were at a *party*? During the CoVID-19 crisis? What kind of risk management decision is that?)

------------------------------

Date: March 27, 2020 22:09:12 JST
From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne@warpspeed.com>
Subject: Mathematics of life and death: How disease models shape national
shutdowns and other pandemic policies (Martin Enserink/Kai Kupferschmidt)

Science, 25 Mar 2020 <https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/03/mathematics-life-and-death-how-disease-models-shape-national-shutdowns-and-other>

Jacco Wallinga's computer simulations are about to face a
high-stakes reality check. Wallinga is a mathematician and the chief
epidemic modeler at the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM), which is advising the Dutch government on what actions, such as closing schools and businesses, will help control the spread of the novel coronavirus in the country.

The Netherlands has so far chosen a softer set of measures than most Western European countries; it was late to close its schools and restaurants and
hasn't ordered a full lockdown. In a 16 March speech,

Prime Minister Mark Rutte rejected *working endlessly to contain the virus*
and *shutting down the country completely*. Instead, he opted for
*controlled spread* of the virus among the groups least at risk of severe illness while making sure the health system isn't swamped with COVID-19 patients. He called on the public to respect RIVM's expertise on how to
thread that needle. Wallinga's models predict that the number of infected people needing hospitalization, his most important metric, will taper off by the end of the week. But if the models are wrong, the demand for intensive
care beds could outstrip supply, as it has, tragically, in Italy and Spain.

COVID-19 isn't the first infectious disease scientists have modeled -- Ebola and Zika are recent examples -- but never has so much depended on their
work. Entire cities and countries have been locked down based on hastily
done forecasts that often haven't been peer reviewed. ``It has suddenly
become very visible how much the response to infectious diseases is based on models,'' Wallinga says. For the modelers, ``it's a huge responsibility,''
says epidemiologist Caitlin Rivers of the Johns Hopkins University Center
for Health Security, who co-authored a report about the future of outbreak modeling in the United States that her center released yesterday.

Just how influential those models are became apparent over the past 2 weeks
in the United Kingdom. Based partly on modeling work by a group at Imperial College London, the U.K. government at first implemented fewer measures than many other countries -- not unlike the strategy the Netherlands is
pursuing. Citywide lockdowns and school closures, as China initially
mandated, ``would result in a large second epidemic once measures were lifted,'' a group of modelers that advises the government concluded in a statement. Less severe controls would still reduce the epidemic's peak and
make any rebound less severe, they predicted.

But on 16 March, the Imperial College group published a dramatically revised model that concluded -- based on fresh data from the United Kingdom and
Italy -- that even a reduced peak would fill twice as many intensive care
beds as estimated previously, overwhelming capacity. The only choice, they concluded, was to go all out on control measures. At best, strict measures might be periodically eased for short periods, the group said (see graphic, below). The U.K. government shifted course within days and announced a
strict lockdown.

Epidemic modelers are the first to admit their projections can be off.
``All models are wrong, but some are useful,'' statistician George Box supposedly once said -- a phrase that has become a cliche in the
field.

Textbook mathematics

It's not that the science behind modeling is controversial. Wallinga uses a well-established epidemic model that divides the Dutch population into four groups, or compartments in the field's lingo: healthy, sick, recovered, or dead. Equations determine how many people move between compartments as weeks and months pass. ``The mathematical side is pretty textbook,'' he says. But model outcomes vary widely depending on the characteristics of a pathogen
and the affected population.

Because the virus that causes COVID-19 is new, modelers need estimates for
key model parameters. These estimates, particularly in the early days of an outbreak, also come from the work of modelers. For instance, by late January several groups had published roughly similar estimates of the number of new infections caused by each infected person when no control measures are taken
-- a parameter epidemiologists call R0. ``This approximate consensus so
early in the pandemic gave modelers a chance to warn of this new pathogen's epidemic and pandemic potential less than 3 weeks after the first Disease Outbreak News report was released by the WHO [World Health Organization]
about the outbreak,'' says Maia Majumder, a computational epidemiologist at Harvard Medical School whose group produced one of those early estimates.

Wallinga says his team also spent a lot of time estimating R0 for
SARS-Cov-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, and feels sure it's just over
two. He is also confident about his estimate that 3 to 6 days elapse between the moment someone is infected and the time they start to infect
others. From a 2017 survey of the Dutch population, the RIVM team also has
good estimates of how many contacts people of different ages have at home, school, work, and during leisure. Wallinga says he's least confident about
the susceptibility of each age group to infection and the rate at which
people of various ages transmit the virus. The best estimates come from a
study done in Shenzhen, a city in southern China, he says.

Compartment models assume the population is homogeneously mixed, a
reasonable assumption for a small country like the Netherlands. Other
modeling groups don't use compartments but simulate the day-to-day
interactions of millions of individuals. Such models are better able to
depict heterogeneous countries, such as the United States, or all of
Europe. WHO organizes regular calls for COVID-19 modelers to compare
strategies and outcomes, Wallinga says: ``That's a huge help in reducing discrepancies between the models that policymakers find difficult to
handle.''

Still, models can produce vastly different pictures. A widely publicized, controversial modeling study published yesterday by a group at the
University of Oxford argues that the deaths observed in the United Kingdom could be explained by a very different scenario from the currently accepted one. Rather than SARS-CoV-2 spreading in recent weeks and causing severe disease in a significant percentage of people, as most models suggest, the virus might have been spreading in the United Kingdom since January and
could have already infected up to half of the population, causing severe disease only in a tiny fraction. Both scenarios are equally plausible, says Sunetra Gupta, the theoretical epidemiologist who led the Oxford work. ``I
do think it is missing from the thinking that there is an equally big possibility that a lot of us are immune,'' she says. The model itself cannot answer the question, she says; only widespread testing for antibodies can,
and that needs to be done urgently.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2020 07:10:47 +0800
From: Richard Stein <rmstein@ieee.org>
Subject: Coronavirus: Robots use light beams to zap hospital viruses (bbc.com)

https://www.bbc.com/news/business-51914722

"Glowing like light sabres, eight bulbs emit concentrated UV-C ultraviolet light. This destroys bacteria, viruses and other harmful microbes by
damaging their DNA and RNA, so they can't multiply.

"It's also hazardous to humans, so we wait outside. The job is done in 10-20 minutes. Afterwards there's a smell, much like burned hair."

This disinfection bot is not "Bad to the Bone," but is bad to the skin.

Risk: Melanoma from UV-C albedo.

------------------------------

Date: Sat, Mar 21, 2020 at 8:55 AM
From: Geoff Kuenning <geoff@cs.hmc.edu>
Subject: Risks of extrapolation

Professor Ioannidis criticizes working with a lack of data, and then proceeds to extrapolate (apparently entirely from a single population of 700 people) without even attempting to examine the extensive data we already have. In particular, Mark Handley of University College London has shown that when unchecked, infections grow at a rate of about 35% per day, which translates
to doubling every three days. That's completely unlike the seasonal flu,
which infects only a small proportion of the population each year.

The data we have is consistent with that growth pattern. We don't run out
of ICU beds with the seasonal flu. But multiple localities are running out
of beds.

There is also evidence that people who suffer severe COVID-19 symptoms
survive with significantly reduced lung capacity. Again, that's different
from the seasonal flu.

But perhaps the most bizarre argument in his article is his apparent claim
in the statnews.com article that the best thing to do is to let everybody
who contracts the virus die quickly so that there will be ICU beds left over for heart patients six months from now. (Search the article for "heart
attack" and read the paragraph containing that phrase.)

I am reminded of James Watson's statement that "One could not be a
successful scientist without realizing that, in contrast to the popular conception supported by newspapers and mothers of scientists, a goodly
number of scientists are not only narrow-minded and dull, but also just stupid."

*Like an elephant being attacked by a house cat'*

EXCERPT:

``If we had not known about a new virus out there, and had not checked individuals with PCR [virus] tests, the number of total deaths due to `influenza-like illness' would not seem unusual this year. At most, we might have casually noted that flu this season seems to be a bit worse than average.''

This was not written by some right-wing crank claiming coronavirus is a conspiracy to deny President Trump a second term, or an excuse to bring down capitalism.

https://www.thedailybeast.com/twitter-deleted-sheriff-clarkes-wildly-reckless-coronavirus-tweets-so-he-says-hes-going-to-parler

It's from a sobering and illuminating essay by Stanford University epidemiologist John Ioannidis, co-director of its Meta-Research Innovation Center, published in the life sciences news site STAT.

https://www.statnews.com/2020/03/17/a-fiasco-in-the-making-as-the-coronavirus-pandemic-takes-hold-we-are-making-decisions-without-reliable-data/

The coronavirus-driven crackdowns on public life by state and local
political leaders are being made in a data vacuum, Ioannidis warns, and
extreme government measures to prevent infections may actually lead to more deaths.

``The current coronavirus disease, Covid-19, has been called a once-in-a-century pandemic,'' he says. ``But it may also be a
once-in-a-century evidence fiasco,'' with policymakers relying on ``meaningless'' statistics based on unreliable samples. [...]

https://www.thecollegefix.com/stanford-epidemiologist-warns-that-coronavirus-crackdown-is-based-on-bad-data/

The "M" in XML stands for *markup*. If you don't have anything outside the angle brackets, you probably shouldn't be using XML.

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 10:30:04 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren@vortex.com>
Subject: Coronavirus Reactions Creating Major Internet Security Risks

https://lauren.vortex.com/2020/03/18/coronavirus-reactions-creating-major-internet-security-risks

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 12:29:31 -0400
From: Peter de Jager <pdejager@technobility.com>
Subject: Seeking podcast contributors relating to Y2K (Peter de Jager)

Peter de Jager, once prominent in the Y2K issue, who wrote the now infamous 'Doomsday 2000' article in Computerworld in Sept1993, and operated the now defunct Year2000,com website, has decided to take a look back at Y2K and is producing a podcast: Y2K an Autobiography. [Only if it writes itself! PGN]

You can google it, or find it here:

Free Content: https://podcasts.apple.com/ca/podcast/y2k-an-autobiography/id1455676429 https://yy2k.podbean.com/

Premium Content:
https://www.vimeo.com/ondemand/Y2K
[You're welcome to use, and share this 70% off discount code for the premium content: risksdigest]

John Koskinen, once the Y2K Czar for Clinton's Task force has supported
this effort by doing an interview with him - you can find this interview
and others in the Premium content.

I have a request. If you worked on Y2K in any capacity? He'd like to
interview you for the show, so that you can tell your side of the so called 'hoax' we were a part of --- and set the record straight. If you're
interested in more details on how he's doing the interviews? Please contact
him at: pdejager@technobility.com

Here's his promise - you have final say on whether or not your interview is released - unlike the typical media interview where you have no control
over how you're represented? Peter wants your story to represent your full perspective of your involvement and not just a few cherry picked quotes to
meet the media's agenda.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2020 10:00:03 -0700
From: Rob Seaman <seaman@hanksville.org>
Subject: Risks of Leap Years, and depending on WWVB


[continued in next message]

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