[continued from previous message]

"Truth Default" concept. By default, humans believe their peers. He explores and discusses conditions that contribute to trust determination. He explains the elusive nature of human deception, and the challenges that burden experienced interrogators (judges, detectives, counter-intelligence agents, etc.) attempting to identify it.

AI algorithm decisions might one day be automatically judged for bias if an international reference standard existed for this context. This "bias
reference standard" would be analogous to the kilogram, meter, or second,
but it would apply to AI algorithm bias detection and context.

It is doubtful that a software stack, especially one using conditional
Boolean logic, can serve in this reference capacity. It is unlikely that a human can engineer it directly. Perhaps an artificial generalized
intelligence can evolve to serve humans in this magnanimous capacity. Until
a universal bias reference standard emerges, a bias-free AI algorithm, or equivalent computation structure hosted via quantum, neuromorphic, and/or analog computers, appears unlikely to materialize.

Unless governments tighten regulations and toughen enforcement, criminals
and scurrilous interests will exploit AI at the public's expense.

Scam surveillance programs, enhanced malware detection platforms, may
comprise the next technological disruption that entrepreneurs and startups pursue. How will their unbiased trust be earned and shown to serve the
public interest? Will they yield explainable, transparent, and fair outcomes that can withstand legal scrutiny?

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 10:51:17 -1000
From: the keyboard of geoff goodfellow <geoff@iconia.com>
Subject: Clearview app lets strangers find your name, info with snap of a
photo, report says (CNET)

EXCERPT:

What if a stranger could snap your picture on the sidewalk then use an app
to quickly discover your name, address and other details? A startup called Clearview AI <https://clearview.ai/> has made that possible, and its app is currently being used by hundreds of law enforcement agencies in the US, including the FBI, says a Saturday report in The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/18/technology/clearview-privacy-facial-recognition.html>

The app, says *The Times*, works by comparing a photo to a database of more than 3 billion pictures that Clearview says it's scraped off Facebook,
Venmo, YouTube and other sites. It then serves up matches, along with links
to the sites where those database photos originally appeared. A name might easily be unearthed, and from there other info could be dug up online.

The size of the Clearview database dwarfs others in use by law enforcement.
The FBI's own database, which taps passport and driver's license photos, is
one of the largest, with over 641 million images of US citizens.

The Clearview app isn't currently available to the public, but the Times
says police officers and Clearview investors think it will be in the
future. [...]

https://www.cnet.com/news/clearview-app-lets-strangers-find-your-name-info-with-snap-of-a-photo-report-says/

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 18 Jan 2020 10:58:10 +0200
From: Amos Shapir <amos083@gmail.com>
Subject: College career centers teach job applicants how to impress AI
systems (CNN)

It seems that hiring companies use AI system to analyze not just CV's, but
also video job interviews.

Full story:

https://edition.cnn.com/2020/01/15/tech/ai-job-interview/?utm_source=join1440&utm_medium=email&utm_placement=etcetera

------------------------------

Date: January 20, 2020 22:49:51 JST
From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne@warpspeed.com>
Subject: Banning Facial Recognition Isn't Enough (Bruce Schneier, NYTimes)

[via Dave Farber]

Bruce Schneier, 20 Jan 2020
The whole point of modern surveillance is to treat people differently, and facial recognition technologies are only a small part of that.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/opinion/facial-recognition-ban-privacy.html

Communities across the United States are starting to ban facial recognition technologies. In May of last year, San Francisco banned facial recognition;
the neighboring city of Oakland soon followed, as did Somerville and
Brookline in Massachusetts (a statewide ban may follow). In December, San
Diego suspended a facial recognition program in advance of a new statewide
law, which declared it illegal, coming into effect. Forty major music
festivals pledged not to use the technology, and activists are calling for a nationwide ban. Many Democratic presidential candidates support at least a partial ban on the technology.

These efforts are well intentioned, but facial recognition bans are the
wrong way to fight against modern surveillance. Focusing on one particular identification method misconstrues the nature of the surveillance society
we're in the process of building. Ubiquitous mass surveillance is
increasingly the norm. In countries like China, a surveillance
infrastructure is being built by the government for social control. In countries like the United States, it's being built by corporations in order
to influence our buying behavior, and is incidentally used by the
government.

In all cases, modern mass surveillance has three broad components: identification, correlation and discrimination. Let's take them in turn.

Facial recognition is a technology that can be used to identify people
without their knowledge or consent. It relies on the prevalence of cameras, which are becoming both more powerful and smaller, and machine learning technologies that can match the output of these cameras with images from a database of existing photos.

But that's just one identification technology among many. People can be identified at a distance by their heart beat or by their gait, using a laser-based system. Cameras are so good that they can read fingerprints and iris patterns from meters away. And even without any of these technologies,
we can always be identified because our smartphones broadcast unique numbers called MAC addresses. Other things identify us as well: our phone numbers,
our credit card numbers, the license plates on our cars. China, for example, uses multiple identification technologies to support its surveillance state.

Once we are identified, the data about who we are and what we are doing can
be correlated with other data collected at other times. This might be
movement data, which can be used to *follow* us as we move throughout our
day. It can be purchasing data, internet browsing data, or data about who we talk to via email or text. It might be data about our income, ethnicity, lifestyle, profession and interests. There is an entire industry of data brokers who make a living analyzing and augmenting data about who we are -- using surveillance data collected by all sorts of companies and then sold without our knowledge or consent.

There is a huge -- and almost entirely unregulated -- data broker industry
in the United States that trades on our information. This is how large
internet companies like Google and Facebook make their money. It's not just that they know who we are, it's that they correlate what they know about us
to create profiles about who we are and what our interests are. This is why many companies buy license plate data from states. It's also why companies
like Google are buying health records, and part of the reason Google bought
the company Fitbit, along with all of its data.

The whole purpose of this process is for companies -- and governments -- to treat individuals differently. We are shown different ads on the internet
and receive different offers for credit cards. Smart billboards display different advertisements based on who we are. In the future, we might be treated differently when we walk into a store, just as we currently are when
we visit websites.

The point is that it doesn't matter which technology is used to identify people. That there currently is no comprehensive database of heart beats or gaits doesn't make the technologies that gather them any less effective. And most of the time, it doesn't matter if identification isn't tied to a real name. What's important is that we can be consistently identified over
time. We might be completely anonymous in a system that uses unique cookies
to track us as we browse the internet, but the same process of correlation
and discrimination still occurs. It's the same with faces; we can be tracked
as we move around a store or shopping mall, even if that tracking isn't tied
to a specific name. And that anonymity is fragile: If we ever order
something online with a credit card, or purchase something with a credit
card in a store, then suddenly our real names are attached to what was anonymous tracking information.

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2020 12:31:45 -0500
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: It May Be the Biggest Tax Heist Ever. And Europe Wants Justice
(The New York Times)

Stock traders are accused of siphoning $60 billion from state coffers, in a scheme that one called `the devil's machine'. Germany is the first country
to try to get its money back.

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/business/cum-ex.html

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 26 Jan 2020 16:15:47 -0500
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: India Restores Some Internet Access in Kashmir After Long Shutdown
(NYTimes)

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/26/world/asia/kashmir-internet-shutdown-india.html

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 20:35:47 -0500
From: Steve Golson <sgolson@trilobyte.com>
Subject: Y2038 is here (Twitter)

Wonderful and scary story about Y2038. It's here, now. https://twitter.com/jxxf/status/1219009308438024200

Summary: a batch script that does financial projections 20 years out, dies
on January 19, 2018.

No one knew what was wrong at first. This batch job had never, ever
crashed before, as far as anyone remembered or had logs for. The person
who originally wrote it had been dead for at least 15 years, and in any
case hadn't been employed by the firm for decades.

[Unix Redux. 2038 seemed fairly far ahead when Ken Thompson chose that end
date. Unix systems will still be around, and we will here more
beforehand, and then after the fixes don't last, just like Y2K. PLAN
AHEAD means different things to different folks. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2020 12:21:54 -0500
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Yikes, friend's LinkedIn account hacked and spamming (Google)

... sending messages within LinkedIn with dodgy links. No reason LinkedIn accounts would be immune, so be alert.

Plenty of previous reports:

https://www.google.com/search?client=firefox-b-1-d&q=linkedin+account+hacked

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2020 15:49:04 PST
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Subject: From a car dealer

Your Recent Service Experience

TMNA_GEO_NAME_ENUM and BP_EXTERNAL_NAME_TXT would like to thank you for choosing a new TMNA_MODEL_NAME_AUTO. We appreciate your business and value
you as a customer.

About two weeks ago, we sent an email requesting your feedback. The
information you provide will help TMNA_GEO_NAME_ENUM, its distributors, its affiliates, and BP_EXTERNAL_NAME_TXT continuously improve customer
experiences.

If you have already shared your feedback, please disregard this email.

This survey will be active through TMNA_SURVEY_EXPIRATION_DATE_TEXT_EMAILS= Please begin by responding to the question below. [...]

Please do not reply to this e-mail as we are not able to respond to messages sent to this address.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 22:17:25 +0000
From: Chris Drewe <e767pmk@yahoo.co.uk>
Subject: Re: "Don't expect a return to the browser wars".

I spotted this in a newspaper -- summary follows https://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2020/01/20/dont-expect-return-browser-wars/

*The Telgraph*, 20 January 2020

Don't expect a return to the browser wars. It has been two decades since
Microsoft and the US government went to war over the former's efforts to
crush challengers to its Internet Explorer web browser. Explorer's market
share peaked at around 95pc in 2004 before heading rapidly down with the
rise of superior rivals such as Mozilla's Firefox, Opera and then Google's
Chrome. Whether Microsoft lost because of intervention or because free
market innovation did its job is still a matter of debate. But the firm
was relegated to an afterthought in the browser wars. Explorer remains the
butt of many jokes. [Edge] runs on Chromium, the engine built by Google
for the search company's own Chrome browser. Most net users are
unconcerned about which web engines they use but they have been a key part
of the battle between major software companies. Microsoft's [IE] browser
-- once so dominant it triggered monopoly investigations on two continents
-- managed to become so irrelevant it was not worth working to
support. Quite a fall.

I had to feel a twinge of sympathy for Microsoft as the EU court case
dragged on for years, and when they paid the fine, hardly anybody was still using Internet Explorer anyway...

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 11:11:11 -0800
From: RISKS-request@csl.sri.com
Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

The ACM RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet manifestation is
comp.risks, the feed for which is donated by panix.com as of June 2011.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: The mailman Web interface can be used directly to

subscribe and unsubscribe:
http://mls.csl.sri.com/mailman/listinfo/risks

SUBMISSIONS: to risks@CSL.sri.com with meaningful SUBJECT: line that

includes the string `notsp'. Otherwise your message may not be read.
*** This attention-string has never changed, but might if spammers use it.

SPAM challenge-responses will not be honored. Instead, use an alternative

address from which you never send mail where the address becomes public!

The complete INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites,

copyright policy, etc.) is online.
<http://www.CSL.sri.com/risksinfo.html>
*** Contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines!

OFFICIAL ARCHIVES: http://www.risks.org takes you to Lindsay Marshall's

searchable html archive at newcastle:
http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS --> VoLume, ISsue.
Also, ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks for the current volume
or ftp://ftp.sri.com/VL/risks-VL.IS for previous VoLume
If none of those work for you, the most recent issue is always at
http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt, and index at /risks-31.00
Lindsay has also added to the Newcastle catless site a palmtop version
of the most recent RISKS issue and a WAP version that works for many but
not all telephones: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/w/r
ALTERNATIVE ARCHIVES: http://seclists.org/risks/ (only since mid-2001)
*** NOTE: If a cited URL fails, we do not try to update them. Try
browsing on the keywords in the subject line or cited article leads.
Apologies for what Office365 and SafeLinks may have done to URLs.

Special Offer to Join ACM for readers of the ACM RISKS Forum:

<http://www.acm.org/joinacm1>

------------------------------

End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 31.55
************************

--- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
* Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)