[continued from previous message]

unverified sources, according to El Gabry. While ``that device could
eventually end up with bad actors,'' Starlink can monitor where these
devices are connecting from. ``If they pick up it ``connecting from a particular militant group for instance, they can enforce that control,'' he said.

One Facebook group of people complaining they've`been cut off suggests that Starlink has recently de-activated some of the equipment smuggled into South Africa. Still, social media groups point to a workaround, with terminals re-registered in a country like Malawi and reactivated. Customers can then
make use of Starlink's roaming services, with a subscription paid through
the website. The company offers a global roaming service with a monthly
charge of $200. Customers in South Africa can expect to pay about 12,000
rand ($630) for a kit.

In Venezuela, customers similarly get around the ban by paying for the
global service plan using an international credit card, according to people familiar with the market, who said its use is now ``normalized.''

President Joe Biden's administration could tighten the export controls that apply to Starlink to keep them out of the hands of American adversaries, according to a former US government official. A security consultant who provides training to companies on the restrictions said the real key is
trying to geolocate kits when they are turned on and blocking the ones that
are in violation of US export controls. That would require the company to cooperate, the person said, asking not to be named discussing commercially sensitive matters of national security.

A State Department spokesperson said that satellite constellations like Starlink are a key tool for providing connectivity and bridging digital divides. ``We encourage companies to take appropriate measures to seek
licenses for operating in nations around the world,'' they said.

Meanwhile, SpaceX is providing assurance to some countries that it will work with them to keep its Starlink services out of certain areas. SpaceX has reassured Israel that it can geolocate and turn off individual terminals
when it detects illegal use, according to an Israeli government official.
In Yemen, meanwhile, Starlink kits are openly for sale on social media,
bought in countries such as Singapore or Malaysia, then activated on
roaming. Customers pay via bank transfers in other countries or at the port
of arrival. Prices are higher in Houthi-controlled areas, said one seller
who asked not be named for safety reasons. That's because telecoms are controlled by the Houthis, who profit from the revenues, and have warned of severe actions against those caught using Starlink. Facebook and WhatsApp groups offer the equipment regardless mdash; along with tips on how to
conceal the dish.

--With assistance from Fabiola Zerpa, Daniel Flatley, Mohammed Alamin,
Mohammed Hatem, Andreina Itriago Acosta, Nariman Gizitdinov, Ray Ndlovu,
Eric Johnson and Jake Rudnitsky.

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 27 Mar 2024 06:07:35 +0000
From: "John Colville" <John.Colville@uts.edu.au>
Subject: Explanations of Australian emergency phone number failure

Follow-up to failure of emergency call systems on 1 March 2024:

https://www.thenewdaily.com.au/news/national/2024/03/27/errors-telstra-triple-zero-outage

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 28 Oct 2023 11:11:11 -0800
From: RISKS-request@csl.sri.com
Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

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