• Risks Digest 33.67

    From RISKS List Owner@21:1/5 to All on Fri Apr 7 00:38:59 2023
    RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Saturday 1* April 2023 Volume 33 : Issue 67

    ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

    ***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. ***** This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
    <http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/33.67>
    The current issue can also be found at
    <http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt>

    Contents: BACKLOGGED with pre-1Apr unread messages. Will get to it. Speculative out-of-order execution on my part? (PGN)
    Airline baggage drops (JSX)
    How space storms miscue train signals (phys.org)
    Why Long Trains Keep Derailing (ProPublica)
    Trojanized Windows and Mac apps rain down on 3CX users in massive supply
    chain attack (Sentinel One)
    Chinese fraudsters: evading detection and monetizing stolen credit-card
    information (ATT)
    A Front Company and a Fake Identity: How the U.S. Came to Use Spyware It Was
    Trying to Kill. (NYTimes)
    It's like children turned loose on a jungle gym (CBC)
    AI application ChatGPT temporarily banned in Italy over data collection
    concerns (CBC)
    Even More on Trust & Safety and AI (Lauren Weinstein)
    Australian mayor prepares world's first defamation lawsuit over ChatGPT
    content (The Guardian)
    Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut It All Down
    (Eliezer Yudkowsky)
    Forgive or Forget: What Happens When Robots Lie? (Catherine Barzler)
    I am not afraid of robots. I am afraid of people. (Gary Marcus)
    Are robot waiters the future? Some restaurants think so. (AP News)
    It's Their Content,You're Just Licensing it, (NYTimes)
    Stupid physical risk (Nextdoor via Phil Smith III)
    Re: DC Metro Will Retrofit Faregates To Cut Down On Fare Evasion
    (Stan Brown)
    Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

    Date: Thu, 06 Apr 2023 16:57:44 PDT
    From: Peter G Neumann <neumann@csl.sri.com>
    Subject: Speculative out-of-order execution on my part?

    * In that I somehow managed to put out the 1 April issue as RISKS-33.68 one
    day early, an off-by-one error in the issue number, so I now figure that I should backdate this RISKS-33.67 issue five days to April Fools' Day, to balance off my previous *post*-dated issue. It seems only natural, but
    was actually *not* an April-Fools prank.

    ------------------------------

    Date: Sat, 01 Apr 2023 18:07:01 +0000
    From: Henry Baker <hbaker1@pipeline.com>
    Subject: Airline baggage drops (JSX)

    I just received this *April Fool's* email from JSX, a startup airline
    serving California.

    The amazing thing is that I suggested something eerily similar about
    a decade ago.

    My non-April-Fool's suggestion was to have Fedex/UPS simply dump
    all their packages from ~10,000' altitude, and have them GPS-guided
    to their destinations, JDAM-style:

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Direct_Attack_Munition

    "The JDAM is not a stand-alone weapon; rather it is a 'bolt-on' guidance package that converts unguided gravity bombs into precision-guided munitions (PGMs)."

    I figured that UPS/Fedex could deliver packages with the same precision
    as JDAM bombs.

    Beating swords into plowshares...

    [In RISKS-26.78, I noted from my Bell Labs days that Vic Vyssotsky had a
    wonderful piece on a Cable-laying Satellite, programmed to drop a cable
    between two specified points, carefully engineered to avoid snap-back and
    collateral damage . PGN]

    ------------------------------

    Date: Sun, 02 Apr 2023 02:55:48 +0000
    From: Richard Marlon Stein <rmstein@protonmail.com>
    Subject: How space storms miscue train signals (phys.org)

    [Re: Over 1,000 Trains Derail Each Year in America (NYTimes, RISKS-33.63.
    PGN]

    https://phys.org/news/2023-03-space-storms-miscue.html

    "Train track disruptions are particularly troublesome because space storms
    can interfere with detection systems that prevent collisions. Railways
    detect trains using electrical currents and send stop signals to others to avoid crashes. But when Earth's magnetic field is disrupted, they might send false signals to stop or go, affecting operations and potentially
    endangering the freight and passengers on board."

    Recent train derailings across the U.S. are being investigated.

    Certain trains (in the U.S.) with HazMat cargoes are remotely piloted by joystick -- virtually crewed. They are currently exempt from certain safety regulations.

    https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/remote-hazmat-trains-fall-congress-push-rail-regulation-rcna77667

    ------------------------------

    Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2023 14:59:12 -0400
    From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
    Subject: Why Long Trains Keep Derailing (ProPublica)

    Before that morning in Hyndman in August 2017, regulators had already investigated seven long-train accidents in which the length was a culprit,
    and the nation's largest rail-worker union had sounded alarms about a
    pattern of problems.

    None of this caused the Federal Railroad Administration, the agency in
    charge of train safety, to intercede -- even as more long trains crashed in
    the years after the Hyndman derailment, sending cars spilling into other communities.

    Today, the rail administration says it lacks enough evidence that long
    trains pose a particular risk. But ProPublica discovered it is a quandary of the agency's own making: It doesn't require companies to provide certain
    basic information after accidents -- notably, the length of the train --
    that would allow it to assess once and for all the extent agency of the
    danger.

    ... [More on Hunter Harrison PGN-truncated]

    https://www.propublica.org/article/train-derailment-long-trains

    ------------------------------

    Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 20:19:13 -0700
    From: geoff goodfellow <geoff@iconia.com>
    Subject: Trojanized Windows and Mac apps rain down on 3CX users in
    massive supply chain attack (Sentinel One)

    Remember SolarWinds? A similar attack is playing out now against a new
    software supplier.

    Hackers working on behalf of the North Korean government have pulled off a massive supply chain attack on Windows and macOS users of 3CX, a widely
    used voice and video calling desktop client, researchers from multiple
    security firms said.

    Through means that aren't yet clear, the attack managed to distribute
    Windows and macOS versions of the app, which provides both VoIP and PBX services to 600,000+ customers <https://www.3cx.com/company/customers/>, including American Express, Mercedes-Benz, and Price Waterhouse Cooper. The attackers somehow gained the ability to hide malware inside 3CX apps that
    were digitally signed using the company's official signing key. The macOS version, according to <https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x73.html> macOS security expert Patrick Wardle, was also notarized by Apple, indicating that the company analyzed the app and detected no malicious functionality.

    In the making since 2022

    ``This is a classic supply chain attack, designed to exploit trust relationships between an organization and external parties,'' Lotem Finkelstein, Director of Threat Intelligence & Research at Check Point Software, said in an email. ``This includes partnerships with vendors or
    the use of a third-party software which most businesses are reliant on in
    some way. This incident is a reminder of just how critical it is that we do
    our due diligence in terms of scrutinizing who we conduct business
    with.''

    Security firm CrowdStrike said the infrastructure and an encryption key
    used in the attack match those seen in a March 7 campaign carried out by Labyrinth Chollima, the tracking name for a threat actor aligned with the
    North Korean government.

    The attack came to light late on Wednesday, when products from various
    security companies began detecting malicious activity coming from
    legitimately signed binaries for 3CX desktop apps. Preparations for the sophisticated operation began no later than February 2022, when the threat actor registered a sprawling set of domains used to communicate with
    infected devices. By 22 Mar 2023, security firm Sentinel One saw a spike in behavioral detections <https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/smoothoperator-ongoing-campaign-trojanizes-3cx-software-in-software-supply-chain-attack/>

    ------------------------------

    Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2023 07:37:52 -0700
    From: geoff goodfellow <geoff@iconia.com>
    Subject: Chinese fraudsters: evading detection and monetizing stolen
    credit-card information (ATT)

    Cyber-attacks are common occurrences that often make headlines, but the
    leakage of personal information, particularly credit-card data, can have
    severe consequences for individuals. It is essential to understand the techniques employed by cyber-criminals to steal this sensitive information.

    Credit-card fraud in the United States has been on the rise, with total
    losses reaching approximately $12.16 billion in 2021, according to Insider Intelligence. Card-Not-Present (CNP) fraud constituted 72% of these losses, with a substantial portion attributed to Chinese fraudsters.

    This article discusses the tactics employed by Chinese cyber-actors in committing CNP fraud and their value chain.

    Chinese fraudsters primarily target the United States for two reasons: the large population makes phishing attacks more effective, and credit-card
    limits in the country are higher compared to other nations. These factors
    make the U.S. an attractive market for card fraudsters.

    Common methods for acquiring card information include phishing, JavaScript injection through website tampering, and stealing data via Trojan horse infections. Phishing is the most prevalent method, and this analysis will
    focus on phishing tactics and the monetization value chain of stolen credit-card information. [...]

    https://cybersecurity.att.com/blogs/security-essentials/chinese-fraudsters-evadi
    ng-detection-and-monetizing-stolen-credit-card-information

    ------------------------------

    Date: Sun, 2 Apr 2023 20:00:24 -0400
    From: Jan Wolitzky <jan.wolitzky@gmail.com>
    Subject: A Front Company and a Fake Identity: How the U.S. Came to Use
    Spyware It Was Trying to Kill. (NYTimes)

    The Biden administration has been trying to choke off use of hacking tools
    made by the Israeli firm NSO. It turns out that not every part of the government has gotten the message.

    <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/02/us/politics/nso-contract-us-spy.html>

    ------------------------------

    Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2023 14:39:49 -0600
    From: Matthew Kruk <mkrukg@gmail.com>
    Subject: It's like children turned loose on a jungle gym (CBC)

    https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/chatgpt-intelligence-ownership-column-don-pittis-1.6739025

    In some ways the surprising thing about ChatGPT is how it caught not just
    the general public, but even artificial intelligence experts by surprise.

    People like Karina Vold, a philosopher of cognitive science and artificial intelligence at the University of Toronto, knew this kind of thing was
    around the corner, but the user-friendly accessibility that allowed almost anyone with a few computer skills to try it out has been transformative.
    She thinks even its creators were surprised.

    ``They are learning, I think, a lot from our own human feedback as we play
    with the system, kind of like building a jungle gym and then releasing a
    bunch of children onto it,'' said Vold.

    ------------------------------

    Date: Fri, 31 Mar 2023 19:47:13 -0600
    From: Matthew Kruk <mkrukg@gmail.com>
    Subject: AI application ChatGPT temporarily banned in Italy over
    data-collection concerns (CBC)

    https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/italy-openai-chatgpt-ban-1.6797963

    Italy's Data Protection Authority on Friday temporarily banned OpenAI's
    ChatGPT chatbot and launched a probe over a suspected breach of the
    artificial intelligence application's data-collection rules.

    The agency, also known as Garante, accused Microsoft Corp-backed ChatGPT of failing to check the age of its users who are supposed to be 13 and up.

    [This item even made it to the Palo Alto local Daily Post on 3 Apr.
    PGN]

    ------------------------------

    Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2023 10:38:28 -0700
    From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren@vortex.com>
    Subject: Even More on Trust & Safety and AI

    In answer to some questions I've received, let me put it this way. The firms pushing out these AI chat systems seem to lack an understanding of how
    ordinary persons exposed to them would react and use them. This is not altogether surprising, we've seen this pattern in tech repeatedly for many years, especially (but not exclusively) on the Internet.

    While the firms have generally had disclaimers present on these AI
    chat systems, to expect them to be fully understood in context by
    random users of these systems is both unreasonable and potentially
    dangerous.

    Attempting to pause or stop AI training or other related research is not practical nor desirable. But better communication with the public is
    absolutely necessary. These systems need to be explained in ways that non-technical, busy persons will appreciate in the context of their own
    lives and experiences. The technologists designing these systems need to realize that if sufficient resources are not dedicated to these direct
    public communication and education needs, the firms will be ever more
    targeted by politically-motivated attacks, and risk their work being ever
    more mis-characterized by entities with political motives of their own, to
    the detriment of the firms, their users, and the community at large.

    This must be understood and acted upon immediately, or the benefits of AI
    will be consumed by false narratives and it will be too late for much more
    than painful regrets.

    ------------------------------

    Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2023 09:21:46 -0700
    From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren@vortex.com>
    Subject: Australian mayor prepares world's first defamation lawsuit over
    ChatGPT content

    https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2023/apr/06/australian-mayor-prepares-worlds-first-defamation-lawsuit-over-chatgpt-content

    ------------------------------

    Date: Sun, 2 Apr 2023 11:07:55 -0700
    From: geoff goodfellow <geoff@iconia.com>
    Subject: Pausing AI Developments Isn't Enough. We Need to Shut It
    All Down (Eliezer Yudkowsky)

    https://time.com/6266923/ai-eliezer-yudkowsky-open-letter-not-enough/

    AI Labs Urged to Pump the Brakes in Open Letter <https://time.com/6266679/musk-ai-open-letter/>

    ------------------------------

    Date: Wed, 5 Apr 2023 11:44:07 -0400 (EDT)
    From: ACM TechNews <technews-editor@acm.org>
    Subject: Forgive or Forget: What Happens When Robots Lie?
    (Catherine Barzler)

    Catherine Barzler, Georgia Institute of Technology, 30 Mar 2023,
    via ACM Tech News

    Georgia Institute of Technology (Georgia Tech) researchers aimed to
    determine whether a robot could apologize after lying to rebuild trust. The study involved 341 online and 20 in-person participants in a game-like simulation in which they were tasked with driving a robot-assisted car to
    rush their friend to the hospital. The robot assistant warned that there
    were police ahead and to stay under the speed limit, but after arriving at
    the hospital, participants were informed that there had been no police. The robot assistant then randomly provided one of five responses, three of which admitted to deception and two that did not. Forty-five percent of in-person participants did not speed, mainly because they believed the robot knew more about the situation. The researchers found that apologizing without
    admitting deception outperformed the other apologies, but when told about
    the deception, the apology most effective in repairing trust involved an explanation.

    ------------------------------

    Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2023 00:04:05 -0400
    From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
    Subject: I am not afraid of robots. I am afraid of people. (Gary Marcus)

    Some thoughts on AI risks, near-term and long-term, some recent
    controversies in AI, and why we are in trouble if we can't find a way to
    work together

    https://garymarcus.substack.com/p/i-am-not-afraid-of-robots-i-am-afraid

    With this great illustration of not-problem-solving: https://twitter.com/razorbelle/status/1642000591802204162

    ------------------------------

    Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2023 09:08:47 -0700
    From: geoff goodfellow <geoff@iconia.com>
    Subject: Are robot waiters the future? Some restaurants think so.
    (AP News)

    You may have already seen them in restaurants: waist-high machines that can greet guests, lead them to their tables, deliver food and drinks and ferry dirty dishes to the kitchen. Some have cat-like faces and even purr when you scratch their heads.

    But are robot waiters the future? It's a question the restaurant industry is increasingly trying to answer.

    Many think robot waiters are the solution to the industry's labor
    shortages. Sales of them have been growing rapidly in recent years, with
    tens of thousands now gliding through dining rooms worldwide.

    ``There's no doubt in my mind that this is where the world is going,'' said Dennis Reynolds, dean of the Hilton College of Global Hospitality Leadership
    at the University of Houston. The school's restaurant began using a robot in December, and Reynolds says it has eased the workload for human staff and
    made service more efficient. [...]
    [Long article truncated for RISKS. PGN]

    https://apnews.com/article/robots-waiters-restaurants-84336d32667219776d4d0942c28caa46

    ------------------------------

    Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2023 23:08:06 -0400
    From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
    Subject: It's Their Content,You're Just Licensing it. (NYTimes)

    Recent automatic updates to e-book editions of works by Roald Dahl,
    R.L. Stine and Agatha Christie are a reminder of who really owns your
    digital media.

    https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/04/arts/dahl-christie-stine-kindle-edited.html

    [Sticking pins in the Dahl with widespread implications? PGN]

    ------------------------------

    Date: Mon, 3 Apr 2023 10:45:14 -0400
    From: "Phil Smith III" <phsiii@gmail.com>
    Subject: Stupid physical risk

    *Nextdoor* reports that some apartment complex of multiple buildings nearby
    has identical keys for unit n in each building. Someone found out when she
    woke up to find a stranger *in her apartment*, holding a key: he was a prospective renter, was given key to check out unit, went to wrong building.

    After some arguing with management, they sent locksmith to change at least *her* locks. She got a few neighbors to verify that this was true for their keys, too (presumably they knocked on other door, explained, then demonstrated).

    [I Wonder how common this is. Sure would make it easier for management to
    keep track of keys! /s]

    ------------------------------

    Date: Sat, 1 Apr 2023 07:07:03 -0700
    From: Stan Brown <the_stan_brown@fastmail.fm>
    Subject: Re: DC Metro Will Retrofit Faregates To Cut Down On Fare Evasion
    (RISKS-33.68)

    My calculations come up with a different answer:

    40,000 evasions per weekday
    365*5/7 = about 261 weekdays per year (ignoring holidays)
    40,000 * 261 = 10,440,000 evasions per year
    Using your $5/fare(*) estimate, that's $52.2 million per year

    Payback period, 70/52.2 = 1.34 years, or 1 year 4 months.

    I'm sure there are plenty of shortsighted actions for which the Metro board
    can be criticized, but a payback period of 16 months doesn't sound like one
    of them.

    [Also noted by Martin Ward. Opps. Sorry. I misread that as 40,000 each week... BAD. PGN]

    ------------------------------

    Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2020 11:11:11 -0800
    From: RISKS-request@csl.sri.com
    Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

    The ACM RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet manifestation is
    comp.risks, the feed for which is donated by panix.com as of June 2011.
    SUBSCRIPTIONS: The mailman Web interface can be used directly to
    subscribe and unsubscribe:
    http://mls.csl.sri.com/mailman/listinfo/risks

    SUBMISSIONS: to risks@CSL.sri.com with meaningful SUBJECT: line that
    includes the string `notsp'. Otherwise your message may not be read.
    *** This attention-string has never changed, but might if spammers use it.
    SPAM challenge-responses will not be honored. Instead, use an alternative
    address from which you never send mail where the address becomes public!
    The complete INFO file (submissions, default disclaimers, archive sites,
    copyright policy, etc.) is online.
    <http://www.CSL.sri.com/risksinfo.html>
    *** Contributors are assumed to have read the full info file for guidelines!

    OFFICIAL ARCHIVES: http://www.risks.org takes you to Lindsay Marshall's
    searchable html archive at newcastle:
    http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/VL.IS --> VoLume, ISsue.
    Also, ftp://ftp.sri.com/risks for the current volume/previous directories
    or ftp://ftp.sri.com/VL/risks-VL.IS for previous VoLume
    If none of those work for you, the most recent issue is always at
    http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt, and index at /risks-33.00
    ALTERNATIVE ARCHIVES: http://seclists.org/risks/ (only since mid-2001)
    *** NOTE: If a cited URL fails, we do not try to update them. Try
    browsing on the keywords in the subject line or cited article leads.
    Apologies for what Office365 and SafeLinks may have done to URLs.
    Special Offer to Join ACM for readers of the ACM RISKS Forum:
    <http://www.acm.org/joinacm1>

    ------------------------------

    End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 33.67
    ************************

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: fsxNet Usenet Gateway (21:1/5)