RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest Tuesday 23 March 2021 Volume 32 : Issue 57

ACM FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks) Peter G. Neumann, founder and still moderator

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. ***** This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
<http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/32.57>
The current issue can also be found at
<http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt>

Contents:
Cybersecurity in retrospect: not good! (PGN on NYTimes item)
A New York Lawmaker Wants to Ban Police Use of Armed Robots (WiReD)
Eastern Health blames software after thousands allowed to book early vaccine
appointments (CBC.CA)
How far should humans go to help species adapt? (Atlas Obscura)
No good evidence that 5G harms humans, new studies find (Gizmodo)
Where Are Those Shoes You Ordered? Check the Ocean Floor (WiReD)
Hackers are exploiting a server vulnerability with a severity of 9.8
out of 10 (Ars Technica)
What Happens When Our Faces Are Tracked Everywhere We Go?
Face Is Not Your Own (NYTimes)
Risk transfer and Doordash (Rob Slade)
'Expert' Hackers Used 11 Zerodays to Infect Windows, iOS, Android Users
(Dan Goodin)
New publication launch: Zero Day (Kim Zetter)
Faster fusion reactor calculations thanks to machine learning (phys.org)
Re: Victoria University of Wellington accidentally wipes all desktop
computers (John Harper)
Richard Thieme -- Mobius: A Memoir (reviewed by PGN)
Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2021 14:18:59 PDT
From: Peter Neumann <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Subject: Cybersecurity in retrospect: not good! (PGN on NYTimes item)

[I missed noting this article from 15 March. It deserves mention here, in
the wake of the SolarWinds (RISKS-32.41-44) and Microsoft Exchange
(RISKS-32.53-54) hacks (attributed to Russia and China, respectively).
Evidently, the intelligence agencies missed massive intrusions by Russia
and China, forcing the administration and Congress to look for solutions,
including closer partnership with private industry. PGN-pruned here with
just a few salient paragraphs of a 3/4-page article. The rest is worth
reading. There's lots more on what happened, what is being done, and what
needs to be done. As RISKS readers know, we urgently need better software
on better hardware, better software engineering, better government and
corporate understanding of the risks and their international implications
-- and *much more*. PGN]

David E. Sanger, Julian E. Barnes and Nicole Perlroth
White House Rethinks Cybersecurity After Failure to Detect Hackings:
Looking to private companies to cope with domestic surveillance restraints
*The New York Times*, 15 Mar 2021 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/14/us/politics/us-hacks-china-russia.html

The sophisticated hacks pulled off by Russia and China against a broad array
of government and industrial targets in the U.S. -- and the failure of the intelligence agencies to detect them -- are driving the Biden administration and Congress to rethink how the nation should protect itself from growing cyberthreats.

Both hacks exploited the same gaping vulnerability in the existing system:
They were launched from inside the United States -- on servers run by
Amazon, GoDaddy and smaller domestic providers -- putting them out of reach
of the early warning system run by the National Security Agency. The
agency, like the CIA and other American intelligence agencies, is prohibited
by law from conducting surveillance inside the United States, to protect the privacy of American citizens. [...] In the end, the hacks were detected
long after they had begun not by any government agency but by private
computer security firms.

The full extent of the damage to American interests from the hacks is not
yet clear, but the latest, attributed by Microsoft to China, is now
revealing a second vulnerability. As Microsoft releases new patches to close the holes in its system, that code is being reverse-engineered by criminal groups and exploited to launch rapid ransomware attacks on corporations, industry executives said. So a race on between Microsoft's efforts to seal
up systems, and criminal efforts to get inside those networks before the patches are applied. [...] The failures have prompted the White House to begin assessing options for overhauling the nation's cyber-defenses even as
the government investigates the hacks. Some former officials believe the
hacks show Congress needs to give the government additional powers.

It was FireEye that ultimately found the SolarWinds attack organized by
Russia, and a small Virginia firm named Volexity that revealed to Microsoft
the fact that Chinese hackers found four previously unknown vulnerabilities
in their systems, exposing hundreds of thousands of computer servers that
use Microsoft Exchange software.

Previous items: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/technology/fireeye-hacked-russians.html> <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/06/technology/microsoft-hack-china.html>

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2021 18:29:23 -0400
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: A New York Lawmaker Wants to Ban Police Use of Armed Robots (WiReD)

Officers' use of Boston Robotics Digidog intensifies concerns about militarization of the police.

New York City council member Ben Kallos says he watched in horror last month when city police responded to a hostage situation in the Bronx using Boston Dynamics Digidog, a remotely operated robotic dog equipped with surveillance cameras. Pictures of the Digidog went viral on Twitter, in part due to their uncanny resemblance with world-ending machines in the Netflix sci-fi series Black Mirror. ...

In the Bronx incident last month, police used the Digidog to gather intelligence on the house where two men were holding two others hostage, scoping out hiding places and tight corners. Police ultimately apprehended
the suspects, but privacy advocates raised concerns about the technical capabilities of the robot and policies governing its use.

The ACLU questioned why the Digidog was not listed on the police
department's disclosure of surveillance devices under a city law passed last year. The robot was only mentioned in passing in a section on situational awareness cameras. The ACLU called that disclosure ``highly inadequate'' -- criticizing the ``weak data protection and training sections'' regarding Digidog.

In a statement, the NYPD said it has been using robots since the 1970s to
save lives in hostage situations and hazmat incidents. This model of robot
is being tested to evaluate its capabilities against other models training sections, râregarding Digidog.in use by our Emergency Service Unit a Bomb Squad.

In a statement, Boston Dynamics CEO Robert Playter said the company's terms
of service prohibit attaching weapons to its robots. ``All of our buyers, without exception, must agree that Spot will not be used as a weapon or configured to hold a weapon. As an industry, we think robots will achieve long-term commercial viability only if people see robots as helpful,
beneficial tools without worrying if they're going to cause harm.''

https://www.wired.com/story/new-york-lawmaker-wants-ban-police-armed-robots/

The risk? Overreacting. Prospectively reacting. Horror over surveillance?
Shock over robots -- in use for decades -- evolving?

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2021 10:39:25 -0600
From: Matthew Kruk <mkrukg@gmail.com>
Subject: Eastern Health blames software after thousands allowed to book
early vaccine appointments (CBC.CA)

A problem with Eastern Health's COVID-19 vaccination appointment booking
system has allowed about 2,800 people to schedule appointments ahead of schedule, according to the health authority.

At a media conference Tuesday afternoon, Eastern Health president and CEO
David Diamond said people were able to prematurely book appointments due to
the scheduling software's design, allowing those who had access to the
booking website to share their codes with others.

"The system has allowed people to register somewhat outside of our regular process . book themselves, schedule themselves for vaccine appointments," Diamond said.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/software-problem-early-appointments-1.5960328

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2021 16:23:11 -0400
From: Gabe Goldberg <gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: How far should humans go to help species adapt? (Atlas Obscura)

The idea of using gene editing to preserve natural systems seems, from a certain perspective, crazy. What could be less natural than a creature
created in a lab? And the perils of releasing gene-edited organisms -- particularly those equipped with gene drive -- are clearly enormous.

https://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/how-far-should-humans-go-to-help-species-adapt

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2021 09:39:48 -1000
From: geoff goodfellow <geoff@iconia.com>
Subject: No good evidence that 5G harms humans, new studies find (Gizmodo)

Concerns over the potential harms of 5G technology are overblown, according
to two large new reviews of research recently published by scientists in Australia. Both found no clear evidence that the type of radio-frequency
energy used by 5G mobile networks poses any danger to human health.

5G is the next generation of wireless communication. It enables faster
speeds and lower latency than LTE, and while we're already seeing that in action on 5G phones, it'll take years before 5G's potential to transform industries like autonomous cars becomes a reality. <https://gizmodo.com/the-state-of-5g-in-2021-are-we-there-yet-1846401219>

That delayed promise hasn't stopped some people from warning that 5G will
only accelerate the harms purportedly caused by our existing use of wireless technology. The evidence for any health risks from our cell phones today
isn't particularly strong, but it's still something scientists are keeping
an eye on. In particular, there have been many studies in the lab and on animals trying to figure how varying levels of radio-frequency energy could possibly affect the body, including the sort of energy that would be emitted
by 5G networks. <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/we-have-no-reason-to-believe-5g-is-safe/>
<https://gizmodo.com/no-a-study-didnt-just-prove-that-cellphones-cause-brai-1825776106>
<https://gizmodo.com/a-new-report-links-cellphone-radiation-to-cancer-in-rat-1822730549>

The two new papers are the work of researchers from the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Agency (ARPANSA) and the Swinburne University
of Technology in Australia. Both were published this week in the Journal of Exposure Science and Environmental Epidemiology and are billed as the first reviews to focus on 5G specifically. [...] <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41370-021-00297-6> <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41370-021-00307-7>

https://gizmodo.com/no-good-evidence-that-5g-harms-humans-new-studies-find-1846513518

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2021 09:27:36 -1000
From: geoff goodfellow <geoff@iconia.com>
Subject: Where Are Those Shoes You Ordered? Check the Ocean Floor (WiReD)

*More containers have fallen off ships in the past four months than are typically lost in a year. Blame heavy traffic and rolling waves.*

[Add this to the list of "supply-chain" risks. PGN]

Since the end of November, this is some of what has sunk to the bottom of
the Pacific Ocean: vacuum cleaners; Kate Spade accessories; at least
$150,000 of frozen shrimp; and three shipping containers full of children's clothes. ``If anybody has investments in deep-sea salvage, there's some beautiful product down there,'' Richard Westenberger, chief financial
officer of the children's clothing brand Carter's told a conference
recently.

You can blame the weather, a surge in US imports tied to the pandemic, or a phenomenon known as parametric rolling.

All told, at least 2,980 containers have fallen off cargo ships in the
Pacific since November, in at least six separate incidents. That's more than twice the number of containers lost annually between 2008 and 2019,
according to the World Shipping Council. <https://www.worldshipping.org/Containers_Lost_at_Sea_-_2020_Update_FINAL_.pdf>

Shipping companies tend to blame the weather. The Maersk *Essen*, which lost 750 containers while sailing from China to Los Angeles in mid-January, ``experienced heavy seas during her North Pacific crossing,'' Maersk said in
a press statement. (The company didn't respond to WIRED's questions.) The Maersk *Eindhoven* experienced *heavy weather* in mid-February that
contributed to a shipwide blackout in the middle of a storm; it lost 260 containers. The ONE *Apus*, bound for the port of Long Beach from southern China, lost more than 1,800 containers during what the company called 'gale-force winds and large swells' in November. That's expected to prove
one of the costliest losses ever.

The tough weather has been exacerbated by rising traffic to the US. US container imports grew 30 percent in December, compared with the same month
a year earlier, according to IHS Markit <https://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/surge-us-imports-asia-january-extends-peak-2021_20210218.html>.
``It's a boom in import cargo beyond anything we've seen before,'' says Lars Jensen, the CEO of SeaIntelligence Consulting, which advises clients in the container shipping industry.

That's led to a shortage of containers, particularly empty containers stuck
in North America when they're needed in Asia. So it's possible that
shippers have pressed older, well-used containers into service, which are
more likely to have defective or corroded lashing or locking mechanisms,
says Ian Woods, a marine cargo lawyer and a partner with the firm Clyde &
Co. Then you've got tired crews, stretched by the extra work so they're not able to pack and secure the containers as well as they would if well
rested. [...] https://www.wired.com/story/where-shoes-ordered-check-ocean-floor/

[Also noted by Gabe Goldberg. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2021 10:05:35 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Hackers are exploiting a server vulnerability with a severity of
9.8 out of 10 (Ars Technica)

As if the mass-exploitation of Exchange servers wasn't enough, now there's BIG-I

https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2021/03/to-security-pros-dread-another-critical-server-vulnerability-is-under-exploit/

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2021 22:02:24 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: What Happens When Our Faces Are Tracked Everywhere We Go?
Face Is Not Your Own (NYTimes)

When a secretive start-up scraped the Internet to build a facial-recognition tool, it tested a legal and ethical limit — and blew the future
of privacy in America wide open.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/03/18/magazine/facial-recognition-clearview-ai.html

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2021 12:30:03 -0800
From: Rob Slade <rmslade@shaw.ca>
Subject: Risk transfer and Doordash

In terms of risk management, there are our four basic strategies: risk avoidance, risk acceptance, risk mitigation, and risk transfer.

Risk avoidance is fairly simple: if the game isn't worth the candle, don't
do it.  If the risk, in terms of both factors of impact and probability, is
any greater than the potential benefit, then we simply don't get involved in that activity or situation.  Or, more often, if the reward we aren't going
to get from this isn't *much* greater than the risk, then we don't pursue
the risk.

Risk acceptance is more complicated.  Risk acceptance *should* be the calculated decision that the gain is much more than the potential loss, and
so we will accept the risk.  However, most often risk acceptance is simply
the fact that we *want* to do something, and we blindly accept the risk
without knowing what that risk actually is.  The decision to drive drunk is based on a) the fact the we want to drink, and b) the fact that, by the time closing time comes, we are far too drunk to do any kind of risk calculation
at all.  The decision to go to a party during a pandemic has everything to
do with the fact that we are bored, and nothing to do with the probability
of encountering someone who might be infected (currently likely around 50%), and the risk that, if infected, we might die (generally about 2%).

(Psychology, social dynamics, and social engineering come in at this point.  Study after study shows that "successful," in terms of non-inherited money
or running large corporations, people are much less risk averse and much
more risk accepting than the general public.  This holds true even if the
risk is demonstrably unlikely to come out in their favour.  This is unlikely
to say anything about optimal risk strategies, since human beings have been tuned, by millions of years of evolution, natural selection, and avoiding sabre-toothed tigers in the savannah, to a certain range of risk acceptance
and risk avoidance.  It is much more probable that is says something about
the artificiality of modern, primarily capitalist, societies.  [The sample
size is rather small, since we are not talking just about the one percent,
but the vanishingly small proportion who manage to move into one percent
from outside of it.]  It also says something ironic and contraindicating
about CEOs of large corporations, since startups are much more risk
accepting, having little or nothing *to* risk, while large corporations,
having infrastructure, capital, and branding goodwill to risk, are generally much more risk averse.  And, again in terms of general risk acceptance, note that, while we remember and celebrate all the startups that go on to become large corporations, most startups, and many, many more than succeed, fail within the first year.)

Risk mitigation is the bulk of what we think about when we think about risk management.  Mitigation is all the assessment, analysis, safeguards,
controls, countermeasures, metrics, that we spend most of our time
discussing, writing about, and teaching.  So I won't go into that here.

Risk transfer is a way to shift our risk onto somebody else.  Most of the
time, when we come to risk transfer, the only thing we can think of is insurance.  Go ahead.  Do a quick search on risk transfer on the ISC2 "community."  Of the five items that come up, two obviously are about insurance, one actually is about insurance, and the remaining two just
mention risk transfer without actually talking about it.

However, the CoVID pandemic has provided us with a new example of risk transfer: food delivery.  We are afraid to go out--it's dangerous out
there.  So we pay other people to go out there for us, and bring us food
(and other necessities).  We thus transfer the risk to them.  As noted, it's not just meal deliveries: we now have a much greater use of grocery
deliveries, and online shopping of all kinds.  We are staying home, in a dangerous time to go out, and getting other people to go out and take those risks for us.

Although I'm grateful for the example of risk transfer (and I'm only sorry I thought about this too late to get it into the book), I'm not a big fan of
food delivery, in general.  It's a big part of the "gig economy," and the
gig economy is a massive "race to the bottom" in terms of wages and working standards.  (The gig economy is also, at least partly, being used by corporations to outsource both costs and risks, which is, again, ironic in
view of the fact that the pandemic has also demonstrated the inherent brittleness of the business practice of endlessly trimming any and all
margins in the name of "efficiency.")  Capitalism in general is currently driving growing inequities, and the gig economy may be pushing for the development of a massive underclass as there was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (and possibly leading to violence, revolution, and war,
as it did then).  In terms of the pandemic risk, we are seeing case clusters and outbreaks in fulfillment centres such as Amazon, but the delivery
workers, of all types, are becoming the largest and most unregarded class of essential workers.  Unfortunately, the risk of illness to them is hard to probably years from now.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2021 11:49:18 -0400 (EDT)
From: ACM TechNews <technews-editor@acm.org>
Subject: 'Expert' Hackers Used 11 Zero-days to Infect Windows, iOS, Android
Users (Dan Goodin)

Dan Goodin, Ars Technica, 18 Mar 2021, via ACM TechNews 22 Mar 2021

Google's Project Zero security researchers warned that a team of hackers
used no fewer than 11 zero-day vulnerabilities over nine months, exploiting compromised websites to infect patched devices running the Windows, iOS, and Android operating systems. The group leveraged four zero-days in February
2020, and their ability to link multiple zero-days to expose the patched devices prompted Project Zero and Threat Analysis Group analysts to deem the attackers "highly sophisticated." Project Zero's Maddie Stone said over the ensuing eight months the hackers exploited seven more previously unknown iOS zero-days via watering-hole attacks. Blogged Stone, "Overall each of the exploits themselves showed an expert understanding of exploit development
and the vulnerability being exploited."

https://orange.hosting.lsoft.com/trk/click?ref=znwrbbrs9_6-2a13bx2296d7x070813&

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 20 Mar 2021 10:14:26 -0700
From: Kim Zetter <kzetter@gmail.com>
Subject: New publication launch: Zero Day

I have launched a substack publication yesterday called Zero Day, which is focused on spies, hackers, and the intersection between cybersecurity and national security.

Here's the first story I published:

https://zetter.substack.com/p/would-government-monitoring-have

I hope you'll sign up if interested -- you have the option of a free or a
paid subscription (everything on the site is free for now but I'll
eventually put some of it behind a paywall).

Here's the About page describing my plan for the publication:

https://zetter.substack.com/about

I plan to publish not just news but also features and investigations,
which consume a lot of time and resources. I'll still write for other
publications as well, but this gives me a lot of freedom to publish things
that I ordinarily wouldn't be able to get an editor interested in. I have
a backlog of interviews and research that I've never been able to write
about because I couldn't find a publication interested in the topic. So
I'm looking forward to publishing some of that.

And, of course, if any of you have tips, please send them along.

And sign up for Seth's Parallax publication as well! He's focused on
medical and health cybersecurity topics, a critical topic at the moment and
one that will continue to be important for years.

Kim Zetter
m. 415.940.4067 <(415)%20940-4067>
Twitter: @KimZetter
Author: *Countdown to Zero Day: Stuxnet and the Launch of the World's First
Digital Weapon*

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 23 Mar 2021 10:33:12 +0800
From: Richard Stein <rmstein@ieee.org>
Subject: Faster fusion reactor calculations thanks to machine learning
(phys.org)

https://phys.org/news/2021-03-faster-fusion-reactor-machine.html

"The ultimate goal of research on fusion reactors is to achieve a net power gain in an economically viable manner. To reach this goal, large intricate devices have been constructed, but as these devices become more complex, it becomes increasingly important to adopt a predict-first approach regarding
its operation. This reduces operational inefficiencies and protects the
device from severe damage."

"To simulate such a system requires models that can capture all the relevant phenomena in a fusion device, are accurate enough such that predictions can
be used to make reliable design decisions and are fast enough to quickly
find workable solutions."

The plasma physics models and simulations become progressively tuned as computational infrastructure enables. The computations typically scale like O(N^3), possibly O(N^4) given time-dependent solutions.

Applying machine learning to assist convergence, to extrapolate and
accelerate solution discovery, enables confirmation bias. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias)

At tens of millions of degrees Kelvin, this predisposition must be correct
to prevent a plasma diverter meltdown. Fermi solutions -- order of magnitude calculations -- may provide quicker guidance.

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 21 Mar 2021 18:08:14 +1300 (NZDT)
From: John Harper <harper@msor.vuw.ac.nz>
Subject: Re: Victoria University of Wellington accidentally wipes all
desktop computers (RISKS-32.56)

The university didn't wipe all desktop computers, only the ones using Microsoft. My desktop machine was one of the Linux ones and was not
affected. I'm very grateful to the people who look after our Linux systems.

A year or two ago I told our Maths, Stats and Computing people that when I
was writing my own PhD thesis on paper in a different university in the pre-LaTeX and pre-Xerox-machine era, I made a carbon copy and took it home every night, leaving the original in my office, in a building that had been rebuilt after a fire a few years earlier. Daily backups are easier to do now but are still useful when there is a fire, burglary, serious computer
problem, ...

Victoria Univ. of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington 6140, New Zealand.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 22 Mar 2021 10:11:00 PDT
From: Peter G Neumann <neumann@csl.sri.com>
Subject: Richard Thieme -- Mobius: A Memoir

Richard Thieme's *Mobius: A Memoir" is written on at least three levels of rhetoric (as was Moby Dick, according to Wikipedia): It is a very enjoyable read as an instructive spy-like novel for lay readers; it is also a wise
book for techies, and a thoughtful challenge to Intelligence-aware insiders
as to what is really is going on -- often invisibly. Recognizing that a
mobius strip is a one-dimensional surface on which we unavoidably keep
coming back to where we started, Mobius is actually a metaphor for the
entire novel: while doubling back on itself, this book encourages us to incrementally reflect on where we have been, where we might be headed, and
when we might need to move off the treadmill. Intriguingly, the author of
the novel might be referred to as Mobius Dick (Richard), who in turn
declares that the memoir is attributed to Mobius Nick (Cerk). I really
loved the book, but then I am both a reader for enjoyment and also a lurking insider.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 1 Aug 2020 11:11:11 -0800
From: RISKS-request@csl.sri.com
Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

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