[continued from previous message]

Subject: Patients frustrated over computer system outage at Abrazo Health Hospitals.
(AZFamily)

https://www.azfamily.com/news/patients-frustrated-over-computer-system-outage-at-abrazo-health-hospitals/article_099c9d74-8f23-11e9-8030-2b5b391b080a.html

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Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2019 20:17:30 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Power outage at Greensboro apartments has unintended consequence,
reveals alleged Medicaid scheme

https://www.greensboro.com/power-outage-at-greensboro-apartments-has-unintended-consequence-reveals-alleged/article_5f215b6e-3713-567d-908a-7873cfea3a6b.html

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2019 20:10:14 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Is Target still down? Chain says registers working now after outage.
(USA Today)

https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/06/15/target-registers-down-shoppers-reporting-outage-saturday/1465476001/

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2019 20:15:25 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Spotify outage not related to today's update, company is
working on a fix. (TechCrunch)

https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/13/spotify-outage-not-related-to-todays-update-company-is-working-on-a-fix/

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2019 20:13:40 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Instagram Outage Follows Disruption To PlayStation Network (Deadline)

https://deadline.com/2019/06/instagram-outage-follows-disruption-to-playstation-network-1202632448/

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2019 20:16:45 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: The PlayStation Network Is Back Up. Here's the Latest on the PSN
Outage (Digital Trends)

https://www.digitaltrends.com/gaming/playstation-network-psn-down-outage-updates/

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 16:43:01 -0700
From: Richard Stein <rmstein@ieee.org>
Subject: In the Wiggle of an Ear, a Surprising Insight into Bat Sonar
(Scientific American)

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/in-the-wiggle-of-an-ear-a-surprising-insight-into-bat-sonar/

"...the two researchers developed an artificial horseshoe bat ear out of silicon, with devices called 'fast actuators' that move different parts of
the ear in the same way bats do. These movements also added Doppler shifts
to incoming sounds."

Bats apply Doppler shift detection from echolocation stimulus to locate
meals, navigate, and dodge flying or static obstacles.

The research suggests that delivery drones might someday be equipped with artificial bat ears to assist drone navigation of the sky. The sky is "complicated and unpredictable": trees, telephone poles, aircraft, birds,
bugs -- all kinds of obstacles that can interfere with drone delivery.

Delivery zones with buried power lines, and sparse foliage or tree cover
might only require GPS navigation to complete their route. But a heavy population center or a suburban landscape with telephone poles, or
tree-lined streets might require echolocation and GPS to reach their destination.

Correlating GPS and echolocation signals to reach fixed coordinates presents
a complicated, challenging problem.

Cruise missiles (CMs) can achieve payload delivery using nap-of-the-earth navigation and RADAR, though CMs are unlikely concerned with telephone
poles, foliage, road signs, bill boards, etc.

Risk: Ultrasonic sensor overload, sensor image correlation failure.

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 12 Jun 2019 09:43:20 -0700
From: Gene Wirchenko <gene@shaw.ca>
Subject: 'RAMBleed' Rowhammer attack can now steal data, not just alter it
(ZDNet)

https://www.zdnet.com/article/rambleed-rowhammer-attack-can-now-steal-data-not-just-alter-it/
'RAMBleed' Rowhammer attack can now steal data, not just alter it
Academics detail new Rowhammer attack named RAMBleed.
By Catalin Cimpanu for Zero Day | June 11, 2019 -- 17:00 GMT (10:00 PDT) |

opening text:

A team of academics from the US, Austria, and Australia, has published new research today detailing yet another variation of the Rowhammer attack.

The novelty in this new Rowhammer variety -- which the research team has
named RAMBleed -- is that it can be used to steal information from a
targeted device, as opposed to altering existing data or to elevate an attacker's privileges, like all previous Rowhammer attacks, have done in the past.

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 10:05:38 -0700
From: Gene Wirchenko <gene@shaw.ca>
Subject: "Ransomware halts production for days at major airplane parts
manufacturer" (Catalin Cimpanu)

Catalin Cimpanu for Zero Day | June 12, 2019

https://www.zdnet.com/article/ransomware-halts-production-for-days-at-major-airplane-parts-manufacturer/
Ransomware halts production for days at major airplane parts manufacturer Nearly 1,000 employees sent home for the entire week, on paid leave.

opening text:

ASCO, one of the world's largest suppliers of airplane parts, has ceased production in factories across four countries due to a ransomware infection reported at its plant in Zaventem, Belgium.

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 01:51:40 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Study finds that a GPS outage would cost $1 billion per day
(Ars Technica)

https://arstechnica.com/science/2019/06/study-finds-that-a-gps-outage-would-cost-1-billion-per-day/

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 16 Jun 2019 19:06:52 -0600
From: jared gottlieb <jared@netspace.net.au>
Subject: Re: GPS Degraded Across Much of U.S (RISKS-31.29)

This event seems to be a software bug in a system processing GPS data. A bulletin from one manufacturer discussing one model of a commercial aviation GPS receiver, (https://www.duncanaviation.aero/files/intellegence/GPS_CustomerComm_FINAL.pdf

Our team has been actively working to determine a root cause. We found that
a software design error resulted in the system misinterpreting GPS time
updates due to a leap-second event, which typically occurs once every 2.5
years within the U.S. Government GPS satellite almanac update. Our GPS-4000S-100 version software's timing calculations have reacted to this
leap second by not tracking satellites upon power-up and subsequently
failing. The U.S. Government distributed a regularly scheduled almanac
update with this leap second on 0:00GMT, Sunday, June 9, 2019, and the
failures began to occur soon after. The next scheduled update by the
U.S. Government to the GPS constellation is set for next Sunday, June 16 at 00:00Z. At this time, we do not believe this update will have the time

failures began to occur soon after. The next scheduled update by the
U.S. Government to the GPS constellation is set for next Sunday, June 16 at 00:00Z. At this time, we do not believe this update will have the time information that triggers this error. We are testing additional impact of
this next almanac update. ...>>

Handling leap seconds is a software risk which has affected many systems
beyond GPS receivers (a few of which have appeared in comp.risks). GPS receivers have had other time concerns, perhaps most recently the 6 April
2019 week number rollover if a receiver used the legacy 10bit value and firmware updates were not available or applied.

What the almanac update issue was nor why it would be experienced using the
one update is not clear. There has not been a leap second for more than two years and none is currently planned (IERS Bulletin C ...announcements of the leap seconds… https://datacenter.iers.org/data/latestVersion/16_BULLETIN_C16.txt

Testing of this receiver's software is extended by the 'power-up’ pre-condition mentioned in the bulletin; an aircraft manufacturer's notice illustrates the complexity of this unit's initiation https://support.cessna.com/custsupt/contacts/pubs/ourpdf.pdf%3Fas_id%3D50304

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2019 10:22:39 -0700
From: Rob Slade <rmslade@shaw.ca>
Subject: Did I Tweet that?

A researcher has noted that Twitter reference URLs can be manipulated to
make it appear someone said/tweeted something when they actually didn't.

https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/twitter-urls-can-be-manipulated-to-spread-fake-news-and-scams/

So, I tweeted a warning: https://www.twitter.com/rslade/status/1087839317534363648

Well, of course, actually, no I didn't. If you look closely at the
resulting page, you'll see it isn't my account at all. Twitter doesn't care what account you put in the URL: it just cares about the tweet status ID.

Donald Trump is so concerned that he retweeted my warning: https://www.twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1087839317534363648

So did the Queen: https://www.twitter.com/RoyalFamily/status/1087839317534363648

------------------------------

Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2019 09:34:06 -0700
From: Rob Slade <rmsladeshaw.ca>
Subject: Bull and backdoors

We're binge-watching a TV show called "Bull." (For years I've had to be careful about watching movies and TV with a high tech or security theme,
since they make so many mistakes. Apparently, having spent a couple of
decades teaching American law to Americans, I now have to avoid legal TV
shows and movies as well.)

In one episode (s3e4) they have a computer expert (someone who can program) giving testimony. He is to explain a "backdoor."

Now, as everyone here knows, a backdoor (aka trapdoor) is a technical means of circumventing a technical control or safeguard, usually to do with access control. There are some legitimate uses for backdoors, generally in development, but they are generally considered a "bad thing" in production. The
"expert" explains that a backdoor is a means of evading a control, but it's a (presumably technical, because he programmed it) means of evading a policy or regulatory control.

This piece of dialogue is a really interesting mix of fact and serious misunderstanding. Yes, a backdoor is a means of evading a control. But
the backdoor and the control are of different types. Generally a technical evasion cannot evade a policy or regulatory control (although it might obfuscate
the issue). To someone who only partially understands the situation, it might seem reasonable, but, in fact, in reality it makes no sense at all.

(Oh, come on. I wrote a *dictionary*, and you expect me to put up with this?)

(Yes, I know. This is why you don't want to watch technically themed
movies and TV shows with me. Gloria has to put up with these kinds of interruptions and explanations *a lot*.)

------------------------------

Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2019 10:57:26 -0700
From: Rob Slade <rmslade@shaw.ca>
Subject: Ross Anderson's non-visa

Ross Anderson (yes, *that* Ross Anderson, the one who wrote "Security Engineering," the best single volume for security and the one I recommend to anyone taking the exam, and he even put it online for everyone) was to
receive an award at a ceremony in Washington, DC (richly deserved, whatever
it was).

And the U.S. wouldn't give him a visa to come get it.

(By the way, *anything* Anderson writes is worth reading. Even if it's not your immediate field.)

[The visa situation is actually a bit more complicated, in that Ross did
not need a visa if he had only been receiving the award -- the desired
trip had another purpose as well. Nevertheless, the rejection seems
utterly ridiculous. PGN]

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 14 Jan 2019 11:11:11 -0800
From: RISKS-request@csl.sri.com
Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

The ACM RISKS Forum is a MODERATED digest. Its Usenet manifestation is
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