[continued from previous message]
In any event, Hron said the ransom attack is just the beginning of what an attacker could do. With more work, he believes, an attacker could program a coffee maker -- and possibly other appliances made by Smarter -- to attack
the router, computers, or other devices connected to the same network. And
the attacker could probably do it with no overt sign anything was amiss.
[No surprise. This is just one more example of the risks related to the
Internet of Things, and of course to the Things Themselves. PGN]
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2020 22:40:22 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <
monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Apple's T2 security chip has an unfixable flaw (Lily Hay Newman)
Checkm8 vulnerability used to jailbreak iPhones hits Macs as well.
by Lily Hay Newman, wired.com
Oct 10, 2020
A recently released tool is letting anyone exploit an unusual Mac vulnerability to bypass Apple's trusted T2 security chip and gain deep system access. The flaw is one researchers have also been using for more than a year to jailbreak older models of
iPhones. But the fact that the T2 chip is vulnerable in the same way creates a new host of potential threats. Worst of all, while Apple may be able to slow down potential hackers, the flaw is ultimately unfixable in every Mac that has a T2 inside.
In general, the jailbreak community hasn't paid as much attention to macOS
and OS X as it has iOS, because they don't have the same restrictions and walled gardens that are built into Apple's mobile ecosystem. But the T2
chip, launched in 2017, created some limitations and mysteries. Apple added
the chip as a trusted mechanism for securing high-value features like
encrypted data storage, Touch ID, and Activation Lock, which works with
Apple's "Find My" services. But the T2 also contains a vulnerability, known
as Checkm8, that jailbreakers have already been exploiting in Apple's A5 through A11 (2011 to 2017) mobile chipsets. Now Checkra1n, the same group
that developed the tool for iOS, has released support for T2 bypass. [...]
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/10/apples-t2-security-chip-has-an-unfixable-flaw/
https://www.wired.com/story/apple-t2-chip-unfixable-flaw-jailbreak-mac/
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2020 03:35:44 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <
monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Indian Police Accuse Popular TV Station of Ratings Fraud (NYTimes)
But this week, police officials in Mumbai accused Republic TV and two
smaller channels of rigging the ratings system by paying poor people the equivalent of a few dollars a month to tune into the station and leave their televisions on. In some cases, police officials said, people being bribed to watch the English-language channel did not speak English and were annoyed to tie up their television sets with programming that they couldn't even understand. [...]
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/09/world/asia/india-republic-tv-ratings.html
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2020 17:25:08 -0400
From: Gabe Goldberg <
gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Watch out for this green dot on your iPhone -- it means someone is
watching (The Sun)
IF you've ever panicked that an app might be watching through your iPhone's camera, Apple has got you covered.
The latest iPhone update adds a new "warning dot" that alerts you whenever
your microphone or camera is activated.
https://www.the-sun.com/lifestyle/tech/1595314/iphone-green-dot-orange-camera-microphone-notification-ios-14/
The risks? Not running current iOS, not noticing little dots on screen.
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2020 17:05:35 -0400
From: Gabe Goldberg <
gabe@gabegold.com>
Subject: Fairfax County Schools Employee Data Leaked On Dark Web: Report
(Patch)
https://patch.com/virginia/vienna/fairfax-county-schools-employee-data-leaked-dark-web-report
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 10 Oct 2020 21:09:30 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <
monty@roscom.com>
Subject: A prison video visitation service exposed private calls between
inmates and their attorneys (Tech Crunch)
Fearing the spread of coronavirus, jails and prisons remain on
lockdown. Visitors are unable to see their loved ones serving time, forcing friends and families to use prohibitively expensive video visitation
services that often don't work.
But now the security and privacy of these systems are under scrutiny after
one St Louis-based prison video visitation provider had a security lapse
that exposed thousands of phone calls between inmates and their families,
but also calls with their attorneys that were supposed to be protected by attorney-client privilege. [...]
https://techcrunch.com/2020/10/10/prison-visitation-homewav-leak/
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 11 Oct 2020 03:39:09 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <
monty@roscom.com>
Subject: Herd immunity letter signed by fake experts including 'Dr Johnny
Bananas' (The Guardian)
9 Oct 2020
An open letter that made headlines calling for a herd immunity approach to Covid-19 lists a number of apparently fake names among its expert
signatories, including Dr Johnny Bananas and Professor Cominic Dummings.
The Great Barrington declaration, which was said to have been signed by more than 15,000 scientists and medical practitioners around the world, was found
by Sky News to contain numerous false names, as well as those of several homeopaths. [...]
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/09/herd-immunity-letter-signed-fake-experts-dr-johnny-bananas-covid
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 15:59:28 +0100
From: "Patrick O'Beirne" <
pob@sysmod.com>
Subject: Updated Eusprig page
Ever seen a report on an out of date website and think "oops thats my job"?
So, I updated this page, please refresh to read it :)
http://www.eusprig.org/horror-stories.htm
My own analysis of the sorry tale is at
https://sysmod.wordpress.com/2020/10/13/uk-covid-19-track-trace-excel-snafu-uncontrolled-spreadsheets-lead-to-data-loss/
------------------------------
Date: Mon, Oct 12, 2020 at 12:00 AM
From: Dewayne Hendricks <
dewayne@warpspeed.com>
Subject: 'I Feel Like I Have Dementia': Brain Fog Plagues Covid Survivors
(NYTimes)
* The condition is affecting thousands of patients, impeding their ability
to work and function in daily life.*
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/11/health/covid-survivors.html
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 10:31:54 -1000
From: geoff goodfellow <
geoff@iconia.com>
Subject: International Statement: End-To-End Encryption and Public Safety
(DoJ)
Department of Justice
Office of Public Affairs
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Sunday, October 11, 2020
International Statement: End-To-End Encryption and Public Safety
We, the undersigned, support strong encryption, which plays a crucial role
in protecting personal data, privacy, intellectual property, trade secrets
and cyber security. It also serves a vital purpose in repressive states to protect journalists, human rights defenders and other vulnerable people, as stated in the 2017 resolution of the UN Human Rights Council[1] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety# ftn1>.
Encryption is an existential anchor of trust in the digital world and we do
not support counter-productive and dangerous approaches that would
materially weaken or limit security systems.
Particular implementations of encryption technology, however, pose
significant challenges to public safety, including to highly vulnerable
members of our societies like sexually exploited children. We urge industry
to address our serious concerns where encryption is applied in a way that wholly precludes any legal access to content. We call on technology
companies to work with governments to take the following steps, focused on reasonable, technically feasible solutions:
- Embed the safety of the public in system designs, thereby enabling
companies to act against illegal content and activity effectively with no
reduction to safety, and facilitating the investigation and prosecution of
offences and safeguarding the vulnerable;
- Enable law enforcement access to content in a readable and usable
format where an authorisation is lawfully issued, is necessary and
proportionate, and is subject to strong safeguards and oversight; and
- Engage in consultation with governments and other stakeholders to
facilitate legal access in a way that is substantive and genuinely
influences design decisions.
*IMPACT ON PUBLIC SAFETY*
Law enforcement has a responsibility to protect citizens by investigating
and prosecuting crime and safeguarding the vulnerable. Technology companies also have responsibilities and put in place terms of service for their
users that provide them authority to act to protect the public. End-to-end encryption that precludes lawful access to the content of communications in
any circumstances directly impacts these responsibilities, creating severe risks to public safety in two ways:
1. By severely undermining a company's own ability to identify and
respond to violations of their terms of service. This includes responding
to the most serious illegal content and activity on its platform, including
child sexual exploitation and abuse, violent crime, terrorist propaganda
and attack planning; and
2. By precluding the ability of law enforcement agencies to access
content in limited circumstances where necessary and proportionate to
investigate serious crimes and protect national security, where there is
lawful authority to do so.
Concern about these risks has been brought into sharp focus by proposals to apply end-to-end encryption across major messaging services. UNICEF
estimates that one in three internet users is a child. The WePROTECT
Global Alliance -- a coalition of 98 countries, 39 of the largest companies
in the global technology industry, and 41 leading civil society
organisations -- set out clearly the severity of the risks posed to children online by inaccessible encrypted services in its 2019 Global Threat
Assessment: ``Publicly-accessible social media and communications platforms remain the most common methods for meeting and grooming children online. In 2018, Facebook Messenger was responsible for nearly 12 million of the
18.4 million worldwide reports of CSAM [child sexual abuse material to the
US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC)]. These
reports risk disappearing if end-to-end encryption is implemented by
default, since current tools used to detect CSAM [child sexual abuse
material] do not work in end-to-end encrypted environments.'' [2] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftn2>
On 3 October 2019 NCMEC published a statement on this issue, stating that:
``If end-to-end encryption is implemented without a solution in place to safeguard children, NCMEC estimates that more than half of its CyberTipline reports will vanish.'' [3] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftn3>
And on 11 December 2019, the United States and European Union (EU) issued a joint statement making clear that while encryption is important for
protecting cyber security and privacy: ``the use of warrant-proof encryption
by terrorists and other criminals =93 including those who engage in online child sexual exploitation =93 compromises the ability of law enforcement agencies to protect victims and the public at large.''[4] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftn4>
*RESPONSE*
In light of these threats, there is increasing consensus across governments
and international institutions that action must be taken: while encryption
is vital and privacy and cyber security must be protected, that should not
come at the expense of wholly precluding law enforcement, and the tech
industry itself, from being able to act against the most serious illegal content and activity online.
In July 2019, the governments of the United Kingdom, United States,
Australia, New Zealand and Canada issued a communique, concluding that:
``tech companies should include mechanisms in the design of their encrypted products and services whereby governments, acting with appropriate legal authority, can gain access to data in a readable and usable format. Those companies should also embed the safety of their users in their system
designs, enabling them to take action against illegal content.''[5] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftn5>
On 8 October 2019, the Council of the EU adopted its conclusions on
combating child sexual abuse, stating: ``The Council urges the industry to ensure lawful access for law enforcement and other competent authorities to digital evidence, including when encrypted or hosted on IT servers located abroad, without prohibiting or weakening encryption and in full respect of privacy and fair trial guarantees consistent with applicable law.''[6] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftn6>
The WePROTECT Global Alliance, NCMEC and a coalition of more than 100 child protection organisations and experts from around the world have all called
for action to ensure that measures to increase privacy =93 including
end-to-end encryption =93 should not come at the expense of children's safety [7] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftn7>
.
*CONCLUSION*
We are committed to working with industry to develop reasonable proposals
that will allow technology companies and governments to protect the public
and their privacy, defend cyber security and human rights and support technological innovation. While this statement focuses on the challenges
posed by end-to-end encryption, that commitment applies across the range of encrypted services available, including device encryption, custom encrypted applications and encryption across integrated platforms. We reiterate that data protection, respect for privacy and the importance of encryption as technology changes and global Internet standards are developed remain at
the forefront of each state's legal framework. However, we challenge the assertion that public safety cannot be protected without compromising
privacy or cyber security. We strongly believe that approaches protecting
each of these important values are possible and strive to work with
industry to collaborate on mutually agreeable solutions.
*SIGNATORIES*
Rt Hon Priti Patel MP, United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Home Department
William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United States
The Hon Peter Dutton MP, Australian Minister for Home Affairs
Hon Andrew Little MP, Minister of Justice, Minister Responsible for the
GCSB, Minister Responsible for the NZSIS
The Honourable Bill Blair, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency
Preparedness
India
Japan
*11 October 2020*
[1] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftnref1>
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G17/073/06/PDF/G1707306.pdf?OpenElement
[2] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftnref2>
WePROTECT
Global Alliance, *2019 Global Threat Assessment*, available online at: <
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5630f48de4b00a75476ecf0a/t/5deecb0fc4c5ef23016423cf/1575930642519/FINAL+-+Global+Threat+Assessment.pdf
[3] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftnref3>
http://www.missingkids.org/blog/2019/post-update/end-to-end-encryption
[4] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftnref4>
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/12/11/joint-eu-us-statement-following-the-eu-us-justice-and-home-affairs-ministerial-meeting/
[5] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftnref5>
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/822818/Joint_Meeting_of_FCM_and_Quintet_of_Attorneys_FINAL.pdf
[6] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftnref6>
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-12862-2019-INIT/en/pdf
[7] <
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety#_ftnref7>
http://www2.paconsulting.com/rs/526-HZE-833/images/WePROTECT%202019%20Global%20Threat%20Assessment%20%28FINAL%29.pdf?_ga=3D2.109176709.1865852339.1591953966-1877278557.1591953966,
http://www.missingkids.org/blog/2019/post-update/end-to-end-encryption, https://www.nspcc.org.uk/globalassets/documents/policy/letter-to-mark-zuckerberg-february-2020.pdf
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/international-statement-end-end-encryption-and-public-safety
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 13 Oct 2020 11:58:12 -1000
From: geoff goodfellow <
geoff@iconia.com>
Subject: Wearable tattoo: Scientists print sensors directly onto skin
without heat (UPI)
Engineers have developed a way to print biometric sensors onto skin, like a non-permanent tattoo, without the use of heat.
In addition to being more comfortable and less intrusive than today's
wearable devices, the technology -- described Monday *in the journal ACS Applied Materials and Interfaces* <
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acsami.0c11479> -- can also collect more precise biometric measurements.
"In this article, we report a simple yet universally applicable fabrication technique with the use of a novel sintering aid layer to enable direct
printing for on-body sensors," first author Ling Zhang, researcher in the Harbin Institute of Technology in China, said in a news release.
Zhang and lead researcher Huanyu "Larry" Cheng, professor of engineering science and mechanics at Penn State University, previously fabricated
flexible printed circuit boards for wearable devices. [...]
https://www.upi.com/Science_News/2020/10/12/Wearable-tattoo-Scientists-print-sensors-directly-onto-skin-without-heat/8371602507160/
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 10:28:05 +0800
From: Richard Stein <
rmstein@ieee.org>
Subject: Continuous glucose monitoring/insulin dosing systems
The National Diabetes Statistics Report, 2020, yields "Estimates of Diabetes and Its Burden in the United States." The summary (pg. 3) states for
calendar year 2018:
https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf,
* 34.2 million people of all ages -- or 10.5% of the US population -- had
diabetes.
* 34.1 million adults aged 18 years or older -- or 13.0% of all U.S. adults
-- had diabetes (Table 1a; Table 1b).
* 7.3 million adults aged 18 years or older who met laboratory criteria for
diabetes were not aware of or did not report having diabetes (undiagnosed
diabetes, Table 1b). This number represents 2.8% of all US adults (Table
1a) and 21.4% of all US adults with diabetes.
Page 15 summarizes health care costs:
The total direct and indirect estimated costs of diagnosed diabetes in the United States in 2017 was US$ 327B.
Invoking
https://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/search?query=glucose reveals 10
prior posts from AUG2005 through APR2020 that discuss device/system safety,
and document patient quality of life impact.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4667344/ (retrieved on
12OCT2020) summarizes continuous glucose monitor (CGM) and Insulin Dosing
(ID) device patient usage experience in the US and Germany. This limited
study does not provide device deployment estimates per 100,000 population diagnosed with diabetes.
https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/understanding-the-insulin-market/ (retrieved on 14OCT) indicates that 8.3M patients in the US require insulin
to treat a diabetic condition. Patient insulin dependence is likely to determine CGM/ID device eligibility. Given the National Diabetes Report, the number of deployed devices is likely large (greater than 100,000) with anticipated growth.
Refer to
https://www.niddk.nih.gov/health-information/diabetes/overview/managing-diabetes/continuous-glucose-monitoring
(retrieved on 12OCT2020) for an illustration and description of the major device components used in an CGM.
The FDA's Total Product Lifecycle (TPLC) reporting system collates device problems for integrated glucose monitor and insulin dosing devices. There
are four FDA allocated product codes: QFG, OZQ, OZP and OZO categorizing
these devices for certification and reporting purposes.
This risks submission summarizes TPLC tabulations for devices assigned to product codes OZO and OZP. These product codes appear to possess the highest density of CGM/ID device problems and medical device reports (MDRs). MDRs usually originate from patient-device interactions that yield injury, malfunction, death, or other significant events that merit MDR submission to FDA's MAUDE utility.
For OZO, from 01JAN2015 to 30SEP2020 (
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfTPLC/tplc.cfm?id=727&min_report_year=2015),
the Top-10 TPLC Device Problems (in CSV format):
Device Problems,MDRs with this Device Problem,Events in those MDRs
Device Displays Incorrect Message,49762,49762
Adverse Event Without Identified Device or Use Problem,28727,28727
Patient Device Interaction Problem,27400,27400
Obstruction of Flow,16925,16925
No Display/Image,16613,16613
Pumping Stopped,13318,13318
No Apparent Adverse Event,11854,11854
Mechanical Problem,10551,10551
Device Difficult to Program or Calibrate,10441,10441
Power Problem,10175,10175
The same report yields medical device reports (MDR) originating with
patients. Here's the Top-10:
Patient Problems,MDRs with this Patient Problem,Events in those MDRs
No Consequences Or Impact To Patient,130842,130842
Hyperglycemia,73219,73219
No Known Impact Or Consequence To Patient,42242,42242
Hypoglycemia,22639,22639
Diabetic Ketoacidosis,5174,5174
Vomiting,1671,1671
Nausea,1583,1583
Death,881,881
Blood Loss,854,854
Loss of consciousness,770,770
For OZP, from 01JAN2015 to 30SEP2020 (
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfTPLC/tplc.cfm?id=727&min_report_year=2015),
the Top-10 TPLC Device Problems (in CSV format):
Device Problems,MDRs with this Device Problem,Events in those MDRs
Patient Device Interaction Problem,47719,47719
Adverse Event Without Identified Device or Use Problem,31499,31499
No Apparent Adverse Event,20789,20789
Power Problem,11452,11452
Connection Problem,11060,11060
No Display/Image,10546,10546
Appropriate Term/Code Not Available,9079,9079
Device Alarm System,7415,7415
Mechanical Problem,6354,6354
Device Difficult to Program or Calibrate,6024,6024
Moisture or Humidity Problem,5974,5974
The same report yields medical device reports (MDR) originating with
patients. Here's the Top-10:
Patient Problems,MDRs with this Patient Problem,Events in those MDRs:
No Consequences Or Impact To Patient,95530,95530
Hyperglycemia,36555,36555
Hypoglycemia,15859,15859
Diabetic Ketoacidosis,2550,2550
Blood Loss,1999,1999
Nausea,1142,1142
Vomiting,940,940
Abdominal Pain,447,447
Dyspnea,355,355
No Known Impact Or Consequence To Patient,332,332
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 13:36:58 +0300
From: Amos Shapir <
amos083@gmail.com>
Subject: Onions too sexy for Facebook (BBC)
An ad for onions was rejected by Facebook's automatic censor because the
onions were presented "in a sexually suggestive manner".
Full story at:
https://www.bbc.com/news/54467384
[This is a case of onion routing, in that the onion ads were routed. It
should really make you want to cry. PGN]
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 12:07:31 -0700
From: Rob Slade <
rmslade@shaw.ca>
Subject: Interview techniques and the "don't know" answer
While I'm not an expert on interviewing techniques, one of the pointers I do know is that when you ask a subject about something they should know about,
and they have no idea or opinion, they are lying to you. Or, at the very least, trying to hide something. For example, I am a security maven. If
you were to ask me how I would go about breaking into something, I should
have at least half a dozen ideas to try, right off the top of my head. If I said I had no idea how I would approach breaking into whatever you were interested in, it's probably a good bet that I am already well along in my
plan to actually break into it, and don't want to give the game away.
As another example, if you are questioning, say, a judge, about appointment
to a higher office, and you know that the judge under investigation clerked
for a higher court judge, and you ask the judge under investigation about
the higher court judges opinion that a case should have been decided
otherwise, and the judge under investigation says that [he or] she doesn't
want to give an opinion off the top of her head, she's lying. Well, she's either lying or completely incompetent, or trying, very seriously, to
mislead you, or avoid answering. It's her job to have an opinion. And it wouldn't be off the top of her head: she worked with the higher court judge
and probably had something to do with writing the dissenting opinion. It's
her job, it's her background, and there is no reason for her to avoid
answering the question, in great detail.
Unless [he or] she's lying.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 15 Oct 2020 09:34:26 -0700
From: Rob Slade <
rmslade@shaw.ca>
Subject: To my friends and colleagues in the U.S.: Be careful out there.
Oh, my colleagues and only friends, especially in the US--you are under
threat. You are in danger. You are at risk. Please be careful.
Possibly it is because I put myself through uni working in a hospital and
even an isolation ward. Perhaps it is because I just finished writing a
book on "Cybersecurity Lessons from CoVID-19." I am, perhaps, more
sensitized to the topic, and I have, possibly, been keeping too close an eye
on the numbers. But I suspect you may be heading for trouble.
Maybe not you, personally, but, maybe. You, my colleagues and friends, are professionals, and live and work in environments that are probably not at greatest risk. But infectious diseases do not pay attention to rent levels. And possibly someone that you know and love is at greater risk.
I live in BC. We've been very fortunate. We were at high risk due to
levels of international travel, but we were randomly lucky in regard to
things like the dates of spring school vacation, and having the world's greatest chief medical health officer. March and April were really hard,
and then we seemed to get things under control.
But, in pandemics, things may not be as they "seem." Recently we have had a surge in cases in BC. Every pandemic in history has had a second wave, and generally worse than the first. Unfortunately, there isn't a good pattern
for second waves, other than that they exist; and the only way to know when you've had it is after it's over. Our recent surge, in BC, may be our
second wave. Or, our second wave may still be to come. But four other provinces in Canada have also had surges. Europe is having a surge. And, despite having the highest rates both absolutely and per capita, there are indications that the US may be heading for a surge as well. The predictions
of 400,000 deaths by January may be conservative.
Everybody is tired of the pandemic. And the fact that there is so much we don't know about it makes it much harder to get people to pay attention. We
do not like uncertainty. We dislike it so much that when things are
uncertain we ignore them. We have only known of the existence of this class
of virus for sixty years. We have had only one experience with a disease
from this class of virus, and that was limited and short-lived. This type
of virus defies our models of spread from better-known disease vectors.
Getting a disease from many viruses confers life- long protection, but this
one seems to be able to re-infect some people, sometimes within months. We
are learning as we go, and it's hard to keep up. And, unfortunately, as we
go, and as we learn, some people are dying, and others are getting very
sick. Sometimes for a long time.
We are working on a vaccine. At least 150 vaccines, in fact. A handful are under last stage trials. Two of those trials have been halted, hopefully temporarily, because of possible problems that have come to light during the trials. This is common, and it is the purpose of trials to find those problems. This time around it is making news only because people are so desperate for the vaccines.
But, even when we find a vaccine (hopefully more than one), we then have to manufacture (carefully, and with due attention to contamination) billions of doses, and then figure out how everyone is going to get "shot." Many people are thinking we will have a vaccine by the beginning of the new year. I
rather suspect that it will be June before enough people have been
vaccinated to provide real protection.
In the meantime, as Dr. Bonnie Henry has said, the future is in your hands,
and you must continue to wash them. Strict isolation is not absolutely necessary, and, as Poe pointed out in "The Masque of the Red Death," not guaranteed. Nothing, in fact, is guaranteed. Defence in depth and layered defence is mandatory. Physical distancing is primary. Keeping groups;
*all* groups, *all* meetings, *all* parties; small and to a minimum is
primary. Washing your hands, constantly, is vital. Wearing a mask, if you must be in public or with others, is not magic and will not save you, but reduces (not eliminates) the risk of close contact. Follow the World Health Organization's Five Heroic Acts. (Speaking of the which, the integrity of advice is not only changing, but is under attack. Stick to the advice of
those who know what they are talking about. Listen to experts like Bonnie Henry or Fauci, not Barrington and his gang of homeopaths.) Activities with heavy breathing and in large groups, like contact sports or choirs, are very dangerous. (Orgies are *definitely* contraindicated.)
https://www.who.int/campaigns/connecting-the-world-to-combat- coronavirus/safehands-challenge/5-heroic-acts
Be kind. Be calm. Be safe. Be careful. This is not forever, but it is
for now.
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 21:59:16 +0100
From: Chris Drewe <
e767pmk@yahoo.co.uk>
Subject: Re: Why cars are more "fragile": more technology has reduced
robustness (Robinson, RISKS-32.31)
A few years ago, a motoring journalist commented that there seems to be an 'unholy alliance' between governments and car makers; they want to show how much they want to save our lives and save the planet so they add these
costly features for improved safety, fuel economy, and lower emissions. Governments like this because it shows how caring and compassionate they
are, and car makers like this because it allows them to control the repair business. And making cars difficult to repair probably earns more tax $$$$s for selling new ones.
One example that comes to mind is the power steering on my car, made in
1988, which uses the traditional hydraulic pump and steering box. Works
fine, but the slight snag is poor energy efficiency. Modern cars use
electric power steering, with an electric motor and tons of complicated electronics. Much better energy efficiency as the assistance only works
when it's needed, *and* the amount of assistance can be varied to suit the driver's taste (fingertip-light to sports car) with a dashboard control. Downside is that it's (reportedly) not a repairable item, with replacements
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