On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with this in the >>>>>> header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75
Umm...
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the aioe.org NNTP
server and not to any specific poster, right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims unless I am
sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't remember who)
already pointed out this error to you when you were claiming the
poster in question was from Germany. That's like assuming that
someone must be from Mountain View CA since they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly false
until independently confirmed. That is how first-principles reasoning
works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge
First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to reverse-engineer
complicated problems and unleash creative possibility. Sometimes
called “reasoning from first principles,” the idea is to break down
complicated problems into basic elements and then reassemble them from
the ground up. https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your 'theories', since
they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the field.
FAIL.
On 2/22/22 12:03 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with this in >>>>>>>> the header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75
Umm...
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the aioe.org NNTP >>>>>>> server and not to any specific poster, right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims unless I am
sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't remember who)
already pointed out this error to you when you were claiming the
poster in question was from Germany. That's like assuming that
someone must be from Mountain View CA since they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly false
until independently confirmed. That is how first-principles
reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge
First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to
reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative
possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first principles,” the >>>> idea is to break down complicated problems into basic elements and
then reassemble them from the ground up.
https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your 'theories', since
they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the field.
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not correspond
to conventional wisdom because I have corrected the errors in the
philosophical underpinnings of this conventional wisdom. People acting
like sheep say that I am wrong because they are attached to the
conventional wisdom.
When it comes to actually showing any mistake all they have is
gibberish double talk anchored in the fact that they simply do not
believe me.
It isn't 'Conventional Wisdom', it is that they don't conform to the
RULES of the field. They just are not truths, as truths by definition, conform to reality, and in a logical field, that includes its rules and definitions.
The replies that you are trying to reject are NOT 'Gibberish', they are pointing out that you are BREAKING THE RULES of the field.
Logically,
you are an OUTLAW. You can not accept them, because your mind is stuck
in your fantasy where you THINK you know something that no one else
does, but that idea is just a lie.
You claims that you have somehow 'proved' something are just flat out
LIES as the definition of Truth means it obeys the reality of the
system. Perhaps the simplest one to point out is your insistance that
the behavior of the simulation of <H^> <H^> does not correspond to the behavior of the machine H^ applied to <H^>, when by all definitions of simulation, that is the plain meaning.
If a simulation does not match
the thing it is supposed to be simulating, the simulation is inaccurate.
You even admit (or have in the past) that H^ applied to <H^> Halts,
which means the ONLY correct answer for what a simulation of <H^> <H^>
should show is that it halts. BY DEFINITION.
In many ways I pity you, as it seems you have some ideas that might be
worth discussing (in a different venue) but you have basically closed
that door because you are insainly committed you mind to a path that you
can not support. This seems to indicate that you really don't understand
what Truth actually is, and are going to suffer the consequences of that.
You have FAILED. You are going to pay for your rebellion to the truth.
On 22/02/2022 05:03, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with this in >>>>>>>> the header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75
Umm...
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the aioe.org NNTP >>>>>>> server and not to any specific poster, right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims unless I am
sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't remember who)
already pointed out this error to you when you were claiming the
poster in question was from Germany. That's like assuming that
someone must be from Mountain View CA since they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly false
until independently confirmed. That is how first-principles
reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge
First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to
reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative
possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first principles,” the >>>> idea is to break down complicated problems into basic elements and
then reassemble them from the ground up.
https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your 'theories', since
they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the field.
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not correspond
to conventional wisdom
No, it's that they are simply wrong. And wrong in very dumb
(uninteresting) ways...
On 2/22/22 2:07 PM, olcott wrote:You never notice that this input never halts whether or not it is
On 2/22/2022 6:10 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 12:03 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with this in >>>>>>>>>> the header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75
Umm...
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the aioe.org
NNTP server and not to any specific poster, right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims unless I
am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't remember who) >>>>>>> already pointed out this error to you when you were claiming the >>>>>>> poster in question was from Germany. That's like assuming that
someone must be from Mountain View CA since they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly false
until independently confirmed. That is how first-principles
reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge
First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to
reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative
possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first principles,” >>>>>> the idea is to break down complicated problems into basic elements >>>>>> and then reassemble them from the ground up.
https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your 'theories',
since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the field.
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not
correspond to conventional wisdom because I have corrected the
errors in the philosophical underpinnings of this conventional
wisdom. People acting like sheep say that I am wrong because they
are attached to the conventional wisdom.
When it comes to actually showing any mistake all they have is
gibberish double talk anchored in the fact that they simply do not
believe me.
It isn't 'Conventional Wisdom', it is that they don't conform to the
RULES of the field. They just are not truths, as truths by
definition, conform to reality, and in a logical field, that includes
its rules and definitions.
When it is shown that these rules are inconsistent with themselves
then this inconsistency cannot be ignored and must be resolved.
Then show an ACTUAL inconsistency!!
The replies that you are trying to reject are NOT 'Gibberish', they
are pointing out that you are BREAKING THE RULES of the field.
No they are not. You simply do not believe that this repeating pattern
can be recognized by embedded_H even though you yourself already
acknowledged that it is an infinitely repeating pattern.
When Ĥ is applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩
Ĥ copies its input ⟨Ĥ1⟩ to ⟨Ĥ2⟩ then embedded_H simulates ⟨Ĥ1⟩ ⟨Ĥ2⟩
Only if H never aborts.
On 2/22/22 8:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 5:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 2:07 PM, olcott wrote:You never notice that this input never halts whether or not it is
On 2/22/2022 6:10 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 12:03 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with this >>>>>>>>>>>> in the header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75
Umm...
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the aioe.org >>>>>>>>>>> NNTP server and not to any specific poster, right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims unless I >>>>>>>>> am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't remember >>>>>>>>> who) already pointed out this error to you when you were
claiming the poster in question was from Germany. That's like >>>>>>>>> assuming that someone must be from Mountain View CA since they >>>>>>>>> use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly
false until independently confirmed. That is how
first-principles reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge
First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to
reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative
possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first principles,” >>>>>>>> the idea is to break down complicated problems into basic
elements and then reassemble them from the ground up.
https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your 'theories',
since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the field. >>>>>>>
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not
correspond to conventional wisdom because I have corrected the
errors in the philosophical underpinnings of this conventional
wisdom. People acting like sheep say that I am wrong because they
are attached to the conventional wisdom.
When it comes to actually showing any mistake all they have is
gibberish double talk anchored in the fact that they simply do not >>>>>> believe me.
It isn't 'Conventional Wisdom', it is that they don't conform to
the RULES of the field. They just are not truths, as truths by
definition, conform to reality, and in a logical field, that
includes its rules and definitions.
When it is shown that these rules are inconsistent with themselves
then this inconsistency cannot be ignored and must be resolved.
Then show an ACTUAL inconsistency!!
The replies that you are trying to reject are NOT 'Gibberish', they
are pointing out that you are BREAKING THE RULES of the field.
No they are not. You simply do not believe that this repeating
pattern can be recognized by embedded_H even though you yourself
already acknowledged that it is an infinitely repeating pattern.
When Ĥ is applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩
Ĥ copies its input ⟨Ĥ1⟩ to ⟨Ĥ2⟩ then embedded_H simulates ⟨Ĥ1⟩ ⟨Ĥ2⟩
Only if H never aborts.
aborted because halting is required to reach a final state.
Because you never notice this when it is reiterated countless times
you must either be a liar or have actual brain damage.
And you never notice that the CORRECT behavior DOES reach the final
state because you give up when your machine aborts it.
On 2/22/22 8:10 PM, olcott wrote:Like I said point out the specific error that Wittgenstein made (his
On 2/22/2022 6:43 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
On 22/02/2022 05:03, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with this in >>>>>>>>>> the header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75
Umm...
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the aioe.org
NNTP server and not to any specific poster, right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims unless I
am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't remember who) >>>>>>> already pointed out this error to you when you were claiming the >>>>>>> poster in question was from Germany. That's like assuming that
someone must be from Mountain View CA since they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly false
until independently confirmed. That is how first-principles
reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge
First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to
reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative
possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first principles,” >>>>>> the idea is to break down complicated problems into basic elements >>>>>> and then reassemble them from the ground up.
https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your 'theories',
since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the field.
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not
correspond to conventional wisdom
No, it's that they are simply wrong. And wrong in very dumb
(uninteresting) ways...
If I was simply wrong then Wittgenstein would not have perfectly
summed up my view quoted on page 6 of my paper:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Wittgenstein
Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the
philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy
of language. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein understood these things on the basis of their
philosophical foundation rather than the learned-by-rote of logicians
and mathematicians. He understood these things at the deepest
philosophical level. He was very famous in his day for his knowledge
of the philosophy of logic.
If you think that I am incorrect then you would be able to explain the
specific error that Wittgenstein made.
Everyone presented with this challenge simply dodges and asserts that
Wittgenstein did not understand Gödel very well.
Also on page 7 of my paper is Gödel's own words that claim:
"Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof." In other words his proof has the exact same
basis as the liar paradox, that he refers to as the "liar antinomy".
I explain that the liar paradox is simply not a "truth bearer" because
it is self-contradictory.
Even one of the greatest minds on the subject of the liar paradox Saul
Kripke did not boil it down to this simple essence.
Saul Kripke (1975) Outline of a theory of truth
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Kripke%20-%20Outline%20of%20a%20Theory%20of%20Truth.pdf
Maybe the issue is that you mind just can't handle the complexities of
the problem. B
On 2/22/22 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:The simulation of ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ by embedded_H cannot possibly reach ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
On 2/22/2022 7:47 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 8:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 5:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 2:07 PM, olcott wrote:You never notice that this input never halts whether or not it is
On 2/22/2022 6:10 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 12:03 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:Umm...
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this in the header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75 >>>>>>>>>>>>>
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the aioe.org >>>>>>>>>>>>> NNTP server and not to any specific poster, right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims unless >>>>>>>>>>> I am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't remember >>>>>>>>>>> who) already pointed out this error to you when you were >>>>>>>>>>> claiming the poster in question was from Germany. That's like >>>>>>>>>>> assuming that someone must be from Mountain View CA since >>>>>>>>>>> they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly >>>>>>>>>> false until independently confirmed. That is how
first-principles reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge
First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to
reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative >>>>>>>>>> possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first
principles,” the idea is to break down complicated problems >>>>>>>>>> into basic elements and then reassemble them from the ground >>>>>>>>>> up. https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your 'theories', >>>>>>>>> since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the field. >>>>>>>>>
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not
correspond to conventional wisdom because I have corrected the >>>>>>>> errors in the philosophical underpinnings of this conventional >>>>>>>> wisdom. People acting like sheep say that I am wrong because
they are attached to the conventional wisdom.
When it comes to actually showing any mistake all they have is >>>>>>>> gibberish double talk anchored in the fact that they simply do >>>>>>>> not believe me.
It isn't 'Conventional Wisdom', it is that they don't conform to >>>>>>> the RULES of the field. They just are not truths, as truths by
definition, conform to reality, and in a logical field, that
includes its rules and definitions.
When it is shown that these rules are inconsistent with themselves >>>>>> then this inconsistency cannot be ignored and must be resolved.
Then show an ACTUAL inconsistency!!
The replies that you are trying to reject are NOT 'Gibberish',No they are not. You simply do not believe that this repeating
they are pointing out that you are BREAKING THE RULES of the field. >>>>>>
pattern can be recognized by embedded_H even though you yourself
already acknowledged that it is an infinitely repeating pattern.
When Ĥ is applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩
Ĥ copies its input ⟨Ĥ1⟩ to ⟨Ĥ2⟩ then embedded_H simulates ⟨Ĥ1⟩
⟨Ĥ2⟩
Only if H never aborts.
aborted because halting is required to reach a final state.
Because you never notice this when it is reiterated countless times
you must either be a liar or have actual brain damage.
And you never notice that the CORRECT behavior DOES reach the final
state because you give up when your machine aborts it.
As I have told you at .east fifty times this never occurs:
embedded_H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
whether or not embedded_H aborts its simulation.
You either have brain damage or are a liar.
Note, you can't say that embedded_H goes to H^.Qn
On 2/22/22 9:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:The simulation of ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ by embedded_H cannot possibly reach ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
On 2/22/2022 7:47 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 8:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 5:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 2:07 PM, olcott wrote:You never notice that this input never halts whether or not it is
On 2/22/2022 6:10 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 12:03 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:Umm...
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this in the header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aioe.org NNTP server and not to any specific poster, right? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims >>>>>>>>>>>>> unless I am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't
remember who) already pointed out this error to you when >>>>>>>>>>>>> you were claiming the poster in question was from Germany. >>>>>>>>>>>>> That's like assuming that someone must be from Mountain >>>>>>>>>>>>> View CA since they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly >>>>>>>>>>>> false until independently confirmed. That is how
first-principles reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge >>>>>>>>>>>> First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to
reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative >>>>>>>>>>>> possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first
principles,” the idea is to break down complicated problems >>>>>>>>>>>> into basic elements and then reassemble them from the ground >>>>>>>>>>>> up. https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your
'theories', since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the >>>>>>>>>>> field.
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not >>>>>>>>>> correspond to conventional wisdom because I have corrected the >>>>>>>>>> errors in the philosophical underpinnings of this conventional >>>>>>>>>> wisdom. People acting like sheep say that I am wrong because >>>>>>>>>> they are attached to the conventional wisdom.
When it comes to actually showing any mistake all they have is >>>>>>>>>> gibberish double talk anchored in the fact that they simply do >>>>>>>>>> not believe me.
It isn't 'Conventional Wisdom', it is that they don't conform >>>>>>>>> to the RULES of the field. They just are not truths, as truths >>>>>>>>> by definition, conform to reality, and in a logical field, that >>>>>>>>> includes its rules and definitions.
When it is shown that these rules are inconsistent with
themselves then this inconsistency cannot be ignored and must be >>>>>>>> resolved.
Then show an ACTUAL inconsistency!!
The replies that you are trying to reject are NOT 'Gibberish', >>>>>>>>> they are pointing out that you are BREAKING THE RULES of the >>>>>>>>> field.
No they are not. You simply do not believe that this repeating >>>>>>>> pattern can be recognized by embedded_H even though you yourself >>>>>>>> already acknowledged that it is an infinitely repeating pattern. >>>>>>>>
When Ĥ is applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩
Ĥ copies its input ⟨Ĥ1⟩ to ⟨Ĥ2⟩ then embedded_H simulates
⟨Ĥ1⟩ ⟨Ĥ2⟩
Only if H never aborts.
aborted because halting is required to reach a final state.
Because you never notice this when it is reiterated countless
times you must either be a liar or have actual brain damage.
And you never notice that the CORRECT behavior DOES reach the final
state because you give up when your machine aborts it.
As I have told you at .east fifty times this never occurs:
embedded_H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
whether or not embedded_H aborts its simulation.
You either have brain damage or are a liar.
Note, you can't say that embedded_H goes to H^.Qn
The simulation of ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ by embedded_H cannot possibly reach ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
The simulation of ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ by embedded_H cannot possibly reach ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
The simulation of ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ by embedded_H cannot possibly reach ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
Which means that
On 2/22/22 9:14 PM, olcott wrote:So then what could 'True in Russell's system' mean ???
On 2/22/2022 8:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Like I said point out the specific error that Wittgenstein made (his
On 2/22/22 8:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 6:43 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
On 22/02/2022 05:03, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with this >>>>>>>>>>>> in the header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75
Umm...
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the aioe.org >>>>>>>>>>> NNTP server and not to any specific poster, right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims unless I >>>>>>>>> am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't remember >>>>>>>>> who) already pointed out this error to you when you were
claiming the poster in question was from Germany. That's like >>>>>>>>> assuming that someone must be from Mountain View CA since they >>>>>>>>> use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly
false until independently confirmed. That is how
first-principles reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge
First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to
reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative
possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first principles,” >>>>>>>> the idea is to break down complicated problems into basic
elements and then reassemble them from the ground up.
https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your 'theories',
since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the field. >>>>>>>
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not
correspond to conventional wisdom
No, it's that they are simply wrong. And wrong in very dumb
(uninteresting) ways...
If I was simply wrong then Wittgenstein would not have perfectly
summed up my view quoted on page 6 of my paper:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Wittgenstein
Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the
philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the
philosophy of language.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein understood these things on the basis of their
philosophical foundation rather than the learned-by-rote of
logicians and mathematicians. He understood these things at the
deepest philosophical level. He was very famous in his day for his
knowledge of the philosophy of logic.
If you think that I am incorrect then you would be able to explain
the specific error that Wittgenstein made.
Everyone presented with this challenge simply dodges and asserts
that Wittgenstein did not understand Gödel very well.
Also on page 7 of my paper is Gödel's own words that claim:
"Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof." In other words his proof has the exact same
basis as the liar paradox, that he refers to as the "liar antinomy".
I explain that the liar paradox is simply not a "truth bearer"
because it is self-contradictory.
Even one of the greatest minds on the subject of the liar paradox
Saul Kripke did not boil it down to this simple essence.
Saul Kripke (1975) Outline of a theory of truth
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Kripke%20-%20Outline%20of%20a%20Theory%20of%20Truth.pdf
Maybe the issue is that you mind just can't handle the complexities
of the problem. B
view is identical to mine) or admit that you are simply utterly
clueless about the deep analysis of these things, you only know them
by rote.
Wittgenstein is quoted on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Again, he is presupposing that True only means provable.
His Quote that you highlight:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved in Russell's
system; and 'false in Russell's system' means:the opposite has been
proved in Russell's system
is not a correct statement.
On 2/22/22 10:05 PM, olcott wrote:_Infinite_Loop()
On 2/22/2022 8:47 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 9:37 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:25 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:The simulation of ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ by embedded_H cannot possibly reach ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
On 2/22/2022 7:47 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 8:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 5:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 2:07 PM, olcott wrote:You never notice that this input never halts whether or not it >>>>>>>> is aborted because halting is required to reach a final state. >>>>>>>>
On 2/22/2022 6:10 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/22/22 12:03 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this in the header that will get rid of them: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 46.165.242.75
Umm...
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aioe.org NNTP server and not to any specific poster, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unless I am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> remember who) already pointed out this error to you when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you were claiming the poster in question was from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Germany. That's like assuming that someone must be from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mountain View CA since they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly false until independently confirmed. That is how >>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-principles reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge >>>>>>>>>>>>>> First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative >>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles,” the idea is to break down complicated >>>>>>>>>>>>>> problems into basic elements and then reassemble them from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the ground up. https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your
'theories', since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the >>>>>>>>>>>>> field.
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not >>>>>>>>>>>> correspond to conventional wisdom because I have corrected >>>>>>>>>>>> the errors in the philosophical underpinnings of this
conventional wisdom. People acting like sheep say that I am >>>>>>>>>>>> wrong because they are attached to the conventional wisdom. >>>>>>>>>>>>
When it comes to actually showing any mistake all they have >>>>>>>>>>>> is gibberish double talk anchored in the fact that they >>>>>>>>>>>> simply do not believe me.
It isn't 'Conventional Wisdom', it is that they don't conform >>>>>>>>>>> to the RULES of the field. They just are not truths, as
truths by definition, conform to reality, and in a logical >>>>>>>>>>> field, that includes its rules and definitions.
When it is shown that these rules are inconsistent with
themselves then this inconsistency cannot be ignored and must >>>>>>>>>> be resolved.
Then show an ACTUAL inconsistency!!
The replies that you are trying to reject are NOT
'Gibberish', they are pointing out that you are BREAKING THE >>>>>>>>>>> RULES of the field.
No they are not. You simply do not believe that this repeating >>>>>>>>>> pattern can be recognized by embedded_H even though you
yourself already acknowledged that it is an infinitely
repeating pattern.
When Ĥ is applied to ⟨Ĥ⟩
Ĥ copies its input ⟨Ĥ1⟩ to ⟨Ĥ2⟩ then embedded_H simulates
⟨Ĥ1⟩ ⟨Ĥ2⟩
Only if H never aborts.
Because you never notice this when it is reiterated countless
times you must either be a liar or have actual brain damage.
And you never notice that the CORRECT behavior DOES reach the
final state because you give up when your machine aborts it.
As I have told you at .east fifty times this never occurs:
embedded_H ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⊢* ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
whether or not embedded_H aborts its simulation.
You either have brain damage or are a liar.
Note, you can't say that embedded_H goes to H^.Qn
The simulation of ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ by embedded_H cannot possibly reach ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
The simulation of ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ by embedded_H cannot possibly reach ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
The simulation of ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ by embedded_H cannot possibly reach ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn
Which means that
The simulation of ⟨Ĥ⟩ ⟨Ĥ⟩ can't possibly reach ⟨Ĥ⟩.qn because it is
infinitely recursive.
Then H can't have aborted its simulation, so it didn't answer, and it
FAILED.
On 2022-02-22 20:32, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
So then what could 'True in Russell's system' mean ???
On 2/22/22 9:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Like I said point out the specific error that Wittgenstein made (his
On 2/22/22 8:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 6:43 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
On 22/02/2022 05:03, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:Umm...
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with >>>>>>>>>>>>>> this in the header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75 >>>>>>>>>>>>>
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the aioe.org >>>>>>>>>>>>> NNTP server and not to any specific poster, right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims unless >>>>>>>>>>> I am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't remember >>>>>>>>>>> who) already pointed out this error to you when you were >>>>>>>>>>> claiming the poster in question was from Germany. That's like >>>>>>>>>>> assuming that someone must be from Mountain View CA since >>>>>>>>>>> they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly >>>>>>>>>> false until independently confirmed. That is how
first-principles reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge
First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to
reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative >>>>>>>>>> possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first
principles,” the idea is to break down complicated problems >>>>>>>>>> into basic elements and then reassemble them from the ground >>>>>>>>>> up. https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your 'theories', >>>>>>>>> since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the field. >>>>>>>>>
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not
correspond to conventional wisdom
No, it's that they are simply wrong. And wrong in very dumb
(uninteresting) ways...
If I was simply wrong then Wittgenstein would not have perfectly
summed up my view quoted on page 6 of my paper:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Wittgenstein
Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the
philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the
philosophy of language.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein understood these things on the basis of their
philosophical foundation rather than the learned-by-rote of
logicians and mathematicians. He understood these things at the
deepest philosophical level. He was very famous in his day for his >>>>>> knowledge of the philosophy of logic.
If you think that I am incorrect then you would be able to explain >>>>>> the specific error that Wittgenstein made.
Everyone presented with this challenge simply dodges and asserts
that Wittgenstein did not understand Gödel very well.
Also on page 7 of my paper is Gödel's own words that claim:
"Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar >>>>>> undecidability proof." In other words his proof has the exact same >>>>>> basis as the liar paradox, that he refers to as the "liar antinomy". >>>>>>
I explain that the liar paradox is simply not a "truth bearer"
because it is self-contradictory.
Even one of the greatest minds on the subject of the liar paradox
Saul Kripke did not boil it down to this simple essence.
Saul Kripke (1975) Outline of a theory of truth
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Kripke%20-%20Outline%20of%20a%20Theory%20of%20Truth.pdf
Maybe the issue is that you mind just can't handle the complexities
of the problem. B
view is identical to mine) or admit that you are simply utterly
clueless about the deep analysis of these things, you only know them
by rote.
Wittgenstein is quoted on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Again, he is presupposing that True only means provable.
His Quote that you highlight:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved in Russell's
system; and 'false in Russell's system' means:the opposite has been
proved in Russell's system
is not a correct statement.
You'd have to ask Wittgenstein that.
You'd also have to ask him why he felt this had any relevance to Gödel's Theorem since Gödel's paper doesn't use the expression 'True in
Russell's System'. In fact, it does not mention or discuss truth at all.
As has been pointed out to you, the Wittgenstein quote you are so
enamoured with was taken from a set of notebooks which were never
intended for publication. They were essentially Wittgenstein 'thinking
out loud', and contain both worthwhile ideas which he later expanded
upon and published as well as half-baked ideas which he clearly came up
with before his morning coffee.
We'll never know how Wittgenstein came to view this particular paragraph
if he later revisited it, but there are two things of which we are
absolutely certain.
(1) We know the comment was written *BEFORE* Wittgenstein had actually
read Gödel's paper, so it was based on some second-hand summary of the
paper which he had encountered.
(2) We know that Wittgenstein *DID* eventually read Gödel's paper, and
that after reading it he did not make any attempt to publish this
'criticism' of Gödel, nor did he mention it again in any of his known notebooks.
André
On 2022-02-22 22:17, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:04 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 20:32, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
So then what could 'True in Russell's system' mean ???
On 2/22/22 9:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Like I said point out the specific error that Wittgenstein made
On 2/22/22 8:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 6:43 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
On 22/02/2022 05:03, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:Umm...
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this in the header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aioe.org NNTP server and not to any specific poster, right? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims >>>>>>>>>>>>> unless I am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't
remember who) already pointed out this error to you when >>>>>>>>>>>>> you were claiming the poster in question was from Germany. >>>>>>>>>>>>> That's like assuming that someone must be from Mountain >>>>>>>>>>>>> View CA since they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly >>>>>>>>>>>> false until independently confirmed. That is how
first-principles reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge >>>>>>>>>>>> First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to
reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative >>>>>>>>>>>> possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first
principles,” the idea is to break down complicated problems >>>>>>>>>>>> into basic elements and then reassemble them from the ground >>>>>>>>>>>> up. https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your
'theories', since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the >>>>>>>>>>> field.
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not >>>>>>>>>> correspond to conventional wisdom
No, it's that they are simply wrong. And wrong in very dumb >>>>>>>>> (uninteresting) ways...
If I was simply wrong then Wittgenstein would not have perfectly >>>>>>>> summed up my view quoted on page 6 of my paper:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Wittgenstein
Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the >>>>>>>> philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the
philosophy of language.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein understood these things on the basis of their
philosophical foundation rather than the learned-by-rote of
logicians and mathematicians. He understood these things at the >>>>>>>> deepest philosophical level. He was very famous in his day for >>>>>>>> his knowledge of the philosophy of logic.
If you think that I am incorrect then you would be able to
explain the specific error that Wittgenstein made.
Everyone presented with this challenge simply dodges and asserts >>>>>>>> that Wittgenstein did not understand Gödel very well.
Also on page 7 of my paper is Gödel's own words that claim:
"Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar undecidability proof." In other words his proof has the >>>>>>>> exact same basis as the liar paradox, that he refers to as the >>>>>>>> "liar antinomy".
I explain that the liar paradox is simply not a "truth bearer" >>>>>>>> because it is self-contradictory.
Even one of the greatest minds on the subject of the liar
paradox Saul Kripke did not boil it down to this simple essence. >>>>>>>>
Saul Kripke (1975) Outline of a theory of truth
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Kripke%20-%20Outline%20of%20a%20Theory%20of%20Truth.pdf
Maybe the issue is that you mind just can't handle the
complexities of the problem. B
(his view is identical to mine) or admit that you are simply
utterly clueless about the deep analysis of these things, you only >>>>>> know them by rote.
Wittgenstein is quoted on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Again, he is presupposing that True only means provable.
His Quote that you highlight:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved in Russell's
system; and 'false in Russell's system' means:the opposite has been
proved in Russell's system
is not a correct statement.
You'd have to ask Wittgenstein that.
You'd also have to ask him why he felt this had any relevance to
Gödel's Theorem since Gödel's paper doesn't use the expression 'True
in Russell's System'. In fact, it does not mention or discuss truth
at all.
As has been pointed out to you, the Wittgenstein quote you are so
enamoured with was taken from a set of notebooks which were never
intended for publication. They were essentially Wittgenstein
'thinking out loud', and contain both worthwhile ideas which he later
expanded upon and published as well as half-baked ideas which he
clearly came up with before his morning coffee.
We'll never know how Wittgenstein came to view this particular
paragraph if he later revisited it, but there are two things of which
we are absolutely certain.
(1) We know the comment was written *BEFORE* Wittgenstein had
actually read Gödel's paper, so it was based on some second-hand
summary of the paper which he had encountered.
(2) We know that Wittgenstein *DID* eventually read Gödel's paper,
and that after reading it he did not make any attempt to publish this
'criticism' of Gödel, nor did he mention it again in any of his known
notebooks.
André
My view on Gödel is totally summed up by Wittgenstein.
I formed Wittgenstein's complete view long before I ever heard of him.
You don't know what Wittgenstein 'complete view' actually was. No one
other than Wittgenstein knows this.
What you are really saying is that you formed some view and then
interpreted one of Wittgenstein's remarks in terms of that view.
Note that Haskell Curry is quoted before Wittgenstein has a comparable
notion of what "true in a formal system" means.
Let 𝓣 be such a theory. Then the elementary statements which belong
to 𝓣 we shall call the elementary theorems of 𝓣; we also say that
these elementary statements are true for 𝓣. Thus, given 𝓣, an
elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is true...
Olcott's true in a formal system 𝓣 is exactly Curry's elementary
theorems of 𝓣 and statements of 𝓣 derived by applying truth
preserving operations beginning with Curry's elementary theorems of 𝓣
as premises.
When you start with truth and only apply truth preserving operations
you always necessarily end up with truth.
Which has nothing whatsoever to do with Gödel, since his theorem was not concerned with truth and made no mention of truth at all.
André
On 2/23/22 12:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:04 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 20:32, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
So then what could 'True in Russell's system' mean ???
On 2/22/22 9:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Like I said point out the specific error that Wittgenstein made
On 2/22/22 8:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 6:43 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
On 22/02/2022 05:03, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:Umm...
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this in the header that will get rid of them: 46.165.242.75 >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aioe.org NNTP server and not to any specific poster, right? >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims >>>>>>>>>>>>> unless I am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't
remember who) already pointed out this error to you when >>>>>>>>>>>>> you were claiming the poster in question was from Germany. >>>>>>>>>>>>> That's like assuming that someone must be from Mountain >>>>>>>>>>>>> View CA since they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as possibly >>>>>>>>>>>> false until independently confirmed. That is how
first-principles reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge >>>>>>>>>>>> First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to
reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative >>>>>>>>>>>> possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first
principles,” the idea is to break down complicated problems >>>>>>>>>>>> into basic elements and then reassemble them from the ground >>>>>>>>>>>> up. https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your
'theories', since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the >>>>>>>>>>> field.
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not >>>>>>>>>> correspond to conventional wisdom
No, it's that they are simply wrong. And wrong in very dumb >>>>>>>>> (uninteresting) ways...
If I was simply wrong then Wittgenstein would not have perfectly >>>>>>>> summed up my view quoted on page 6 of my paper:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Wittgenstein
Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, the >>>>>>>> philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the
philosophy of language.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein understood these things on the basis of their
philosophical foundation rather than the learned-by-rote of
logicians and mathematicians. He understood these things at the >>>>>>>> deepest philosophical level. He was very famous in his day for >>>>>>>> his knowledge of the philosophy of logic.
If you think that I am incorrect then you would be able to
explain the specific error that Wittgenstein made.
Everyone presented with this challenge simply dodges and asserts >>>>>>>> that Wittgenstein did not understand Gödel very well.
Also on page 7 of my paper is Gödel's own words that claim:
"Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar undecidability proof." In other words his proof has the >>>>>>>> exact same basis as the liar paradox, that he refers to as the >>>>>>>> "liar antinomy".
I explain that the liar paradox is simply not a "truth bearer" >>>>>>>> because it is self-contradictory.
Even one of the greatest minds on the subject of the liar
paradox Saul Kripke did not boil it down to this simple essence. >>>>>>>>
Saul Kripke (1975) Outline of a theory of truth
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Kripke%20-%20Outline%20of%20a%20Theory%20of%20Truth.pdf
Maybe the issue is that you mind just can't handle the
complexities of the problem. B
(his view is identical to mine) or admit that you are simply
utterly clueless about the deep analysis of these things, you only >>>>>> know them by rote.
Wittgenstein is quoted on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Again, he is presupposing that True only means provable.
His Quote that you highlight:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved in Russell's
system; and 'false in Russell's system' means:the opposite has been
proved in Russell's system
is not a correct statement.
You'd have to ask Wittgenstein that.
You'd also have to ask him why he felt this had any relevance to
Gödel's Theorem since Gödel's paper doesn't use the expression 'True
in Russell's System'. In fact, it does not mention or discuss truth
at all.
As has been pointed out to you, the Wittgenstein quote you are so
enamoured with was taken from a set of notebooks which were never
intended for publication. They were essentially Wittgenstein
'thinking out loud', and contain both worthwhile ideas which he later
expanded upon and published as well as half-baked ideas which he
clearly came up with before his morning coffee.
We'll never know how Wittgenstein came to view this particular
paragraph if he later revisited it, but there are two things of which
we are absolutely certain.
(1) We know the comment was written *BEFORE* Wittgenstein had
actually read Gödel's paper, so it was based on some second-hand
summary of the paper which he had encountered.
(2) We know that Wittgenstein *DID* eventually read Gödel's paper,
and that after reading it he did not make any attempt to publish this
'criticism' of Gödel, nor did he mention it again in any of his known
notebooks.
André
My view on Gödel is totally summed up by Wittgenstein.
I formed Wittgenstein's complete view long before I ever heard of him.
Note that Haskell Curry is quoted before Wittgenstein has a comparable
notion of what "true in a formal system" means.
Let 𝓣 be such a theory. Then the elementary statements which belong
to 𝓣 we shall call the elementary theorems of 𝓣; we also say that
these elementary statements are true for 𝓣. Thus, given 𝓣, an
elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is true...
Olcott's true in a formal system 𝓣 is exactly Curry's elementary
theorems of 𝓣 and statements of 𝓣 derived by applying truth
preserving operations beginning with Curry's elementary theorems of 𝓣
as premises.
When you start with truth and only apply truth preserving operations
you always necessarily end up with truth.
And if YOUR concept of what Truth means doesn't match what someone else
is using, it doesn't mean you get to force your definition onto their
work. That a Fallacy And Invalid Logic, i.e. FAIL.
One of the fundamental laws of logic is you need to examane a statement
in the framework it was given in. Your attempts just violate that basic principle.
This is the problem with your concept of 'First Principles', you need to
know enough of a system to be able to correctly think in it.
You clearly
don't understand the meaning of many of the basic concepts, but are INCORRECTLY mapping the words to similar things your thought up, and are
just assuming they match up. They don't.
You seemed to have skimmed over some works and learned a bit of
symbology, and have tried to assign it meaning, but since you really
don't know the meaning you use it wrong. I don't think you really
understand what a Computation is (and you comments to what 'computers'
do reveal that, as Computation Theory predates the Digital Computer). My guess is whatever it is that you are thinking it means has some
significant difference for the actual meaning.
I also think you just don't understand the real concept of something
being actually True.
On 2022-02-23 08:13, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 22:17, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:04 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 20:32, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
So then what could 'True in Russell's system' mean ???
On 2/22/22 9:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Like I said point out the specific error that Wittgenstein made >>>>>>>> (his view is identical to mine) or admit that you are simply
On 2/22/22 8:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 6:43 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
On 22/02/2022 05:03, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this in the header that will get rid of them: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 46.165.242.75
Umm...
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aioe.org NNTP server and not to any specific poster, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unless I am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> remember who) already pointed out this error to you when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you were claiming the poster in question was from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Germany. That's like assuming that someone must be from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mountain View CA since they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly false until independently confirmed. That is how >>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-principles reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge >>>>>>>>>>>>>> First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative >>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles,” the idea is to break down complicated >>>>>>>>>>>>>> problems into basic elements and then reassemble them from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the ground up. https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your
'theories', since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the >>>>>>>>>>>>> field.
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not >>>>>>>>>>>> correspond to conventional wisdom
No, it's that they are simply wrong. And wrong in very dumb >>>>>>>>>>> (uninteresting) ways...
If I was simply wrong then Wittgenstein would not have
perfectly summed up my view quoted on page 6 of my paper:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Wittgenstein
Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, >>>>>>>>>> the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the >>>>>>>>>> philosophy of language.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein understood these things on the basis of their >>>>>>>>>> philosophical foundation rather than the learned-by-rote of >>>>>>>>>> logicians and mathematicians. He understood these things at >>>>>>>>>> the deepest philosophical level. He was very famous in his day >>>>>>>>>> for his knowledge of the philosophy of logic.
If you think that I am incorrect then you would be able to >>>>>>>>>> explain the specific error that Wittgenstein made.
Everyone presented with this challenge simply dodges and
asserts that Wittgenstein did not understand Gödel very well. >>>>>>>>>>
Also on page 7 of my paper is Gödel's own words that claim: >>>>>>>>>>
"Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof." In other words his proof has >>>>>>>>>> the exact same basis as the liar paradox, that he refers to as >>>>>>>>>> the "liar antinomy".
I explain that the liar paradox is simply not a "truth bearer" >>>>>>>>>> because it is self-contradictory.
Even one of the greatest minds on the subject of the liar
paradox Saul Kripke did not boil it down to this simple essence. >>>>>>>>>>
Saul Kripke (1975) Outline of a theory of truth
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Kripke%20-%20Outline%20of%20a%20Theory%20of%20Truth.pdf
Maybe the issue is that you mind just can't handle the
complexities of the problem. B
utterly clueless about the deep analysis of these things, you
only know them by rote.
Wittgenstein is quoted on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Again, he is presupposing that True only means provable.
His Quote that you highlight:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved in
Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' means:the
opposite has been proved in Russell's system
is not a correct statement.
You'd have to ask Wittgenstein that.
You'd also have to ask him why he felt this had any relevance to
Gödel's Theorem since Gödel's paper doesn't use the expression
'True in Russell's System'. In fact, it does not mention or discuss
truth at all.
As has been pointed out to you, the Wittgenstein quote you are so
enamoured with was taken from a set of notebooks which were never
intended for publication. They were essentially Wittgenstein
'thinking out loud', and contain both worthwhile ideas which he
later expanded upon and published as well as half-baked ideas which
he clearly came up with before his morning coffee.
We'll never know how Wittgenstein came to view this particular
paragraph if he later revisited it, but there are two things of
which we are absolutely certain.
(1) We know the comment was written *BEFORE* Wittgenstein had
actually read Gödel's paper, so it was based on some second-hand
summary of the paper which he had encountered.
(2) We know that Wittgenstein *DID* eventually read Gödel's paper,
and that after reading it he did not make any attempt to publish
this 'criticism' of Gödel, nor did he mention it again in any of
his known notebooks.
André
My view on Gödel is totally summed up by Wittgenstein.
I formed Wittgenstein's complete view long before I ever heard of him.
You don't know what Wittgenstein 'complete view' actually was. No one
other than Wittgenstein knows this.
Because I formed this same view myself independently of Wittgenstein I
can say that his quoted words in my paper form a 100% complete
rebuttal that Gödel found a sentence that is both true and unprovable.
It is simply unprovable because it is untrue.
It is quite possible for two people to independently reach the same
wrong conclusion. So the above hardly constitutes an argument.
What you are really saying is that you formed some view and then
interpreted one of Wittgenstein's remarks in terms of that view.
Note that Haskell Curry is quoted before Wittgenstein has a
comparable notion of what "true in a formal system" means.
Let 𝓣 be such a theory. Then the elementary statements which belong >>>> to 𝓣 we shall call the elementary theorems of 𝓣; we also say that >>>> these elementary statements are true for 𝓣. Thus, given 𝓣, an
elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is true...
Olcott's true in a formal system 𝓣 is exactly Curry's elementary
theorems of 𝓣 and statements of 𝓣 derived by applying truth
preserving operations beginning with Curry's elementary theorems of
𝓣 as premises.
When you start with truth and only apply truth preserving operations
you always necessarily end up with truth.
Which has nothing whatsoever to do with Gödel, since his theorem was
not concerned with truth and made no mention of truth at all.
André
It has everything to do with all undecidable propositions.
Undecidable propositions are simply not truth bearers
The above claim is simply false. It is not consistent with the standard definitions of 'undecidable' and 'truth bearer'.
Moreover, it also doesn't follow from your above claim that "When you
start with truth and only apply truth preserving operations you always necessarily end up with truth." So you're basically presenting a non-sequitur.
in the same way that the following sentence is neither true nor false: "What time is it?"
That sentence is not a proposition. Gödels paper is concerned with undecidable *propositions*. And it isn't concerned with natural language
at all.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only truth
preserving operations beginning with a set of premises known to be
true (such as Haskell Curry's elementary theorems) are sound, else
unsound.
Oh dear. You really are confused. You're making numerous category errors above. Soundness is not a property of arguments, not propositions (which
is what Gödel is concerned with).
And 'expressions of formal or natural
language' don't 'apply truth preserving operations'.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only truth
preserving operations beginning with a set of premises are valid, else
invalid.
That sentence is incoherent.
valid reasoning requires conclusions to be a necessary consequence of
the premises.
Which is not contradicted by Gödel. He would agree with this.
André
On 2/23/22 10:13 AM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 22:17, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:04 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 20:32, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:43 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
So then what could 'True in Russell's system' mean ???
On 2/22/22 9:14 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 8:00 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Like I said point out the specific error that Wittgenstein made >>>>>>>> (his view is identical to mine) or admit that you are simply
On 2/22/22 8:10 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 6:43 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
On 22/02/2022 05:03, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:48 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 2/21/22 11:38 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:34 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-21 21:22, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 10:01 PM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 2022-02-21 20:36, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/21/2022 9:19 PM, B.H. wrote:
0
Best to put them on ignore.
If you can set your newsreader to delete messages with >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> this in the header that will get rid of them: >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> 46.165.242.75
Umm...
You do realize that that IP address belongs to the >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> aioe.org NNTP server and not to any specific poster, >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> right?
https://ipinfo.io/46.165.242.75
It looks like you are correct.
Of course I'm correct. Unlike you, I don't post claims >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unless I am sure of them.
But there is some irony here since someone (I can't >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> remember who) already pointed out this error to you when >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> you were claiming the poster in question was from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Germany. That's like assuming that someone must be from >>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Mountain View CA since they use gmail.
André
I always count everything that I have been told as >>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly false until independently confirmed. That is how >>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-principles reasoning works:
First Principles: The Building Blocks of True Knowledge >>>>>>>>>>>>>> First-principles thinking is one of the best ways to >>>>>>>>>>>>>> reverse-engineer complicated problems and unleash creative >>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibility. Sometimes called “reasoning from first >>>>>>>>>>>>>> principles,” the idea is to break down complicated >>>>>>>>>>>>>> problems into basic elements and then reassemble them from >>>>>>>>>>>>>> the ground up. https://fs.blog/first-principles/
Maybe you should try applying that to some of your
'theories', since they are actually wrong.
After all, they don't follow the actual definitions of the >>>>>>>>>>>>> field.
FAIL.
It is not that my theories are wrong it is that they do not >>>>>>>>>>>> correspond to conventional wisdom
No, it's that they are simply wrong. And wrong in very dumb >>>>>>>>>>> (uninteresting) ways...
If I was simply wrong then Wittgenstein would not have
perfectly summed up my view quoted on page 6 of my paper:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Wittgenstein
Austrian-British philosopher who worked primarily in logic, >>>>>>>>>> the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of mind, and the >>>>>>>>>> philosophy of language.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ludwig_Wittgenstein
Wittgenstein understood these things on the basis of their >>>>>>>>>> philosophical foundation rather than the learned-by-rote of >>>>>>>>>> logicians and mathematicians. He understood these things at >>>>>>>>>> the deepest philosophical level. He was very famous in his day >>>>>>>>>> for his knowledge of the philosophy of logic.
If you think that I am incorrect then you would be able to >>>>>>>>>> explain the specific error that Wittgenstein made.
Everyone presented with this challenge simply dodges and
asserts that Wittgenstein did not understand Gödel very well. >>>>>>>>>>
Also on page 7 of my paper is Gödel's own words that claim: >>>>>>>>>>
"Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>>> similar undecidability proof." In other words his proof has >>>>>>>>>> the exact same basis as the liar paradox, that he refers to as >>>>>>>>>> the "liar antinomy".
I explain that the liar paradox is simply not a "truth bearer" >>>>>>>>>> because it is self-contradictory.
Even one of the greatest minds on the subject of the liar
paradox Saul Kripke did not boil it down to this simple essence. >>>>>>>>>>
Saul Kripke (1975) Outline of a theory of truth
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Kripke%20-%20Outline%20of%20a%20Theory%20of%20Truth.pdf
Maybe the issue is that you mind just can't handle the
complexities of the problem. B
utterly clueless about the deep analysis of these things, you
only know them by rote.
Wittgenstein is quoted on page 6
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333907915_Proof_that_Wittgenstein_is_correct_about_Godel
Again, he is presupposing that True only means provable.
His Quote that you highlight:
'True in Russell's system' means, as was said: proved in
Russell's system; and 'false in Russell's system' means:the
opposite has been proved in Russell's system
is not a correct statement.
You'd have to ask Wittgenstein that.
You'd also have to ask him why he felt this had any relevance to
Gödel's Theorem since Gödel's paper doesn't use the expression
'True in Russell's System'. In fact, it does not mention or discuss
truth at all.
As has been pointed out to you, the Wittgenstein quote you are so
enamoured with was taken from a set of notebooks which were never
intended for publication. They were essentially Wittgenstein
'thinking out loud', and contain both worthwhile ideas which he
later expanded upon and published as well as half-baked ideas which
he clearly came up with before his morning coffee.
We'll never know how Wittgenstein came to view this particular
paragraph if he later revisited it, but there are two things of
which we are absolutely certain.
(1) We know the comment was written *BEFORE* Wittgenstein had
actually read Gödel's paper, so it was based on some second-hand
summary of the paper which he had encountered.
(2) We know that Wittgenstein *DID* eventually read Gödel's paper,
and that after reading it he did not make any attempt to publish
this 'criticism' of Gödel, nor did he mention it again in any of
his known notebooks.
André
My view on Gödel is totally summed up by Wittgenstein.
I formed Wittgenstein's complete view long before I ever heard of him.
You don't know what Wittgenstein 'complete view' actually was. No one
other than Wittgenstein knows this.
Because I formed this same view myself independently of Wittgenstein I
can say that his quoted words in my paper form a 100% complete
rebuttal that Gödel found a sentence that is both true and unprovable.
It is simply unprovable because it is untrue.
What you are really saying is that you formed some view and then
interpreted one of Wittgenstein's remarks in terms of that view.
Note that Haskell Curry is quoted before Wittgenstein has a
comparable notion of what "true in a formal system" means.
Let 𝓣 be such a theory. Then the elementary statements which belong >>>> to 𝓣 we shall call the elementary theorems of 𝓣; we also say that >>>> these elementary statements are true for 𝓣. Thus, given 𝓣, an
elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is true...
Olcott's true in a formal system 𝓣 is exactly Curry's elementary
theorems of 𝓣 and statements of 𝓣 derived by applying truth
preserving operations beginning with Curry's elementary theorems of
𝓣 as premises.
When you start with truth and only apply truth preserving operations
you always necessarily end up with truth.
Which has nothing whatsoever to do with Gödel, since his theorem was
not concerned with truth and made no mention of truth at all.
André
It has everything to do with all undecidable propositions.
Undecidable propositions are simply not truth bearers in the same way
that the following sentence is neither true nor false: "What time is it?"
Excpet that they are. The Computation H^ applied to <H^> will ALWAYS
either Halt or Not Halt, and the exact value is determinable for any
given H if it answers the question H <H^> <H^>.
Thus it IS a Truth Bearer.
The WRONG qustion that isn't a Truth Bearer is what answer can H return,
but that ISN'T the Question of the Halting Problem.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only truth
preserving operations beginning with a set of premises known to be
true (such as Haskell Curry's elementary theorems) are sound, else
unsound.
Which doesn't imply that all Truth is Provable. Is just says that
everything that is provable is True.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only truth
preserving operations beginning with a set of premises are valid, else
invalid.
valid reasoning requires conclusions to be a necessary consequence of
the premises.
So. That still doesn't prove your point. It also points out the ERROR in
your whole arguement, because you always start out with an incorrect
claim, like H applied to <H^> <H^> isn't responsible for the behavior of
H^ applied to <H^> when that is EXACT what the definition of a Halt
Decider says it is responsible for.
FAIL.
On 2022-02-23 13:57, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2022 1:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-23 08:13, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 22:17, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:04 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 20:32, olcott wrote:
<snippage
Because I formed this same view myself independently of Wittgenstein
I can say that his quoted words in my paper form a 100% complete
rebuttal that Gödel found a sentence that is both true and
unprovable. It is simply unprovable because it is untrue.
It is quite possible for two people to independently reach the same
wrong conclusion. So the above hardly constitutes an argument.
It is very easy to see that true and unprovable is impossible once one
comprehends the self evident truth regrading how analytic truth itself
actually works.
Which 'self-evident truth' is that?
Note that you have a bad track
record of assuming that things which are demonstrably false are 'self-evidently true'.
Note also that Gödel was not talking about analytic truth. He was
talking about theories of arithmetic.
The analytic/synthetic distinction
is one made when discussing philosophy of language which deals with
entirely different questions than arithmetic does.
Different fields often use similar terms with subtly different meanings.
You can't just assume that it is possible to import concepts from one
field to another.
Most people "know" that a statement is true on the basis that someone
that they trust told them this statement is true. Most people here
"know" that I must be wrong simply because they trust that Gödel is
correct.
Or, more likely, because they actually read the proof (which you have admitted to not having done) and found it compelling.
What you are really saying is that you formed some view and then
interpreted one of Wittgenstein's remarks in terms of that view.
Note that Haskell Curry is quoted before Wittgenstein has a
comparable notion of what "true in a formal system" means.
Let 𝓣 be such a theory. Then the elementary statements which
belong to 𝓣 we shall call the elementary theorems of 𝓣; we also >>>>>> say that these elementary statements are true for 𝓣. Thus, given >>>>>> 𝓣, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement which is true... >>>>>>
Olcott's true in a formal system 𝓣 is exactly Curry's elementary >>>>>> theorems of 𝓣 and statements of 𝓣 derived by applying truth
preserving operations beginning with Curry's elementary theorems
of 𝓣 as premises.
When you start with truth and only apply truth preserving
operations you always necessarily end up with truth.
Which has nothing whatsoever to do with Gödel, since his theorem
was not concerned with truth and made no mention of truth at all.
André
It has everything to do with all undecidable propositions.
Undecidable propositions are simply not truth bearers
The above claim is simply false. It is not consistent with the
standard definitions of 'undecidable' and 'truth bearer'.
It is consistent with the way that <truth> really works, thus
superseding and overriding all of the misconceptions that seem to
contradict it.
I have no reason to believe that you have any understanding of how truth 'really works'.
Moreover, it also doesn't follow from your above claim that "When you
start with truth and only apply truth preserving operations you
always necessarily end up with truth." So you're basically presenting
a non-sequitur.
Something that 100% perfectly logically follows is utterly
ridiculously characterized as non-sequitur.
If you think the latter follows from the former you then you need a
course in remedial logic.
in the same way that the following sentence is neither true norfalse:
"What time is it?"
That sentence is not a proposition. Gödels paper is concerned with
undecidable *propositions*. And it isn't concerned with natural
language at all.
I wanted to make a very clear example of an expression of language
that very obviously cannot be resolved to true or false. Example form
formal language that are not truth bearers are placed in the incorrect
category of undecidable.
There is no category in formal systems analogous to interrogatives.
You seem to not grasp the distinction between ontology and epistemology. Whether we can *determine* whether a statement is true or false is an epistemological issue which has no bearing at all on whether the
statement actually *is* true or false.
Flibble is correct in that the reason these things are not properly
resolved is category error. When one assumes a term-of-the-art
definition that has hidden incoherence then these terms-of-the-art
make their own error inexpressible.
The strong version, or linguistic determinism, says that language
determines thought and that linguistic categories limit and determine
cognitive categories. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
Both a mischaracterization and utterly irrelevant.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only truth
preserving operations beginning with a set of premises known to be
true (such as Haskell Curry's elementary theorems) are sound, else
unsound.
Oh dear. You really are confused. You're making numerous category
errors above. Soundness is not a property of arguments, not
propositions (which is what Gödel is concerned with).
I will use more generic language that has not been overridden
idiomatic terms-of-the-art meanings.
expressions of language that were derived by applying truth preserving
operations to expressions of language known to be true necessarily
derive true expressions of language.
And 'expressions of formal or natural language' don't 'apply truth
preserving operations'.
If I have a cat then I have an animal applies the truth preserving
operation Is-A-Type_Of(cat, animal) on the basis of a knowledge
ontology that specifies all of the general knowledge.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only truth
preserving operations beginning with a set of premises are valid,
else invalid.
That sentence is incoherent.
If one applies only truth preserving operations to a set of true
expressions of language then true expressions of language are derived.
If one starts with true premises and uses valid deductive rules one is guaranteed to arrive at true conclusions.
That does *NOT* entail that
every true statement can be derived from some set of axioms using valid deductive rules.
If one applies only truth preserving operations to a set of
expressions of language then logically entailed expressions of
language are derived.
valid reasoning requires conclusions to be a necessary consequence
of the premises.
Which is not contradicted by Gödel. He would agree with this.
André
The key mistake is that he believes that his sentence is true and
unprovable which is analogous to a purebred cat that is a kind of dog.
Gödel makes no claims at all about the truth or falsehood of Gödel sentences.
André
On 2/23/22 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2022 6:52 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-23 13:57, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2022 1:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-23 08:13, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 22:17, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:04 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 20:32, olcott wrote:
<snippage
Because I formed this same view myself independently of
Wittgenstein I can say that his quoted words in my paper form a
100% complete rebuttal that Gödel found a sentence that is both
true and unprovable. It is simply unprovable because it is untrue.
It is quite possible for two people to independently reach the same
wrong conclusion. So the above hardly constitutes an argument.
It is very easy to see that true and unprovable is impossible once
one comprehends the self evident truth regrading how analytic truth
itself actually works.
Which 'self-evident truth' is that?
The actual knowledge ontology structure of the body of analytic
knowledge.
Note that you have a bad track record of assuming that things which
are demonstrably false are 'self-evidently true'.
I do use some terminology somewhat inconsistently with its
conventional meaning to overcome [strong linguistic determinism] that
makes the ideas that I need to express otherwise inexpressible.
Maybe you need to MISUSE terms because the ideas you have are not just otherwise inexpressible but actually IMPOSSIBLE (or incompatible with
the field you are trying to work in).
strong version, or linguistic determinism, says that language
determines thought and that linguistic categories limit and determine
cognitive categories. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
And maybe you should look at the fact that you can't use the terms
correctly means that your world view doesn't match the reality of the
field.
Note also that Gödel was not talking about analytic truth. He was
talking about theories of arithmetic.
The body of analytic truth encompasses all of mathematics and logic
and only excludes knowledge that can only be validated by input from
the sense organs.
Then it needs to handle the fact that not all truths are provable.
Otherwise, you need to PROVE your statement without assuming it.
You still haven't answered the challenge of 3x+1, that one of the
statements MUST be true, but neither might be provable.
The analytic/synthetic distinction is one made when discussing
philosophy of language which deals with entirely different questions
than arithmetic does.
The notion of analytic truth is the foundation of all mathematics and
logic.
No, the notion of analytic PROOF is the foundation of mathematics.
Different fields often use similar terms with subtly different
meanings. You can't just assume that it is possible to import
concepts from one field to another.
If one field overloads the term "true" to include expressions of
language that are not true, then it errs.
WRONG, if a field overloads the term True to exclude expressions that
are clearly True, then it errs.
You conflate True with Known.
Most people "know" that a statement is true on the basis that
someone that they trust told them this statement is true. Most
people here "know" that I must be wrong simply because they trust
that Gödel is correct.
Or, more likely, because they actually read the proof (which you have
admitted to not having done) and found it compelling.
If its conclusion is incorrect then all of the steps can be ignored.
No, if a conclusion SEEMS incorrect, you need to see how to actually
disprove it, or YOU need to worry that you logic system has gone
inconsistent (which I strongly suspect it has).
If you claim the 'right' answer is to just ignore a seeming valid proof
that you find goes against your believes, then by the logic, we can just
say that YOUR theory is wrong and we get to just ignore you and just say
you are wrong.
Do you agree to that?
What you are really saying is that you formed some view and then >>>>>>> interpreted one of Wittgenstein's remarks in terms of that view. >>>>>>>
Note that Haskell Curry is quoted before Wittgenstein has a
comparable notion of what "true in a formal system" means.
Let 𝓣 be such a theory. Then the elementary statements which >>>>>>>> belong to 𝓣 we shall call the elementary theorems of 𝓣; we >>>>>>>> also say that these elementary statements are true for 𝓣. Thus, >>>>>>>> given 𝓣, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement which >>>>>>>> is true...
Olcott's true in a formal system 𝓣 is exactly Curry's
elementary theorems of 𝓣 and statements of 𝓣 derived by
applying truth preserving operations beginning with Curry's
elementary theorems of 𝓣 as premises.
When you start with truth and only apply truth preserving
operations you always necessarily end up with truth.
Which has nothing whatsoever to do with Gödel, since his theorem >>>>>>> was not concerned with truth and made no mention of truth at all. >>>>>>>
André
It has everything to do with all undecidable propositions.
Undecidable propositions are simply not truth bearers
The above claim is simply false. It is not consistent with the
standard definitions of 'undecidable' and 'truth bearer'.
It is consistent with the way that <truth> really works, thus
superseding and overriding all of the misconceptions that seem to
contradict it.
I have no reason to believe that you have any understanding of how
truth 'really works'.
Analytic truth is nothing more that a semantically connected set of
expressions of language each one known to be true.
Then Analytic Truth is a sub-set of Truth. Just like the set of black
cats doesn't contain all cats.
Moreover, it also doesn't follow from your above claim that "When
you start with truth and only apply truth preserving operations you
always necessarily end up with truth." So you're basically
presenting a non-sequitur.
Something that 100% perfectly logically follows is utterly
ridiculously characterized as non-sequitur.
If you think the latter follows from the former you then you need a
course in remedial logic.
If you start with expressions of language that are known to be true
(such as Haskell Curry's elementary theorems) and only apply truth
preserving operations you don't end up with peanut butter.
But you also do get you all Truths.
in the same way that the following sentence is neither true norfalse:
"What time is it?"
That sentence is not a proposition. Gödels paper is concerned with
undecidable *propositions*. And it isn't concerned with natural
language at all.
I wanted to make a very clear example of an expression of language
that very obviously cannot be resolved to true or false. Example
form formal language that are not truth bearers are placed in the
incorrect category of undecidable.
There is no category in formal systems analogous to interrogatives.
There is one yet not one that you are aware of.
This is not my idea:
Questions are merely propositions with a missing piece.
You seem to not grasp the distinction between ontology and
epistemology. Whether we can *determine* whether a statement is true
or false is an epistemological issue which has no bearing at all on
whether the statement actually *is* true or false.
In computer science and information science, an ontology encompasses a
representation, formal naming, and definition of the categories,
properties, and relations between the concepts, data, and entities
that substantiate one, many, or all domains of discourse.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
Flibble is correct in that the reason these things are not properly
resolved is category error. When one assumes a term-of-the-art
definition that has hidden incoherence then these terms-of-the-art
make their own error inexpressible.
The strong version, or linguistic determinism, says that language
determines thought and that linguistic categories limit and
determine cognitive categories.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
Both a mischaracterization and utterly irrelevant.
A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ such
that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ).
The above simply ignores the case where a syntactically correct
expression of a formal language is unprovable simply because at the
semantic level it is self-contradictory.
Except the problem in question is NOT self-contradictory, which you
don't understand.
Halting( H^ applied to <H^>) HAS a correct answer, so the question is
NOT self-contradictory.
H just can't give that answer, because it uses a copy of H.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only
truth preserving operations beginning with a set of premises known >>>>>> to be true (such as Haskell Curry's elementary theorems) are
sound, else unsound.
Oh dear. You really are confused. You're making numerous category
errors above. Soundness is not a property of arguments, not
propositions (which is what Gödel is concerned with).
I will use more generic language that has not been overridden
idiomatic terms-of-the-art meanings.
expressions of language that were derived by applying truth
preserving operations to expressions of language known to be true
necessarily derive true expressions of language.
And 'expressions of formal or natural language' don't 'apply truth
preserving operations'.
If I have a cat then I have an animal applies the truth preserving
operation Is-A-Type_Of(cat, animal) on the basis of a knowledge
ontology that specifies all of the general knowledge.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only
truth preserving operations beginning with a set of premises are
valid, else invalid.
That sentence is incoherent.
If one applies only truth preserving operations to a set of true
expressions of language then true expressions of language are derived.
If one starts with true premises and uses valid deductive rules one
is guaranteed to arrive at true conclusions. That does *NOT* entail
that every true statement can be derived from some set of axioms
using valid deductive rules.
For the body of analytic knowledge that includes all of mathematics
and logic an expression of language is true if:
(1) It is stipulated to be true like Curry's elementary theorems
(2) It is derived from applying truth preserving operations to (1) or
(2).
Nope, you are PRESUMING a wrong definition of True. You are stating was
is PROVABLE or KNOWN, not what is True.
Yes, items that are True but unproven are not part of the Body of
analytic knowledge, but knowledge is NOT a limitation of Truth.
If one applies only truth preserving operations to a set of
expressions of language then logically entailed expressions of
language are derived.
valid reasoning requires conclusions to be a necessary consequence >>>>>> of the premises.
Which is not contradicted by Gödel. He would agree with this.
André
The key mistake is that he believes that his sentence is true and
unprovable which is analogous to a purebred cat that is a kind of dog.
Gödel makes no claims at all about the truth or falsehood of Gödel
sentences.
André
He says that it is true that G is unprovable. The only way that we can
know that G is unprovable is by a proof that G is unprovable, hence
proving that G is provable.
Nope, you make the mistake that we need to KNOW something for it to be
True.
Again, one of the statements about the 3*x+1 sequence is true, by
definition, but we have not proven it. Thus while we don't know the
answer, we know that one of the sentence MUST be True, thus we know the existance of a set of sentences, one of which MUST be true, but none of
which are proven.
THAT is a piece of Knowledge.
On 2/23/22 11:31 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2022 9:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Yes it is yet it encompasses all of mathematics and logic.
It only excludes those things that rely on sense data from the sense
organs to be validated. All cats are animals is analytic. There is no
cat in my living room right now is synthetic.
If it insists that All Truth is Provable, it does NOT. That is what
Godel proved.
Godel sentence is an actual Truth Bearing Statement, just like the pair
of statements of the 3x+1 problem.
Statement P must be True or it is False.
If statement P is True, then by
its statement P is Unprovable, and thus no proof of it can exist.
If Statement P is false, then its converse is true, that that means that
P must be Provable. But it P is Provable, then either P must be True, or
the logic system has gone inconsistent.
Thus, we MUST conclude that P is unprovable, and thus some truths are
not provable.
Moreover, it also doesn't follow from your above claim that "When >>>>>>> you start with truth and only apply truth preserving operations
you always necessarily end up with truth." So you're basically
presenting a non-sequitur.
Something that 100% perfectly logically follows is utterly
ridiculously characterized as non-sequitur.
If you think the latter follows from the former you then you need a
course in remedial logic.
If you start with expressions of language that are known to be true
(such as Haskell Curry's elementary theorems) and only apply truth
preserving operations you don't end up with peanut butter.
But you also do get you all Truths.
You get the entire body of analytic truth.
You still are missing the fact that while analysis can show you what is provable, and thus many things that are True, it has been shown that
there exists Truths that can not be proven. And that Mathematics
includes such Truths.
in the same way that the following sentence is neither truenor false:
"What time is it?"
That sentence is not a proposition. Gödels paper is concerned
with undecidable *propositions*. And it isn't concerned with
natural language at all.
I wanted to make a very clear example of an expression of language >>>>>> that very obviously cannot be resolved to true or false. Example
form formal language that are not truth bearers are placed in the
incorrect category of undecidable.
There is no category in formal systems analogous to interrogatives.
There is one yet not one that you are aware of.
This is not my idea:
Questions are merely propositions with a missing piece.
You seem to not grasp the distinction between ontology and
epistemology. Whether we can *determine* whether a statement is
true or false is an epistemological issue which has no bearing at
all on whether the statement actually *is* true or false.
In computer science and information science, an ontology encompasses
a representation, formal naming, and definition of the categories,
properties, and relations between the concepts, data, and entities
that substantiate one, many, or all domains of discourse.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
Flibble is correct in that the reason these things are not
properly resolved is category error. When one assumes a
term-of-the-art definition that has hidden incoherence then these
terms-of-the-art make their own error inexpressible.
The strong version, or linguistic determinism, says that language
determines thought and that linguistic categories limit and
determine cognitive categories.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
Both a mischaracterization and utterly irrelevant.
A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ
such that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ).
The above simply ignores the case where a syntactically correct
expression of a formal language is unprovable simply because at the
semantic level it is self-contradictory.
Except the problem in question is NOT self-contradictory, which you
don't understand.
"This sentence is not true" is indeed not true yet this does not make
it true because it is self-contradictory.
But that is NOT the Godel Sentence.
"This sentence is not provable" is indeed not provable yet this does
not make it provable because it is self-contradictory.
It is NOT self-contradictory unless you have mistakenly assumed that
Truth is Provable. That is your flaw.
Yes, if you start with an assumption that Truth must be provable, then
you can say that the sentence is not a Truth Bearer, but then you also
can not express the whole of mathematics in a consistent logic system.
THAT is the proof of Godel, as his proof is actually the establishment
that the sentence IS a Truth-Bearer by the rules of Mathematics.
Halting( H^ applied to <H^>) HAS a correct answer, so the question is
NOT self-contradictory.
H just can't give that answer, because it uses a copy of H.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only
truth preserving operations beginning with a set of premises
known to be true (such as Haskell Curry's elementary theorems) >>>>>>>> are sound, else unsound.
Oh dear. You really are confused. You're making numerous category >>>>>>> errors above. Soundness is not a property of arguments, not
propositions (which is what Gödel is concerned with).
I will use more generic language that has not been overridden
idiomatic terms-of-the-art meanings.
expressions of language that were derived by applying truth
preserving operations to expressions of language known to be true
necessarily derive true expressions of language.
And 'expressions of formal or natural language' don't 'apply
truth preserving operations'.
If I have a cat then I have an animal applies the truth preserving >>>>>> operation Is-A-Type_Of(cat, animal) on the basis of a knowledge
ontology that specifies all of the general knowledge.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only
truth preserving operations beginning with a set of premises are >>>>>>>> valid, else invalid.
That sentence is incoherent.
If one applies only truth preserving operations to a set of true
expressions of language then true expressions of language are
derived.
If one starts with true premises and uses valid deductive rules one
is guaranteed to arrive at true conclusions. That does *NOT* entail
that every true statement can be derived from some set of axioms
using valid deductive rules.
For the body of analytic knowledge that includes all of mathematics
and logic an expression of language is true if:
(1) It is stipulated to be true like Curry's elementary theorems
(2) It is derived from applying truth preserving operations to (1)
or (2).
Nope, you are PRESUMING a wrong definition of True. You are stating
was is PROVABLE or KNOWN, not what is True.
This only applies to the body of analytic truth.
In this case unprovable means untrue.
And you 'anaytic truth' thus either can't handle the concepts of
Mathematics or is inconsistent.
The entire body of analytic truth is verified as true entirely on the
basis of the meaning of its expressions of language. It is really
nothing more than a complex set of interconnected true statements.
It may be all verified as True, but it can not verify that it has proven everything that is actually True as being Proven.
Yes, items that are True but unproven are not part of the Body of
analytic knowledge, but knowledge is NOT a limitation of Truth.
All of mathematics and logic is 100% analytic and 0% synthetic.
every expression of language that does not depend on confirmation from
sense data from the sense organs is analytic.
Then is the Godel Sentence True (and thus unprovable) or is it False,
and thus P is Provable and thus True?
That or you need to find the actual flaw in the logic where he shows the sentence is a Truth Bearer as being a simple statement of Mathematics.
Proving an Proven Conclusion as False does not by itself negate the
Proof, all it does is indicate that one of the proofs must be incorrect,
or the logic system is inconsistent.
If one applies only truth preserving operations to a set of
expressions of language then logically entailed expressions of
language are derived.
valid reasoning requires conclusions to be a necessary
consequence of the premises.
Which is not contradicted by Gödel. He would agree with this.
André
The key mistake is that he believes that his sentence is true and
unprovable which is analogous to a purebred cat that is a kind of
dog.
Gödel makes no claims at all about the truth or falsehood of Gödel >>>>> sentences.
André
He says that it is true that G is unprovable. The only way that we
can know that G is unprovable is by a proof that G is unprovable,
hence proving that G is provable.
Nope, you make the mistake that we need to KNOW something for it to
be True.
Every expression of language in the body of analytic truth that cannot
possibly be proved or refuted is simply not a member of the body of
analytic truth.
But it still might be Truth.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldbach%27s_conjecture is not currently
excluded from this body, we just don't currently know its answer.
Can you actually make that claim? If that is a True Statement, then you
must be able to PROVE it.
This is one of the limitation of the logic
system that require Truth to be Provable, they have a hard time talking
about what they might know, as it can be as hard to prove that something
is actually probable or refutable as it is to actually prove or refute it.
Again, one of the statements about the 3*x+1 sequence is true, by
definition, but we have not proven it. Thus while we don't know the
answer, we know that one of the sentence MUST be True, thus we know
the existance of a set of sentences, one of which MUST be true, but
none of which are proven.
THAT is a piece of Knowledge.
On 2/23/22 9:50 PM, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2022 6:52 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-23 13:57, olcott wrote:
On 2/23/2022 1:08 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-23 08:13, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:45 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 22:17, olcott wrote:
On 2/22/2022 11:04 PM, André G. Isaak wrote:
On 2022-02-22 20:32, olcott wrote:
<snippage
Because I formed this same view myself independently of
Wittgenstein I can say that his quoted words in my paper form a
100% complete rebuttal that Gödel found a sentence that is both
true and unprovable. It is simply unprovable because it is untrue.
It is quite possible for two people to independently reach the same
wrong conclusion. So the above hardly constitutes an argument.
It is very easy to see that true and unprovable is impossible once
one comprehends the self evident truth regrading how analytic truth
itself actually works.
Which 'self-evident truth' is that?
The actual knowledge ontology structure of the body of analytic
knowledge.
Note that you have a bad track record of assuming that things which
are demonstrably false are 'self-evidently true'.
I do use some terminology somewhat inconsistently with its
conventional meaning to overcome [strong linguistic determinism] that
makes the ideas that I need to express otherwise inexpressible.
Maybe you need to MISUSE terms because the ideas you have are not just otherwise inexpressible but actually IMPOSSIBLE (or incompatible with
the field you are trying to work in).
strong version, or linguistic determinism, says that language
determines thought and that linguistic categories limit and determine
cognitive categories. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
And maybe you should look at the fact that you can't use the terms
correctly means that your world view doesn't match the reality of the
field.
Note also that Gödel was not talking about analytic truth. He was
talking about theories of arithmetic.
The body of analytic truth encompasses all of mathematics and logic
and only excludes knowledge that can only be validated by input from
the sense organs.
Then it needs to handle the fact that not all truths are provable.
Otherwise, you need to PROVE your statement without assuming it.
You still haven't answered the challenge of 3x+1, that one of the
statements MUST be true, but neither might be provable.
The analytic/synthetic distinction is one made when discussing
philosophy of language which deals with entirely different questions
than arithmetic does.
The notion of analytic truth is the foundation of all mathematics and
logic.
No, the notion of analytic PROOF is the foundation of mathematics.
Different fields often use similar terms with subtly different
meanings. You can't just assume that it is possible to import
concepts from one field to another.
If one field overloads the term "true" to include expressions of
language that are not true, then it errs.
WRONG, if a field overloads the term True to exclude expressions that
are clearly True, then it errs.
You conflate True with Known.
Most people "know" that a statement is true on the basis that
someone that they trust told them this statement is true. Most
people here "know" that I must be wrong simply because they trust
that Gödel is correct.
Or, more likely, because they actually read the proof (which you have
admitted to not having done) and found it compelling.
If its conclusion is incorrect then all of the steps can be ignored.
No, if a conclusion SEEMS incorrect, you need to see how to actually
disprove it, or YOU need to worry that you logic system has gone
inconsistent (which I strongly suspect it has).
If you claim the 'right' answer is to just ignore a seeming valid proof
that you find goes against your believes, then by the logic, we can just
say that YOUR theory is wrong and we get to just ignore you and just say
you are wrong.
Do you agree to that?
What you are really saying is that you formed some view and then >>>>>>> interpreted one of Wittgenstein's remarks in terms of that view. >>>>>>>
Note that Haskell Curry is quoted before Wittgenstein has a
comparable notion of what "true in a formal system" means.
Let 𝓣 be such a theory. Then the elementary statements which >>>>>>>> belong to 𝓣 we shall call the elementary theorems of 𝓣; we >>>>>>>> also say that these elementary statements are true for 𝓣. Thus, >>>>>>>> given 𝓣, an elementary theorem is an elementary statement which >>>>>>>> is true...
Olcott's true in a formal system 𝓣 is exactly Curry's
elementary theorems of 𝓣 and statements of 𝓣 derived by
applying truth preserving operations beginning with Curry's
elementary theorems of 𝓣 as premises.
When you start with truth and only apply truth preserving
operations you always necessarily end up with truth.
Which has nothing whatsoever to do with Gödel, since his theorem >>>>>>> was not concerned with truth and made no mention of truth at all. >>>>>>>
André
It has everything to do with all undecidable propositions.
Undecidable propositions are simply not truth bearers
The above claim is simply false. It is not consistent with the
standard definitions of 'undecidable' and 'truth bearer'.
It is consistent with the way that <truth> really works, thus
superseding and overriding all of the misconceptions that seem to
contradict it.
I have no reason to believe that you have any understanding of how
truth 'really works'.
Analytic truth is nothing more that a semantically connected set of
expressions of language each one known to be true.
Then Analytic Truth is a sub-set of Truth. Just like the set of black
cats doesn't contain all cats.
Moreover, it also doesn't follow from your above claim that "When
you start with truth and only apply truth preserving operations you
always necessarily end up with truth." So you're basically
presenting a non-sequitur.
Something that 100% perfectly logically follows is utterly
ridiculously characterized as non-sequitur.
If you think the latter follows from the former you then you need a
course in remedial logic.
If you start with expressions of language that are known to be true
(such as Haskell Curry's elementary theorems) and only apply truth
preserving operations you don't end up with peanut butter.
But you also do get you all Truths.
in the same way that the following sentence is neither true norfalse:
"What time is it?"
That sentence is not a proposition. Gödels paper is concerned with
undecidable *propositions*. And it isn't concerned with natural
language at all.
I wanted to make a very clear example of an expression of language
that very obviously cannot be resolved to true or false. Example
form formal language that are not truth bearers are placed in the
incorrect category of undecidable.
There is no category in formal systems analogous to interrogatives.
There is one yet not one that you are aware of.
This is not my idea:
Questions are merely propositions with a missing piece.
You seem to not grasp the distinction between ontology and
epistemology. Whether we can *determine* whether a statement is true
or false is an epistemological issue which has no bearing at all on
whether the statement actually *is* true or false.
In computer science and information science, an ontology encompasses a
representation, formal naming, and definition of the categories,
properties, and relations between the concepts, data, and entities
that substantiate one, many, or all domains of discourse.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
Flibble is correct in that the reason these things are not properly
resolved is category error. When one assumes a term-of-the-art
definition that has hidden incoherence then these terms-of-the-art
make their own error inexpressible.
The strong version, or linguistic determinism, says that language
determines thought and that linguistic categories limit and
determine cognitive categories.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linguistic_relativity
Both a mischaracterization and utterly irrelevant.
A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ such
that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ).
The above simply ignores the case where a syntactically correct
expression of a formal language is unprovable simply because at the
semantic level it is self-contradictory.
Except the problem in question is NOT self-contradictory, which you
don't understand.
Halting( H^ applied to <H^>) HAS a correct answer, so the question is
NOT self-contradictory.
H just can't give that answer, because it uses a copy of H.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only
truth preserving operations beginning with a set of premises known >>>>>> to be true (such as Haskell Curry's elementary theorems) are
sound, else unsound.
Oh dear. You really are confused. You're making numerous category
errors above. Soundness is not a property of arguments, not
propositions (which is what Gödel is concerned with).
I will use more generic language that has not been overridden
idiomatic terms-of-the-art meanings.
expressions of language that were derived by applying truth
preserving operations to expressions of language known to be true
necessarily derive true expressions of language.
And 'expressions of formal or natural language' don't 'apply truth
preserving operations'.
If I have a cat then I have an animal applies the truth preserving
operation Is-A-Type_Of(cat, animal) on the basis of a knowledge
ontology that specifies all of the general knowledge.
All expressions of formal or natural language that apply only
truth preserving operations beginning with a set of premises are
valid, else invalid.
That sentence is incoherent.
If one applies only truth preserving operations to a set of true
expressions of language then true expressions of language are derived.
If one starts with true premises and uses valid deductive rules one
is guaranteed to arrive at true conclusions. That does *NOT* entail
that every true statement can be derived from some set of axioms
using valid deductive rules.
For the body of analytic knowledge that includes all of mathematics
and logic an expression of language is true if:
(1) It is stipulated to be true like Curry's elementary theorems
(2) It is derived from applying truth preserving operations to (1) or
(2).
Nope, you are PRESUMING a wrong definition of True. You are stating was
is PROVABLE or KNOWN, not what is True.
Yes, items that are True but unproven are not part of the Body of
analytic knowledge, but knowledge is NOT a limitation of Truth.
If one applies only truth preserving operations to a set of
expressions of language then logically entailed expressions of
language are derived.
valid reasoning requires conclusions to be a necessary consequence >>>>>> of the premises.
Which is not contradicted by Gödel. He would agree with this.
André
The key mistake is that he believes that his sentence is true and
unprovable which is analogous to a purebred cat that is a kind of dog.
Gödel makes no claims at all about the truth or falsehood of Gödel
sentences.
André
He says that it is true that G is unprovable. The only way that we can
know that G is unprovable is by a proof that G is unprovable, hence
proving that G is provable.
Nope, you make the mistake that we need to KNOW something for it to be
True.
Again, one of the statements about the 3*x+1 sequence is true, by
definition, but we have not proven it. Thus while we don't know the
answer, we know that one of the sentence MUST be True, thus we know the existance of a set of sentences, one of which MUST be true, but none of
which are proven.
THAT is a piece of Knowledge.
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