*This cannot be understood outside of the philosophy of logic*
Most importantly analytical truthmaker theory must be understood.
*This is true by definition* Within the body of analytical truth of the analytic/synthetic distinction every element of the body of analytic knowledge (BOAK) is true entirely on the basis of its connection to the semantic meanings that make it true.
This proves that Gödel's 1931 Incompleteness and Tarski's Undefinability Theorem cannot apply to the body of analytical knowledge (BOAK). Lacking
this connection excludes an expression from the BOAK, thus undecidable expressions cannot exist within the BOAK.
True(x) is defined by the above, within the BOAK thus refuting Tarski.
Every element of the BOAK has a provability connection to its semantic meanings truthmaker within the BOAK thus refuting both Tarski and Gödel
that say this cannot correctly and consistently accomplished.
*This is similar to Wittgenstein* https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
On 12/23/2023 10:59 AM, olcott wrote:
*This cannot be understood outside of the philosophy of logic*
Most importantly analytical truthmaker theory must be understood.
*This is true by definition* Within the body of analytical truth of the
analytic/synthetic distinction every element of the body of analytic
knowledge (BOAK) is true entirely on the basis of its connection to the
semantic meanings that make it true.
This proves that Gödel's 1931 Incompleteness and Tarski's Undefinability
Theorem cannot apply to the body of analytical knowledge (BOAK). Lacking
this connection excludes an expression from the BOAK, thus undecidable
expressions cannot exist within the BOAK.
True(x) is defined by the above, within the BOAK thus refuting Tarski.
Every element of the BOAK has a provability connection to its semantic
meanings truthmaker within the BOAK thus refuting both Tarski and Gödel
that say this cannot correctly and consistently accomplished.
*This is similar to Wittgenstein*
https://www.liarparadox.org/Wittgenstein.pdf
To the extent that truths require infinite proofs such as
the Goldbach conjecture they are excluded from the BOAK
because their truth value remains unknown thus are not knowledge.
We know that the GC is true or false, yet do not know which.
Anything that cannot be proven or refuted from the axioms of
BOAK is defined as not a member of BOAK. This prevents
the Gödel's 1931 Incompleteness and Tarski's Undefinability
from applying to the BOAK.
On 12/23/2023 3:06 PM, immibis wrote:
On 12/23/23 17:59, olcott wrote:
*This cannot be understood outside of the philosophy of logic*
Then don't post it to comp.theory.
This also equally applies to computability.
Some of the basic concepts of computability
have incoherence hard-wired into them.
For example three computer scientists essentiallyI suspect that you don't understand what they are saying,
agree that the halting problem is essentially
a self-contradictory (thus incorrect) question.
They use different yet equivalent terminology.
The lead author of these three specifically agrees
that the halting problem <is> an incorrect question.
On 12/24/2023 4:42 AM, immibis wrote:
On 12/23/23 23:21, olcott wrote:
On 12/23/2023 3:06 PM, immibis wrote:
On 12/23/23 17:59, olcott wrote:
*This cannot be understood outside of the philosophy of logic*
Then don't post it to comp.theory.
This also equally applies to computability.
Some of the basic concepts of computability
have incoherence hard-wired into them.
For example three computer scientists essentially
agree that the halting problem is essentially
a self-contradictory (thus incorrect) question.
Anyone can find three idiots.
Zero idiots can become PhD computer science professors.
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