On 5/10/2023 6:24 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/9/23 10:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/9/2023 8:30 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/9/23 8:18 PM, olcott wrote:
Gödel intended his actual G to be isomorphic to the above self-
referential expression.
Nope, you are over-simplifying things.
Not at all. I boiled them down to their barest essence. Gödel's G was
intended to be and is isomorphic to a self-contradictory expression.
This is dead obvious in Tarski's comparable proof where he flat out
states that he is anchoring his proof in the actual Liar Paradox.
So, you are just PROVING that you don't understand how logic actually
works and are falling for your own Straw man Error.
No I am proving to have a deeper understanding of these things than most others have.
When we understand that he sums up his own proof as
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its
own unprovability. 15 ... (Gödel 1931:39-41)
Then we can see that he intended his G to be isomorphic to a G that
...which asserts its own unprovability. 15 ... (Gödel 1931:39-41)
and he intended this be self contradictory
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:39-41)
Here is how G asserts its own unprovability in F is self-contradictory: Proving G requires a sequence of inference steps in F that prove that
they themselves do not exist.
That you continue to fail to understand this is not my mistake it is
your mistake.
Gödel, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
Related Systems
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
Since Tarski directly stated that he is anchoring his comparable proof
in the actual Liar Paradox I have provided sufficient support for my position.
Ever since 1936 the world has been convinced that the notion of Truth
is not formally definable entirely on the basis that Tarski could not
prove that the non-truth bearer of the Liar Paradox is true.
On 5/10/23 10:27 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/10/2023 6:24 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/9/23 10:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/9/2023 8:30 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/9/23 8:18 PM, olcott wrote:
Gödel intended his actual G to be isomorphic to the above self-
referential expression.
Nope, you are over-simplifying things.
Not at all. I boiled them down to their barest essence. Gödel's G was >>>> intended to be and is isomorphic to a self-contradictory expression.
This is dead obvious in Tarski's comparable proof where he flat out
states that he is anchoring his proof in the actual Liar Paradox.
So, you are just PROVING that you don't understand how logic actually
works and are falling for your own Straw man Error.
No I am proving to have a deeper understanding of these things than most
others have.
Nope, just that you are so dumb you don't know what you don't understand.
On 5/10/23 10:27 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/10/2023 6:24 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/9/23 10:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/9/2023 8:30 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/9/23 8:18 PM, olcott wrote:
Gödel intended his actual G to be isomorphic to the above self-
referential expression.
Nope, you are over-simplifying things.
Not at all. I boiled them down to their barest essence. Gödel's G was >>>> intended to be and is isomorphic to a self-contradictory expression.
This is dead obvious in Tarski's comparable proof where he flat out
states that he is anchoring his proof in the actual Liar Paradox.
So, you are just PROVING that you don't understand how logic actually
works and are falling for your own Straw man Error.
No I am proving to have a deeper understanding of these things than most
others have.
Nope, just that you are so dumb you don't know what you don't understand.
When we understand that he sums up his own proof as
...We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its >> own unprovability. 15 ... (Gödel 1931:39-41)
No, that isn't a "summary" of his proof, but a STEP in the proof.
From G in F, we can prove in Meta-F, that G
Then we can see that he intended his G to be isomorphic to a G that
...which asserts its own unprovability. 15 ... (Gödel 1931:39-41)
Nope, you don't seem to understand what a chain of logic is.
and he intended this be self contradictory
...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar undecidability proof...(Gödel 1931:39-41)
No, it just shows that you have no idea what he is talking about, or the meaning of the words are that you are using.
YOU are the one guilt of trying to put words in other peoples mouthes,
to then try to disprove those altered words.
In other words, your whole arguement is bassed on asserting a Strawman Falacy.
Here is how G asserts its own unprovability in F is self-contradictory:
Proving G requires a sequence of inference steps in F that prove that
they themselves do not exist.
Except that the ACTUAL statement of G isn't in any way
"Self-Contradictiory", so your "Isomorphism" / "Equivalence" is just
your pathologica lie.
That you continue to fail to understand this is not my mistake it is
your mistake.
Nope, You are the one making the mistake.
It is a demonstarted principle, that if EVERYONE disagrees with you, you
are likely wrong. Even the greatest who came up with new ideas, were
able to get at least a FEW of the smartest to understand what they were talking about.
You have only gotten agreement from a couple at the bottom, and people
you have "tricked" by the misuse of words, and who don't actually agree
with your ideas.
Gödel, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
Related Systems
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
Since Tarski directly stated that he is anchoring his comparable proof
in the actual Liar Paradox I have provided sufficient support for my
position.
Nope, In fact, he is using the non-truth bearing of the Liars Paradox
for his proof,
On 5/10/2023 6:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/10/23 10:27 AM, olcott wrote:I say that incorrectly. I have a deeper understanding OF THE ESSENCE OF
On 5/10/2023 6:24 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/9/23 10:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/9/2023 8:30 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/9/23 8:18 PM, olcott wrote:
Gödel intended his actual G to be isomorphic to the above self- >>>>>>> referential expression.
Nope, you are over-simplifying things.
Not at all. I boiled them down to their barest essence. Gödel's G was >>>>> intended to be and is isomorphic to a self-contradictory expression. >>>>>
This is dead obvious in Tarski's comparable proof where he flat out
states that he is anchoring his proof in the actual Liar Paradox.
So, you are just PROVING that you don't understand how logic
actually works and are falling for your own Straw man Error.
No I am proving to have a deeper understanding of these things than most >>> others have.
Nope, just that you are so dumb you don't know what you don't understand.
HIS PROOF. It is commonly understood that Gödel's actual proof is
isomorphic to {a proposition which asserts its own unprovability}. It is
also commonly understood that this is self-contradictory.
What is not commonly understood is that formal systems that cannot prove self-contradictory expressions are not in any way deficient.
On 5/10/23 11:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/10/2023 6:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Gödel, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
Related Systems
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
Since Tarski directly stated that he is anchoring his comparable proof >>>> in the actual Liar Paradox I have provided sufficient support for my
position.
Nope, In fact, he is using the non-truth bearing of the Liars Paradox
for his proof,
I say that Tarski is using the Liar Paradox as the basis of his proof
and you say no I am wrong the truth is that Tarski is using the Liar
Paradox as the basis of his proof?
YOU have been saying that because Tarski, erroneosly, finds that logic
can't prove the liar's paradox, his proof must be wrong, i.e there is
no definition of Truth.
I say that his proof shows that if a Definition of Truth (meaning a determinate procedure to determine if any statement is true or false) existed, then it would be possible to prove that the liar's paradox is a
true statement,
On 5/10/23 11:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/10/2023 6:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/10/23 10:27 AM, olcott wrote:I say that incorrectly. I have a deeper understanding OF THE ESSENCE OF
On 5/10/2023 6:24 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/9/23 10:46 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/9/2023 8:30 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/9/23 8:18 PM, olcott wrote:
Gödel intended his actual G to be isomorphic to the above self- >>>>>>>> referential expression.
Nope, you are over-simplifying things.
Not at all. I boiled them down to their barest essence. Gödel's G was >>>>>> intended to be and is isomorphic to a self-contradictory expression. >>>>>>
This is dead obvious in Tarski's comparable proof where he flat out >>>>>> states that he is anchoring his proof in the actual Liar Paradox.
So, you are just PROVING that you don't understand how logic
actually works and are falling for your own Straw man Error.
No I am proving to have a deeper understanding of these things than
most
others have.
Nope, just that you are so dumb you don't know what you don't
understand.
HIS PROOF. It is commonly understood that Gödel's actual proof is
isomorphic to {a proposition which asserts its own unprovability}. It is
also commonly understood that this is self-contradictory.
What is not commonly understood is that formal systems that cannot prove
self-contradictory expressions are not in any way deficient.
But that isn't what his proof is about,
You just have a deeper MISunderstanding of what he is saying because you don't understand what he is saying at all, but are just trying to
understand the altered strawman arguement that you think you can
understand,
YOU FAIL.
None of thes proofs are about a system being deficient for not being
able to resolve a self-contradictory statement or a non-truth-bearer.
The fact you think they are just shows that you are misunderstanding the proofs.
Godel shows a statement, THAT IS TRUE, (and thus CAN'T be
self-contradictory) that can not be proven in that system. This meets
the DEFINTION of "Incompleteness" in Logic.
Tarski shows that there are some statements, that have a truth value,
that we can not know that truth value, because the mere existance of a "Definition" (deterministic method) to test them with leads to the contradiction that the Liar's Paradox must be True..
The problem isn't that he expects that a system should be able to
resolve the Liar's Paradox, but that a "Definition of Truth" leads to a claimed resolution, namely that the Liar's Paradox IS True (which means
it also must be False). He shows that a "Definition of Truth" turns the Liar's Paradox from a non-truth-bearer into a Truth Bearer that is True
(and thus also False).
Your failure to understand this just shows your stupidity.
On 5/11/2023 6:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/10/23 11:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/10/2023 6:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Gödel, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
Related Systems
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
Since Tarski directly stated that he is anchoring his comparable proof >>>>> in the actual Liar Paradox I have provided sufficient support for my >>>>> position.
Nope, In fact, he is using the non-truth bearing of the Liars
Paradox for his proof,
I say that Tarski is using the Liar Paradox as the basis of his proof
and you say no I am wrong the truth is that Tarski is using the Liar
Paradox as the basis of his proof?
YOU have been saying that because Tarski, erroneosly, finds that logic
can't prove the liar's paradox, his proof must be wrong, i.e there is
no definition of Truth.
I say that his proof shows that if a Definition of Truth (meaning a
determinate procedure to determine if any statement is true or false)
existed, then it would be possible to prove that the liar's paradox is
a true statement,
Where did you get that nutty idea?
On 5/11/23 10:12 AM, olcott wrote:In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the notion of
On 5/11/2023 6:37 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/10/23 11:01 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/10/2023 6:29 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Gödel, Kurt 1931.
On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica And
Related Systems
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
Since Tarski directly stated that he is anchoring his comparable
proof
in the actual Liar Paradox I have provided sufficient support for my >>>>>> position.
Nope, In fact, he is using the non-truth bearing of the Liars
Paradox for his proof,
I say that Tarski is using the Liar Paradox as the basis of his
proof and you say no I am wrong the truth is that Tarski is using
the Liar Paradox as the basis of his proof?
YOU have been saying that because Tarski, erroneosly, finds that
logic can't prove the liar's paradox, his proof must be wrong, i.e
there is no definition of Truth.
I say that his proof shows that if a Definition of Truth (meaning a
determinate procedure to determine if any statement is true or false)
existed, then it would be possible to prove that the liar's paradox
is a true statement,
Where did you get that nutty idea?
FROM HIS PROOF!
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties.
FROM HIS PROOF!In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties.
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis directly related
to the Liar Paradox?
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties.
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis directly related
to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't be true,
and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) would lead to being
able to prove that the Liar's paradox is true,
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties.
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis directly related >>> to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't be true,
and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) would lead to
being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is true,
That is ridiculous.
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties.
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis directly
related
to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't be
true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) would lead
to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is true,
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be True?
You seem to want to put him down for "basing" his proof on a
contradiction, but he isn't basing it in the way you want to do so.
You are just stuck trying to push a LIE, but can't quite figure out how
to do it.
Sorry, you are just too stupid to handle logic.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties.
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis directly
related
to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't be
true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) would
lead to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is true,
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be True?
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
You seem to want to put him down for "basing" his proof on a
contradiction, but he isn't basing it in the way you want to do so.
You are just stuck trying to push a LIE, but can't quite figure out
how to do it.
Sorry, you are just too stupid to handle logic.
On 5/12/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:That is a nutty idea.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the notion of >>>>>> Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis directly
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties.
related
to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't be
true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) would
lead to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is true,
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be True?
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
Right, so why do you fault Tarski for saying that?
His proof shows that if a "Definition of Truth" existed, it provides a
way to prove the Liar's Paradox is True.
On 5/12/2023 9:06 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:That is a nutty idea.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!to the Liar Paradox?
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties. >>>>>>> In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the notion of >>>>>>> Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis directly >>>>>>> related
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't be
true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) would
lead to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is true,
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be True?
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
Right, so why do you fault Tarski for saying that?
His proof shows that if a "Definition of Truth" existed, it provides a
way to prove the Liar's Paradox is True.
Any system that proves that a self-contradictory expression is true is a broken system.
Analytic truth is derived from applying truth preserving operations to expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true.
This cannot possibly derive non-truth bearers as true.
Prolog uses the exact same system that I just specified expressions that
are stipulated to be true are Prolog facts with Prolog rules as a set of truth preserving operations.
Prolog is smart enough to reject the Liar Paradox.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The above test shows that LP is infinitely recursive never resolving to
a truth value.
On 5/12/23 11:04 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 9:06 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:That is a nutty idea.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!to the Liar Paradox?
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties. >>>>>>>> In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the notion of >>>>>>>> Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis directly >>>>>>>> related
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't be >>>>>>> true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) would >>>>>>> lead to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is true,
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be True?
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
Right, so why do you fault Tarski for saying that?
His proof shows that if a "Definition of Truth" existed, it provides
a way to prove the Liar's Paradox is True.
Any system that proves that a self-contradictory expression is true is
a broken system.
Right, and the proof shows that would be any system with a "definition
of Truth", so you AGREE with Tarski.
Analytic truth is derived from applying truth preserving operations to
expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true.
This cannot possibly derive non-truth bearers as true.
Right, so you agre with Tarksi that there can not be a "Definition of
Truth".
Prolog uses the exact same system that I just specified expressions that
are stipulated to be true are Prolog facts with Prolog rules as a set of
truth preserving operations.
Prolog is limited in the logic it can do,
But, so it seems are you.
Prolog is smart enough to reject the Liar Paradox.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The above test shows that LP is infinitely recursive never resolving
to a truth value.
So?
On 5/12/23 11:04 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 9:06 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:That is a nutty idea.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!to the Liar Paradox?
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties. >>>>>>>> In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the notion of >>>>>>>> Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis directly >>>>>>>> related
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't be >>>>>>> true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) would >>>>>>> lead to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is true,
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be True?
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
Right, so why do you fault Tarski for saying that?
His proof shows that if a "Definition of Truth" existed, it provides
a way to prove the Liar's Paradox is True.
Any system that proves that a self-contradictory expression is true is
a broken system.
Right, and the proof shows that would be any system with a "definition
of Truth", so you AGREE with Tarski.
On 5/12/2023 1:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 11:04 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 9:06 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:That is a nutty idea.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties. >>>>>>>>> In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis
directly related
to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't be >>>>>>>> true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) would >>>>>>>> lead to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is true,
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be True? >>>>>>
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
Right, so why do you fault Tarski for saying that?
His proof shows that if a "Definition of Truth" existed, it provides
a way to prove the Liar's Paradox is True.
Any system that proves that a self-contradictory expression is true
is a broken system.
Right, and the proof shows that would be any system with a "definition
of Truth", so you AGREE with Tarski.
Not at all, Tarski's system is incorrect. All of analytical truth1 is a
body of semantic tautologies that excludes the liar paradox.
1 It is commonly known that analytical truth includes all of math and
all of logic. My new idea is that it also includes the model of the
world.
Analytic truth is derived from applying truth preserving operations to
expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true.
This cannot possibly derive non-truth bearers as true.
Right, so you agre with Tarksi that there can not be a "Definition of
Truth".
Not at all.
Prolog uses the exact same system that I just specified expressions that >>> are stipulated to be true are Prolog facts with Prolog rules as a set of >>> truth preserving operations.
Prolog is limited in the logic it can do,
But, so it seems are you.
Prolog is smart enough to reject the Liar Paradox.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The above test shows that LP is infinitely recursive never resolving
to a truth value.
So?
Tarski was too stupid (on this one issue) to understand that the Liar
Paradox is excluded from the body of truth.
On 5/12/23 8:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 1:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 11:04 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 9:06 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:That is a nutty idea.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties. >>>>>>>>>> In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis
directly related
to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't >>>>>>>>> be true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) >>>>>>>>> would lead to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is true, >>>>>>>>>
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be True? >>>>>>>
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
Right, so why do you fault Tarski for saying that?
His proof shows that if a "Definition of Truth" existed, it
provides a way to prove the Liar's Paradox is True.
Any system that proves that a self-contradictory expression is true
is a broken system.
Right, and the proof shows that would be any system with a
"definition of Truth", so you AGREE with Tarski.
Not at all, Tarski's system is incorrect. All of analytical truth1 is a
body of semantic tautologies that excludes the liar paradox.
Then why does that "Definition of Truth" PROVE the Liar's Paradox?
If his system is "incorrect" what SPECIFIC step did he do that was
improper? (not conclusion, what STEP).
Your problem is you don't actually understand how logic works.
1 It is commonly known that analytical truth includes all of math and
all of logic. My new idea is that it also includes the model of the
world.
Except since your model doesn't work at all, you have a problem.
Prolog is smart enough to reject the Liar Paradox because it uses the
same system that I use, only expressions of language that have been
derived by applying truth preserving operations [Prolog rules] to
expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true [Prolog
facts] are true. Everything else [Prolog's negation as failure] counts
as untrue.
And Prolog is too limited to handle the logic of these proofs.
The fact that you can't understand that just shows how stupid you are.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The above test shows that LP is infinitely recursive never resolving
to a truth value.
On 5/12/2023 9:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 8:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 1:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 11:04 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 9:06 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:That is a nutty idea.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the >>>>>>>>>>> notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of
properties.
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis
directly related
to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't >>>>>>>>>> be true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) >>>>>>>>>> would lead to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is >>>>>>>>>> true,
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be True? >>>>>>>>
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
Right, so why do you fault Tarski for saying that?
His proof shows that if a "Definition of Truth" existed, it
provides a way to prove the Liar's Paradox is True.
Any system that proves that a self-contradictory expression is true
is a broken system.
Right, and the proof shows that would be any system with a
"definition of Truth", so you AGREE with Tarski.
Not at all, Tarski's system is incorrect. All of analytical truth1 is a
body of semantic tautologies that excludes the liar paradox.
Then why does that "Definition of Truth" PROVE the Liar's Paradox?
If his system is "incorrect" what SPECIFIC step did he do that was
improper? (not conclusion, what STEP).
The step where he used the Liar Paradox as the basis of his proof.
Your problem is you don't actually understand how logic works.
My problem is that others do not understand the philosophical
foundations of logic as deeply as I do, they merely follow what they
read in a textbook as if it was the infallible word of God.
1 It is commonly known that analytical truth includes all of math and
all of logic. My new idea is that it also includes the model of the
world.
Except since your model doesn't work at all, you have a problem.
When-so-ever an expression of language is derived by applying only truth preserving operations to expressions of language that have been
stipulated to be true we are guaranteed that this expression is true.
Prolog is smart enough to reject the Liar Paradox because it uses the
same system that I use, only expressions of language that have been
derived by applying truth preserving operations [Prolog rules] to
expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true [Prolog
facts] are true. Everything else [Prolog's negation as failure] counts
as untrue.
And Prolog is too limited to handle the logic of these proofs.
It is not in fact too limited to handle these proofs as I have
concretely proved. I invented Minimal Type Theory that translates logic expressions into directed graphs and a cycle in the graph indicates the expression never resolves to a truth value.
Prolog simply does this same thing.
The fact that you can't understand that just shows how stupid you are.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The above test shows that LP is infinitely recursive never resolving
to a truth value.
On 5/12/23 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 9:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 8:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 1:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 11:04 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 9:06 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:That is a nutty idea.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the >>>>>>>>>>>> notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of >>>>>>>>>>>>> properties.
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis >>>>>>>>>>>> directly related
to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't >>>>>>>>>>> be true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) >>>>>>>>>>> would lead to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is >>>>>>>>>>> true,
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be >>>>>>>>> True?
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
Right, so why do you fault Tarski for saying that?
His proof shows that if a "Definition of Truth" existed, it
provides a way to prove the Liar's Paradox is True.
Any system that proves that a self-contradictory expression is
true is a broken system.
Right, and the proof shows that would be any system with a
"definition of Truth", so you AGREE with Tarski.
Not at all, Tarski's system is incorrect. All of analytical truth1 is a >>>> body of semantic tautologies that excludes the liar paradox.
Then why does that "Definition of Truth" PROVE the Liar's Paradox?
If his system is "incorrect" what SPECIFIC step did he do that was
improper? (not conclusion, what STEP).
The step where he used the Liar Paradox as the basis of his proof.
Your problem is you don't actually understand how logic works.
My problem is that others do not understand the philosophical
foundations of logic as deeply as I do, they merely follow what they
read in a textbook as if it was the infallible word of God.
1 It is commonly known that analytical truth includes all of math and
all of logic. My new idea is that it also includes the model of the
world.
Except since your model doesn't work at all, you have a problem.
When-so-ever an expression of language is derived by applying only truth
preserving operations to expressions of language that have been
stipulated to be true we are guaranteed that this expression is true.
Prolog is smart enough to reject the Liar Paradox because it uses the
same system that I use, only expressions of language that have been
derived by applying truth preserving operations [Prolog rules] to
expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true [Prolog
facts] are true. Everything else [Prolog's negation as failure] counts >>>> as untrue.
And Prolog is too limited to handle the logic of these proofs.
It is not in fact too limited to handle these proofs as I have
concretely proved. I invented Minimal Type Theory that translates logic
expressions into directed graphs and a cycle in the graph indicates the
expression never resolves to a truth value.
Then your logic is too simple to handle the needed logic.
Prolog only does FIRST order logic, and not all of it.
The logic used here is at least Second order, so out of the reach of
Prolog.
If you want to claim differently, show how Prolog verifies a proof of
the Pythagorean Theorem.
In fact, almost all of the examples you actaully try to run with are
down at the simple level of Categorical logic which only handles things
of one super-class divided into sub-classes. That logic is way to simple
to handle the things the theorems have been talking about. My guess is
that is as complicated of logic that you can understand, so you try to
force everything into it, and FAIL.
On 5/12/23 5:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 1:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 11:04 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 9:06 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:That is a nutty idea.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of properties. >>>>>>>>>> In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis
directly related
to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't >>>>>>>>> be true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) >>>>>>>>> would lead to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is true, >>>>>>>>>
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be True? >>>>>>>
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
Right, so why do you fault Tarski for saying that?
His proof shows that if a "Definition of Truth" existed, it
provides a way to prove the Liar's Paradox is True.
Any system that proves that a self-contradictory expression is true
is a broken system.
Right, and the proof shows that would be any system with a
"definition of Truth", so you AGREE with Tarski.
Not at all, Tarski's system is incorrect. All of analytical truth1 is a
body of semantic tautologies that excludes the liar paradox.
1 It is commonly known that analytical truth includes all of math and
all of logic. My new idea is that it also includes the model of the
world.
Analytic truth is derived from applying truth preserving operations to >>>> expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true.
This cannot possibly derive non-truth bearers as true.
Right, so you agre with Tarksi that there can not be a "Definition of
Truth".
Not at all.
Prolog uses the exact same system that I just specified expressions
that
are stipulated to be true are Prolog facts with Prolog rules as a
set of
truth preserving operations.
Prolog is limited in the logic it can do,
But, so it seems are you.
Prolog is smart enough to reject the Liar Paradox.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The above test shows that LP is infinitely recursive never resolving
to a truth value.
So?
Tarski was too stupid (on this one issue) to understand that the Liar
Paradox is excluded from the body of truth.
Why do you say that? WHere does he say what you say he is saying?
Please point out the pont where he is ACCEPTING the Liar's paradox.
The point where the Liar coms up, he uses that fact to point out that
the intial assumption MUST be incorrect, as it lead to proving a
non-true statement.
I think your problem is that you just don't understand the proof you are reading and reading into it the errors that you yourself make.
On 5/12/2023 9:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 5:57 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 1:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 11:04 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 9:06 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:That is a nutty idea.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the >>>>>>>>>>> notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of
properties.
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis
directly related
to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox can't >>>>>>>>>> be true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of Truth) >>>>>>>>>> would lead to being able to prove that the Liar's paradox is >>>>>>>>>> true,
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be True? >>>>>>>>
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
Right, so why do you fault Tarski for saying that?
His proof shows that if a "Definition of Truth" existed, it
provides a way to prove the Liar's Paradox is True.
Any system that proves that a self-contradictory expression is true
is a broken system.
Right, and the proof shows that would be any system with a
"definition of Truth", so you AGREE with Tarski.
Not at all, Tarski's system is incorrect. All of analytical truth1 is a
body of semantic tautologies that excludes the liar paradox.
1 It is commonly known that analytical truth includes all of math and
all of logic. My new idea is that it also includes the model of the
world.
Analytic truth is derived from applying truth preserving operations to >>>>> expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true.
This cannot possibly derive non-truth bearers as true.
Right, so you agre with Tarksi that there can not be a "Definition
of Truth".
Not at all.
Prolog uses the exact same system that I just specified expressions
that
are stipulated to be true are Prolog facts with Prolog rules as a
set of
truth preserving operations.
Prolog is limited in the logic it can do,
But, so it seems are you.
Prolog is smart enough to reject the Liar Paradox.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
The above test shows that LP is infinitely recursive never
resolving to a truth value.
So?
Tarski was too stupid (on this one issue) to understand that the Liar
Paradox is excluded from the body of truth.
Why do you say that? WHere does he say what you say he is saying?
Please point out the pont where he is ACCEPTING the Liar's paradox.
The point where the Liar coms up, he uses that fact to point out that
the intial assumption MUST be incorrect, as it lead to proving a
non-true statement.
I think your problem is that you just don't understand the proof you
are reading and reading into it the errors that you yourself make.
Anyone that uses the Liar Paradox as any basis for showing the
properties of truth has committed a category error1, the Liar Paradox is excluded from the category of truth.
1 Flibble's key insight
On 5/13/2023 8:17 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 9:18 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 8:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 1:42 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 11:04 AM, olcott wrote:
On 5/12/2023 9:06 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/12/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:That is a nutty idea.
On 5/11/2023 10:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 11:30 PM, olcott wrote:
On 5/11/2023 9:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 5/11/23 10:34 PM, olcott wrote:
FROM HIS PROOF!In other words you agree that Tarski did "prove" that the >>>>>>>>>>>>> notion of
He first does a lot of work to establish a number of >>>>>>>>>>>>>> properties.
Truth cannot be fully formalized on a fundamental basis >>>>>>>>>>>>> directly related
to the Liar Paradox?
Only in the sense that since we KNOW the Liar's paradox >>>>>>>>>>>> can't be true, and a "Definition of Truth" (not a "notion of >>>>>>>>>>>> Truth) would lead to being able to prove that the Liar's >>>>>>>>>>>> paradox is true,
That is ridiculous.
Why? Do you think the Liar's Paradox should be provable to be >>>>>>>>>> True?
The Liar Paradox is not a truth bearer, END-OF-STORY !!!
Right, so why do you fault Tarski for saying that?
His proof shows that if a "Definition of Truth" existed, it
provides a way to prove the Liar's Paradox is True.
Any system that proves that a self-contradictory expression is
true is a broken system.
Right, and the proof shows that would be any system with a
"definition of Truth", so you AGREE with Tarski.
Not at all, Tarski's system is incorrect. All of analytical truth1
is a
body of semantic tautologies that excludes the liar paradox.
Then why does that "Definition of Truth" PROVE the Liar's Paradox?
If his system is "incorrect" what SPECIFIC step did he do that was
improper? (not conclusion, what STEP).
The step where he used the Liar Paradox as the basis of his proof.
Your problem is you don't actually understand how logic works.
My problem is that others do not understand the philosophical
foundations of logic as deeply as I do, they merely follow what they
read in a textbook as if it was the infallible word of God.
1 It is commonly known that analytical truth includes all of math and >>>>> all of logic. My new idea is that it also includes the model of the
world.
Except since your model doesn't work at all, you have a problem.
When-so-ever an expression of language is derived by applying only truth >>> preserving operations to expressions of language that have been
stipulated to be true we are guaranteed that this expression is true.
Prolog is smart enough to reject the Liar Paradox because it uses the >>>>> same system that I use, only expressions of language that have been
derived by applying truth preserving operations [Prolog rules] to
expressions of language that have been stipulated to be true [Prolog >>>>> facts] are true. Everything else [Prolog's negation as failure] counts >>>>> as untrue.
And Prolog is too limited to handle the logic of these proofs.
It is not in fact too limited to handle these proofs as I have
concretely proved. I invented Minimal Type Theory that translates logic
expressions into directed graphs and a cycle in the graph indicates the
expression never resolves to a truth value.
Then your logic is too simple to handle the needed logic.
Prolog only does FIRST order logic, and not all of it.
The logic used here is at least Second order, so out of the reach of
Prolog.
If you want to claim differently, show how Prolog verifies a proof of
the Pythagorean Theorem.
In fact, almost all of the examples you actaully try to run with are
down at the simple level of Categorical logic which only handles
things of one super-class divided into sub-classes. That logic is way
to simple to handle the things the theorems have been talking about.
My guess is that is as complicated of logic that you can understand,
so you try to force everything into it, and FAIL.
Please explain this in English:
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
ChatGPT
The first statement in Prolog is an assignment where LP is defined as
the negation of the truth value of LP itself. This means that LP is the logical negation of LP, indicating that LP is false if it is true, and
true if it is false.
The second statement is a query that checks if there exists a
unification between LP and not(true(LP)). It attempts to find a
consistent value for LP that satisfies the equation.
In this case, the result of the query is false, indicating that there is
no valid unification between LP and not(true(LP)). In other words, there
is no consistent value that can simultaneously satisfy the equation LP = not(true(LP)). This suggests that there is a contradiction in the logic,
as the equation cannot hold true for any value of LP.
Anyone that uses the Liar Paradox as any basis for showing the
properties of truth has committed a category error1, the Liar Paradox is excluded from the category of truth.
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