On 1/2/23 9:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:01 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 10:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is >>>>>>>>>> simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been >>>>>>>>>> created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar >>>>>>>>> Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to
resolve the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic.
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox
understand Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond Binary >>>>>>> Logic to see if other Logical Paradigms might be able to handle
that sort of thing (and actually are probably looking at things
more complicated then the simple Liar's Paradox).
Anyone that is trying to resolve an expression of language that is >>>>>> not a
truth bearer to a truth value is on a fools errand.
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who don't
understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb things, and if >>>>>>> those are hiting your radar, you need a better selection filter. >>>>>>>
Saul Kripke was by no means any sort of dumb
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
And he isn't trying to say the Liar's Paradox is a Truth Beared.
At a quick glance he seems to be working on logic that handles
ill-defined statments with partial knowledge
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of
understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of the
Liar's Paradox and they leave it at that.
Tarski "proved" that truth cannot be specified and used the Liar
Paradox as the foundation of this proof.
Not quite.
He Showed that if you presume a complete specification for truth
could exist in a system, that it is neccessarily possible to prove
that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Maybe Tarski made that same mistake you are are making.
If Tarski believed that he proved this sentence is true in his
meta-theory: "This sentence is not true" then Tarski made a terrible
mistake.
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"} would be true. >>>> "This sentence is not true" is never true.
My key skill from software engineering is to boil complex things
down to their barest possible essence. Tarski already mostly did
that for Gödel.
Did you verify that his proof is only two pages yet?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
Where in those pages do you see your summary expressed?
Note, the construction of the Meta Theory is such that any statement
in the Theory means exactly the same thing in the Meta Theory, so it
isn't the meta theory having a statement referencing the statement in
the theory, but is a proof of the actual original statement.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a
different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
And where are you getting these two sentences from?
The proof you reference on pages 275-276 is just a simple proof that
it is possible to construct in the Theory a statement that says, in
effect, that statement x is not provable in the Theory if and only if
p is True. With p being a reference to the whole sentence (Which is
sort of Godels statement in the Meta-theory),
LP := "this sentence is not true" // theory
~True(LP) // meta-theory
Nope, you apperently don't understand the concept of a Meta Theory.
Sentence x exists in the domain of the Theory.
That exact same Sentence exist in the Meta-Theory, not a sentence
REFERING to the sentence in the Theory. It means the same thing, but
with a wider context by the definition of the Meta Theory.
This is NOT the "Liars Paradox", as the liar's paradox is about a
statement being TRUE, not about it being PROVABLE. (and in fact, it
Everywhere, both in the formulation of the
theorem and in its proof, we replace the symbol 'Tr' by the
symbol 'Pr' which denotes the class of all provable sentences
of the theory under consideration
*Tarski used Pr as a proxy for Tr*
You understand that is a direct result of the Theory he referenced?
This is no "Proxy".
Maybe you need to study THAT Theory to understand it.
(3) x ∉ Pr if and only if x ∈ Tr.
x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
~Provable(x) ↔ True(x).
x is true if and only if x is unprovable
x is true if and only if x lacks the required semantic connection to a
truth maker is false.
It is the same sort of thing as saying that one can only bake an angel
food cake when one lacks the ingredients for an angel food cake.
Nope, You are arguing with the result of the mentioned Theory.
Try to find the flaw in its proof.
It is a necessary consequence of the requirements of the system that
such a statement is allowed to be created.
Your failure to understand it shows how LOW your IQ is.
looks like the top of page 275 is him showing why this statement IS a
Truth Bearer, using his words that "We can construct a sentence x of
the science in question". I beleive you will find this is his
terminology to describe sentneces which are what you call Truth Bearers. >>>
Since the premise x is provable, or it is not true that x is provable
are BY DEFINITION truth bears.
It is not a little bear that always tells the truth, it is that the
expression of language has a Boolean semantic value of true or false.
Right. The statements x is Provable, x is not Provable, and x is True
are all statements which are Truth Bearers.
From the previously mentiond Theory, the whole statement is a Truth
Bearer, and that Requires that the only possible case is that x is True
and x is not Provable.
You can't just take a proven statement and say it can't be true because
you don't like it or it breaks something you would like to be a rule.
If you think Tarski is incorrect in making that statement, you have to
find the error in him making it, and since it is based directly on a
Theorem that he proved, you need to find the error in that proof, which
it seems you haven't even read.
On 1/2/2023 9:09 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:01 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 10:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is >>>>>>>>>>> simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been >>>>>>>>>>> created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar >>>>>>>>>> Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to >>>>>>>>> resolve the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic.
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox
understand Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond Binary >>>>>>>> Logic to see if other Logical Paradigms might be able to handle >>>>>>>> that sort of thing (and actually are probably looking at things >>>>>>>> more complicated then the simple Liar's Paradox).
Anyone that is trying to resolve an expression of language that
is not a
truth bearer to a truth value is on a fools errand.
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who don't >>>>>>>> understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb things, and if >>>>>>>> those are hiting your radar, you need a better selection filter. >>>>>>>>
Saul Kripke was by no means any sort of dumb
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
And he isn't trying to say the Liar's Paradox is a Truth Beared.
At a quick glance he seems to be working on logic that handles
ill-defined statments with partial knowledge
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of
understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of the >>>>>>>> Liar's Paradox and they leave it at that.
Tarski "proved" that truth cannot be specified and used the Liar >>>>>>> Paradox as the foundation of this proof.
Not quite.
He Showed that if you presume a complete specification for truth
could exist in a system, that it is neccessarily possible to prove >>>>>> that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Maybe Tarski made that same mistake you are are making.
If Tarski believed that he proved this sentence is true in his
meta-theory: "This sentence is not true" then Tarski made a
terrible mistake.
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"} would be
true.
"This sentence is not true" is never true.
My key skill from software engineering is to boil complex things
down to their barest possible essence. Tarski already mostly did
that for Gödel.
Did you verify that his proof is only two pages yet?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
Where in those pages do you see your summary expressed?
Note, the construction of the Meta Theory is such that any statement
in the Theory means exactly the same thing in the Meta Theory, so it
isn't the meta theory having a statement referencing the statement
in the theory, but is a proof of the actual original statement.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a
different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
And where are you getting these two sentences from?
It is common knowledge that this is a version of the Liar Paradox:
"This sentence is not true".
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
I discovered that when the pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) has
been removed by applying the sentence to another instance of itself,
then this new sentence is true.
The proof you reference on pages 275-276 is just a simple proof that
it is possible to construct in the Theory a statement that says, in
effect, that statement x is not provable in the Theory if and only
if p is True. With p being a reference to the whole sentence (Which
is sort of Godels statement in the Meta-theory),
LP := "this sentence is not true" // theory
~True(LP) // meta-theory
Nope, you apperently don't understand the concept of a Meta Theory.
A meta-theory merely has an additional level of indirection when
referring to expression in the theory.
LP := "This sentence is not true" // LP in the theory
~True(LP) // LP in the meta-theory
Sentence x exists in the domain of the Theory.
That exact same Sentence exist in the Meta-Theory, not a sentence
Not, not at all, this is incorrect. The sentence in the meta-theory has exactly one level of indirect reference to the sentence in the theory.
REFERING to the sentence in the Theory. It means the same thing, but
with a wider context by the definition of the Meta Theory.
This is NOT the "Liars Paradox", as the liar's paradox is about a
statement being TRUE, not about it being PROVABLE. (and in fact, it
Everywhere, both in the formulation of the
theorem and in its proof, we replace the symbol 'Tr' by the
symbol 'Pr' which denotes the class of all provable sentences
of the theory under consideration
*Tarski used Pr as a proxy for Tr*
You understand that is a direct result of the Theory he referenced?
This is no "Proxy".
Maybe you need to study THAT Theory to understand it.
When Tarski substitutes the symbol Tr with the symbol Pr he is saying
that he is construing True to mean Provable.
(3) x ∉ Pr if and only if x ∈ Tr.
x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
~Provable(x) ↔ True(x).
x is true if and only if x is unprovable
x is true if and only if x lacks the required semantic connection to a
truth maker is false.
It is the same sort of thing as saying that one can only bake an angel
food cake when one lacks the ingredients for an angel food cake.
Nope, You are arguing with the result of the mentioned Theory.
Try to find the flaw in its proof.
It is a necessary consequence of the requirements of the system that
such a statement is allowed to be created.
Your failure to understand it shows how LOW your IQ is.
looks like the top of page 275 is him showing why this statement IS
a Truth Bearer, using his words that "We can construct a sentence x
of the science in question". I beleive you will find this is his
terminology to describe sentneces which are what you call Truth
Bearers.
Since the premise x is provable, or it is not true that x is
provable are BY DEFINITION truth bears.
It is not a little bear that always tells the truth, it is that the
expression of language has a Boolean semantic value of true or false.
Right. The statements x is Provable, x is not Provable, and x is True
are all statements which are Truth Bearers.
Every sentence that claims that it has zero semantic connections to a
truth maker either has a semantic connection to a truth maker making
it false or has no semantic connection to a truth maker making it
untrue.
From the previously mentiond Theory, the whole statement is a Truth
Bearer, and that Requires that the only possible case is that x is
True and x is not Provable.
Already addressed above. Provable means having a finite semantic
connection to a truth maker, thus every sentence that has zero semantic connections to a truth maker has zero finite connections to a truth
maker. Epistemological antinomies have zero connections to any truth
maker, thus are both untrue and unprovable.
You can't just take a proven statement and say it can't be true
because you don't like it or it breaks something you would like to be
a rule.
You already agreed that every expression of language that has zero
finite or infinite connections to a truth maker is untrue.
If you think Tarski is incorrect in making that statement, you have to
find the error in him making it, and since it is based directly on a
Theorem that he proved, you need to find the error in that proof,
which it seems you haven't even read.
Epistemological antinomies have zero connections to any truth
maker, thus are both untrue and unprovable.
The Tarski proof made the mistake of failing to reject an
Epistemological antinomy as not a member of any formal system.
When we eliminate the use of Epistemological antinomies from the Tarski
and Gödel proofs these proofs lose their entire basis.
On 1/2/23 11:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 9:09 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:01 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 10:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is >>>>>>>>>>> simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been >>>>>>>>>>> created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar >>>>>>>>>> Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to >>>>>>>>> resolve the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic. >>>>>>>>>
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox >>>>>>>> understand Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond Binary >>>>>>>> Logic to see if other Logical Paradigms might be able to handle >>>>>>>> that sort of thing (and actually are probably looking at things >>>>>>>> more complicated then the simple Liar's Paradox).
Anyone that is trying to resolve an expression of language that >>>>>>> is not a
truth bearer to a truth value is on a fools errand.
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who don't >>>>>>>> understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb things, and if >>>>>>>> those are hiting your radar, you need a better selection filter. >>>>>>>>
Saul Kripke was by no means any sort of dumb
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
And he isn't trying to say the Liar's Paradox is a Truth Beared. >>>>>>
At a quick glance he seems to be working on logic that handles
ill-defined statments with partial knowledge
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of >>>>>>>> understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of the >>>>>>>> Liar's Paradox and they leave it at that.
Tarski "proved" that truth cannot be specified and used the Liar >>>>>>> Paradox as the foundation of this proof.
Not quite.
He Showed that if you presume a complete specification for truth >>>>>> could exist in a system, that it is neccessarily possible to prove >>>>>> that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Maybe Tarski made that same mistake you are are making.
If Tarski believed that he proved this sentence is true in his
meta-theory: "This sentence is not true" then Tarski made a
terrible mistake.
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"} would be >>>>> true.
"This sentence is not true" is never true.
My key skill from software engineering is to boil complex things
down to their barest possible essence. Tarski already mostly did
that for Gödel.
Did you verify that his proof is only two pages yet?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
Where in those pages do you see your summary expressed?
Note, the construction of the Meta Theory is such that any statement >>>> in the Theory means exactly the same thing in the Meta Theory, so it >>>> isn't the meta theory having a statement referencing the statement
in the theory, but is a proof of the actual original statement.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a >>> different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
And where are you getting these two sentences from?
It is common knowledge that this is a version of the Liar Paradox:
"This sentence is not true".
so, what happened to the sentences:
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"You seem to like editing out the parts being refered to.
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
Just shows how little you understand about what is True.
I discovered that when the pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004) has been removed by applying the sentence to another instance of itself,
then this new sentence is true.
So? Since this isn't what the Theories are doing, it doesn't matter.
The proof you reference on pages 275-276 is just a simple proof that >>>> it is possible to construct in the Theory a statement that says, in >>>> effect, that statement x is not provable in the Theory if and only
if p is True. With p being a reference to the whole sentence (Which >>>> is sort of Godels statement in the Meta-theory),
LP := "this sentence is not true" // theory
~True(LP) // meta-theory
Nope, you apperently don't understand the concept of a Meta Theory.
A meta-theory merely has an additional level of indirection whenNope, says you don't understand the concept of the Meta-Theory,
referring to expression in the theory.
LP := "This sentence is not true" // LP in the theoryNope. You aren't understanding the Meta Theory. I guess you mind is just
~True(LP) // LP in the meta-theory
too week.
Sentence x exists in the domain of the Theory.
That exact same Sentence exist in the Meta-Theory, not a sentence
Not, not at all, this is incorrect. The sentence in the meta-theory has exactly one level of indirect reference to the sentence in the theory.Nope, because the statement in the Theory is ALSO a statement in the Meta-Theory, because of the rules used to create the Meta-Theory.
REFERING to the sentence in the Theory. It means the same thing, but
with a wider context by the definition of the Meta Theory.
This is NOT the "Liars Paradox", as the liar's paradox is about a
statement being TRUE, not about it being PROVABLE. (and in fact, it
Everywhere, both in the formulation of the
theorem and in its proof, we replace the symbol 'Tr' by the
symbol 'Pr' which denotes the class of all provable sentences
of the theory under consideration
*Tarski used Pr as a proxy for Tr*
You understand that is a direct result of the Theory he referenced?
This is no "Proxy".
Maybe you need to study THAT Theory to understand it.
When Tarski substitutes the symbol Tr with the symbol Pr he is sayingNope. You don't understand what he is doing.
that he is construing True to mean Provable.
You seem to be missing that he is using the NEGATION of the first
sentence built according to the Theory he is referencing.
(3) x ∉ Pr if and only if x ∈ Tr.
x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
~Provable(x) ↔ True(x).
x is true if and only if x is unprovable
x is true if and only if x lacks the required semantic connection to a >>> truth maker is false.
It is the same sort of thing as saying that one can only bake an angel >>> food cake when one lacks the ingredients for an angel food cake.
Nope, You are arguing with the result of the mentioned Theory.
Try to find the flaw in its proof.
It is a necessary consequence of the requirements of the system that
such a statement is allowed to be created.
Your failure to understand it shows how LOW your IQ is.
looks like the top of page 275 is him showing why this statement IS >>>> a Truth Bearer, using his words that "We can construct a sentence x >>>> of the science in question". I beleive you will find this is his
terminology to describe sentneces which are what you call Truth
Bearers.
Since the premise x is provable, or it is not true that x is
provable are BY DEFINITION truth bears.
It is not a little bear that always tells the truth, it is that the
expression of language has a Boolean semantic value of true or false.
Right. The statements x is Provable, x is not Provable, and x is True
are all statements which are Truth Bearers.
Every sentence that claims that it has zero semantic connections to a truth maker either has a semantic connection to a truth maker making
it false or has no semantic connection to a truth maker making it
untrue.
But becaue of the Theorem, the statement IS a truth Bearer, so untrue is false.
You are ignoring the Theorem he is referencing, probably because you
don't understand it.
From the previously mentiond Theory, the whole statement is a Truth
Bearer, and that Requires that the only possible case is that x is
True and x is not Provable.
Already addressed above. Provable means having a finite semantic connection to a truth maker, thus every sentence that has zero semantic connections to a truth maker has zero finite connections to a truth
maker. Epistemological antinomies have zero connections to any truth maker, thus are both untrue and unprovable.
But the statement isn't an Epistemolgogical antinomy, because it was
proven to be a Truth Bearer by the Theorem.
You just THINK is is an Epistemological antinomy because you confuse Provable with Truth,
You can't just take a proven statement and say it can't be true
because you don't like it or it breaks something you would like to be
a rule.
You already agreed that every expression of language that has zeroNo, I never agreed that an infinite set of connections makes a statment untrue, it make it TRUE.
finite or infinite connections to a truth maker is untrue.
It makes it UNPROVABLE, and thus UNKNOWABLE, not UNTRUE.
You are just showing yourself to be a LIAR or and IDIOT.
If you think Tarski is incorrect in making that statement, you have to
find the error in him making it, and since it is based directly on a
Theorem that he proved, you need to find the error in that proof,
which it seems you haven't even read.
Epistemological antinomies have zero connections to any truthRight, but the sentence in question isn't an Epistemolgical antinomy, as
maker, thus are both untrue and unprovable.
it has been proven to be a Truth Bearer, and thus can't be such a thing.
The Tarski proof made the mistake of failing to reject anNo, you make the mistake of not understanding what he is saying.
Epistemological antinomy as not a member of any formal system.
When we eliminate the use of Epistemological antinomies from the Tarski and Gödel proofs these proofs lose their entire basis.
Nope.
You are just proving you don't understand what they are actually saying because you over simplify their words to mean something they don't
actually mean.
Probably because you mind can't actually handle the actual meaning of
the statements because your mind is so weak.
On 1/2/23 11:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 9:09 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:01 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 10:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is >>>>>>>>>>>> simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been >>>>>>>>>>>> created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the Liar >>>>>>>>>>> Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to >>>>>>>>>> resolve the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic.
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox
understand Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond
Binary Logic to see if other Logical Paradigms might be able to >>>>>>>>> handle that sort of thing (and actually are probably looking at >>>>>>>>> things more complicated then the simple Liar's Paradox).
Anyone that is trying to resolve an expression of language that >>>>>>>> is not a
truth bearer to a truth value is on a fools errand.
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who don't >>>>>>>>> understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb things, and >>>>>>>>> if those are hiting your radar, you need a better selection
filter.
Saul Kripke was by no means any sort of dumb
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
And he isn't trying to say the Liar's Paradox is a Truth Beared. >>>>>>>
At a quick glance he seems to be working on logic that handles
ill-defined statments with partial knowledge
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of >>>>>>>>> understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of the >>>>>>>>> Liar's Paradox and they leave it at that.
Tarski "proved" that truth cannot be specified and used the Liar >>>>>>>> Paradox as the foundation of this proof.
Not quite.
He Showed that if you presume a complete specification for truth >>>>>>> could exist in a system, that it is neccessarily possible to
prove that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Maybe Tarski made that same mistake you are are making.
If Tarski believed that he proved this sentence is true in his
meta-theory: "This sentence is not true" then Tarski made a
terrible mistake.
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"} would be
true.
"This sentence is not true" is never true.
My key skill from software engineering is to boil complex things
down to their barest possible essence. Tarski already mostly did
that for Gödel.
Did you verify that his proof is only two pages yet?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
Where in those pages do you see your summary expressed?
Note, the construction of the Meta Theory is such that any
statement in the Theory means exactly the same thing in the Meta
Theory, so it isn't the meta theory having a statement referencing
the statement in the theory, but is a proof of the actual original
statement.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a
different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
And where are you getting these two sentences from?
It is common knowledge that this is a version of the Liar Paradox:
"This sentence is not true".
so, what happened to the sentences:
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a
different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
You seem to like editing out the parts being refered to.
Just shows how little you understand about what is True.
I discovered that when the pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004)
has been removed by applying the sentence to another instance of
itself, then this new sentence is true.
So? Since this isn't what the Theories are doing, it doesn't matter.
The proof you reference on pages 275-276 is just a simple proof
that it is possible to construct in the Theory a statement that
says, in effect, that statement x is not provable in the Theory if
and only if p is True. With p being a reference to the whole
sentence (Which is sort of Godels statement in the Meta-theory),
LP := "this sentence is not true" // theory
~True(LP) // meta-theory
Nope, you apperently don't understand the concept of a Meta Theory.
A meta-theory merely has an additional level of indirection when
referring to expression in the theory.
Nope, says you don't understand the concept of the Meta-Theory,
LP := "This sentence is not true" // LP in the theory
~True(LP) // LP in the meta-theory
Nope. You aren't understanding the Meta Theory. I guess you mind is just
too week.
Sentence x exists in the domain of the Theory.
That exact same Sentence exist in the Meta-Theory, not a sentence
Not, not at all, this is incorrect. The sentence in the meta-theory has
exactly one level of indirect reference to the sentence in the theory.
Nope, because the statement in the Theory is ALSO a statement in the Meta-Theory, because of the rules used to create the Meta-Theory.
REFERING to the sentence in the Theory. It means the same thing, but
with a wider context by the definition of the Meta Theory.
This is NOT the "Liars Paradox", as the liar's paradox is about a
statement being TRUE, not about it being PROVABLE. (and in fact, it
Everywhere, both in the formulation of the
theorem and in its proof, we replace the symbol 'Tr' by the
symbol 'Pr' which denotes the class of all provable sentences
of the theory under consideration
*Tarski used Pr as a proxy for Tr*
You understand that is a direct result of the Theory he referenced?
This is no "Proxy".
Maybe you need to study THAT Theory to understand it.
When Tarski substitutes the symbol Tr with the symbol Pr he is saying
that he is construing True to mean Provable.
Nope. You don't understand what he is doing.
You seem to be missing that he is using the NEGATION of the first
sentence built according to the Theory he is referencing.
(3) x ∉ Pr if and only if x ∈ Tr.
x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
~Provable(x) ↔ True(x).
x is true if and only if x is unprovable
x is true if and only if x lacks the required semantic connection to a >>>> truth maker is false.
It is the same sort of thing as saying that one can only bake an angel >>>> food cake when one lacks the ingredients for an angel food cake.
Nope, You are arguing with the result of the mentioned Theory.
Try to find the flaw in its proof.
It is a necessary consequence of the requirements of the system that
such a statement is allowed to be created.
Your failure to understand it shows how LOW your IQ is.
looks like the top of page 275 is him showing why this statement IS
a Truth Bearer, using his words that "We can construct a sentence x
of the science in question". I beleive you will find this is his
terminology to describe sentneces which are what you call Truth
Bearers.
Since the premise x is provable, or it is not true that x is
provable are BY DEFINITION truth bears.
It is not a little bear that always tells the truth, it is that the
expression of language has a Boolean semantic value of true or false.
Right. The statements x is Provable, x is not Provable, and x is True
are all statements which are Truth Bearers.
Every sentence that claims that it has zero semantic connections to a
truth maker either has a semantic connection to a truth maker making
it false or has no semantic connection to a truth maker making it
untrue.
But becaue of the Theorem, the statement IS a truth Bearer, so untrue is false.
You are ignoring the Theorem he is referencing, probably because you
don't understand it.
From the previously mentiond Theory, the whole statement is a Truth
Bearer, and that Requires that the only possible case is that x is
True and x is not Provable.
Already addressed above. Provable means having a finite semantic
connection to a truth maker, thus every sentence that has zero semantic
connections to a truth maker has zero finite connections to a truth
maker. Epistemological antinomies have zero connections to any truth
maker, thus are both untrue and unprovable.
But the statement isn't an Epistemolgogical antinomy, because it was
proven to be a Truth Bearer by the Theorem.
You just THINK is is an Epistemological antinomy because you confuse
Provable with Truth,
You can't just take a proven statement and say it can't be true
because you don't like it or it breaks something you would like to be
a rule.
You already agreed that every expression of language that has zero
finite or infinite connections to a truth maker is untrue.
No, I never agreed that an infinite set of connections makes a statment untrue, it make it TRUE.
On 1/2/23 10:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 8:52 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% >>>>>>>>>> much less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe >>>>>>>>>> the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that >>>>>>>>> you don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding of >>>>>>>> these
things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these
mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they barely >>>>>>>> skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too much >>>>>>>> to carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I
haven't studied in great detail (but it seems I still understand >>>>>>> some of the point better than you, which shows your lack of
intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth Value. >>>>>>>
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using the >>>>>>> standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis A"
which resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then we
can prove that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and thus >>>>>>> not True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers you >>>>>>> have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed comments >>>>>>> on them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be sufficent, >>>>>>> which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable ratio
considering our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic
connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
Even a guy with a top 1% IQ would be able to figure out from our prior >>>> context that I must mean expressions of language that have finite
semantic connections to their truth maker.
Which means you aren't talking about ANYTHING that anyone else we
have been talking about would call "True", and thus meaningless for
this conversation.
The subset of expressions of language that have finite semantic
connections to their truth maker is not an entirely different subject
than the set of expressions of language having semantic connections
to their truth maker.
Limiting your definition of "True" to finite connections is the
equivalent of limiting it to Provable, which has been shown (though
you don't understand it) to leads either logic system that are
constrained in what they can handle, or they become inconsistent.
Not at all. It leads to rejecting expressions of language that have no
possible connection to any truth maker. Prolog can already do this.
Bo, it leads to rejecting expression of language that DO have a
connection to a truth maker, because such a connect is infinite.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Fallacy of Proof by Example.
Proving your Stupidity.
If that is the sort of logic system you want to talk about, ok, but
make it clear, and admit you aren't talking about fields like the
properties of the Natural Numbers.
Any expression of formal or natural language that cannot possibly have
any connection to a truth maker is not true. Epistemological antinomies
cannot possibly have a semantic connection to any truth maker, thus are
always untrue.
So? I haven't been talking about Epistemological antinomies having a
semantic connection to a truth maker,
but that some actually TRUE
statement, having an infinite set of connections to a Truth Maker,
actually ARE TRUE by definition, but are also not provable, since a
proof needs a FINITE connect.
The fact you keep going to the antinomies shows you don't understand
this basic concept, because you are just too stupid,
On 1/2/2023 10:25 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 10:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 8:52 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% >>>>>>>>>>> much less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily believe >>>>>>>>>>> the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated that >>>>>>>>>> you don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding of >>>>>>>>> these
things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these >>>>>>>>> mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they barely >>>>>>>>> skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too much >>>>>>>>> to carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I
haven't studied in great detail (but it seems I still understand >>>>>>>> some of the point better than you, which shows your lack of
intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth Value. >>>>>>>>
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using the >>>>>>>> standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis A" >>>>>>>> which resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then we >>>>>>>> can prove that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and thus >>>>>>>> not True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers
you have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed
comments on them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be sufficent, >>>>>>>> which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable ratio
considering our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic
connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
Even a guy with a top 1% IQ would be able to figure out from our prior >>>>> context that I must mean expressions of language that have finite
semantic connections to their truth maker.
Which means you aren't talking about ANYTHING that anyone else we
have been talking about would call "True", and thus meaningless for
this conversation.
The subset of expressions of language that have finite semantic
connections to their truth maker is not an entirely different subject
than the set of expressions of language having semantic connections
to their truth maker.
Limiting your definition of "True" to finite connections is the
equivalent of limiting it to Provable, which has been shown (though
you don't understand it) to leads either logic system that are
constrained in what they can handle, or they become inconsistent.
Not at all. It leads to rejecting expressions of language that have
no possible connection to any truth maker. Prolog can already do this.
Bo, it leads to rejecting expression of language that DO have a
connection to a truth maker, because such a connect is infinite.
You and I and the set of human knowledge can all see that
epistemological antinomies have no finite or infinite semantic
connection to any truth maker, thus are not truth bearers.
That Gödel and Tarski included expressions of language that cannot
possibly have a correct Boolean value in their respective formal systems
was their key mistake invalidating both of their proofs.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Fallacy of Proof by Example.
Proving your Stupidity.
Prolog correctly determines that LP is not a truth bearer because it correctly determines that is has no semantic connection to any truth
maker.
If that is the sort of logic system you want to talk about, ok, but
make it clear, and admit you aren't talking about fields like the
properties of the Natural Numbers.
Any expression of formal or natural language that cannot possibly have
any connection to a truth maker is not true. Epistemological antinomies
cannot possibly have a semantic connection to any truth maker, thus are
always untrue.
So? I haven't been talking about Epistemological antinomies having a
semantic connection to a truth maker,
Then you have been dodging the key point because the Gödel and Tarski
proofs require an epistemological antinomy or they fail.
but that some actually TRUE statement, having an infinite set of
connections to a Truth Maker, actually ARE TRUE by definition, but are
also not provable, since a proof needs a FINITE connect.
The fact you keep going to the antinomies shows you don't understand
this basic concept, because you are just too stupid,
Verbatim quote of Gödel anchoring his key mistake:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof.
On 1/2/23 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 10:25 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 10:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 8:52 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% >>>>>>>>>>>> much less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily
believe the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated >>>>>>>>>>> that you don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding >>>>>>>>>> of these
things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these >>>>>>>>>> mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they
barely skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too >>>>>>>>>> much to carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I
haven't studied in great detail (but it seems I still
understand some of the point better than you, which shows your >>>>>>>>> lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth >>>>>>>>> Value.
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using >>>>>>>>> the standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis >>>>>>>>> A" which resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then >>>>>>>>> we can prove that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and
thus not True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers >>>>>>>>> you have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed
comments on them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be
sufficent, which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable >>>>>>>>> ratio considering our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic
connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
Even a guy with a top 1% IQ would be able to figure out from our
prior
context that I must mean expressions of language that have finite
semantic connections to their truth maker.
Which means you aren't talking about ANYTHING that anyone else we
have been talking about would call "True", and thus meaningless for
this conversation.
The subset of expressions of language that have finite semantic
connections to their truth maker is not an entirely different subject
than the set of expressions of language having semantic connections
to their truth maker.
Limiting your definition of "True" to finite connections is the
equivalent of limiting it to Provable, which has been shown (though
you don't understand it) to leads either logic system that are
constrained in what they can handle, or they become inconsistent.
Not at all. It leads to rejecting expressions of language that have
no possible connection to any truth maker. Prolog can already do this.
Bo, it leads to rejecting expression of language that DO have a
connection to a truth maker, because such a connect is infinite.
You and I and the set of human knowledge can all see that
epistemological antinomies have no finite or infinite semantic
connection to any truth maker, thus are not truth bearers.
Right, but Godel's G is NOT an epistemolgical antinomy, and neither is
the sentence Tarski uses on that page of proof.
That Gödel and Tarski included expressions of language that cannot
possibly have a correct Boolean value in their respective formal systems
was their key mistake invalidating both of their proofs.
Nope, you just don't understand the sentences they give.
The fact that you can't even give a proper summary of Godel's G is very telling.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Fallacy of Proof by Example.
Proving your Stupidity.
Prolog correctly determines that LP is not a truth bearer because it
correctly determines that is has no semantic connection to any truth
maker.
The fact that Prolog can identify that one sentence is not a Truth
Bearer does not establish that Prolog is a complete logic system that
can handle the stuff you claim.
The fact you make the claim just proves you are incompetent to handle
logic.
If that is the sort of logic system you want to talk about, ok, but
make it clear, and admit you aren't talking about fields like the
properties of the Natural Numbers.
Any expression of formal or natural language that cannot possibly have >>>> any connection to a truth maker is not true. Epistemological antinomies >>>> cannot possibly have a semantic connection to any truth maker, thus are >>>> always untrue.
So? I haven't been talking about Epistemological antinomies having a
semantic connection to a truth maker,
Then you have been dodging the key point because the Gödel and Tarski
proofs require an epistemological antinomy or they fail.
Nope. You just don't seem to understand what an epistemological antinomy actually is, or what the sentences that they use are.
G is NOT an epistemological antinomy, but a question about the existence
of a number define to have a specific property defined by a primitive recursive relationship. Since Primative Recursive Relationships are Computable, the existance or lack thereof of a number that meets that relationship IS a Truth Bearer.
but that some actually TRUE statement, having an infinite set of
connections to a Truth Maker, actually ARE TRUE by definition, but
are also not provable, since a proof needs a FINITE connect.
The fact you keep going to the antinomies shows you don't understand
this basic concept, because you are just too stupid,
Verbatim quote of Gödel anchoring his key mistake:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof.
Right, His proof derives a Primative Recursive Relationship
corresponding to the antinomy. The act of converting it in this way
removes the antinomy, as it changes it from refering to the Truth of the statement to the Provability of the Statement.
The Primative Recursive Relationship is not the epistemological
Antinomy, by something based on the structure with a transform.
On 1/2/2023 2:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 10:25 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 10:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 8:52 AM, Richard Damon wrote:Bo, it leads to rejecting expression of language that DO have a
On 1/2/23 9:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top >>>>>>>>>>>>> 1% much less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily >>>>>>>>>>>>> believe the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated >>>>>>>>>>>> that you don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding >>>>>>>>>>> of these
things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these >>>>>>>>>>> mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they >>>>>>>>>>> barely skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too >>>>>>>>>>> much to carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I >>>>>>>>>> haven't studied in great detail (but it seems I still
understand some of the point better than you, which shows your >>>>>>>>>> lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth >>>>>>>>>> Value.
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using >>>>>>>>>> the standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the
"Thesis A" which resumes a definition of Truth was actually >>>>>>>>>> True, then we can prove that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and >>>>>>>>>> thus not True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers >>>>>>>>>> you have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed >>>>>>>>>> comments on them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be
sufficent, which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable >>>>>>>>>> ratio considering our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic >>>>>>>>> connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
Even a guy with a top 1% IQ would be able to figure out from our >>>>>>> prior
context that I must mean expressions of language that have finite >>>>>>> semantic connections to their truth maker.
Which means you aren't talking about ANYTHING that anyone else we
have been talking about would call "True", and thus meaningless
for this conversation.
The subset of expressions of language that have finite semantic
connections to their truth maker is not an entirely different subject >>>>> than the set of expressions of language having semantic connections
to their truth maker.
Limiting your definition of "True" to finite connections is the
equivalent of limiting it to Provable, which has been shown
(though you don't understand it) to leads either logic system that >>>>>> are constrained in what they can handle, or they become inconsistent. >>>>>>
Not at all. It leads to rejecting expressions of language that have
no possible connection to any truth maker. Prolog can already do this. >>>>
connection to a truth maker, because such a connect is infinite.
You and I and the set of human knowledge can all see that
epistemological antinomies have no finite or infinite semantic
connection to any truth maker, thus are not truth bearers.
Right, but Godel's G is NOT an epistemolgical antinomy, and neither is
the sentence Tarski uses on that page of proof.
That Gödel and Tarski included expressions of language that cannot
possibly have a correct Boolean value in their respective formal systems >>> was their key mistake invalidating both of their proofs.
Nope, you just don't understand the sentences they give.
The fact that you can't even give a proper summary of Godel's G is
very telling.
He does it for me:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Fallacy of Proof by Example.
Proving your Stupidity.
Prolog correctly determines that LP is not a truth bearer because it
correctly determines that is has no semantic connection to any truth
maker.
The fact that Prolog can identify that one sentence is not a Truth
Bearer does not establish that Prolog is a complete logic system that
can handle the stuff you claim.
A dishonest dodge away for the point.
The fact the Prolog knows how to reject the basis of Tarski's proof
rejects the basis of Tarski proof. It need not reject the basis of every proof under the Sun, hence the dishonest dodge aspect of your reply.
The fact you make the claim just proves you are incompetent to handleYet again you only say what a bot could say.
logic.
If that is the sort of logic system you want to talk about, ok,
but make it clear, and admit you aren't talking about fields like
the properties of the Natural Numbers.
Any expression of formal or natural language that cannot possibly have >>>>> any connection to a truth maker is not true. Epistemological
antinomies
cannot possibly have a semantic connection to any truth maker, thus
are
always untrue.
So? I haven't been talking about Epistemological antinomies having a
semantic connection to a truth maker,
Then you have been dodging the key point because the Gödel and Tarski
proofs require an epistemological antinomy or they fail.
Nope. You just don't seem to understand what an epistemological
antinomy actually is, or what the sentences that they use are.
If you think that I made any mistake and you want to be honest then you
must always explain every detail of why what I said seems to be a
mistake.
That you say that I made a mistake and do not provide any reasoning why
you think this is a mistake only indicates that you are trying to hide
your lack of understanding of what I said.
G is NOT an epistemological antinomy, but a question about the
existence of a number define to have a specific property defined by a
primitive recursive relationship. Since Primative Recursive
Relationships are Computable, the existance or lack thereof of a
number that meets that relationship IS a Truth Bearer.
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof.
Hence the Liar Paradox can be used as a basis and when this version is refuted the refutation applies to G.
but that some actually TRUE statement, having an infinite set of
connections to a Truth Maker, actually ARE TRUE by definition, but
are also not provable, since a proof needs a FINITE connect.
The fact you keep going to the antinomies shows you don't understand
this basic concept, because you are just too stupid,
Verbatim quote of Gödel anchoring his key mistake:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar >>> undecidability proof.
Right, His proof derives a Primative Recursive Relationship
corresponding to the antinomy. The act of converting it in this way
removes the antinomy, as it changes it from refering to the Truth of
the statement to the Provability of the Statement.
The Primative Recursive Relationship is not the epistemological
Antinomy, by something based on the structure with a transform.
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof.
Meaning that the Liar Paradox based proof is equivalent.
On 1/2/2023 10:40 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 11:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 9:09 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:01 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 10:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is >>>>>>>>>>>>> simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never been >>>>>>>>>>>>> created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the >>>>>>>>>>>> Liar Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how to >>>>>>>>>>> resolve the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic. >>>>>>>>>>>
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox >>>>>>>>>> understand Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond
Binary Logic to see if other Logical Paradigms might be able >>>>>>>>>> to handle that sort of thing (and actually are probably
looking at things more complicated then the simple Liar's
Paradox).
Anyone that is trying to resolve an expression of language that >>>>>>>>> is not a
truth bearer to a truth value is on a fools errand.
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who
don't understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb
things, and if those are hiting your radar, you need a better >>>>>>>>>> selection filter.
Saul Kripke was by no means any sort of dumb
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
And he isn't trying to say the Liar's Paradox is a Truth Beared. >>>>>>>>
At a quick glance he seems to be working on logic that handles >>>>>>>> ill-defined statments with partial knowledge
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of >>>>>>>>>> understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of >>>>>>>>>> the Liar's Paradox and they leave it at that.
Tarski "proved" that truth cannot be specified and used the
Liar Paradox as the foundation of this proof.
Not quite.
He Showed that if you presume a complete specification for truth >>>>>>>> could exist in a system, that it is neccessarily possible to
prove that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Maybe Tarski made that same mistake you are are making.
If Tarski believed that he proved this sentence is true in his
meta-theory: "This sentence is not true" then Tarski made a
terrible mistake.
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"} would be >>>>>>> true.
"This sentence is not true" is never true.
My key skill from software engineering is to boil complex things >>>>>>> down to their barest possible essence. Tarski already mostly did >>>>>>> that for Gödel.
Did you verify that his proof is only two pages yet?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
Where in those pages do you see your summary expressed?
Note, the construction of the Meta Theory is such that any
statement in the Theory means exactly the same thing in the Meta
Theory, so it isn't the meta theory having a statement referencing >>>>>> the statement in the theory, but is a proof of the actual original >>>>>> statement.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a >>>>> different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
And where are you getting these two sentences from?
It is common knowledge that this is a version of the Liar Paradox:
"This sentence is not true".
so, what happened to the sentences:
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
The RHS is the Liar Paradox. The whole sentence is one sentence
referring to another sentence that refers to itself.
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a
different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
You seem to like editing out the parts being refered to.
Just shows how little you understand about what is True.
I discovered that when the pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004)
has been removed by applying the sentence to another instance of
itself, then this new sentence is true.
So? Since this isn't what the Theories are doing, it doesn't matter.
The proof you reference on pages 275-276 is just a simple proof
that it is possible to construct in the Theory a statement that
says, in effect, that statement x is not provable in the Theory if >>>>>> and only if p is True. With p being a reference to the whole
sentence (Which is sort of Godels statement in the Meta-theory),
LP := "this sentence is not true" // theory
~True(LP) // meta-theory
Nope, you apperently don't understand the concept of a Meta Theory.
A meta-theory merely has an additional level of indirection when
referring to expression in the theory.
Nope, says you don't understand the concept of the Meta-Theory,
What do you think it means?
LP := "This sentence is not true" // LP in the theory
~True(LP) // LP in the meta-theory
Nope. You aren't understanding the Meta Theory. I guess you mind is
just too week.
Sentence x exists in the domain of the Theory.
That exact same Sentence exist in the Meta-Theory, not a sentence
Not, not at all, this is incorrect. The sentence in the meta-theory has
exactly one level of indirect reference to the sentence in the theory.
Nope, because the statement in the Theory is ALSO a statement in the
Meta-Theory, because of the rules used to create the Meta-Theory.
The sentence in the theory (even though it has the same words) is not
the same as the sentence in the theory. The sentence in the theory
refers to itself thus preventing it from being a truth bearer. The
sentence in the meat-theory refers to the sentence on the theory
otherwise it too would not be a truth bearer.
Any sentence of the form:
X := ~True(X) is not a truth bearer in any formal system.
REFERING to the sentence in the Theory. It means the same thing, but
with a wider context by the definition of the Meta Theory.
This is NOT the "Liars Paradox", as the liar's paradox is about aEverywhere, both in the formulation of the
statement being TRUE, not about it being PROVABLE. (and in fact, it >>>>>
theorem and in its proof, we replace the symbol 'Tr' by the
symbol 'Pr' which denotes the class of all provable sentences
of the theory under consideration
*Tarski used Pr as a proxy for Tr*
You understand that is a direct result of the Theory he referenced?
This is no "Proxy".
Maybe you need to study THAT Theory to understand it.
When Tarski substitutes the symbol Tr with the symbol Pr he is saying
that he is construing True to mean Provable.
Nope. You don't understand what he is doing.
What do you think he means, even a bot can merely disagree.
You seem to be missing that he is using the NEGATION of the first
sentence built according to the Theory he is referencing.
And he is substituting Pr for Tr.
(3) x ∉ Pr if and only if x ∈ Tr.
x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
~Provable(x) ↔ True(x).
x is true if and only if x is unprovable
x is true if and only if x lacks the required semantic connection to a >>>>> truth maker is false.
It is the same sort of thing as saying that one can only bake an angel >>>>> food cake when one lacks the ingredients for an angel food cake.
Nope, You are arguing with the result of the mentioned Theory.
Try to find the flaw in its proof.
It is a necessary consequence of the requirements of the system that
such a statement is allowed to be created.
Your failure to understand it shows how LOW your IQ is.
Right. The statements x is Provable, x is not Provable, and x is
looks like the top of page 275 is him showing why this statement
IS a Truth Bearer, using his words that "We can construct a
sentence x of the science in question". I beleive you will find
this is his terminology to describe sentneces which are what you
call Truth Bearers.
Since the premise x is provable, or it is not true that x is
provable are BY DEFINITION truth bears.
It is not a little bear that always tells the truth, it is that the
expression of language has a Boolean semantic value of true or false. >>>>
True are all statements which are Truth Bearers.
Every sentence that claims that it has zero semantic connections to a
truth maker either has a semantic connection to a truth maker making
it false or has no semantic connection to a truth maker making it
untrue.
But becaue of the Theorem, the statement IS a truth Bearer, so untrue
is false.
X := ~True(X) is never ever a truth bearer.
You are ignoring the Theorem he is referencing, probably because you
don't understand it.
From the previously mentiond Theory, the whole statement is a Truth
Bearer, and that Requires that the only possible case is that x is
True and x is not Provable.
Already addressed above. Provable means having a finite semantic
connection to a truth maker, thus every sentence that has zero semantic
connections to a truth maker has zero finite connections to a truth
maker. Epistemological antinomies have zero connections to any truth
maker, thus are both untrue and unprovable.
But the statement isn't an Epistemolgogical antinomy, because it was
proven to be a Truth Bearer by the Theorem.
Epistemolgogical antinomy cannot possibly ever be true because it means
that a semantic connection to a truth maker cannot possibly exist.
It is the same thing as my pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
You just THINK is is an Epistemological antinomy because you confuse
Provable with Truth,
If there is no finite or infinite connection from an expression of
language to a truth maker then the expression is necessarily never true.
This is what I mean by saying that True(x) ≡ Provable(x).
Now that I have accounted for infinite proofs I say the same sort of
thing like this: True(x) ↔ (⊨x).
You can't just take a proven statement and say it can't be true
because you don't like it or it breaks something you would like to
be a rule.
You already agreed that every expression of language that has zero
finite or infinite connections to a truth maker is untrue.
No, I never agreed that an infinite set of connections makes a
statment untrue, it make it TRUE.
*Please pay attention*
*Please pay attention*
*Please pay attention*
*Please pay attention*
If there are zero finite semantic connections to a truth maker
AND
there are zero infinite semantic connections to a truth maker
*then this expression of language is untrue*
On 1/2/23 4:11 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 2:45 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 10:25 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 10:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 8:52 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top >>>>>>>>>>>>>> 1% much less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily >>>>>>>>>>>>>> believe the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated >>>>>>>>>>>>> that you don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding >>>>>>>>>>>> of these
things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make >>>>>>>>>>>> these mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they >>>>>>>>>>>> barely skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too >>>>>>>>>>>> much to carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I >>>>>>>>>>> haven't studied in great detail (but it seems I still
understand some of the point better than you, which shows >>>>>>>>>>> your lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth >>>>>>>>>>> Value.
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using >>>>>>>>>>> the standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the
"Thesis A" which resumes a definition of Truth was actually >>>>>>>>>>> True, then we can prove that the Liar's Paradox is True. >>>>>>>>>>>
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and >>>>>>>>>>> thus not True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers >>>>>>>>>>> you have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed >>>>>>>>>>> comments on them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be
sufficent, which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable >>>>>>>>>>> ratio considering our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic >>>>>>>>>> connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
Even a guy with a top 1% IQ would be able to figure out from our >>>>>>>> prior
context that I must mean expressions of language that have finite >>>>>>>> semantic connections to their truth maker.
Which means you aren't talking about ANYTHING that anyone else we >>>>>>> have been talking about would call "True", and thus meaningless
for this conversation.
The subset of expressions of language that have finite semantic
connections to their truth maker is not an entirely different subject >>>>>> than the set of expressions of language having semantic connections >>>>>> to their truth maker.
Limiting your definition of "True" to finite connections is the
equivalent of limiting it to Provable, which has been shown
(though you don't understand it) to leads either logic system
that are constrained in what they can handle, or they become
inconsistent.
Not at all. It leads to rejecting expressions of language that
have no possible connection to any truth maker. Prolog can already >>>>>> do this.
Bo, it leads to rejecting expression of language that DO have a
connection to a truth maker, because such a connect is infinite.
You and I and the set of human knowledge can all see that
epistemological antinomies have no finite or infinite semantic
connection to any truth maker, thus are not truth bearers.
Right, but Godel's G is NOT an epistemolgical antinomy, and neither
is the sentence Tarski uses on that page of proof.
That Gödel and Tarski included expressions of language that cannot
possibly have a correct Boolean value in their respective formal
systems
was their key mistake invalidating both of their proofs.
Nope, you just don't understand the sentences they give.
The fact that you can't even give a proper summary of Godel's G is
very telling.
He does it for me:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof.
But that isn't a sumary of G, and the fact you think is it just prves
your stupidity.
To quote for some references to this:
Gödel specifically cites Richard's paradox and the liar paradox as semantical analogues to his syntactical incompleteness result in the introductory section of "On Formally Undecidable Propositions in
Principia Mathematica and Related Systems I". The liar paradox is the sentence "This sentence is false." An analysis of the liar sentence
shows that it cannot be true (for then, as it asserts, it is false), nor
can it be false (for then, it is true). A Gödel sentence G for a system
F makes a similar assertion to the liar sentence, but with truth
replaced by provability: G says "G is not provable in the system F." The analysis of the truth and provability of G is a formalized version of
the analysis of the truth of the liar sentence.
It is not possible to replace "not provable" with "false" in a Gödel sentence because the predicate "Q is the Gödel number of a false
formula" cannot be represented as a formula of arithmetic. This result,
known as Tarski's undefinability theorem, was discovered independently
both by Gödel, when he was working on the proof of the incompleteness theorem, and by the theorem's namesake, Alfred Tarski.
Thus, it may be BASED on the Liars paradox, but it isn't the Liar's
Paradox.
And a description of the actual sentence of G is:
Thus, although the Gödel sentence refers indirectly to sentences of the system F, when read as an arithmetical statement the Gödel sentence
directly refers only to natural numbers. It asserts that no natural
number has a particular property, where that property is given by a
primitive recursive relation (Smith 2007, p. 141). As such, the Gödel sentence can be written in the language of arithmetic with a simple
syntactic form. In particular, it can be expressed as a formula in the language of arithmetic consisting of a number of leading universal quantifiers followed by a quantifier-free body (these formulas are at
level Pi 1/0 of the arithmetical hierarchy). Via the MRDP theorem, the
Gödel sentence can be re-written as a statement that a particular
polynomial in many variables with integer coefficients never takes the
value zero when integers are substituted for its variables (Franzén
2005, p. 71).
Thus, the ACTUAL Godel sentence is just a statement about
Natural/Integer Numbers.
The interpreation of it showing it is True but unprovable occurs in the Meta-Theory which provides an interpration of these numbers.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Fallacy of Proof by Example.
Proving your Stupidity.
Prolog correctly determines that LP is not a truth bearer because it
correctly determines that is has no semantic connection to any truth
maker.
The fact that Prolog can identify that one sentence is not a Truth
Bearer does not establish that Prolog is a complete logic system that
can handle the stuff you claim.
A dishonest dodge away for the point.
The fact the Prolog knows how to reject the basis of Tarski's proof
rejects the basis of Tarski proof. It need not reject the basis of every
proof under the Sun, hence the dishonest dodge aspect of your reply.
FALSE.
Prolog only handles a limited set of expression, and will thus reject anything that uses higher level or more complicated logic than what it
can handle.
Prolog is limited to First Order Logic, so can't handle Mathematics
which uses Second Order Logic.
Your attempts to fake Second order logic by expanding the universe of
what you are dealing with fails, as it moves your Universe to an
UNCOUNTABLE infinite set, which breaks a lot of the logic principles
that First Order Logic is built on.
So, your use of Prolog just shows you ignorance of the actual basics of
the theories you are working in.
The fact you make the claim just proves you are incompetent to handleYet again you only say what a bot could say.
logic.
If that is the sort of logic system you want to talk about, ok,
but make it clear, and admit you aren't talking about fields like >>>>>>> the properties of the Natural Numbers.
Any expression of formal or natural language that cannot possibly
have
any connection to a truth maker is not true. Epistemological
antinomies
cannot possibly have a semantic connection to any truth maker,
thus are
always untrue.
So? I haven't been talking about Epistemological antinomies having
a semantic connection to a truth maker,
Then you have been dodging the key point because the Gödel and Tarski >>>> proofs require an epistemological antinomy or they fail.
Nope. You just don't seem to understand what an epistemological
antinomy actually is, or what the sentences that they use are.
If you think that I made any mistake and you want to be honest then
you must always explain every detail of why what I said seems to be a
mistake.
You keep on saying that Godel's G is an epistemological statement.
I have explained to you what Godel's G acutally is.
It is NOT an actual epistemological statement, and can't be, as the
existance of a number that matches a computable property is always a
Truth Bearer.
Thus, you are in error, and too stupid to understand it.
That you say that I made a mistake and do not provide any reasoning why
you think this is a mistake only indicates that you are trying to hide
your lack of understanding of what I said.
That I HAVE provided reasoning, but you keep on saying I don't says you
are too stupid to read what I have been writing.
In fact, the fact that you keep on trying to repeat statements that I
haven't objected to shows your lack of understanding.
G is NOT an epistemological antinomy, but a question about the
existence of a number define to have a specific property defined by a
primitive recursive relationship. Since Primative Recursive
Relationships are Computable, the existance or lack thereof of a
number that meets that relationship IS a Truth Bearer.
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof.
Hence the Liar Paradox can be used as a basis and when this version is
refuted the refutation applies to G.
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying, I have explained an you
don't get it. Obviously you are just too stupid.
but that some actually TRUE statement, having an infinite set of
connections to a Truth Maker, actually ARE TRUE by definition, but
are also not provable, since a proof needs a FINITE connect.
The fact you keep going to the antinomies shows you don't
understand this basic concept, because you are just too stupid,
Verbatim quote of Gödel anchoring his key mistake:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar >>>> undecidability proof.
Right, His proof derives a Primative Recursive Relationship
corresponding to the antinomy. The act of converting it in this way
removes the antinomy, as it changes it from refering to the Truth of
the statement to the Provability of the Statement.
The Primative Recursive Relationship is not the epistemological
Antinomy, by something based on the structure with a transform.
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof.
Meaning that the Liar Paradox based proof is equivalent.
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer
On 1/2/23 6:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's Paradox
antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer
You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or acknowledge
this is impossible.
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the ordinary
English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the
incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove your lack of
understanding (or dishonesty).
Read Godels proof!!
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's Paradox
antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer
You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or acknowledge
this is impossible.
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the ordinary
English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the
incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove your lack of understanding (or dishonesty).
On 1/2/23 6:23 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's Paradox
antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer
You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or acknowledge
this is impossible.
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the ordinary
English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the
incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove your lack of
understanding (or dishonesty).
Read Godels proof!!
On 1/2/23 3:21 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 10:25 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 10:46 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 8:52 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:30 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:07 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 12:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 11:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:20 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 9:14 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 9:47 PM, olcott wrote:
I don't believe that you have an IQ anywhere near the top 1% >>>>>>>>>>>> much less
than the 185 IQ of top 2 in a billion. I could easily
believe the top
5%, most everyone here is in the top 5%.
Doesn't matter what you believe, as you have demonstrated >>>>>>>>>>> that you don't understand what is actually Truth.
You have not demonstrated any very significant understanding >>>>>>>>>> of these
things. It does seem that you have demonstrated key
misunderstandings of
Tarski. I guy with a 2 in one billion IQ would not make these >>>>>>>>>> mistakes.
A guy with a top 1% IQ might make these mistakes if they
barely skimmed
the material.
You can see that the proof is only two pages long, not too >>>>>>>>>> much to carefully study.
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
First, you confuse Intelgence with Knowledge.
As I have mentioned before, this is an area that I admit I
haven't studied in great detail (but it seems I still
understand some of the point better than you, which shows your >>>>>>>>> lack of intelegence).
You claim Tarski bases his proof on the Liar needing a Truth >>>>>>>>> Value.
In fact, a simple reading of the text shows that he is using >>>>>>>>> the standard Proof by Contradiction to show that IF the "Thesis >>>>>>>>> A" which resumes a definition of Truth was actually True, then >>>>>>>>> we can prove that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Since we know the Liar's Paradox is not a Truth Bearer, and
thus not True, the Thesis can not be true.
IF I find the time, I might put the effort to read the papers >>>>>>>>> you have linked to and see if I can make some more detailed
comments on them.
My first guess is a few days effort would probably be
sufficent, which compared to your decades, seems a reasonable >>>>>>>>> ratio considering our comparative intelegence.
Finite Truth is all about showing that a truth maker semantic
connection exists. If exists then true else untrue.
Where are you getting the term "Finite Truth".
Even a guy with a top 1% IQ would be able to figure out from our
prior
context that I must mean expressions of language that have finite
semantic connections to their truth maker.
Which means you aren't talking about ANYTHING that anyone else we
have been talking about would call "True", and thus meaningless for
this conversation.
The subset of expressions of language that have finite semantic
connections to their truth maker is not an entirely different subject
than the set of expressions of language having semantic connections
to their truth maker.
Limiting your definition of "True" to finite connections is the
equivalent of limiting it to Provable, which has been shown (though
you don't understand it) to leads either logic system that are
constrained in what they can handle, or they become inconsistent.
Not at all. It leads to rejecting expressions of language that have
no possible connection to any truth maker. Prolog can already do this.
Bo, it leads to rejecting expression of language that DO have a
connection to a truth maker, because such a connect is infinite.
You and I and the set of human knowledge can all see that
epistemological antinomies have no finite or infinite semantic
connection to any truth maker, thus are not truth bearers.
Right, but Godel's G is NOT an epistemolgical antinomy, and neither is
the sentence Tarski uses on that page of proof.
That Gödel and Tarski included expressions of language that cannot
possibly have a correct Boolean value in their respective formal systems
was their key mistake invalidating both of their proofs.
Nope, you just don't understand the sentences they give.
The fact that you can't even give a proper summary of Godel's G is very telling.
?- LP = not(true(LP)).
LP = not(true(LP)).
?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))).
false.
Fallacy of Proof by Example.
Proving your Stupidity.
Prolog correctly determines that LP is not a truth bearer because it
correctly determines that is has no semantic connection to any truth
maker.
The fact that Prolog can identify that one sentence is not a Truth
Bearer does not establish that Prolog is a complete logic system that
can handle the stuff you claim.
The fact you make the claim just proves you are incompetent to handle
logic.
If that is the sort of logic system you want to talk about, ok, but
make it clear, and admit you aren't talking about fields like the
properties of the Natural Numbers.
Any expression of formal or natural language that cannot possibly have >>>> any connection to a truth maker is not true. Epistemological antinomies >>>> cannot possibly have a semantic connection to any truth maker, thus are >>>> always untrue.
So? I haven't been talking about Epistemological antinomies having a
semantic connection to a truth maker,
Then you have been dodging the key point because the Gödel and Tarski
proofs require an epistemological antinomy or they fail.
Nope. You just don't seem to understand what an epistemological antinomy actually is, or what the sentences that they use are.
G is NOT an epistemological antinomy, but a question about the existence
of a number define to have a specific property defined by a primitive recursive relationship.
Since Primative Recursive Relationships are
Computable, the existance or lack thereof of a number that meets that relationship IS a Truth Bearer.
but that some actually TRUE statement, having an infinite set of
connections to a Truth Maker, actually ARE TRUE by definition, but
are also not provable, since a proof needs a FINITE connect.
The fact you keep going to the antinomies shows you don't understand
this basic concept, because you are just too stupid,
Verbatim quote of Gödel anchoring his key mistake:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof.
Right, His proof derives a Primative Recursive Relationship
corresponding to the antinomy. The act of converting it in this way
removes the antinomy,
On 1/2/2023 7:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 6:23 PM, olcott wrote:You said that:
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's Paradox
antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer
You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or acknowledge
this is impossible.
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the ordinary
English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the
incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove your lack of
understanding (or dishonesty).
Read Godels proof!!
"the simple Liar's Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to
a Truth Bearer"
Do it or admit that you don't know how.
On 1/2/23 3:45 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 10:40 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 11:17 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 9:09 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:51 AM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 12:01 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:49 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 10:36 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 11:13 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 8:39 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 8:29 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/1/2023 3:37 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/1/23 2:51 PM, olcott wrote:
Hardly anyone seems to understand that the Liar Paradox is >>>>>>>>>>>>>> simply not a
truth bearer otherwise tertiary logic would have never >>>>>>>>>>>>>> been created.
No Nearly EVERYONE understands that in Binary Logic, the >>>>>>>>>>>>> Liar Paracos is simply not a Truth Bearer.
I don't think that all the people writing papers about how >>>>>>>>>>>> to resolve the Liar Paradox fail to understand binary logic. >>>>>>>>>>>>
Most INTELEGENT people trying to resolve the Liar's Paradox >>>>>>>>>>> understand Binary Logic, and are looking for logic beyond >>>>>>>>>>> Binary Logic to see if other Logical Paradigms might be able >>>>>>>>>>> to handle that sort of thing (and actually are probably
looking at things more complicated then the simple Liar's >>>>>>>>>>> Paradox).
Anyone that is trying to resolve an expression of language >>>>>>>>>> that is not a
truth bearer to a truth value is on a fools errand.
I will admit, that are probably a lot of DUMB people, who >>>>>>>>>>> don't understand logic, and are doing all sorts of dumb
things, and if those are hiting your radar, you need a better >>>>>>>>>>> selection filter.
Saul Kripke was by no means any sort of dumb
https://www.impan.pl/~kz/truthseminar/Kripke_Outline.pdf
And he isn't trying to say the Liar's Paradox is a Truth Beared. >>>>>>>>>
At a quick glance he seems to be working on logic that handles >>>>>>>>> ill-defined statments with partial knowledge
Of course, those are probably the works that you can sort of >>>>>>>>>>> understand, since they are at your level.
And actually, MOST people just understand that non-truth of >>>>>>>>>>> the Liar's Paradox and they leave it at that.
Tarski "proved" that truth cannot be specified and used the >>>>>>>>>> Liar Paradox as the foundation of this proof.
Not quite.
He Showed that if you presume a complete specification for
truth could exist in a system, that it is neccessarily possible >>>>>>>>> to prove that the Liar's Paradox is True.
Maybe Tarski made that same mistake you are are making.
If Tarski believed that he proved this sentence is true in his >>>>>>>> meta-theory: "This sentence is not true" then Tarski made a
terrible mistake.
{This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"} would >>>>>>>> be true.
"This sentence is not true" is never true.
My key skill from software engineering is to boil complex things >>>>>>>> down to their barest possible essence. Tarski already mostly did >>>>>>>> that for Gödel.
Did you verify that his proof is only two pages yet?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Tarski%20-%20The%20Concept%20of%20Truth%20in%20Formalized%20Languages.pdf
Where in those pages do you see your summary expressed?
Note, the construction of the Meta Theory is such that any
statement in the Theory means exactly the same thing in the Meta >>>>>>> Theory, so it isn't the meta theory having a statement
referencing the statement in the theory, but is a proof of the
actual original statement.
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a >>>>>> different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
And where are you getting these two sentences from?
It is common knowledge that this is a version of the Liar Paradox:
"This sentence is not true".
so, what happened to the sentences:
This sentence is not true: "This sentence is not true"
The RHS is the Liar Paradox. The whole sentence is one sentence
referring to another sentence that refers to itself.
More lying by triming.
The outer-sentence has the same words as the inner sentence yet has a
different semantic meaning because the inner sentence is self-
referential and the outer sentence is not self-referential.
You seem to like editing out the parts being refered to.
Just shows how little you understand about what is True.
I discovered that when the pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004)
has been removed by applying the sentence to another instance of
itself, then this new sentence is true.
So? Since this isn't what the Theories are doing, it doesn't matter.
The proof you reference on pages 275-276 is just a simple proof
that it is possible to construct in the Theory a statement that
says, in effect, that statement x is not provable in the Theory
if and only if p is True. With p being a reference to the whole
sentence (Which is sort of Godels statement in the Meta-theory), >>>>>>>
LP := "this sentence is not true" // theory
~True(LP) // meta-theory
Nope, you apperently don't understand the concept of a Meta Theory.
A meta-theory merely has an additional level of indirection when
referring to expression in the theory.
Nope, says you don't understand the concept of the Meta-Theory,
What do you think it means?
For instance, for Godel, we have in the theory, we have a statement "G"
in the theory that says that there does not exist a Natural Number with
a spicific property specified by a specified Primative Recursive Relationship.
In the Meta-Theory, the statement means the same thing, but it also has
a semantic connection to the fact that a number that meets that
Primitive Recursive Relationship represents a Proof of the statement "G" within the Theory.
We can then in the Meta-Theory prove that no such number can exist, and
since both Theory and Meta-Theory use the same rules for mathematics,
that means that no such number can exist in the Theory, so "G" must be
True in the system.
Since no such number exist, we know from the Meta-Theory that no proof
of G can exist in the Theory (or the number corresponding to the theory
would exist).
LP := "This sentence is not true" // LP in the theory
~True(LP) // LP in the meta-theory
Nope. You aren't understanding the Meta Theory. I guess you mind is
just too week.
Sentence x exists in the domain of the Theory.
That exact same Sentence exist in the Meta-Theory, not a sentence
Not, not at all, this is incorrect. The sentence in the meta-theory has >>>> exactly one level of indirect reference to the sentence in the theory.
Nope, because the statement in the Theory is ALSO a statement in the
Meta-Theory, because of the rules used to create the Meta-Theory.
The sentence in the theory (even though it has the same words) is not
the same as the sentence in the theory. The sentence in the theory
refers to itself thus preventing it from being a truth bearer. The
sentence in the meat-theory refers to the sentence on the theory
otherwise it too would not be a truth bearer.
Nope. The sentence in the Theory makes no refernce to itself (for Godel
at least). Like I said, the Godel sentence is about the existance of a Natural Number with a specified property. It is only in the Meta-Theory
that we can connect that property to the sentence itself
Any sentence of the form:
X := ~True(X) is not a truth bearer in any formal system.
Which isn't the form of any of the sentences, which you should know if
you read any of them.
REFERING to the sentence in the Theory. It means the same thing,
but with a wider context by the definition of the Meta Theory.
This is NOT the "Liars Paradox", as the liar's paradox is about a >>>>>>> statement being TRUE, not about it being PROVABLE. (and in fact, it >>>>>>Everywhere, both in the formulation of the
theorem and in its proof, we replace the symbol 'Tr' by the
symbol 'Pr' which denotes the class of all provable sentences >>>>>> of the theory under consideration
*Tarski used Pr as a proxy for Tr*
You understand that is a direct result of the Theory he referenced?
This is no "Proxy".
Maybe you need to study THAT Theory to understand it.
When Tarski substitutes the symbol Tr with the symbol Pr he is
saying that he is construing True to mean Provable.
Nope. You don't understand what he is doing.
What do you think he means, even a bot can merely disagree.
He is using the method of his Proof of Theorem I, and in the proof
making a change of True for Provable.
That yeilds (as he says) that expression.
You seem to be missing that he is using the NEGATION of the first
sentence built according to the Theory he is referencing.
And he is substituting Pr for Tr.
Right, IN THE STEPS OF THE PROOF of Theorem I, so repeat that proof
using Pr instead of Tr.
Find the error in that proof with that change.
(3) x ∉ Pr if and only if x ∈ Tr.
x ∉ Provable if and only if x ∈ True.
~Provable(x) ↔ True(x).
x is true if and only if x is unprovable
x is true if and only if x lacks the required semantic connection
to a
truth maker is false.
It is the same sort of thing as saying that one can only bake an
angel
food cake when one lacks the ingredients for an angel food cake.
Nope, You are arguing with the result of the mentioned Theory.
Try to find the flaw in its proof.
It is a necessary consequence of the requirements of the system
that such a statement is allowed to be created.
Your failure to understand it shows how LOW your IQ is.
Right. The statements x is Provable, x is not Provable, and x is
looks like the top of page 275 is him showing why this statement >>>>>>> IS a Truth Bearer, using his words that "We can construct a
sentence x of the science in question". I beleive you will find
this is his terminology to describe sentneces which are what you >>>>>>> call Truth Bearers.
Since the premise x is provable, or it is not true that x is
provable are BY DEFINITION truth bears.
It is not a little bear that always tells the truth, it is that the >>>>>> expression of language has a Boolean semantic value of true or false. >>>>>
True are all statements which are Truth Bearers.
Every sentence that claims that it has zero semantic connections to a
truth maker either has a semantic connection to a truth maker making
it false or has no semantic connection to a truth maker making it
untrue.
But becaue of the Theorem, the statement IS a truth Bearer, so untrue
is false.
X := ~True(X) is never ever a truth bearer.
But that isn't any of the statements in question
You are ignoring the Theorem he is referencing, probably because you
don't understand it.
From the previously mentiond Theory, the whole statement is a Truth
Bearer, and that Requires that the only possible case is that x is
True and x is not Provable.
Already addressed above. Provable means having a finite semantic
connection to a truth maker, thus every sentence that has zero semantic >>>> connections to a truth maker has zero finite connections to a truth
maker. Epistemological antinomies have zero connections to any truth
maker, thus are both untrue and unprovable.
But the statement isn't an Epistemolgogical antinomy, because it was
proven to be a Truth Bearer by the Theorem.
Epistemolgogical antinomy cannot possibly ever be true because it means
that a semantic connection to a truth maker cannot possibly exist.
It is the same thing as my pathological self-reference(Olcott 2004).
But they aren't one.
You just THINK is is an Epistemological antinomy because you confuse
Provable with Truth,
If there is no finite or infinite connection from an expression of
language to a truth maker then the expression is necessarily never true.
This is what I mean by saying that True(x) ≡ Provable(x).
Which is nonsense, since Provable(x) means there is a FINITE chain of connections between the statement and its truth makers while True(x)
means there is a finite or INFINITE chain of connections between the statement and its truth makers.
Thus True(x) != Provable(x) since some statements (in rich enough
systems) have statements that have this infinite set of connections.
Now that I have accounted for infinite proofs I say the same sort of
thing like this: True(x) ↔ (⊨x).
Infinte Proof do not exist in classical theory.
If you are defining Provable to mean including Infinite proof, you can
use NO logic about provability of statements from any of that logic.
You are thus showing that you are just a LIAR when you use your
terminolgy and applying any of the classical logic theory.
You have just shown you have wasted decades of your life. You should
have been working on the low level statements of logic with your changed definition of Provable.
Of course, one problem you run into is that with your system, provable
no longer means Knowable, as Knowable still requires a finite proof.
You can't just take a proven statement and say it can't be true
because you don't like it or it breaks something you would like to
be a rule.
You already agreed that every expression of language that has zero
finite or infinite connections to a truth maker is untrue.
No, I never agreed that an infinite set of connections makes a
statment untrue, it make it TRUE.
*Please pay attention*
*Please pay attention*
*Please pay attention*
*Please pay attention*
If there are zero finite semantic connections to a truth maker
AND
there are zero infinite semantic connections to a truth maker
*then this expression of language is untrue*
So, you AGREE that the presence of a single infinte sequnce of
connections makes a statement TRUE, and also makes it UNPROVABLE and UNKNOWABLE. (per standard theory).
If you aren't using standard theory, you can't use any of material
derived based on the standard theory. You can't say you have refuted
Godel or Tarski since you aren't talking about the systems that they
were shown in.
On 1/2/23 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 7:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 6:23 PM, olcott wrote:You said that:
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's
Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer
You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or acknowledge
this is impossible.
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the ordinary
English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the
incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove your lack of >>>> understanding (or dishonesty).
Read Godels proof!!
"the simple Liar's Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED
to a Truth Bearer"
Do it or admit that you don't know how.
And the Truth Bearer is the statement "This statement is not Provable".
What did you think I meant?
I note you have clipped all of my discsussion on what Godel was saying.
Every comment from now on that shows you don't understand it (unless
actully asking about a clarification in it) will be takens as proof that
you are too dumb to handle the logic.
On 1/2/2023 10:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 7:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 6:23 PM, olcott wrote:You said that:
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or acknowledge >>>> this is impossible.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's
Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer >>>>
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the ordinary
English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the
incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove your lack of >>>> understanding (or dishonesty).
Read Godels proof!!
"the simple Liar's Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED
to a Truth Bearer"
Do it or admit that you don't know how.
And the Truth Bearer is the statement "This statement is not Provable".
This sentence is not provable.
It is not provable about what?
It is not provable about being not provable.
It is not provable about being not provable about what?
It is not provable about being provable about being not provable.
Not even a little brown truth bear.
What did you think I meant?
I note you have clipped all of my discsussion on what Godel was saying.
Every comment from now on that shows you don't understand it (unless actully asking about a clarification in it) will be takens as proof that you are too dumb to handle the logic.
--
Copyright 2022 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
On 1/2/2023 10:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 7:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 6:23 PM, olcott wrote:You said that:
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or acknowledge >>>>> this is impossible.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's
Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer >>>>>
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the ordinary
English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the
incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove your
lack of
understanding (or dishonesty).
Read Godels proof!!
"the simple Liar's Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED
to a Truth Bearer"
Do it or admit that you don't know how.
And the Truth Bearer is the statement "This statement is not Provable".
This sentence is not provable.
It is not provable about what?
It is not provable about being not provable.
It is not provable about being not provable about what?
It is not provable about being provable about being not provable.
Not even a little brown truth bear.
What did you think I meant?
I note you have clipped all of my discsussion on what Godel was saying.
Every comment from now on that shows you don't understand it (unless
actully asking about a clarification in it) will be takens as proof
that you are too dumb to handle the logic.
On 1/2/23 11:56 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 10:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 7:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 6:23 PM, olcott wrote:You said that:
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or acknowledge >>>>>> this is impossible.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's
Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer >>>>>>
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the ordinary >>>>>> English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the
incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove your
lack of
understanding (or dishonesty).
Read Godels proof!!
"the simple Liar's Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is
TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer"
Do it or admit that you don't know how.
And the Truth Bearer is the statement "This statement is not Provable".
This sentence is not provable.
It is not provable about what?
???? You don't understand what a statement not being provable means?
There exists no finite set of Semantic Connections which can take you
from your know set of Truth Makers to the Statement in the Theory.
Note, maybe it might be more correct to say the statement is:
"This statement is not provable in <the Theory>"
It is not provable about being not provable.
It is not provable about being not provable about what?
It is not provable about being provable about being not provable.
Not even a little brown truth bear.
Because you are too stupid.
Remember, this is the meaning of the statement in the Meta-Theory.
The ACTUAL statement in the Theory, is:
There does not exist a Natural Number g that satisfies <a specified
Primitive Recursive Relationship>
The exact Primitive Recursive Relationship is developed per all the Mathematics described in his Theory, and is likely totally over your head.
The key point is, that being a simple statement about the existance of a number that satifies a computable relationship, it is provable that the statement is a Truth Bearer, as such a number either does exist or it doesn't, so the Law of the Excluded Middle holds for that statement.
It turns out that for this particular relationship, no number exists
that matches the relationship, but it is impossible to actually prove
that except via an exhaustive search.
On 1/3/2023 5:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 11:56 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 10:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 7:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 6:23 PM, olcott wrote:You said that:
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's
Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth
Bearer
You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or
acknowledge
this is impossible.
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the ordinary >>>>>>> English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the
incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove your
lack of
understanding (or dishonesty).
Read Godels proof!!
"the simple Liar's Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is
TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer"
Do it or admit that you don't know how.
And the Truth Bearer is the statement "This statement is not Provable". >>>>
This sentence is not provable.
It is not provable about what?
???? You don't understand what a statement not being provable means?
There exists no finite set of Semantic Connections which can take you
from your know set of Truth Makers to the Statement in the Theory.
Note, maybe it might be more correct to say the statement is:
"This statement is not provable in <the Theory>"
It is not provable about being not provable.
It is not provable about being not provable about what?
It is not provable about being provable about being not provable.
Not even a little brown truth bear.
Because you are too stupid.
Remember, this is the meaning of the statement in the Meta-Theory.
The ACTUAL statement in the Theory, is:
There does not exist a Natural Number g that satisfies <a specified
Primitive Recursive Relationship>
The exact Primitive Recursive Relationship is developed per all the
Mathematics described in his Theory, and is likely totally over your
head.
The key point is, that being a simple statement about the existance of
a number that satifies a computable relationship, it is provable that
the statement is a Truth Bearer, as such a number either does exist or
it doesn't, so the Law of the Excluded Middle holds for that statement.
It turns out that for this particular relationship, no number exists
that matches the relationship, but it is impossible to actually prove
that except via an exhaustive search.
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its own
unprovability. pages40/43 to 41/44
Here is the simplest way to say that: G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G if and only if G is unprovable in F
Because Gödel says:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof. page: 40/43
This proves that the above simplified expression sufficiently captures
the essence of his enormously more complex expression as long as it is
an epistemological antinomy.
?- G = not(provable(F, G)). % G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
When we test the above expression we find that it is not provable in the Prolog formal system: (SWI-Prolog (threaded, 64 bits, version 7.6.4)
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
The key detail that Gödel leaves out is that G is not provable in F
because it forms an erroneous cyclic term that cannot be resolved in any formal system what-so-ever.
G is unprovable.
Unprovable about what?
About being unprovable.
About being unprovable about what?
About being unprovable about being unprovable...
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 11:56 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 10:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 7:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 6:23 PM, olcott wrote:You said that:
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's >>>>>>>>> Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth >>>>>>>>> Bearer
You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or
acknowledge
this is impossible.
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the ordinary >>>>>>>> English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the >>>>>>>> incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove your >>>>>>>> lack of
understanding (or dishonesty).
Read Godels proof!!
"the simple Liar's Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is
TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer"
Do it or admit that you don't know how.
And the Truth Bearer is the statement "This statement is not
Provable".
This sentence is not provable.
It is not provable about what?
???? You don't understand what a statement not being provable means?
There exists no finite set of Semantic Connections which can take you
from your know set of Truth Makers to the Statement in the Theory.
Note, maybe it might be more correct to say the statement is:
"This statement is not provable in <the Theory>"
It is not provable about being not provable.
It is not provable about being not provable about what?
It is not provable about being provable about being not provable.
Not even a little brown truth bear.
Because you are too stupid.
Remember, this is the meaning of the statement in the Meta-Theory.
The ACTUAL statement in the Theory, is:
There does not exist a Natural Number g that satisfies <a specified
Primitive Recursive Relationship>
The exact Primitive Recursive Relationship is developed per all the
Mathematics described in his Theory, and is likely totally over your
head.
The key point is, that being a simple statement about the existance
of a number that satifies a computable relationship, it is provable
that the statement is a Truth Bearer, as such a number either does
exist or it doesn't, so the Law of the Excluded Middle holds for that
statement.
It turns out that for this particular relationship, no number exists
that matches the relationship, but it is impossible to actually prove
that except via an exhaustive search.
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its own
unprovability. pages40/43 to 41/44
Here is the simplest way to say that: G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G if and only if G is unprovable in F
Which isn't the statement of G in the Theory
OVER simplication is an error
Because Gödel says:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
Right, IN THE META-THEORY, the statement G can be interpreted as a
statement derived by TRANSFORMING any similar statement. They ALL
become, in the theory, a statment like:
There does not exist a number g which satisfies <a specified Primative Recursive Relationship>
The different antinomies lead to different Primative Recursive
Relationships, but all are truth bearers.
This proves that the above simplified expression sufficiently captures
the essence of his enormously more complex expression as long as it is
an epistemological antinomy.
Nope, because that is only it he META THEORY.
I guess you don't understand how those w
?- G = not(provable(F, G)). % G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
When we test the above expression we find that it is not provable in
the Prolog formal system: (SWI-Prolog (threaded, 64 bits, version 7.6.4)
So?
Prolog can't prove a lot of things.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
Which just means it is possible that it uses logic above what prolog can handle.
Nope, G in F has NO "cycle" at all.
The key detail that Gödel leaves out is that G is not provable in F
because it forms an erroneous cyclic term that cannot be resolved in
any formal system what-so-ever.
You are just too stupid to understand that.
Can you PROVE that the statement, the ACTUAL statement, not your
erroneous one, has a cycle (in F)
Remember, the ACTUAL statement of G is that:
There does not exist a number g which satisfies <a specified Primative Recursive Relationship>
Primative Recursive Relationships are just pure mathematical
computations that are always finite in computation for ALL possible input.
G is unprovable.
Unprovable about what?
About being unprovable.
About being unprovable about what?
About being unprovable about being unprovable...
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
Yep, you are just proving you are too stupid to understand the logic
that Godel is using.
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 11:56 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 10:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 7:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 6:23 PM, olcott wrote:You said that:
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's >>>>>>>>>> Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth >>>>>>>>>> Bearer
You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or
acknowledge
this is impossible.
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the ordinary >>>>>>>>> English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the >>>>>>>>> incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove your >>>>>>>>> lack of
understanding (or dishonesty).
Read Godels proof!!
"the simple Liar's Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is
TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer"
Do it or admit that you don't know how.
And the Truth Bearer is the statement "This statement is not
Provable".
This sentence is not provable.
It is not provable about what?
???? You don't understand what a statement not being provable means?
There exists no finite set of Semantic Connections which can take
you from your know set of Truth Makers to the Statement in the Theory. >>>>
Note, maybe it might be more correct to say the statement is:
"This statement is not provable in <the Theory>"
It is not provable about being not provable.
It is not provable about being not provable about what?
It is not provable about being provable about being not provable.
Not even a little brown truth bear.
Because you are too stupid.
Remember, this is the meaning of the statement in the Meta-Theory.
The ACTUAL statement in the Theory, is:
There does not exist a Natural Number g that satisfies <a specified
Primitive Recursive Relationship>
The exact Primitive Recursive Relationship is developed per all the
Mathematics described in his Theory, and is likely totally over your
head.
The key point is, that being a simple statement about the existance
of a number that satifies a computable relationship, it is provable
that the statement is a Truth Bearer, as such a number either does
exist or it doesn't, so the Law of the Excluded Middle holds for
that statement.
It turns out that for this particular relationship, no number exists
that matches the relationship, but it is impossible to actually
prove that except via an exhaustive search.
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its own >>> unprovability. pages40/43 to 41/44
Here is the simplest way to say that: G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G if and only if G is unprovable in F
Which isn't the statement of G in the Theory
OVER simplication is an error
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets the spec*
Because Gödel says:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
Right, IN THE META-THEORY, the statement G can be interpreted as a
statement derived by TRANSFORMING any similar statement. They ALL
become, in the theory, a statment like:
There does not exist a number g which satisfies <a specified Primative
Recursive Relationship>
Now you are adding back in the purely extraneous complexity of
artificially contriving a provability predicate in a language that is woefully insufficiently expressive for this purpose so we go back to the minimal essence of: G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
The different antinomies lead to different Primative Recursive
Relationships, but all are truth bearers.
This proves that the above simplified expression sufficiently
captures the essence of his enormously more complex expression as
long as it is an epistemological antinomy.
Nope, because that is only it he META THEORY.
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G) // is the theory
⊢G // here is the meta-theory
"This sentence in not true" // is the theory
// this is the meta-theory
This sentence in not true: "This sentence in not true"
In both cases the sentence in the theory is not a truth bearer and the sentence in the mate-theory correctly recognizes this.
I guess you don't understand how those w
?- G = not(provable(F, G)). % G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
When we test the above expression we find that it is not provable in
the Prolog formal system: (SWI-Prolog (threaded, 64 bits, version 7.6.4)
So?
Prolog can't prove a lot of things.
None-the-less it correctly determines that the minimal essence of G is
not a truth bearer.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
Which just means it is possible that it uses logic above what prolog
can handle.
Not at all 2 in one billion IQ. No correct formal system in the world
can possibly correctly evaluate any expression of language that never
reaches a truth value because the expression is not a truth bearer.
From the best of my recollection an https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_machine can handle infinite proofs
that are truth bearers.
Nope, G in F has NO "cycle" at all.
The key detail that Gödel leaves out is that G is not provable in F
because it forms an erroneous cyclic term that cannot be resolved in
any formal system what-so-ever.
I already proved that the minimal essence of G has a cycle.
You are just too stupid to understand that.
I am smarter about these things than you are.
Can you PROVE that the statement, the ACTUAL statement, not your
erroneous one, has a cycle (in F)
Remember, the ACTUAL statement of G is that:
There does not exist a number g which satisfies <a specified Primative
Recursive Relationship>
Primative Recursive Relationships are just pure mathematical
computations that are always finite in computation for ALL possible
input.
G is unprovable.
Unprovable about what?
About being unprovable.
About being unprovable about what?
About being unprovable about being unprovable...
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/350789898_Prolog_detects_and_rejects_pathological_self_reference_in_the_Godel_sentence
Yep, you are just proving you are too stupid to understand the logic
that Godel is using.
It is not that I am too stupid, it is that many decades of C++ software engineering has taught me that the simplest possible solution is best.
This makes the minimal essence of G, the best G that can be:
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:58 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 11:56 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 10:44 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 9:07 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/2/2023 7:59 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/2/23 6:23 PM, olcott wrote:You said that:
On 1/2/2023 3:57 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
Nope, you don't understand what he is saying.
And yes, the classical Godel G is based on the simple Liar's >>>>>>>>>>> Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is TRANSFORMED to a Truth >>>>>>>>>>> Bearer
You are not smart enough (or truthful enough) to know (or
acknowledge
this is impossible.
Try and show all of the detailed steps of exactly how the
ordinary
English Liar Paradox is transformed into a truth bearer and the >>>>>>>>>> incoherence (or dishonest dodge) of your answer will prove >>>>>>>>>> your lack of
understanding (or dishonesty).
Read Godels proof!!
"the simple Liar's Paradox antinomy, but that antinomy is
TRANSFORMED to a Truth Bearer"
Do it or admit that you don't know how.
And the Truth Bearer is the statement "This statement is not
Provable".
This sentence is not provable.
It is not provable about what?
???? You don't understand what a statement not being provable means? >>>>>
There exists no finite set of Semantic Connections which can take
you from your know set of Truth Makers to the Statement in the Theory. >>>>>
Note, maybe it might be more correct to say the statement is:
"This statement is not provable in <the Theory>"
It is not provable about being not provable.
It is not provable about being not provable about what?
It is not provable about being provable about being not provable.
Not even a little brown truth bear.
Because you are too stupid.
Remember, this is the meaning of the statement in the Meta-Theory.
The ACTUAL statement in the Theory, is:
There does not exist a Natural Number g that satisfies <a specified
Primitive Recursive Relationship>
The exact Primitive Recursive Relationship is developed per all the
Mathematics described in his Theory, and is likely totally over
your head.
The key point is, that being a simple statement about the existance
of a number that satifies a computable relationship, it is provable
that the statement is a Truth Bearer, as such a number either does
exist or it doesn't, so the Law of the Excluded Middle holds for
that statement.
It turns out that for this particular relationship, no number
exists that matches the relationship, but it is impossible to
actually prove that except via an exhaustive search.
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
We are therefore confronted with a proposition which asserts its own >>>> unprovability. pages40/43 to 41/44
Here is the simplest way to say that: G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G if and only if G is unprovable in F
Which isn't the statement of G in the Theory
OVER simplication is an error
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets the spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is used, is
based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
Because Gödel says:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
Right, IN THE META-THEORY, the statement G can be interpreted as a
statement derived by TRANSFORMING any similar statement. They ALL
become, in the theory, a statment like:
There does not exist a number g which satisfies <a specified
Primative Recursive Relationship>
Now you are adding back in the purely extraneous complexity of
artificially contriving a provability predicate in a language that is
woefully insufficiently expressive for this purpose so we go back to the
minimal essence of: G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
It isn't extraneous.
Also, BY DEFINITION, all statement that a mearly the statement of the provability of a sentence, any sentence, are Truth Bearers, as the proof
of that statement either exists or not.
The statement: "It is not provable that Unicorns are Carnivors", is a
Truth Bearers.
The different antinomies lead to different Primative Recursive
Relationships, but all are truth bearers.
This proves that the above simplified expression sufficiently
captures the essence of his enormously more complex expression as
long as it is an epistemological antinomy.
Nope, because that is only it he META THEORY.
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G) // is the theory
⊢G // here is the meta-theory
Nope, You don't understand what a Meta Theory is,
The Theory is:
There does not exist a number g that satisifies <a specific Primative Recursive Relationship>
The Meta-Theory is able to PROVE from that statement that this statement truth is exactly the same as the statement
G: In the Theory we can not prove the statement G.
"This sentence in not true" // is the theory
// this is the meta-theory
This sentence in not true: "This sentence in not true"
Nope, You don't understand the concept of these Meta-Theory.
They are NOT adding a level of indirection.
In both cases the sentence in the theory is not a truth bearer and the
sentence in the mate-theory correctly recognizes this.
But the statement that Godel uses IS a truth bearer in the Theory, as it
is a simple statement of Mathematics.
Your FALSE statements just PROVE you are a simple LIAR>..
I guess you don't understand how those w
?- G = not(provable(F, G)). % G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
When we test the above expression we find that it is not provable in
the Prolog formal system: (SWI-Prolog (threaded, 64 bits, version
7.6.4)
So?
Prolog can't prove a lot of things.
None-the-less it correctly determines that the minimal essence of G is
not a truth bearer.
Nope. Just a Falacious arguement.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
Which just means it is possible that it uses logic above what prolog
can handle.
Not at all 2 in one billion IQ. No correct formal system in the world
can possibly correctly evaluate any expression of language that never
reaches a truth value because the expression is not a truth bearer.
So, your saying in your mind a false statement can not be evaluted to determine it is false?
From the best of my recollection an
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_machine can handle infinite
proofs that are truth bearers.
Right, but they don't exist.
Nope, G in F has NO "cycle" at all.
The key detail that Gödel leaves out is that G is not provable in F
because it forms an erroneous cyclic term that cannot be resolved in
any formal system what-so-ever.
I already proved that the minimal essence of G has a cycle.
But that isn't what G is in the Theory.
You are just too stupid to understand that.
I am smarter about these things than you are.
Nope, and the fact you think you are proves you are not.
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets the spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is used, is
based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible, someone with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory sentence
is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then it must
not be the same sentence.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these things
you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this simple
example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it is no
longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true."
Because Gödel says:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar undecidability proof. page: 40/43
Right, IN THE META-THEORY, the statement G can be interpreted as a
statement derived by TRANSFORMING any similar statement. They ALL
become, in the theory, a statment like:
There does not exist a number g which satisfies <a specified
Primative Recursive Relationship>
Now you are adding back in the purely extraneous complexity of
artificially contriving a provability predicate in a language that is
woefully insufficiently expressive for this purpose so we go back to the >>> minimal essence of: G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
It isn't extraneous.
When we use a language that has its own provability predicate and no
longer must use dozens of pages of formulas to artificially contrive a provability predicate in a language that is woefully insufficiently expressive then all of these pages of formulas are shown to be purely extraneous complexity.
Also, BY DEFINITION, all statement that a mearly the statement of the
provability of a sentence, any sentence, are Truth Bearers, as the
proof of that statement either exists or not.
No your are wrong provability is one level of indirection away from satisfiability. Satisfiability requires provability yet is not identical
to provability.
The statement: "It is not provable that Unicorns are Carnivors", is a
Truth Bearers.
Never pluralized. When a sentence only refers to its own truth value
(or provability) this makes the sentence an epistemological antinomy,
thus self-contradictory, thus not a truth bearer. Your sentence also
refers to unicorns.
The different antinomies lead to different Primative Recursive
Relationships, but all are truth bearers.
This proves that the above simplified expression sufficiently
captures the essence of his enormously more complex expression as
long as it is an epistemological antinomy.
Nope, because that is only it he META THEORY.
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G) // is the theory
⊢G // here is the meta-theory
Nope, You don't understand what a Meta Theory is,
The Theory is:
There does not exist a number g that satisifies <a specific Primative
Recursive Relationship>
https://mavdisk.mnsu.edu/pj2943kt/Fall%202015/Promotion%20Application/Previous%20Years%20Article%2022%20Materials/godel-1931.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primitive_recursive_function
Not any arbitrary relationship, the specific relationship of
"a proposition which asserts its own unprovability" PDF_Page(43)
This is the simplest possible essence of that: G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
The Meta-Theory is able to PROVE from that statement that this
statement truth is exactly the same as the statement
Show exactly how the meta-theory can prove that this statement is true:
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G) or acknowledge that you only learned these things by rote and cannot correctly apply the reasoning yourself to this expression:
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G) because you simply do not understand these things well enough to do that.
G: In the Theory we can not prove the statement G.
"This sentence in not true" // is the theory
// this is the meta-theory
This sentence in not true: "This sentence in not true"
Nope, You don't understand the concept of these Meta-Theory.
They are NOT adding a level of indirection.
In both cases the sentence in the theory is not a truth bearer and the
sentence in the mate-theory correctly recognizes this.
But the statement that Godel uses IS a truth bearer in the Theory, as
it is a simple statement of Mathematics.
"a proposition which asserts its own unprovability" PDF_Page(43)
and is and epistemological antinomy: G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G) is *not* a truth bearer.
Your FALSE statements just PROVE you are a simple LIAR>..
I guess you don't understand how those w
?- G = not(provable(F, G)). % G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
When we test the above expression we find that it is not provable
in the Prolog formal system: (SWI-Prolog (threaded, 64 bits,
version 7.6.4)
So?
Prolog can't prove a lot of things.
None-the-less it correctly determines that the minimal essence of G is
not a truth bearer.
Nope. Just a Falacious arguement.
"a proposition which asserts its own unprovability" PDF_Page(43)
and is and epistemological antinomy: G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G) is *not* a truth bearer.
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
Which just means it is possible that it uses logic above what prolog
can handle.
Not at all 2 in one billion IQ. No correct formal system in the world
can possibly correctly evaluate any expression of language that never
reaches a truth value because the expression is not a truth bearer.
So, your saying in your mind a false statement can not be evaluted to
determine it is false?
This is an epistemological antinomy and asserts its own unprovability:
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
This is an epistemological antinomy and asserts its own untruth:
LP ↔ ¬True(LP)
From the best of my recollection an
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oracle_machine can handle infinite
proofs that are truth bearers.
Right, but they don't exist.
They do not currently physically exist and are currently assumed to
never physically exist on the basis of current assumptions about the
nature of reality. It is my current understanding that quantum computing
may establish the theoretical limits of the speed of physical computers. These limits are much faster than current machines yet still finite.
Nope, G in F has NO "cycle" at all.
The key detail that Gödel leaves out is that G is not provable in F >>>>> because it forms an erroneous cyclic term that cannot be resolved
in any formal system what-so-ever.
I already proved that the minimal essence of G has a cycle.
But that isn't what G is in the Theory.
That is what someone that only has a learned-by-rote understanding would
say. Someone having a much deeper understanding would know that this is
an epistemological antinomy and asserts its own unprovability:
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G) Thus perfectly meets the spec.
You are just too stupid to understand that.
I am smarter about these things than you are.
Nope, and the fact you think you are proves you are not.
Show how this epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true" is transformed into a truth bearer or failing to do that implicitly
acknowledge that you only understand these things on the basis of learned-by-rote and thus have a very shallow understanding.
This is an epistemological antinomy and asserts its own unprovability:
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
This is an epistemological antinomy and asserts its own untruth:
LP ↔ ¬True(LP)
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof. page: PDF_Page(43)
Because Gödel said the above then this by itself conclusively proves
that both of these expressions
This is an epistemological antinomy and asserts its own unprovability:
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
This is an epistemological antinomy and asserts its own untruth:
LP ↔ ¬True(LP)
"can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof" PDF_Page(43)
I can't tell whether or not you actually fail to comprehend this simple statement or are dishonestly disagreeing with what you know is true.
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets the spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is used, is
based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible, someone with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory sentence
is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then it must
not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these things
you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this simple
example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it is no
longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true."
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are transforming,
that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the talking
about "Provable in <Theory>
On 1/4/2023 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar >>>>> undecidability proof. page: 40/43Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets the spec* >>>>
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is used, is
based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible, someone with >>> a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory sentence
is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then it must
not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these things
you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this simple
example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it is no
longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true."
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are
transforming, that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the talking
about "Provable in <Theory>
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G is not provable in F.
Not provable in F about what?
Not provable in F about being not provable in F.
Not provable in F about being not provable in F about what?
Not provable in F about being not provable in F about being not provable
in F.
00 ↔
01 ¬ ---> 02 // G
02 ⊢ ---> 03, 01 // F, G
03 F
The directed graph of the evaluation of G
has an infinite cycle from 02 to 01
?- G = not(provable(F, G)). % G = ¬(F ⊢ G)
?- unify_with_occurs_check(G, not(provable(F, G))).
false.
When we test the above pair expression we find that is not provable in
the Prolog formal system: (SWI-Prolog (threaded, 64 bits, version 7.6.4) because it specifies an “uninstantiated subterm of itself”
This is the exact same idea as my directed graph's cycle.
On 1/4/23 8:43 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar >>>>>> undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets the
spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is used,
is based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible, someone
with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory sentence >>>> is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then it must >>>> not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these things
you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this simple
example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it is no >>>> longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true."
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are
transforming, that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the
talking about "Provable in <Theory>
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G is not provable in F.
Not provable in F about what?
So, you don't understand what that sentence mwns?
By your own definitions, the statement "G is not provable in F" means
there does not exist a finite set of connections from the set of Truth
Makers in F to the statement "G is not provable in F"
On 1/4/2023 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 8:43 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar >>>>>>> undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets the >>>>>>> spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is used,
is based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible, someone
with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory sentence >>>>> is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then it must >>>>> not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these things >>>>> you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this simple >>>>> example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it is no >>>>> longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true."
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are
transforming, that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the
talking about "Provable in <Theory>
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G is not provable in F.
Not provable in F about what?
So, you don't understand what that sentence mwns?
By your own definitions, the statement "G is not provable in F" means
there does not exist a finite set of connections from the set of Truth
Makers in F to the statement "G is not provable in F"
It is never from the set of truth makers. It is always a semantic
connection from the expression of language to its truth maker.
That you don't bother to pay attention to crucial details like this
seems to mean that you don't give a rat's ass for an honest dialogue.
On 1/4/23 8:43 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar >>>>>> undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets the
spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is used,
is based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible, someone
with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory sentence >>>> is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then it must >>>> not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these things
you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this simple
example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it is no >>>> longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true."
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are
transforming, that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the
talking about "Provable in <Theory>
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G is not provable in F.
Not provable in F about what?
So, you don't understand what that sentence mwns?
By your own definitions, the statement "G is not provable in F" means
there does not exist a finite set of connections from the set of Truth
Makers in F to the statement "G is not provable in F"
On 1/4/2023 10:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 10:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 8:43 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets >>>>>>>>> the spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is
used, is based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible,
someone with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory
sentence
is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then it >>>>>>> must
not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these
things
you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this simple >>>>>>> example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it >>>>>>> is no
longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true." >>>>>>>
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are
transforming, that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the
talking about "Provable in <Theory>
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G is not provable in F.
Not provable in F about what?
So, you don't understand what that sentence mwns?
By your own definitions, the statement "G is not provable in F"
means there does not exist a finite set of connections from the set
of Truth Makers in F to the statement "G is not provable in F"
It is never from the set of truth makers. It is always a semantic
connection from the expression of language to its truth maker.
No, proofs go FROM the known truths TO the statement to be proven.
OK my mistake. I forgot that I already said that.
(1) Expressions of language that are stipulated to have the semantic
property of Boolean True.
(2) True preserving operations applies to (1) and the output of (2).
You don't seem to understand how proofs work.
I merely momentarily forgot.
You are just digging the grave of your reputation deeper.
I don't give a rat's ass about reputation I only care about the
fundamental nature of truth itself.
That you don't bother to pay attention to crucial details like this
seems to mean that you don't give a rat's ass for an honest dialogue.
No, YOU are confusing things.
Isn't that standard form of the standard arguement:
Yes in this case I temporarily conflated truth with provability.
given statements A and B, and the relationship that A & B -> C
We can conclude C.
you go FROM the knowns TO the thing to be proven.
Yes you are correct, yet unlike what modern logic says we are only
allowed to apply truth preserving operations thus the principle of
explosion is rejected as incorrect.
Proof by contradiction is a bit of a special case, where you try an
assumption, and if you can prove it leads to a contradiction you know
the assumption was wrong.
Note, if you make the assumption and get to your goal, you haven't
proven anything, you can only DISPROVE a statement by assuming it.
On 1/4/23 10:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 8:43 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets the >>>>>>>> spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is used, >>>>>>> is based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible,
someone with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory
sentence
is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then it
must
not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these things >>>>>> you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this simple >>>>>> example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it
is no
longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true."
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are
transforming, that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the
talking about "Provable in <Theory>
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G is not provable in F.
Not provable in F about what?
So, you don't understand what that sentence mwns?
By your own definitions, the statement "G is not provable in F" means
there does not exist a finite set of connections from the set of
Truth Makers in F to the statement "G is not provable in F"
It is never from the set of truth makers. It is always a semantic
connection from the expression of language to its truth maker.
No, proofs go FROM the known truths TO the statement to be proven.
You don't seem to understand how proofs work.
You are just digging the grave of your reputation deeper.
That you don't bother to pay attention to crucial details like this
seems to mean that you don't give a rat's ass for an honest dialogue.
No, YOU are confusing things.
Isn't that standard form of the standard arguement:
given statements A and B, and the relationship that A & B -> C
We can conclude C.
you go FROM the knowns TO the thing to be proven.
Proof by contradiction is a bit of a special case, where you try an assumption, and if you can prove it leads to a contradiction you know
the assumption was wrong.
Note, if you make the assumption and get to your goal, you haven't
proven anything, you can only DISPROVE a statement by assuming it.
On 1/4/23 11:12 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 8:43 PM, olcott wrote:I proved two different ways that the pathological self reference of G
On 1/4/2023 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets the >>>>>>>> spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is used, >>>>>>> is based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible,
someone with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory
sentence
is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then it
must
not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these things >>>>>> you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this simple >>>>>> example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it
is no
longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true."
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are
transforming, that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the
talking about "Provable in <Theory>
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G is not provable in F.
Not provable in F about what?
So, you don't understand what that sentence mwns?
By your own definitions, the statement "G is not provable in F" means
there does not exist a finite set of connections from the set of
Truth Makers in F to the statement "G is not provable in F"
prevents it from ever being resolved to a truth value in the exact same
way that the Liar Paradox cannot possibly be resolved to a truth value.
No, your ARGUED. To be a proof you need to start from an ACTUAL Truth
Maker, which means in this case a PROPER definition of the
epistimological antinomy, and then with actual logical steps show that
you get to your conclusion.
Note, Epistimological Antinomy does NOT mean that a statement refers to itself, even in a negatory way.
You need to actual present an actual proof that the statement that G (in
the meta theory) says that G is not provable in the Theory F can not be resolved, not just "claim " it.
You just don't understand what a proof is.
If G does not have pathological self-reference that forces it to never
be resolved to a truth value then it fails to meet Gödel's requirement
that it be an epistemological antinomy.
But saying to doesn't have a proof DOESN'T force it to never be resolved.
An epistemological antinomy is a self-contradictory expression that
cannot possibly be resolved to a truth value.
Right, and the statement "This statement does not have a proof" does
have a valid truth value, it can be True.
If it is True, it means that it is connected to the Truth Makers by
either a finite or infinite set of connections. If it is True, then it
is unprovable, so it does not have a finte set of connections, but still
can have an infinite set of connections.
What it can not be is false, as if it is false, the that says that it
has NO set of connections, but that also means it is provable, which
means it has a finte set of connections.
A set of connections can not at the same time not exist and exist as a
finite set.
Only if you add the ERRONEOUS assumption that all truth only have a
finite set of connections do you get a contradiction, but that can only
be an actual requirement if you can't ever have a statement that only
has an infinite set of connections, and the only really way to do that
is allow only a finite set of possible connections to exist, which means
your logic system is strictly limited.
On 1/4/23 11:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 10:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 10:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 8:43 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets >>>>>>>>>> the spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is
used, is based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy. >>>>>>>>>
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible,
someone with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory
sentence
is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then >>>>>>>> it must
not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these >>>>>>>> things
you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this
simple
example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it >>>>>>>> is no
longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true." >>>>>>>>
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are
transforming, that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the
talking about "Provable in <Theory>
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G is not provable in F.
Not provable in F about what?
So, you don't understand what that sentence mwns?
By your own definitions, the statement "G is not provable in F"
means there does not exist a finite set of connections from the set
of Truth Makers in F to the statement "G is not provable in F"
It is never from the set of truth makers. It is always a semantic
connection from the expression of language to its truth maker.
No, proofs go FROM the known truths TO the statement to be proven.
OK my mistake. I forgot that I already said that.
(1) Expressions of language that are stipulated to have the semantic
property of Boolean True.
(2) True preserving operations applies to (1) and the output of (2).
You don't seem to understand how proofs work.
I merely momentarily forgot.
Bad thing to forget.
You are just digging the grave of your reputation deeper.
I don't give a rat's ass about reputation I only care about the
fundamental nature of truth itself.
THen why do you LIE about it?
That you don't bother to pay attention to crucial details like this
seems to mean that you don't give a rat's ass for an honest dialogue.
No, YOU are confusing things.
Isn't that standard form of the standard arguement:
Yes in this case I temporarily conflated truth with provability.
You are ALWAYS confusing the two.
Note, both of the work from the established Truth Makers to the statement.
Truth just allows an infinite connection, so some things are True but
not provalbe.
given statements A and B, and the relationship that A & B -> C
We can conclude C.
you go FROM the knowns TO the thing to be proven.
Yes you are correct, yet unlike what modern logic says we are only
allowed to apply truth preserving operations thus the principle of
explosion is rejected as incorrect.
Nope, you don't understand how it works.
Because, given a True statement T, we can assert that for ANY statement
that A -> T, and that is a truth perserving operation.
It is a FACT that this is a valid arguement:
Given: A
therefore, by the definition of the Implication operator
B -> A
This follows from the definition of the Implication operator.
If you are getting rid of that, you are going to have trouble making
your logic system work.
We also have that if A -> C then by definitoin A & B -> C, even if B is always false.
Proof by contradiction is a bit of a special case, where you try an
assumption, and if you can prove it leads to a contradiction you know
the assumption was wrong.
Note, if you make the assumption and get to your goal, you haven't
proven anything, you can only DISPROVE a statement by assuming it.
On 1/4/23 10:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 8:43 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets the >>>>>>>> spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is used, >>>>>>> is based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible,
someone with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory
sentence
is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then it
must
not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these things >>>>>> you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this simple >>>>>> example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it
is no
longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true."
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are
transforming, that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the
talking about "Provable in <Theory>
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G is not provable in F.
Not provable in F about what?
So, you don't understand what that sentence mwns?
By your own definitions, the statement "G is not provable in F" means
there does not exist a finite set of connections from the set of
Truth Makers in F to the statement "G is not provable in F"
It is never from the set of truth makers. It is always a semantic
connection from the expression of language to its truth maker.
No, proofs go FROM the known truths TO the statement to be proven.
On 1/4/2023 10:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 10:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 8:43 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets >>>>>>>>> the spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is
used, is based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy.
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible,
someone with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory
sentence
is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then it >>>>>>> must
not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these
things
you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this simple >>>>>>> example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that it >>>>>>> is no
longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true." >>>>>>>
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are
transforming, that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the
talking about "Provable in <Theory>
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G is not provable in F.
Not provable in F about what?
So, you don't understand what that sentence mwns?
By your own definitions, the statement "G is not provable in F"
means there does not exist a finite set of connections from the set
of Truth Makers in F to the statement "G is not provable in F"
It is never from the set of truth makers. It is always a semantic
connection from the expression of language to its truth maker.
No, proofs go FROM the known truths TO the statement to be proven.
To prove that an expression of language is true one must must establish
a semantic connection to its truth maker.
This can proceed from known truths to conclusions by applying only truth preserving operations.
On 1/4/2023 10:55 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 11:19 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 10:12 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 10:26 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 9:07 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 8:43 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:05 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/4/23 12:47 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/4/2023 7:13 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 11:51 PM, olcott wrote:
On 1/3/2023 5:49 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
On 1/3/23 12:08 PM, olcott wrote:
14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a >>>>>>>>>>> similar
undecidability proof. page: 40/43
*It is an epistemological antinomy thus 100% perfectly meets >>>>>>>>>>> the spec*
Just prove you are too stupid to be able to read.
CAN BE USED doesn't mean used in an unmodified form.
I hqva explained how it is used, and why the result that is >>>>>>>>>> used, is based on the antinomy but is no longer an antinomy. >>>>>>>>>>
You are too confused to understand that this is impossible,
someone with
a mere 100 IQ would understand that when a self-contradictory >>>>>>>>> sentence
is transformed so that it is no longer self-contradictory then >>>>>>>>> it must
not be the same sentence.
I never said it was the same sentence, and neither did Godel.
Your confusion on this shows that you are the Stupdi one.
Because you only have a learned-by-rote understanding of these >>>>>>>>> things
you cannot not even show what you mean on the basis of a this >>>>>>>>> simple
example. Try to show how this sentence is transformed so that >>>>>>>>> it is no
longer an epistemological antinomy: "This sentence is not true." >>>>>>>>>
I did, but you don't seem to understand the words.
Remember normally transformation change the thing they are
transforming, that is the meaning of the word.
The transformation is converting the talking of "Truth" to the >>>>>>>> talking about "Provable in <Theory>
G ↔ ¬(F ⊢ G)
G is not provable in F.
Not provable in F about what?
So, you don't understand what that sentence mwns?
By your own definitions, the statement "G is not provable in F"
means there does not exist a finite set of connections from the
set of Truth Makers in F to the statement "G is not provable in F" >>>>>>
It is never from the set of truth makers. It is always a semantic
connection from the expression of language to its truth maker.
No, proofs go FROM the known truths TO the statement to be proven.
OK my mistake. I forgot that I already said that.
(1) Expressions of language that are stipulated to have the semantic
property of Boolean True.
(2) True preserving operations applies to (1) and the output of (2).
You don't seem to understand how proofs work.
I merely momentarily forgot.
Bad thing to forget.
You are just digging the grave of your reputation deeper.
I don't give a rat's ass about reputation I only care about the
fundamental nature of truth itself.
THen why do you LIE about it?
That you don't bother to pay attention to crucial details like this
seems to mean that you don't give a rat's ass for an honest dialogue. >>>>>
No, YOU are confusing things.
Isn't that standard form of the standard arguement:
Yes in this case I temporarily conflated truth with provability.
You are ALWAYS confusing the two.
Note, both of the work from the established Truth Makers to the
statement.
Truth just allows an infinite connection, so some things are True but
not provalbe.
In rare causes an expression of language is semantically connected to
its truth maker in an an infinite sequence.
Epistemological antinomies never have any finite or infinite semantic connection to a truth maker.
given statements A and B, and the relationship that A & B -> C
We can conclude C.
you go FROM the knowns TO the thing to be proven.
Yes you are correct, yet unlike what modern logic says we are only
allowed to apply truth preserving operations thus the principle of
explosion is rejected as incorrect.
Nope, you don't understand how it works.
If one starts with a false statement and applies only truth preserving operations then one only derives expressions of language that are false.
Because, given a True statement T, we can assert that for ANY
statement that A -> T, and that is a truth perserving operation.
If A is stipulated and A -> T is stipulated then T is true.
It is a FACT that this is a valid arguement:
Given: A
therefore, by the definition of the Implication operator
B -> A
That is backwards.
A
A -> B
-------
B
This follows from the definition of the Implication operator.
If you are getting rid of that, you are going to have trouble making
your logic system work.
(A & ~A) -> empty_string
We also have that if A -> C then by definitoin A & B -> C, even if B
is always false.
Proof by contradiction is a bit of a special case, where you try an
assumption, and if you can prove it leads to a contradiction you
know the assumption was wrong.
Note, if you make the assumption and get to your goal, you haven't
proven anything, you can only DISPROVE a statement by assuming it.
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